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Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq

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Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq MARCH 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 4 Mapping the Factional The notion of factional structure of the other insurgent groups, under the involves the integration of measures assumption that more influential groups Structure of the Sunni of: (i) insurgent group ideological or will be referred to more frequently by Insurgency in Iraq strategic differences; (ii) cooperative their insurgent brethren.5 relationships between groups; and (iii) Group Symbol By Michael Gabbay the overall influence of each group. Islamic Army in Iraq IAI The methodology fuses concepts from the zeal and dexterity with which social network analysis and spatial 1920 Revolution Bri- 1920RB contemporary Islamist insurgent and models of politics, which frame political gades terrorist groups convey their messages competition and voting behavior as Mujahidin Army MA over the internet and satellite television occurring along a policy or ideology Rashidin Army RA channels is often cast as part of a public space.2 Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi JAMI relations struggle with the United States Brigades over the hearts and minds of the Muslim For the ideology measure, differences in Al-Qa`ida in Iraq AQI masses.1 In Iraq, it is apparent, however, the mix of target classes that are claimed that these media also increasingly serve by insurgent groups are considered. The Ansar al-Sunna Group ASG as forums in which insurgent groups motivation behind this choice is that Fatihin Army FA compete with each other for the loyalties disagreement over what types of targets Iraq’s Jihadist Leagues IJL not of the population at large, but are legitimate has often been the primary Shield of Islam Bri- SIB rather of those who already support the source of dissension within Islamist gade insurgency, including insurgent fighters insurgencies.3 The value of a targeting themselves. Accordingly, an analysis policy variable is calculated, which Just Punishment JPB of insurgent rhetoric can provide a essentially scores each insurgent group Brigades window into the factional structure and by the average legitimacy of the target Table 1. Insurgent Groups Included in Analysis. dynamics within the insurgency. classes it claims operations against, where the legitimacy of each target Factional Structure This paper describes a quantitative class is the acceptability of attacking The factional maps are shown in Figure methodology for constructing diagrams it as perceived within the ensemble of 1. Considering targeting policy, the that characterize and clarify insurgency insurgent groups (at least according to groups are more evenly dispersed over factional structure using insurgent their public statements).4 The targeting the spectrum than expected from a rhetoric as data. These “factional maps” policy is plotted along the horizontal simple binary division into nationalist- can shed insight into insurgent dynamics axis of the factional maps where lower leaning and jihadist Salafist wings. involving cooperation, rivalries, scores indicate the presence of less Given its thinly-veiled, indiscriminate decision-making and organizational acceptable, more controversial targeting targeting of Shi`a and Sunni civilians, cohesion. The results suggest that the claims. al-Qa`ida in Iraq appears on the extreme coarse-graining of the Sunni insurgency left whereas the Rashidin Army and the into a nationalist-leaning camp on one For the cooperative relationship Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigades, who side and al-Qa`ida-inspired jihadist measure, the study analyzes the number unambiguously claim attacks only on Salafists on the other needs to be further of either joint communiqués or declared U.S. forces, appear on the far right. In resolved to serve as a guide for U.S. joint operations between groups; the terms of prominence, AQI is seen to be counter-insurgency policy. strength of the relationship is indicated very significant but nowhere near the by the thickness of the links connecting dominant group that its overwhelming Factional Mapping Methodology groups in the factional maps. The overall presence in the news coverage would The data used to construct the Iraqi influence of a given group is assessed suggest. It is the Islamic Army in factional maps includes 11 Sunni via its prominence within the rhetoric Iraq that is seen to be most prominent insurgent groups listed in Table 1 and followed by the 1920 Revolution Brigades.6 On the low end of the scale, spans the time period from August 2 Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, Analytical the little-known Shield of Islam Brigade 2005 through April 2007, just prior to a Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). is seen to have zero prominence having process of alliance formation among the 3 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, never been mentioned by other groups. nationalist-leaning groups. The data CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). set consists of hundreds of translated 4 Each insurgent group’s attitude regarding targeting a Observing the cooperative relationship insurgent statements from jihadist given class is rated on a 5-point scale: claimed = 2; legiti- networks, the joint operations network websites and interviews of insurgent mate (but not claimed) = 1; no clear opinion = 0; weak con- group officials in print and broadcast demnation = -1; strong condemnation = -2. The average of media as provided by the Open Source its attitude values across the groups is the legitimacy of 5 The prominence of a group is proportional to the num- Center (OSC). a given target class. Listed in order of decreasing legiti- ber of times it is referred to by other groups in the form macy values, the target classes are: U.S. forces (2); Shi`a of: (i) joint communiqués; (ii) joint operations; and (iii) militias (1.7); Iraqi government forces (1.7); police (1.6); simple mentions unrelated to (i) and (ii). It is normalized 1 The author would like to thank Mohammed Hafez for spies and agents (1.2); Kurdish militias (1.1); Iraqi civil- so that a value of 1 indicates average prominence. enlightening discussions that helped contribute to this ian government (0.8); foreign civilians (0.6); oil pipelines 6 The influence of the 1920RB has been substantially re- paper. This work was supported by the Office of Naval (0.6); politicians (0.2); Sunni local leaders (0.1); Shi`a ci- duced since it fissioned in March 2007, with the break- Research under award number N00014-06-1-0471. vilians (-0.6); and Sunni civilians (-0.8). away faction taking the name, Hamas of Iraq. MARCH 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 4 displays more symmetric cross-cutting A strong indication that targeting policy claim operations against Iraqi targets between groups than does the network of is indicative of broader ideological and has opposed targeting the police joint communiqués. This likely indicates divisions is the fact that three major and Iraqi state institutions, would have greater operational cooperation between alliances of insurgent groups have the same underlying strategic agenda field units on a local level as compared nucleated around the most prominent as the IAI. Consequently, the PCIR with the more selective cooperation group in each region of the spectrum: should not be considered as an IAI- between leadership elements required AQI’s Islamic State of Iraq on the left; led alliance. Rather, it may be intended for issuing policy statements. The primarily as a bloc for negotiating with isolation of the jihadist Salafist groups— the United States. Yet the fact that the AQI and the Ansar al-Sunna group—on PCIR’s most prominent member is also this leadership level is apparent. In its most extreme could have serious contrast, the groups that are commonly implications for the demands of the considered to be more nationalist in PCIR in negotiations, particularly with orientation—IAI, MA, 1920RB, JAMI, respect to power-sharing with Shi`a. RA—are all inter-connected, forming a clique in social network terms. Nationalist Ideological and Strategic Moreover, given the substantial spread Divergences of these groups in targeting policy, the This study suggests the conclusion that factional map suggests that it is on the spread of nationalist-leaning groups the level of ties among leaders, rather along the targeting policy dimension than ideological congruence, that the reflects fundamental differences in lumping of these groups into a single, their underlying ideologies, goals and nationalist-leaning camp is most on constituencies. If true, this could help the mark. In terms of targeting policy, explain the lack of greater consolidation the IAI, which trumpets operations among nationalist groups which would against an expansive list of Iraqi otherwise be puzzling given that their targets—national forces, police, Shi`a professed high level political goals are and Kurdish militias, spies and agents, essentially identical: a territorially government officials, and politicians— intact, non-federal Iraq with a basis is far closer to the ASG than it is to most in Islamic law and a place for all Iraqi of the nationalist groups.7 sects and ethnic groups. This study’s inference that the IAI’s power base is It is striking that the IAI appears as the composed of both Salafist and nationalist most prominent group and also at the factions implies that in order to satisfy center of the targeting policy spectrum. both constituencies, the IAI, for reasons This is suggestive of a spatial politics of organizational cohesion and survival, paradigm in which positioning oneself must jointly pursue the goals that each at the location of the median voter is Figure 1. Factional map diagrams for the period Aug. constituency holds most dear; for the 2005 - Apr. 2007. Links represent: (a) joint communiqués advantageous, but where the “voters” in and (b) joint operations. Salafists, that is Sunni Shari`a rule, and this case happen to be the insurgency’s for the nationalists, it is an intact Iraq. pool of fighters and active supporters.
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