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The Map of Insurgency in Iraq: the Armed Groups

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The Map of Insurgency in Iraq: the Armed Groups NO: 11 PERSPECTIVE JULY 2014 The Map of Insurgency in Iraq: The Armed Groups CAN ACUN • How has the rebellion against the Maliki administration in Iraq started? • Who are the Sunni groups other than ISIS fighting in the field? • What is the ultimate goal of these groups? INTRODUCTION In such an environment, the US tried to draw The military offensive, Operation Iraqi Liberation a new political map of Iraq according to ethnic and (OIL), launched in 2003 by a multi-national coalition sectarian balances in the country; however, Sunnis force of about 40 countries under the leadership of were equated to the Baath and failed to escape from the United States, culminated in the occupation of all “otherization”. Although the Iraqi Constitution Iraq and eventually put an end to the Saddam Hussein prepared in 2005 granted the citizens of Iraq the right regime in the country. to form political parties and join political activities, A new era as well has begun in Iraq after the and envisaged a political pluralism and disallowed occupation of the country by the U.S. and Britain on adoption of racism, terrorism, the calling of others the grounds that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction infidels, and sectarianism; political dynamics have (WMDs) - later it was proven that the claim was false1 been shaped through ethnic and sectarian differences. - and that the WMDs posed a serious threat to the The most important development to change security of the “free world”, the coalition countries in the fate of Iraq was that Sunni Arabs boycotted the particular. However, Iraq has continuously suffered an elections in 2005 and, with US interference, Nouri al administrative crisis along with ethnic-sectarian crises Maliki was assigned to form the new government. As that have gradually increased in the post-occupation Maliki slowly took political and military powers under period since 2003. The Sunni-led asymmetrical control, he did not hesitate to bring the sectarian card military insurgency and the policies thereagainst into play in politics.2 Iran pulled the ropes and Maliki implemented by the occupation forces and their local managed to remain in office although the Iraqiyah allies have caused the spread of scrimmage countrywide Alliance won the second parliamentary elections held and the loss of lives of many Iraqis. in 2010. After the elections in particular, the Alliance 1. Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd, “Defector admits to WMD lies that 2. Mete Çubukçu, Taha Özhan, İşgal Altında İstikrar Arayışları, 2010 Irak triggered Iraq war”, The Guardian, February 15, 2011. Seçimleri, Seta Analiz, April 2010. CAN ACUN SETA Foreign Policy Research Assistant, Ankara. PERSPECTIVE TURKEY DOHUK Sinjar Tal Afar ARBIL Mosul NINAWAH KIRKUK SULAIMANIYAH SYRIA Baiji SALAH AL DIN Tigrit IRAN DIYALA Ramadi Falluja ANBAR BAGHDAD WASIT BABIL KARBALA JORDAN MAYSAN QADISIYA DHI QAR NAJAF MUTHANNA BASRA Sunn Organzatons n Iraq* The Mltary Councl of Trbal Revolutonares of Iraq KUWAIT Ansar Al Islam (Cemaat Ensar’ul-slam) The Islamc Army In Iraq (El Ceyş’ul-slam F’l Irak) The 1920s Revoluton Brgades (Ketab Es-sevret’ül İşrn) SAUDI Jaysh Rjal Al Tarqa Al Naqshbanda (Ceyş’ur Rcal Et-tarkat’un Nakşbendyye) ARABIA *Structures other than the Islamc State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) 2 setav.org THE MAP OF INSURGENCY IN IRAQ: THE ARMED GROUPS was considered as the last chance for Iraq to keep its militants and civilians without any exceptions. Since territorial integrity since it united ethnic and sectarian there remained no political ground for Sunnis, 44 diversities under one roof. Until the appointments of Sunni members of the Iraqi Parliament announced ministers of the Interior, Defense and State responsible their resignation. for national security, al Maliki also occupied their As the clashes spread in the country, civilian losses6 seats, and somehow the final Cabinet could not be that had relatively decreased in number, according to shaped. Therefore, the Iraqi government which had the United Nations, began to rapidly increase again. already failed to settle a firm and sound institutional Throughout 2014, a total of 618 civilians were killed in structure and suffered structural issues, also faced the January, 564 in February, 484 in March, 610 in April problem of remaining half-completed. and 798 in May, and as many military officers and As the Iranian influence over Iraq increased militants were murdered.7 Over half a million people together with the withdrawal of US troops from the left their houses in the province of al Anbar and became country on December 18, policies were toughened refugees.8 As the effects of the civil war in Syria have to intimidate opponents of Maliki.3 The tension gradually pulled Iraq into more of a sectarian power continued to escalate when one of the key Sunni struggle every passing day, the State of Law Coalition leaders, Vice President Tariq al Hashimi, had to leave led by Maliki’s Dawa Party won9 the parlimantary the country4 and another key Sunni figure again, elections in 2014, held in an environment of passive Finance Minister Rafi al Isawi, was subdued. In the last Sunnis and some Shiite opposition. As a consequence, quarter of 2012, Sunni groups frequently held protests tribes that were tired of discriminatory policies, [in Baghdad] against the Maliki government accusing former insurgency groups and Iraqi military officers him of excluding Sunnis; the protests, however, were of the Baath period uniting under various umbrella suppressed gorily. As demonstrations spread to other organizations10, such as the Jihad and Change Front, cities, Sunnis were massacred in the northern Iraqi the Islamic Salvation Front, Jihad and Reform Front town of Havija in May 2013, and murders of dozens raised the red flag against the Central Government of of people investigated the acts of violence. After the Iraq. They acted together with ISIS in several Sunni arrest of Sunni Parliamentary Representative Ahmad al cities such as Ramadi and Falluja, and formed many Alwani on December 28, 2013, the Iraqi Army raided armed groups and organized attacks. the square where anti-government protests were held The Sunni insurgency gaining momentum against for over a year in Ramadi, the largest city of Anbar the Shiite-weighted al Maliki government in Iraq lead Province. Thereupon, Sunni tribes, the Islamic State to a takeover of the largest northern city Mosul, on of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS)5 staged a riot involved June 11, 2014 and managed to clear a considerable in hot encounters with the Iraqi army in Falluja and part of the Central Iraqi Army out of the provinces Ramadi. The Iraqi army in these regions massacred 6. The occupation of Iraq had caused amplitude of civilian losses since day 3. Furkan Torlak, Ufuk Ulutaş, Çekilme Sonrası Irak’ta Düzen Arayışları, one and the death toll jumped up to 3,000 during the most intensive times Seta Analiz, December 2011. of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007. The death toll relatively decreased 4. A member of the Iraqiyah Bloc Vice President Tariq Hashimi faced a afterwards but has started to rise again as of 2012 and approached to the detention attempt at the Baghdad Airport where he was about to depart toll of 2006 and 2007 in 2014. for the capital of the Northern Iraq Kurdish Administration, Arbil, 7. “UN Casualty Figures for May 2014”, UNAMI, June 1, 2014. on December 19, 2011, the day after the withdrawal of the US forces. Hashimi was sentenced to capital punishment in September 2012 for 8. “El-iktital el-mutawasil fi muhafazaat el-anbar el-irakiyye yetaşabab fi murders by setting up death squads. nezuh havali 500,000 şahs”, UNHCR, April 2, 2014. 5. For detailed information about ISIS, see: Can ACUN, Neo al Qaeda: 9. “Mufudat el-intihabat ta’len ‘an netaic el-tasvit el-has, el-intihabat The Islamic State of Iraqaand the Sham (ISIS), Seta Perspektif, http:// meclis el-nuwab el-iraki”, Irak High Electoral Commission, May 23, 2014. setav.org/en/neo-al-qaeda-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-sham-isis/ 10. Fatih Öner, “Musul Olayı ve Irak’ta Gelişmeler 3”, Yeni Şark, June 16, perspective/16006 2014. setav.org 3 PERSPECTIVE mostly populated by Sunni-Arabs such as Ninova, Fatih Krekar and remained active in Northern Iraq, Anbar, Diala and Salahaddin. It is an undeniable fact particularly in the Kurdish regions and the Halabaja that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), periphery. Its formation was the result of a merger the existence of which has been strongly felt in both of the Islah, al-Tawhid Islamic Front and Jund al- Iraq and Syria, was operative during a substantial time Islam. Krekar departing from the Kurdistan Islamic period of the said offensive. ISIS was quite effective to Movement merged with the Jund al Islam of Abu a degree that it planned and carried out the operation Abdullah al Shafi and declared the establishment in Mosul. However, it will be inadequate and a of Ansar al Islam in 2001. Some AI members are mistake to read the developments in Iraq only through Kurdish and Arab fighters who have participated in ISIS and “terror” perspective.11 The incidents taking the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet place following the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army occupation of the country in particular. The group has from Mosul and the administrative structure built are fought against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) among the significant manifestations of this.12 led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democracy In this study; in order to reveal the real face of Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani in particular. the Sunni Uprising and make an inference about Since its area of activity is close to Suleymaniyah and prospective developments, an assessment will be Halabaja periphery, Ansar al Islam mostly clashes with made on the courses of establishment, philosophies Talabani forces.
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