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How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions

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Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions Adam Day, Case Study Authors: Vanda Felbab-Brow and Fanar Haddad Adam Day Adam Day is the Head of Programmes at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. Vanda Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution and Fanar Haddad is Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. The author would like to thank Erica Gaston and Cale Salih for their review and insights provided to this paper and Eamon Kircher-Allen for editorial support. The paper was written in close consultation with Vanda Felbab-Brown and Fanar Haddad (the authors of the case studies in this volume). Any errors herein are the fault of the author(s). This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. ISBN: 978-92-808-6513-4 © United Nations University, 2020. All content (text, visualizations, graphics), except where otherwise specified or attributed, is published under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial- Share Alike IGO license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO). Using, re-posting and citing this content is allowed without prior permission. Citation: Adam Day, Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-conflict Transitions (New York: United Nations University, 2020). Cover photo: AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool (Licensed) Back cover photo: UN Photo/Stuart Price Contents Executive Summary ....................................................2 I. The Risks and Rewards of PGMs ...........................6 II. Case Studies ..........................................................10 III. Towards a Strategy for Dealing with Pro-government Militias ..................................18 IV. Conclusions and Areas for Further Research ........24 Case Study 1: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units ................................30 Context The PMU and the State The PMU after the fall of the Islamic State Economic activity The current Government response The limits of DDR and security sector reform Conclusions and policy recommendations Case Study 2: Militias (and Militancy) in Nigeria’s North-East ............66 The context Auxiliary groups in detail The current response Conclusions and recommendations Case Study 3: The Problem with Militias in Somalia ..........................112 Conflict overview Auxiliary groups in detail Current response Conclusions and recommendations Executive Summary oday’s civil wars are becoming more risks of relapse.6 PGMs exploit conflict situations frequent, more harmful to civilians for their own economic and political gain and and harder to resolve. Over the past may become spoilers to any peace process T decade, the rate of major civil wars that would curtail those benefits, especially has tripled, driven in part by the growing role where they are excluded in political talks and of non-State actors, proliferating insurgencies integration deals. More broadly, using PGMs may and transnational extremist groups.1 Modern entrench certain forms of violence, corruption conflicts also suffer from much higher rates of and impunity that can last beyond a peace relapse than earlier eras: nearly 60 per cent of deal, undermining longer-term peacebuilding conflicts from the early part of this century’s efforts and contributing to a higher likelihood of first decade have relapsed, while 90 per cent of relapse into violent conflict. Indeed, the strong today’s conflicts take place in a country that has links between militias and a range of regional experienced war in the past three decades.2 Why powerbrokers often means that PGMs embroil are sustainable peace outcomes proving more countries in regional and even international elusive? competitions, with far greater risks to stability. One contributing factor to these trends may be Based on in-depth field research in Nigeria, the increasing use of pro-government militias Somalia and Iraq, this report aims to understand (PGMs) in armed conflict. More than 80 per the role of PGMs in conflict and post-conflict cent of conflicts over the past 30 years have settings. Specifically, it investigates how PGMs involved government collaboration with PGMs, might help or hurt prospects for sustainable while the more recent rise in transnational peacebuilding. violent extremist groups has prompted an even greater reliance on PGMs in places like It is guided by the following questions: Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Nigeria.3 Auxiliary forces have played crucial roles in • How do PGMs play a role in resolving helping governments win back territory, weaken civil wars and what specific value do they rebel forces or consolidate battlefield strength. provide to governments? They are a quick and cheap means of mobilizing force and may offer unique local knowledge and • What social, economic and political intelligence, building greater traction among stakes do PGMs acquire during conflict contested communities or constituencies.4 and how can they be taken into account In some situations, States may turn to PGMs to avoid becoming spoilers to peace? to outsource the “dirty work” of war while maintaining plausible deniability for human • How do States manage violence rights violations.5 committed by PGMs, including accountability for serious human rights However, the use of PGMs carries significant abuses? risks in terms of post-conflict peace and stability. • What challenges have manifested in Research has shown that the use of PGMs as terms of efforts to demobilize, integrate counter-insurgents can make conflicts last or otherwise disband PGMs in post- longer, with higher levels of violence and greater conflict settings? 2 • And what are the essential elements of Taken together, the presence of PGMs a strategy for dealing with PGMs? may tend to make a conflict last longer, Ultimately, this report looks to provide concrete and actionable recommendations for produce increased levels of violence policymakers and practitioners engaged in some and abuse and make the post-conflict of the most complex conflicts today. period more volatile. This framework contains four sections: (1) a review of the main scholarship on PGMs, focusing on the ways in which using them While each country is unique — in both the undermines longer-term peace and stability; nature of its conflict and the ways in which (2) a comparison across the three case studies, PGMs have been brought into play — they drawing lessons for more general applicability; share common themes. A comparison across (3) the essential elements of a comprehensive the three case studies reveals a number of strategy for addressing PGMs in settings with important considerations for policymakers and violent extremism; and (4) conclusions and areas practitioners in nine cross-cutting ways: of future research. A. Increasing fragmentation, Conflicts involving PGMs present policymakers and lack of control; and practitioners with a set of strategic and B. Blurred lines of State and non-State; operational choices. While national Governments and international partners often have different C. The competition to govern; and competing rationales for collaborating with D. Economic incentives; militias, they broadly make the decision to do so for four reasons: as inexpensive force multipliers; E. Diversity and division in PGMs; due to their superior local knowledge; avenues F. Human rights abuses for legitimacy or coercion that are otherwise and accountability; unavailable in weak or contested States; and G. Foreign support; where they wish to maintain plausible deniability for human rights violations. H. International recognition and funding cul-de-sacs; As the case studies in this report detail, reliance I. Few good options for DDR. on PGMs can be a double-edged sword: in the short-term, they may meet immediate security PGMs cannot be considered flash-in-the- demands, but over time they can present pan responses to insecurity; instead, they significant consequences to peace and stability are an increasingly permanent feature of the in four areas: undermining the State capacity and landscapes of twenty-first century conflicts. Their authority; the risk to civilians and the rule of law, utility allows them to become indispensable contributing to further instability; through illicit actors, tied to the main sources of power in the networks and agents of criminal enterprises; and capital and the broader region. Resilient in the the polarizing forces in local communities and face of efforts at demobilization and integration, regions of PGMs. PGMs appear to be most comfortable in the penumbra of the State, drawing resources and Taken together, the presence of PGMs may tend cover from weak governments, while being to make a conflict last longer, produce increased subject to none of the usual constraints on their levels of violence and abuse and make the post- behaviour. conflict period more volatile. Executive Summary 3 This raises questions and points of consideration DDR. Instead, they point more towards for policymakers to consider in relation to PGMs: the need for highly tailored, context- specific processes for dealing with • Setting a clear goal related to PGMs: PGMs. Do DDR programme in relation What role will PGMs play in the post- to PGM members needs to be located conflict period? What incentives and within a broader strategy that includes points of leverage exist to shape PGM some combination of human
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