A COMMITMENT TO REFORM:
THE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS OF NIGERIA'S SECOND CIVILIAN REGIME
by
JAYSON S. MYERS
B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University, 1979
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
iri
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science)
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
July 1982
(c) Jayson S. Myers, 1982 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
Department of Political Science
The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3
6 October 1982 Abstract
On 1 October 1979, thirteen years of military rule came to an end in Nigeria. A new constitution was promulgated, the result of an exercise in institutional reform intended to overcome the political problems that, in the
1960s, had led the country to military rule and civil war. Nigeria's constitution is to provide the structural framework for a system of government capable of responding effectively to the exigencies of economic and social development, a government which is also non-exclusive of the diverse communal and regional interests of a plural political society.
The constitutional document is-the product of four years of debate among Nigeria's civilian and military leaders. Erected on a set of funda• mental principles set forth by the Federal Military Government, many of the political institutions the basic law establishes — a charter of rights,
an executive presidency, a redefined federal system — are new to Nigeria.
However, the disputes which shaped the constitutional deliberations are
reminiscent of the partisan and communal rivalries that have.plagued'previous
regimes.
The political problems engendered by sectional conflicts and by the
conditions of economic underdevelopment remain a potent feature of constitu•
tional rule in Nigeria. The process of constitutional reform, and the
provisions of the basic law, have been subject to popular criticism. Partisan
rivalries continue to rage over access to political office. The checks and
balances established by the constitution are part of a cumbersome system of
government. A strengthened federal government still finds itself in conflict
with regional administrations. Nigeria's new constitution establishes the
institutional framework in which political activity is to take place. Since
1979, the nature of that activity has been determined by political forces
similar to those that prevailed under the country's first, ill-fated civilian regime.
- ii - Table of Contents
Page
Abstract ii List of Tables iii List of Figures V Acknowledgement V-.l Chapter I: A Legacy of Political Unrest 1 The Politics of Development 4 Politics in a Plural Society 8 The Objectives of Reform 12 Chapter II: Constitutional Reconstruction 18 Setting the Course for Constitutional ^ Reform
The Birth of a New Constitution: 2g Fundamental Guidelines
A Statement of National Objectives ^0 and Fundamental Rights A Federal System of Government 41 An Executive Presidency 52 A Representative Legislature 58 The Conduct of Public Officials 59 Traditional Institutions: ^ The Sharia Court of Appeal Military Amendments 65 Chapter III: The Return to Civilian Rule 72 Problems of Institutionalization 75 The Process of Constitutional Reform 80 A Delicate Balance 84
Threatening the Balance: 87 The Re-Emergence of Party Politics Sectionalism Revived 98 Government Under a New Constitution 105 Defining the Federation 116 A National Commitment 130 Notes 139 Bibliography 154
- iii List of Tables
Page
Table I: Constituent Assembly Allocation 25 of Seats
Table II: Party Standings in Nigeria's 1979 Elections: The First 91 Four Rounds
Table III: Party Standings in.Nigeria's 1979 Elections: A State-by-State 91 Analysis of the First Four Rounds
Table IV": Party Standings in Nigeria's 1979 Presidential Election: A 94 State-by-State Analysis List of Figures
Page
Figure 1: The Federal Republic of Nigeria 43
- V - Acknowledgement
For his criticism, his encouragement, his patience and concern, my warm thanks go to my supervisor, John Wood. I have gained considerably from his insights in comparative politics, as I have from the expertise and encouragement of Alan Cairns and Robert Jackson. Also at the University of
British Columbia, Peter Busch provided much needed assurance and advice.
I am also indebted to Anthony Kirk-Greene and Gavin Williams at
Oxford, and to my former tutor at the London School of Economics,
Keith Panter-Brick, for their comments and critique.
My research at the University of British Columbia was conducted with the assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
I would like to extend a special thanks to Nancy Wong for her friendship and support. Finally, my appreciation goes to my fellow students in the Department of Political Science, whose friendship made my year at the University of British Columbia a very enjoyable one indeed. -1-
Chapter I
A Legacy of Political Unrest
When Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as Nigeria's first executive president on 1 October 1979, fourteen years of military rule came to an end.
A capacity crowd gathered to watch the ceremony in Tafawa Balewa Square as
General Olusegun Obasanjo, head of state since 1976 and the man deemed respon• sible for the country's recent constitutional reforms, handed power back to civilian authorities. Cannons boomed a 22-gun salute, while jet fighters flew overhead and tanks rolled through the square in a show of support for the in• coming president.''" A new constitution was promulgated: the product of more than four years ;of deliberation and debate among Nigerians. As President Shagari committed himself and his. fellow citizens to the "great challenge" and "new opportunity" represented by this, the inauguration of the Second Nigerian
Republic, he reminded the nation of the problems and conflicts which had led 2 to the collapse of civilian government in 1966. "Those problems are still with us", he told his audience. "Now more than ever before, Nigerians must work 3 together ... to cultivate a feeling of nationhood". Coloured by so many reminders of the past, the ceremony prompted many observers to wonder what, 4
if anything, had changed since the days of the First Republic.
The ceremonies' that took place in Lagos were intended to usher in a new era of social and economic development and political'reform. The new constitution was designed to establish the procedures and machinery of a
"truly national" system of government. As such, it was to set forth the
institutions that would allow for the rational and efficient implementation of national development plans, as well as for the peaceful management of
conflicts arising between ethnic and sectional interests. Nigeria's constitu•
tion was to overcome the political problems the country had experienced since
it achieved independence in I960, problems which had led to the imposition
of military rule, civil war, and widespread political unrest. - 2 -
How realistic are these aspirations? To what extent is institu• tional engineering capable of resolving the crises that threaten political stability in Nigeria? The intentions of Nigeria's constitutional engineers and the political problems which they confront, both as a legacy from the past and in the form of more recent conflicts, play an important role in explaining the nature of the country's constitutional development. However, at the heart of- the matter lies a more speculative issue — the relationship between those structures and practices set forth by the constitution and the political forces that operate within Nigerian society. No constitution is able to specify the correct form of political activity in every circumstance. It may only be able to circumscribe that activity by establishing the rules and machinery through which individuals take part in the process of governing. In turn, such struc-: tures must be institutionalized. They must become accepted procedures, valued ini.their own right above the sometimes contrary demands of personal or sectional interest.
The greatest challenge to the establishment and maintenance of civilian rule in Nigeria is exactly this need to establish the structures and procedures outlined by the new constitution as the appropriate institutions of government — to ensure through practice that the constraints embodied in the constitution are, in fact, applied to those individuals and groups taking an active part in political affairs. The process of constitutional revision and
the ^political developments which have occurred within Nigeria since October
1979 indicate just how difficult that task may be. From the time of their
formulation, Nigeria's new constitutional provisions have been at the centre
of controversy. Pressures were mounting for their revision even before the
constitution was promulgated, and several key articles are still subject to
open attack. Nigeria's constitution operates within a political environment
shaped by competition among factions that have survived the years of military - 3 -
rule. Its capacity to contain the conflict which plagued the country's first
civilian government remains very much a matter of conjecture.
* *• #
When the members of Nigeria's Constitution Drafting Committee and
Constituent Assembly met to draw up the articles of a new constitutional
document in the late 1970s, the experiences of the previous two decades were
foremost in their minds. Their nation, which at independence in 1960 had been
5
acclaimed as Africa's brightest economic and political star, had over the previous 15 years experienced the collapse of civilian government, a bloody
civil war, several military coups d'etat, general strikes, mass riots, and
student domonstrations. For the men who were to draft a new constitution, the
country could not be allowed to return to the factious conditions of the
First Republic with its "anxious moments", "self-inflicted wounds", and the Q
chaos which eventually brought about its demise. They were intent upon
establishing an institutional framework that would prevent a repetition of the
disorder of the recent political past.
Two distinct, yet .related, problems have confronted civilian and
military regimes in Nigeria since independence. The first arises from condi•
tions of economic underdevelopment. Constrained by limited resources and by
a system of government that impeded centralized planning and policy-making,
federal politicians of the First Republic found themselves unable to resolve
many of the economic grievances expressed by labour, student groups, farmers,
or by the Nigerian military. The frustrations caused by a limited capacity to
improve national economic and social conditions were compounded, in the second
place, by turbulent and often violent rivalries among political parties,
regional authorities, and ethnic groups. Factions competed for political power
and the ability to control the allocation of resources. The state existed as
a political prize in itself. Its structures and practices of government were - A -
the objects of fierce dispute, because they seemed to operate exclusively in accordance with the sectional interests of those groups which wielded political power. Nigeria's recent political history is very much shaped by the activities of a central government attempting to extend its control over a developing and pluralistic society.
The Politics of Development
The authors of Nigeria's new constitution intended, first of all, that the basic law should consolidate the structures of a national government which had become increasingly involved in directing the course of economic growth and the development of social services in the country. Since the publication of the first development plan in 1946, national and regional . authorities have become the most important "instruments for raising living 7 standards and promoting social welfare". Both levels of government were engaged in extensive planning activities throughout the period of civilian rule that immediately followed independence. Regional marketing boards helped Q to stabilize the incomes of export crop producers. Public revenues collected from national import tariffs, and distributed to the regions according to a formula that reflected the amount of taxes levied within regional boundaries, provided a fund to attract foreign capital, encourage private investment,; finance national transportation and communications projects, and extend health and education services.^
Since 1960, however, the national government in Lagos has assumed an increasing degree of responsibility for directing the course of Nigeria's
"economic development. Federal authorities have been aided in their task by sizeable revenues derived from the profits of the petroleum industry."^
11 12 nationa(Petroleul mgovernmen revenuest haamountes regulated to dmor the e thaimportation $US 15,00n o0f milliocertain i"luxurn 1975.y goods") The.
It has taxed the profits of large foreign companies. Federal commissions have - 5 - established the level of wage awards for public, and indirectly for private,
13 employees. National authorities have sought to extend Nigerian economic participation by stipulating the level of foreign-owned equity in a number
14 of strategic industries. And, they have financed public shareholdings in several commercial interests, as well as in such newly established industries 15 as petrochemicals and iron and steel. Foreign and indigenous private invest• ors play a "crucial part" in Nigeria's growing economy; but, they have become 16
"partners in progress led by the federal public sector". The Third National
Development Plan explicitly states the national government's determination "to translate the country's vast potential into a permanent improvement in the 17 living standards of all Nigerians".
The Nigerian economy has made significant gains under governmental leadership. An increase in the country's gross domestic product from its 1963
level of $US 3,900 million to over $US 40,000 million by 1978 reflects the growth of new industrial developments, new opportunities for employment and 18 investment, and improved welfare and infrastructural facilities. Yet, Nigeria remains an economically and socially underdeveloped nation. By 1976 per capita 19 income was estimated at little more than $US 330 a year. More than 70 percent of the population is employed in an agricultural sector whose declining produc- 20 tivity has resulted in massive imports of foodstuffs. Manufacturing remains
concentrated in light industries such as textiles, food processing, and >
21 22 tobacco. Where indigenous investment is at a very low level, the country
is dependent upon the interests of foreign capital which, regardless of indi-
genization decrees, continues to make production decisions and to import 23 component parts from outside Nigeria. The problems involved in establishing
heavy industry and an export-oriented manufacturing sector are witnessed by
the meagre 2.2 percent increase in its share of the gross domestic product
24 since 1963. - 6 -
The petroleum industry has provided unexpectedly few benefits for other sectors of the economy. The industry which accounted for 92.9 percent
25 of total export earnings and for more than 35 percent of the gross domestic 26 27 product in 1975, employs little over 6,000 people. And, despite the efforts of the federal Nigerian National Oil Corporation to influence the policies of foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria, production and refining decisions are still made on the advice of foreign managements and often prove to be of
28 marginal benefit to other business concerns.
An unemployment figure that has remained above 8.0 percent for more than a decade does not include young people or rural workers who are in search 29 of job opportunities. Likewise, an average annual rate of inflation of about 15.0 percent since 1971 understates a yearly 27.1 percent increase -in food
30 prices during the same period. Apart from purely economic difficulties,
Nigeria's Third National Development Plan includes a long list of infrastruc- tural and social services — transportation and communications networks, education, low cost housing, the provision of fresh water, hospitals, epidemic 31 control centres — as immediate social priorities. The demands placed on public revenue and planning capacities for improving Nigeria's economic and social condition remain almost endless.
Constrained by its financial resources and by the institutions • within which it operates, Nigeria's national government has not always been able to respond to those demands. The country's independence constitution
established a federal system of government, and with it a disjointed system
of planning and policy-making. While the federal authority was accorded
jurisdiction over most aspects of transportation and communications, the
currency and customs, those functions concerned with economic planning, indus•
trial and agricultural development, public works and the provision of health 32 and educational facilities were shared by federal and regional governments. - 7 -
The situation was exacerbated by a system of revenue allocation based on the principle of "derivation", whereby revenues were apportioned to the governments of the regions in which they originated. National authorities were accorded access only to taxes on company profits and import duties, and to 50 percent
33 of mineral royalties. Such an arrangement guaranteed the regions a high degree of fiscal autonomy and control over their own social policies; but, it also meant that economic development would proceed haphazardly and at different rates among regions. It ensured that no one federal or regional government \ * would be able to implement an industrial development strategy of its own accord.
Financial problems did not disappear with the advent of military rule in 1966 and the subsequent centralization of revenue control, particularly with respect to petroleum royalties.^ By the late 1970s, no satisfactory formula for allocating public funds to federal and state authorities had been found. And, despite substantial oil revenues, public debt had risen to more than.i$US 4,000 million by the end of 1979.35
In addition to these financial difficulties, large sums of public money have made their way into the pockets of government officials. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Nigerian press revealed case after case of bureaucrats and politicians diverting government revenues to their own personal bank accounts. Whether as a result of uncoordinated policy efforts or because of a scarcity of funds, the efforts of Nigerian governments in stimulating economic growth have appeared to be inefficient, ineffective, or simply inadequate.
Assuming responsibility for economic growth and social welfare,- though unable to command the organizational or financial resources necessary for a
complete transformation of economic conditions, the federal government has
.been\:regu'lar±yo threatened by popular expressions of economic dissatisfaction.
General strikes, slow-downs, and walk-outs by Nigeria's labour unions have - 8 -
36 accompanied deliberations by federal commissions on industrial wage demands.
In the countryside, economic grievances have sparked periodic and often
37 violent riots among farmers. Dissatisfaction has been vociferously expressed 38 during periods of commodity shortages and rapidly rising prices. A large army has demanded greater expenditures for military purposes and has opposed 39
any policy of forced demobilization into an already tight labour market. The
implications of Nigerian underdevelopment range beyond economic and social concerns. At the heart of the situation stands a fundamentally political problem. The political stability of Nigeria's national government rests on the
capacity of federal and state administrations to undertake policies in response
to the economic and social demands of thw entire population. Politics in a Plural Society
If Nigeria's new constitution were to overcome the institutional
barriers that obstructed the path of governmental economic direction, it also
had to resolve the destabilizing effects of regional, ethnic, and partisan
conflict which brought about the collapse of civilian government in 1966.
Post-independence Nigeria has been rife with communal and sectional rivalries. 40 A multiplicity of linguistic, religious, and tribal communities — the /i
Islamic Hausa-Fulani predominating in the north, Yorubas in the west, Ibos to 41
the east — is evidence of a heterogeneous society. Yet, tribal, religious,
and other types of factional conflict do not emanate from the simple existence
of diverse languages, religions, and customs. Hostility derives instead from 42
competition between peoples for wealth and power. In a developing country,
where economic opportunities and resources are limited, and where social
amenities are not available to all, that competition is especially strong.
In so far as some group identity is perceived to be necessary
for attaining economic or social goals — because resources are distributed - 9 - according to communal criteria or because certain groups see themselves continually excluded from economic and social benefits — the personal fortunes of individuals appear to depend on their communal origins and
43 connections. Where competition for economic rewards becomes a "winner-takes- all" proposition, conflict between regions, states, political factions, or religious groups is the immediate result.
The uneven rate of economic and social development in Nigeria, which brought about the rapid rise of an educated and prosperous middle class in the
Western Region, and especially among the Ibos of the Eastern Region, has made the differences in economic opportunities available to tribal, religious, 44 and regional populations all the more apparent. Competition for economic and social benefits is translated into conflict over access to state power.
Public authority is the instrument which allows each group to achieve its own ends. It allows traditional elites to maintain their influence over the way of life of their tribal and religious: followers. Federal and state govern• ments assume a leading role in directing economic growth. Their policies i. allocate the resources — the money, contracts, and commercial opportunities
— involved in the development process. Therefore, the question of who exercises political power is of the greatest importance. Political life "turns on gaining the opportunity to acquire wealth, power, and prestige, to be able to distribute benefits in the form of jobs, contracts, scholarships, and gifts 45 of money ... to one's relatives and political allies". In short, it becomes a struggle for control of the state — a struggle between those rival communal groups and political factions that have gained access to political power and those that^find they have been excluded.
From the mid-1940s to the last days of the first civilian Republic,
Nigeria's political parties were closely identified with particular tribal and religious interests. Although the National Council of Nigeria and the - 10 -
Cameroons (NCNC), led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was the country's first political party to gain support from a wide cross-section of the population, its membership and nationalist platform quickly became associated with the largest
46 ethnic group of the Eastern Region, the Ibo. The Action Group (AG), founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo as the political wing of a Yoruba cultural organ- 47 ization, occupied a dominant position in the affairs of the Western Region.
Similarly, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), with its close ties to the traditional authorities of the North, was generally regarded as the political 48 voice of the Hausa-Fulani tribes and Islamic emirates of that region. Elec• toral success directly involved the fortunes of those regions and populations which political parties claimed to represent. Issues concerning the shape of governmental institutions and public policy decisions were more than matters of partisan rivalry or general principle. They were disputes whose outcomes, were frequently defined in regional and ethnic terms.
The history of the constitutional debates that preceded Nigerian independence, and of the six years of civilian government which followed, is heavily shaded by partisan and communal conflict. In accord with the demands of the Northern People's Congress, the country's independence constitution' guaranteed the three regional authorities a considerable degree of autonomy 49 over economic and cultural affairs. Three years after independence, an attempt on the part of regional officials to inflate census figures for their respective regions generated a serious political crisis. It clearly revealed 50 the rivalries which centred on access to politicalspower at the federal level.
The gerrymandering and rigged results of the 1964 federal election, and ofh the 1965 election in the Western Region, also indicate the lengths to which
Nigeria's political coalitions were prepared to go in pursuit of public :'
51 office. In 1965 widespread unrest, riots, and violent confrontations between ethnic communities accompanied the breakdown of governmental authority. They - 11 -
were the last vestiges of Nigeria's first civilian regime.
Communal conflict did not disappear with the January coup of 1966
that replaced civilian administration with a military council under the 52
leadership of an Ibo officer, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi. Within seven
months Ironsi had himself been killed in a counter-coup launched by northern
officers — a product of the widespread discontent, and ofi.the fear of
eastern hegemony, that resulted from Ironsi's attempt to centralize Nigerian
administration.
A federal government that was now controlled by northern interests,
and which seemed to overlook the attacks made upon Ibo .settlements-in the : L
North, was not recognized by the military governor of the Eastern Region,
Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. His demands for Eastern autonomy were met,
in turn, by federal efforts to reduce the power of regional administrations.
Policies aimed at reinforcing the authority of the central government were 54
initiated by Lieutenant-General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria's new head of state.
In May 1967, the Eastern Region declared its secession from Nigeria, consti•
tuting itself as the Republic of Biafra. The course was set for a bloody civil
war. It was a conflict that would not be concluded until January 1970, in a
military victory for the federal regime.
Yet, regional and communal rivalries persisted. Inflated population
figures disrupted the attempt to carry out a reliable national census in 1973,
underlining once more the importance popularly attached to any activity
affecting the representation of regional interests, and hence of the distri- 55 bution of ^political power, among regional, tribal, and ethnic populations. In 1974 General Gowon cited the reappearance of sectional conflict as justification for his decision to postpone indefinitely Nigeria's return to
56 civilian rule. The sectionalism and the regional and ethnic conflict - 12 - engendered in competition for political power exercised a destabilizing influence, even under the "corrective" policies of military rule. When a new administration pledged itself to constitutional reform in 1975, it had to confront, above all, the problems posed by a fragmented and volatile political society.
The Objectives of Reform
From the time they first gained political control, Nigeria's military leaders stressed the remedial nature of their regime. They repeatedly asserted that they had assumed power, not as-a result of personal ambition, > but in order to ensure that politics would not return to a state of conflict
57 between regional and tribal blocs. To this end, every military council ,r committed itself to correcting the flaws which had plagued the Nigerian poli• tical system since independence, and to a return to civilian rule. Such goals, it was commonly'-held, were to be achieved through a process of structural reform. From the perspective of a national military and political leadership, institutional changes were needed to strengthen the authority of the central government.
The first tentative steps were taken in that direction by General
Gowon. In an effort to diffuse the political power of regional administrations, his regime created twelve new states in place of the four larger regional 58 authorities existing in 1967. It appropriated all petroleum revenues and established a system of revenue allocation designed to distribute resources 59 more evenly to all states. Moreover, Gowon outlined an extensive programme of political reforms in 1970 involving the reorganization of the armed forces, the formulation of a Second National Development Plan, the eradication of public corruption, the creation of more states, preparation and adoption of a new constitution, completion of a national population census, the reorgan- - 13 - ization of political parties, and the scheduling of popular elections.^ It was this programme which he was forced to suspend four years later.
The military administration of Murtala Muhammed reasserted its commitment to the return of civilian government when it acceded to power in a coup toppling General Gowon in 1975. Successive military regimes had been struggling for almost a decade to achieve national unity, by attempting to overcome sectional animosities and through the management of national develop• ment schemes. Yet, it was evident in the mid-1970s:: that serious political problems still existed in Nigerian politics. Political dissatisfaction had infected the country's armed forces too. Morale was at a low ebb as a result of internal wrangles in the officer corps. Organizational and financial resources were being diverted in ever greater amounts to the effort of govern• ing, and away from purely military purposes. In any case, military leaders were forced to rely on civilian bureaucrats and local officials to implement their policy decisions.6"1" The failure to conduct a reliable census in 1973 and Gowon1s subsequent postponement of civilian rule from the promised 1976 deadline eroded the credibility of his regime, either as an effective, or as an interim, administration. (Both events were important factors contributing to his removal from office.) Finally, pressures for some measure of liberal-s• izing reform were mounting among civilian leaders whose participation in policy-making, and indeed in all political activity, had been curtailed by restrictions originally imposed by General Gowon. To Muhammed and his successor, Olusegun Obasanjo, few options appeared to be available to
Nigeria's military council but to relinquish power to a new civilian regime.
Their authority too was based on the "corrective" face of military rule.
However, Nigeria's military leaders believed that if the country were to return to civilian administration, political behaviour would have to be constrained to a much greater degree by the practices and institutions - 14 -
set forth in a new national constitution. Again, structural reform appeared as the only solutiuon to Nigeria's political problems. The failure of civilian government during the First Republic was attributed primarily to an absence of constitutional checks limiting the actions of government officials.
"Our 1963 constitution, like its predecessors," the Federal Military Govern• ment explained, "spoke only in terms of power and of rights.... It says
62 nothing of the duties of the government towards its subjects". A new constitution would set out the rules of conduct governing political life, and would thereby provide "the very foundation of an orderly and democratic 63 society". It should make it clear that "powers are bestowed upon the organs and institutions of government not for the purpose of personal aggrandizement of those who wield them from time to time, but for the welfare and advance- 64 ment of society as a whole". The objective of the Federal Military Government,
"to unite Nigeria into one nation bound together by common attitudes and •> .; values, common institutions and procedures, and above all by an acceptance of common objectives and destiny", underscored its effort to provide the struc• tural basis for a "truly national system of government whose institutions 65 would prevent the abuses that were rife in the First Republic".
The course of institutional reform in Nigeria was determined first by the structural changes which had been already engineered during a decade of military rule and, in the second place, by a common perception of Nigeria's political difficulties. Successive military administrations made a deep impression on the manner by which the country had come to be governed. During the era of military rule, a centralized hierarchy of military command was replicated by the Nigerian political system. While traditional, local, and regional authorities continued to administer to the more immediate demands of the population, overall policy-making, financial, and coercive responsi^v bilities were placed in the hands of the Federal Military Council in Lagos. - 15 -
Economic planning activities, revenue collection and distribution, social and cultural policies were now matters of federal concern. Moreover, twelve state administrations had come into being. Subject to a nation-wide chain of command, their military governors were ultimately under the authority of
Nigeria's commander-in-chief and head of state. This centralization of poli• tical control provided military leaders, and at a later date Nigeria's consti• tutional engineers, with the institutional context in which further reform would take place. The country's political crises appeared as problems of central government control. For this reason, Nigeria's new constitution was intended to consolidate the authority of the country's national administration. From the beginning, the Federal Military Government made it clear that the process of constitutional reform would entail, above anything else, the further strengthening of the institutions of central government.
At an early date, military leaders and constitution-makers committed themselves to establishing an effective system of national policy• making. In their view, "a modern era and a growing economy" must have a
"national government with power to direct the future of national society".66
"Peace, Unity, and Progress" were to be the watchwords of the new politicals order. The great range of economic and social tasks that the Nigerian government had yet to undertake, and the limited resources which it could command, emphasized the importance of establishing an efficient and rationally organized system of government. The central authority must be capable of effective policy planning and implementation.
Likewise, Nigeria's military leaders and constitutional experts held that the country's new political institutions must be open to all sectional groups. They felt that the authority vested in policy decisions, and the legitimacy of the structural organization of governmnet itself, ultimately rests on the'condition that no group within society should find - 16 - its voice systematically excluded from the political process. For General
Muhammed, the failure of civilian politicians to develop a basis of wide political support was a key factor in the collapse of the First Republic.
Three major political parties emerged with regional and ethnic support, and at the centre, only an uneasy coalition of two of these parties was possible at any one time.... Winning elections became a life and death struggle which justified all means — fair and foul.... ^ Orderly succession to power was made virtually impossible.
Muhammed argued that where political institutions are subordinated to the interests of particular regional, partisan, or communal groups, sectional conflict is immanent. The result is either a struggle for control over the state itself, or an attempt to establish separate systems of government with jurisdiction over specific regional communities.
The authors of Nigeria's new constitution go even further, stressing that loyalty to the nation-state, and to the rules of political conduct . embodied in its institutions, must transcend the more parochial interests of region, tribe, religion, race, and linguistic group. "Loyalty to one's ethnic community ought not to be allowed to inhibit or detract from national loyalty, 70 loyalty to the Nigerian state". Such a position does not imply that a national identity should supplant all other personal interests. Identification with the institutions of national "government may augment loyalties to communal, occupational, and cultural groups, local administrations, or village, tribal, and religious organizations. Indeed, rules of political conduct may provide for the expression of particularistic interests in the structures of government policy-making. General Muhammed described his objectives in the following terms: The Federal Military Government is committed to the emergence of a stable system of government through constitutional law. This we trust can best be achieved through the creation of viable political institutions which will ensure maximum participation and^consensus and orderly succession to political power. - 17 -
The crucial message here is that Nigeria's political institutions must : • become non-exclusive. They must not be identified with the interests of any particular sectional group.
The process of constitutional reform undertaken in Nigeria during the latter part of the 1970s, then, was in large part a reaction to years of political instability and unrest. Military leaders and many other interested observers believed the new constitution would overcome the conflict which once seemed endemic in Nigerian society. Yet, the course of that reform was very much shaped by the forces which it was intended to overcome. Constitu• tional reconstruction, after all, involved the fundamental issue of who was to enjoy access to political authority. Factional rivalries could not help but play,;an important role in determining the type of reforms that were to be carried out, even in.spite of the warnings.and directives issued.by'Officials of the Federal Military Government. They have remained a common feature of
Nigerian politics well into the new era of civilian rule. -18-
Chapter II
Constitutional Reconstruction
A purely contemporary view of any problem is necessarily a limited and even distorted view. Every situation has its roots in the past.... The past survives into the present; the- present is indeed the past undergoing modification.
The constitutional provisions that came into effect on 1 October
1979 are the product of more than four years of discussion, bargaining, and mutual conciliation among Nigerian military and civilian leaders. Under the direct supervision of the military government, elected delegates met to decide the nature of public institutions in a new civilian regime. Mindful of the political crises that paralyzed national government during the early
1960s and of the deep sectional animosities that remained apparent during the administration of General Gowon, Nigeria's constitutional engineers were called upon to devise the structural arrangements that would ensure the emergence of an effective and acceptable system of central political institutions, practices, and procedures. In short, their task was to prescribe the foundations for a system of national democratic government.
The controversies and conflict which accompanied the emergence of
Nigeria's new constitution, however, indicates that this was no mean task.
Communal, regional, and partisan rivalries survived the era of military rule.
Fearing that once again the institutions of national government might become the preserve of particularistic sectional interests, many constitutional .\\ delegates and members of the general public vehemently opposed proposals which seemed to concentrate power in the hands of a few officials, or to : exclude traditional practices from the procedures of national government. Yet, in their own turn, measures which would enable diverse sectional groups to influence government decisions were criticized because they introduced further complications into the state's policy-making process. Many of the disputes - 19 - which characterized Nigeria's constitutional proceedings are reflected in the structural arrangements prescribed by the country's new constitution. The v principles that the Federal Military Government set forth to guide institu• tional reform.merely set the scene for a debate in which civilian leaders worked to ensure that their interests would not be excluded in any revised set of institutional arrangements. At times resting on only a common commit• ment among assembly delegates to establish the structural prerequisites for . a return to civilian government, Nigeria's process of constitutional reform was shaped not only by a rationalized set of governmental objectives, but also and most significantly, by the interests and machinations of those political groups involved in the negotiations that prepared the way for a return to civilian rule.
Setting the Course for Constitutional Reform
General Murtala Muhammed assumed office in order to "sweep clean, give direction, and provide the constitutional foundations of good 2 government". In his National Day broadcast of 1 October 1975, Muhammed announced a five-stage programme which he pledged would "forge a viable 3 political system, both stable and responsible to public feeling", and lead to a return to civilian rule by October 1979. As Nigeria's new head of state adamantly declared: "The present military leadership does not intend to stay in office a day longer than is necessary, and certainly not beyond this date."
He promised to establish panels to study and make recommendations on certain national problems, such as the creation of new states, the location of the federal capital, and the drafting of a new constitution. Nigeria's system of
local government was to be reorganized; the existing ban on partisan activity would be lifted; and "free and fair" elections would be held for legislative and other elective offices, at both federal and state levels, before handing - 20 -
power back to civilians in 1979. In the process, politics would be "trans•
formed from its previous scenario of bitter personal wrangles into a healthy 5
game of political argument and discussion". For Nigeria's military
administration, the means by which such a transformation was to be carried
out lay in "wise" institutional reform — in the formulation of a "good
constitution".
Yet, as Muhammed emphasized, constitutional reform had to be under•
taken by Nigerian citizens on their own behalf. He conceived of the constitu•
tion as an "agreement freely entered into by a people regarding how they are
7
to be governed". It was the intention of Nigerian military leaders to make :
the business of constitutional reconstruction as representative as possible
of the country's diverse sectional and communal interests. They recognized
the significance of an open debate in which a wide cross-section of regional,
ethnic, and religious spokesmen might participate, in gaining general approval
for the methods and results of institutional reform. At the same time though, the country's military leaders felt that it would be dangerous to allow constitutional discussions to follow their own course, and perhaps to founder on the sectional rivalries and factional disputes that could well erupt if no initial direction were to be provided.
The Federal Military Government too had made its assessment of
Nigerian political problems. Its leaders possessed their own ideas as to what form a new political system should take in order to overcome those difficulties. The course through which the new constitution finally evolved directly reflects their considerations. A draft document was to be prepared by a committee of constitutional experts following the general recommendations of the Supreme Military Council. The public would be allowed to respond to r. that draft before it was.delivered to a representative assembly for revision. - 21 -
However, a final right of amendment was reserved for the Federal Military-
Government before promulgation. This strategy for reform was as important as the substance of the new constitution itself. In the end, the legitimacy of Nigeria's institutions of civilian government would depend on a generally accepted belief that they were fairly and responsibly conceived.
Nigeria's Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) first met on
18 October 1975. Its 49 members were appointed by the Federal Military
Government in such a way as to ensure that each of the nation's twelve states wouldnbe<.represented by.:atiieastStWo;^delegates. The Committee was composed primarily of academics and lawyers, many of whom were already experienced in the country's political life, either as civilian commissioners in the Federal Military or state governments, or as ministers, civil servants, Q and politicians during the first civilian regime. Its chairman was Chief
Rotimi Williams, a noted Nigerian lawyer and a former minister of the Western
Region. The responsibilities of the CDC were explicitly outlined by General
Muhammed during the Committee's inaugural meeting: This Administration believes strongly that the pro• visions of the Constitution can be used for removing or minimizing some of our basic problems.... Your aim, therefore, must be to devise a constitution whish will help to solve other problems which may arise in the future.... to produce an initial draft of a Constitu• tional Arrangement that would provide a soundgbasis for the continuing existence of a united Nigeria.
Working on a set of guidelines initially established by the Federal Military
Government, the Constitution Drafting Committee was given one year in which to submit its proposed draft of constitutional arrangements to the ruling
Military Council.
Concluding its deliberationsiin September 1976, the CDC presented its recommendations to the head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo,10 for public discussion. No less than 346 memoranda had already been submitted to - 22 - the CDC during the course of its debates, by a number of local and state authorities, by organizations such as the National Joint Muslim Association, the National Council of Women's Societies, the Evangelical Churches of
West Africa, and by academics, lawyers, former politicians, bureaucrats., and other interested individuals."'"''" Their comments were accompanied by a stream of newspaper editorials, addresses by former politicians, and resolutions passed by public meetings held for the purpose of discussing Nigeria's proposed constitutional arrangements.
In 1977 the Federal Military Government convened a Constituent
Assembly, charging it with responsibility to deliberate on the proposals of the Constitution Drafting Committee and to amend them where necessary.
Composed of a chairman, a deputy chairman, and 20 other members appointed by Nigeria's Supreme Military Council, as well as the chairman of the CDC and its seven sub-committees, and 203 delegates popularly selected from the 12 states, the Assembly met from October 1977 to June 1978. The Assembly's
draft was accepted by the Federal Military Government with only a few
additional amendments and modifications. Finally, by the terms of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree of 1978, the country's draft
constitutional proposals were enacted into law. They came into effect on
Independence Day 1979 — the target date for a return to civilian government 13 set exactly four years earlier by the late Murtala Muhammed. * # #
The procedures for constitutional revision implemented by the
Federal Military Government were widely criticized. Periodically they became
the focus of disputes which threatened to upset the entire reform project.
The constitution, after all, was to set forth the structures and practices
of national government in Nigeria. It would not only prescribe the means by
which political power would be wielded in a civilian regime; it would define - 23 -
who was to gain access to that power, and to the resources under public
control, as well. Consequently, the nature of representation — of who would
participate in shaping the new institutions — was a matter of serious conten- 14 tion.
Dissension was apparent, even as the members of the Constitution
Drafting Committee and Constituent Assembly were being named. It was originally
intended, for instance, that the CDC should be composed of 50 members. The
one appointed delegate who declined to serve was the former political leader,.
of the Western Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Awolowo's decision to abstain
from the proceedings was widely interpreted as an attempt to save his own political1': ambitions from the constraints that would necessarily be imposed 15 were he to participate in any process of constitutional reform. A father
of Nigeria's new political system and a leading author of its constitution would more than likely be expected to act in strict accordance with its
legal provisions. In 1975, Awolowo was not prepared to commit his political fortunes to such an unswerving path, especially when the actions of his poten• tial rivals would not be limited in the same way. His failure to serve on the
Constitution Drafting Committee immediately brought the intentions of
Nigeria's civilian leaders into question. Would a new constitution be able to constrain the actions of political groups in a civilian regime? The affair served to deepen mutual suspicions that rival groups might be prepared to empl'oy/'illegal means to achieve their political aims. While military leaders were working to unite the country in a project of national self-renewal through constitutional reform, Chief Awolowo's decision, made it clear that a consensus did not exist over the desirability of that reform, or the means that should be used in achieving it.
Deciding on the composition of the Constituent Assembly was an even more delicate issue for military leaders than the appointment of delegates - 24 - to the CDC. The Assembly was to be a "representative" body. However, this simp-le formula glossed over two very important questions: How were Assembly delegates to be selected^ And, in what way were they to be representative?
The Federal Military Government's solution was to appoint Assembly 16 delegates on the basis of their election by local councils. Because local councillors themselves had been recently elected on a non-partisan basis, it was hoped that this method would obviate the need for any type of electoral campaign. It was necessary, in the estimation of the country's military leaders, to avoid potentially violent factional or partisan rivalries before the introduction of adequate legal safeguards regulating political-activity.
Nevertheless, many observers, particularly from Nigeria's southern: states, recognized a built-in bias in the procedure that was eventually recommended.
They pointed to the local councils of the former Northern Region where many councillors had been returned unopposed, or where they were indirectly 17 elected through the offices of traditional tribal authorities. In such circumstances, selection on the basis proposed by the Supreme Military Council would mean that Assembly delegates from the northern states would be more likely to act as spokesmen for tribal and communal interests.
The complaints of southern leaders were, to some extent, mitigated by a second federal decision not to allocate seats in the Constituent Assembly according to a system of representation strictly in proportion to states' populations. Instead, the distribution of Assembly seats was intended to provide all states with a substantial degree of representation. Population i
differences would necessarily be taken into account. However, regional
criteria-'-were also to be considered. As a result, seats were allocated on a
formula which accorded to Niger, the Republic's least populous state, slightly
less than half the number of Assembly delegates to which Kano, with a popula•
tion five times as large, was entitled. The distribution of seats to states - 25 -
and former political regions in the Constituent Assembly is represented in
Table I.l.
Table I
18 Constituent Assembly Allocation of Seats
Former State Estimated Estimated Seats Political Area (km2 ) Population Region
North 237,886,056 28,938,581 100 Bauchi 61,813,790 2,193,674 10 Benue 69,740 3,041,194 10 Borno 116,589 2,990,526 11 Gongola 102,067,210 3,002,808 10 Kaduna 70,293 4,098,305 13 Kano 42,123 5,774,842 16 Niger 73,555,478 1,271,767 7 Plateau 56,245 2,026,657/ 9 Sokoto 94,588 4,538,808 14 West 93,709,269 12,742,411 49 Kwara 73,403,503 2,309,339 8 Lagos 3,535 1,443,567 8 Ogun 20,241,204 1,557,946 8 Ondo 18,165 2,272,675 10 Oyo 42,862 5,158,884 15 Mid-West ^ 38,061 2,435,839 10 Bendel 38,061 2,435,839 10 East - * 79,138 11,551,823 44 Anambra 15,770 2,943,483 11 Cross River 29,164 3,600,000; i 12 I mo 13,032 3,208,340 13 Rivers 21,172 1,800,000 8
The formula carried with it a number of important) political implications. It meant that the predominantly Islamic states of the former
Northern Region, with a total estimated population of 29 million inhabitants, would be represented by 100 Assembly delegates. On the other hand, 103 Assembly seats were granted to southern states, where few Moslems could be counted
19 among an estimated 27 million inhabitants. The objections of northern representatives were loudly voiced, especially when the Assembly turned its - 26 -
attention to the issue of Islamic courts. Northern members claimed that the
Assembly was not democratically composed. The Federal Military Government had
"distorted the essence of democratic representation and created an artificial freak assembly with priorities unrelated to the reality of the country or any
20
... known principle of constitution-making". For northern as well as southern delegates, then, the procedures of constitutional reform themselves became objects of dispute.
The composition of Nigeria's Constituent Assembly was eventually accepted by constitutional delegates, though not without a great deal of 21 encouragement, and the occasional threat, from military officials. Never• theless, questions regarding the propriety of the constitutional process were left unanswered. As such, they remain points of weakness which may be exploited at some point in the future, should disgruntled political groups wish to 1 challenge the legitimacy of Nigeria's political institutions.
The Birth of a New Constitution: Fundamental Guidelines
Like the timetable for institutional reform, the constitutional provisions that emerged from the Committee and Assembly meetings of the late
1970s reflect the priorities of, and many of the decisions already taken by,
Nigeria's Federal Military Government. Murtala Muhammed expressed the general objectives of his administration during the opening session of the Constitution
Drafting Committee: The Supreme Military Council has ... agreed on the following: — V/e are committed to a federal system of government; and to a free, democratic, and lawful system ofgovern• ment which guarantees fundamental human rights. Consequently, "any constitution devised for Nigeria" should seek to:
i) eliminate cutthroat political competition based on a system or rules of winner-takes-all. As Corollary (sic.), it should discourage electoral malpractices. ii) discourage institutionalized opposition to the - 27 -
government in power and, instead, develop consensus politics and government based on a community of all interests rather than interests of a section of the •: country. iii) firmly establish the principle of public accountability for all holders of public office. All public office holders must be seen to account openly for their conduct of affairs. iv) eliminate over-centralization of power in a few hands, and as a matter of principle decentralize power whenever possible, as a means of diffusing tensions. The powers and duties of the leading func-^^ tionaries of government should be carefully defined.
It was felt that the rules of conduct which were to be enunciated in the constitution must prevent a return to the corrupt and factious political practices of the past.
Muhammed went a stage further, specifying in a fairly general manner the structural provisions which the Supreme Military Council deemed necessary in order to put its principles of orderly government into effect.
The development of "genuine and truly national" political parties demanded that limitations be placed on the number of partisan organizations and their 24 sources of support. Indeed, because party conflict was viewed as the primary cause of the collapse of the first civilian Republic, the CDC was told:
The Supreme Military Council is of the opinion that, if during the course of your deliberations and having regard to our disillusion with party politics in the past, you should discover some means by which government can be '•>:>,!,,. formed without the crea^jlon of political parties, you should feel free to recommend.
From the organization of political interests the Federal Military Government turned to prescribe the nature of the political system itself. It called for an "executive presidential system" in which:
a) the President and Vice-President are elected, with clearly defined powers and are accountable to the people-: ... and are brought into office in such a manner so to reflect the federal character of the country; and b) the choice of members of the Cabinet should also be such a^'.to reflect the federal character of the country. - 28 -
The new constitution thus departs from the parliamentary model that provided
the basis for the first civilian regime.
Instead, it adopts a presidential system simulating many of the structures and checks of American government. For Nigerian military leaders, anxious as they were to provide some sort of institutional safeguards on the exercise of political power, the American model was worthy of emulation. It • was felt that an executive president and his appointed cabinet would provide a cohesive and effective decision-making group with the capacity to formulate legislation and development plans, while implementing the laws enacted by an independent legislature. At the same time, the division of powers embodied in the American system implies that no one individual or set of partisan interests would have the capacity to gain control over the entire policy-making process.
Separate elections could be conducted for executive and legislative positions
in both federal and state governments. Such a procedure would create wider opportunities for the involvement of all political parties in the governmental
system.
Moreover, it was thought that a system of checks and balances would help to ensure that a majority in one legislative chamber would not automat•
ically guarantee the approval of executive "decisions. If a bicameral legis•
lature were to be adopted, along with the power of presidential veto, then a proposed bill would have to gain the support of a sizeable majority in both assemblies before it could become law. The two legislative bodies might be composed so as to provide representation on the basis of both population and regional criteria. And, if the American example were followed, perhaps the
significance of partisan identification among assembly membgr"! as a factor
determining their; vqting patterns within the national legislature would begin
to wane. Such an arrangement would effectively remove a major obstacle to
the conduct of harmonious political activity in the country. In any event, - 29 - an independent judiciary would be empowered to rule against any piece of legislation it found to be ultra vires. Institutions based on the American system of government would at least check the behaviour of political actors in all branches of public authority. It was the responsibility of the
Constitution Drafting Committee and Constituent Assembly to set out the structural arrangements in much finer detail. However, the essential nature of governmental procedures and practices was specified before public debate began.
The Supreme Military Council listed three other constitutional requirements. The independence of Nigeria's judiciary was to be guaranteed under the supervision of a Judicial Service Commission. Provision was to be made for such bodies as a Corrupt Practices Tribunal and a Public Complaints
Bureau which would monitor the behaviour of government officials. Finally, a constitutional restriction was to be imposed on the number of additional ; : 27 states that could be created. Muhammed stressed that his proposals were '•
"central" to the Federal Military Government's programme for constitutional renewal. Not only did they form the terms of reference for the CDC; they were, in effect, directives upon which all subsequent discussion was to be based.
While the Military Council outlined the form which Nigeria's new institutional arrangements should take, responsibility for working out exact structures and procedures lay primarily in the hands of the country's civilian constitutional engineers. It was in the debates and resolutions of the Consti• tution Drafting Committee and Constituent Assembly that the basic choices is regarding constitutional reform were made — choices which bring,:into;relief the often" incompatible requirements of establishing a system of government which would be, at the same time, effective and open to all organized political interests. The provisions of Nigeria's new constitution may be summarized with - 30 -
regard to four broad issue areas: the establishment of national objectives,
the organization of a federal system of government, the establishment of an
executive presidency, and provision for traditional institutions and parti•
cularly for the role of Islamic law. Each set of issues provided a focus for
contention during the four years of constitutional debate that preceded the promulgation of Nigeria's basic law. For this reason, many articles embodied
in the final version of the constitution remain the objects of criticism, even
after they were put i into effect. The process of constitutional reconstruction
itself reflects the difficulties involved in attempting to solve Nigeria's political problems by means of structural reform.
A Statement of National Objectives and Fundamental Rights
For the authors of Nigeria's new constitution, a revised charter of political norms and procedures had to go beyond merely defining the limi• tations to be placed on public office. It should necessarily include a statement of purpose, of national objectives and directive principles to guide state policy. In the words of the Constitution Drafting Committee, a constitution should "proclaim the principleoon which the state is organized ;
28 and spell out the ideas and objectives of the social order". Indeed, the
CDC report goes on to explain that "unless the goals and the fundamental attitudes and values" prescribing the role of government officials and institutions are clearly stated and accepted, "a new nation is likely to 29 find itself rudderless with no sense of purpose or direction". A charter of national objectives would unite the aspirations and loyalties of Nigerians.
By defining the goals of society and describing the institutional goals and procedures for pursuing them, a statement of fundamental objectives and directive prin• ciples in our Constitution seeks to direct and concert the efforts and actions of the people towards the achieve• ment of those goals.... Only an- explicit statement of objectives and directive principles which clearly sets the parameters of government and informs its policies and - 31 -
actions can generate,^ spirit of cooperation, peace, unity, and progress.
By explicitly committing itself to the goals of economic and social devel• opment — to control over the economy and the provision of adequate food, clothing, water,' medical and educational facilities — and to the integration of a multi-ethnic society, the constitution would act as a focus for the loyalty of all Nigerians, as welliasi a directive to government policy
. . . 31 decisions.
Although delegates unanimously supported the inclusion of a state• ment of national objectives and individual liberties in their constitutional document, conflict arose over questions concerning the substance of those directives and the extent to which government should be bound to follow expressions of principle. What should be the role of the state in providing • for economic growth and social welfare? Should the constitution be expected to define the appropriate role of government in the first place?
The CDC's sub-committee on national objectives and public account• ability recommended that Nigerians commit themselves to a socialist order in West Africa. Its report concludes:
It cannot be disputed that the ideology that is most relevant to our society today and one that is accepted by most Nigerians is one of socialism operating within the framework of participatory democracy and the ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Justice. It is the only effective answer to the conditions of underdevelopment inequality, i and exploitation that exist in the country.
Accordingly, the long-term objective of Nigerians should be "to place in the hands of the State and people the ownership and control of the means of 33 production and distribution". The recommendations of the sub-committee were met by loud cries of opposition from the majority of the Constitution Drafting
Committee. Fearing that an expression of socialist goals might frighten away foreign and domestic investment, members of the main Committee stressed that - 32 -
34 wealth must first be created before it can be distributed. While they agreed that "the security and the welfare of the people shall be the primary
35 purpose of government" — a principle which appears in the final draft of ' the constitution — most members of the CDC argued that the only acceptable ideology for all Nigerians is that of a "mixed economy".
Proponents of this view called for a state that would be "socialist" in certain areas of economic activity, yet which would also "encourage and protect" individual ownership and initiative in those sectors of the economy where it was felt that "public ownership and control.is not in the national . 36 interest". Caution should be taken to ensure that the new constitution would not excite expectations that were not likely to be realized in the near future. Thus, it was argued that while the state must seek to improve living conditions, to provide better housing, medical, and educational facilities, it cannot do so without relying on private investment and profit to encourage maximum economic growth. After lengthy debate, the arguments put forward by the advocates of a mixed economy were finally accepted by the plenary session of the CDC. (The decision not to adopt a more socialist set of economic objectives led two members of the Constitution Drafting
Committee to dissociate themselves from the Committee's final recommendations 37 and to file dissenting minority reports of their own. ) The CDC reported that a majority of its members had agreed "to maintain a mixed economy" in which the public sector "plays a large and leading role by controlling the major sectors of economic activity, determining basic prices, and regulating 38 competition, but where private investment is allowed and encouraged".
The conflict between proponents of a socialist state and advocates of a mixed economy, which occupied so much of the time of the Constitution
Drafting Committee, was largely avoided during the sessions of the Constituent
Assembly. Assembly delegates were presented with a compromise formula by their - 33 -
39 chairman, Sir Udo Udoma, emphasizing the "fundamental value of equality".
Declaring that the state shall participate in many areas of the economy "where this is necessary", but shall control the "major areas — those areas which it already controls or which it may take over by the legislation of a future 40 government", — the draft amendment was accepted by both sides of the dispute.
Thus, by the terms of the constitution, Nigerian government is empowered to control the national economy "in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom, and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social 41 justice and the equality of status and opportunity','. Its charter allows 42 it to ''(manage and operate the major sectors of the economy". In short, the economic activity of the state is to remain largely unchanged.
On the other hand, members of the CDC and Constituent Assembly were unable to reach a consensus regarding the issue of fundamental economic and social rights. Here the difficulty centred around the question of justicia- . bility. Delegates felt that some statement of the goals of economic and social development was required. The right to equal pay for equal work, free education, free health and medical services, permanent employment in the public service, full employment and job security, suitable and adequate shelter, adequate food, a minimum living wage, adequate leisure opportunities, 43 and unemployment benefits stands as the ultimate objective of Nigerian state policy — as it does for most national governments. Yet, should the basic law force the government to provide those amenities? A majority of CDC members were opposed to the idea of elevating such economic and social rights to the status of legally binding norms. Economic rights are not "mutual" like a person's legal freedoms, they argued. The CDC's report explains that economic and social rights come into existence only after governments provide facilities for them. Furthermore, they are rights that depend on the avails ability of resources. The CDC concluded that it would not only be "ludicrous" - 34 - to oblige government to provide such economic and social benefits to the 44 general public, but that it would be "dangerous" as well. While the constitution should provide direction for the state's development policies, the objectives of development should be non-justiciable.
The economic sub-committee of the CDC and a number of the Committee's other members strongly disagreed with the majority opinion. They were concerned that if the constitution were to acknowledge that governments cannot legally be bound by economic and social norms, Nigeria's public 45 officials might simply ignore their commitment to a common social purpose.
That view was accepted by a majority of members of the Constituent Assembly.
Nevertheless, Assembly delegates specified that economic and social principles
should assume an advisory rather than a legal status. The Assembly acknow•
ledged that the effect of the constitution's provisions would: likely be by 46
way of public opinion, instead of judicial action. However, it maintained
that the terms of Nigeria's new constitution should clearly set forth the
principle that government policy is to be directed towards "ensuring the
promotion of a planned and balanced economic development" in which "the
material resources of the community are harnessed and distributed as best as
possible to serve the common good" and "suitable and adequate shelter,
suitable and adequate food, a reasonable national minimum living wage, old
age care and pensions, and unemployment and sick benefits are provided for
47
all citizens". Its resolution to that effect was approved by the.Supreme
Military Council.
If a statement of fundamental economic and social objectives was
difficult to achieve, constitutional delegates found the task of outlining
the principles of a "truly national" government no easier. National objectives
must embody values shared by the entire national community. As the report of - 35 -
the CDC explains:
The important thing is that the values and objectives declared should be the really fundamental ones widely shared in the community, and not the sectional objec• tives and goals of a particular group o-g the particular social ... policies of a ruling party.
Nevertheless, the attempt to identify national values may exclude from
consideration the more particularistic interests of certain tribal, religious,
or regional populations. Delegates from the former Northern Region felt
that this was an especially serious danger.
For the Constitution Drafting Committee, the fundamental objectives
49
of government must reflect "the need for loyalty to Nigeria". "National
Unity" is an ideal that gives theoretical substance both to the constitution
as well as to state policy. Accordingly, the country's new constitution
includes a number of symbolic provisions for the purpose of cultivating a
feeling of Nigerian identity. The state is committed to protecting and 50 "enhancing" Nigerian culture. The ideals of "Freedom, Equality, and Justice" stand as the foundation of the "state social order". A "national ethic" is
51
expressed in the watchwords "Discipline, Self-Reliance, and Patriotism".
At the insistence of its northern Islamic members, the CDC changed the motto
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from "Unity, Peace, and Progress" to "Unity 52
and Faith, Peace and Progress". Finally, in a statement of universal purpose,
Nigeria is committed to the promotion of African unity, as well as the
"total political, economic, soc'ialy'and cultural liberation of Africa, and
all other forms of international cooperation" aimed at "the consolidation of 53 universal peace and mutual respect among all peoples and all states".
National principles such as these are intended to encourage the development of a stronger sense of Nigerian nationality. Above the parochial interests that divide the communities within the country, they are to be the common aspirations that unite all citizens. - 36 -
A Charter of Individual Rights and Freedoms is to play a similar role. Embodying the norms of liberal-democracy, it sets out the fundamental equality of all individuals before the law and specifies their rights and liberties with respect to the exercise of all legislative, executive, and judicial authority. As the constitution declares, every citizen of Nigeria should enjoy the right to life, individual dignity, his own personal liberty
— freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, freedom of assembly and expression, and the freedom to move at will throughout the country — and to 54 his private property. Every citizen "shall have equality of rights, obliga- 55 tions, and opportunities before the law".
Yet, those articles relating to the fundamental rights of individual citizens were not accepted without considerable controversy. A majority of
CDC members, led by delegates representing northern states, argued that a reservation to the rule of equality before the law should be included for the benefit of Moslem and other traditional customs. Islamic leaders were parti• cularly fearful the a provision guaranteeing legal equality would threaten not only their religious and social hierarchy, but also their authority to interpret those Islamic teachings concerned with family matters and relations with individuals outside the faith. They maintained that the rules of Islam and of other traditional practices are still influential and comprise the
"basis of Nigeria's religious and cultural heritage".^ For this reason, a majority of the plenary session of the CDC agreed that the constitution should include an article providing that "all citizens, male and female, should have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law but this
57 provision shall not abrogate any rule of Moslem or customary law".
That conclusion was bitterly resented by delegates representing the southern states during the sessions of the Constituent Assembly. Opponents of the reservation clause viewed its inclusion as a special concession "-to the - 37 -
north, and one which would prevent the development of a nation-wide system of legal norms. They argued that nothing should be allowed to qualify "what, after all, is a statement of the ideal which we wish to attain". In their opinion, "it ought to beoexpected that rules of Islamic or customary law would or should eventually give way to the ideals of equality enshrined in the rule".^ Opponents of the concession to Islamic law formed a majority in the
Constituent Assembly. Declaring their aspirations for a unified system of .l..=v legal principle, they voted to remove any religious qualifications to the rule of equality before the law.
A similar dispute erupted over the wording of provisions setting forth the principles of national integration. Article 15 of Nigeria's new constitution reads in part:
For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty of the State to - a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free ab bmobility of people, goods, and services throughout the Federation; b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation; c) encourage intermarriage among persons of different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic, or linguistic association or ties; and d) promise or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other sectional barriers.
The obligation to encourage intermarriage contradicts a fundamental tenet of Islamic law. According to the teachings of that faith, it is offensive for a Moslem woman to marry a non-believer. Opposition to the provision grew quite strong in meetings of the Constitution Drafting Committee, and especially during those of the Constituent Assembly. Led by Islamic funda-
60 mentalists, a movement was organized within the Assembly to prevent the inclusion of such an immoral objective in the country's new constitution.
Although the decision of a majority of constitutional delegates was in - 38 -
favour of the provision, the dispute indicates that consensus regarding even
such a basic issue as securing individual rights for all Nigerians is not
easily attained. What one social group determines to be an essential standard
of morality may not be "moral" at all, from the perspective of another group
whose behaviour is informed by different sets of values and traditions.
Conflict also arose over the inclusion of principles to ensure the
participation of all communities in the conduct of government. Several members
of the CDC, especially those from the dominant tribes of the northern and
western states, argued that while all states and ethnic groups within Nigeria
should be accorded fair and equal treatment with respect to the composition \
and the activities of national government, adequate safeguards already existed
in the form of provisions establishing separate state governments. To add a
constitutional qualification guaranteeing the participation of ethnic groups
would add an unwelcome complication to the make-up and capabilities of 61 government office. It would ultimately stand in the way of developing a :: sense of national loyalty.
Because of the relatively large population of Nigeria's northern
states, Hausa-Fulani politicians were assured of extensive participation in t
the country's new political structure. However, for the country's smaller s ethnic groups, and particularly for the minority groups of the central states, participation in the processes of national government was not guaranteed.
Many CDC members pointed to the instability of the past as evidence of
"inter-ethnic rivalry to secure the domination of government by one ethnic 62 group or combination of ethnic groups to the exclusion of others". They maintained that written provisions were thus required to avoid the domination of public office by representatives of a few states or sectional interests.
Accordingly, it was proposed that the new constitution should prevent "the monopoly of public office ... in the Federal Government ... or states ... or - 39 -
of the office of the President ... (by) ethnic or other sectional groups to
63
the exclusion of persons*-from other states, ethnic or sectional groups".
Moreover, it should provide that "the affairs of every government in the
Federation shall be conducted so as to assure a fair and just treatment for 64
all ethnic groups within the area of authority of each government". Dele•
gates from minority tribes viewed such statements of the non-exclusiveness of
government institutions as essential.
This position was attacked by a third group of constitutional
delegates. Stressing the need for unqualified loyalty to the Nigerian state,
they argued that Nigeria "cannot afford to accept a situation in which a man's
ethnic or linguistic affiliation is the primary definition" of his citizen- 65
ship. A national system of government must be based on values which stand
above ethnic identities. Hence it was proposed that a statement providing
that "the composition of every government in the Federation and the conduct
of its affairs shall be carried out ... (so as) to recognize the need for
national integration and the promotion .of national unity"66 was adequate.
Such an argument rests on the view that effective government demands an
integrated system of state structures and the support of a united people.
By recognizing sectional divisions as the basis of the nation's political
system, Nigeria would exist simply as a sum of its component parts. In the
opinion of this group of constitutional delegates, it was that very perception
that led to the collapse of civilian government in the mid-1960s.
A compromise was eventually worked out during the closing sessions
of the Constitution Drafting Committee'. Recalling the words of General Muhammed, a majority of CDC delegates accepted the phrase "federal character of Nigeria"
in the place of a more explicit recognition of sectional differences. None•
theless, the dispute re-emerged during the• meetings of the Constituent
Assembly. The fears of minority ethnic populations were again clearly stated. - 40 -
The final decision of the Assembly makes reference to both the "federal character of Nigeria" and the need for non-exclusive institutions of government.^ By the terms of the new constitution:
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be earried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectiongl groups in that government or in any of its agencies.
The principles of national integration embodied in the constitution could not exclude reference to the country's sectional divisions. As Nigeria's constitutional debates neared an end, several delegates openly regretted the fact that their fellow assemblymen had found it impossible to erect the 69 foundations of national unity on national values alone.
The disputes which thus shaped the course of the debate on Nigeria's national objectives and principles do not directly involve questions regarding the specifics of institutional engineering. However, they do accentuate an issue which stands at the heart of constitutional reform. What sort of norms should guide the decisions of the men whose responsibility it is to draftia new constitutional document? Evidently, in the case of Nigeria, compromise could be reached on only the most general of statements. The extent to which delegates believed that specified norms of behaviour would actually influence the conduct of political activity remains largely a matter of conjecture. The provisions which follow the constitution's declaration of principles are more specific in their detail of governmental practices and procedures. Yet, they to were subject to controversies which, at times, threatened to bring the entire process of constitutional reform to a halt. - 41 -
A Federal System of Government
Federalism in Nigeria did not emerge as an issue in its own right during the country's constitutional debates. As General Muhammed made clear at the opening session of the CDC, the authors of the new constitution were already committed to building a federal system of government. However, it was to be a federal system that would differ greatly from the fragile arrangement of regions and weak central government that characterized the first civilian
Republic.
Constitutional delegates were not viewed as the direct representa•
tives of sovereign regional or state authorities. Rather, they served as representatives of the "people". They were expected to act on behalf of federal
and state governments alike. While the interests of organized state bureau•
cracies were expressed, agreement on the provisions of the constitution did
not depend on constructing a consensus of opinion among spokesmen for indepen•
dent governments. Keith Panter-Brick explains: "The States were not coming
together to form a Federation: the Federation was reconstituting itself in its 70
own sovereign ... fashion". In so doing, the constitutional provisions that
finally emerged were influenced by the degree of centralization already
achieved during the era of military rule. Jurisdictions were allocated to
various levels of government on the rationalized basis of what functions each
could, or should, be expected to carry out. Neither the composition of states
nor the allocation of legislative and executive powers proved to be issues
free of dispute. But the need for a strong central authority was generally
recognized. Defining the powers and the organization of the federal govern•
ment was, after all, the primary purpose of Nigeria's constitutional
exercise.
Chapter I of the new constitution formally establishes Nigeria
as an "indivisible and indissoluble" Federation consisting of 19 states and - 42 -
71 a federal capital territory. (Figure 1 illustrates Nigeria's federal and state boundaries as established by the country's 1979 constitution.) The decisions of the Gowon (and more recently of the Muhammed-Obasanjo) admin• istrations, creating twelve and then 19 states, were thereby incorporated into the nation's basic law. Wishing to undermine the influence wielded by large regional governments, General Gowon had first sub-divided Nigeria's four regions into twelve separate states in 1967. Because the;new state adminis• trations Were to exercise! power over smaller populations — and over a more limited fund of revenues and other resources as well — their political influence would be reduced. They would no longer be able to entertain the prospect of successfully seceding from the Nigerian Federation, at least on 72 an individual basis. The creation of more states would further reduce the bargaining position of state authorities vis-a-vis Nigeria's national government. State governments could not expect to demand concessions from federal authorities without joining in coalitions with other states, a move which would first require a broad consensus of interests. Moreover, the creation of more states would increase the opportunities for individuals to attain positions of political power, and to exercise the control over revenues and economic resources which that power entails. It would thus help to assuage minority fears of exclusion from the political process. Finally, in spite of recognizing that the demands for the creation of new states arise from the
"strength of ethnic loyalty, mutual suspicion, and even hatred among the 73 diverse peoples that make up Nigeria", the Federal Military Government maintained that one reason for increasing the number of state administrations outweighs all the others. Simply put, "there exists a very strong movement for 74 it and political stability cannot be guaranteed without it".
It was this latter consideration that prompted General Muhammed in 1975 to establish an advisory committee with powers to recommend the - 43 -
(Federal Department of Information, Lugos) - 44 -
creation of more states. The proposal was supported at the time by bureaucrats
and former politicians — Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Sir Louis Mbanefo,
Chief J.U. Nwodo, and Chief Aja Nwachuku, all well-known political person•
alities and former regional or federal ministers ---:• anxious to increase the
number of government positions and their chances of attaining political
office, by: communal, deaders1 from minority groups which found themselves
excluded from policy-making activities in existing state governments, and by
young civil servants and students in searah of opportunities for public
employment. In 1976 General Obasanjo announced his decision to increase the 75
number of states to 19. At the same time, he recognized that the process of
state creation could go on indefinitely. If the intention of the central
military government was to provide a separate state for each distinct ethnic
group demanding its own government, then the number of states would be so
great, and the capabilities of many so restricted, as to make state
administration ineffective. For that reason the Federal Military Government
instructed Nigeria's constitutional authors that the further creation of
states should be made as difficult as possible.
The issue of state creation proved to be highly contentious for
members of the CDC and Constituent Assembly. Several former politicians and
communal leaders continued to argue that the present number of state
authorities should only be regarded as temporary. In their view, petitions
for the creation of more states would continue after the return to civilian rule. To illustrate the point, one CDC sub-committee reports: It is inconceivable, almost bordering on naivety, to think that people in the Calabar-Ogoja area will suddenly turn sweet under a civilian government and be quiet when, even under the present firm military administration which has come out unequivocally against further creation of i > more states, they and their chiefs have defied apparent reproof and have continued canvassing openly, loudly and petitioning for the creation of their new state. Such - 45 -
peoples and communities will certainly be more 9gen and aggressive under a civilian administration.
The sub-committee called for provisions which would be flexible enough to meet those demands, without having to resort to extra-constitutional means.
Other delegates who associated themselves closely with existing state governments, and with the Federal Military Government, strongly supported the decision of the Supreme Military Council for stringent constitutional restraints. At one time debate over the issue became so heated that several members of the Constituent Assembly from minority tribal regions threatened
77 to walk out of the sessions. It was not until General Obasanjo issued a
stern warning reiterating the opposition of the Supreme Military Council to
the idea of an increasing the number of states that discussion on the matter 78 was brought to an end.
The constitution establishes a complex procedure for state
creation. A request for the formation of a new state must be supported by at
least a two-thirds majority of the members of the federal Senate and House
of Representatives who represent the area in which the demand originates, by
the Houses of Assembly of the states involved, and by the local government
councils of the area affected. Furthermore, the request must be submitted
in the form of a referendum for the approval of a two-thirds majority of the
population in the area concerned. Only then may the proposal be presented
to both houses of the National Assembly. Its final passage into law requires 79
the support of two-thirds of National Assembly members. In effect, such
a formula makes the creation of new states almost impossible. It defines a
limit beyond which the demands of effective government are no longer able to give way to guarantees of communal participation. * «• #
The distribution of executive and legislative powers raised
relatively few issues of contention for members of the CDC or Constituent - 46 -
Assembly. In this respect, the decisions of constitutional delegates reflected the centralized policy-making initiatives already adopted by the
Federal Military Government and now recognized as essential for undertaking programmes of national economic and social development. It was generally accepted that central authorities should be responsible for maintaining basic infrastructural services, national defence and internal security. However, it was also acknowledged that the constitution should not restrain federal initiatives, either in formulating plans for economic growth or in providing social services. While state administrations are to concern themselves with 80 matters of local import — the operation of local government councils, cultural affairs, local economic development projects, and securing educa• tional, health and other social services for their own populations — federal officials must be granted unlimited capacity to plan, coordinate, and imple• ment nation-wide economic and social policies. Thus, the authors of Nigeria's new constitution were concerned to specify the powers of central authority.
Federal jurisdictions must be clearly enunciated and understood.
The constitution establishes three areas of governmental respon• sibility. The first is outlined in a list of functions to be placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government; the second, a consurrent list, specifies those matters in which both central and state governments are empowered to legislate, but where federal laws supercede enactments of state assemblies; and, the third takes the form of a set of residual powers 81 left to the discretion of state authorities. The exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government is extensive. Federal officials are accorded the right to safeguard the supply of essential commodities and to control their prices.
They control banking and financial activities. The central administration has the exclusive right to borrow money for federal or state purposes. - 47 -
Moreover, the federal government is to regulate trade and commerce between
states, maintain trunk roads, railways, shipping and communications services,
and supervise all customs and excise duties, labour relations and standards
of education. Control over all mines and oil fields is placed in federal hands. So are matters coming under the rubric of external affairs and 82 national defence. Central authorities are further enabled to establish and regulate agencies for the implementation of the constitution's fundamental objectives — a clause which several constitutional experts opposed, fearing that it would justify federal intervention in any policy area whatsoever.
The constitution stipulates that in a declared state of emergency (in cases of national disorder, or upon the request of a state governor and a two-thirds majority of his House of Assembly, and proclaimed by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly), the federal government may assume responsibility for any matter under state jurisdiction. In short, the new constitution establishes a federal authority with exclusive power to provide for the security, as well as to control the financial, economic, and infrastructural activities, of the entire nation.
A list of concurrent powers is also included in Nigeria's new constitutional arrangements. Both federal and state governments are empowered to make laws with respect to revenue allocation, national monuments, archives, the collection of taxes, electoral procedures, electrical power, the film industry, scientific and technological research, as well as university and other post-primary education. Likewise, federal and state legislatures exercise concurrent jurisdiction over agricultural research and industrial working conditions. Both levels of government may regulate foreign and indigenous business enterprises. And, they are jointly charged with respon• sibility for formulating industrial, commercial, and agricultural development - 48 -
policies. 83 In each of these areas, however, federal legislation takes prece•
dence. State governments, then, may make laws only in so far as they are not
superceded by decisions of the central government. While this scheme allows
for centralized coordination and planning, it also enables state governments
to respond to the circumstances of their immediate localities, particularly
througth the implementation and administration of federal policies.
By the terms of the constitution, Nigeria's state governments are
left with residual powers. Yet, this category also covers a wide range of
responsiilities. In effect, states are accorded jurisdiction over most
84
cultural and tribal matters. Moreover, they retain responsibility for
education, health, and social services, and for the provision of such facil•
ities to their respective populations. The constitution commits each state
to the establishment of local government councils. It guarantees the existence
of "democratically elected local councils" for areas defined by "the common
interest of community, traditional association, and administrative
85 convenience". Nevertheless, it places the responsibility for defining the number, composition, finances, and functions of local councils with state
86
authorities. Stressing the importance of involving individuals in making
decisions that affect their own communities, the constitution enables local
governments to make recommendations to their respective state Economic
Planning Commissions. Local authorities may construct roads and cemeteries.
They may regulate local business establishments. Furthermore, they are to act
as the administrative organs of state governments in providing primary educat
tion, developing agricultural resources, and in maintaining health and
87
welfare services. In effect, the distribution of powers embodied in the
constitution accords state authorities substantial jurisdiction over the
economic and social conditions of their populations. It extends responsibility
for economic policy coordination and planning to the central government. But, - 49 -
many of the decisions required to implement those policies remain within
state jurisdiction.
The allocation of public revenues proved to be a much more conten•
tious issue during the meetings of the constitutuinal Committee and Assembly.
By the late 1970s, the Federal Military Government had attained control
over mining and petroleum royalties and the revenues of agricultural
marketing boards. It had centralized the collection of incomes, profits, and
capital gains taxes. In addition, it had established a distributable pool
account and an allocation formula that, to a large extent, replaced the
88
principle of redistributing moneys to those states whence they originated.
Instead, finances were allocated according to the criteria of "need, equity,
and balanced development" — 50 percent of those revenues set aside for
state governments being shared equally among the states and the other 50 89
percent allocated on the basis of population. The issue concerning which
level of government should be empowered to levy specific taxes was not
disputed. What state authorities and constitutional delegates did question was
the formula that was to determine the amount of public revenues each state
administration would receive.
The Constitution Drafting Committee recognized the need to amend
rhe system of revenue allocation at an early date. The existing formula was
"unsatisfactory and undoubtedly unfair to some of the states with large
90
populations". CDC delegates, though, were unable to agree on a formula for
redistributing revenues among states. If a solution provided proportionally
more revenue to poorer or less developed states, it did not necessarily take
into consideration relative state populations. The Committee recommended that
the Federal Military Government should devise a formula for revenue allocation
acceptable to state authorities and include its proposals in a schedule to the - 50 -
91 constitution. A technical committee was thus convened by the Supreme 92
Military Council in 1979. In spite of its efforts to reach a consensus,
the committee of enquiry finally had to suggest that a formula for revenue
allocation should be a matter for the country's new National Assembly to
decide.
Nigeria's new constitution does define federal and state juris• dictions with regard to the collection of public revenues. While the federal government has exclusive right over export duties, mining and petroleum royalties, stamp duties, and taxes on incomes, profits and capital gains, state administrations are empowered to levy any other taxes, fees, or rents 93 through the agency of local government councils. The constitution provides for the establishment of a distributable pool account in order to allocate
94 revenues collected by the federal government to state authorities. However, with the exception of an article providing that "taxes and duties on capital gains, incomes, and profits of persons other than companies and on documents 95 or transactions by way of stamp duties" should be distributed to the states on the basis of derivation, no comprehensive formula for revenue allocation is set forth. Following the recommendation of the federal commission of enquiry, the redistribution of public funds has been effectively left to the discretion 96 of the National Assembly.
Nigeria's constitutional distribution of government responsibilities and public reevenues reflects the growth of central administration during the era of military rule. Decree and administrative practice brought many governmental activities within the jurisdiction of federal authority, both, during and after Nigeria's civil war. The constitution formally acknowledges these structural changes. But, it does not dispel opportunities for conflict among local populations and federal and state governments. Communal leaders continue to demand the creation of new states to satisfy their quest for - 51 -
political power, and for the ability to provide their supporters with tangible benefits from public resources. Federal authorities are accorded far-reaching powers, and it is written that federal legislation shall take precedence over state laws. But, the opportunities for federal-state conflict are thereby increased. Should the economic fortunes of political leaders and there clientele come to rest on the implementation of a certain policy decision, then it is possible that state governments might simply disregard constitutional restraints and attempt to implement their legislation in contradiction to federal policies. Where officials continue to use their power for the material benefit of their political allies, a federal system may leave little room for negotiation between two contending levels of government. By itself, Nigeria's constitutional document cannot prevent intergovernmental conflict — conflict which may ultimately lead to the use of force by federal authorities.
Finally, the constitution leaves the issue of revenue allocation open. The division of public finances among state governments determines the resources available for distribution by local officials. The disputes that have revolved about the issue of devising a revenue allocation formula thus bring into clear relief the rivalries that exist among state officials and their respective allies for political power and access to those economic benefits under governmental control. The constitutional provisions that establish a federal system of government for Nigeria embody a particular division of governmental jurisdictions between national and state authorities.
Shaped by the administrative practices that tended to centralize authority during the years of military rule, and guided by a set of objectives intended to sustain the powers of the federal administration, the decisions of
Nigeria's constitution-makers were intended above all to consolidate the institutions of an effective national government. - 52 -
An Executive Presidency
Perhaps the most extensive range of constitutional reforms lies in: the provision for a presidential system of government to replace the parlia• mentary system of the first civilian Republic. By the terms of the CDC1s recommendations:
There shall be a President and a Vice-President of the Republic who shall be elected on the same ticket. The President shall be Head of State and Head of Govern• ment of the Federation and Commgnder-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation.
The Committee thus rejected a system of government in which the head of state and head of government are separate, and where decision-making rests with a cabinet of elected ministers headed by a prime minister. According to the
CDC report, experience had shown that a separation of ceremonial and real political power is very difficult to maintain in Africa.
(The) division between real authority and formal authority ... is meaningless in the light of African political experience and history.... It is difficult to: maintain in practice. No African Head of State has been known to be content with the position of a mere figurehead.... The system has resulted in a clash of personalities and of interests, a conflict of author• ity and an unnecessary complexity and uncertainty in governmental relations.
The report goes on to state that the complexity of parliamentary government is not conducive either to the centralized administration necessary for economic development or to the cultivation of national loyalty.
The paramount heed of Nigeria is for development. We want to be able to develop our economy, to modernize and integrate our society, to secure and promote stability in the community, and to safeguard civil liberty.... The effect of ... (a) system- of government and opposition ... on national integration and social stability is pos• itively detrimental.
The CDC felt that the conflicts inherent in a parliamentary system necessarily result in political instability. They pose a threat to national unity. In such circumstances, there can be no centre of loyalty, no sense - 53 -
of national integration.
For members of the Constitution Drafting Committee, a presidential
system modelled on the structures of American government was believed to be
better suited to Nigeria's political needs. A single executive detached from
the legislature, it was argued, would provide unified and efficient leader•
ship. "The unity of a single executive clearly conduces (sic.) more to
energy and despatch than the disunity of many wills". In order to
institute effective leadership, then, it was necessary to "establish a single
individual in the capacity of chief executive" with the power to impose his
will over his cabinet when differences of opinion threaten to forestall
agreement. Furthermore, a presidential system of government would concentrate
responsibility in the hands of the chief executive. Capable of controlling the
actions of hisiappointed.^ministers, a directly elected president would stand
as a focus of loyalty for all citizens. The right of the president to govern, the CDC argued, flows directly from the people. It does not depend on his ability to maintain a majority in any legislative assembly. While the chief executive would have to rely on the legislature to put his policies into effect, his tenure of office and his capacity to formulate policies would not be based on the:fluid nature of partisan representation in an elected assembly. "'"^ The issue of establishing a presidential system of government excited very few differences of opinion among members of the CDC or Constituent 102
Assembly. The Supreme Military Council, after all, had resolved that an executive presidency should be established, even before the CDC had convened.
Delegates did, however, recognize the danger involved in concentrating power in the hands of one individual. As the CDC report indicates: A President with such wide powers and armed with the organized forces of the state could easily become a dictator, and could dismiss the legislature which, as an institution, has no organized force under its control and no machinery for preventing the usurpa• tion of power by the executive. The stage is then set for personal rule by the president.... (where) every challenge to any act of government might be viewed as a challenge to the State and to the entire political system.
The effectiveness of presidential government is counterbalanced by the
possibility that unchecked decision-making power might become the exclusive
privilege of one person. As Dr. Suleiman Kumo argued in the Constituent
Assembly, "it is inconsistent with the promotion of democratic principles to
104
have an executive president who is law unto himself". Provision might be
made for the representation of communal or sectional groups in the federal
cabinet and National Assembly. Yet, a president with unlimited executive power
would be able to direct the policy decisions of national government on his
own account. Again, the reins of national government would fall into the
hands of one set of partisan or sectional interests. What appeared to be
necessary, then, was a system of executive, legislative, and constitutional
checks on the power of the president. The recommendations of both the CDC
and Constituent Assembly placed strong emphasis on developing such institu•
tional constraints. Once again, the aim was to ensure the participation of
diverse sectional groups in the machinery of central government.
Nigeria's new constitution sets forth provisions for a presidential
system of government, accompanied by a complex arrangement of safeguards affecting
the exercise ©f executive and legislative power. Executive authority is distin•
guished from the legislative responsibilities vested in the two chambers of
the National Assembly — the Senate and House of Representatives — and the
states' Houses of Assembly. Federal executive power is vested in the office
of the president who is to act in the capacity of head of state and head of government. Likewise, chief executive authority at the state level is accorded - 55 -
to the office of governor. With a vice-president and appointed ministerial
cabinet (deputy governor and commissioners in the states), each chief
executive is charged with responsibility for determining the policies of his respective administration and coordinating the activities of various ministries, and commissions, in the implementation of legislative and
... 105 executive decisions.
Constitutional qualifications for presidential and gubernatorial office are stringent. The president must be Nigerian by birth and at least
35 years of age.^6 He and his vice-presidential running-mate must be popularly elected, commanding the highest number of votes cast in a national election and not less than one-quarter of the votes cast in at least two- thirds of the states of the Federation. If no candidate is elected on this basis, the constitution requires a run-off election between the two candidates
107 with the highest number of votes cast in their favour. The formula determined by the CDC and Constituent Assembly stipulated that the successful candidate must again receive a minimum of 25 percent of the votes cast in at least two-thirds of the states. In the case that a deadlock results once more from this procedure, the National Assembly and all state Assemblies would constitute themselves as an electoral college, their members determining by a 108 simple majority vote which of the two candidates is to be president.
A state governor is subject to the same age and citizenship qualifications as the president of the Federation. He too must be elected by popular vote. A successful candidate is required to obtain the highest number of votes cast, in addition to at least one-quarter of the votes cast in two-thirds of the local government areas in his respective state. If necessary, another election is to be held in the state House of Assembly. The candidate who then achieves a simple majority in that body is to be duly: elected 109 governor. In this manner, the constitution attempts to guarantee that the - 56 -
offices of national president and state governor are occupied by individuals whose electoral support is not concentrated in particular geographic areas
of the country. Nigeria's executive offices are to be representative of all parts of the nation.
The period of tenure for each executive position is also established by the constitution. The president and state governors are to be elected every four years.^® They may, however, be removed from office before their term expires for reasons of "gross misconduct in the performance of duties1'."'""'"'
Allegations of "gross misconduct" must be proved to the satisfaction of a committee of seven persons appointed by the president of the Senate (by the
Speaker of the House of Assembly in the case of a state governor). Impeachment of a chief executive then requires the adoption of the committee's recommenda• tion to that effect by two-thirds of the members of each house of the National
Assembly (or, for governors, by two-thirds of the members of the House of 112
Assembly concerned). Impeachment proceedings are not made so simple as to become a routine threat to the stability of chief executive office. Neverthe• less, the opportunity to remove the president, or a state governor, does exist and can be exercised in situations where an abuse of executive power is judged to have taken place.
Provisions for the appointment of federal ministers explicitly recognize the need to represent all regions within the policy-making machinery of central government. The constitution stipulates that federal ministers shall be appointed by the president with majority Senate approval.
It goes on to declare that at least one minister shall be appointed from 113 every state, "who is an indigene of that state". The formulation of policy decisions, therefore, cannot become the exclusive preserve of one set of regional interests. All parts of the country must be represented in the federal cabinet. - 57 -
A further constraint on the powers of the president is set forth in the establishment of certain executive bodies whose functions are nominally independent of presidential control. A Council of Stateconsisting of the president, vice-president, former heads of government and chief ; justices, the president of the Senate and speaker of the House of Represent• atives, the federal attorney-general, the governor of each state, and one person from every state appointed by a Council of Chiefs, is empowered to advise the president in matters relating to the national census, honours and awards, the appointment of members of other federal commissions, and the maintenance of public order. Appointments to the national public service and to leading judicial positions are to be made by a Federal Public Service 114
Commission and a Federal Judicial Service Commission respectively. A Federal
Electoral Commission is charged with regulating the conduct of national elections. A National Population Commission is to undertake the registration of births and deaths in the Republic. Moreover, provisions for a National
Defence Council, National Economic Council, National Security Council, and a' Police Service Commission are set forth, enabling the president to obtain the advice of his chief ministers, and of the country's economic and military leaders, in issues specifically affecting internal and external security, 115 economic development, and control over Nigeria's police forces.
Similar executive bodies are established at the state level. The constitution creates Civil Service Commissions, State Electoral Commissions,
Economic Development Commissions, and State Judicial Service Commissions to assume the same functions as their federal counterparts. In addition, a
Council of Chiefs is established in every state. Appointed by each House of
Assembly, the councils are empowered to advise state governments in matters of local and cultural concern, intercommunal relations, and chieftancy - 58 -
116 affairs. Federal and state executive commissions are to be independent
agencies, free of presidential or gubernatorial influence. Their purpose
is to remove certain administrative issues from the exclusive control of
the president or state governors. They are to act as a restraint on the
exercise of discretionary executive power in "matters of supreme importance
or sensitivity".
A Representative Legislature
The composition and responsibilities of federal and state legisla•
tures, as stipulated by Nigeria's new constitution, are to ensure a broad
range of communal and regional representation in the consideration and enact•
ment of public statutes. At the federal level, a bicameral National Assembly
is composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Five members from
each of Nigeria's 19 states, as well as one representing the Federal Capital
Territory, sit in the federal Senate. Membership in the House of Representa•
tives totals 450 and is based on popular election from single-member
118
constituencies. Bills are enacted into law when they are passed by both houses of the National Assembly and given assent by the president. Although any bill may originate in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, a statute cannot receive presidential assent unless an consensus is reached between the two chambers. If agreement cannot be attained, then the bill in 119 question is defeated. :However, in the case of legislation affecting public finance, the bill may be referred to a joint finance committee representing
120 both houses, for purposes of further debate and amendment. The president must signify his consent to legislation not later than 30 days after it has been submitted to him by the National Assembly. If presidential assent is withheld, the bill may be enacted into law by a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives (or, for money bills, by a two- - 59 -
121 thirds majority of the National Assembly in joint session). The legislature,
then, is constitutionally empowered to override the presidential veto. The
National Assembly, (though, must command the support of a substantial majority
of national representatives.
Legislative institutions at the state level are similar in form.
Each state is provided with a unicameral legislature — a House of Assembly —
composed of three times the number of members elected from that state to
the House of Representatives. Again, election is on the basis of adult
suffrage in single-member constituencies. Bills become law upon their
passage in the House of Assembly and the signification of assent by the
state governor. A similar provision is made for situations in which a
governor withholds his assent. A statute may be enacted into law, under
these circumstances, as long as it receives the support of a two-thirds
122 majority in the House of Assembly.
The Conduct of Public Officials
Nigeria's constitution establishes a number of additional safe•
guards for purposes of preventing the abuse of governmental authority and
ensuring that particular ethnic and regional interests are not excluded from
the offices of the federal government. The president, state governors, and
executive commissioners responsible for appointing both federal and state
officials are constantly reminded of the "need to promote national unity"
and exorted to appoint officials "with regard for the federal character of
123
Nigeria". At the same time, the behaviour of all political officials is
to be regulated by a code of conduct enforced by a special Public Complaints
Tribunal. The code declares any attempt to use public office for reasons of
personal benefit illegal: - 60 -
A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest jgrjflicts with his duties and responsibilities.
Officials are not allowed to operate private businesses while they are publicly employed. They may not associate with any illegal organizations.
Personal gifts may be accepted only from relatives. Loans may not be received from sources other than government agencies or legally recognized financial institutions. A written declaration of all properties, assets, and liabil• ities must be filed when an individual assumes public office, as well as at 125 the end of every four year period thereafter.
A code of conduct for public employees is accompanied by a code of electoral behaviour. Although the Supreme Military Council had suggested the abolition of political parties, the Constitution Drafting Committee concluded that partisan activity was indeed a central feature of Nigerian politics. Parties are, however, to be closely regulated. As the constitution
specifies:
No association other than a political party shall canvas for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to th^gelection expenses of any candidate at an election.
A political party must be registered with the Federal Electoral Commission
and operate from headquarters located in the federal capital. Moreover, a
party must be national in scale. Not only is the composition of its
executive committee to reflect the "federal character of Nigeria", but party
membership must be open to every citizen of the country. A party's name,
emblem, and motto are required to be free of any specific ethnic, religious,
or 'regional connotation. Finally, the code prohibits the use or threat of 127
violence in any electoral campaign. Like the code of conduct for public
officials, Nigeria's new electoral code was devised to prevent the abuse of
power that was so evident in the first civilian Republic. - 61 -
Traditional Institutions: The Sharia Court of Appeal
The most contentious issue of Nigeria's constitutional debates clearly reveal the difficulties inherent in an attempt to achieve an effective system-of :government which, at the same time, ensures the participation of a- wide range of sectional interests. The dispute centred on the role of
Islamic law in the federal judiciary. And, it emerged in the course of discussions relating to the constitutional recognition of traditional customs and practices. The report of the Constitution Drafting Committee acknowledges that some delegates were reticent about including provisions designed to protect Islamic law.
There was some argument to the effect that the reservation about Islamic and customary law may turn out to involve constitutional protection for rules of conduct which may be wholly jngefensible and which do not deserve to be protected.
Moslem delegates found such a statement highly offensive. As Keith
Panter-Brick observes, the quarrel brought out "all the prejudices that 129 have caused so- much disunity in the past". The debate extended beyond matters of principle when delegates of the CDC, and later of the Constituent
Assembly, turned their attention to those articles relating to the organ• ization of Nigeria's judiciary.
Since 1960, Moslems in the North had been subject to separate systems of criminal and civil law. While the region's criminal code was unified under the norms of English jurisprudence, a system of common law was accompanied by an Islamic civil code (the Sharia) administered by judges learned in the Islamic texts. The North's "native courts" dealt with all family matters and with many other cases of civil law placed before them.
A Sharia Court of Appeal also ;had been established in the region to hear appeals from the "native courts". Further appeal to the Supreme Court of - 62 -
Nigeria could be made only on questions involving human rights or inter•
pretations of the constitution. This pattern of divided legal norms was
maintained after the subdivision of the Northern Region in 1967. Each new :n i
130
state was granted its own system of Sharia courts.
The authors of Nigeria's new constitution, meeting in the late
1970s, were concerned to provide a unified judicial system for the country. Delegates agreed to establish a judicial structure wherein appeals of criminal and civil cases would be made from the High Courts of each state to a Federal Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme Court of 131
Nigeria. However, Moslem delegates also demanded the creation of a new
Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, composed of men "learned in Islamic law"
— the Mufti — to hear appeals from the Sharia appellate courts of each state. Although the Supreme Court, whose magistrates are versed primarily in
English -common law and procedure, would take precedence over the Federal
Sharia Court of Appeal in cases involving constitutional interpretation, the former would not serve as -a court to which further appeal could be made regarding matters of Islamic law. The establishment of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal is an issue that excited a great deal of controversy among
Nigerian constitution-makers. Should Nigeria have one system of courts? Or, should it have a dual system recognizing both English and Islamic legal codes?
A majority of the Constitution Drafting Committee recommended the estab• lishment of both a Federal Court of Appeal and a Federal Sharia Court of
132
Appeal. It prescribed a judicial system founded on the principles of common and Islamic law.
The decision was hotly disputed by non-Moslem delegates in the
Constituent Assembly. A movement to exclude Islamic courts from the federal judiciary was organized and led by delegates from southern states where - 63
followers of Islam comprise only a small proportion of the total population
— members like Professor Justin Tseayo of Abu, or Paul Unongo representing
Kwande in Benue state. They argued that provision for two courts of appeal
would unnecessarily complicate the federal judiciary. The expense involved
in maintaining a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal would benefit only one section
of the Nigerian population — the Islamic inhabitants of the northern states.
Opponents of the idea believed that the creation of a Federal Sharia Court
of Appeal would tend to divide Nigerian citizens into Moslems and non-Moslems.
133
"That cannot be a good idea for this country". In their opinion, the
establishment of a separate system of Islamic law in the judicial structures
of central government would inhibit the development of a unified set of
legal principles equally applicable to all Nigerians.
Moslem rtiembers of the Constituent Assembly attacked, that position as preju^ .
diced and myopic. The system>of Sharia courts was an integral part of their
culture and religious heritage. Creation of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal,
it was held, would not benefit Moslems at the expense of other religious
groups. It would merely satisfy the desire of Islamic inhabitants for a
central appellate court with jurisdiction over Islamic civil law and the
Sharia courts already in existence in the northern states. They argued that a
truly national legal system could not exclude Islamic law from its central
court structure.
Antagonism among the members of the Constituent Assembly reached
a climax in April 1978. A majority within the Assembly voted to delete the
articles of the draft constitution providing for a Federal Sharia Court of
Appeal to be composed of a Grand Mufti and several lesser Kadis. The decision
immediately sparked a protest among Moslem delegates. Eighty-seven Assembly members formally withdrew from the constitutional negotiations. Pointing to - 64 -
the predominance of southern members in the Constituent Assembly, they
134 condemned the "cavalier manner" in which the vote was taken. Their
action was accompanied by demonstrations throughout the northern states,
135
in support of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. Demonstrators in Kaduna
carried banners reading "Mo Sharia, No Peace" and "No Sharia, No
Constitution".''"'^ In Zaria, more than 500 protestors marched chanting 137
"Sharia is the only answer". Agitation became so widespread that General
Obasanjo issued a stern warning that the Federal Military Government would
act by whatever means it believed necessary to prevent the recurrence of
tribal and regional unrest. He told the Constituent Assembly: The confidence and trust of our people in you must not be shaken or betrayed.... By your actions, attitudes and utterances, some of you are making this happen because you either failed to sufficiently appreciate the consequences of promoting divisions in this country or you lack the will, the experience, the where- withall of a good statesman rather than a politician. Personal feelings and sectional interests should not override the need to fashion a constitution that will be flexible and workable as^^ell as guarantee the exis• tence of our great nation.
On his suggestion, the Assembly reviewed for a second time the question of establishing a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. Northern delegates resumed their seats after a two-week absence from the Assembly. A compro• mise had been proposed which both sides of the dispute, though hesitant, were willing to accept.
The compromise is embodied in the articles of Nigeria's new constitution relating to judicial organization. Every state is enabled to establish its own system of Sharia courts or customary courts to adjudicate 139 cases involving Islamic or customary law with regard to family matters.
No Sharia Court of Appeal is established at the federal level. However.,- the
Federal Court of Appeal is to include three magistrates learned in Islamic - 65 -
lav; who are empowered to preside over cases that have been appealed from 140
the Sharia courts of each state. The compromise did not fully satisfy
either side of the Sharia dispute. Many non-Moslems still regard any
acknowledgement of Islamic law as an unnecessary concession, of benefit
only to the country's Moslem population. On the other hand, there are northern
leaders who view the decision not to establish a Federal Sharia Court of
Appeal as an attempt to exclude Moslem legal customs from the nation's
judicial system. The compromise was accepted for the simple reason that it
allowed Nigeria's constitutional proceedings to continue. Without it, the
course of constitutional reform would have come to an abrupt end. The prospects for returning to peaceful civilian rule would then have appeared rather slim. The constitution represents the terms of an agreement reached among members of the Constituent Assembly. The conflict between principles involved on either side of the Sharia dispute remain largely unresolved. Military Amendments
The constitutional document that was finally enacted by the
Supreme Military Council in 1978 varies only slightly from the draft sub• mitted by delegates of Nigeria's Constituent Assembly. Military officials made 17 amendments at that time, many of which were intended to remove the
141 ambiguities from, and to strengthen, the provisions of the new basic lav;.
The inclusion of more stringent controls on the conduct of public officials is a case in point. Where members of the Constituent Assembly (most of whom entertained political aspirations of their own) were hesitant in establishing a detailed code of conduct, Nigeria's military leaders had no qualms in increasing both the number of restrictions relating to the activities of public officials and the penalties that would be imposed should governmental power be abused. The amendment emphasized the concern of the Supreme Military - 66 -
Council that the constitution should not provide any opportunity whatsoever
for corrupt political practices to re-emerge in a civilian regime.
Some of the changes effected by the military, on the other hand,
removed those portions of the Aseembliy's draft document that the Supreme
Military Council considered impractical, or undesirable. For instance, the
SMC rejected an article making English the sole language of business in the
National Assembly. English is the language of Nigeria's business, academic,
and professional communities. Its use in the National Assembly was expected
to provide a neutral means of communication. One ethnic group would not be favoured over another. Yet, while a multi-ethnic state requires a commonly understood language for its official communications, the exclusive use of
English in the National Assembly would completely ignore the cultural and linguistic diversity — and, it was feared, the political interests — of indigenous ethnic groups. It would mean that persons who lacked training in
English would find it very difficult to enter the Assembly. And, in any event, it would give precedence to a foreign language, to the language of
Nigeria's colonial past, at a time when citizens were being asked to cultivate a deeper sense of Nigerian identity. In its final form, the constitution recognizes Nigeria's three largest linguistic groups. The business of the
National Assembly is to be conducted in English, and in Hausa, Ibo, and
142
Yoruba when adequate arrangements have been made therefor. The formula represents a compromise between the need for a common and neutral language for parliamentary debate and the recognition of an indigenous plurality of ethnic cultures in Nigeria. It establishes a tenuous balance. Many tribal languages are still excluded from Assembly proceedings. Certain groups benefit while others do not. It was for this reason that members of the
Constituent Assembly found it impossible to agree on the use of any language - 67 -
other than English in the National Assembly. The compromise amendment
represents a decision which the Supreme Military Council alone was in a
position to take.
The SMC also rejected a Constituent Assembly motion that would
have given the judiciary ultimate control over public capital expenditures.
Military leaders recognized the Assembly's concern that expenditure decisions
should be made by the most impartial means possible. However, judicial
control in this area would place an inordinate amount of power in the hands
of appointed officials, who would be responsible neither to the National
Assembly nor to the population at large. Military leaders decided that
public expenditures were to remain a matter falling within the legislative
competence of the National and state assemblies and the administrative
jurisdictions of national and state executive officials.
A controversial Assembly motion disqualifying from elective office
all individuals found guilty of political misconduct since 1 October 1960
was deleted by the military leadership. Such a procedure would doubtless be
an extremely partisan operation. It would be a divisive affair, with every
potential for reviving the old sectional rivalries of the first civilian
regime. Even during the sessions of the Constituent Assembly, the motion was
interpreted by some observers not as a means to combat political corruption, but as an attempt to obstruct the political ambitions of the Yoruba leader,
Obafemi Awolowo. The idea found no favour among military officials intent upon returning the country to civilian rule and anxious that the transition should occur in as peaceful a manner as possible.
A further military amendment deleted procedures for incorporating into Nigeria territory from other sovereign states. The motion had found favour among Constituent Assembly members whose tribal ties extended into neighbouring countries — Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It was, however, an embarrassing proposal for an administration attempting to maintain
cordial relations v/ith bordering states. In any event, provisions for incor•
porating foreign territory into the Nigerian Federation hardly correspond
to'the more general principles of national sovereignty, national integrity,
and African unity which appear elsewhere in the constitution. Military leaders
felt that in this instance the Assembly had stepped beyond the limits of its
constitutional mandate.
The organizational interests of Nigeria's armed forces helped to
shape the amendments made by the country's military leaders as well. As one
of the last changes made to the Constituent Assembly's draft document, the
Supreme Military Council rejected a motion which would have related
recruitment into the federal armed forces directly to the size of state
populations. The SMC acknowledged the need for representation from all states
in the armed forces. However, military leaders did not want to lose control
over recruitment activities. They recognized too that recruitment on the
basis suggested by the Assembly would institutionalize within the armed forces
a majority from the most populous northern states. At best, the military
itself might become an object for political dispute among regional groups.
At worst, the legitimacy of military authority in the southern states might suffer. Their amendment of the Assembly's draft constitution, in the eyes of
Nigeria's military leaders, preserved the military as a force above politics
— as an effective guarantor of political stability even after the transition to civilian rule.
Nigeria's military leaders eliminated sections of the constitutional draft which they deemed undesirable. They added sections that they thought were necessary, although agreement had not been reached within the Constituent
Assembly. The military amendments announced during the latter part of 1978 represent the final intervention on the part of the Supreme Military Council - 69 -
into the constitutional process before the publication of the Constitution
(Enactment) Decree. Like the guidelines for constitutional reform presented
to the CDC, they indicate just how influential the military leaders were in
determining the final form of Nigeria's new basic lav/, in spite of their
decision not to participate directly in the sessions of either the Drafting
Committee or Constituent Assembly. Even as an indirect force, military admin•
istrative practices shaped the nature of the federal political system that
was ultimately bequeathed to a civilian regime. The timetable for constitu•
tional reform and the question of who would participate in the proceedings
were both matters resolved by military directive. Indeed, the experiences of
military government provided an indication of what lay in store for Nigeria
should constitutional deliberations have broken down. The prospect of a
return to military rule continues to exert a very real force on the conduct
of political activity under Nigeria's new constitution. * * *
Nigeria's 1979 constitution sets forth a new body of structural
and procedural provisions which are to govern political behaviour in an
era of civilian administration. In order to overcome the problems of
previous regimes, the constitution is designed to provide the basis for
an effective method of decision-making that would allow Nigerian officials
to tackle the process of economic and social development. Moreover, the constitution is to ensure that no single set of ethnic, regional, or partisan interests is able to gain exclusive control over the institutions of national government. The basic law is to strike a balance between the need for a strong federal government and the political necessity of devolving as much power as possible to the 19 states. It is an attempt to reconcile the emergence of a modern society with the pulls of traditional authority. And, it sets out to unite Nigeria's ethnic communities into a single political entity. By any - 70 -
standards, the result is complicated, the product of a long and complex negotiating process.
Specifying the details of constitutional reform proved to be a contentious business. Viewpoints frequently clashed. Debate often degenerated into heated argument. Nevertheless, military leaders and consti• tutional delegates were able to agree on one point: The stability of Nigeria's political system depends, in the last instance, on the extent to which these two goals — of effective and pluralistic government — are fulfilled.
What became increasingly evident during the proceedings of the
Constitution Drafting Committee and Constituent Assembly are the difficulties involved in reconciling the objectives of constitutional reform. Cynthia Enloe refers to the two counterbalancing tendencies in her study of ethnic conflict and political development.
Functional modernity demands administrative central• ization and nationalization of policy priorities to maximize the use of deficient resources and assure the coordination of necessary "national activities". However, unification of a multiethnic society often is achieved by acquiescing to entrenched communal desires.
Provisions that concentrate responsibilities in the hands of a central government, and which are intended to "rationalize" the organization of federal institutions, were viewed with some trepidation because they tend to limit the access to important centres of decision-making authority for spokesmen representing the more parochial interests of sectional or regional communities. On the other hand, a political system which accords too much authority to state governments, treating them as the valid representatives of regional interests, complicates the governmental process. So does the process of expanding the machinery of central government by establishing a multitude of checks on the exercise cf political power, or by creating opportunities for the expression of particularistic interests within the - 71 -
central administration. The controversies that shaped Nigeria's constitutional proceedings reflect the tensions involved in attempting to lay the foundations for an effective and non-exclusive system of government. The country's constitutional engineers were concerned, above all, with finding a balance, a compromise, between these two objectives. Their task was to construct a set of institutional arrangements that would provide for a unified and workable system of national government, and at the same time recognize the diversity of interests inherent in a multi-ethnic society. Periodically, their behaviour threatened to disrupt the entire process of constitutional reconstruction. Debate was largely shaped by sectional rivalries and disputes.
The proceedings emphasize one of the most pressing problems for emergent states like Nigeria: How is it possible "to reconcile the demands of communal groups for security and autonomy with the requirements of the nation-estate
144 for order and unity"?
Nigeria's constitution is a product of its own political environment. It is a compromise — a compromise between two political objectives; between the aspirations of Nigeria's constitutional engineers and the practical political concerns expressed in their deliberations; between the diverse interests of the country's constitutional authors. Its ultimate acceptance, and the extent to which it is capable of diverting political behaviour from the rancorous course it has taken in the past, depend largely on the nature of that compromise. Chapter III
The Return to Civilian Rule
The ceremonies which marked the accession to power of a civilian
government in 1979 were also intended to celebrate the advent of a new era
of internal peace and political stability in Nigeria. They represented the
aspirations of the country's military and political leaders, and the hopes
they placed in the process of constitutional reform. What effect has a new
constitution actually had on the conduct of political activities in Nigeria?
By its own account, the document merely sets forth a set of governmental
structures and practices. It prescribes the rules and procedures by which
Nigeria should be governed. However, this is perhaps the simplest of the
tasks it is expected to fulfill. The capacity of Nigeria's new constitutional
document to regulate political behaviour is another matter altogether. The
disputes which erupted during the months of constitutional debate, the
conduct of political affairs since steps were first taken to elect a new civilian government, the internal logic of the provisions contained in the basic law promulgated in 1979, all indicate that the constitution's influence on political conduct is neither as immediate nor as direct as popular opinion had presumed it would be.
A statement enunciating the principles of effective, democratic, and representative government is not sufficient in itself to guarantee a corresponding pattern of political behaviour. While Nigeria's constitution is founded on a general will to establish a political system which is both stable and effective, the stability of that system is a property contingent upon the dynamic interplay of political interests. Any attempt to assess the degree to which political activity in Nigeria is likely to assume the shape prescribed for it by the new constitution, therefore, must involve some consideration of the relationship that exists between the structures of govern• ment on the one hand, and political interests and the traditions of political - 73 -
behaviour on the other.
From a general perspective, what role does the constitution play
in the Nigerian political system? More specifically, are there conditions
that must be fulfilled in order for government to operate within the
structural and procedural bounds established by the new constitution? Whether
the system of government set forth by the Nigerian constitution is capable
of managing political conflict or not is a matter that must ultimately be
left for time to resolve. However, the provisions of the constitution and
the procedures involved in their formulation may afford some glimpse of the
difficulties Nigeria is likely to experience in its return to civilian rule.
A constitutional document performs a dual purpose. As James Bryce writes, it provides "a frame of political society, organized through and by
the law, that is to say, one in which the law has established permanent forms with recognized functions and definite rights".^" Alternatively, it embodies a
set of rules whose purpose is to constrain the actions of those individuals who exercise political power. Carl Friedrich observes that:
(A) constitution ... is the process by which govern• mental action is effectively restrained ... and is understood as the process the function of which is not only to organize but to restrain.
A constitution, then, not only specifies the organization of government; it also involves the definition and limitation of public authority. It provides a prescription concerning relations among various governmental structures and between them and the citizen. B.O. Nwabueze writes of constitutionalism in emergent states that government is a creation of the basic law. "The constitution ... creates the organs of government, clothes them with their 3 powers and in so doing delineates the scope in which they are to operate".
As such, the constitution exists as a normative framework formally setting forth the legality of certain organizations and procedures that should - 74 - determine the bounds of political activity.
Yet, a structural framework, a statement of principles and procedures, remains insignificant in itself. It cannot be dissociated from the context of the political interests in which it evolved. Likewise, the value of a constitution resides less in the character of its actual provisions than in the extent to which political activity is in fact regulated by the organizations and procedures that it establishes. The hopes vested in Nigeria's new constitution thus rest on the acceptance of its structural arrangements, 4 by those individuals whom they affect, as right and proper. Its procedures 5 of government must become "institutionalized". They must become part of
Nigeria's traditions of political behaviour, valued in their own right, acquiring a sense of stability and recurring over time because the rules which they embody are customarily obeyed. J. Roland Pennock explains: Whether political and governmental structures are formal or informal, incorporated in the legal structure or not, it is of greatest importance that they should be institutionalized.... It is when certain forms and procedures become the accepted ways of doing things that they become effective instruments of stability.
How far does political practice reflect the principles and procedures enunciated by Nigeria's new constitution? Will the adoption of the constitution consolidate reform within Nigeria's political system?
The answers to these questions depend in the first instance upon the nature of the structures and constraints specified by the basic law. What activities are circumscribed by constitutional provision? A complete evaluation, however., must also account for the authority popularly attached to the articles of the basic law. It is necessary to consider the constitution from the standpoint of those customs and practices which inform the conduct of political activity in Nigeria. Traditions of political behaviour were instrumental in determining the final form of the country's basic law. But, they were themselves the - 75 - object of the entire project of constitutional reform. The "success" of that project ultimately rests on the capacity of the constitution to accommodate the interests, experiences, and practices of political actors. The authority commanded by any document purporting to circumscribe political activity is based upon the extent to which that constitution embodies political tradition. What must ultimately be asked, then, is not how a constitution actually constrains political activity, but whether its provisions are able to regulate such activity in the first place.
Problems of Institutionalization
Both the specific provisions of the Nigerian constitution and the procedures that were employed in their formulation influence the extent political actors are prepared to defer to the new basic law. It must be noted at the beginning that Nigeria's new constitution is a product of the rational deliberations of its authors. The document is the creation of consti• tutional engineers whose task it was to determine which set of structural arrangements would best contribute to the emergence of a stable political regime in that country. The record of constitutional proceedings indicates the significance that was placed in past political experience, the importance of entrenched political interests and common political practices, in their deliberations. It also shows that much of the task of constitutional reform involved a selection of "appropriate" structures and procedures on the basis of theoretical principles of "good" government. After all, Nigeria's consti• tution-makers possessed very few precedents upon which to base their prescrip• tions for political stability. Often their constitutional proposals were founded on little more than commonly held aspirations. They were justified largely on the assumption that political activity would take on the rational inner logic of their constitutional provisions once put into effect. - 76 -
The national objectives enunciated by military leaders, by the
Constitution Drafting Committee, and by the Constituent Assembly, served to
unite Nigeria's constitution-makers in their effort to achieve a common
purpose. The constitution was to lay the foundations for civilian govern•
ment. It was to be a democratic government committed to preserving the legal
rights of the individual citizen, to the reconciliation of diverse political
interests, and to the exigencies of economic and social development. Nigeria's
system of government would emulate the ideals of Western democracy. "Modern•
ization" and "liberal democracy" thus stood as the objectives of constitu•
tional design. Yet, little attention was ever paid to defining the valuative
implications of those principles. Constitutional delegates never debated the theoretical questions raised by their abstract and rather incongruent goals.
Does a democratic regime rest on a certain level of economic affluence? Is it possible to design a system of government which is at once liberal and democratic? What is meant by those terms in the first place? For centuries, these questions have been asked by political philosophers. They were of no immediate concern to the authors of Nigeria's new constitution.
Democracy, liberalism, and economic development are strong emotive symbols that effectively justified the proceedings and the results of the country's constitutional debates. As such, they are values which attach themselves to the governmental structures of the new civilian regime. The business of constitutional reform was never a purely deductive exercise though.
Nigeria's constitutional provisions are not the products of a wholly theoretical calculus based on a set of fundamental principles, although they are often explained and defended in exactly those terms. Instead, the decisions taken by the country's constitutional authors reflect a course of deliberation and compromise over certain formalized governmental procedures, - 77 -
indigenous and foreign, past and present, real and imaginary.
Political structures may be judged and selected on the grounds of
principle, and, to this extent, the procedure is defined as a rational
undertaking. Commentators must be careful though not to evaluate a consti•
tutional document from the standpoint of "objective" moral principles alone,
or with regard to how well it achieves its "democratic" or "liberal" ends.
The meaning of political values — for the authors of Nigeria's new
constitution as well as for anyone attempting to assess that document —
rests upon personal experience and personal beliefs. The merits of particular
institutional arrangements — a federal or a unitary state? a presidential
or parliamentary system? — are discussed in terms of past or predicted
behaviour. They are debated on the grounds of how certain institutions are
expected to function within the Nigerian polity. The compromises and decisions
of the constitutional reform process inevitably involve the interests of participating political groups, interests which must also be defined in terms
of past political experience. Critics, then, must not base their analyses purely at the level of the provisions contained within the constitution
itself. A basic law may prescribe a system of government which, on the grounds of past experience, appears to everyone concerned to be the epitome of a liberal-democratic or federal state. That does not mean that such a constitution will actually guarantee a certain type of political behaviour.
The true test of any constitution may simply be the existence of a smoothly functioning system of government, and of the stable and predictable political behaviour that formula entails.
Such a prescription could provide Nigeria's constitutional engineers with very little in the way of assistance in their efforts to design the institutions of a new civilian regime. By any standard, the task of economic and social development appeared onerous. Moreover, the country - 78 -
had never before experienced independent and democratic civilian rule.
Lieutenant-General Danjuma, Army Chief of Staff, made the point clear as the
Military Government prepared to lift its restrictions on political parties
before the elections of 1979:
It is now fashionable in Nigeria to talk about a military regime as an aberration, and that a return to civilian rule means a return to democracy. This is a fallacy because we have never had a democracy in Nigeria — the question of ^returning" to democracy does not, therefore, arise.
No precedent could be found to illustrate the type of institutions which
might engender the development of a stable and democratic system of national
government in Nigeria. To a large extent, the process of constitution-
building was an activity which had to start almost entirely from "scratch".
Nigeria's military and civilian constitution-makers agreed to
maintain a federal political system, as well as the pattern of jurisdictional
responsibilities that had evolved throughout the era of military rule. But,
when they turned their attention to establishing a democratic, representative,
and effective system of government, constitutional engineers were not able to
base their proposals on a great deal of political experience. In fact,
partisan rivalries, communal conflict, and military rule seemed to provide
more of a political tradition than any efforts at reconcilaition or civilian
self-government. In a purely negative sense, constitutional reconstruction
was undertaken to overcome the faults of Nigeria's previous systems of
government, not to preserve the political traditions of the country's first
civilian regime.
For this reason, little attention was paid to estimating how political leaders might actually behave given the institutional constraints
of a new constitution, or indeed to the possibility that certain governmental organizations and practices might operate in a wholly unexpected manner. - 79 -
Certainly, these remain matters of considerable speculation. They do,
however, emphasize the fact that the relationship between constitutional
design and political behaviour is neither pre-ordained nor unilinear. Politi•
cal conduct is not reformed by a simple act of constitutional promulgation.
Rather, it is affected by rules and practices that develop over time
because they are customarily observed — practices which may be justified by
tradition as much as by constitutional fiat. The problem is especially
apparent in the case of Nigeria. At times, established custom may place the
demands of personal or partisan interest before loyalty to a set of consti•
tutional rules. But even if the constraints of Nigeria's new constitution
are generally respected, that does not signify that political conflict has
come to an end. Sectional interests continue to be played out within the
structures of the new basic law. New sets of governmental institutions may
give rise to new rivalries and conflicts. The potential for political unrest
still exists.
What may be questioned from the beginning, then, is not so much
the content of Nigeria's new constitution as the faith its authors seem to
ascribe to a system of government modelled, for instance, on the institutions
of American politics. (Of course, there is no acknowledgement of the fact that
the American political system once erupted in civil war itself.) The constel•
lation of interests which characterizes Nigerian political society is very
different from the context of political activity in the United States. While the organization and procedures of American government are accepted and do afford the opportunity for stable civilian rule in the United States, we should not, therefore, expect that similar constitutional provisions would automatically create a state of political stability in Nigeria. Governmental institutions operate differently as social, economic, and political conditions - 80 - vary over time and place. They need not be subjected to the same pressures or supported by the same traditions. The expectation that Nigeria might come to emulate the American political system, then, is based on an assumption that reduces political activity to the nature of the constitutional provisions that are intended to govern it. In short, political behaviour is deemed to derive from the articles of the constitution. Political harmony follows directly upon strict adherence to Nigeria's new basic law. It is not the commitment to a system of government based on the American model, or on the principles of liberty, democracy, and economic well-being, that may be challenged here. Rather, it is the ill-founded notion that through such a constitutional commitment political stability can, in some way, be ensured.
The Process of Constitutional Reform
There is nothing inevitable about the result of constitutional reconstruction in Nigeria. Indeed, the entire reform project was affected by the context of political interests and relationships in which it took place.
Nigeria's constitutional authors believed that the procedures that led up to the formal authorization of the constitution must be widely recognized and accepted as proper and correct. If the meetings of the CDC and
Constituent Assembly were to be perceived as illegitimate, then so would the outcome of their deliberations. The fact that the constitution was promul• gated in 1979 is evidence to suggest that the procedures of constitutional reform were generally accepted at that time. However, the question of who was involved in formulating Nigeria's new basic law is still raised by political groups in justification of their reluctance to comply with specific details of the country's constitution.
Disputes regarding the regional origins and communal ties of constitutional delegates were most frequent during the selection of repre- sentatives to the Constituent Assembly. While a method of indirect election
by local authorities allowed the Islamic hierarchy of the northern states
a strong voice in the Assembly, the allocation of seats along regional lines
meant that southern representatives were in a majority. Both northern
and southern delegates were dissatisfied by the scheme. The Sharia controversy
was, thus, as much a matter of procedural concern as it was a debate concern•
ing the role Islamic law should play in the organization of the national judiciary.
The composition of the Constitution Drafting Committee and of the
Constituent Assembly meant that their deliberations were biased in other respects as well. CDC membership consisted of "learned men" versed in law, economics, history, and the social sciences. Among the 50 members originally appointed to the Committee, 18 were employed by universities, 21 were recruited from private business, and eleven had held previous government responsibilities. Twelve members were qualified to practise law. It is no surprise, then, that such a Committee should express a strong preference for the encouragement of private enterprise. (Only two of its members — both university professors — filed dissenting reports proclaiming the advan• tages of public ownership and economic control.) Likewise, the composition of the CDC helps to explain the Committee's emphasis on law and order and its concern that the constitution should include a Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms. Legal themes again predominated the memoranda received from the general public. Communications regarding the proposed constitutional arrangements were filed primarily on behalf of judges, lawyers, professors, civil servants, "retired" politicians, traditional rulers, and religious 9 organizations. Members of the Constituent Assembly were similarly recruited from the legal, academic, and political professions,"'"0 occupations closely - 82
associated with local government. The formulation of a draft constitution,
the "public"'s comment, and the Assembly's role in legitimizing the
resolutions of the all-appointed CDC, were based on decisions taken by the
members of a relatively narrow professional and entrepreneurial class. As
Claude Phillips comments, they "clearly did not represent all shades of
opinion or all interests"."'""'" Although military and civilian statesmen spoke
of popular consent as the basis for constitutional reform — the basic law
was to be an expression of the public will,— they evidently believed that
the general interest could best be expressed by academics, legalists, and
private businessmen.
Nigeria's new constitution is not immune from the charge that it
represents the interests of a small segment of the national population. If
anything, the role of the army during the constitutional proceedings lends
credence to such a view. It is true that, apart from the general guidelines
initially set forth by Murtala Muhammed and the changes made to the draft
submitted by the Constituent Assembly, the Nigerian military did not play a
direct role in determining the content of the new basic law. (The military's
presence on the Constitution Drafting Committee was limited to a single 12
army chaplain. ) Yet, the army exercised a powerful influence on the entire
constitutional process. Generals Muhammed and Obasanjo wielded a considerable degree of moral suasion. It was always possible for the army to intervene, as it had done in the past, by once more imposing the restrictions of military rule. Obasanjo felt it necessary to threaten such action on several occasions as disputes brought constitutional deliberations to a standstill. His warnings regularly succeeded in convincing Nigeria's constitutional delegates that some level of compromise had to be found. Viewed from a somewhat different angle, however, the threat of army intervention served as an effective method for imposing the will of the Supreme Military Council upon - 83 -
the shape of Nigeria's new civilian regime. What is now deemed to be the
benevolent actions of a military government taken to "correct" the course
of constitutional proceedings when they were goins "astray", might appear
quite differently to partisan groups should they find themselves excluded from
political power by the terms of the constitution.
The proceedings leading up to the promulgation of Nigeria's
constitution were generally regarded as legitimate in 1979. Constitutional
delegates appeared to represent the will of the people. The military, it
was believed, exercised a wholly altruistic influence on constitutional
revisions. And the basic law emerged in the aura of the general interest —
it was a concrete expression of the public voice. The myth which was thus
erected around the constitutional process provides a moral affirmation of the
organization and procedures of government that accompanied the return of
civilian rule. It could hardly have been otherwise. If the constitutional
debates had appeared to be biased in favour of a particular group of interests,
then the process of constitutional revision, and indeed the constitution
itself, would not have been accepted in the first place. The virtues of the new, popularly reformed constitution have been proclaimed by military leaders, political chiefs, and the press alike. The whole idea of national self- renewal which the constitutional project was supposed to involve, helped to mobilize Nigerian emotions behind the common purpose of a return to civilian government.
Adherence to the provisions of the new constitution, and the organization of political activity in general, rest to a large part on such an emotional commitment to civilian rule and a belief in the propriety of
Nigeria's constitutional proceedings. However, those moral supports are themselves liable to be weakened should the conditions of political unrest - 84 -
reminiscent of the the First Republic again emerge. A system of government
that proves to be incapable of implementing policy decisions, or perhaps
more significantly, which continues to exclude certain sectional or partisan
interests from positions of political power, cannot continue to justify its
constitution merely on the grounds that it had once been regarded as
legitimate. In fact, dissatisfied groups might actually prefer the return of
military rule to a political situation in which they constantly find themselves
disadvantaged. With few traditions of civilian government to appeal to in
the event of widespread discontent, Nigeria's political leaders might find it
extremely difficult to recall any moral rationale whatsoever in justification
of their claims to national authority.
In such circumstances, Nigerians might find some credibility in the
view that the process of constitutional reform indeed had been biased in favour
of a particular set of interests and was, in fact, imposed by military fiat
upon the general population. In other words, the myths surrounding the consti•
tutional debates and the prelude to civilian government might take on an
entirely negative form. A great deal depends on the conduct of political
activity in the country. A system of government which successfully maintains
political stability over a period of time is likely to possess a certain
moral authority which in itself justifies the nature of its constitution.
A Delicate Balance
The most immediate problem of Nigerian politics, then, is the
prospect not that constitutional rules might be totally ignored, but that
disabling political conflicts might persist even within the governmental
institutions established by the new basic law. What has become evident since
Nigeria's new constitution formally came into effect is that the nature of national politics has not been radically transformed by the process of - 85 -
structural reform. Nigeria remains an underdeveloped nation, confronted by
the need to encourage economic growth and to provide basic social amenities
for its population, yet with a limited amount of public revenue at the
disposal of the state. Ethnic, regional, and partisan interests persist. And
the tensions among those particularistic interests within the policy process
still hold forth the potential for rivalry and conflict. The country's
constitution, on the other hand, establishes a governmental framework whose
organization and procedures are intended to contain such disintegrative
forces. As such, the document has met with some success. There have been
serious difficulties as well, in the development of effective decision-making
institutions and the management of political conflict.
The articles of Nigeria's new constitution embody a compromise
between the two often incongruent goals that stood at the heart of constitu•
tional reconstruction. In the terms of the basic law itself, they provide
a balance between the norms of effective and representative government. Their
practical effect rests on the nature of that balance. How open may a system
of government be to the involvement of diverse sectional interests before the
constraints such a formula imposes on its policy-making capacity prove
intolerable? To what extent should legislative and executive institutions be made more efficient while power is concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer officials? These considerations lay behind the efforts of Nigeria's constitutional engineers in preparing the country for its return to civilian rule. They are essential questions, at the centre of any discussion of what the Nigerian constitution is actually capable of achieving.
Nigeria's constitution has operated rather successfully in ushering in a new civilian regime. From 7 July to 11 August 1979, state governors, senators, members of the national House of Representatives and of state - 86 -
legislatures, and finally the president and vice-president were popularly
elected at polls conducted under the auspices of the Federal Electoral
Commission, in accordance with a set of electoral regulations similar to 13
those entrenched in the constitution. The country's constitutional pro•
visions took effect several weeks after the elections were held.
Since October 1979, Nigeria's system of government has demonstrated
that it is at least capable of functioning. Federal-state relations have
proved operable. Steps have been taken in preparation for a new national
population census which, with the aid of the United Nations, is intended 14 to be "completely free from political influence and manipulation". State authorities are regularly represented at meetings with federal executive 15 officials. At least one member of the federal cabinet has been chosen from 16
every state. And the judiciary has established a reputation for impartiality
and for its defence of fundamental legal rights and constitutional
procedure.
The value of an independent judiciary is underscored in the case
of Alhaji Shugaba Abdurahman Darman. Abdurahman was ordered deported by the
federal government in 1980. A leading politician in Borno state and majority
leader of the state Assembly, he was arrested on the charge of being a Chadian
national and secretly bundled into that country by federal agents. (The
incident appears to have been an attempt on the part of officials of the
ruling National Party of Nigeria — President Shagari's party — to rid
themselves of an influential rival. Abdurahman is a member of the Great
Nigerian People's Party.) In any event, the Supreme Court held upon appeal that the order infringed the constitutional right of a Nigerian citizen to move freely throughout his country. The judges imposed a stiff fine on the 17 federal government on Abdurahman's behalf. Their decision indicates, at least in this instance, the determination of the Supreme Court to hold - 87 -
the federal government in check by interpreting the provisions of the
constitution in a fairly broad and independent manner.
By the first anniversary of his civilian administration, President
Shagari could speak of a "growing feeling of hope for the future of Nigeria".
The fact that the country's system of government had survived thus far,
without the appearance of any great political debacle, was reason enough for
celebration.
Threatening the Balance: The Re-Emergence of Party Politics
Nigeria's new constitution brings with it a certain amount of
hope about the country's political future. Yet, riavlry and conflict among
partisan groups and regional authorities over access to governmental power
remain the most salient characteristics of Nigerian politics. Public
authority at national and state levels is still the means by which financial
and material benefits are allocated. Achieving power over the resources of
the state continues to be an accomplishment of the highest priority.
For Nigeria, a return to civilian rule meant a return to party
politics. After the Federal Military Government finally lifted its ban on
partisan activity in 1978, in preparation for national and state elections,
it soon became evident that the party rivalries inherited from the first
civilian Republic would reappear. In the weeks following the lifting of the
ban over 50 political associations were formed. Nineteen submitted formal
applications for registration to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO)
by the deadline of 18 December 1978. The Commission judged that only five parties met the registration criteria of the new constitution. The formation of Nigeria's political parties was thus dominated by a concern to negotiate appropriate alliances, in order to avoid charges of ethnic particularism.
Nevertheless, the organizations that were finally recognized by FEDECO do - 88 -
not differ radically from the political associations of the 1960s.
The National Party of Nigeria, for example, includes among its
supporters politicians who were formerly members of the Nigerian People's
Congress, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (of the old Western Region),
and the United Middle Belt Congress. Its presidential candidate, Alhaji
Shehu Shagari, was a northerner, a former federal commissioner under the country's military regime (1970-1975), and a member of the Constituent
Assembly. The NPN's vice-presidential candidate, Dr. Alex Ifeanyichukwu
Ekwueme, on the other hand, was a well-known Ibo architect from Anambra state, with no political experience whatsoever. Emphasizing its wide range of support, the NPN boasts in its election manifesto that it is the only 19 party "formed out of nation-wide consultation and consensus". It is 20 "a remarkable collection of senior and respected politicians".
Alternatively, the National Party is described as the de facto representative of the powerful Hausa-Fulani rulers of the north. Indeed, northern states do account for the largest proportion of its members. And while former NNDP and UMBC politicians are now staunch NPN supporters, it must be recalled that they had joined forces with the Northern People's
Congress once before, in 1964, to form the ruling Nigerian National Alliance.
Shagari was a federal minister, a member of the Alliance and of the
Northern People's Congress prior to the 1966 coup. At an early stage in the
1979 electoral campaign, his party received the full support of the northern 21 Islamic hierarchy.
The links with the past are even more evident in the case of the
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). The party was founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, formerly the leader of the Action Group and still the best known politician from the Western Region. Awolowo was the leader of the federal opposition in 89 -
Nigeria's first civilian regime. He was a federal commissioner from 1967
until 1971. He also became the UPN's presidential candidate in the 1979
campaign. (His running-mate was Chief Philip Umeadi, a little known Ibo
lawyer from Onitsha.) The UPN evolved from a "National Committee of Friends",
an organization under Awolowo's control, which is believed to have been
involved in clandestine political activity throughout the period of military 22 rule. That view was given considerable credence when the UPN announced its
electoral manifesto a mere 24 hours after military authorities lifted the ban 23 on partisan activity.
A third organization, the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), affords
another example of the regional component of party politics. As originally
constituted, the NPP was an alliance among several political groupings,
including the National Union Council for Understanding led by Alhaji Waziri
Ibrahim (a wealthy northern businessman and a former federal minister of the
Northern People's Congress), the "Club 19" composed of Constituent Assembly
delegates from every state who were opposed to the establishment of a Federal
Sharia Court of Appeal, the Committee for National Unity founded mainly by
former members of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons — sup• porters of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe,— and the Progressive Front led by Alhaji
Alufemi Okunno (a federal commissioner under military rule and a northerner).
The alliance did not last long. At its inaugural meeting in November 1978 the NPP split into a number of factions, following opposition from eastern members to an attempt by Waziri Ibrahim to become both party chairman and 24 presidential nominee. Ibrahim broke away to form his own party. The
Progressive Front joined ranks with the NPN. The NPP assumed its present form — an organization firmly established in Nigeria's eastern states, whose membership largely consists of past NCNC supporters. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, - 90 -
Nigeria's NCNC president at the time of the 1966, coup was the party's
presidential candidate in 1979. His running-mate was Professor Ishaya Audu,
vice-chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University in the north but, again, a man 25 of little political experience.
After leaving the NPP, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim and his followers
founded their own political party, the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP).
Ibrahim became the GNPP's presidential nominee. Dr. Ben Nzeribe, an Ibo, 26 was the party's vice-presidential candidate.
The fifth organization recognized by FEDECO is the People's
Redemption Party (PRP). Its founder and presidential candidate, Alhaji
Aminu Kano, is no stranger to Nigerian politics either. Kano was chief
government whip from 1959 until 1964. Formerly the leader of the Northern
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a left-of-centre organization which
opposed the Northern People's Congress in 1965 and 1966, Kano accupied
the post of federal commissioner from 1967 to 1974. Like Shagari, he was a member of the Constiuent Assembly in the period of transition to civilian government. Kano's running-mate, Sam Ikoku, a left-wing Ibo economist, was formerly associated with the Action Group. The PRP was formed after Kano withdrew his support for Shagari. There are "fundamental differences", Kano believes, "between the PRP and the conservative orientation of the NPN with 27 its commitment to full recognition and respect for traditional rulers". The
PRP manifesto calls for the establishment of "democratic humanism ... which teaches self-reliance and the takeover of our economy from the grip of neo-colonialists". Although aiming to build "a really firm foundation for 28 socialist democracy", and emphasizing the ideological commitment of its members rather than their regional origins, the PRP is most extensively organized in the states of Kaduna and Kano. Not too surprisingly, those were - 91 -
exactly the areas where NEPU had attracted its greatest support in the
29
mid-1960s. After a period of nearly 14 years of military rule, observers
may be justified in thinking that the men who are once more involved in
civilian politics are generally "the very same lot whose names were current 30 when Nigeria won its independence from Britain In 1960".
The persisting regional and ethnic patterns of partisan identifica•
tion in Nigeria become even more apparent in a survey of the 1979 election 31 results. Five rounds of voting were held in July and August 1979. Party standings in the first four rounds — elections for the Senate, House of
Representatives, state assemblies, and state governorships — appear in
Table II.
Table II
32 Party Standings in Nigeria's 1979 Elections: The First Four Rounds
Party Election GNPP NPN NPP PRP UPN
Senate 8 36 16 7 28 House of Representatives 43 168 78 49 111 State Assemblies 156 489 226 143 333 State Governorships 2 7 3 2 5
Table III presents a state-by state analysis of those same results.
Table III
33 Party Standings in Nigeria's 1979 Elections: A State-by-State Analysis of the First Four Rounds
Anambra — Senate NPP 5; House of Representatives NPP 26, NPN 3; House of Assembly NPP 73, NPN 13, GNPP 1; Governor NPN (Mr Jim Nwobodo).
Bauchi — Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 18, GNPP 1, NPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 45, GNPP 9, NPP 4, PRP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaji Tatari Ali). - 92 -
(Table III — continued)
Bendel — Senate UPN 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives UPN 12, NPN 6, NPP 2; House of Assembly UPN 34, NPN 22, NPP 4; Governor UPN (Prof. Ambrose Alii).
Benue — Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 18, NPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 48, GNPP 6, NPP 3, Governor NPN (Mr Aper Aku).
Borno — Senate GNPP 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives GNPP 22, NPN 2; House of Assembly GNPP 59, NPN 11, PRP 2; Governor GNPP (Alhaji Mohammed Goni).
Cross River — Senate NPN 3, GNPP 2; House of Representatives NPN 22, GNPP 4, UPN 2; House of Assembly NPN 58, GNPP 16, UPN 7, NPP 3; Governor NPN (Dr. Clement Isong).
Gongola — Senate GNPP 2, UPN 2, NPN 1; House of Rep• resentatives GNPP 8, UPN 7, NPN 5, NPP 1; House of Assembly GNPP 25, UPN 18, NPN 15, NPP 4, PRP 1; Governor GNPP (Alhaji Abubakar Barde).
Imo — Senate NPP 5; House of Representatives NPP 28, NPN 2; House of Assembly NPP 78, NPN 10, GNPP 2; Governor NPP (Mr Samuel Mbakwe). Kaduna — Senate NPN 3, PRP 2; House of Representatives NPN 19, PRP 10, NPP 2, GNPP 1, UPN 1; House of Assembly NPN 66, PRP 15, GNPP 9, NPP 6, UPN 3; Governor PRP (Alhaji Balarabe Musa).
Kano — Senate PRP 5; House of Representatives PRP 39, NPN 7; House of Assembly PRP 123, NPN 11, GNPP 3, UPN 1; Governor PRP (Alhaji Abubakar Rimi). Kwara — Senate NPN 3, UPN 2; House of Representatives NPN 8, UPN 5, GNPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 25, UPN 15, GNPP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaj i Adamu Atta).
Lagos — Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 12; House of Assembly UPN 36; Governor UPN (Alhaji Lateef Jakande).
Niger — Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 10; House of Assembly NPN 28, GNPP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaji Awwal Ibrahim).
Ogun — Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 12; House of Assembly UPN 36; Governor UPN (Chief Bisi Onabanjo).
Ondo — Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 22; House of Assembly UPN 65, NPN 1; Governor UPN (Mr Michael Ajasin). Oyo — Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 38, NPN 4; House of Assembly UPN 117, NPN 9, Governor UPN (Mr Bola Ige).
Plateau — Senate NPP 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives NPP 13, NPN 3; House of Assembly NPP 35, NPN 10, GNPP 3; Governor NPP (Mr Solomon Lar). - 93 -
(Table III — continued)
Rivers — Senate NPN 3, NPP 2; House of Representatives NPN 10, NPP 4; House of Assembly NPN 25, NPP 16, UPN 1; Governor NPN (Chief Melford Okilo).
Sokoto — Senate NPN 5; House of REpresentatives NPN 31, GNPP 6; House of Assembly NPN 92, GNPP 19; Governor NPN (Alhaji Shehu Kangiwa).
Every state elected a governor and an Assembly majority of the same party except Kaduna, where a PRP governor was returned with an NPN majority in the state legislature, and Gongola where no single party was elected to a majority in the House of Assembly. The statistics indicate that each of the five parties drew its greatest support in its leader's home area. Only the NPN, which obtained the highest percentage of votes cast nationally in each of the elections, achieved a significant level of support across most of the Federation. NPN senators were elected in twelve out of
19 states, NPN federal representatives in 16 states, NPN House of Assembly members in 17 states, and NPN governors in seven states. On the other hand,
PRP support is almost exclusively confined to northern states. The UPN, although predominating in states of the former Western Region, is scarcely represented in other parts of the country.
The results of the presidential election show a similar pattern of voting based on regional considerations. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the NPN candidate, received the highest proportion of votes cast — 33.8 percent.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo (UPN) received 29.2 percent, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP)
16.7 percent, Alhaji Aminu Kano (PRP) 10.3 percent, and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim
(GNPP) 10.0 percent of the popular vote.34 Table IV gives the state-by-state outcome of Nigeria's 1979 presidential poll, this time grouped according to former political regions. - 94 -
Table IV
35 Party Standings in Nigeria's 1979 Presidential Election: A State-by-State Analysis
Former Candidates' Percentages of Vote* Political State GNPP NPN NPP PRP UPN Region
North Bauchi 15.44 62.48 4.72 14.34 3.00 Benue 7.89 76.39 11.71 1.35 2.57 Borno 54.04 34.71 1.35 6.52 3.35 Gongola 34.09 35.52 4.35 4.34 21.67 Kaduna 13.80 43.12 4.72 31.66 6.68 Kano 1.54 19.94 0.91 76.41 1.23 Niger 16.50 74.88 1.11 3.99 3.69 Plateau 6.82 34.73 49.17 3.98 5.29 Sokoto 26.61 66.58 0.92 3.33 2.52
West Kwara 5.71 53.62 0.52 0.67 39.48 Lagos 0.48 7.18 9.57 0.47 82.30 Ogun 0.53 6.23 0.32 0.31 92.11 Ondo 0.26 4.19 0.86 0.18 94.51 Oyo 0.57 12.75 0.55 0.32 85.78 Mid-West Bendel 1.23 36.19 8.60 0.73 53.23
East Anambra 1.67 13.49 82.88 1.20 0.75 Cross River 15.14 64.40 7.66 1.01 11.76 Imo 3.00 8.80 86.67 0.89 0.64 Rivers 2.18 72.65 14.35 0.46 10.33
* Not all percentages total 100, due to rounding > •
Again, each party leader received the greatest support from his home state.
(The states of the old Western Region, in particular, voted heavily in favour of Chief Awolowo.) Even in this, the final round of voting, it is evident that patterns of partisan identification and electoral choice within Nigeria are much the same as they were prior to military rule.
The nature of electoral activity seems to have remained about the same as well. When the restrictions on partisan activities were lifted by military authorities, General Obasanjo appealed to politicians to learn from
Nigeria's past experiences and "not to disembark on a politics of deceit, false hopes, empty promises, and unattainable goals which ... all eventually lead to unrealizable expectations, bitterness, discontent, and the unhappiness of the electorate". Criticizing the "unpatriotic and selfish stances" of
various factions within the Constituent Assembly, he warned that the Federal
Military Government would not "allow any individual or group of individuals
to subjugate the higher national interest ... to their selfish and narrow 36
interests". Nevertheless, allegations of hooliganism, thuggery, and violence were levelled by all parties throughout the campaign of 1979. Old grievances were resurrected. Candidates regularly referred to rival organizations as
"tribalistic". And parties were said to have a "tradition of violence", a 37 corrupt leadership, or to have curried the favour of military leaders. The
Federal Electoral Commission disqualified a total of 1,028 candidates for public office on grounds of corruption, including the leader of the People's 38
Redemption Party, Aminu Kano. (After considerable legal action Kano was able to re-establish his candidacy.) The Commission banned no less than 15 gubernatorial candidates, 17 of their running-mates, 120 senatorial candidates,
575 candidates for state assemblies, and 300 prospective members of the 39 national House of Representatives, mainly for reasons of tax default. Amid pleas for "national harmony and understanding" broadcast by 40 the Federal Military Government, the elections of 1979 were fought in much the same style as they had been fifteen years previously. Indeed, dis• putes became so violent during the campaign that General Obasanjo thought it necessary to summon political leaders to the Dodan Barracks on several occasions in order to warn them to decrease the fervour of their partisan 41 attacks. But Nigeria's new political parties were engaged in an almost desparate rivalry for political power. Like their earlier counterparts, they are organizations "whose goal is to win an election and which therefore 42 cannot accept the prospect of political defeat". One aspect of partisan rivalry, and a source of concern to - 96 -
Nigeria's military leaders since the reintrcduction of party politics, is
the willingness that has been demonstrated on more than one occasion by
Nigerian politicians to change the articles of the new constitution, or to
interpret its provisions according to their own particularistic preferences.
Despite a complicated amendment formula requiring the approval of a two-
thirds majority in each house of the National Assembly and the support, by
resolution, of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all
states,4"^ the election campaign of 1979 resounded with promises to revise th
constitution. Politicians spoke of constitutional reform before the basic
law came into effect! Chief Awolowo declared that he would abolish the Publi
Complaints Tribunal established to enforce the constitution's Code of
Conduct. Moreover, he denounced the restrictions imposed on the creation of new states. Hoping to attract electoral support from the minority groups of central Nigeria, he maintained that such constitutional restraints 44 were unnecessary and "undemocratic". Provisions concerning the regulation political parties were also challenged. Aminu Kano suggested that parties 45 should be able to use regional symbols. He, along with other party leaders, would further amend the regulations requiring parties to publish periodic 46 financial statements. Throughout the electoral campaign, political leaders treated the constitution simply as a document amenable to partisan interests. The norms and procedures of the basic law proved to be contro• versial long after the Constituent Assembly had presented its final recommendations.
Ironically, the most fractious issue to arise during the election of Nigeria's new civilian government centres on an interpretation of the constitution, which, at the time, had not yet been promulgated. A major dispute emerged concerning the election of Alhaji Shehu Shagari as president - 97 -
of the Republic. In the final round of balloting, Shagari obtained a total
of 5.69 million votes, consisting of more than 25 percent of the votes cast
in twelve states. (See Table IV.) Shagari*s nearest rival, Chief Awolowo,
47
received the support of 4.92 million electors. The constitution stipulates
that the president must be elected with the support of one-quarter of the
votes cast in at least two-thirds of the states of the Federation. In the
event, Shagari did not attract one-quarter of the votes in thirteen states
— he received only 19.94 percent of the votes cast in Kano state, where his
vote was closest to the constitutional limit. Rival political leaders
immediately called for a run-off election. Citing the constitution's
provisions for cases of electoral deadlock, they demanded a second poll to
be contested by the two leading candidates. Advocates for the NPN, on the
other hand, argued that two-thirds of 19 actually amounts to twelve and
two-thirds. Shagari, in fact, had received the support of more than a
quarter of two-thirds of the votes cast in Kano. FEDECO accepted the NPN
position and duly proclaimed Shagari president over the loud protests of 48 Awolowo and his Unity Party followers.
Awolowo lodged a petition with the Federal Electoral Tribunal on
behalf of himself, Dr. Azikiwe, and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, in protest over
FEDECO's decision. Unanimously rejected by the Tribunal's three judges, the
case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. By a majority of seven to
one, the petition was again turned down. It was revealed during the proceed•
ings that FEDECO had formulated its interpretation of what constitutes two-thirds of 19 when considering applications for registration from political parties in late 1978. If twelve and two-thirds had not been adopted as the constitutinal threshold at that time, then one of the five parties would not 49 have been sufficiently represented in all states to contest the election. - 98 -
The incident reveals the keen rivalry that existed among all
Nigerian parties for the country's chief executive office. As the Economist
reports, "Shagari's opponents, rather than gracefully congratulating their
rival, immediately rushed to their adding machines and then plaintively 50
cried foul". The controversy also spurred the Federal Military Government
to make one last amendment to the constitution three days before the
document was to take effect. The Supreme Military Council deleted those
articles establishing the National Assembly as an electoral college. In their
stead provision was made, in the case of an indecisive presidential election
result, for a second run-off election to be held throughout the Republic.
The poll would be contested by the two leading presidential candidates. It 51
would be determined by a simple plurality of votes. Nigeria's basic law
thus emerged at the centre of a political storm at exactly the moment when
civilian officials were assuming governmental control. The controversy has
affected the course of political behaviour in the Republic from that time
onward. Sectionalism Revived
Interparty rivalry scarcely has diminished since Nigeria's return
to civilian government in October 1979. Disputes continue to erupt over
the nature of federal appointments. They often lead to violent confrontations between the supporters of rival partisan organizations. For political office remains a valuable prize. It continues to be a source of patronage, as well as a means by which to ensure that one's own ethnic or regional interests are not overlooked.
In his inaugural address President Shagari swore that he would seek to solve "the problems of creating a national government ... and the integra• tion of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria in fairness and without - 99 - 52 acrimony". He would, he thought, be greatly assisted in his task by the
provisions of the country's new constitution. Indeed, the constitution provides
a system of safeguards that is intended to inhibit the concentration of
power in the hands of one individual or set of sectional interests. Yet, in
spite of the principle that national officials should be appointed with
regard to the "federal character of Nigeria", and despite the establishment of executive commissions which function independently of federal or state administrations, the question of who occupies positions of political author• ity remains a crucial and contentious matter.
The federal principle upon which appointments to national office are to be made is vague at best. The idea is to guarantee state interests a role in certain federal decision-making bodies. But who represents a state's interests? Will any state resident do? The problem is revealed in a decision taken by President Shagari in early 1980 to appoint presidential liaison officers in each state to supervise federal projects and maintain contact with state administrations. State authorities were not consulted about the appointments in the first place. They were almost unanimously opposed to the move. The real clash, though, came over the issue of who was to be appointed. All appointees were residents of the regions in which they were to hold office. But they were not civil servants. They were all NPN men. In Kano, for instance, a state governed by the PRP, the liaison officer turned out to be the unsuccessful NPN gubernatorial candidate from neighbouring Kaduna (a state whose governor also represented the PRP). As a result, the appointees were all believed to be creatures of the federal government. More specifically, they appeared to represent the northern-based NPN. The federal decision was interpreted in eastern and western states as a blatant intrusion into their
53 sphere of regional interests.
At times, the principle of federal representation itself proves to - 100 -
be a source of sectional dispute. The governor of the northern state of
Borno, for instance, appointed three Yoruba lawyers to important judicial
and cabinet posts within his state administration in late 1980. The move,
of course, meant that the positions could not be occupied by Hausa
tribesmen, or by followers of the Islamic faith. It was immediately
criticized by Malam Adannu Ciroma, federal Industry Minister, a northerner,
and a leading member of the NPN, for that very reason. Ciroma called the
Yorubas "strangers" and "foreigners". In his opinion, the governor had
54
"betrayed the people's trust". Those remarks, coupled with President
Shagari's reticence to disown his minister's comments, fed the fears of
northern Hausa domination regularly circulated by the UPN. They sparked off
protests in several western cities where, as in 1966, the federal government
was portrayed as a self-perpetuating northern cabal operating so as to 55
exclude other tribal groups from public office. From whatever perspective
one takes, the replacement of one official by another from a different tribe,
although justified on the grounds of "federal reflection", effectively excludes
from positions of power one set of sectional interests to the advantage of
another. It may simply appear as the thin edge of a much larger wedge which
might eventually threaten traditional claims to all sources of political
patronage. At its worst, then, the principle of federal representation can be
used to justify the removal of rival factions from political office. Even
at its best, the principle may lead to explosive conflicts among Nigeria's
sectional groups.
The disputes centring on the appointment of NPN officials and the selection of executive officers from a specific ethnic grouping raise a further problem regarding the extent to which any political office can be deemed "representative" or "independent". Where the membership of federal - 101-
executive commissions includes state officials, federal ministers, or
military, finacial, and judicial figures, the role of such agencies is
limited to an advisory capacity only. The commissions empowered to appoint
officials and to establish regulations of their own accord are themselves
appointed by either the president or a state governor. Because access to political office depends on executive appointment, a president or governor may
exercise indirect control over the agencies' decisions. The possibility is all the greater should the appointees belong to the same political party, or the same tribal association, as the president or state executive. The "impar• tiality" of executive commissions, then, is not a widely regarded fact of political life in Nigeria, even under a new constitution.
Controversies surrounding the appointment of federal and state officials also fuel the discontents arising from the Republic's 1979 pres• idential election results. Chief Awolowo's Unity Party, in particular, has taken a prominent position in most of the recurring disputes. UPN opposition to President Shagari's administration, and to any attempt to weaken the power base of Yoruba politicians, is strident. On occasion, it has led to violence.
A survey of UPN activities since the party's 1979 electoral defeat cannot help but read as a litany of conspiracy and unrest. If
Awolowo could complain of Malam Ciroma's attack on Yoruba appointees in
Borno, he could also protest the appointment by the federal cabinet of five
UPN governors to an all-party conference on public salaries, convened in
July 1980. Calling the meeting a "motley assembly", Awolowo himself refused to attend. The method of appointing delegates had "widened the scope beyond 56 what could properly be called an all-party meeting". For his efforts, the
UPN;leader was attacked by Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe, presidential advisor to the
National Assembly Liaison Committee, as an "ungrateful ingrate who has resorted to castigating the people who feed him ... and who threatens to 102 -
plunge the country again into the gravest of political difficulties". 57 They
are words that further alienate UPN officials from the national administration.
Unity Party opposition claimed its most important victim in October
1980. The resignation of Paul Unongo, federal Minister of Mines and Power,
on charges of corruption, came at the end of a thinly disguised UPN attack
on the central government. Unongo, facing charges on several counts of bribery,
was finally driven from office by a well-coordinated press campaign based on 58
information supplied by Awolowo's office. The UPN widened its criticism of
public officials after Unongo's resignation. In December of the same year,
for instance, Awolowo called on Nigeria's Chief Justice, Rotimi Fatayi Williams,
to resign. The former chairman of the CDC, Williams had upheld FEDECO's
1979 election ruling against Awolowo. According to UPN sources, his judgments 59
were an indication of political preference. Since March 1981, Awolowo has
gone even further in attacking the Chief Justice, as well as General
Obasanjo, as "time-servers of the northern elite".60 The leader of the
opposition has accused Obasanjo repeatedly of contriving to hand power over
to the northern-based National Party. The fact that both Obasanjo and Williams
are of Yoruba origin seems to make little difference. They are, in the words
of Chief Awolowo, "traitors of the western people".
Such charges do not easily go unanswered. As early as January 1980,
the National Secretary of the National Party, Alhaji Suleimen Takuma, warned
at a Lagos press conference of an "alleged secessionist plot" being hatched 62
by the UPN with Yoruba support. No evidence was provided at the time to
confirm his allegations. However, one year later, the Nigerian Herald, a
government-operated newspaper, published the text of what was claimed to be
a secret UPN plan to destabilize the country and overthrow the Shagari regime.
The ultimate aim of the Unity Party, the document reads, "must be to take
Nigeria back to square one". The current political situation is reminiscent of 103 -
of the 1962-1966 political and constitutional debacle that culminated in
civil war". While "it is clear that the next civil war will be bloody, ...
if the blood of tyrants has to be shed to ensure the emergence of a just
society, so be it".^ Whether or not the document is the work of the UPN has
never been resolved. That may not be the most important issue in any case.
The plan merely summarizes what are already presumed to be the aims of the
UPN. Indeed, Unity Party leaders have never denied the document's authenticity,
Consequently, publication of the paper has provided the government with
ammunition in its counterattack upon the UPN. The opposition party is
portrayed as a faction "determined to cause confusion, and to foment indis•
cipline among other political parties, thus ensuring the completion of the
64
circle of rendering the new constitution unworkable". That statement led
to a series of riots in Yorubaland. Seventeen people were injured as Unity
Party and National Party supporters clashed in Abeokuta, capital of the western state of Ogun. With the press hinting of civil war, the disturbances 65 were firmly put down by state police.
UPN opposition to the present federal regime does bring with it the prospect of instability and unrest. Awolowo and his Unity Party followers should not be cast, though, as les betes noires of Nigerian politics. Their efforts to extend Yoruba representation, and to resist any attempt to weaken their own organizational base, are expressions of genuine concern. UPN politicians are afraid that federal, and perhaps even western, institutions may be swamped by non-Yoruba — and particularly by northern — interests.
Indeed, local UPN organizations regularly complain of "political victimization" in areas where they do not exercise control over government offices.^ If
Awolowo's political adventurism is a major obstacle to Nigerian unity, it is also a strategy which, in Yorubaland, appears to protect certain basic tribal - 104 -
and regional rights.
What the activities of the UPN and its political opponents do
clearly indicate is that the threat of political instability has not disap•
peared in Nigeria. Partisan loyalty remains the most important means of
acceding to political office. And, access to political authority, and to
the resources under public control, is still the object of fierce and often
violent factional rivalries. In spite of its numerous checks on legislative
and executive authority, Nigeria's constitution cannot contain the destabil•
izing tendencies of partisan conflict, of its own accord. On one side, it
may be argued that the checks imposed on political activity are simply
inadequate. The demands of a centralized governmental organization simply do
not allow for the devolution of authority necessary to diffuse political
tensions. Yet, as an organizational framework, a constitution can only
establish the structures in which political activity occurs. There is no
one-to-one correspondence between the norms and procedures embodied in a
constitution and the actual course of political behaviour. On the other side,
then, it must be recognized that a basic law is capable of restraining
political conduct only in so far as its specified procedures are translated
into customary practices of government. That, in itself, demands some degree
of political stability. Partisan groups must believe that their best interests
are served through the maintenance of existing governmental institutions.
It is not at all evident that such a consensus exists in the case
of Nigeria. Past experience in that country seems to indicate that when
factional groups find themselves in a disadvantageous political position, their worst fears of losing political control are simply confirmed. In those circumstances, restraints on political activity may begin to dissolve. The achievement of governmental authority may come to justify any means for attaining that objective. And, should the resulting political unrest once 105 -
again lead to military intervention, then perhaps even that situation might
be preferred to the continuation of present constitutional arrangements.
From a more optimistic point of view, the very existence of a civilian
government operating on the basis of Nigeria's new constitution suggests
that partisan groups have not found themselves excluded from positions of
political influence on a regular basis. Yet, a danger that sectional
conflict might produce a level of political instability that would bring
with it widespread acts of violence — and eventually the demise of consti•
tutional rule — still exists. In the last analysis, the conduct of political
activity in Nigeria is constrained less by constitutional provision than by
the commitment of all political actors to maintain the institutions of
government established by the basic law. On several occasions since the
return of civilian rule in 1979, that commitment has appeared to be very
tenuous indeed.
Government Under a New Constitution
How well has Nigeria's political system functioned since the
country's new constitution was put into effect? Has the constitution at least
made the legislative and administrative processes more effective? What of
the constitution-makers' goal of "efficient" or "rational" government?
The presidential system adopted by Nigerian statesmen in 1979 is
supposed to afford executive officials, at both federal and state levels, an amount of administrative leeway. The constitution allows the executive branch to make certain decisions without immediate recourse to the partisan interests represented in national or state legislatures. While popularly elected assem• blies must approve acts of legislation and ratify the appointment of a number of executive officials, the life expectancy of a government does not depend on the support of a standing majority of assembly members. Election dates are 106 -
now set by the constitution itself. Moreover, the basic law prescribes certain
rules of conduct for public officials. The expectation is that corruption
will be reduced, if not entirely eliminated. Nigeria's system of government,
then, is designed to operate in spite of the diverse partisan and sectional
interests found at every institutional level. The first several months of
civilian rule provide ample evidence of just how cumbersome the resulting
governmental process can be.
First of all, corruption has not been eliminated by entrenching in
the constitution a code of conduct for public officials. At an early stage,
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee were unable to agree on the
limitations that should be placed on the material benefits to be gained from
holding public office. When a CDC sub-committee on public accountability
recommended that it should be made illegal for any elected or appointed
official, and his immediate family, to operate a business or to receive money
during his term of office, the proposal provoked "heated controversy". The
code of conduct, as it finally appears in the constitution, embodies a much
68 narrower interpretation of the sub-committee's resolution. It says nothing of the business activities of immediate family members. The code restricts supplementary business interests for public figures, but only during the period that officials are actually working for the government. Another proposal, requiring that a declaration of assets be made annually, was also amended to extend the interval to a period of four years. The difficulties
CDC delegates experienced in drafting the terms of a new code of conduct raise many doubts about the commitment expressed by Nigeria's political leaders not to use public authority for purposes of private gain. From the record of political activity since the country's return to civilian rule, it seems that those doubts are well justified. 107
The 1980 resignation of Paul Unongo on charges of bribery is only
one result of a press campaign against public corruption — a campaign
which shows no sign of abating now that Nigeria's code of conduct has been
enacted. A number of federal and state officials were implicated in January
1981 in a scandal concerning the importation of rice supplies. Alledgedly
import permits were being restricted by the Ministry of Trade to those
companies in which leading NPN and NPP members had a direct business interest.
One company on the government's list of permit-holders was, in fact, non•
existent. The matter has been brought before the courts. But its implications
are far greater than the discovery of yet another instance of political
corruption. For the scheme also resulted in an artificially contrived
shortage of rice supplies. As demand for the foodstuff continued to rise, the
price of imports increased dramatically. Food riots took place in many 69
communities. What is at stake, then, is more then simply the proper conduct
of government officials. The regulation of political behaviour affects the
broader question of social stability as well.
Corrupt political practices are not the only difficulties which
obstruct the governmental process in Nigeria. The checks and balances of the
country's presidential system pose further problems for federal and state
policy-makers alike. Stalemates and bottlenecks commonly arise as executive
officials and assembly members struggle to reach an accord to guarantee the
passage of legislation by both branches of government. At the same time,
constitutional provisions designed to eliminate the abuse of public authority
and involve sectional interests in the decision-making process take their
toll on government efficiency. Policy formulation and implementation is a
complicated business. Nigeria's new system of government has met already with harsh criticism for its rather meagre record of legislative activity. - 108 -
Many of the structures prescribed by the constitution for purposes
of inhibiting the concentration of political power, subject the governmental
process to a series of procedural entanglements. By requiring that at least
one federal minister be appointed from each state, for example, the
president may be forced to overlook especially talented individuals because
they, do not meet his criteria for selection. Moreover, the constitutional
relationship that exists between legislative and executive branches holds
forth every possibility of governmental deadlock. At the federal level,
membership of the House of Representatives reflects the distribution of
population throughout the Republic. An allocation of seats on the basis of
Nigerians last "acceptable" population count — the 1963 census — grants
a House majority to district representatives from states of the former Northern 70 Region. The Senate, on the other hand, with its seats distributed equally
among all states, ensures a majority to members representing those states
71
created from the former Eastern, Western, and Mid-Western Regions. Such a
formula increases the potential for conflict — not only between the northern
and southern regional majorities housed in the bicameral National Assembly,
but also between the executive and at least one house of the federal legisla•
ture — in matters where regional interests are at stake. The constitution assumes that any stalemate will be resolved by some means of reconciliation.
Yet, in a country where political fortunes often rest on the regional effects of national legislation, the process of garnering an agreement may be a drawn- out and extremely complicated affair.
The difficulties inherent in the functioning of Nigeria's new system of government are evident from the very beginning of civilian rule. <_••;
Upon assuming office in October 197J9, President Shagari committed his administration to a broad range of social and economic development policies.
He pledged that his government would make Nigeria self-sufficient in food, - 109 -
encourage housing and the development of small-scale industries, and review
the system of collective bargaining for wages in the industrial and public 72 sectors. His intentions have been checked by two unfavourable circumstances. First, civilian politicians inherited from their military predecessors a 73
substantial federal debt. Government investment programmes could not be
radically expanded without decreasing the tight supply of money even further.
The Nigerian Treasury was already.under severe strain.
Perhaps more telling, however, has been the need to prepare legis•
lation which meets with the approval of the National Assembly. Nigeria is governed by an NPN president. The National Party commands the greatest number of seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives of all political parties. However, the NPN does not possess an absolute majority in either house. In order to ensure the passage of executive bills through the federal legislature, then, President Shagari must not only maintain loyalty within his own party, but attract support from the members of other parties as well.
That demands legislation which does not benefit one section of the country above another. It requires close coordination with state officials, and an effort to appeal to as broad a regional base as possible.
At the end of the 1979 election campaign, Shagari pleaded that partisan interests must be put aside for the good of the Republic. We must subjugate our political and other differences to the unrelenting pursuit of peace, unity, and progress of our motherland.... It is your duty, indeed your sacred responsibility, to ensure that our national unity and stability are not sacrificed on the alter of ego or fleeting political gains or expediency. More then anything else, there is a need for tolerance, understanding, and trust. Inflam• matory speeches and indulgence in polemics must not be allowed to becloud the real issues before you. Since our ultimate objective is to provide for the welfare of all Nigerians, we must subjugate our political differences^to the unrelenting pursuit of peace, unity, and progress.
The president's conciliatory message provides the ideological basis for a - no - cooperation agreement that was concluded between his own National Party and the Nigerian People's Party in mid-October 1979. At that time, the two parties undertook "to work together in the interest of amity, peace, stability, and
75 progress of the country". The pact did not give rise to a formal coalition.
However, it did create3Bn"5 NPN-NPP voting alliance in the National Assembly, giving Shagari a working majority of 52 out of 95 seats in the Senate and
246 out of 449 seats in the House of Representatives. In return, four NPP politicians were to be appointed to the federal cabinet. The president of the
Senate and the deputy speaker of the House of Representatives were chosen from among members of the NPN; the Senate's deputy president and the speaker of the House were NPP nominees. Thus, at an early stage, the agreement witnessed
the emergence of de facto majority and minority voting alliances in the
National Assembly.
The existence of an NPN-NPP voting agreement does not resolve the
problems of presidential government. In some instances, it may make the task
of administration even more difficult. UPN politicians are totally excluded
from the pact. Federal appointments go:tdf northern (NPN) and eastern (NPP)
nominees. UPN senators and representatives are relegated to opposition benches,
a disadvantageous position from the standpoint of influencing federal legis•
lation. The alliance effectively serves to isolate UPN members of the National
Assembly. It exacerbates an already open cleavage within Nigerian politics,
magnifying within national political institutions a division that-appears
to separate western, Yoruba, interests from those of other regions of the
Federation. It is a situation all too reminiscent of the Action Group's
exclusion from the ruling NPC-NCNC coalition that stood at the heart of
Tafawa Balewa's ill-fated government immediately after Nigerian independence.
In addition, the alliance has proved very difficult to maintain. The - Ill -
reports of the 1981 debates on the federal government's Revenue Allocation Bill
well illustrate the tensions involved, particularly as the NPP attempts to
balance regional representation with its desire to remain within the govern•
ing alliance. The constitution stipulates that the distribution of federally
collected revenues to federal, estate, and local governments is a matter which
must be decided by the National Assembly. In November 1980, President Shagari
presented to the federal legislature a bill which would distribute 55 percent
of total revenues to the federal government, 34.5 percent to the states, and 76
8 percent to local authorities. Although supported by NPP members of the
cabinet, the bill met strong opposition from NPP representatives in the
National Assembly. After a very acrimonious series of debates — on several
occasions the proceedings of the Assembly yielded to quarrels and open 77
fighting among its members — the House of Representatives drastically
reduced the federal share in favour of the states. The Senate restored the
original allocation formula. As prescribed by the constitution, a meeting of
the Senate-House joint finance committee was then convened. The committee
(with an NPN majority) accepted the Senate's version of the bill, and
President Shagari signed it into law in February 1981^
The president's decision to enact the legislation without re•
submitting it to the National Assembly after the joint committee's ruling,
precipitated violent scenes in both legislative chambers. (At one point
police actually fought with legislators in an effort to maintain order.) The
Nigerian People's Party, along with other opposition groups, initiated court proceedings against the federal government, claiming that the method employed 78
to pass the Revenue Allocation Bill was unconstitutional. That move exacer• bated the mutual distrust that had already developed between the NPN and NPP.
The federal administration retaliated by rejecting out of hand a list of NPP - 112 -
79 ambassadorial nominees. Politicians on both sides called for an end to the
interparty accord. Claiming that it had "received only confrontation" from
the government, the Nigerian People's Party announced in July 1981 that its
alliance with the National Party had come to an end. The speaker of the House
of Representatives, deputy president of the Senate, and a few NPP ministers
resigned their posts.
A de facto voting alliance between the NPN and NPP, however, remains
within the National Assembly. By August 1981, opposition to the NPN was
weakening among NPP leaders. A group of NPN and NPP officials issued a joint
81
statement opposing the breakup of the alliance. Consequently the federal
government is still able to muster the support of a majority of Senate and •
House representatives. What is now clear, though, is the tenuous nature of
that majority. NPP members have shown themselves willing to vote against
government legislation. For that matter, the NPN-NPP accord never worked
effectively. At a more general level, voting patterns within the Assembly
have not always followed party lines. Support for the federal executive
within the national legislature, then, cannot be absolutely guaranteed. It
emerges only from a series of continuing and complex interparty negotiations.
As a result, the federal legislative process has proved to be a
cumbersome and time-consuming affair. In its first year-and-a-half of 82 existence the National Assembly passed only three bills. The federal government's Revenue Allocation Act was judged unconstitutional in October 83
1981. Moreover, the national legislature has been reluctant to ratify federal
executive appointments. President Shagari's list of NPN and NPP nominees for his cabinet's 38 ministerial positions was submitted to the Senate within 84 two weeks of his inauguration. The Senate rejected three candidates outright.
It was not until early January 1980 that senators finally approved v* Shagari's - 113 -
list of ministerial nominees -- and even then the decision was the result of 85 a UPN boycott of the session. By the end of the second year of civilian administration, Nigeria was still to post slightly under half of its 86 ambassadors. Claiming that it should have the power to nominate liaison officers to the National Economic Council, the Senate still refuses to ratify 87
President Shagari's list of candidates for the post. A working relation•
ship between executive and legislative branches of government can only be expected to develop with time and experience; To date, those relations appear to be very frosty indeed.
The legislative process is painfully slow in Nigeria. All too
often it results in federal government inaction, accompanied by a growing ;i .. amount of public criticism. As reported incidents of smuggling, robbery, and corruption increase, and as figures indicating the level of industrial and 88 agricultural productivity continue to wane, the federal administration seems to be drifting and Nigeria's legislatures appear in disarray. Ignoring threats of a ^general strike in May 1981, the national government found itself conceding to union wage demands a few hours after the strike was 89 called. During that same month, a border clash with Cameroon left five Nigerian soldiers dead. The lack of any official response from President Shagari elicited a strongly worded protest from an outraged military 90 leadership. In many quarters, Shagari is viewed as the chief culprit behind the practice of "minimal government"."The need to search for national concil• iation to override the institutional demands of office" exists as "a heavy 91 weight" upon the country's new president. The national priorities announced by President Shagari on the first and second anniversaries of civilian govern• ment are identical to the programme for reform unveiled the day of his
92 inauguration. - 114 -
Stalemates between executive and legislative branches of government
are not phenomena confined to the federal level alone. In the state of
Kaduna, for instance, no executive decisions requiring legislative approval were taken within the first 20?-months of civilian rule. The People's
Redemption Party captured two gubernatorial seats in the 1979 elections — in
Kaduna and Kano. However, the party failed to win a majority in the-Kaduna state assembly. The governor, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, faced a National Party majority which, from the start, showed that it was unwilling to cooperate with a "socialist" PRP administration. In the words of one National Party spokesman, the NPN was reluctant to deal with a governor who could only 93 represent the talakwa, the poor masses. In any event, the deadlock para• lyzed state government. Kaduna's House of Assembly rejected the governor's fourth list of cabinet nominees in July 1980, despite the fact that many of the candidates were National Party members. A fifth list was turned down 94 even before its contents were announced. The intervention of National Party executive officials, and of President Shagari himself, were of no avail in 95 resolving the dispute. Consequently no state commissioners were appointed. s
The state budget could not be ratified. The Assembly would not grant salaries for executive officials; the governor scaled down the salaries of Assembly members* The state assembly simply refused to pass any legislation presented to it by Balarabe Musa.
In January 1981, after four weeks of impeachment threats, Balarabe initiated proceedings against the state assembly in Kaduna's High Court. The governor's action followed upon his refusal to appear before a committee of the House of Assembly set up to investigate his conduct in office. The
Assembly issued a warrant of arrest against the governor and immediately began proceedings for his impeachment. (Balarabe's plight was compounded by a - 115 - split within his own party. In 1980 he and the governor of Kano were both expelled by the leader of the PRP for participating in a meeting with Unity
Party governors. Claiming that they represented the true PRP, the governors retaliated by expelling Aminu Kano. Ironically, the party's national executive 97 lent its full support to the efforts of the NPN-dominated Kaduna Assembly.,! ) 98
Alhaji Balarabe Musa was impeached for "gross misconduct" in July 1981.
It was the only action open to the National Party within the provisions of the new constitution.
Most obervers feel that the impeachment was a serious distortion of the spirit of the constitution: The document did not intend impeachment to be used purely for political ends. In any case, the deadlock remains VM unresolved. Balarabe was replaced by his deputy governor, Alhaji Abba Rimi, who is also a member of the People's Redemption Party. National Party oppo• sition persists in the state assembly. Kaduna is a sensitive issue in the politics of Nigeria's civilian regime. In that state, government inaction seems to be the only outcome of playing by the country's new constitutional rulesi . 99
Nigeria's new constitution provides no means of resolving execu• tive-legislative deadlock. Again, political accommodation can emerge only by way of governmental practice. Effective government requires experience and diplomacy. No constitutional formulae are able to guarantee a smoothly func• tioning system of administration for Nigeria. The operation of government cannot be regarded as a pre-existing condition of political society. Like the relations among sectional groups, cooperation between executive and legislative officials develop within the structures established by the basic law. Political actors make constitutional arrangements work. In Nigeria, it is simply not clear to what extent partisan calculations — and competition - 116 - over positions of political authority — can be put aside in the interest of operable government.
Defining the Federation
Nigeria's new civilian constitution retains a federal system of government. State authorities are charged with jurisdiction over local matters
— health, primary education, local government, regional development. The federal government, on the other hand, exercises responsibility over such matters as communications and transportation networks, currency, and national economic development — affairs that are deemed to be in the national .-> , ... interest. Both levels of government possess their own bureaucratic structures and ^sources of finance. Both are accountable to the publics resident within their territorial boundaries. Nigeria's civilian regime also-has inherited many of the problems associated with federalism. Intergovernmental conflict still exists. As a result, the balance of power between central and state governments within^the Federation is constantly being redefined.
Any attempt'to draft^a new federal constitution involves, ipso facto, an allocation of government responsibilities to national_,.and regional- . authorities. Yet,, how. are . federal and local;interests ^toTbe determined?
Federations older than Nigeria have been faced with the same dilemma. Matters placed under the jurisdiction of state authorities are often of common concern to an entire national population. Similar demands for political action may be voiced from all parts of the federation. Alternatively, the policies of one state may affect the inhabitants of another, thereby requiring a response by other regional administrations, and eventually creating a situation which must be dealt with on a national scale. From the opposite perspective, acti• vities that are deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of national government may affect regions differently. They may affect regional interests which can - 117 -
only effectively be dealt with by state administrations. Local and national
interests cannot be defined by any objective standard. A constitution may
list the responsibilities to be exercised by federal and state authorities.
However, an extensive range of concrete political issues cannot be so precisely
allocated. The distribution of powers reflects a political formula devised
during the period of constitutional construction, rather than any attempt to
establish an ideal federal system. Likewise, a workable federal system requires
a continuous dialogue between federal and provincial authorities. An analysis
of modern Nigerian federalism thus begins from two points of enquiry: What
is the constitutional organization of Nigeria's federal system intended to
achieve? And, given those expectations, how well do federal institutions
actually work?
The federal system of government established by Nigeria's new
constitution reflects the balance of political forces involved in the
drafting process. The impetus for constitutional reform came predominantly
from the central military government. Timetables for the sessions of the
CDC and Constituent Assembly, as well as for the election of a civilian regime, were devised by the Supreme Military Council in Lagos. That body defined the problems that a new constitution was intended to alleviate. The
SMC established the objectives of constitutional reform, setting forth the basic organizational features of a federal system of civilian government.
At the same time, its decisions were based on the experience of almost two decades of federal rule in Nigeria. The constitution is a product both of the political difficulties of the First Republic and of the institutions established during the years of military administration. It is a document constructed primarily from the perspective of the central government, whose aim is to consolidate a system of national authority. Political stability - 118 - and effective government in Nigeria are defined in the terms of the entire
Federation. The constitution represents an attempt to strengthen the insti• tutions of central government, rather than any effort to devolve power to regional or state authorities.
The centralist nature of Nigeria's federalist constitution is evident in the geographic delimitation of state boundaries, as well as in the allocation of powers to federal and state governments. By maintaining a federation of 19 states, the constitution ensures that no single regional administration is capable on its own of posing a threat to national integrity by threatening to secede from the union. Similarly, no state, by withholding
its consent in federal-state negotiations, can obstruct the development of national polcies requiring a certain degree of state support. The constitution
incorporates a "divide-and-rule" principle with an allocation of governmental
authority designed to limit state administrations to matters of local concern.
It grants the central government overriding jurisdiction to plan and
implement national economic and social programmes. The task of ensuring national political stability and encouraging national economic development
is assisted by institutional arrangements devised to reinforce the hand of
the national government.
At the same time, though, Nigeria's federal system is confronted by a number of problems inherent in its very organization. First of all,
federal and state governments in Nigeria are relatively recent creations.
Both organizations are imposed on a diverse collection of traditional
community, religious, and tribal groups. Given these circumstances, it is :
futile to ask whether or not a system of federal government per se is
appropriate to meet the goals set forth by the country's constitutional
engineers. There would be no need for a smoothly functioning federal government if some form of nationally determined economic and social - 119 -
development strategy were not considered a priority. The need to integrate
a wide range of sectional interests would not arise if traditional and local
authorities possessed the power to make political decisions in all matters
they regard as crucial. The objectives of "good government" in Nigeria are
defined by the very existence of national and state authorities — that
should go without saying.
It is valid, however, to question the extent to which Nigerian
federalism can go in achieving either a stable level of national integration
or an operable system of government. Two sets of problems arise in this regard.
The first centres about the dilemmas involved in imposing federal and state
authorities upon an already deeply ingrained pattern of traditional rule.
The second is a direct concommitant of any federal system — the emergence
of organizational conflicts between local and state administrations, and
between federal and state officials.
We have already considered some of the difficulties that arise in
the effort to include in the institutions of federal and state governments,
spokesmen representing a variety of sectional interests. Further problems may emerge because the demands of modern federal and state administrations
are directly at odds with the activities of traditional tribal and religious
authorities. The city of Kano provides evidence on both counts. Late in 1980,
in the wake of the Iranian revolution, Kano experienced a series of riots
instigated by the Yen Awaki, a fanatical sect of Islamic fundamentalists. In one week more than a thousand people died and many more were injured as a result of the disturbances. The riots were quelled only after martial law had been imposed. The army moved into the city, violently suppressing any opposition it encountered."'"^ Such a demonstration of religious fanaticism
is not important because it illustrates some organizational flaw in Nigeria's new constitution. Its significance resides in the fact that the riots occurred - 120 -
in spite of the constraints imposed on political activity by the basic
law.
Such conflicts among religious and social groups are beyond the
pale of constitutional provision. They exist regardless of the nature of
federal and state government. And they can be contained only by resort to
the coercive power of public authority. Nigeria's federal system is construc•
ted atop traditional patterns of authority that still determine how many
political interests are to be defined. The constitution can only be expected
to influence public affairs as long as federal and state institutions are the exclusive loci of political activity. Kano's religious disturbances suggest that national and regional governments do not exert unrivalled authority over Nigeria's political affairs. Federalism is in no sense a
"natural" form of government for Nigeria. Where local and traditional author^- ities exert a decisive influence on social behaviour, there cannot be any guarantee that sectional differences will find expression, or be contained, within the institutions of a federal system of government.
Indeed, state officials may find themselves in direct conflict with local tribal and religious leaders. Many traditional rulers, although they possess no legislative powers-;1 still command a large following among the community. Through the Councils of Chiefs established in each state, they are accorded an advisory role in state administration. Nevertheless, disputes between modern and traditional state authorities are common. As witnessed in the state of Kano, such conflicts can result,in violent disturbances. Since his election in 1979, Kano's PRP governor, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, has empha• sized his commitment to limit the power of the state's traditional rulers, and particularly that of the emir of Kano, by intervening in matters of local tribal and religious concern. By July 1981 opposition on the part of the - 121 - emirate to Abubakar Rimi's activities had become quite generalized. When the governor demanded the resignation of the emir later that year, riots erupted throughout the entire state.State officials again required government troops to restore order.
Traditional loyalties and tribal practices die hard in Nigeria.
Traditional institutions governing family matters, religious rites, and tribal custom touch upon the daily lives of many individuals to a far greater extent than the activities of state or national administrations. The number of voters who actually cast ballots in Nigeria's 1979 elections provides " another poignant illustration of the relatively minor role popularly accorded to the political process. Overall turnout ranged from 26 percent of the electorate in the senatorial election to a mere 35.5 percent in the presi-
102 dential poll. In an electoral campaign that was to presage a return to civilian rule — the first election held in the country for thirteen years — the low figures indicate that for a majority of Nigerians a new system of constitutional government means very little. Any effort to impose a frame• work of political rules, and more specifically a federal regime, upon a soci^»
ety where traditional authorities still dominate daily life, is bound to be
a difficult operation. If political institutions fail to accommodate tradi•
tional practices and social customs, then many community activities may
remain beyond the scope of governmental authority. Where federal and state
administrations challenge the power of traditional rulers, their actions
may generate popular opposition, if not open revolt. In short, federalism in
Nigeria is not a system of government that develops naturally from the
political demands of a plural society. It is a relatively new and artificial
creation, whose institutions rival existing authority relationships within
communities that remain organized along traditional lines. - 122 -
Nigeria's federal system also brings with it organizational problems
of its own. The very existence of separate state and federal administrations,
each attempting to govern within the jurisdictional parameters established
by the constitution, provides sufficient cause for intergovernmental dispute.
Central and regional governments tend to develop an organizational
impetus of their own. As policy issues become more and more complex, decision• makers at both levels attempt to extend their authority over matters in related areas of government activity. Jurisdictional boundaries are blurred.
Conflicts arise between federal and state authorities along a widening area of mutual concern. Administrations place increasingly greater demands upon a limited pool of bureaucratic and financial resources. Access to political power becomes an even more valuable prize. As regional groups attempt to gain exclusive control over public resources, each demands the creation of policy-making structures which it alone is able to dominate. The conflicts which thus develop between federal and state governments, and among regional populations, are intrinsic to Nigeria's federal system of government. They are, in a sense, organizationsl problems arising from the actual operation of those political institutions established by the constitution.
Governmental responsibilities cannot be strictly compartmentalized according to the categories set forth by the constitution. The activities of federal and state -administrations often overlap. As a result, the policy process involves a large measure of intergovernmental consultation and negotiations. Decision-making in a federal system, while not necessarily requiring'^an accord between central and state governments, does at least involve some measure of mutual predictability. The probable reaction of other governments within the federation is a factor that enters into national and regional policy calculations. In the case of Nigeria, regular meetings - 123 -
of federal and state bureaucrats, chief executives, and cabinet secretaries provide an institutional framework for the development of cooperative relations between governments. The constitution establishes a national
Council of State, Federal Electoral Commission, a National Economic Council, and National Population Commission in which federal as"well as regional
103 authorities are to be represented. Nonetheless, disputes over the precise distribution of central and state powers are common. Political institutions may promote intergovernmental contact on a fairly regular basis, and thereby provide a forum in which contentious issues can be resolved. But they are not solutions in themselves. Federal-state conflict over particular jurisdictional responsibilities arises from the.operation of political forces within Nigerian federalism. It is one more facet of the game of politics played by the rules of Nigeria's new constitution.
Sharp disputes have emerged between federal and state administrations in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule, particularly in the field of education policy. In late 1979 the country's five UPN-controlled state governments announced their intention to provide free education at all age
104 levels. The governor of Lagos further indicated that he would not admit children transferring from "non-free education states" into the schools undetf his jurisdiction. The NPP governor of Imo responded by imposing an education fee on parents whose children were enrolled at "free-state"
105 schools. Acting under his authority to enforce the constitutional right of all Nigerians-'to move at will throughout the country, President Shagari challenged the actions of both governors. In so doing, the president immed• iately transformed an interstate dispute into a full-blown confrontation between the federal administration and 19 state governors. Shagari referred to his responsibility to preserve the constitutional order. The governors - 124 - claimed that decisions affecting education policy fall within the exclusive
106 competence of state authorities.'. Both parties are correct. After several bitter exchanges, the matter was finally submitted for negotiation between state and federal bureaucrats. As the affair well illustrates, Nigeria's new constitution does not prevent intergovernmental conflict. Neither does it prescribe a set of rules through which such conflict can be resolved.
Intergovernmental conflict has also ;.centred on the distribution of financial resources to federal and state authorities. The federal government appointed a commission of enquiry, headed by Justice Pius Okigbo, 107 in November 1979 to recommend a formula for national revenue allocation. The commission published its report six months later. The findings immed-
108 iately created a major political storm. Basing its conclusions on the criteria of "national interest, derivation, population, even development, equitable distribution, equality of states' needs, financial comparability, minimum responsibilities, independent revenues, and continuity", the commission recommended that 53 percent of federally collected revenues 109 should remain at the disposal of the central government. At the same time,
30 percent should be allocated to state authorities and distributed accordingly: 40 percent in proportion to state populations, 40 percent on the grounds of equality, 15 percent in proportion to primary school enrolment and development needs, and 5 percent to be determined by the amount of revenue collected within each state. Ten percent of national revenues should go to local governments, while 7 percent should be invested in a special relief and development fund."''"'"0
The commission's recommendations contrasted with a federal proposal, which appeared in early 1981, allocating 70 percent of nationally collected revenues to the central government, 20 percent to the states, and 10 percent to local administrations."'""'"''' Okigbo's formula was also rejected by a group - 125 -
of nine state governors representing the oil-producing regions of the
country. The governors argued that the federal share proposed by the Okigbo
plan should be reduced. Forty percent of national revenues, they felt, "is
the minimum required to enable the governors of all the 19 states to fulfill
promises made ... to .the electorate during the electioneering campaigns as
112
well as to service loans already borrowed from abroad".
Bitter disagreements between federal and state officials, over the
issue of revenue allocation, raged on through the latter months of 1980. Each
level of government naturally claimed a higher proportion of revenues for its
own purposes. Although the National Economic Council was convened on several
occasions, in an attempt to reconcile federal and state differences, no
formula attracted the support of all parties. Finally, in November, President
Shagari introduced his National Revenue Allocation Bill in the National
Assembly. The legislation set aside 55 percent of nationally collected revenues for the central government, while 34.5 percent would go to the states, 8 percent to local authorities, and 2.5 percent to a fund for the 113 development of a new capital territory at Abuja. The bill met with widespread criticism from state administrations. As previously mentioned, it encountered strident opposition in the National Assembly, was eventually passed and later judged ultra vires. The entire episode placed a great deal of strain on federal-state relations. The bill resulted in violent demonstra• tions on the part of its opponents. It brought with it the immediate threat of civil unrest.
In one sense, the revenue allocation controversy is evidence that
Nigeria's federal system actually does work. Intergovernmental negotiations are capable of reconciling adverse political demands, at least to some degree.
The bill that President Shagari introduced in the National Assembly, although it would have given the central government a slightly larger share of national - 126 -
revenues than that proposed by the Okigbo commission, was certainly not as
biased towards the federal level as the president's first revenue allocation
formula. The federal administration made compromises in the face of state
pressure. The bill was a product of intergovernmental negotiations. It emerged
from an extensive, albeit unfinished, dialogue between federal and state officials — a dialogue in which political posturing, grand statements of principle, and hard bargaining techniques were employed by both sides. Never• theless, one matter remains unresolved. To what extent can intergovernmental conflict be productive? Can such conflict exist without exacerbating the already fissiparous tendencies of Nigerian politics? In a community of politically active and competing sectional groups, the federal system may operate so as to weaken the chances of its own survival.
Nigeria's federal system faces one final set of problems. Sectional groups still believe that the advantages of achieving political power are enormous. Political office is a source of patronage, a lever to be used in bargaining with other groups, a means for protecting local customs. It is a very valuable prize. It remains the object of a great deal of factional rivalry. One facet of that rivalry is fierce interparty competition. Another is an increasing number of demands made on the part of regional and tribal groups for political institutions which they alone are able to control. Since
October 1979, political leaders have questioned existing state boundaries, as well as the composition of local government administrations. Once more, ti• the resulting controversies underline the dilemma that exists in any attempt to design political structures to accommodate a diversity of sectional inters ests and, at the same time, to ensure that the administrative units that are created are capable of providing an effective form of government.
Throughout the period of constitutional reform, Nigeria's Federal
Military Government refused to redraw state boundaries. Nigeria was to remain - 127 -
114 a federation of 19 states. Procedures outlined in the constitution for the creation of new states are so complex as to be virtually prohibitive.
Nevertheless, within the first year of civilian rule, the federal government
115 received 61 separate requests to establish new regional administrations.
Many of the reasons that prompted military leaders to create seven additional states in the late 1970s reappear in more recent demands for further boundary revisions. Minority groups fear that they may be excluded from the institu• tions of existing state governments. Political leaders wish to increase their personal access to resources under state control. Regional groups attempt to secure more funds for local areas. The creation of more state authorities is justified on the principle of achieving an equal distribution of national 116 wealth to all geographic regions within Nigeria.
The difficulties involved in further subdividing the federation were recognized by the Supreme Military Council at an early stage in the consti• tutional debates. If the objective is to provide a separate state for every regional or tribal identity, then the process of state creation may go on for .an indefinite period. A large number of small states would result in a massive duplication of administrative effort. It would mean greater disecon• omies of scale in the business of government as well. Problems of arriving at any intergovernmental agreement would increase tremendously. In any case, the administration of a state authority whose boundaries are constantly chang• ing would amount to a bureaucratic nightmare. Little would be developed in the way of governmental practice, and any attempt to plan ahead would simply be futile. Until its removal in 1979, the Federal. Military Government treated state creation as a divisive issue. The idea that each sectional group should command a set of policy-making institutions within the federation, was all too reminiscent of the "East-for-Easterners" campaign that flourished in the - 128 - months that led up to civil war. It remains an issue that can exacerbate ethnic emotions, regardless of the reaction of Nigeria's central government.
Federal officials have received with sympathy proposals for creating new states. However, the idea runs squarely against the provisions of Nigeria's
new constitution. President Shagari explains the position of the federal u- government in the following terms:
V/e are going to have to create new states because we are all agreed on it. But the constitutional provisions which were deliberately so made in order to create more states are vJrv. stringent and may be impossible to meet if not amended.
The federal government cannot unilaterally increase the number of state authorities.
A similar situation exists with respect to local government boundaries. State administrations have received many applications on behalf of tribal groups demanding their own local power base. The problems of sectional divisiveness and diseconomies of scale are relevant here as well.
States too have proved reluctant to subdivide existing local authorities.
Spokesmen for regional groups are frequently vocal in criticizing the inactivity of federal and state officials with regard to the establishment of additional state and local administrations. At times, government inaction results in violent confrontations between competing political groups. Ten people were killed in 1981, for instance, as rioting swept the town of
Modakeke in Yorubaland. The disturbance was sparked off when Oyo state authorities refused to separate Modakeke from the Ile-Ife local adminis- 118 tration in which it is located. Such tensions are aggravated by the claims of federal and state opposition leaders. Intent upon attracting popular support for their respective parties, opposition spokesmen argue that, if only they were in power, they would respond positively to the demands of local 119 groups.r. It is a claim made by politicians who are not in positions of - 129 -
governmental responsibility. Nevertheless, the suggestion is that ruling political officials are simply ignoring the appeals of regional communities.
In a country which has already experienced a considerable degree of sectional unrest, that is one of the most divisive impressions that it is possible to convey. The issue of state creation again brings the entire structure of
Nigerian federalism into question. What may appear to be the perfect system of government for a plural society such as Nigeria's is actually neither as effective, nor as accommodative of local interests, as the classical federal model suggests.
The competing organizational demands of federal and state govern• ments, and the interplay of sectional interests v/ithin the institutions of
Nigerian federalism, are sources of potential conflict intrinsic to the very nature of the country!s federal system. The constitution specifies the structures of Nigerian government. Yet, intergovernmental relations, and the balance of power that exists between different levels of political authority, develop according to a dynamic that is independent of constitutional constraint. The extent to which federal and regional institutions are capable of either incorporating or supplanting traditional authority relationships is a matter that can only be determined through political practice, over a period of time. Similarly, cooperation between federal and state adminis• trations is built on a network of intergovernmental contacts established in the course of regular political activity. Conflicting legislative and admin• istrative demands are always present. Yet, where the nature of the country's federal system itself becomes an issue of dispute, the problem is one of establishing governmental practice. The rival demands of traditional authorities, intergovernmental conflict, and the controversy surrounding the creation of more states and units of local government all hinder the formu- - 130 - lation and implementation of policy decisions. They may serve to aggravate sectional conflict. The federal system institutionalizes regional differences.
Issues affecting the balance of power among central, state, and local authorities often become matters of sectional dispute. In such circumstances,
"national interest" may appear a hollow symbol, to be subsumed under the competing interests of regional and ethnic communities. In practical terms, disputes arising among federal, state, and local governments can lead to more generalized conditions of social unrest. They are conditions that may once again presage the collapse of civilian rule.
A National Commitment
The difficulties which confront constitutional government in
Nigeria today are, in many respects, similar to the problems experienced by the country's first civilian regime. Nigeria remains an underveloped country. In fact, economic growth has slowed since the late 1970s. An overdependence on oil — the petroleum industry accounted for 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and 80 percent of government revenues 120 in 1980 — has taken its toll. Conditions of excess supply in the inter• national petroleum market forced Nigeria to reduce its oil production by more 121 than two-thirds during the first eight months of 1981. As a result, exchange 122 reserves and government revenue were cut by approximately 20 percent.
Meanwhile, black market activities are on the increase. Nigeria's central bank reports that the number of man-hours lost through industrial unrest has more 123 than quadrupled since 1978. And, drought in the Sahel keeps agricultural production figures lower than average. While the value of goods imported yearly into the country is now double that of 1979, indigenous industries are losing their share of the domestic market. The value of industrial produc• tion is static; unemployment figures are growing. Water supplies remain - 131 - unreliable. Power cuts are frequent. Telecommunications are poor. With a population estimated to be approaching the 100 million mark, problems of overcrowding are accompanied by increasing demands for public health, 124
education, and housing facilities. By all accounts, the enormity of the
task which lies before Nigeria's political leaders in their efforts to
encourage economic development and to provide basic amenties to the entire population, remains a daunting feature of national government. The country's new constitution specifies a new set of organizational arrangements through which public policy-makers are to operate. It does not, however, guarantee that
federal and state governments now possess adequate financial or organizational
capabilities to undertake the tasks popularly expected of them. Partisan
conflict, institutional checks and balances, disputes among federal and state
administrations — they are all features characteristic of constitutional rule in Nigeria. Such conditions complicate the policy process. They limit public officials in their response to the exigencies of economic development.
The Nigerian poet Saadu Zangar expresses his nation's plight in more eloquent
terms. "Where is the advantage of political freedom if we continue to live
in grinding poverty?
For many politicians, the answer to Zangar's question is plain. The
benefits of participating in Nigeria's political system accrue to those who
wield political pov/er. Public office is the agency through which communal
resources are distributed. Consequently, the exercise of political power
remains the object of regional, partisan, and intergovernmental rivalries, in
much the same manner as it was during the first civilian regime. On the other
hand, exclusion from the channels leading to political office contributes to
sectional discontent, and perhaps even to the collapse of governmental
authority. - 132 -
When an attempted coup was uncovered in February 1982, the fragile foundations of Nigeria's national government were clearly revealed. Businessmen and soldiers alike were implicated in a plot to overthrow the country's civilian regime. Their motives were founded squarely on material gain. A civilian government was no longer granting them the lucrative contracts which 126 they had come to expect under military rule. The coup might have been expected from a group which found its political interests — here defined in material and financial terms — unrepresented within the existing institutions of civilian government. Alternative organizational arrangements are preferred, as long as they restore the prospect of political patronage.
Sectional and partisan rivalries thus develop within the insti•
tutions established by Nigeria's new constitution. Moreover, the structures
of government may themselves become objects of communal dispute. As the governor of Kano caustically remarked in early 1981, constitutional rules
are used by competing political groups, moulded to their own ends, and
must, in the last analysis;•• be viewed as an important focus for partisan
conflict. Abubakar Rimi explains: Anything can happen in this country at any time. ... What happened in the first democratic era, from independence to the period of the first coup, was that politicians, in particular those of the Northern People's Congress, violated the constitution at every turn. The people who did this in the MPC are now in the National Party (NPN). President Shagari^as an NPC minister and now he is a member of the NPN.
The governor's polemic is, of course, a statement of partisan interest in
its own right. Its claim that national government leaders belong to a self-
perpetuating northern elite reflects the sentiments of a politician whose
own party is excluded from the federal executive. Yet, the statement indicates
the extent to which constitutional rules can themselves appear to be manipu•
lated by factional groups vying for political power. Constitutional reform, - 133 - and the structural engineering it entails, are not sufficient in themselves to contain sectional conflict. The stability of civilian rule depends, above all, upon a common commitment to maintain the political institutions set forth by the constitution. What is highly uncertain is how long such a commitment may be expected to exist.
Nigeria's constitution has survived thus far the partisan disputes and the cumbersome system of checks and balances that are features of civilian rule. The organizational provisions of the new constitution have been imple• mented. Its procedural norms have been enforced. Supported by the belief that the constitution represents the general will of the Nigerian people, the institutions prescribed by the basic law form the structural framework in which political activity takes, place. To evaluate those institutions in terms of their role in successfully resolving the problems of partisan conflict and effective government is perhaps a misleading exercise. The value of a constitution becomes apparent only with respect to immediate political condi• tions. Constitutional "success", then, is a relative term. In the case of
Nigeria, it may "best be gauged simply byrthe existence of.a civilian ".regime dyer a period of time.
The survival of constitutional government in Nigeria, in spite of its many problems, does afford some indication that present institutions of public authority are, on the whole, preferred to any alternative political regime. The prospect of a return to military rule lingers on. If the experience of the country's first civilian regime holds any lesson for Nigerian politi• cians, it is that where government office becomes the private preserve of its occupants or where partisan conflicts lead to widespread social unrest — conditions which would both deter effective government policy-making — army commanders are likely to intervene to re-establish order. Since the advent - 134 - of civilian rule, public officials have agreed openly on one point,— that a return to military government must be avoided if at all possible.
If the declarations of political leaders are to be taken at face value, they offer the overall impression that Nigeria's public figures are determined to make the country's political system work. As a senior politician in Kaduna puts it: "We know the army is not far away, watching us. If we fail this time, God knows when Nigeria will have the right to choose a government 128 again". Those sentiments seem to be shared by all shades of partisan opinion. In the words of one UPN official: "The only choice is between National 129
Party government and renewed military rule". Chief Awolowo also recognizes the immanent danger of political unrest. While addressing meetings of Unity
Party faithful, Awolowo still refuses to accept as fair the 1979 election results. Yet, even he is able to admit that "the worst civilian government is 130 better than military rule". Whether these sentiments actually moderate partisan conflict is not at all clear. The spectre of renewed military inter• vention may place a moral constraint upon political behaviour. It may provide a basis for cooperation among partisan groups, at least to the extent that would keep Nigeria's system of government functioning. An explicit commitment on the part of national leaders to "make the system work" does help to legiti• mate existing political institutions. It reinforces the symbol of national unity that was generated during the process of constitutional reform. That, in itself, strengthens the procedures and the organization of constitutional government, increasing the resilience of those structunes to the problems posed by a fragmented and underdeveloped political society.
For its part, the military continues to show its willingness to support Nigeria's second civilian regime. Despite frequent warnings from media commentators that the country is on the verge of civil war, or that - 135 -
army leaders are once again preparing to intervene in Nigerian politics,
military commanders appear to be far more occupied by organizational problems
of their own. The logistical difficulties of maintaining an armed force of
well over 140,000 men are enormous. Moreover, Nigerian military involvement
in other parts of Africa to a certain extent deflects the attention of military
leaders away from the arena of national politics. The army has responded
promptly to the aid of state authorities, restoring order to regions where
local discontents have erupted into violence. In early 1982, when military
officers were implicated in the plot to overthrow President Shagari, they were
brought before a military tribunal and summarily executed for treason.
Civilian politicians are aware that the probability of military intervention
would become much greater if circumstances were to reveal a corrupt political
system oh the verge of collapse. Dissatisfaction within the military establish•
ment would also grow if it were to appear that military interests in particular
were being ignored by a civilian regime. Nevertheless, it is recognized that
military intervention would destroy any semblance of legitimacy presently
attached to Nigeria's constitutional government. It would again commit the
army to a responsibility for national administration, this time for an indefin•
ite period. The prospect of returning to a political situation similar to that which existed in the early 1970s is not particularly relished by army officers.
The consequences of re-establishing military rule may themselves act as a
constraint upon the involvement of the army in political affairs.
However, a striking similarity remains between Nigeria's recent
experience; of constitutional reform and the achievement of national indepen•
dence 20 years earlier. Both events united political actors behind a common objective to establish civilian government. Yet, once that goal had been achieved, politicians in the First Republic scrambled for the rewards of political power, competing amongst each other with little regard for the - 136 - stability of the national regime. Likewise, a commitment to make Nigeria's current system of government "work" may not be sufficient to contain the disintegrative tendencies of partisan conflict. That can be achieved only through the development of a common ideal standing above the differences that distinguish various personal or sectional interests — an objective which might again serve to unite the loyalties and aspirations of all Nigerians.
The federal government's foreign and defence policies have acquired, since 1979, much of the ideological significance of a common national interest. Nigerian troops are referred to as West Africa's peace- 131 keepers. The enthusiasm shown by the Shagari administration in committing:. men and materiel to an expeditionary force prepared to intervene in the
Chadian civil war, helped to reinforce that image. Nigeria has assumed a more active role in foreign affairs as well. The federal administration is vocal in its appeals for African unity. It supports the activities of guerilla organizations in Namibia while condemning the apartheid policies of South 132
Africa. Nigeria's role in international affairs is well publicized at home.
The central government has gained the recognition of other regimes as well, acting, for instance, in its capacity as African spokesman at the 1980 133
Commonwealth Conference on Namibia. Military and diplomatic affairs thus provide a focus for national sentiment. They engender a sense of national identity, founded on the ideal of a common national purpose.
Be that as it may, the stability of constitutional rule in Nigeria ultimately rests on the degree to which the organization:- and procedures of government are established as the institutions in which political activity takes place. It may simply be a question of time before partisan and sectional groups feel that their interests are not being systematically excluded from government. Again, it may be a question of time before cooperation develops - 137 - between executive and legislative branches, or between federal and state officials. Indeed, a great deal of political experience has been built up already, within the first few years of constitutional rule. President Shagari has acquired a reputation for integrity and fairness. To many, he appears as 134
"a man above divisions who is able to speak for Nigeria as a whole". He is respected as a national statesman. His activities reinforce the symbolic role of the president as a figurehead for national unity. At the same time, .-: they help to consolidate the institutions of Nigerian government.
Other signs point to the development of a more stable political system. As executive officials establish more extensive contacts with national and state assemblies, they become increasingly aware not only of the legis• lation that will find favour within those bodies, but also of their power to lobby assembly members. On the other hand, legislators who vote across 135 party lines are now common phenomena. Partisan conflict too is moderated by the mechanics of Nigeria's new system of government. During a 1981 visit,
President Shagari was given a warm welcome from the UPN governor of Oyo state. He was similarly received by the officials of Lagos state, another
Unity Party stronghold. The administrations of both states are dependent on 136 federal aid in order to finance an overhead railway system. As public officials consolidate their positions in national and state governments, as . they attempt to implement policies for which they are responsible, the need to find some level of accommodation in order to make government "work" becomes increasingly important. In such circumstances, the destabilizing effects of partisan conflict may be moderated within the institutions of government themselves.
The same cannot be said for the electoral process. The achievement of political office remains a highly competitive affair. In this sense,, perhaps the most immanent threat to constitutional rule in Nigeria is posed - 138 - by the upcoming round of federal and state elections scheduled, by-the constitution, for 1983. It is in the contest for public office that partisan differences are bared. A series of elections fought between rival coalitions closely identified with regional or sectional interests, might result in widespread social disturbances that would make a mockery of any democratic principle. Once again, the maintenance of political order is based on the development of an accepted code of electoral practice. It is only as a result of political experience, of the establishment of political practices over time, that the institutions specified by Nigeria's civilian constitution can be >valued in their own right, above the particularistic interests of partisan and communal groups. What may be lacking in the equation is simply the element of time.
The success of any constitution must be gauged by its capacity to
"age in the wood" of political society. Bitter memories of the social unrest, civil war, and military rule which accompanied the breakdown of governmental authority in the First Republic remain fresh in the collective Nigerian conscience. The very fact that a new constitution has been promulgated in
Nigeria,: and that a civilian administration has managed thus far to formulate and implement policy decisions in an authoritative manner, reflects a commitment to establish a stable system of government for the country. That is something of an achievement in itself. -139-
Notes
Chapter I; A Legacy of Political Unrest
1. See Daily Times, Lagos (2 October 1979); "Installation of a President", West Africa 3247 (8 October 1979), pp. 1833-1835. 2. "First National Broadcast by President Shagari", West Africa 3247 (8 October 1979), p. 1862. 3. Ibid., p. 1862. 4. See "Installation of a President", p. 1835; Claude S. Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions? 1975-9", Journal of Modern African Studies XVIII, 1 (March 1980), p. 15. 5. "With almost a quarter of the continent's population, possessing an abundance of natural wealth, and recently endowed with the machinery required by modern government, Nigeria seemed to have everything —talent, resources, and good will — and was set on the road to certain success". "The African Giant", New Africa VIII, 11/12 (November/December 1966), p. 5. 6. Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo in an address formally opening Nigeria's Constituent Assembly, 6 October 1977, quoted in "Nigeria's Historic Gathering", West Africa 3145 (17 October 1977), p. 2113. 7. Lord Hailey quoted by Douglas Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", in Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, ed. Keith Panter-Brick (London, 1978), p. 146. 8. See Rimmer,"Elements of Political Economy", p. 143. 9. Ibid., pp. 147-149; Gavin Williams and Terisa Turner, "Nigeria", in West African States: Failure and Promise — A Study in Comparative Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 138-139. 10. The value of Nigeria's petroleum exports rose from $US 100.5 million in 1962 to $US 1,500 million by 1970, and stood at $US 15,900 million in 1974. (Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", p. 150; Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980, Vol. I (Lagos, 1975), pp. 15-16.) Similarly, the proportion of government revenue derived from taxes levied on the petroleum industry and from the profits of the state-run Nigerian National Oil Corporation increasdd from 3 percent in 1963 to more than 77 percent in 1975. (Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria (London, 1977), p. 51; Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", p. 152.) In the words of Abdul Atta, Permanent Secretary of Finance in 1971: "It is expected that revenues from an effective Nigerian oil policy will ... above all ensure political stability". (Quoted by Terisa Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup", in Soldiers and Oil, p. 150.) 11. World Bank, Nigeria: Options for Long-Term Development (London, 1974), p. 49; Jonathon Baker, "Oil and African Development", Journal of Modern African Studies XV, 2 (June 1977), p. 189. 12. Passenger vehicles, safety pins, and hair spray for instance. World Bank, Nigeria, p. 24. 13. For a discussion of the reports published by the Morgan Commission (1964), the Adebo Commission (1970-1971), and the Udoji Commission (1974), see Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", pp. 154-155; Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 148; World Bank, 'Nigeria', pp. 31-35; and Arnold, Modern Nigeria, pp. 116-123. 14. In 1972 and 1977 the Federal Military Government published its Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees which reserved specific economic activities solely for Nigerian nationals, while stipulating that other foreign enterprises were to have at least 40 percent of their equity in Nigerian ownership. Federal Government of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974,(Lagos, 1970), p. 144; Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", pp. 157-158; Arnold, Modern Nigeria, pp. 78-79. - 140 -
15. See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Plan, pp. 11-21. 16. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Plan, p. 289. 17. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Plan, p. 5. 18. Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 81; Colin Legum, "Nigeria", in Africa: Contemporary Record, 1977-1978 (London, 1979), p. B759. 19. Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 1. 20. Ibid., p. 91; World Bank, Nigeria, p. 30. Between 1967 and 1971, the annual growth rate of agricultural production was only 0.8 percent. As a result of low yields, decreasing soil fertility, lack of credit, and slowly rising international coraraddity prices, the production of such trad• itional goods as cotton, cocoa, and palm oil has fallen off. (Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 71; World Bank, Nigeria, p. 12; as well as the budget statement of President Shagari in "The Gradual Ending of Constraints", West Africa 3271 (31 March 1980), p. 558.) 21. World Bank, Nigeria, p. 13. 22. Three percent of Nigeria's population controls 66 percent of the nation's capital investment. Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 78. 23. Ibid., p. 82. 24. In the 1962/1963 financial year, manufacturing accounted for 5.8 percent of Nigeria's gross domestic product. (World Bank, Nigeria, p. 13.) The share had climbed to only 8.0 percent by 1975. (Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 81.) See also Peter Hill, "Nigeria: A Special Report", The Times, London (22 July 1976), p. vi. 25. Rimmer, "Elements of Political Economy", p. 150. 26. Legum, "Nigeria", p. B759. 27. Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 153. 28. Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 53; Scott R. Pearson, "Oil Boom Reshapes Nigeria's Future", African Report XVI, 2 (February 1971), pp.14-17; Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism,(Berkeley, 1977), pp. 39-62. 29. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, quoted in "The Gradual Ending of . • .- Constraints", p. 558, 30. World Bank, Nigeria, p. 250. At the same time, it is estimated that 94 percent of the public do not benefit directly from industrial or public wage increases. See Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 122. 31. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Plan, pp. 13-15. 32. John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (London: 1966), p. 38. 33. Regional governments, on the other hand, relied on exclusive control over income tax, export duties on petroleum products and primary commodities produced within their respective regions, and 50 percent of all mineral royalties and rents. Moreover, 30 percent of the import duties and mining royalties collected by the federal government were allocated to a distributable pool and divided proportionately among the regions — 40 percent to the North, 24 percent to the West, and 31 percent to the East. Ibid., p. 31. 34. The decree which extended federal control over revenues from the oil industry was itself a decisive factor in the events leading up to the declaration of Biafran secession and the outbreak of civil war in June 1967. 35. Shagari, "The Gradual Ending of Constraints", p. 560. General Obasanjo warned in 1976 that petroleum revenues were inadequate to meet the requirements of development. (Guy Arnold in "Nigeria; A Special Report", p. iv.) 36. The 13-day general strike which followed the federal government's hesitation to publish Justice Adeyinka Morgan's report in 1964 effectively - 141 - paralyzed Nigerian industry. (See P.C. Lloyd, Power and Independence: Urban Africans' Perception of Social Inequality (London, 1974), p. 211; Williams and Turner, !1Nigeria", pp. 152-153.) Strikes also followed upon the government's exemption of certain firms from a wage increase recommended by Justice Simeon Adebo in 1970. And, industrial action was renewed in 1974 with the report of the Public Service Review Commission headed by Justice J.O. Uddji. (Arnold, Modern Nigeria, pp.vl20-123; Arnold, "Nigeria: A Special Report", p. vi; Lloyd, Power and Independence, pp. 211-212; Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 162; Richard A. Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience", Journal of Modern African Studies XVI, 2 (June 1978), p. 237.) 37. The Agbekoya tax riots of 1968 and 1969, for example, were for Henry Bienen, "an overt rebellion on the part of the peasantry". See Henry Bienen and Martin Fitton, "Soldiers, Politicians, and Civil Servants", in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 35-36. Also Henry Bienen, "Military Rule and Political Process", Comparative Politics X, 2 (January 1978), pp. 216-217; Lloyd, Power and Independence, pp. 204-209. 38. In 1975, for instance, a scarcity of petroleum products resulted in massive queues at service stations throughout the southern part of Nigeria. As the military assumed control over the pumps, they faced an increasingly hostile public. Newspapers of the day carry stories of near riots sparked off by the behaviour of the troops. They suggest that many Nigerians directly affected by the oil shortages in fact welcomed the coup which toppled General Gowon from power in July of that same year. See the Daily Times, Lagos (May-August 1975). 39. An attempted coup in February 1976, involving the assassination of the head of state, General Murtala Muhammed, by officers who later explained that their actions hadfbeen promoted by fears for their own career prospects, demonstrated that military officers were willing to use their power to determine who was to hold political authority in the country. Ian Campbell, "Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal", in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 60-64, 86-91. 40. It is estimated that more than 250 distinct language groups exist in Nigeria. More than 200 tribes possess a number of separate dialects, and are organized into distinct villages and clans. See Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston, 1973), p. 89; "Nigeria Starts Again", Economist CCLXXII, 7095 (August 1979), p. 13. 41. The concept of a Yoruba, Hausa, or Ibo identity is itself a relatively new phenomenon. Tribal labels tend to subsume the existence of a diversity of local customs, practices, and loyalties. (See John Hatch, "Re-Uniting Nigeria", New Statesman LXXIX, 2028 (23 January 1970), p. 105; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa", in Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology, ed. Eric A. Nordlinger (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p. 220; Audrey C. Smock and David R. Smock, "Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Development in Eastern Nigeria", Journal of DevelopingAreas III, 4 (July 1969), p. 50,) Descriptions of the ethnic composition of Nigeria may be found in K.A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy (New York, 1967), pp. 114-115; Enloe, Ethnic Conflict, pp. 89- 92; C.S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Transition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton, 1970); James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (New York, 1963); P.C. Lloyd, 'x'The Yoruba Town Today", Sociological Review VII, 1 (July 1959), pp. 45-63; Audrey C. Smock, Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria (Cambridge, Mass., 1971; Paul Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and - 142 - the Ibos", Journal of Modern African Studies V, 2 (September 1967), pp. 169- 173. 42. P.C. Lloyd, "The Ethnic Background of the Nigerian Crisis", in Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War, ed. Keith Panter- Brick (London, 1970), p. 5. See also Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration", p. 168. 43. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", in Nigeria: Modernizationiand the Politics of Communalism, ed. Melson and Wolpe (Ann Arbor, 1971), p. 6. 44. First exposed to European education and economic activity, the populations of Nigeria's Eastern and Western Regions enjoyed a higher standard of living and a greater range of economic opportunities than the inhabitants of the North. The Ibos especially took advantage of their economic circumstances. During the 1950s and early 1960s, easterners spread throughout Nigeria filling managerial positions and clerical posts in the public and private sectors. In 1953, for instance, an estimated 82 percent of clerical workers in the Northern Region were of eastern origin. (Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race — The Politics of Independence (Boston, 1965), p. 71.) Such migrations decreased employment opportunities for residents of other regions and challenged the authority of traditional leaders. They prompted fears that "the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive of some groups ... has to be regulated if we are not to be left as the economic, social, and possibly political under-dogs ino our own areas of origin in the very near future". (Memorandum from the Western Region published a few weeks before the collapse of civilian administration in 1966, quoted in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966-1969,ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Vol. I (London, 1971), pp. 14-15.) 45. Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 133. 46. See Mackintosh, Government and Politics, pp. 405-426; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Chpts. XV-XVII. 47. The Action Group was committed to "capturing power in the Western Region and to preserving the institutions of the region for Westerners". Mackintosh, Government and Politics, pp. 426-460; D.I.O. Ewezukwa, "Nigeria", in Constitutions of the Countries of the World, ed. Albert P. Blonstein and Gisbert H. Flanz (New York, 1979), p. 19. 48. Organized under the motto "Only my tribe; only my faith, only my culture", the NPC pledged itself to defending the "unity" and "traditions" of the North. (Schwarz, Nigeria, p. 80.) The first president of the party was the Sardauna of Sokoto, the most eminent of northern emirs. The NPC stres• sed one's religious duty to obey and to protect hereditary rulers, the virtue of Islamic unity, as well as the usefulness of patronage and clientage (of traditional styles of leadership) in Nigerian politics. (Whitaker, Politics of Transition.) 49. Ewezukwa, Nigeria, pp. 19-20. 50. During the 1963 census, enumerators found that the inhabitants of the Eastern and Western Regions were more numerous than Northern residents. The North, which until that time had been attributed more than half the population of the country, and whose NPC delegates accounted for more than 50 percent of the members of the federal parliament, was thus threatened with the possibility of losing control over the central government. As the figures were alleged to have been inflated in parts of the Eastern Region, the prime minister, a Northerner, rejected the results and ordered a new count to be taken. The amended population estimates inflated the Northern and Western counts - 143 - and restored the North to its former dominant position within the federal legislature. See Ian Campbell, "The Nigeria Census: An Essay in Civil- Military Relations", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics LIV, 3 (November 1976), pp. 242-254; Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 142; Kirk- Greene, Crisis and Conflict, Vol. I, pp. 18-19. 51. By 1964, the NPC-NCNC coalition which had governed Nigeria since independence had crumbled. With a federal election scheduled later that year, the Northern People's Congress joined forces with a new party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, itself composed of several members of the Western wing of the NCNC as well as the United People's Party (an organization led by Chief L.S. Akintola that split away from the Action Group in 1962). The new coalition was known as the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The NCNC, on the other hand, allied itself to the Action Group in the United Pro• gressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The election of December 1964 was openly rigged. Parties opposed to the regional governments in the North and West (NFC and NNDP governments respectively) were not free to nominate candidates or to campaign in the election. In many instances, electoral officers registered only candidates nominated by the party in power. Several cases of intimidation, often including regional police forces, were reported. Some opposition candidates were detained by local authorities until after the election was over. Several members were declared to have been returned unopposed despite the fact that opposing candidates had been validly nominated. The UPGA boycotted the election while the NNA claimed victory by default. The results were rejected by Nigeria's president, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, himself the leader of the NCNC. The crisis was finally defused in early 1965 when several new elections were held and a "broad-based" government was formed, under the former NNA prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. (Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", pp. 142-143; Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, Vol. I, pp. 22-23; Ewezukwa, "Nigeria", pp. 28-29; Mackintosh, Government and Politics, pp. 545-609.) Within a year the NNA and UPGA were again locked in an irregular electoral battle in the Western Region. In its bid to gain a majority in the Western House of Assembly, the NNDP resorted to the rigging techniques of its 1964 federal campaign. REpresentatives of opposing parties were excluded from polling stations. Returning officers were instructed to send their tallies directly to the premier's office for publication. Two versions of the election results were finally published, one by the government of the Western Region, the other by the UPGA bureau of information. Both organizations claimed a major electoral victory. Both the NNDP and the UPGA named a regional premier. A period of lawlessness and unrest followed. Westerners fought with Eastern'. residents of the region. Government officials were attacked. The paralysis of the Western Region, the violence and unrest, were finally brought to an end by the Ironsi coup of 15 January 1966. (Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", pp. .:, 142-143; Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, Vol. I, pp. 22-23; Ewezukwa, . "Nigeria", p. 29. 52. The objective of the coup, "to destroy the politicians, end party government and regionalism, and substitute a unitary constitution free of corruption, tribalism, and inefficiency", was widely supported at the time. See Mackintosh, Government and Politics, p. 627. 53. Ignoring the fears of unitary government voiced by Northern leaders, Ironsi had announced that control over local courts, prisons, and police in Nigeria was to be taken from the regions' Native Authorities and placed in the hands of the federal government. In May, the military govern• ment abolished Nigeria's regional authorities. Public services were to be unified, and all political associations were banned. Northerners interpreted the actions of the new military regime as an attempt to extend the control of - 144 -
Ibos across the country. Student protest spread throughout the North. Local merchants and NPC clients organized attacks on Ibo settlements in the region. A counter-coup was staged by northern officers, led by Yakubu Gowon, on 29 July 1966. (Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, Vol. I, pp. 25-48.) 54. Ojukwu echoed the demands made months before by Northern activists. He was not prepared to accept a strong central government if it were controlled by Northern interests, or any arrangement which would decrease the authority of his rehional administration. When the Federal Military Government denied any notion of ceding increased political, military, or administrative powers to the regions, Eastern officials claimed that it had repudiated an agreement worked out at a series of constitutional meetings at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967. Eastern fears or Northern and Western domination were brought to a climax on 27 May 1967 when Gowon announced that twelve new states would be created out of Nigeria's existing regions. Three days later the Republic of Biafra was proclaimed. (Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict, Vol. I, pp. 25-111; Williams and Turner, "Nigeria", p. 145; Panter- Brick, "From Military Coup to Civil War, January 1966 to May 1967", in Nigerian Politics, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 14-57. 55. Campbell, "The Nigeria Census", pp. 246-247. 56. When the civil war ended in January 1970, the Federal Military Government committed itself to a programme of political reforms designed to return the country to civilian rule by 1976. Yet, the re-emergence of sectionalism led General Gowon to announce on 1 October 1974 that:"It could only amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to the target date for civilian government". He continued: "There has already emerged such a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings all designed to whip up ill feelings within the country for the benefit of a few, there is no doubt that it would not take them long to return to the old cutthroat politics that once led the nation into serious crisis". (Gowon, quoted in the Daily Times, Lagos (2 October 1974), p. 1. 57. Gowon, quoted by A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Nigeria: What Should Follow Army Rule and When?", African Report XVI, 2 (February 1971), p. 22. 58. Mackintosh, Government and Politics, pp. 67-69. 59. S. Egite Oyovbaire, "The Politics of Revenue Allocation", in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 225-229. 60. Pauline H. Baker, "The Politics of Nigerian Military Rule", African Report XVI, 2 (February 1971), pp. 18-19. 61. See especially Bienen and Fitton, "Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants". 62. Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG), Your Draft Constitution: Reports of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Vol. I.. (Lagos, 1976), p. v. 63. Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, at the closing session of the CDC, 7 October 1976, in Ibid., Vol. I, p. E. 64. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. v-vi. 65. Ibid., Vol. I, p. vi. 66. Report of the Sub-Committee on National Objectives and Public Accountability, in Ibid., Vol. II, p. 35. 67. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 37. 68. Murtala Muhammed, address to the opening session of the CDC, 18 October 1975, in Ibid., Vol. I, pp. xli-xlii. 69. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. xli-xlii. 70. Ibid., Vol I, p. viii. 71. Muhammed, in Ibid., Vol. I, p. xlii. - 145 -
Chapter II: Constitutional Reconstruction
1. From S. Phillipson and S.O. Adebo, The Nationalisation of the Civil Service (Lagos, 1954), p. 49. 2. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, p. 292. 3. Muhammed, quoted in Daily Times, Lagos (2 October 1975), p. 1. 4. Muhammed, quoted in "Nigeria Pledged to 1979", West Africa 3041 (6 October 1975), p. 1166. 5. Muhammed, in FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xli. 6. Ibid., p. xli. 7. Shehu Yar-^Adua, 7 October 1976, quoted in Ibid., p. E. 8. See "Constitutional Committee", West Africa 3042 (13 October 1975), p. 1228. 9. Muhammed, in FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xli. 10. Obasanjo acceded to power upon the assassination of Muhammed in the abortive Dimka coup of 13 February 1976. 11. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 10-26. 12. Ewezukwa, "Nigeria", pp. 36-37; Kirk-Greene, "From Blueprint to Constitution: 2", West Africa 3195 (9 October 1978), p. 1983; "Rebuilding Nigeria's Foundations", West Africa 3124 (23 May 1977), p. 978; Legum, "Nigeria", pp. B730-B732. 13. The process of constitutional engineering in Nigeria is described by Ewezukwa, "Nigeria", pp. 34-42; Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", pp. 289-298, See also FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, pp. i-xliii, and Vol. II; Legum, "Nigeria", pp. B730-B734; "Draft Constitution Launched for Public Debate", The Times, London (8 October 1976), p. 9; "Elections for Places in Constituent Assembly", The Times, London (1 September 1977), p. 6; "Opening of Constituent Assembly", The Times, London (6 October 1977), p. 8; "Constituent Assembly to Complete New Constitution Within One Year", The Times, London (7 October 1977), p. 9; "Head of State Formally Presented with New Constitution", The Times, London (30 August 1978), p. 4; "Constitution Committee Starts Work", West Africa 3044 (27 October 1975), p. 1285; "Draft Constitution Discussions", West Africa 3091 (27 September 1976), p. 1426; "Constitution Debate", West Africa 3097 (8 November 1976), p. 1889; "Assembly Amendments", West Africa 3187 (14 August 1978), p. 1614; "Constitution Becomes Law", West Africa 3199 (6 November 1978), p. 2221; as well as the Daily Times and New Nigerian, Lagos (October 1975-November 1978). 14. See Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 9. 15. "Constitution Committee", p. 1228; Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 2. 16. Panter-Brick, "Nigeria's Great Debate", West Africa 3108 (31 January 1977), p. 191. 17. Ibid., p. 191. 18. "Rebuilding Nigeria's Foundations", p. 978. 19. Ibid., p. 978. 20. "Obasanjo Warning to Assembly Members", West Africa 3171 (24 April 1978), p. 777. 21. Ibid., pp. 776-777. 22. Muhammed, in FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xlii. 23. Ibid., p. xlii. 24. Ibid., p. xlii. 25. Ibid., p. xlii.
i - 146 -
26. Ibid., p. xlii. 27. Ibid., pp. xlii-xliii. 28. Ibid., p. vi. 29. Ibid., p. vi. 30. Ibid., p. vi. 31. See Panter-Brick, "Four African Constitutions: Two Models", Government and Opposition XIV, 3 (Summer 1979), pp. 340, 342-343; and Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", p. 298. 32. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. II, p. 36. 33. Ibid., p. 36. 34. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", p. 300. 35. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, II, 13 (2)(a). 36. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. 13. 37. The dissenting members were Dr. S. Osoba and Dr. Yusufu Usman. 38. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xiv. 39. "Changes in the Constitution", West Africa 3190 (3 September 1978), p. 1729; Daily Times, Lagos (4 April 1978), p. 1. 40. "Changes in the Constitution", p. 1729. 41. Constitution, II, 16 (l)(a). 42. Ibid., II, 16 (l)(b)(c). 43. Ibid., II, 16, 17, 18; FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xv, and Vol. II, pp. 38-39. 44. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, pp. xv-xvi.
45. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committed", p,; 304. 46. Daily Times, Lagos (17 May 1978), p. 7; "Changes in the Constitution", p. 1729. 47. Constitution, II, 2 (a)(b)(d). 48. FMG,.Your Draft-Constitution, Vol. I, p. vi. 49. Ibid., p. viii. 50. Constitution, II, 20. 51. Ibid., II, 22. 52. Ibid., II, 15 (1). 53. Ibid., II, 19. 54. Ibid., IV. All legal liberties are subject to the discretion of the nation's courts of law in passing"sentance on civil and criminal cases. They may be temporarily withdrawn in times of proclaimed national emergency. 55. Ibid., II, 17 (2)(a). 56. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. vii. 57. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. vii, 12-13; Constitution, II, 11 (1)(2). 58. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, p. vii; "Changes in the Consti• tution", p. 1729; "Nigeria's Road Back to Civil Rule", West Africa 3180 (29 June 1978), pp. 1209-1210; Daily Times, Lagos (14 April 1978), pp. 1-2. 59. Constitution, II, 15 (30'(a) (b) (c) (d). 60. Daily Times, Lagos (15 April 1978), p. 1. 61. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. viii. 62. Ibid., p. ix. 63. Ibid., p. ix. 64. Ibid., p. ix. 65. Daily Times, Lagos (3 December 1975), pp. 8-9. 66. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. ix. 67. "Nigeria's Road Back", p. 1209. 68. Constitution, II, 14 (3). 69. Daily Times, Lagos (20 July 1978), p. 11. 70. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", p. 334. - 147 -
71. Constitution, I, 2 (1)(2), 3 (1). A Federal Capital Territory- is to be established at Abuja. Ewezukwa, "Nigeria", pp. 35-36. 72. It was the prospect of significantly reduced powers and revenues which led immediately to the secession of the Eastern Region, soon after Gowon announced his plan for creating new states. 73. FMG, Ministry of Information, FMG Views on the Report of the Panel on the Creation of States (Lagos, 1976), pp. 8-9. 74. Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 11. 75. Ali D. Yahaya, "The Creation of New States", in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 202-223. 76. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxviii. 77. Daily Times, Lagos (7 November 1977), p. 1; "Assembly in Action", West Africa 3149 (14 November 1977), p. 2293. 78. "Obasanjo Warning", p. 776. 79. Constitution, I, 8 (1) (a)(b)(c)(d). 80. State jurisdiction over local government is recognized in Ibid., I, 7. 81. The CDC originally proposed that one exclusive list should be provided, describing matters in which the federal government would have legislative and administrative jurisdiction, as well as those where federal legislative power would be accompanied by state executive responsibilities. For reasons of simplicity, the Constituent Assembly recommended the inclusion of a concurrent list. "Changes in the Constitution", p. 1731. 82. Constitution, Second Schedule, Part I. 83. Ibid., Second Schedule, Part II. 84. In the field of marriage law, for instance, the federal government is granted exclusive power over the formation, annulment, and dissolution of marriages, except for marriages under Islamic law and customary law. In the latter cases, traditional practices are still valid. Where disputes arise under customary law, state authorities possess powers of adjudication. 85. Constitution, I, 7 (1), 2 (b). 86. Ibid., I, 7 (1). 87. Ibid., Fourth Schedule (1)(2). 88. Oyoubaire.in Soldiers and Oil, ed. Panter-Brick, pp. 225-231. 89. Ibid., p. 231. 90. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxxii. 91. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", p. 340. 92. New Nigerian, Lagos (9 July 1977), p. 1. 93. Constitution, Second Schedule, Part I, 21, 36, 55, 56; Part II D, 7, 8, 9, 10. 94. Ibid., VI, Part I, C, 149 (1). 95. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. 42. 96. Constitution, VI, Part I, c, 149 (2)(3). 97. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxix. 98. Ibid., p. xxix. 99. Ibid., p. xxix. 100. Ibid., p. xxx. 101. Ibid., p. xxx. 102. "Nigeria's Road Back", pp. 1209-1210; "Nigeria's Historic. Gathering", p. 2113; "Assembly in Action", p. 2293; "At the Assembly", West Africa 3150 (21 November 1977), pp 2345-2346. 103. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxx. 104. Suleiman Kumo, "At the Assembly", p. 2346. - 148 -
105. Constitution, I, Part II, 5 (l)(a)(b), 2 (a)(b). 106. Ibid., VI, Part I, 123 (a)(b). 107. Ibid., VI, Part I, 126 (1)(2)(3). 108'. The provisions for the run-off election and electoral college were later amended by the Suprema^.Military Council. See page 98 below. '{ (Military Men Amend the Constitution", West Africa 3247 (8 October 1979), p. 1833.) 109. Constitution, VI, Part II, 163, 164. 110. Ibid., VI, Part I, 127 (2), Part II, 165 (2). 111. Ibid., VI, Part I, 132 (2)(b), Part II, 170 (2)(b). 112. Ibid., VI, Part I, 132, Part II, 120. 113. Ibid., VI, Part I, 135 (2)(3). 114. Ibid., Third Schedule, Part I, D, 7. 115. Ibid., VI, Part I, B, 140 (1); Third Schedule, Part I. 116. Ibid., Third Schedule, Part II. 117. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxxiii. 118. Constitution, V, Part I, D, 65 (a)(b). 119. Ibid., V, Part I, B, 54. 120. If the committee cannot resolve the disagreement, the money bill is then to be referred to the decision of the entire National Assembly. Ibid., V, Part I, B, 55. 121. Ibid., V, Part I, B, 54, 55. 122. Ibid., V, Part II. 123. Ibid., VI, Part I, D, 157 (5). 124. Ibid., Fifth Schedule, Part I, 1. 125. Ibid., Fifth Schedule, Part I. 126. Ibid., VI, Part III, D, 201. 127. Ibid., VI, Part III, D, 202, 203 (b), 207. 128. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p.. vii. 129. Panter-Brick, "The Constitution Drafting Committee", pp. 340-341. 130. Ibid., p. 341. 131. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxxv; Constitution, VII, Part I, A, B, C. 132. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxxiv. 133. Justin Tseayo, quoted in "At the Assembly", p. 2345. 134. Ibid., p. 2345; "Obasanjo Warning", pp. 776-779. 135. "Walkout Protest over Sharia", West Africa 3170 (17 April 1978), p. 737; New Nigerian, Lagos (7-9 April 1978), p. 1. 136. "Obasanjo Warning", p. 779. 137. Ibid., p. 779. 138. Ibid., p. 776. 139. Constitution, VII, Part II, B, 240; C, 245. 140. Ibid., VII, Part I, B, 217 (2)(b), 219. 141. "Military Men Amend the Constitution", p. 1833. 142. Constitution, V, Part I, B, 51. 143. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict, p. 84. 144. Melson and Wolpe, "Modernization-iand the Politics of Communalism", p. vii.
Chapter III: The Return to Civilian Rule
1. James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. I (Oxford, 1901), p. 195. - 149 -
2. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, 4 ed.,(Waltham, Mass., 1968), p. 171. 3. B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (London, 1973), p. 5. 4. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review LIII, 1 (March 1959), p. 86. 5. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London, 1968), p. 12; Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative Politics III, 3 (April 1971), pp. 315-318; Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review LXII, 1 (March 1968), p. 70; Arnold Rivkin, Nations by Design: Institutions-Building in Africa (Garden City, 1968). 6. J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods", World Politics XVIII, 3 (April 1966), p. 418. 7. Danjuma, November 1978, quoted by Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 19. 8. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 9. Ibid., p. 5. 10. Ibid., p. 10. 11. Ibid., p. 3. 12. Ibid., p. 4. 13. Ibid., pp. 14-21; "Let the Game of Politics Begin", West Africa 3194 (2 October 1978), p. 1937. 14. Shagari, quoted in "Issues Worrying President Shagari", West Africa 3298 (6 October 1980), p. 1985; See also "Preparations for Census", West Africa 3286 (7 July 1980), p. 1254. 15. Martin Dent, "Effective and Ineffective Constitutions", West Africa 3297 (29 September 1980), pp. 1885-1887. 16. The states of Imo, Anambra, Rivers, Plateau, Gongola, Kano, Kwara, Cross Rivers, and Niger had no permanent secretaries under previous regimes. "Reflecting Federal Character", West Africa 3303 (10 November 1980), p. 2260. 17. Dent, "Effective and Ineffective Constitutions", p. 1887; "Significance of Shugabe Victory", West Africa 3289 (4 August 1980), p. 1424. 18. "Causes for Celebration", West Africa 3297 (28 September 1980), p. 1875. 19. "The Political Leaders", West Africa 3239 (13 August 1979), pp. 1451-1452. 20. Ibid., p. 1451. 21. "Now We Are Five", Economist CCLXX, 7064 (20 January 1979), p. 58. 22. "Denials of Awolowo Inspiration", West Africa 3167 (27 March 1979), p. 624. 23. "Now We Are Five", p. 58; "The Political Leaders", pp. 1451-1452. 24. "The Political Leaders", pp. 1451-1452. 25. See also "Now We Are Five", p. 58. 26. Ibid., p. 58. 27. "The Political Leaders", p. 1452. 28. Ibid., p. 1452. 29. "Now We Are Five", p. 58. 30. "Nigeria Starts Again", p. 13. 31. Elections for 95 seats in the federal Senate (five from each . - - 150 - state) were held on 7 July 1979. One week later a poll-»was held to fill the 449 seats of the House of Representatives. Members of state assemblies, 1347 in all, were elected on 21 July 1979. Polls £or 19 state governorships were conducted on 28 July 1979. The presidential election took place on 11 August 1979. 32. "Road to Democracy Mapped Out", West Africa 3241 (27 August 1979), p. 1572. 33. Ibid., p. 1572. 34. Ibid., p. 1572. 35. "President Shagari is Elected", West Africa 3240 (20 August 1979), p. 1491. 36. "Obasanjo Speaks on Leadership", West Africa 3235 (16 July 1979), p. 1283. 37. "Shagari Decries Tribalism", West Africa (23 July 1979), p. 1345; "Final Warning to Politicians", West Africa 3233 (2 July 1979), p. 1182. 38. "Aminu Kano Banned", West Africa 3233 (2 July 1979), p. 1149. 39. Ibid., p. 1149. FEDECO disqualified 4 percent of all NPN candidates, 17 percent of UPN candidates, 25 percent of GNPP candidates, 40 percent of those seeking offices on behalf of the NPP, and 43 percent of all PRP nominees. "Disqualified Candidates", West Africa 3234 (9 July 1979), p. 1241. 40. "Obasanjo Speaks on Leadership", p. 1283. 41. Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 20. 42. "Awolowo's Election Petition", West Africa 3244 (17 September 1979), p. 1680. 43. Constitution, I, Part II, 9 (2). 44. "Denials of Awolowo Inspiration", p. 624. 45. "Look Upon the Whole, Not the Part", West Africa 3209 (15 January 1979), p. 103. 46. Ibid., p. 103. The suggestion was made before Kano was himself investigated for tax evasion. 47. "President Shagari is Elected", p. 1491. 48. Ibid., p. 1491. 49. Kenneth Mackenzie, "Nigerian Factions Treading Softly to Preserve Civilian Government", The Times, London (11 April 1980), p. 9. 50. "Nigeria Starts Again", p. 13. 51. "Military Men Amend the Constitution", p. 1833; See Constitution, VI, Part I, 126. 52. "First National Broadcast by President Shagari", p. 1862. 53. See Mackenzie, "Nigerian Factions", p. 9. 54. Karan Thapar, "Tribal Quarrel Threat to Nigerian Unity", The Times, London (23 January 1981), p. 7. 55. Karan Thapar, "Tribalism Prevents Creation of One Nation in Nigeria", The Times, London (12 March 1981), p. 8. 56. "Awolowo Boycotts Political Meeting", West Africa 3288 (28 July 1980), pp. 1378-1379. 57. Dr. K.0. Mbadiwe, quoted in "K0 Attacks Awo", West Africa, p. 1255. 58. Karan Thapar, "British Alleged in Nigerian Bribery", The Times, London (31 October 1980), p. 6. 59. Karan Thapar, "Chief Calls on Nigeria's Chief Judge to Resign", The Times, London (12 December 1980), p. 7. 60. Thapar, "Tribalism Prevents Creation", p. 8. 61. Ibid., p. 8. - 151 -
62. Mackenzie, "Nigerian Factions", p. 9. 63. Karan Thapar, "Nigerian Party Is Accused of Subversion Plot", The Times, London (14 January 1981), p. 5. 64. Quoted by Ibid., p. 5. 65. Karan Thapar, "Nigerian Party Faction Wins Official Recognition", The Times, London (24 January 1981), p. 5. 66. "KO Attacks Awo", p. 1255. 67. FMG, Your Draft Constitution, Vol. I, p. xxxiii. 68. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 59-63. 69. Karan Thapar, "Political Scandal Over Nigerian Rice Imports", The Times, London (3 January 1981), p. 4. 70. Within the House of Representatives, comprising 449 members, 226 seats are allocated to the states of the former Northern Region, while 223 members are to represent the rest of the country — 20 from the Mid-West, 101 from the East, and 102 from the West. 71. Northern states are allocated 45 Senate seats, Western states 25, Mid-Western 5, and Eastern 20. 72. "Installation of a President", p. 1833;"Promises the NPN Has Made", West Africa 3241 (27 August 1979), pp. 1535-1537; "Shagari's Plea for Moderation", West Africa 3249 (22 October 1979), p. 1920; "Alleviate • the Suffering of Millions", West Africa 3249 (22 October 1979), p. 1963. 73. See"The Gradual Ending of Constraints", p. 558. 74. "Shagari's Plea", p. 1963. 75. "NPN-GNPP Agreement", West Africa 3255 (3 December 1979), p. 2257. 76. Karan Thapar, "Nigerian Government Passes Survival Test", The Times, London (11 March 1981), p. 8. 77. "Nigerian MPs Screened by Riot Police", The Times, London (30 January 1981), p. 7. 78. See Thapar, "Nigerian Government Passes", p. 8. 79. Karan Thapar, "Compromise Plan Saves Nigerian Coalition", The Times, London (14 February 1981), p. 5. 80. Karan Thapar, "Government Coalition Breaks Up in Nigeria", The Times, London (9 July 1981), p. 11. 81. Some NPP ministers remained in the Cabinet, the Foreign Minister, Professor Ishaya Audu, for instance. See Karan Thapar, "Nigeria and Cameroon Make It Up", The Times, London (25 July 1981), p. 5. 82. See Karan Thapar, "Poet Makes an Indecisive President", The Times, London (10 July 1981), p. 7. 83. Karan Thapar, "Nigerian Revenue Act Dies in Court", The Times, London (5 October 1981), p. 7. The Supreme Court ruled that it is necessary for legislation to be passed by the National Assembly after a ruling of the joint house finance committee. 84. Among the rejected nominees were Chief Richard Akinjide (the 3 unsuccessful NPN candidate for the governorship of Oyo state and the party's legal advisor) and Paul Unongo (secretary general of the NPP). Both men played a prominent role in securing Shagari's electoral victory. They were strongly opposed by the UPN. See "The GNPP Hangs on the Brink of Total Disintegration", West Africa 3253 (19 November 1979), p. 2161. 85. "President Shagari's Cabinet", West Africa 3258 (24-31 December 1979), pp. 2408-2409. 86. Thapar, "Poet Makes an Indecisive President", p. 7. 87. "Trying Times", pp. 1815, 1817. 88. Thapar, "Poet Makes an Indecisive President", p. 7. 89. Ibid. - 152 -
90. Mark Webster, "Strains Appear in Nigeria's Cumbersome Constitution", Financial Times, London (16 July 1981), p. 4. 91. Stanley Macebuh, "Minimal Government by Shagari", Daily Times, Lagos (12 November 1979), p. 7. See also Karan Thapar, "Internal Dissent Threatens Nigeria's Ruling Party", The Times, London (18 December 1980), p. 6. 92. "Issues Worrying President Shagari", p. 1985. 93. "Political Conflict in Kaduna", West Africa 3256 (10 December 1979), p. 2269. 94. "Impasse Continues in Kaduna", West Africa 3288 (28 July 1980), p. 1372. 95. "Political Conflict in Kaduna", p. 2269. 96. See Webster, "Strains Appear", p. 4. 97. Karan Thapar, "Governor Takes Assembly to Court", The Times, London (5 January 1981), p. 4. 98. "Straining the Nigerian Constitution", The Times, London (13 July 1981), p. 11. 99. Webster, "Strains Appear", p. 4. 100. Karan Thapar;, "Many Feared Dead After Muslim Riots in Nigeria", The Times, London (22 December 1980), p. 5; Thapar, "Lagos Press Puts Kano Riots Death Toll at 250", The Times, London (24 December 1980), p. 5; Thapar, "Army Moves into Kano as Riot Toll Rises", The Times, London (29 December 1980), p. 5. 101. Webster, "Strains Appear", p. 4; "Straining the Nigerian Constitution", p. 11. 102. "Road to Democracy", p. 1572. 103. Constitution, Third Schedule, Part I. 104. "Results of State Assembly Polls", West Africa 3237 (30 July 1979), pp. 1388, 1435; Macebuh, "Minimal Government", p. 7. 105. Macebuh, "Minimal Government", p. 7. 106. Ibid., p. 7. 107. "Sharing the National Cake", West Africa 3254 (26 November 1979), pp. 2206-2207. 108. Shagari, quoted in "An Historic Day", West Africa 3286 (7 July 1980), p. 1221. 109. Ibid., p. 1222. 110. "Oil Governors Reject Okigbo Report", West Africa 3293 (1 September 1980), p. 1641. 111. "An Historic Day", p. 1222. 112. Ibid., p. 1222; "Oil Governors Reject", p. 1641. 113. "Revenue Allocation Bill", West Africa 3303 (10 November 1980), p. 2259. 114. Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", p. 11. 115. "Okpara Calls for Ahia State", West Africa 3287 (14 July 1980), p. 1308; "Nigerians Call for Fourteen More States So Far", West Africa 3290 (11 August 1980), pp. 1479-1480; "Civil War Issues Surface Again in Nigeria", The Times, London (13 March 1981), p. 8. 116. "Nigerians Call for Fourteen More States", pp. 1479-1480; Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions", pp. 11-12. 117. Shagari, quoted in "Issues Worrying President Shagari", p. 1985. 118. "Ten Die as Riots Sweep Two Nigerian Towns", The Times, London (18 April 1981), p. 7. 119. "Nigerians Call for Fourteen More States", p. 1480. - 153 -
120. "Focus on Nigeria", The Times, London (3 February 1982), p. III. 121. From 2,100,000 barrels per day in January to 708,000 barrels a day in August. Ibid., p. III. 122. Ibid., p. III. 123. Ibid., p. III. 124. See Ibid., p. IV. 125. "Ina amfani ga yanci, in akwai haliu talanci?" Saadu Zangar, quoted by Martin Dent, "Effective and Ineffective Constitutions", p. 1887. 126. "'Coup' Plot Foiled in Nigeria", The Times, London (20 February 1982), p. 5. 127. Quoted by Karan Thapar, "Army Alert Against 2 Threats to Nigeria", The Times, London (16 February 1981), p. 5. 128. Mackenzie, "Nigerian Factions", p. 9. 129. Ibid., p. 9. 130. Ibid., p. 9. 131. "Plans for Military Buildup", West Africa 3286 (7 July 1980), p. 1254. 132. Ibid., p. 1254. 133. "Focus on Nigeria", p. I. 134. Daily Times, Lagos (1 )ctober 1980), p. 7. 135. "Focus on Nigeria", p. I. 136. Ibid., p. II. -154-
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Wolf-Phillips, Leslie. Comparative Constitutions. London: Macmillan, 1972.
Zolberg, Aristide R. "Patterns of National Integration", Journal of Modern African Studies V, 4 (December 1967), pp. 449-467.
Zolberg, Aristide R. "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review LXII, 1 (March 1968), pp. 70-87.
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News Journals
Daily Times. Lagos: 1975-1980.
Economist. London: 1975-1980.
Financial Times. London: 1975-1982.
New Nigerian. Lagos: 1975-1980.
The Times. London: 1975-1982.