" • l' 0014733 WHC-EP-0340 Copy No. S43

Transportation Plan New Production Reactor at the '

RECORD COPY

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of New Production Reactors \

~ Westinghouse · ~ Hanford Cmnpany Richland, Hanford Openmons and Engineering Contractcr for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC06-87RL10930

Approved for Public Release .. . "

LEGAL DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of ·; their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party's use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, proc:ess, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not nece&&arily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

This report has been reproduced from the best available copy . Available in paper copy and microfiche. Available to the U.S. Department.of Energy and its contractors from Office of Scientific and Technical Information P.O. Box 62 Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (615) 576-8401 Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, VA 22161 (703) 487-4650

PrinlN in the IJMlcl SlalN of M•iOI ., DISCLM-1.CHP (1-91 ) WHC-EP-0340

Transportation Plan New Production Reactor at the Hanford Site

P. M. Daling R. A. Evans C. D. Hansen

Date Published March 1991

/22;:,-<1 "- ~. /99I HA0~---~-. W. Heacock, Manager Date ' Reactor Advanced Projects Westinghouse·Hanford Company

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of New Production Reactors

~ Westinghouse P.O. Box 1970 \.::) Hanford Company Richland, Washington 99352 Hanford Operations and Engineering Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC06-87RL 10930

Approved for Public Release WHC-EP-0340

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared in support of the New Production Reactor (NPR) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and provides informat ion necessary to characterize the onsite transportation impacts associated with siting an NPR at the Hanford Site (Hanford). The document presents descriptive information on the transportation network (including highway, rail, and barge transport modes), as well as Hanford traffic statistics. Traffic statistics are presented for calendar year 1988 (CY 1988) as representative of annual traffic statistics for Hanford. This document also presents estimates of the radiological impacts of siting an NPR at Hanford. Radiological impacts are presented in terms of the radiological doses to the population surrounding the site and to maximally exposed individuals from routine (incident-free) transport of radioactive materials as well as the radiological risks to the population and radiological consequences of bounding accidents involving tritium fuel cycle materials. Transportation impact data are presented for three NPR technology options, including light water reactor (LWR), heavy water reactor (HWR), and modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) technologies.

Hanford has an extensive highway and rail network that links the outer areas of the site, including the 200 East Area, 400 Area, and Skagit/Hanford Site in which the NPR facilities ·are planned to be located. A significant inventory of rail and truck equipment is also located at the site. The existing rail and highway network ·has seen extensive use, including simultaneous construction of three commercial nuclear reactors, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) research reactor, the N Reactor, and associated chemical processing facilities. Based on past experience, it is

i i i WHC-EP-0340 judged that few, if any, improvements to Hanford transportation network will be necessary to support operation of the NPR and associated facilities.

This document describes the types and characteristics of radioactive material shipments that are projected for the NPR and assoc i ated tritium fuel cycle. These data formed the basis for the radiological impact calculations.

Radiological routi~e doses to the public and workers from onsite shipments of radioactive materials were estimated using the RADTRAN III computer code. RADTRAN III calculates routine doses to truck and rail crew members, persons in passing vehicles, persons while the shipments are stopped, and to persons along the shipping routes that are near the shipments whi l e the vehicle passes by. The routine doses that were estimated to result from operation of the NPR are presented below.

• The total annual collective doses to truck drivers and rail crew members were estimated to be 1.2 person-rem/yr for LWR technology, 1.4 person-rem/yr for HWR technology, and 3.1 person-rem/yr for MHTGR technology. The total integrated dose to these persons over the operating lifetime of the NPR and associated facilities was estimated to be 48 person-rem, 56 person-rem, and 124 person-rem for LWR, HWR, and MHTGR technologies, respectively.

• The total annual collective doses to members of the public were estimated to be about 0.06, 0.12, and 0.3 person-rem/yr fo r LWR, HWR , and MHTGR technologies, respectively. The total integrated dose to these persons over the operating lifetime of the NPR and

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associated facilities was estimated to be 2.4 person-rem (LWR), 4.8 person-rem (HWR), and 12 person- rem (MH TGR) . These estimates are small fractions of the 70 to 95 person-rem/yr exposures rece i ved by the same populati on as a result of natural background radiation .

Separate calculations to those performed by RADTRAN III were performed to estimate the annual doses to the maximum exposed individuals. Because this analysis focused on onsite transportation impacts, the maximum exposed individual s are members of truck and rail crews. The annual doses to these individual s were estimated by calculating the per-shipment doses these individual s may be exposed to and then multiplying the per-shipment dose by the annua l numbers of shipments. The resulting maximum annual doses to truck crew members were conservatively estimated to be approximately 0.2 rem/yr for LWR technology, 0. 2 rem/yr for HWR technology, and 0.3 rem/yr for MHTGR technology . For rail crew members, the maximum annual dose was estimated to be approximately 0.0007 rem/yr, 0.0005 rem/yr, and 0.005 rem/yr for LWR, HWR, and MHTGR technologies, respectively. All of the maximum annual dose estimates are well below the 5 rem/yr occupational dose restriction.

Transportation impacts from accidents involving tritium fuel cycle materials were calculated in terms of the radiological consequences to the maximum exposed individuals and the radiological risks to the exposed population. Population risks are defined as the product of accident

V WHC-EP-0340 frequencies and consequences. The consequences of accidents, which were calculated using the GENII computer code, are presented in the following terms:

• Maximum individual--The radiation doses were calculated for two hypothetical individuals, one located at the Hanford Site boundary nearest to the release and one located 200 ft from the acc ident. The doses were calculated in terms of the effective dose equivalent

(EDE) for a 50-yr commitment period, EDE50 • The doses were presented for the maximum exposed organ and the dose to the thyroid. The doses were also presented by pathway. The lifetime fat al cancer risk to these individuals was also presented.

• Population--The committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE), CEDE50 , was presented, as well as the doses to the gonads and thyroid. The doses were presented by pathway. Also presented were the estimated health effects that could potentially result from the release (cancer deaths and genetic effects to all generations).

The calculated doses from accidents are summarized in Table ES- 1. The annual probability of the severe accidents summarized in Table ES-1 was estimated to be approximately 2 x 10· 8 /yr.

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Table ES-1. Maximum Individual Doses and Population Risks from Transportation Acc i den t s. NPR Technology Dose category LWR HWR MHTGR Populat ion r i sks Comm i tted effective dose equivalenta (person-rem/yr) 1.1 E-2 2.5 E-3 4.5 E-3 Health risks Cancer deaths/yr 4.4 E-6 1.0 E-6 1.8 E- 6 Genetic effects/yr 1. 8 E-6 2.0 E-7 3.3 E- 7 Maximum individual dosesb On site Committed effective dose equivalent (rema) 4.7 E+O 3.9 E-2 3.9 E- 2 Sm a 11 Smal l Maximum organ Lung intestin e i ntesti ne Lifet ime fatal cancer risk 1. 9 E-3 1. 6 E- 5 1. 6 E- 5 Off site Commi t ted effective dose equivalent (rema) 1.5 E-1 7.0 E-4 7.0 E- 4 Lower large Smal 1 Smal 1 Max i mum organ intestine intesti ne in t estine Li fetime fatal cancer risk 5.9 E- 5 2.9 E- 7 2.9 E-7 aA 50-yr commitment period was assumed i n the calculations . "Maximum credible accident was defined as the accident producing the highest consequences that had a fr~quency of approximately 1 X 10- 6 /yr.

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CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 1-1 2.0 REGUtATORY ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2-1 2.1 PACKAGING ..... 2-2 2.2 VEHICLE SAFETY .. 2-4 2.3 HIGHWAY ROUTING .. 2-4 2.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 2-5 3.0 TRANSPORTATION MODES ...... 3-1 3.1 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES AND TRUCKS 3-1 3. 2 RAIL ...... 3-1 3.3 BARGE...... 3-1 4.0 TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS ...... 4-1 4.1 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES AND TRUCKS 4-1 4.2 RAIL NETWORK . . 4-4 4.3 BARGE TRAFFIC . . 4-4 5. 0 TRAFFIC INFORMATION . 5-1 5.1 FUEL CONSUMPTION 5-1 5.2 EMISSIONS ...... 5-1 5.3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INVENTORY ...... 5-2 5.4 TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS (HANFORD EMPLOYEES) 5-2 5.5 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHIPMENT STATISTICS . . . 5-6 5.6 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OWNED EQUIPMENT ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1988 ...... 5-6 5.7 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1988 5-7 5.8 NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR TRANSPORTATION IMPACT 5-8 5.8.1 Per~onal Use Vehicles and Trucks 5-8 5.8 . 2 Rail ...... 5-10 5.8 .3 Barge ...... 5-10 6.0 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 6-1 6.1 SHIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS ...... 6-1 6.2 INCIDENT-FREE RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ANALYSIS ...... 6-1 6.2.1 Approach to Calculate the Normal Radiation Doses 6-1 6.2.2 Input Data for Normal Highway and Rail Transportation Impacts ...... 6-6 6.2.3 Results of Normal Radiological Impact Analysis 6-9 6.3 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ...... 6-16 6.3.1 Approach to Calculate the Impacts of Accidents 6-16 6.3.2 Input Data for Transportation Accident ...... 6-20 6.3.3 Results of Onsite Transportation Accident Analysis 6-27 7.0 REFERENCES 7-1 APPENDIX: A. Joint Frequency and Population Data A-1

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LIST OF FIGURES

3-1 Transportation Network Within the Hanford Site 3-2 4-1 Major Interstate Highways 4-2 4-2 Local and Regional Highways 4-3 4-3 Major Rail Lines . 4-5 5-1 Hanford Site Roads 5-4 5-2 WNP-1 Workforce 5-9 6-1 RADTRAN III Normal Transportation Dose Models 6-5 6-2 Schematic Diagram for Estimation of Population Doses for Onsite Transportation Impacts Calculations .. 6-7

LIST OF TABLES

5-1 Fuel Consumption Estimates for Calendar Year 1988 by Type of Vehicle ...... 5-1 5- 2 Hanford Site Truck and Ra i1 Equipment In"ventory 5- 2 5-3 Hanford Site Employee Transportation Statistics 5- 3 5-4 Estimated Traffic Volumes by Type of Vehicle . .. 5-5 5-5 Total Annual Department of Energy Shipments to/from Hanford. 5-6 6-1 Characteristics of Onsite Shipment for Light Water Reactor Technology ...... 6-2 6-2 Characteristics of Onsite Shipment for Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Technology ...... 6- 3 6-3 Characteristics of Onsite Shipment for Heavy-Water Reactor Technology...... 6-4 6-4 Weighted Hanford Site Population Densities for Each Shipping- Receiving Facility Pair...... 6-8 6-5 Input Data for Analysis of Normal Transport Impacts 6-9 6-6 Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Light-Water Reactor .... 6-10

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LIST OF TABLES (cont.)

6-7 Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Heavy-Water Reactor ...... 6-11 6-8 Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor ...... 6-12 6-9 Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts 6-14 6-10 Conditional Probabilities of Truck and Rail Accidents in each Severity Category ...... 6-18 6-11 Estimated Total Respirable Release Fractions for TRU Packages 6-22 6-12 Fraction of Isotopes Released from Accidents by Severity Category ...... 6-22 6-13 Fraction of Material Released as Aerosols from Accidents by Severity Category ...... 6-23

6-14 Fraction of Material Released as Aerosols less than 10 µ (Respirable) from Accidents by Severity Category 6-23 6-15 Release Quantities for Category VI Accidents Involving LWR Fuel Cycle Materials ...... 6-25 6-16 Release Quantities for Category VI Accidents Involving HWR Fuel Cycle Materials ...... 6-25 6-17 Onsite Transportation Accident Impacts--Light Water Reactor Technology ...... 6-28 6-18 Onsite Transportation Accident Impacts--Heavy Water Reactor Technology ...... 6-29 6-19 Onsite Transportation Accident Impacts--Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Technology 6-30 6-20 Radiological Doses to Maximum Onsite and Offsite Individuals 6-31

X WHC - EP-0340

TRANSPORTATION PLAN NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR AT THE HANFORD SITE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The onsite transportation plan for Hanford discusses applicable transportation regulations; describes the highway, railroad, and barge facilities; and provides estimates of the radiological routine and accident impacts associated with transportation of radioactive materials in support of a New Production Reactor (NPR) at Hanford. Traffic statistics are presented for calendar year 1988 (CY 1988). These statistics represent transportation conditions before the start of the NPR siting studies . The primary operating contractor at Hanford is the Westinghouse Hanford Company (Westinghouse Hanford) . Responsibilities of Westinghouse Hanford include the management and maintenance of the highway and railroad networks . The Westinghouse Hanford is responsible for the movement of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) equipment, material , and supp l ies associated with Hanford, both onsite and offsite. A large warehouse facility at the southern entrance to Hanford (1100 Area) provides for controlled transfer of incoming and outgoing shipments as well as storage of equipment and supplies . Wash i ngton Pub l ic Power Supply System (Supply System) and U.S. Ecology facilities located at Hanford use the Hanford highway system . Each controls and manages shipments in coordination with Westinghouse Hanford and the Hanford Patrol. All vehicular traffic and access to DOE-limited access areas are controlled by Westinghouse Hanford Security and the Hanford Patrol.

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2.0 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT ANO RESPONSIBILITIES

The transportation of tritium production cycle and associated was t e materials will comply with the regulations and orders promulgated by the DOE and the U.S . Department of Transportation (DOT) , and will be basi cally equivalent to the U.S. Nucl ear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements . The Interstate Commerce Commission regulates the economic aspects of shi pments t o the Hanford Site from outside of Washington St ate. These agencies have comprehensive regulations covering shipping packagings , vehicle safety, routing, and physical protection. The DOE transportation requirements are set forth in DOE Order 5480 .3. The radioactive material transportation regulations promulgated by the DOE are consistent with the regulati ons promulgated by the DOT in 49 CFR 173 and the NRC in 10 CFR 71. The following sections briefly di scuss the regulations and organizations responsible for t he safe highway and rail transport of radioactive materials in the United States . Regulations for the safe transportation of radioactive material s are designed to prot ect the public from the potenti al consequences of loss or dispersal of radioactive materials during transit as well as from routine (nonaccident) radiation doses . These regulati ons ensure safety through standards for packaging, handling, and routing of shipments. Specific regulations that apply to offsi t e shipments of radioactive materials are found in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) under the following headings : • 49 CFR 107 Rule-Maki ng Procedures for the Ma t erials Transportati on Bureau (DOT) • 49 CFR 171 General Information, Regulations, and Defin iti ons (DOT) • 49 CFR 172 Hazardous Materials Table and Hazardous Materials Communications Regulations (DOT) • 49 CFR 173 Shippers--General Requirements for Sh i pments and Packagings (DOT) • 49 CFR 174 Carriage by Rail (DOT) • 49 CFR 176 Carriage by Vessel (DOT) • 49 CFR 177 Carriage by Public Highway (DOT) • 49 CFR 178 Shipping Container Specifications (DOT) • 10 CFR 71 Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transportation and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions (NRC).

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2.1 PACKAGING Packaging, as used in this report, is defined as the shipping container for radioactive material. Properly designed, manufactured, and prepared packaging is the primary means for ensuring the safe transport of radioactive materials. Consequently, most of the regulations are concerned with packaging standards. The DOT regulations that apply to shipments of radioactive materials are contained in 49 CFR 173. These regulations seek to enhance safety through three key elements: (1) containment of radioactive material, with allowances for heat dissipation if required, (2) shielding from radiation emitted by the material, and (3) prevention of nuclear criticality in fissile materials. Regulations allow radioactive materials to be sh i pped in different types of packagings, depending on the total radioactive hazard presented by the material within the package. Package types are selected based on the radioactive contents of the shipment, as described in 49 CFR 173.431. All packagings must meet, as a minimum, the design requirements described in 49 CFR 173, Sections 411 and 412. Type B packagings must additionally meet the design requirements for Type B packages specified in 49 CFR 173.413. These Type B design requirements are found in 10 CFR 71, Subpart E. In addition, the packagings must meet the testing requirements specified in 49 CFR 173.465 for Type A packages and 49 CFR 173.467 for Type B packages. Type B packaging tests are found in NRC regulations in 10 CFR 71, Subpart F. The general packaging design requirements are summarized in Table 2.1. Radioactive materials exceeding the limits for Type A packagings can be shipped only in Type B packagings. These packagings are extremely accident­ resistant. Any Type B packaging design placed in service must be certified to the design and testing standards of the NRC. In addition to meeting the standards for a Type A packaging, a Type B packaging must be designed to withstand severe hypothetical accident conditions that demonstrate resistance to impact, puncture, fire, and water immersion (10 CFR 71.73). To be acceptable, the Type B packaging must release no radioactivity except for limited amounts of contaminated coolant and gases. Also, the external radiation dose rate cannot exceed 1,000 mR/h at 1 m from the external surface of the packaging (10 CFR 71.51). Surface contamination of packagings is limited to specified levels. The method for determining amounts of surface contamination is specified in 49 CFR 173.443. Radiation allowed to escape from a packaging must be below specified limits that minimize the exposure of the handling personnel and general public. Radioactive packages are handled only by the shipper and receiver . (i.e., shipped in exclusive-use or sole-use vehicles) and must be designed so that the following radiation limits are not exceeded (49 CFR 173.441) during ' normal transport activitie5: • 1,000 mR/h at 1 m from the exterior of the package (in a closed transport vehicle only) • 200 mR/h at any point on the external surface of the car or vehicle (in a closed transport vehicle only)

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Table 2.1. Type A and Type B Packaging Design Requirements . General Design Requirements for all Packages (49 CFR 173.411) - Ease of handling, either manually or mechanically - Lifting at tachment requirements - Ease of decontaminat i on of external surface - Free of pockets or crevices where water might collect Type A Package Design Requirements (49 CFR 173.412) - General design requirements for all packages - Provisions for sealing packages - External dimension l imitations - External surface free from protrusions - Containment and shielding maintained during transport and storage at temperatures between -40 °C (- 40 °F) to 70 °C (158 °F) - Withstand normal transport conditions, including effects of acce l eration, vi bration, or vibration resonance - Physical and chemical compatibility of package and associated structures - Containment system retains contents under reducti on of pressure t o 0. 25 kg/cm2 (3.5 psi) - Valve protecti on - Capable of withstanding the following tests (49 CFR 173.465) ( 1) Wa t er spray (2) Free drop (drop height is function of package we ight) (3) Compres~ion test (4) Penetration test Type B Package Design Requirementsa - General and Type A package design requirements - Capable of withstanding the following hypothetical accident conditions (10 CFR 71) (1) Free drop from 9 m (30 ft) onto an unyielding surface (2) Puncture from a free drop from 1 m (40 in.) onto a cylindrical puncture probe (3) Exposure to an engulfing fire for 30 minutes at a temperature of 800 °C (1475 °F) (4) Immers i on under water for not less than 8 h. aAdditional requirements are applicable to specific types of packages; e.g., plutonium shipments and fissile material shipments.

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• 10 mR/h at any point 2 m from the vertical planes projected by the outer lateral surfaces of the car or vehicle; or if the load is transported in an open transport vehicle, at any point 2 m from the vertical planes projected from the outer edges of the vehicle • 2 mR/h in any normally occupied position in the car or vehicle; this provision does not apply to private motor carriers under certain conditions.

2.2 VEHICLE SAFETY The carriers of radioactive materials must meet, at a m1n1mum, the same requirements as carriers for any hazardous material. Truck safety is governed by the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) of the DOT, which imposes vehicle-safety standards on all truck carriers (49 CFR 325 .386 through 325.398). Along with other functions, the BMCS conducts unannounced wayside inspections of all truck-carrier vehicles and drivers. Several states, including Washington and , also have truck inspection programs. During the inspection, the condition and loading of the vehicle and the driver's documents are checked. Railcars and trucks carrying radioactive materials must be placarded in accordance with 49 CFR 172, Subpart F. To ensure that cars are in safe condition, DOT regulations in 49 CFR 174 specify that each adjacent railcar be inspected by an authorized representative of the carrier company or DOT at each required inspection point. Inspection includes visual examination for obvious defects of the running gear and any leakage of contents.

2.3 HIGHWAY ROUTING The DOT's routing regulations, 49 CFR 177.825 (Docket HM-164), were published January 19, 1981, and became effective February 1, 1982. The object of these regulations is to reduce impacts of transporting radioactive materials, establish consistent and uniform requirements for route selection, and identify the role of State and local governments in the routing of radioactive materials. The regulations attempt to reduce potential hazards by avoiding populous areas and minimizing transit times. A carrier or any person operating a motor vehicle carrying a "highway-route-controlled quantity" (see 49 CFR 173.403) of radioactive materials is required to use the interstate highway system except when moving from origin to interstate or interstate to destination. Other "preferred highways" may be designated by any state to repla-ce or supplement the interstate highway system. However, under its authority to regulate interstate transportation safety, the DOT can overrule state and local bans and restrictions as "undue restraint of interstate commerce," under the constitutional mandate that states may not regulate interstate commerce. Regulations imposed by State and local governments must be consistent with the provisions of 49 CFR 177.825 or they will be supplanted. The DOT holds that conflicting requirements among jurisdictions may be unduly restrictive and may increase risks by directing shipments to highways with higher accident rates. The DOT regulation requires carriers to use selected routes that minimize transit time and radiological risk. 2-4 WHC-EP-O34O

Carriers transporting radioactive materials to the Hanford Site will be required to travel on interstate circumferential or bypass routes, if available, to avoid populous areas. Carriers may use interstate or preferred highways that pass through urban areas only if circumferential routes are not available. No additional regulations are currently proposed for rail transport. Routes are fixed by ra il locations, and urban areas cannot be readily bypassed. Thus rail transport will be similar to that of other non-Hanford loads routinely carried, including hazardous nonradioactive cargoes .

2.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE Many agencies share responsibility for dealing with accidents involving shipments of radioactive materials. A national radiological assistance plan has been developed for responding to real or suspected releases of radioactive material from a shipment in transit. For example, under this plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the primary responsibility for emergency response planning for transportation accidents involving radioactive materials. Also at the federal level, the DOE will make available from its resources radiological advice and assistance to protect the public health and safety and to cope with radiological hazards. Federal support is also available from the U.S. Env ironmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services through the Food and Drug Administration, the DOT, and the NRC . The ultimate responsibiltty for emergency response planning generally lies with State and local governments. Most State and local governments have established emergency response plans . Local jurisdictions assume primary responsibility for emergency response planning because a member of a local law enforcement agency or fire department is likely to be the first responder to a transportation accident. It is the policy of DOE, upon request from Federal, State, or local authorities, NRC li censees, private organizations , or commercial carriers, to provide radiological assistance teams and training to State and local authorities. One such radiological assistance team operates out of Hanford. The FEMA has published Guidance for Development of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness (FEMA 1983). This document details necessary components of emergency response plans, including institutional responsibilities and jurisdictions, accident characteristics and assessment, radiological exposure control, resources, communications, medical support, notification methods and procedures, emergency response training activities, and postaccident operations.

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3.0 TRANSPORTATION MODES

This section briefly describes the available transportation modes for shipments of materials in support of an NPR. The available transportation modes for Hanford include highway, rail, and barge. Separate subsections are provided for discussions of each transportation mode .

3.1 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES AND TRUCKS Hanford uses its highway network for transportation of personnel to and from their work places (Figure 3-1). A DOE bus service provides a pickup and delivery service from the city of Richland, Washington, residential areas to the bus lot in the 1100 Area and on to the 100 and 200 Areas. The local intercity transit system (Ben Franklin Transit) provides bus service between the Tri-Cities and the 300, 400, and 700 Areas including the Supply System facilities. Both private interests and Ben Franklin Transit provide van pooling opportuniti es . However, the majority of the home-to-workplace travel is by personal cars and light trucks. A workplace emergency evacuation bus fleet is maintained by West i nghouse Hanford. Material shipments to DOE facilities at Hanford are regulated. Commercial barges, railcars, and truck shipments interface at or near Hanford boundary. A breakdown of the DOE fleet of rolling stock by vehicle type, mileage, and fuel consumption is given in Chapter 4. The DOE truck fleet delivers to the various DOE contractor facilities. Special vehicles are used for heavy shipments. The U.S. Ecology is serviced by specific commercial trucking firms whereas the Supply System regulates its own shipments. More than 90% of all shipments are received and delivered by truck.

3.2 RAIL The largest use of the rail system is to deliver coal to the various boiler plants at Hanford. The rail system delivers equipment and material to the various facilities when the shipments by rail are more convenient than by truck. Hanford is devoid of passenger rail service. Most radioactive rail transfers involve movement within the Hanford Site of liquid waste in rail tank cars or high activity cask shipments to burial grounds .

3.3 BARGE Barge traffic is infrequent, but barges may use the Port of Benton dock facilities immediately south of Hanford on the when required. Extremely heavy shipments have been handled at the Port of Benton facility . Components for barge shipment are transported to/from facilities within Hanford by large overland wheeled trailers.

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Figure 3-1. Transportation Network Within the Hanford Site.

1N l

--• Hanford Railroad System --- Hanford Site Roads --State Highways

0 2 4 6 8 10 MIies 39003004.1

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4.0 TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS

Hanford is served by a transportation network that is suitable for transporting a wide variety of commodities. This network includes major highways and rail lines that connect the region to major metropoli t an areas in the and throughout the Nation. It also includes commercial air transportation and a major navigable inland wa t erway system . The following sections describe each of these aspects of the regional transportation infrastructure.

4. 1 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES AND TRUCKS The interstate highways and State routes provide ready access between Hanford and metropolitan areas. The east-west interstate highways providing access to the Tri-Cities are interstates 90 and 84 (Figure 4-1). is the major link west to and east to Spokane, Washington, and passes north of Hanford . Interstate 90 extends from Seattle, Washington, to Boston, Massachusetts, and travels through Chicago , Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; and Buffalo, New York. Interstate 84 is the major link to Portland, Oregon, and passes south of Hanford. This interstate highway provides access from Portland, Oregon, to , Utah; Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; and New York, New York. Interstate 82 connects Interstate 90 to Interstate 84 . Interstate 82 and the spur pass to the west and south of the Hanford Site. i s the major north-south highway; it connects Seattle, Washington, and Portland , Oregon , and runs the entire length of the west coast. Interstata 5 also connects with several east-west interstate highways in . Four important highways, shown in Figure 4-2, provide access to the Tri-Cities region and Hanford from the interstate highways. U.S. Highway 395 , located east of Hanford, connects to Interstate 90 northeast of the Tri-Cities and to Interstate 84 to the south. Washington State Route 243 connects Interstate 90 at Vantage, Washington, north of Hanford to State Route 24 on the west side of Hanford. State Route 14 connects the Tri-Cities and Vancouver, Washington, and provides ready access to Interstate 84 at several locations along the Oregon and Washington border. Hanford already has an extensive network of highways. All are classifi ed as rural monitor arterial, and are used to transport people and materials to their job sites . Route 4 South is the most direct, widest, and preferred route for all highway traffic. Route 4 connects to the Richland bypass highway which interconnects with Interstate 182 . Bus services transport thousands of people daily to remote job sites, such as the 200 and 100 Areas. Also, a large warehouse facility at the south entrance to Hanford processes shipments of equipment, materials, and supplies for delivery to their destinations. Hanford personnel have substantial technical and administrative experience in shipping radioactive materials, both onsite and offsite. Hanford has 288 mi of paved roads, 65 mi of which are publ ic access roads. Washington State Route 24 and 240 traverse Hanford tn the northern and

4-1 WASHINGTON MONTANA

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Figure 4- 2. Local and Regional Highways.

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4- 3 ----~ ------

WHC-EP-0340

southwestern sections, respectively. The majority of private vehicle traffic is generated by commuting employees. A small number of vendor delivery vehicles, and some commercial truck traffic, pick up or deliver shipments. All roads on Hanford are subject to unannounced closure by the Hanford Patrol. Closures may be initiated for the purpose of emergency response, classified activities, and administratively controlled radioactive or hazardous material shipments. Roads may also be closed to accommodate over-dimens i onal shipments, such as those from the barge site, or to restrict access to areas where rail loading/unloading activities are being conducted . There are no significant traffic congestion points on Hanford. There are no dangerous or extremely hazardous sections of roadway. The highway network is in excellent condition. A recently completed highway improvement project involved repavement and widening of the four-lane access route to the Wye Barricade. The highway network has been used extensively for transporting large equipment items, construction materials, and radioactive materials. Recent examples include construction materials and components used in the Supply System reactors and the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor.

4.2 RAIL NETWORK Rail service is provided by two major railroads (Figure 4-3), one shortline railroad and the DOE-owned and operated railroad on Hanford. The Burlington Northern (BN), with classification hump yard and maintenance facilities at Pasco, Washington, i s the longest railroad in the United States. The Washington Central Railroad Company, a shortline railroad formed to operate on trackage abandoned by the BN, provides rail servi ce from the Hanford yard to the BN yards at Pasco. The Union Pacific Railroad, with a classification yard at Hinkle, Oregon, provides service directly to the Hanford interchange. These two major national railroads, and interlining railroads across the country, connect Hanford to every city and town having access to rail service in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. passenger rail service is provided in the Tri-Cities at the Burlington Northern Depot at Pasco. The DOE-owned Hanford railroad is operated by Westinghouse Hanford. It consists of over 115 mi of track, 5 locomotives, and about 90 railcars.

4.3 BARGE TRAFFIC The Columbia River serves the Tri-Cities and Hanford as an inland waterway allowing barge transportation from the Pac i fic Ocean through four navigation dam and lock facilities. The Port of Benton provides a barge slip where shipments arriving at Hanford may be offloaded . Shipments requiring movement by barge, because of size and weight restrictions by other modes of transportation, have arrived at Hanford from shipping points in Virginia, Tennessee, Ohio, and the Puget Sound area of Washington State. The Neil F. Lampson Co . , Inc., a world-wide crane and rigging company , has its headquarters and shops located in Kennewick and Pasco, Washington. They provide the area with heavy lift capacity, technology, and equipment . This company has repeatedly accomplished lifts exceeding two mill i on pounds. Hanford uses these services regularly.

4-4 lO C ""1 (D .p. I w ~ :i:: ("") I .p. fTl --0 I I lTI 0w .p. 0 WYOMING _. Poca1ullof OREGON r

UTAH CALIFORNIA NEVADA Cheyi,one

c(~~~~.> ::::- BURLINGTON NOR c:;) :::: SOUTliERN PACIFl~l:AN RAILROAD - - - UNION PACIFIC RAILROADAILROAD . l'Stl401 lli~A WHC-EP-0340

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WHC - EP-0340

5.0 TRAFFIC INFORMATION

This section provides information on fuel consumption, emissions, fleet inventories, and various transportation statistics for Hanford. Most of the data were deri ved from statistics that are maintained by Westinghouse Hanford. The data in this -chapter were developed from the CY 1988 statistics. The estimated total fleet travel for DOE-owned vehicles in CY 1988 was 11,891,000 mi. It was estimated that approximately 3,300 private vehicles per day travel on the Hanford Site. Assuming that each vehicle travels an average of 30 mi/day and 5 days/week results in approximately 26,000,000 vehicle- mil es/yr.

5.1 FUEL CONSUMPTION Estimates of the total DOE fuel consumption in CY 1988, including all engines not part of the fleet, are 495,000 gal diesel, 754,000 gal unleaded gasoline, and 235,000 gal of Jet A fuel, which is used by the Hanford Patrol Helicopter. A breakdown of fuel consumption by type of vehicle is presented in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Fuel Consumption Estimates for Calendar Year 1988 by Type of Vehicle . Distance traveled per Total fuel consumption Type of vehicle vehicle (mi/yr) (gal/yr) Sedan 9,437 119,410 Ambulance 6, 000 3,989 Bus 18,245 197,302 Truck 4 x 2 < 8,500 lb 5,270 166,830 4 X 4 < 8, 500 1b 6,686 37 , 112 4 X 2 > 8,500 lb 8,842 201,119 4 x 4 > 8,500 lb 8,261 123,766 Truck 12,500-23,999 lb 4,000 685 Truck> 24,000 lb 4,705 98,598 Special purpose vehicle 3,938 96 ,812

5.2 EMISSIONS Vehicle emissions are not monitored at Hanford . Surrounding air quality is monitored by public agencies, but smog is rare. Hanford geological features do not create inversion layers, and the population density of the surrounding area is low. Winds gusting to 40 mi/h or more occur on average 25 days/yr and SO mi/h gusts occur on average of 5 days/yr. In certain seasons, blowing dust creates a traffic hazard by obscuring drivers' vis ion.

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5.3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INVENTORY The inventory of DOE rolling stock assigned to Hanford totals slightly less than 2,000 vehicles, including both rail and highway equipment. Table 5-2 section presents the inventory of truck and rail equipment at Hanford.

Table 5-2. Hanford Site Truck and Rail Equipment Inventory. Equipment type Quantity Rail equipment Locomotives 5 Flat cars 42 Bulkhead flat cars 3 (SN-owned in assigned service) Dump cars 7 Cask cars 17 Tank cars 20 Other rail maintenance cars -1 Total 95 Highway equipment Buses 83 Truck tractors 42 Trailers 175 Tank trucks 17 Van, pane.l 49 Mini-vans 67 Van wagons 67 Dump trucks 21 Flatbed trucks 111 Scooters 86 Pickup trucks 554 Carryalls 109 Sedans 231 Construction vehicles 71 Special vehicles 41 Motorized cranes 28 Fire trucks 20 Ambulances 5 Total 1,777

5.4 TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS (HANFORD EMPLOYEES) Table 5-3 presents various transportation statistics relative to Hanford employees including mileage from the 1100 Area to each location on Hanford. There are a number of reasons for selecting this. reference point. Al l inbound shipments arriving at Hanford must be received at the 1163 Building before

5-2 WHC - EP-0340 further transportation to the outer areas by either commercial or DOE vehicle . Al l outbound shipments are released into inter- state commerce fr om the 11 00 Area regardless of where the shipment originated. The 1100 Area i s across the street from the city of Richland property , and is the po i nt where the Hanford Si t e begins for 95% of the commuting contractor employees . Although a significant· number of contractor employees work ·within the Richland

Table 5-3. Hanford Site Employee Transportation Statistics. Onsite personnel Other personnel Total Contractor employees Location within the Number Location Number city of Richland DOE 365 0 -- 365 700 Westinghouse 8,206 736 100a 972 1100 Hanford 3,500 200b 596 700 861 300c 774 3000 673 400d 94 600 PNL 2, 570 1,091 300c 1, 479 3000 KEH 822 6 100a 294 1100 96 200b 111 3000 36 300c 1 700 278 Var i ous HEHF 117 14 Variouse 83 3000 20 700 Supply System 1,746 1,340 WNP-2t 406 3000 ANF 725 0 -- 725 3000 U.S. Testing 120 0 -- 120 3000 U.S. Ecology 23 23 200b 0 -- Total 14,694 8,748 5,946 a32 mi from 1100 Area. bz4 mi from 1100 Area. c3 mi from 1100 Area. d3 mi from 1100 Area. eAverage 24 mi from 1100 Area. t10 mi from 1100 Area. DOE= Department of Energy PNL = Pacifi c Northwest Laboratories KEH= Kaiser Nuclear Fuels HEHF = Hanford Environmental Health Foundat i on ANF = Advanced Nuclear Fuels Supply System= Washington Public Power Supply System Westinghouse Hanford= Westinghouse Hanford Company .

5-3 WHC-EP-0340

Figure 5-1. Hanford Site Roads.

Adams County

County Line Road State Highway 24

.... I I I Franklin County 3i!! I 2 ... 2Z I 0 i!! :L I 1"' 1 :r I

Benton County ... ., l , 1. ~. • .. - r - - - - ' "'-.., L., ~+.~108 -, L ~ Hanford7 Site 0v,, Boundary -, l 4,;, 'I,

-..,_.1:,_-e-:.t- Port of Benton Hanford Site Dock Faciiltles Legend --- County Line Boundary ----• Divided Highway ~ --- Paved or Improved Road N @) PerirMter Fence Gallll 123 Mlle Post Mark.I --- DOE Project Boundary ll

0 2 3 4 5

Milos 39006034.1

5-4 WHC - EP-0340 city limits, that area is not considered "onsite," and is not subject to the control of the plant security organization . The 600 Area is nonspecific and encompasses all facilities not located in a defined, fenced- in, limited access compound; therefore, mileage to t he 600 Area is not shown . Figure 5- 1 shows distances to the various areas of the site . Table 5-4 presents estimates of various categories of traffic statistics on Hanford. The traffic statistics include bus and van traffic, private vehicle traffic, and radioactive and hazardous material shipment statistics .

Table 5-4. Estimated Traffic Volumes by Type of Vehicle. Da i1 y Personnel Using Bus Transportation DOE bus from 1100 Area bus lot 780 DOE bus from Richland 667 Ben Franklin Bus from Tri-C ities (R ichland, Kennewick, Pasco) 135 Total 1,582 Daily Personnel Van Pooling Ben Franklin-owned vans from Tri-Cities 312 Privately owned vans from Tr i -Ci ties 300 Privately owned vans from Yakima areas _J_Q Total 642 Daily Privately Owned Vehicles Passengers Passengers traveling in privately owned vehicles from all offsite locations to all onsite locations with estimated occupancy of two persons per vehicle 6,501 Twen ty Four Hour Traffi c Count (1987) Total Vehicles of All Kinds Total number of wheeled vehicles passing through the Wye Barricade during the 24-h counting period 5,102 Total number of wheeled vehicles passing through the Yakima Barricade during the 24-h counting period 1,027 Onsite Radioact ive Material Shipments Truck, U.S-. Ecology (Commercial Activities) 758 Truck, DOE (Defense Activities) 2,900 Rail 445 Total 4,103 Onsite Hazardous Material Shipments (Nonradioactive) (Truck) Hazardous waste shipments to 616 Buil ding (Consolidation) 690 Hazardous waste shipments (PCB) to Building 212T (Conso lidation) 59 Hazardous waste shipments (nonspecific to Drum Storage Site) 88 Total 837 DOE= U.S. Department of Energy. PCB= Polychlorinated biphenyls.

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5.5 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHIPMENT STATISTICS Statistics on the numbers of DOE shipments by transport mode and type of material are presented in Table 5-5.

Table 5-5. Total Annual Department of Energy Shipments to/from Hanford.

Barge Rail Truck Air Freight United Parcel Service to from to from to from to from to from General 0 0 827 11 7,287 580 9,838 20,847 62,500 3,600 Hazardous 1-3X of 1-2X of (nonradio- 0 0 15 0 853 242 104 14 total total active) Radioactive 3 0 13 3 328 113 285 40 0 0 Totals 3 0 855 14 8,468 935 10,227 20,901 -63, 7SO -3,650 NOTE: Shipments referenced are as large as a carload of coal or as small as an envelope. The smaller shipments are normally combined to reduce the nUTber of actual truck trips within the Hanford Site.

5.6 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OWNED EQUIPMENT ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1988 Hanford transportation accidents for CY 1988 are presented in this section. 0 Accidents. There were no toxic or hazardous chemical spills nor any 1nJuries or fatalities during CY 1988 associated with any mode of transportation. Barge Accidents: O Fatalities: 0 Injuries: 0 Rail Accidents: 2 Fatalities: 0 Injuries: O Rail Incident No. 1. While switching at slow speed, the steering wheels on the front truck climbed a switch point protector and were grounded. No other equipment was involved. No damage to engine or switch resulted. Steering wheels were rerailed and work continued. Rail Incident No. 2. While using the "shaker" to unload coal cars, some coal dropped onto the rails beneath the coal car instead of into the coal chute. While winching the string of cars forward to unload another car, the front wheels of the empty car climbed onto the loose coal and were grounded. No damage to the rail car or rails resulted. The wheels were rera il ed and work continued. I 1 Auto/Truck Accidents: 20 Fatalities: 0 Injuries: 0 Incident No. 1. A deer ran in front of an empty bus during a test drive by a maintenance employee. Minor damage to the bus occurred when the bus hit the deer.

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Incident No. 2. A truck pulled into an intersection after stopping and was nearly hit by an oncoming auto . No contact was made. The auto spun onto the edge of the road sustaining a flat tire. No other damage was done to either vehicle.

Incidents No. 3 and No. 4 involved heavy equipment . A crane backed into an improperly parked pickup truck, and a crane operator failed to clear a guy-wire, pulling a pole out of posi • ion.

Incident No. 5 involved two vehicles in an open lot during inclement weather. Both vehicles were moving slowly but could not stop because of ice. Minor damage was sustained by both vehicles. Incidents No. 6 through No. 20 involved plant autos, pickups, and trucks all in off-highway situations.

(1) Two guy-wires were struck, and three guard posts were backed into.

(2) A truck loaded too high to clear a door hit the door and damaged it.

(3) A Cushman electric car was overturned when the driver caught the mirror on a chain as he drove by.

(4) A truck side-swiped a fire hydrant.

(5) An overwide load (self-propelled crane) was struck by its rear escort vehicle at 3 mi/h causing minor damage to the escort pickup .

(6) An unattended auto rolled backward down a slight incline into a concrete building. (7) A driver struck an overhead steam line while looking for something on the ground.

(8) At a receiving area a commercial truck side-swiped a parked pickup while turning. The driver claimed the pickup was parked "in his blind spot." There were no incidents involving shipments of radioactive material, hazardous material, or hazardous waste during CY 1988.

5.7 PERSONAL USE VEHICLES ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1988 Accident statistics include both public access and restricted access areas within Hanford. Washington State Route 240 crosses the Hanford Site, Stevens Drive in the City of Richland, Horn Rapids Road, and parts of Hanford Routes 4 and 10 that are outside the restricted access badgehouse known as the Wye barricade.

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A fatality occurred on State Route 240 during CY 1988. This accident involved a single vehicle leaving the highway. Apart from the involvement of the Hanford emergency response team, the accident, the vehicle, and t he deceased were not in any way associated with Hanford. Other injury accidents are listed below.

Date Time Location Injuries 03/17/88 2330 Stevens/Horn Rapids Ribs/shoulder 04/13/88 1230 Rt. 4 Milepost 25.5 Fractured pelvis, internal 05/05/88 1018 U.S. Ecology/GOO Yes/unknown 09/07/88 1045 Central landfill Laceration 09/21/88 1640 Rt. 4 Milepost 14.5 Knee 11/09/88 1600 Rt. 4S Milepost 15.75 Head, neck, leg 12/06/88 0710 Rt. 4S Milepost 12.75 Head, neck, spine

There were 141 non-,nJury accidents involving personal use vehicles at Hanford during CY 1988.

5.8 NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR TRANSPORTATION IMPACT In the late 1970's the Hanford transportation system served an operating N Reactor, associated chemical processing facilities, the FFTF (then under construction), and three commercial nuclear power plants (WNP-1, WNP-2, and WNP-4) (also under construction). The highway network has been improved significantly since that time. The excellent condition of the existing transportation facilities at Hanford establishes a base that will provide adequate services for NPR transportation requirements. In most cases, the NPR mission would replace the requirements of existing processing facilities scheduled for shutdown in the early 1990's. In all cases, the traffic will be much less than that experienced during the late 1970's. The transportation impact of the various technologies is expected to be similar, with the exception of substantially fewer component deliveries and a shorter construction period for the partially completed WNP-1 at Hanford. The impact of the NPR is well within the capabilities of the existing transportation system.

5.8.1 Personal Use Vehicles and Trucks Figure 5-2 shows the projected construction and operational manpower requirements for completion of WNP-1 and new support facilities. The peak workforce loading of about 5,400 workers would occur during construction 1 to 2 yr before reactor initial operation. This could account for over

5-8 5000 ~------, Legend ---- Core Fab 4000 ----•--- Target Proc ,uu✓✓✓-U✓UU. Fuel Proc -n -"• lO C cii 3000 -s :: Cl) 0 Ul 0. I C N :E: cu . :t: :E 2000 n I Ul :ic: ,.,, I :z "'CJ U) "'CJ I ...... I 0w ~ 1000 :c 0 0 -s 7'" -t, 0 -s 0 n -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 ...0 1 2 3 4 5 .Cl) Years • - Represents Start of Full Power Note: Only the Initial Core Fabrication Reactor Operation is Represented on This Figure 39003073.1 WHC-EP-0340

6,000,000 vehicle-miles/year of personal-use vehicle usage on the site. A workforce loading of about 2,000 workers would be required to operate and maintain the reactor and support facilities. This could account for 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 vehicle-miles/year of personal-use vehicle usage at Hanford. Records show 2,900 DOE radioactive truck shipments were completed during CY 1988. As many as 1,200 radioactive truck shipments per year may be required to support the New Production Reactor-Light Water Reactor (NPR-LWR) during operation (WHC 1989). With continued Hanford cleanup activiti es using existing site resources, an increase in the DOE truck fleet for the NPR would be anticipated.

5.8.2 Rail A total of 445 radioactive rail shipments were completed at Hanford in CY 1988. With the continuing shutdown of existing process facilities this number will decrease. A total of 128 rail shipments are projected to handle irradiated driver assemblies and solidified high-level wastes for the NPR-LWR. Failed process equipment shipments to solid waste burial could add several rail shipments per year. The largest impact on the rail network and equipment is antici pated to be the 122 irradiated driver assembly rail shipments from the WNP-1 site to the 200 East Area, a distance of about 12 mi. Depending on future use of the existing five locomotives and various rail cars, it may be necessary to add another locomotive and several cask shipment rail cars to meet the NPR needs.

5.8.3 Barge The existi ng barge slip was developed to handle large components for nuclear reactors, but is currently used infrequently . This facility would probably be used extensively for large component shipments for the NPR-HWR or NPR-MHTGR technolog i es implemented at Hanford. The only addition would be an adequate road surface to the Skagit/Hanford NPR site for the overland transport of the barge shipments.

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6.0 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

This chapter addresses the impacts of incident-free (routine) transport of rad ioactive materials in which the shipments reach their destinati ons without incident . It also addresses t he impacts of accidents involv i ng t he shi pments . The approach~s an d data that will be used to calculat e these impacts are presented, as are the characteristics of the radioactive shipments that are important to determining the radiological impacts.

6.1 SHIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS The shipment characteristics necessary to calculate the radiological impacts of onsite transport include the type of shipping container or "cask," the number of shipments, and the quantity of radioactive material within the cask (referred to as the "inventory"). These parameters are presented in Tables 6-1, 6-2 , and 6-3 for the various tri tium production. cycle and waste materials considered in this study . Table 6- 1 presents these data for the LWR fuel cycle at Hanford, Table 6-2 is for the HWR fuel cycle, and Table 6- 3 for the MHTGR fuel cycl e.

6.2 INCIDENT-FREE RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ANALYSIS This secti on describes the approach to the incident-free, normal radiological impact analysis performed in support of the NPR EIS . Incident ­ free transport refers to a situation in which the shipments of radioactive material s reach their destinations without rel easing the package contents. Impacts from accidents are discussed later. Separate sections in this chapter describe the approach, discuss the input data and assumpt ions, and present t he results .

6.2.l Approach to Calculate the Normal Radiation Doses Radiological impacts during normal transport involve dose to the public from radiation emitted by rad i oactive material packages as the shipment passes by and to transport workers who are in the general vicinity of a radioactive ma t erial shipment. Even though radiation shields are incorporated into packaging designs (if required by regulations), some radiation penetrat es the package and exposes the nearby population to an extremely low dose rate. After the shipment has passed, no further exposure occurs. The groups exposed to radiation while the shipments are in-transi t include crew members of trains , truck drivers, those who directly handle radioactive shipp i ng containers while t hey are enroute, and the general public [for example, bystanders at truck stops and rail sidings, persons living or working along a route, and nearby travelers (movtng in the same and opposite directions)]. The RADTRAN III computer code was used to calculate exposures during highway and rail transport to these population groups (Taylor and Daniel 1982; Madsen et al. 1983; Madsen et al. 1986). The RADTRAN III normal population exposure models are illustrated in Figure 6-1 .

6-1 J Table 6-1. Characteristics of Onsite Shipment for Light Water Reactor Technology.

Annual Speed of Nunber Average Material Transport Package Transport Annual population Origin Destination distance shipment of category mode type index shipments (km) (km/h) crewmen density (perspns/ km> Irradiated fuels NPR SFRC Rail B 14 122 4,880 24 5 98

Irradiated tritiun NPR FMEF Truck B 14 13 100 40 2 850 targets High-level wastes Hlij stored onsite until offsite shipment SFRC, Onsite Low-level wastes NPR, burial Truck A 10 1,320 41,000 56 2 109 FMEF Transuranic waste Contact handled SFRC URAP Truck B 0. 15 53 530 56 2 109 Remote handled SFRC ijRAP Truck B 0. 15 61 610 56 2 109 ::e::: Product I ~u Product stored onsite until offsite shipment n H I O'l rr1 I -0 N FMEF = Fuels and Materials Examination Facility. I 0 NPR = New Production Reactor. w SFRC = Spent Fuel Reprocessing Conl)lex. -""' URAP = Uaste Rece iving and Packaging Facility. 0 Table 6-2. Charact eristics of Onsite Shipment for Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Technology.

Annual Speed of Number Average Materi al Transport Package Transport Annual population Origin Dest ination distance shiµnent of category mode type index shipments (km) (km/h) crewmen dens ity (perspns/ km> Irradiated driver fue ls NPR SFRC Rail e 14 880 30,800 24 5 109 ~u driver assemblies NPR SFRC Rai l e 14 587 20,500 24 5 109 H driver assemblies Irradiated target Pu targets NPR SFRC Ra i l e 14 823 28 , 800 24 5 109 3H targets NPR TPF , Truck e 14 14 168 40 2 850

High-level wastes HLU stored onsite until offsite shipment TPF, SFRC, Onsite Low -level wastes burial Truck A 10 2,940 91,000 56 2 109 NPR, :2::: :::r: FTFP, n I 0) Transuranic waste !Tl I URAP Truck 270 56 -0 W Contact handled SF RC e 0. 15 27 2 109 I Remote handled SFRC ~RAP Truck B 0 . 15 39 390 56 2 109 0 w ~ Product 0 ~u Product stored onsite until offsite shiµnent H fTfP Fuel and Target Fabrication Pl an t . FHEF = fuels and Materials Examination facili ty. NPR New Production Reactor. SFRC = Spent Fuel Reprocessing Complex. TPF = Target Processing facility. URAP = Ua ste Receiving and Packaging Facility. Table 6-3. Characteristics of Onsite Shipment for Heavy-Water Reactor Technology. Amual Speed of Nuroer Average Material Transport Package Transport Annual Origin Destination distance shipment of population category mode type index shipments (km) (km/h) crewmen density (persons/km2) Irradiated driver fuels ~u driver assenblies NPR SFRC Rail B 14 35 1,230 24 5 109 H driver assenblies NPR SFRC Rail B 14 50 1,750 24 5 109 Irradiated t argets ~u targets NPR SFRC Rail B 14 80 2,800 24 5 109 H targets NPR TPF Truck B 14 60 720 40 2 850 High-level wastes Hl\.l stored onsite until offsite shipment TPF, Onsite low- level wastes SFRC, burial Truck B 10 1,430 44,000 56 2 109 NPR, FTFP Transuranic waste Contact handled SFRC \.IRAP Truck B 0. 15 18 180 56 2 109 ~ Remote handled SFRC \.IRAP Truck B 0. 15 22 220 56 2 109 ::c n Product I Ol stored onsite until ..., I ~u Product offslte shipment '"U -""' H I 0 w FTFP = Fuel and Target Fabrication Plant. -""' NPR = New Production Reactor. 0 SFRC = Spent Fuel Reprocessing CCllJl>lex. TPF = Target Processing Facility. \.IRAP = \.laste Receiving and Packaging Facility. WHC-EP-0340

Figure 6-1. RADTRAN III Normal Transportation Dose Models.

39003073.2 In the population exposure models, the assessment of population dose assumes the packaging or shipping cask is a point source of radiation. The point- source approximation is acceptable for distances between the receptor and source of more than two source-characteristic lengths.* At shorter distances, the point-source approximation is conservative; that is , the doses calculated tend to be higher than those likely to occur. · The basic equation used to calculate the dose rate (0) from a point source, assuming only attenuation and buildup in air and ignoring scatter from the ground, is

QK Br exp ( -µ.r) Dr = where:

Dr = Dose rate at distance r B~ = Dose buildup factor for an isotropic source ~=Dose rate factor for a unit source strength at one meter µ=Linear attenuation coefficient r = Distance from the source Q = Source strength.

*Source-characteristic length is equal to the l argest phys ical dimens ion (length, diameter, etc.) of the source. 6-5 WHC-EP-0340

The equations used to calculate exposures differ among population groups and transport modes (that is, truck and rail), but their bases in the point­ source assumption are the same. Derivations of the various equations are discussed in detail by Taylor and Daniel (1982). The equation presented above assumes no intervening shielding between the · source (that is, the container and shipping cask) and receptor (that is, the surrounding population). In reality, most of the population within 800 m of the cask will be inside or behind buildings which provide substantial shielding. To take credit for this shielding, a standard shielding effective­ ness factor for urban areas of 0.018 (Madsen et al. 1986) was applied to the population dose equation.

6.2.2 Input Data for Normal Highway and Rail Transportation Impacts S6me of the miscellaneous input data used in the analysis of normal radiation dose impacts during highway and rail transport of production materials and wastes from NPR operations are discussed in this section. These data are RADTRAN III default values, except where indicated, and are self­ explanatory. The population densities of the regions across which shipments must travel will influence the transportation impacts. Hanford currently has no permanent public residents. Before 1987, approximately 73 persons resided at a Bonneville Power Administration substation at the north western boundary of 2 2 Hanford. The area of Hanford is approximately 560 mi (1,500 km ); therefore, the public population density is less than one person per square mi l e (one per square kilometer). The worker population of Hanford is much larger than the public population. As a result, workers will receive higher population dose commitments from onsite transportation than will the general public. For this study, Hanford site-specific population data have been used to characterize the population densities of regions through which onsite shipments will travel. The formula used to calculate the population densities considers the population densities at shipping facilities, receiving facilities, at facilities along the routes, and the site-wide population density. This formula is derived below. · Assume a shipment is made between Facility A ano Facility 8, as seen in Figure 6-2, and passes Facilities C and D enroute. The boundary of Facility C is assumed to be within 0.5 mi of the route~ Facility Dis assumed to be more than 0.5 mi from the route. According to the RADTRAN methodology, the off-link dose is cut off beyond 0.5 mi from the route. Consequently, the population of Facility C would be considered in the dose calculations by RADTRAN but the popu l ation of Facility D would not. Using the cutoff as an approximation, it was considered that the segments of exposure to shipping Facility A and receiving Facility Bare 0.5 mi. In addition·, for segments where no facility is within 0.5 mi of the route, the general site-wide

6-6 WHC-EP-0340

Figure 6-2. Schematic Diagram for Estimation of Population Doses for Onsite Transportation Impacts Calculations.

Facility B (Destination} 0.5 mi .,,,,- ...-- - ~ / / / / , / Facility D 0.5 mi~ / '< /

Facility A (Origin} 39103006.1

population density was assumed to be exposed. Therefore, the formula for calculating the weighted-average population density for each shipping­ receiving facility pair is

where :

2 PD= Average population density (persons/mi ) X, = Total shipping distance between Facilities A and B (miles) X = Segment of exposure for Facility C (miles) =-Segment of exposure for Facilities A and B (miles) 0.5 2 Pa= Population density at Facility A (persons/mi ) 2 Pb= Population density at Facility B (persons/mi ) 2 Pc= Population density at Facility C (persons/mi ) 2 Ps = Site-wide population density (persons/mi ). The input data for the various shipping-receiving facility pairs were based on estimated shipping distances that were derived from driving the actual routes and from populati on data gi ven in the Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project No. 2 Environmental Report (Supply System 1981) . The resulting population densities for the various shipping-receiving facility pairs are presented in Table 6-4 . The remaining input data used in the 6-7 WHC-EP-0340

Table 6-4. Weighted Hanford Site Population Densities for Each Shipping-Receiving Facility Pair. Population Material Origin Destination density 2 (persons/ mi ) Irrad. targets NPR (WNP-1) TPF (400 Area) 850 SFRC (200 East Irrad. fuel NPR (WNP-1) Area) 98 CH-TRU, RH-TRU SFRC (200 East) WRAP (200 West) 109 Onsite burial LLW FMEF (400 Area) (200 West) 84 Onsite burial LLW NPR (WNP-1) (200 West) 61 Onsite burial LLW SFRC (200 East) (200 West) 109 Onsite burial LLW FMEF (400 Area) (200 West) 84 CH= Contact handled. FMEF = Fuels and Materials Examination Facility. HLW = High-level waste. NPR = New Production Reactor. RH= Remote handled. SFRC = Spent Fuel Reprocessing Complex. TRU = Transuranic. WRAP= Waste Receiving and Packaging Plant.

RADTRAN III analyses of onsite incident-free radiological impacts are listed in Table 6-5. These data are RADTRAN III default parameters, except where indicated, and are self-explanatory. Radiation dose rates emitted from the shipping cask/container systems are conservatively assumed for most materials to be equivalent to the regulatory limits given in 49 CFR 173 (maximum surface dose rate of 200 mrem/h and maximum of 10 mrem/h at 2 m from the surface of the cask). This equates to a Transport Index (TI)* of about 14.0. This applies to all materials except for low-level waste (LLW) (TI= 10) and both categories of transuranic (TRU) waste (TI= 0. 15). No credit is taken for shielding and for the exclusion of personnel from the surface of the cask that is provided by external devices such as personnel barriers or special overpack containers. The radiation dose rate in the cab of a truck is also assumed to be at the regulatory maximum dose rate of 2 mrem/h.

*TI is defined as the dose rate at 1 m from the package surface. 6-8 WHC-EP-0340

Table 6-5. Input Data for Analysis of Normal Transport Impactsa. Parameter Truck Rai l Number of crew 2 5 Di stance from source to crew (m) 5 20 Average speed (km/h) NPR to FMEF 40 24 NPR to SFRC 56 24 All facilities to onsite burial/WRAP 56 24 Number of persons per passing vehicle 3 N/A Traffic count (one-way vehicles/h) NPR to FMEF 708 5 NPR to SFRC 470 1 All facilities to onsite burial/WRAP 470 1 One-way shipp i ng distancesb WNP -1 to onsite burial/WRAP 44 44 Skag i t to onsite burial/WRAP 35 35 WNP-1 to FMEF 7 7 Skagit to TPF 12 12 WNP -1 to SFRC 30 30 Skagit to SFRC 20 20 ava lues are taken from Madsen, et al. (1983) except where otherwise i nd icated. bEstimate. FMEF = Fuels and Materials Examination Facility. NPR = New Production Reactor SFRC = Spent Fuel Reprocessing Complex TPF = Target Processing Facility WRAP= Waste Receiving and Packaging Plant.

6.2.3 Results of Normal Radiological Impact Analysis The RADTRAN III computer code was applied to calculate the routine radiation doses to transport workers and the public that are estimated to result from onsite transportation of radioactive materials in support of the NPR. RADTRAN III was used to calculate doses on a per-shipment basis for the following dose categories; on-link (doses to persons in passing vehicles), off-link (doses to persons within 0.5 km of the route), and truck and rail crew members . The routine doses per shipment of each material were then multiplied by the annual number of shipments , to estimate the annual radiation doses . The annual doses were then converted to health effects by multiplying by health effects conversion factors. Annual fatal cancer risks were calculated by multiplying the annual dose estimates by 4 x 10· 4 fatal cancers per person-rem. Annual genetic effects were calculated by multiplying the total annual dose by 2.5 x 10· 4 genetic effects per person-rem . The annual dose and heal t h effects estimates for routine transport of each material at Hanford are shown in Tables 6-6, 6-7, · and 6-8 for LWR, HWR , and MHTGR technologies, respectively.

6- 9 Table 6-6. Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Light-Water Reactor. Hea 1th risks, Population dose, person-rem/yr LHE/yr Material category Fatal On-link Off-link Crewman Total cancer Genetic death effects Irradiated fuel 9.9 E- 05 1. 1 E- 02 3.7 E-02 4.8 E-02 1.9 E-05 1. 2 E-05 Irradiated targets 3H targets 1.0 E-02 4.0 E-04 1. 5 E-02 2.6 E-02 1.0 E-05 6.8 E-06 Low-level waste 2.9 E-02 2.9 E-03 1. 1 E+OO 1. 1 E+OO 4.6 E-04 3. 0 E--04

Transuranic waste ~ I n Contact handled 6.6 E-04 3.2 E-06 4.9 E-03 5.5 E-03 2.2 E-06 1.4 E-06 I rr, °'I -0 ...... Remote handled 7.6 E-04 3.7 E- 06 5.6 E-03 6.4 E-03 2.6 E-06 1. 7 E-06 I 0 0 w 4.1 E-02 1.4 E-02 1. 2 E+OO 1. 2 E+OO 4.9 E-04 3.2 E-04 -"" TOTAL 0 LHE = Latent health effects...... ------~ ------

Table 6-7. Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Heavy-Water Reactor .

Population dose, person-rem/yr Hea 1th risks, LHE/yr Material category Fatal On-link Off-link Crewman Total cancer Genetic death effects Irradiated driver fuels Pu driver assemblies 4.0 E-05 5.0 E-06 9.2 E-03 9. 2 E-03 3. 7 E-06 2.4 E-06 3H driver assemblies 5.7 E-05 7.2 E-06 1.3 E-02 1. 3 E-02 5.3 E-06 3.4 E-06 Irradiated targets Pu targets 9. 1 E-05 1.1 E-05 2.1 E-02 2 . 1 E-02 8.4 E- 06 5. 5 E-06 ~ ::i:: 3H targets 8.3 E-02 3 . 1 E-03 1. 2 E-01 2 . 1 E-01 8.2 E-05 5.4 E-05 n 0) I I m -0 ...... High-level waste 0 0 0 0 0 0 I ...... 0 w Low-level waste 3. 1 E-02 3. 1 E-03 1. 2 E+OO 1.2 E+OO 4.9 E-04 3.2 E-04 ..i,. 0 Transuranic waste Contact handled 2.3 E-04 1. 1 E-06 1. 7 E- 03 1. 9 E-03 7.5 E-07 4.9 E- 07 Remote handled 2.8 E-04 1. 3 E-06 2.0 E-03 2.3 E-03 9.2 E-07 6.0 E-07 Product Pu 0 0 0 0 0 0 JH 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 1.1 E-01 6.3 E-03 1.4 E+OO 1. 5 E+OO 6.0 E-04 3.9 E-04

LHE = Latent health effects. Table 6-8. Onsite Incident- Free Rad-Transportation Impacts Population Risk for Hanford Site Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. Health risks, Population dose, person- rem/yr LHE/yr Material category Fatal On -link Off-1 ink Crewman Total cancer Genetic death effects Irradiated driver fuels Pu driver assemblies 6.0 E- 04 6.8 E-02 2.2 E- 01 2.9 E-01 1. 2 E-04 7.6 E-05 3H driver assemblies 4.2 E-04 4.7 E-02 1.5 E- 01 2.0 E-01 8.1 E-05 5.2 E-05 Irradiated targets Pu targets 5.8 E-04 6.6 E- 02 2.2 E- 01 2.8 E-01 1. 1 E- 04 7.3 E- 05 3 :c~ H targets 1. 9 E- 02 7.3 E-04 2.8 E-02 4.8 E-02 1. 9 E-05 1.3 E- 05 (""') Ol I I High- level waste 0 0 0 0 0 0 rTl 1--' "'O N I Low- level waste 6.4 E-02 6.4 E-03 2.5 E+OO 2.5 E+OO 1.0 E- 03 6.6 E-04 0 w ~ Transuranic waste 0 Contact handled 3.4 E-04 1.6 E-06 2.5 E- 03 2.8 E- 03 1.1 E-06 7.3 E- 07 Remote handled 4.9 E- 04 2.4 E-06 3.6 E-03 4.1 E-03 1.6 E-06 1.1 E-06 Product Pu 0 0 0 0 0 0 3H 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 8.5 E-02 1.9 E- 01 3.1 E+OO 3.4 E+OO 1.3 E- 03 8.8 E-04 LHE = Latent health effects. WHC-EP-0340

The results indicate that the annual radiation dose commitment to Hanford workers range from approximately 1.2 to 3.1 person-rem for LWR and MHTGR technologies, respectively. Of these estimates, the largest contributor (about 75% to 90% of the total dose) to these doses is the shipment of low­ level non-TRU wastes from the various facil ities to an onsite disposal facilit/ . The total annual health effects were estimated in the range 5 x 10 · to 1 x 10· 3 cancer deaths per yea r and 3 x 10 ·4 to 9 x 10 ·4 genetic effects per year for LWR and MHTGR technologies, respectively . Separate calculations were performed to develop estimates of the routine radiation doses to the maximum exposed individuals. Because the shipments analyzed in this report are entirely onsite, the maximum exposed individuals are most likely truck drivers and rail crew members. The doses to these persons were calculated by multiplying the estimated per-shipment dose by the estimated number of shipments to be transported each year. Separate calculations were performed for the maximum individual dose to rail crew members and truck drivers. The maximum individual dose to truck drivers was estimated by assuming that the dose rate in the truck cab is the maximum allowable under DOT regulations; that is, 2 mrem/h . The travel time per shipment was calculated using the onsite shipping distances given in Table 6- 5 and the average sh i pment speeds gi ven in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3. The products of these t wo variables represents the per-shipment individual doses for each material to be transported . These values were then mu l tiplied by the corresponding annual shipments given in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6- 3 to develop estimates of the maximum individual annual doses . The maximum annual offsite doses were calculated using a formula given by Cashwell et al . (1983) . The total annual dose to an individual who is present as each truck shipment passes by within 50 m (very conservative because public access to Hanford i s restricted) was 2.83 x 10· 3 mrem/shipment. The annual individual doses were then converted to annual health effects (fatal cancer deaths and genet i c effects) using the conversion factors presented prev i ously . The results of these calculations are presented in Table 6-9 for all three NPR technologies . The maximum individual doses to rail crew members were calculated similarly to the truck crew doses. The dose rate to the maximum individual was calculated using the l/r2 (point-source} approximation, assuming thi s individual is located 150 m from the surface of the shipping cask. The resulting average dose rate was about 3.6 x 10· 4 mrem/h. This dose rate was then multiplied by the total annual exposure time (calculated by dividing the annual shipping distance by the average speed) to estimate the total annual doses. As was done for truck crew individual doses, the rail crew doses were converted to annual fatal cancer deaths and genetic effects using the conversion factors presented previously. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 6- 9 for all three NPR technologies . Maximum annual public doses were calculated by multiplyi ng the annual number of shipments by 5.04 x 10· 3 mrem/shipment (Cashwell et al . 1983).

6-13 Table 6-9. Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts. (sheet 1 of 2) Technology: Light Water Reactor Maximum individual Health risk (effects/yr) Material dose (rem/yr) description Cancer death Genetic effect Crewman Off site Crewman Offs i te Crewman Offs ite RH - TRU waste 2.2 E-03 1. 7 E-04 8.7 E- 07 6.9 E-08 5.7 E-07 4.5 E- 08 CH-TRU waste 1. 9 E- 03 1.5 E-04 7.6 E-07 6.0 E-08 4.9 E-07 3.9 E-08 LLW (non-TRU) 1.5 E-01 3.7 E-03 5.8 E-05 1. 5 E-06 3.8 E-05 9.7 E-07 Pu drivers 7.3 E- 04 6.1 E-04 2.9 E-07 2.5 E- 07 1. 9 E-07 1.6 E-07 3H targets 7.8 E- 04 3.7 E-05 3.1 E-07 1.5 E--08 2.0 E- 07 9.6 E-09 :c~ n I O'l ,,, I Technology: Heavy Water Reactor "'O ...... I -"" 0 Hea 1th risk (effects/yr) w -"" Maximum individual 0 Material dose (rem/yr) Cancer death Genetic effect description Crewman Offs ite Crewman Offs ite Crewman Offs ite RH-TRU waste 7.9 E-04 6.2 E- 05 3.1 E- 07 2.5 E-08 2.0 E-07 1. 6 E-08 CH-TRU waste 6.4 E-04 5. 1 E-05 2.6 E-07 2.0 E-08 1. 7 E-07 1.3 E-08 LLW (non - TRU) 2.1 E-01 4.0 E-03 8.6 E-05 1.6 E-06 5.6 E-05 I. 1 E-06 Pu drivers 2.1 E-04 1.8 E-04 8.4 E-08 7. 1 E-08 5.5 E- 08 4.6 E-08 3H drivers 3.0 E-04 2.5 E-04 1. 2 E-07 1.0 E-07 7.8 E-08 6.6 E-08 Pu targets 4.8 E-04 4.0 E-04 I. 9 E-07 1.6 E-07 1.2 E-07 1.0 E-07 3H targets 3.6 E- 03 1.7 E-04 1. 4 E-06 6.8 E-08 9.4 E-07 4.4 E-08 Table 6-9. Onsite Incident-Free Rad-Transportation Impacts. (sheet 2 of 2) Technology: Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

Maximum individual Hea 1th risk (effects/yr) Material dose (rem/yr) Cancer death Genetic effect description Crewman Offs ite Crewman Offs ite Crewman Offs ite RH-TRU waste 1. 4 E-03 1. l E-04 5.6 E- 07 4.4 E-08 3.6 E-07 2.9 E-08 CH-TRU waste 9.6 E-04 7.6 E-05 3.9 E-07 3.1 E-08 2.5 E-07 2.0 E-08 LLW (non-TRU) 3.3 E-01 8.3 E-03 1.3 E-04 3.3 E-06 8.5 E-05 2.2 E-06 Pu drivers 5.3 E-03 4.4 E-03 2.1 E-06 1. 8 E-06 1. 4 E-06 1.2 E-06 3 · H drivers 3.5 E-03 3.0 E-03 l.4 E- 06 1. 2 E-06 9. 2 E-07 7.7 E-07 ~ ::r: n Pu targets 4.9 E-03 4.1 E-03 2.0 E-06 1. 7 E-06 1.3 E-06 1. l E-06 I m n, ...... I 3 -a H targets 8.4 E-04 4.0 E-05 3.4 E- 07 1. 6 E-08 2.2 E-07 1.0 E-08 I 01 0 w CH= Contact handled. _,,,. LLW = Low- level waste. 0 RH= Remote handled. TRU = Transuranic waste. WHC-EP-0340

To place these doses in perspective, the results in Tables 6-6 through 6-9 were compared to the radiation dose received by the same population from natural background radiation. The population dose commitment from natural background radiation was estimated for the same population that is affected by the shipments by multiplying the total affected population by the average background radiation dose rate at Hanford. The affected population was estimated by multiplying the nominal travel distances given in Table 6-5 by the width of the band over which RADTRAN III integrates doses (that is, 1600 m or 800 m on either side of the shipment) and then by the average population densities given in Table 6-2. The average background radiation dose rate for Hanford was given in DOE (1987) as a range between 70 and 96 mrem/yr. Therefore, the average annual population dose commitment from natural background radiation was estimated to be in the range from about 70 to 95 person-rem/yr. The estimated annual public doses from NPR-related transportation at Hanford would contribute only a small increment (3 to 4%) above the population dose commitment from natural background radiation.

6.3 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ACCIDENT ANALYSIS The impacts associated with potential transport accidents are examined in this section. For this analysis, transportation accident impacts are measured in terms of the product of the likelihood of a transportation accident times the dose consequences of the accidents involving the tritium fuel cycle materials. The dose consequences from the bounding releases of radionuclides that are estimated in this analysis are expressed in the following terms: • Maximum individual: The radiation doses are presented for two hypothetical individuals, one located at Hanford boundary nearest to the release and one located at 200 ft from the accident. The doses are presented in terms of the EDE for a 50-yr commitment • period, EDE 0 The doses are presented for the maximum exposed organ and t~e dose to the thyroid. The doses are also presented by pathway. The lifetime fatal cancer risk to these individuals are also presented.

• Population: The CEDE, CEDE50 , is presented, as well as the doses to the gonads and thyroid. The doses are presented by pathway. Also presented are the estimated health effects that could potentially result from the release (cancer deaths and genetic effects to all generations).

6.3.1 Approach to Calculate the Impacts of-Accidents This analysis consisted of three steps. The first step was to calculate the probabilities of accidents involving the NPR materials listed in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3. The second step was to implement detailed atmo­ spheric dispersion and dose calculation computer codes to calculate the radiological impacts to the population that would result from the accidents, should they occur. The third step was to implement the computer codes to calculate the doses to hypothetical maximally exposed individuals from the maximum credible accident. The maximum credible accident for this analysis was defined as the accident that produced the highest dose consequences and had a probability of approximately 1 x 10· 6 per year. 6-16 WHC-EP-0340

As mentioned previously, the population risks are the product of accident frequency and consequences. Therefore, the following formula was used t o calculate the annual transportation risks for each material:

\/I p¾ == I: Fi.Ill • ci, m i•I , m where:

PRrr, =- Population risk for material m , == Subscript denoting severity categories F,. ,m == Frequency of occurrence of accident severity category for material m c.1,m = Consequences of accident severity category i for material m. The probability of an accident that involves radioactive materials is expressed in terms of the expected number of accidents per unit distance integrated over the total distance traveled. The response of the sh i pping container/cask system to the accident environment, and hence, the probability of release or loss of shielding, is related to the severity of the accident. The probabilities of occurrence of transportation accidents that would release significant quantities of radioactive materials is small because the shipping casks are designed to withstand severe transportation accident conditions (see Chapter 2) . For the purposes of calculating transportation impacts, truck and rail accidents are divided into six "severity categories." The severity categories represent the range of accident environments that a package may be exposed to. For example, Severity Category I represents the Type A accident conditions in 49 CFR 173 (see Chapter 2) and Severity Category VI represents extremely severe accident conditions that are likely to result in a package failure and release of the contents . The probabilities of a package being exposed to these conditions are smaller as the severity category number increases. The conditional probabilities that were used in this analysis are presented in Table 6-10 (NRC 1977). To estimate the annual frequency of an accident in a given accident severity category for a particular material, the analyst would multiply the overall accident rate, the conditional probability of the given severity category, and the annual shipping distance for the material. Accidents on the road or railway are difficult to totally eliminate. However, because the shipping casks are capable of withstanding severe transportation accident environments, including severe mechanical and thermal environments, only a small fraction of the accidents involve conditions that are severe enough to result in a release of radioactive material. In fact, to date there have been no in-transit accidental releases of radioactive material from a Type B package within the United States (OTA-SET-304) .

6-17 WHC-EP-0340

Table 6-10. Conditional Probabilities of Truck and Rail Accidents in each Severity Category (NRC 1977). Severity Fractional occurrences category Truck Rail I 0.55 0.50 I I 0.36 0.30 I II 0.07 0.18 IV 0.016 0.018 V 0.0028 0.0018 VI 0.0011 0.00013

Accidents with severities exceeding design standards for shipping packages (see 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 173) could potentially occur, but their probability is extremely small. According to NRC (1987), approximately 99.4% of all truck accidents and 98.7% of all rail accidents are less severe than the hypothetical test conditions given in 10 CFR 71. Thus, there is only a slight possibility that an accident could occur accompanied by a release or loss of package shielding. Severity Categories I and II in Table 6-10 represent the normal and hypothetical accident conditions, respectively, that shopping packages are designed to withstand. Therefore, there are no releases associated with Categories I and II. The conditional probabilities of encountering conditions less damaging that severity Category II are 0.91 and 0.80 for truck and rail accidents, respectively. These probabilities can be compared with the probabilities of no releases from NRC (1987) given above (i.e., 0.994 and 0.987). One can see that the conditional probabilities presented in Table 6-10 are most likely to be conservative. The probability of occurrence of severe onsite transport accidents is smaller than for offsite transport because special precautions and controls can be implemented to prevent shipment movement during periods when accident probabilities are highest . Administrative procedures and controls have been implemented in the past that prevent the casks and radioactive materials from being exposed to potentially severe environments. For example, highly radioactive onsite rail shipments are moved in trains that contain no other cargo. As a result, the possibility that the shipping cask could be exposed to a long-duration fire is very small because the shipment would not be exposed to flammable or other combustible materials. In addition, trained firefighters and fire-fighting equipment are readily available to all areas of the Hanford Site in a short period of time. Should an accident involving a shipment occur, a release of radioactive material could occur only if the shipping cask and inner canisters were to become breached. In some cases, the solid form of the radioactive material would also have to become damaged or fragmented before any of the material could escape from the shipping cask. A breach would most likely be a small gap in a seal or small split in the cask or canister. For the radioactive material to reach the environment, it would have to become dislodged from the material form, pass through the breach in the canister, and then through the breach in the cask. After the accident,

6-18 WHC-EP-0340 most of the released material would settle near the cask. Only very small particles, which behave similar to a gas , would become entrained in a plume. These small particles would in turn become dispersed and diluted by weather action and a fraction would be deposited on the ground (that is, drop out of the contaminated plume) in the surrounding region. Emergency response crews arriving on the scene would · evacuate and secure the area to exclude bystanders from the accident scene . The released material would then be cleaned up using standard decontamination techniques, such as excavation and removal of contaminated soil . Monitoring of the area would be performed to locate contaminated areas and to guide cleanup crews in their choice of protective clothing and equipment (for example, fresh-air equipment and filtered masks). Access to the area would be restricted by Federal and/or state radiation control agencies until it had been decontaminated to safe levels. Public access is further precluded by Hanford security requirements. The next step in the analysis was to estimate the population dose consequences for accident releases of each material. The GENII system (Napier et al. 1989), also referred to as the Hanford Environmental Dosimetry System, was used to perform the radiation dose calculations . GENII is capable of calculating the following doses : • Doses from acute releases, including options for annual dose, committed dose, and accumulated dose • Doses from chronic releases, including options for annual dose, committed dose, and accumulated dose • GENII evaluates the following exposure pathways; direct exposure via water, soil, and air as well as inhalation and ingestion pathways • Acute and chronic elevated and ground-level releases to air • Acute and chronic releases to water • Initial contamination of soil or surfaces • Radionuclide decay may be accounted for. GENII is composed of seven linked computer codes and their associated data libraries. The seven programs may be divided into three categories: user interfaces (interactive, menu-driven programs to assist the user); internal and external dose factor generators; and the environmental dosimetry programs. For more information, the reader is referred to Napier et al. (1988). Inputs to GENII that were used in the analysis of onsite and offsite doses from this accident are discussed in the following paragraphs. The code requires the user to input a population data file for populat,on dose calculations or an individual receptor location for maximum individual dose calculations as well as the weather data applicable to the site being analyzed. The weather data used in this analysis was based on standard Hanford Site environmental documentation (Napier et al. 1988; McCormack, Ramsdell, and Napier 1984). Joint-frequency data for various locations at Hanford assuming a 10 m release height, were used . Weather and population data files that were used in this analysis are presented in Appendix A.

6-19 WHC-EP-0340

The individual receptor locations are as follows. For the LWR technology, the nearest offsite individual is assumed to be located 5,000 m · east of the WNP-1 site, the assumed release point. The nearest onsite individual is assumed to be located 100 m SSW of the release point. For the HWR and MHTGR technologies, the maximum offsite individual is assumed to be located 7,500 m SSW of the assumed release point in the Hanford 400 Area. The nearest onsite individual is assumed to be located 100 m WSW of the release point. The GENII computer code was used to calculate the radiological doses for four pathways: air immersion, ground surface, food ingestion, and inhalation. Air immersion is the external exposure to radiation from a cloud of radio­ active material. Ground surface doses are external exposure that results from radionuclides deposited on the ground. Inhalation is the exposure pathway to radiation that results from inhaling radioactive materials. Ingestion is the exposure pathway of the population from food that has become contaminated with radioactive material and then ingested. GENII assumes that radioactive materials released from a package in an accident are dispersed according to standard Gaussian diffusion models. The model predicts downwind airborne radionuclide concentrations and the amount of material deposited on the ground. Radiation doses to human organs are then determined by GENII using the calculated airborne radionuclide concentrations and standard dosimetric conversion factors. External radiation exposures from ground contamination (groundshine) are calculated using an infinite plane source model. Radiation doses from ground surface contamination include public exposures for 50 yr to the radioactive material deposited on the ground. The model assumes that the contaminated area will be cleaned up to an acceptable residual level , if needed; or, if the contamination is too great, it is assumed that the area will be interdicted. Radiation doses to emergency response personnel and accident-cleanup crews are not included. Population doses from ingestion are estimated with the use of radionuclide transfer fractions which are the relationships between the amount of radioactive material ingested to the amount deposited on the ground.

6.3.2 Input Data for Transportation Accident There are four major categories of input data needed to calculate transportation impacts. These are (1) release quantities, (2) atmospheric dispersion parameters, (3) population distribution parameters, and (4) human uptake and dosimetry models. Each of these major areas is discussed in this subsection. A brief discussion of the probabilities of potential transpor­ tation accidents that are severe enough to result in a significant release of radioactive material is presented below. The probability of a severe accident is estimated by multiplying an overall accident rate (accidents per truck-mile or per rail-mile) times the conditional probability that an accident will involve mechanical and/or thermal conditions that are severe enough to result in a release. For this analysisJ severe accidents are postulated that involve a collision (truck) or derailment (rail) followed by a long-duration fire. The resulting thermal and mechanical accident conditions are postulated to be severe enough to result in 6-20 WHC-EP-0340 cask failure and release of a fraction of the radioactive contents . The resulting radiological consequences of the accidents will be calculated for each potential bounding transportation accident. In order for a release to occur, the accident must be severe enough to result in failure of all levels of containment provided by the shipping cask and internal containers, if applicable. The maximum speed l imit on the Hanford Site is 55 mi / h for truck shipments and 35 mi/h for rail shipments. It is assumed that collisions at these velocities followed by long-duration fire (1 hour or longer) could potentially result in a breach of a shipping cask followed by a release of radioactive material. The probabilities of truck and rail accidents involving these severe mechanical and thermal conditions was taken from a recent NRC report (Fischer et al. 1987). This report stated that about 0.2% of truck and rail accidents are severe enough to produce 2% strain in steel/lead/steel "sandwich-design" shipping cask and mid-thickness temperatures of 600 °F. Such conditions are at the lower limit of the cask failure threshold and would result in only very small releases of gaseous and volatile radionuclides . Fischer et al. (1987) also stated that accident conditions that produce strains in excess of 30% and mid- thickness temperatures in excess of 1050 °Fare present in less than 0.001% of truck accidents and 0.013% of rail accidents. Consequently, the probabilities of the potential accidents that are examined in this analysis are small. Release Quantities Release quantities are estimated by multiplying the total inventory of radioactive materi als within a shipping cask by. the estimated fractions of the contained material that escape from the cask in respirable form when it is subjected to the postulated accident conditions. The quantities of radioactive materials in each shipment were derived from WHC (1989) for LWR technology. Respirable release quantities for HWR and MHTGR technologies were obtained from Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (WSRC 1991) and EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G 1991), respectively. The release fractions for the various radioactive materials are discussed below. These release fractions were used in the screening methodology as well as in the detailed radiological impact calculations. Respirable release fractions were taken from a number of sources, including NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977), the Supplemental EIS for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE 1989), and Cashwell et al. (1983). Because of differences in material properties, different sets of release fractions were used for different materials. These release fractions are presented in Table 6-11 for TRU waste materials and Tables 6-12, 6-13, and 6-14 for the remaining materials in this analysis. For materials applicable to Tables 6-12, 6-13, and 6-14, the total respirable release quantities for each radionuclide are the product of the release fraction (Table 6-12), aerosol fraction (Table 6-13; that is, the fraction of released materials that may be dispersed by atmospheric actions), and the respirable fraction (Table 6-14; that is, the fraction of the aerosolized materials that are small enough particles that they may be inhaled). The release fractions for gases (for example, tritium, iodine, and krypton) were assumed to be ~those given' in Tables 6-12 and 6-13 for Krypton-85.

6-21 WHC-EP-0340

· Table 6-11. Estimated Total Respirable Release Fractions for TRU Packages*. Respirable release fractions Severity Truck Rail category CH-TRU RH-TRU CH-TRU RH-TRU waste waste waste waste package package package package I 0 0 0 0 II 0 0 0 0 I I I 8.0 E-09 6.0 E-09 3.0 E-08 2.0 E-08 IV 2.0 E-07 2.0 E-07 2.0 E-07 2.0 E-07 V 8.0 E-05 1.0 E-04 8.0 E-05 1. 0 E-04 VI 2.0 E-04 2.0 E-04 2.0 E-04 1.0 E-04 *Source: DOE 1989. Applicable to all radionuclides within the shipment.

Table 6-12. Fraction of Isotopes Released from Accidents by Severity Category (Truck and Rail). Accident severity category Isotope I I I III IV V VI 6oCo 0 0 1. 2 E-02 1. 2 E-02 1. 2 E-02 1. 2 E-02 asKr 0 0 0 1. 0 E-02 1.0 E-01 1. 1 E-0 1 90Sr 0 0 0 1. 0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 106Ru 0 0 0 1. 0 E-08 1. 0 E-06 4.2 E-05 134cs 0 0 0 1. 0 E-08 2.0 E-04 2.8 E-04 137cs 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 2.0 E-04 2.8 E-04 144Ce 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 1s4Eu 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 238Pu 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 239pu 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 240Pu 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 241 Pu 0 0 0 1. O E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 241Am 0 0 0 1.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 242Am 0 0 0 1. 0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08 244cm 0 0 0 1. 0 E-08 5.0 E-08 5.0 E-08

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Table 6-13 . Fraction of Material Released as Aerosols from Accidents by Severity Category (Truck and Rail). Accident severity category Isotope I II III IV V I/I ' 6oCo 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO asKr 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 90•sr 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 106Ru 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 134cs 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 137Cs 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 144ce 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1s4Eu 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 23apu 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 239Pu 0 0 0 1. 0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO z40Pu 0 0 a 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 241 Pu 0 0 a 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 241Am 0 a 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 242Am 0 0 0 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 244cm 0 0 a 1.0 E+OO 1. 0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO

Table 6-14. Fraction of Material Released as Aerosols less than 10 µ (Respirable) from Accidents by Severity Category (Truck and Rail) . Accident severity category Isotope I II III IV V VI 60Co 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 asKr 0 0 0 1. 0 E-02 1. 0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 90Sr 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 · 5.0 E-02 106Ru 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 134cs 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 137cs 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 1. 0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 144ce 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 1s4Eu 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 1.0 E+OO 1.0 E+OO 238Pu 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 239Pu 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 240Pu 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 241 Pu 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 241Am 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 242Am 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 244cm 0 0 0 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02 5.0 E-02

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Total release quantities for Category VI accidents for each of the materials listed in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 are shown in Table 6-15 for accidents involving LWR fuel cycle materials and Table 6-16 for HWR fuel cycle materials. The release quantities for CH-TRU, RH-TRU, and LLW transportation accidents were assumed to be the same for all three technologies. For the MHTGR fuel cycle, the release quantities presented in Table 6-16 bounded those specified by EG&G (1991) and were used to represent the release quantities for MHGTR fuel cycle material transportation accidents. Atmospheric Dispersion Parameters Weather conditions directly influence the dispersion of radioact ive materials after a release occurs. Atmospheric dispersion calculations determine the concentrations of radioactive materials that individual s are exposed to and the amount of time they are exposed. Standard atmospheric dispersion parameters have been developed for Hanford and are provided in PNL-3777, Rev. 1 (McCormack, Ramsdell, and Napier 1984). Joint frequency data for the Skagit-Hanford site are based on interpolation of weather data from three meteorological stations in the vicinity of the site. These parameters will be used to perform the atmospheric dispersion modeling. The joint frequency data used in this analysis is reproduced in Appendix A. Other atmospheric dispersion-related inputs to the GENII code are as follows: • The finite plume model within GENII was used. • 50% E/Q values (atmospheric dispersion factor), as calculated by GENII, were used. This means that GENII selects an E/Q value that has a 50% probab i lity of being exceeded. • All releases were assumed to be ground-level. • For maximum individual onsite doses, the fraction of time that the individual is assumed to be in the plume is 1.0. • Inhalation of resuspended dust particles was not considered. Population Distribution The population distributions determine the number of persons exposed to a passing plume of radioactive material and typically include the distance to nearest offsite individual that could be affected by a release. Geographic distributions of the population resi

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Table 6-15. Release Quantities for Category VI Accidents Involving LWR Fuel Cycle Materials (Respirable Ci). . RH-TRU CH - TRU Irradiated Irradiated Radionuclide waste waste fuel targets LLW 3H 8. 7 E- 01 0 5.6 E+Ol 2.0 E+02 0 14c 2.0 E-04 0 0 0 0 ssFe 4.7 E- 01 0 0 0 0 6oCo 3.5 E-01 0 1. 2 E-01 7.1 E+OO 0 ssKr 0 0 1. 7 E+02 0 0 90Sr 2.2 E-01 4.0 E-03 3. 1 E-05 0 0 106Ru 3.1 E-01 0 3.2 E-02 0 0 134cs 8.0 E-02 0 2.4 E-01 0 0 137cs 2.~ E-01 4.2 E-03 3.6 E+OO 0 0 144ce ,I' 2.5 E+OO 0 8.5 E+OO 0 0 1s4Eu 0 0 2.5 E-06 0 0 234u 1. 9 E- 05 0 1.2 E-08 0 3. 1 E-04 235U 5.5 E-07 0 3.9 E-10 0 1. 1 E-05 236u 1.0 E-06 0 1.6 E- 10 0 1. 5 E-05 23su 1. o E-06 0 5.9 E- 10 0 1.5 E-05 237Np 3.4 E- 07 0 2. 1 E- 11 0 1. 1 E-05 238pu 7.1 E-04 1.6 E-03 1. 1 E-08 0 1. 5 E-05 239pu 9.8 E-04 7.0 E-03 2.0 E-07 0 0 240Pu 4.8 E-04 3.7 E-03 2.8 E- 08 0 0 241 Pu 9.1 E-02 1. 3 E-01 1.6 E- 06 0 0 242Pu 2. 2 E-07 0 7.9 E- 13 0 0 241Am 1.8 E-04 4. 4 E-04 2.8 E-09 0 0

Table 6-16. Release Quantities for Category VI Accidents Involving HWR Fuel Cycle Materials (Respirable Ci) . (sheet 1 of 2) 3 3 Radionuclide Pu drivers Pu targets H drivers H targets 3H 4.5 E-06 5.7 E-07 6.7 E-06 2.0 E+02 ssKr 1. 2 E-04 1.2 E-04 1. 7 E-04 0 86Rb 8.6 E-10 8.9 E-11 1. 6 E-09 0 s9Sr 4.5 E-06 7.6 E-07 4.5 E-06 0 9oSr 9.5 E-08 9.5 E-09 1.4 E-07 0 90y 9.5 E-08 9.5 E-09 L 4 E-07 0 91y 5.7 E-06 9.5 E-07 5.7 E-06 0 95zr 6.0 E-06 1. 1 E-06 6.4 E-06 0 9SmNb 7.6 E-08 1.4 E-08 8.3 E-08 0 95Nb 6.7 E-06 8.9 E-07 7.6 E-06 0 99Tc 1.3 E- 11 1.7 E- 12 1.8 E-11 0 103Ru 2.8 E-04 1. 0 E-04 2.8 E- 04 0 106Ru 1. 6 E-05 9.5 E-06 2.2 E-05 0 103mRh 2.8 E-06 1. 0 E-06 2.8 E-06 0 123sn 7.3 E-09 3.1 E-09 8.9 E-09 0 12sSb 4. 1 E-09 1.3 E-09 5.7 E-09 a 121Sb 7.6 E-10 8.3 E-10 7 .3 E-10 0

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Table 6-16. Release Quantities for Category VI Accidents Involving HWR Fuel Cycle Materials (Respirable Ci). (sheet 2 of 2) 3 Radionuclide Pu drivers Pu targets H drivers 3H targets 12s"'T e 6.0 E-10 1.2 E-10 9.9 E-10 0 127"'Te 1. 6 E-08 5. 4 E-09 1.8 E-08 0 127Te 1.6 E-08 6.0 E-09 1.8 E-08 0 129"'Te 1. 4 E-07 3.5 E-08 1. 3 E-07 0 129Te 8.9 E-08 3.5 E-08 8.6 E-08 0 132Te 1. 1 E-08 5.7 E-09 1.0 E-08 0 1291 1.9 E-14 3.5 E-15 2.7 E-14 0 131 I 3.5 E-07 1.8 E-07 3.2 E-07 0 132 I 1. 1 E-08 5.7 E-09 1.0 E-08 0 133Xe 2.7 E-03 1.2 E-03 2.5 E-03 0 134Cs 5.4 E-08 1. 7 E-09 1.4 E-07 0 136Cs 6. 4 E-09 5.4 E-09 9.5 E-09 0 137cs 9.5 E-08 1.2 E-08 1.4 E-07 0 140Ba 2.0 E-06 7.6 E-07 1.8 E-06 0 140La 2.0 E-06 7.6 E-07 1.8 E-06 0 141Ce 4.8 E-06 1.3 E-06 4.8 E-06 0 144ce 2.6 E-06 3.2 E-07 3.5 E-06 0 143Pr 2.2 E-06 8.0 E-07 2.1 E-06 0 144mPr 3.1 E-08 4.1 E-09 4.1 E-08 0 144Pr 2.6 E-06 3.2 E-07 3.5 E-07 0 147Nd 5.4 E-07 2.2 E-07 5.1 E-07 0 147Pm 2. 4 E-07 4.5 E-08 2.4 E-07 0 148pm 5. 4 E-08 5.7 E-09 4.8 E-08 0 151sm 5.1 E-10 2.0 E-10 4.1 E-10 0 1s4Eu 2.2 E-09 1.2 E-10 5.4 E-09 0 237Np 9.5 E-13 2.4 E-14 7.6 E-13 0 23Bpu 2.3 E-09 1.5 E-11 3.2 E-09 0 239Pu 3.2 E-11 6. 4 E-10 2.2 E-11 0 240Pu 1.6 E-11 1.1 E-10 1.8 E-11 0 241 Pu 3. 2 E-09 8.3 E-09 6.0 E-09 0 241Am 9.2 E-13 1. 6 E-12 2.2 E-12 0 243Am 1.0 E-16 1.9 E-17 1.1 E-15 0 242cm 4.8 E-11 1.8 E-11 3.2 E-10 0 244cm 2. 5 E-15 1. 7 E-16 5. 7 E-14 0

• No importation or exportation of food was considered. • Ingestion pathways were not considered for maximum onsite dose calculations. I I • Soil exposure time for max i mum onsite individuals was assumed to be 2 h. ' . Human Uptake of Radionuclides and Dosimetry Models The dosimetry system irecommended in International Commission on Radiological Protection , ICRP-26 and applied in ICRP-30 was used in this

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analysis. This dosimetry model is based on recent human metabolic parameters and updated human uptake and radionuclide retention models. The ICRP- 26 and 1 ICRP-30 models have been incorporated into the GENII computer code. Appendix F of DOE/EIS-0113, provides additional discussion on the methods of calculating radiation doses.

I ' 6.3.3 Results of Onsite Transportati on Accident Analysis This section presents the results of the transportation accident impact calculations. The weighted population risks (that is, accident frequency times consequences summed over all accident severity categories) are presented in Tables 6-17, 6-18, and 6-19 for LWR, HWR, and MHTGR technologies, respectively. The latent health effects estimates were calculated from the GENII results using conversion factors. Latent cancer deaths were calculated 4 / by multiplying the CEDE by 4 x 10· latent cancers per P,erson-rem. Genetic effects are the product of the gonad dose and 2.6 x 10· 4 genetic effects per person-rem. The results of the transportation accident impact calculati ons for the maximum exposed individuals are presented in Table 6- 20 for each NPR technology . The table also presents the dose to the maximum exposed organ and the dose to the thyroid. The doses are also presented for ingestion and other pathways . The table presents the estimated health effects in terms of the lifetime fatal cancer risk to the maximum onsite and offsite individuals. Also shown in the table are the population and joint frequency data that were used to calculate the radiological impacts.

6-27 Table 6-17 . Onsite Transportation Accident lmpacts--Light Water Reactor Technology . Population risk Collective dose, person rem/yr Health risk, LHE/yr Gonads Thyroid Material category CEDE COE COE Cancer deaths Genetic effects Irradiated fuel 4.6 E-03 4.5 E- 03 4.2 E- 03 1.8 E-06 1. 2 E- 06 Irradiat ed tritium targets 6.3 E-06 7.0 E-06 7.0 E- 06 2.5 E-09 1.8 E-09 Low-level waste 1.0 E-03 5.2 E-05 8.2 E-08 4.0 E- 07 1.4 E- 08 Transuranic waste

Contact handled 1. 9 E-03 4.6 E-04 1.3 E-05 7.6 E- 07 1.2 E- 07 lE: ::c n I 0) Remote handled 3.5 E-03 1. 7 E- 03 1.4 E-03 1.4 E- 06 4.5 E-07 rn I "'U N I (X) Total 1. 1 E-02 6.7 E- 03 5.6 E-03 4.4 E-06 1.8 E-06 0 w .i,. 0 Table 6-18. Onsite Transportation Accident Impacts--Heavy Water Reactor Technology . Population risk Collective dose, person rem/yr Health risk, LHE/yr · Gonads Thyroid Material category CEDE COE COE Cancer deaths Genetic effects Irradiated driver fuels Pu driver assemblies 3.0 E- 10 8.8 E- 11 9.5 E-11 1.2 E-13 2.3 E- 14 3H driver assemblies 9.3 E-11 2. 1 E-10 7.4 E-10 3. 7 E-13 5.5 E- 14 Irradiated targets Pu targets I. 5 E-09 3.4 E-10 I. 2 E-09 6.0 E-13 8.8 E-14 3H targets 4.4 E-05 4.8 E-05 4.8 E-05 1.8 f-08 1.3 E-08

· Low-1 eve l waste 7.8 E-04 4.0 E-05 6.3 E-08 3. 1 E-07 1.0 E-08 ~ ::r: C, 0) Transuranic waste I I IT1 N -u \D Contact handled I. 4.0 E-06 I 5.7 E-04 4 E-04 2.3 E-07 3.6 E-08 0 w +>, Remote handled I.I E-03 5.' 5 E-04 4.4 E-04 4.5 E-07 1.4 E-07 0 l Total 2.5 E-03 7.'8 E-04 4.9 E-04 1.0 E-06 2.0 E-07 Table 6-19. Onsite Transportation Accident lmpacts--Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Technology. Population risk Collective dose, person rem/yr Health risk, LHE/yr Gonads Thyroid Material category CEDE COE COE Cancer deaths Genetic effects Irr~diated driver fuels Pu driver assemblies 7.5 E- 09 2.2 E-09 2.4 E-09 3.0 E-12 5.8 E- 13 3H driver assemblies 1. 1 E-08 2.5 E-09 8. 7 E-09 4.4 E-12 6.4 E- 13 Irradiated targets Pu targets 1. 5 E-08 3.5 E-09 1. 2 E-08 6.1 E-12 9.0 E-13 3H targets 1.0 E-05 1. 1 E-05 1. 1 E-05 4.1 E-09 2.9 E-09 :r:~ low-level waste 1.6 E-03 8.2 E-05 1.3 E-07 6.4 E- 07 2.1 E-08 n I I f'T1 °' Transuranic waste \J w I 0 0 Contact handled 8.5 E-04 2.1 E-04 5.9 E-06 3.4 E-07 5.3 E- 08 w -"" 0 Remote handled 2.0 E-03 9.7 E-04 7.7 E-04 7.9 E-07 2.5 E- 07 Total 4.5 E-03 1. 3 E-03 7.9 E- 04 1.8 E-06 3.3 E-07 Table 6-20. Radiological Doses to Maximum Onsite and Offsite Individuals.

Accident CEDE (rem/accident) Maxi11U11 organ Thyroid dose Lifetime Location of maxi11U11 Haximun fatal cancer Accident scenario probability dose (rem/ (rem/ C #/yr> individual accident) organ accident) risk per Ingestion Other Pathways accident UJR technology Irradiated 3.5 E-06 WNP-offsite- 0.14a 0.008 0.34b LLIC 0. 13a 5.9 E-05 driver 5,000 m E assemblies (Release Onsite-100 m SSW o.od 4.7 35b Lung 1.9 E-Ola 1.9 E-03 category 6) HUR technology Irradiated 1.3 E-06 400 Area offsite- 0.0007a 0. 00001 0.00083b Small 7.9 E-04a 2.9 E-07 target 7,500 ssu intestine assemblies

(Release Onsite-100 m WSW o.od 0.039 0.046b Small 0.043a 1.6 E-05 ~ :r: category 6) intestine n 0) I I HHTGR technology rr, w -0 ...... I Irradiated 7.3 E-07 400 Area offsite-7,500 0.0007a 0.00001 0.00083b Small 7.9 E-04a 2.9 E-07 C) target SSW intestine w ~ assemblies C) (Release Onsite-400 m USU o.od 0.0014 0.001,t> Small 0.0016a 5.6 E-07 category 6) intestine ~Maximum dose occurs if release occurs during autumn. -weighted effective dose equivalent. cLLI = Lower large intestine. dlngestion doses were not evaluated for the maximun onsite individual because no food is grown or harvested on the site. ' . WHC-EP-0340

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7.0 REFERENCES

Cashwell, J. W., et al., 986 , Transportation Impacts of the Commercia l Radioactive Waste Management Program, SAND85-2715, Sand i a Nat ional Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexi co. DOE, 1987, Final Environmental Impact Statement--Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes, DOE/EIS- 01 13, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. DOE, 1988, Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public, DOE/EH-0071, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C . DOE, 1989, Draft Supplement Environmental Impact Statement--Waste Isolat ion Pilot Plant, DOE/EIS-0026-DS, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. EG&G , 1991, Transportation Plan In Support of the EIS for A New Production Reactor at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, DRAFT REPORT, EG&G Idaho, Inc . , Idaho Fa 11 s, Idaho . FEMA, 1983, Guidance for Development of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency , Washington, 0. C. Fischer, L. E., 1987, Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions, NUREG/CR-4829, Lawrence Live rmore National Laboratory, Livermore, Cal ifornia. Madsen, M. M., et al., 1983, RADTRAN II User's Guide, SAND82-2681, Sand i a National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Madsen, M. M., et al., 1986, RADTRAN III, SAND84-0036, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. McCormack, W. 0. , J. V. Ramsdell, and B. A. Napier, 1984, Hanford Dose Overview Program: Standardized Methods and Data for Environmental Dose Calculations, PNL-3777 Rev . 1, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland , Washington . Napier, B. A., et al., 1989, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiat ion Dosimetry Software System, PNL-6584, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. NRC, 1977, Final Environmental Statement of the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170 , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. NRC, 1983, Directory of Certificates of Compliance for Radioactive Material Packages, NUREG-0383, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. OTA , 1986, Transportation of Hazardous Materials, OTA-SET-304, U.S. Congre ss , Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C.

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PNL, 1984, Hanford Dose Overview Program: Standardized Methods and Data for Hanford Environmental-Dose Calculations, PNL-3777, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington . Supply System, 1981, WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2 Environmental Report, Docket No. 50-397, Washington Public Power Supply System, Richland, Washington. Taylor, J. M., and S. L. Daniel, 1982, RADTRAN II: A Revised Computer Code To Analyze Transportation of Radioactive Material, SANDB0-1943, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. WHC, 1989, Light-Water Reactor Support Facilities Description - New Production Reactor, WHC-EP-0261, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington. WSRC, 1991, Transportation Plan In Support of the EIS for a New Production Reactor at the Savannah River Site, DRAFT REPORT, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Aiken, South Carolina.

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