The Bureaucratic Imperative: Esprit and the Making of British Foreign Policy (1982-1992)
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The Bureaucratic Imperative: Esprit and the Making of British Foreign Policy (1982-1992) Marjorie Anne Ringrose Thesis Submitted for the PhD Degree in International Relations The London School of Economics and Political Science The University of London September 1994 UMI Number: U062396 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U062396 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 POLITICAL r 7(76 X c 5 ' ( ( )( Abstract This thesis examines British foreign policy-making in Esprit by applying insights from the Bureaucratic Politics perspective of foreign policy analysis. Esprit was a ten year programme that funded collaborative research and development in information technology between researchers across the European Community. Weaknesses in the Bureaucratic Politics perspective are recognized and ways to strengthen the perspective are suggested. No a priori assumptions about the usefulness of the approach or of the suggested modifications are made. This thesis is as much a test of the applicability of the Bureaucratic Politics perspective to British foreign policy analysis as it is a study of British foreign policy-making itself. While recognizing the ubiquity of competition between bureaucrats in Whitehall, traditional approaches to British foreign policy-making deny that bureaucratic competition affects British policy. Strong Ministers and a large and complex web of Whitehall interdepartmental and Cabinet coordinating committees are said to set Government-wide priorities and resolve bureaucratic conflict before it affects policy. Thus, from this point of view, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective is not applicable to Britain. Following that argument to its logical end, is it possible that bureaucratic competition affects policy in the absence of Ministerial authority or effective Whitehall coordinating committees? This thesis argues that competition between bureaucrats for budgets and responsibilities affected British policy in Esprit when Ministers did not clearly articulate consistent objectives, when Ministers did not maintain control and supervision over the policy issue and when Whitehall coordination and control mechanisms were absent or ineffective. When these conditions prevailed, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective, as modified, was useful in analyzing British foreign policy-making in Esprit. The question remains whether the perspective was useful because Esprit was uniquely qualified to encourage bureaucratic competition or whether other policy issues are similarly qualified and hence conducive to the Bureaucratic Politics approach. Table of Contents Abstract.............................................................................................................................2 List of Tables....................................................................................................................7 Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................8 List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 1, Introduction ...................................................................................................11 1.1 The Bureaucratic Politics Approach; the Fundamental Propositions 1.1a Interests 1.1b The Nature of Policy-Making 1.1c Constraints on Bureaucratic politics 1.2 Weaknesses of the Bureaucratic Politics Perspective 1.2a Logic/Politics Dichotomy 1.2b Interests 1.2c Role of Leaders 1.2d Culture-Specificity 1.2e Preference-from-Position 1.2f Methodological Strength 1.3 Strengthening the Perspective 1.3 a Interests 1.3b Preference Formation and Action Channels 1.3c Political Leaders 1.3d Applicability to Whitehall 1.3e Behaviour 1.4 Summary of Purpose 1.5 Contribution to Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations 1.6 Structure and Methodology Chapter 2, History and Evolution of British Information Technology ...................... 46 Research and Development Policy-Making 2.1 Structure of Government for Policy-Making in Research and Development 2.2 The State of Information Technology 2.3 The Conservatives Under Mrs Thatcher 2.4 The Department of Industry Under Sir Keith Joseph 2.5 Information Technology Moves Up the Political Agenda 2.6 Back in the Department of Industry 2.7 Who is in Control Here? 2.8 Conclusion Chapter 3, The Origins of Esprit and the Alvey Programme .......................................65 3.1 Origins of Alvey 3.1a Alvey Committee Deliberations 3.2 Origins of Esprit 3.3 Esprit in the Alvey Committee 3.4 Alvey in Cabinet 3.5 Conclusion Chapter 4, Implementation of the Alvey Programme ............................................... 86 4.1 In the Department of Trade and Industry 4.2 Organizational Considerations 4.3 Budget Poaching 4.4 Territorial Encroachment 4.5 Lack of Control 4.6 Operations 4.7 Conclusion Chapter 5, Alvey Funding Patterns ...........................................................................108 5.1 Overview 5.2 Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) 5.3 Software Engineering 5.4 Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS) 5.5 Systems Architecture 5.6 Man Machine Interface (MMI) 5.7 Large Scale Demonstrators 5.8 Infrastructure and Communications (I&C) 5.9 Explaining Funding Allocations and Recipients 5.10 Conclusion Chapter 6, British Policy in Esprit: April 1983 to Late 1984 ................................ 122 6.1 Approval of Esprit 6 .2 Fundamentals of Esprit I 6.3 Ministers' Policy in Esprit I 6.4 De facto British Policy in Esprit I 6.5 Getting Away with it 6.5a Ministerial Objectives 6.5b Ministerial Control and Supervision 6.5c Whitehall Control and Coordination Mechanisms 6.6 Conclusion Chapter 7, British Policy in Esprit: Late 1984 Through 1985 ............................... 148 7.1 Competition Intensifies 7.2 The Loss of Kenneth Baker 7.3 The European Onslaught 7.4 An Alvey 2? 7.5 A Change of Heart 7.6 British Policy in Esprit: Getting Juste Retour 7.6a Software Technology 7.6b Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM) and Office Systems 7.6c Advanced Information Processing (AIP) or IKBS 7.6d Microelectronics 7.6e Hardware Firms 7.6f Academic Participation 7.6g Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 7.7 Getting Away With It (Again) 7.7a Ministerial Objectives 7.7b Ministerial Control and Supervision 7.7c Whitehall Control and Coordination Mechanisms 7.8 Conclusion Chapter 8, The Interim: 1986 Through 1987 ..........................................................182 8.1 European Initiatives 8.2 R&D in the Department of Trade and Industry 8.3 IT86 Committee Deliberations 8.4 Back in Europe 8.5 IT86 Committee Reports 8.6 Back to European Negotiations 8.7 Progress on the IT86 Report 8.8 The New Team and Outlines of a New R&D Policy 8.9 Responses to New Policy Outlines 8.10 Elsewhere in Whitehall 8.11 Westminster's Assessment 8.12 Conclusion Chapter 9, British Policy in Esprit: January 1988 to April 1991 ............................209 9.1 'Innovation Policy' in the Department of Trade and Industry 9.2 Organizing for Implementation 9.2a Information Engineering Directorate 9.2b Research Technology Policy Division 9.3 Implementation: January 1988 to May 1989 9.4 More Change: May 1989 Through Early 1991 9.5 Esprit in the Information Technology Division 9.6 Exit Esprit 9.7 Conclusion Chapter 10, Conclusion .............................................................................................228 10.1 A Brief Review 10.2 Evaluating the Reformulation 5 10.2a Rationality 10.2b Action Channels 10.2c Interests 10.2d Preference-from-Position Function 10.2e Conditions 10.3 Future Research 10.4 The Final Judgment 10.5 The Judgment in Clive Ponting's Trial Bibliography...............................................................................................................249 Appendix A: Research Methodology ....................................................................... 264 Appendix B: List of Interviewees ..................................................... 269 Appendix C; Glossary of Technical Terms ..............................................................277 List of Tables Page 3.1 Share of World IT Market 65 3.2 Alvey Programme Funding Scheme 71 3.3 Alvey Programme: Total Cost 72 4.1 Civil Service Rankings 89 5.1 Technology Areas in Alvey 108 5.2 Participation in Alvey Software Engineering 111 Sub-programme 5.3 Alvey Project Participation 116 5.4 Funding Types of Participant by Technical Area 117 5.5 Alvey Projects by Technical Area 117 5.6 Alvey Industrial Participants 118 5.7 Defence Orientation of UK IT Firms 118 5.8 Academic Participation in Alvey Projects 120 7.1 UK Esprit Project Involvement by Technical Area 168 7.2 Particiption Levels by Organizations of a 172 Given Type 7.3 Esprit Contract Holdings by Organizations 172 of a Given Type 7.4 Esprit and Alvey Contracts Held by British 172 Industrial Participants 7.5 Participation of the Roundtable 12 Companies 174 in Esprit 1 7.6 Esprit and