Inside the Political Market
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Notes Preface and Acknowledgements 1 Priestley, 1968. Reviewing a book on the latest American campaign tech- niques the same year, Labour agent Terry Pitt warned colleagues that politi- cians ‘will be promoted and marketed like the latest model automobile’ (Labour Organiser no. 558, December). 2 Palast, 2002, p. 161–69. 3 Editorial in The Observer, 18th August 1996. 4 The speech was made to the pro-business Institute of Directors, ‘Mandelson: We sold Labour as news product’, The Guardian, 30th April 1998. 5 Hughes and Wintour, 1990; Gould, 1998. 6 Cockett, 1994. Introduction: Inside the Political Market 1 Coates, 1980; Minkin, 1980; Warde, 1982. 2 Hare, 1993; ‘Top Consumer PR Campaigns of All Time’, PR Week 29th March 2002. Of the other politicians featured the Suffragettes and Conservatives (1979) occupied the fifteenth and sixteenth places respec- tively. 3 Gould, 2002; Gould, 1998, p. 81. 4 Abrams and Rose with Hinden, 1960; Gould, 2002. 5 Mandelson and Liddle, 1996, p. 2; see also Wright, 1997. The Blair leader- ship, like most politicians, deny the extent to which they rely on profes- sionals for strategic input and guidance (Mauser, 1989). 6 Interviewed on BBC1 ‘Breakfast with Frost’, 14th January 1996, cited in Blair, 1996, p. 49. Blair regularly returns to this theme: in his 2003 Conference speech he attacked the interpretation of ‘New Labour’ as ‘a clever piece of marketing, good at winning elections, but hollow where the heart should be’ (The Guardian, 1st October 2003). 7 Driver and Martell, 1998, pp. 158–9. 8 Crompton and Lamb, 1986, p. 1. 9 Almond, 1990, p. 121. Kelley used the term in the following context: ‘The team relies heavily but not entirely upon their own intuitive feel for provid- ing political marketing conditions. They pride themselves on having “good average minds” that help them to see things as the average man sees them’ (Kelley, 1956, p. 53). 10 Downs, 1957. For all of this work’s popularity Peter Mandelson, the Labour practitioner most associated with putting its ideas into practice, admitted to his ignorance of the book when questioned in 1990 (Temple, 2000). 11 Wring, 1999. 12 Butler and Stokes, 1969; Denver, 1994. 180 Notes 181 13 Kotler and Levy, 1969; Rosenbloom, 1973. 14 Davidson, 1992, p. 78. 15 Gamble, 1974, p. 6. Schumpeter was an early advocate of the market analogy: ‘Party and machine politicians are simply the response to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede, and they constitute an attempt to regulate political competition exactly similar to the corresponding practices of a trade association’ (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 283). 16 Webb, 2000, p. 156. See also Palmer, 2002. 17 Wring, 1997a. 18 Farrell and Wortmann, 1987; Worcester, 1987. 19 Harrop, 1990; Newman, 1994. 20 Kotler, 1982. See also Mughan, 2000. 21 Denver, 1994. 22 Franklin, 1994. 23 Denver and Hands, 1997. 24 Niffenegger, 1989. 25 O’Keefe, 1989. 26 Kleinman, 1987; Smith and Saunders, 1990. 27 Mauser, 1983. 28 Keith, 1960; Shama, 1976. See also Smith and Saunders, 1990. The historical application of such terminology differs to Lees-Marshment’s usage of similar concepts in her more explicitly contemporary analysis (Lees-Marshment, 2002). 29 Farrell, 1996; Norris, 1996, Wring, 1996. 30 Shama, 1976. 31 Qualter, 1985, p. 124. 32 Shama, 1976. 33 Harrop, 1990. 34 Shama, 1976; Kotler and Kotler, 1999. 35 For a useful comparative survey of trends see Mancini and Swanson, 1996. 36 Scammell usefully identifies the way in which political science, commun- ication and management studies have all contributed to the emergence of political marketing as a lively field of research (Scammell, 1999). 1 To Educate or Persuade? 1 Wallas, 1948, p. 83. 2 Hamer, 1977, p. 318; Pulzer, 1967, p. 81. 3 Blewett, 1972, pp. 284 and 312; Gorman, 1985, p. 166. 4 Labour Organiser no. 63, 1926. 5 McKibbin, 1974, p. xiv and p. 124; McKenzie, 1955, pp. 559–61. 6 Cole, 1965, p. 228–32; Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, p. 14. 7 McLean, 1980. 8 One of whom suggested that Labour ‘perhaps surpasses in effectiveness the most highly perfected American political machines sustained by spoils’ (McHenry, 1938, p. 303; see also Casey, 1944). 9Thorpe, 1991, p. 20. 182 Notes 10 McKenzie, 1955, p. 567. As Ramsay MacDonald’s assistant in the Labour Representation Committee, Middleton was technically the party’s first ever full-time employee (Morgan, 1992, pp. 231–38). Organisational politics was a feature of headquarters’ life and changes were often greeted with suspi- cion by employees who suspected individuals were attempting to ‘empire build’: ‘They feel there are already enough prima-donnas in the movement’ (Stewart, 1974, p. 47). 11 Cambray, 1932. 12 Dalton had lost his seat in the 1931 election but remained influential (Pimlott, 1985, p. 204). Party headquarters have relocated around London a number of times: 1901–1905 saw the offices housed in MacDonald’s flat at 3 Lincoln’s Inn Fields; 1905–1914, 28 Victoria St; 1914–1918, 1 Victoria St; 1918–33, Eccleston Square; then Transport House in Smith Square (Hamilton, 1939, p. 51). In 1980 headquarters moved south of the Thames to Walworth Road. 1997 saw the organisation return to Westminster and a suite of offices at Millbank Tower. In 2002 the party occupied premises in Old Queen Street near parliament. 13 Morrison, 1920, p. 202. 14 Barker, 1972, pp. 60–61. 15 Jones, 1996, p. 15. For a wider discussion of the ‘evangelical’ socialist tradi- tion within the party see Laybourn, 1997; and Weinbren, 1997, pp. 30–56. 16 Barker, 1972, p. 101. It was during this period that Walter Lippman and others began popularising the study of public opinion (Lippman, 1922). 17 Barker, 1972, pp. 95–96, and 121. Labour’s gradualist approach also demar- cated it from the vanguardist Social Democratic Federation and Communist Party (Barker, 1972, p. 275). 18 Hollins, 1981, pp. 126–130. Similar thinking informed the work of various organisations that flourished in the 1930s and 1940s including John Grierson’s documentary film movement, the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) and the Central Office of Information (COI) set up by the Attlee government (Wildy, 1985). 19 Ryan, 1986, p. 27 and p. 32. 20 Labour Organiser no. 182, 1936. Nearly fifty years later Sidney Blumenthal wrote an influential book, The Permanent Campaign, about this phenome- non (Blumenthal, 1982). 21 Wallas, 1948, p. 87; Qualter, 1985, p. 11. 22 Clarke, 1983, p. 11. The calm prognosis of some persuasionalist minded politicians led to them adopting an impassioned, even inflammatory rhetoric. This apparent paradox was noted by Kelley in his study into the increasing ‘emotionalism, sentimentality, distortion and poverty of ideas’ of many post-World War Two campaigns: ‘the rational interests of the can- didates and parties lead them to encourage irrationality in the electorate’ (Kelley, 1960, p. 17 and p. 23). 23 Wallas, 1948, p. 84. On Wallas’ enduring legacy see Bevir, 1997. 24 Labour Organiser no. 63, 1926. For a contemporary perspective on this point see McNair, 1999, pp. 23–4. 25 ‘Publicity in Politics’, The London News, May 1937, p. 3. 26 Labour Organiser no. 171, 1935. 27 Hollins, 1981, p. 133. Notes 183 28 New Fabian Research Bureau (1937). 29 Kornhauser, 1959. 30 Labour Organiser no. 126, 1931. See also comments by Dean McHenry, an author who had personal experience of emotive, mass mediated election- eering as an activist in Upton Sinclair’s ill-fated 1934 ‘End Poverty In California’ (EPIC) campaign for the governorship of California (McHenry, 1938; Mitchell, 1992, p. 76). 31 MacDonald, 1920, p. 53 cited in Hollins, 1981, p. 126. 32 Labour Organiser no. 23, 1922; Labour Organiser no. 34, 1923. Jennings, 1960, pp. 228–29. Jennings’ propaganda analysis noted the importance of ‘rank’, ‘nature of society’, ‘ruling few’, ‘class’ and ‘class and politics’. 33 Cockett, 1994; Labour Organiser no. 126, 1931. 34 Scammell, 1995, pp. 30–31. 35 In his pioneering study of the party Gamble identifies the Conservatives’ motivation as the ‘politics of power’ rather than just the ‘politics of support’. Thus whilst efforts were geared to influencing public opinion in the electoral market the Tories strove to condition the prevailing political environment by colonising the institutions of state (Gamble, 1974). 36 Conservative Agents Journal, August 1927, cited in Swaddle, 1990, p. 210. 37 Casey, 1939. Significant additional support was forthcoming from the right- wing ‘Economic Leagues’ formed by business interests in the 1920s, Labour Organiser no. 67, 1926. 38 Casey, 1944. 39 McKibbin, 1974, p. 124. 40 McHenry, 1938, p. 66; Hollins, 1981, p. 148. 41 Casey, 1944. 42 Cole, 1948, p. 124. 43 Seymour-Ure, 1996. 44 Matthews, 1987; Williams, 1980, p. 191; Labour Organiser no. 19, 1922. 45 Blewett, 1972, p. 308; McKibbin, 1974, p. 110. 46 Ferris and Bar-Joseph, 1993. 47 Labour Organiser no. 15, 1921. 48 Morrison, 1920, p. 202. 49 Antcliffe, 1984. 50 Labour Organiser no. 126, 1931. The allocations were 11 for the National parties, 3 for Labour, 1 Liberal. In 1935 the share was more equitable with 5 for the Nationals, 4 Labour and 3 Liberal. According to McHenry the pub- licity opportunity was squandered because Attlee and his colleagues’ broad- casts employed a ‘lecturing’ style (McHenry, 1938, pp. 73–74; and p. 188). 51 Thorpe, 1991, pp. 216–17; Labour Organiser no. 143, 1933; Labour Organiser no. 193, 1937. Ironically Labour politicians became the most vocal op- ponents of post-war plans to allow privately owned, commercially funded broadcasting with Herbert Morrison denouncing Radio Luxembourg’s advertising saturated service as ‘sheer naked exploitation’ despite its popu- larity with core Labour voters (Turner, 1952, p. 278; Fielding et al., 1995, p.