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Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290

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Marine Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

The -Bissau– maritime boundary dispute

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood

African Leadership Centre within International Development Institute, Kings College, London, article info abstract

Article history: This article discusses the role of negotiation, arbitration, and that of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Received 11 January 2015 in resolving maritime boundary disputes in the region. Primarily using the cases of Received in revised form Guinea- and Senegal, the paper highlights that joint maritime development agreements could be a 13 July 2015 better option for resolving existing maritime boundary disputes in the region rather than outright de- Accepted 4 August 2015 limitation requests. & 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Maritime boundary dispute Gulf of Guinea Guinea-Bissau Senegal ICJ Arbitration Tribunal Colonial boundaries Utis Possidetis Juris

1. Introduction international law would almost always seek to respect the ‘uti possidetis juris’ (upholding colonial frontiers), in resolving any Proffering a definition to a ‘nation state’, Max Weber notes that boundary dispute. a nation state is defined by its ability to defend its subjects (citi- Further, this article is not intended to analyse the causes, the zens), and its borders (1946: 76). For his part, Brown submits that development or the settlement of boundary disputes in the Gulf of a nation is truly secured if it is able to preserve its physical in- Guinea. It merely attempts to explain why boundary disputes be- tegrity and , maintain its economy on reasonable terms: tween countries in the region should not be allowed to obstruct protect its nature and institutions from outside disruptions, and sustainable development. It begins with a literature review on the most importantly, safeguard its borders (Brown [10]). This implies Gulf of Guinea, some of its security challenges and the role of that for a nation state to be categorised as secure, it should not in exacerbating the boundary dispute in the African only be able to protect its people, but it should also ensure the continent. It then draws attention to the historical background of safety of its , including, in this case maritime boundaries. the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal boundary disputes and attempts For many countries in , particularly those in the Gulf of made by the two countries to settle their dispute. Arguments are Guinea, the subject of national security is particularly pertinent, as drawn from historical studies and case archive of the ICJ. they continue to work towards curbing security challenges on land The discussion demonstrates that the colonial powers did not and . However, as Ali and Tsamenyi [4] submit, deepening understand the culture of the people they colonized as a result, not boundary uncertainties are inhibiting maritime security coopera- enough effort was made to ensure that they left clearly defined tion with potential for regional instability. boundaries. The article contends that in order to avoid conflict fi This article aims to highlight the signi cance of joint maritime between states, the adopted the principle of up- development agreements as an option for resolving existing holding colonial frontiers. As a result, in many cases, boundary maritime boundary disputes in the Gulf of Guinea, by analysing disputes have almost always been in the favour of the existing the resolution of the maritime boundary dispute between Guinea- colonial agreements. Taking this principle into account, it is futile Bissau and Senegal with the help of the ICJ. The objectives of the for countries in the Gulf of Guinea whose boundaries are currently article are first, to show that seeking outright delimitation is not disputed, to seek outright delimitation, by espousing the process only time consuming, but also impedes a country's ability to ex- Guinea-Bissau and Senegal went through to resolve their dispute. plore its natural resources. Second, to accentuate the point that Finally, the article concludes with the recommendation that calls for the adoption of a joint maritime development agreement, E-mail address: [email protected] as an option for maritime boundary dispute resolution across the http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.08.008 0308-597X/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290 285

Gulf of Guinea region, since seeking outright delimitation is both to [30] (Fig. 1). time consuming, expensive and can impede sustainable The region's maritime domain presents an enormous oppor- development. tunity for advancing sustainable development in the region. In preparing the article, the author scoured most publicly However, due to the prevalence of maritime security challenges available written sources on maritime security challenges in the such as piracy/armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, illegal, Gulf of Guinea, with particular emphasis on maritime boundary unreported and unregulated fishing and maritime boundary dis- delineation disputes between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Most of putes between neighbouring states, (which are impeding the legal the materials for this article have been sourced from the archives exploitation of fisheries resources, the peaceful use of sea lines of of the ICJ. In addition, a review of selected literature on post- communication, as well as the stability of littoral states in the colonial boundary disputes in the African continent, and also region), such developments, are increasingly becoming elusive [4]. boundary delimitation agreements was carried out. This article is Further, the partitioning of Africa by the Europeans during the predominantly based on online archival documents from the ICJ, colonial era has become the source of border disputes in the and also previous work and analysis conducted by scholars. continent, especially because these boundaries were drawn with limited knowledge of pre-colonial history, ethnic, culture and geography of the continent (Yoon, [45]: 77). Worse, the colonial 2. The Gulf of Guinea maritime domain boundaries of Africa were almost all just land boundaries, which are either partially defined or undefined in most cases [4,5]. With There are various definitions of what constitutes the Gulf of Guinea-Bissau–Senegal maritime agreement of 1960 being the Guinea ([4], Mañe [27]; Ukeje and Ela, [39]; Wardin and Duda only one that delimited the maritime areas of territorial sea and [42]), but in this article the Gulf of Guinea is used in the broad continental shelf on the west of Africa by the colonial powers sense, and is defined as the coastal states stretching from Senegal [9: 92–94], a lot of maritime boundary disputes ensued following

Fig. 1. Map of the Gulf of Guinea [14]. 286 I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290 the independence of countries in the region. Examples abound within its maritime boundary with Guinea-Bissau until the said from Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, Ga- boundary was contested by Guinea-Bissau in 1974 [31]. bon and , and Sao Tome and Principe and Undoubtedly, the disputed maritime boundary is of strategic the last but not the least Nigeria and [18,33,43,4]. and economic significance to both parties because it is rich in a Nevertheless, African borders have remained almost un- variety of biological, mineral and marine resources – which they changed. This is explained by the fact that as part of the estab- were anxious to explore [21]. However, due to the stipulations of lishment of the Organization of African Unity, (OAU), now African international law, which notes, “any State which desires to pro- Union in 1963, its member states resolved to adopt the principle of ceed to a peaceful exploitation of maritime resources must, how- inheriting the colonial territory in its entirety (Yoon, [45]: 76). This ever, achieve first of all a clearly established delimitation with idea of preserving colonial boundaries partly explains why the neighbouring States, so that the exploitation may not subse- state of affairs in African politics remains the same [18]. quently be a source [of] conflict” [21]. Both parties started nego- According to Chiozza and Choi, international disputes over tiations to seek a peaceful resolution of their boundary dispute. territory are most likely to involve the deployment of military The negotiations started in 1977, however, after 8 years of what force, with a capacity to escalate to war ([12]: 252). This has not has been termed ‘fruitless’ negotiations, by March 12, 1985, they been the case in Africa, as the number of territorial disputes that agreed to sign an arbitration agreement also known as a com- eventually escalated to war is remarkably small, despite the large promise. In it, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal decided to submit dis- number of disputed territories in the continent [43]. For his part putes relating to their maritime boundaries to arbitration [9]. Frynas observes that only very few African leaders demand bor- The settlement of disputes through arbitration is unique. This is ders to be re-drawn, irrespective of the fact that most borders are because unlike judicial settlements, which involve the referral of a artificial and cut across ethnic groups and historic regions. He dispute to a permanent court, in arbitration the parties to the went on to say that this is partly because African leaders recognize dispute select the arbitrators. This is done either through an ad that any attempts to re-draw boundaries might lead to violent hoc agreement (as in the case of the 1985 arbitral agreement be- conflicts and chaos across the continent [18: 10]. tween Guinea-Bissau and Senegal) or by referring to a prior Alongside the challenges of ‘unresolved maritime boundaries’ agreement (Copeland [15]). in the oil rich region of the Gulf of Guinea, and also the con- Parallel to the unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute temporary challenges of piracy/armed robbery at sea, illegal oil through negotiation, after 4 years of arbitration proceedings, the bunkering and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, to outcome did not result in the successful resolution of the dispute. name a few, the countries in the region are increasingly working This is because the arbitration ended in an award in favour of towards securing their maritime domain in order to fully enjoy the Senegal, an outcome that was unfavourable to Guinea-Bissau. exploitation of the vast resources (fisheries and oil and gas) that lie Unsatisfied with the arbitrator's decision, still in the spirit of see- within it [4,30]; Wardin and Duda,. [42] These efforts include ing a peaceful end to the dispute, both Guinea-Bissau and Senegal among other things, attempts to resolve disputed maritime agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice boundaries in an amicable manner [4]. (ICJ) [20,9,29]. The decision by Guinea-Bissau to reject the judge- Accordingly, the idea of ‘peaceful’ delimitation of contested ment of the Arbitration Tribunal will be analysed further in the borders is an important component of the African Union mandate, ensuing paragraphs. which among other things is resolute on “eliminating possible What is notable here is that in 1985, Guinea-Bissau accepted boundary uncertainties…for the benefit of all, and in particular for the Award of Arbitration on a maritime boundary dispute it had communities living along both sides of the boundary” (AU, 2013: with Guinea. The negotiations to resolve this dispute commenced 10). In the same vein, the willingness of member states to respect the same year negotiations were initiated with Senegal in 1977, set rules is reflected in and 's resolve to have but as with the case with Senegal, both Guinea-Bissau and Guinea their maritime boundary dispute arbitrated by the resolved to refer the dispute to Arbitration in 1983 [43,44]. under the provisions of the United Nations Conventions on the Therefore, the question that begs for an answer is why did Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Notably, this decision was reached after Guinea-Bissau accept the arbitration award on its maritime 10 bilateral meetings between the two parties failed to bring about boundary dispute with Guinea, but not that of Senegal? It has been a favourable outcome [25]. Thus, it is evident that countries in the argued that the probable adverse fiscal impact of the dispute region are resolute not to allow boundary disputes distract the contributed in compelling Guinea-Bissau and Guinea to confer and progress of the continent. resolve the dispute, 8 years after negotiations commenced [28: To understand how joint maritime development agreement 95]. could serve as a probable solution to outright delineation, thereby For his part, Frynas, observes that both parties set out to resolve saving countries with disputed boundaries time and resources on the dispute, as well as accept the judgment of the Court of Arbi- unproductive deliberations, this article turns to the maritime tration due to pressure from the oil companies who were waiting boundary dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal and its re- to exploit the energy resources within the two countries territorial solution, which serves as a suitable example. [18]. Ironically, no oil was to be found on the contested ( Aquarone [6]). Nevertheless, while the Guinea-Bissau and Guinea's boundary 3. The dispute dispute was resolved through arbitration, the same could not be said for Guinea-Bissau and Senegal dispute, as Guinea-Bissau re- The end of colonialism in Africa gave rise to boundary disputes jected the award of the arbitration tribunal. The reason for this is between ‘newly’ liberated countries in the continent [43], Yoon, buttressed further in the ensuing section. [45]. Like most countries in the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea re- gion, upon gaining its independence in 1974 Guinea-Bissau sought, among other things, to put its house in order by seeking to clearly 4. Arbitration agreement delimit its maritime boundaries in order to exploit resources that lie within it [18: 5]. On the other hand, gaining its independence According to McLlarky, arbitration was seemingly favourable in from the French in 1960, 14 years earlier than Guinea-Bissau, Se- resolving the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal maritime boundary dis- negal had long enjoyed the surpluses of the resources that lay pute, because earlier in 1985, Guinea-Bissau had successfully I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290 287 resolved its boundary dispute with Guinea through arbitration the arbitration award of 31 July 1989 be resolved as soon as pos- ([28]: 107). Similar success stories could not be repeated in this sible, as both Parties desire” [21]. case because, after four years of deliberations, in its award of July The ICJ's final rulings thus paved the way for direct negotiations 1989, the arbitration tribunal found that the 1960 agreement had between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal to determine a line delimiting the force of law in respect of the three specified maritime areas of all the maritime areas, including the EEZ [29: 36–37]. It is probable the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the continental shelf that the decisions of the ICJ to uphold the award of the arbitration [29]. tribunal were guided by the urge to sustain the provisions of in- Submitting his decision, the president of the arbitration tribu- ternational law. This is especially so since case law and doctrine nal notes “the agreement concluded by an exchange of letter on 26 appear to be oriented towards sustaining the validity and appli- and relating to the maritime boundary, has the force of cation of the principle of ‘utis possidetis juris’–upholding colonial law in the relations between the of Guinea-Bissau and frontiers, even for the determination of a maritime boundary. In the Republic of Senegal with respect to the territorial sea, the addition, the terms of the arbitration agreement signed by both contiguous zone and the continental shelf, but does not have the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, compromise, intimated that the award force of law with respect to the waters of the Exclusive Economic “shall be final and binding”, which is inline with the 1899 and Zones (EEZ) or fishery zones” [34: 215]. It is noteworthy to men- 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International tion that there was no concept of maritime boundaries beyond a disputes [9: 92]. territorial sea until the middle of the 20th century; this is the Although the arbitration tribunal and the ICJ failed to essen- probable reason why the 1960 agreement did not refer to the EEZ tially deal with the delimitation of the EEZ boundaries between [13]. Given this impasse, the two parties agreed to refer the dis- the two countries. The positive outcome of 8 years of negotiations pute to the ICJ [23: 48]. Guinea-Bissau contested the award of the and 4 years of arbitration is that both parties were close to arbitrators on the basis that it contradicted the opinions of the reaching a lasting agreement which would see the joint exploita- president of the arbitration tribunal [23: 48]. tion of the resources within the disputed boundaries [29: 35–39]. The case was filed with the ICJ in August 1989; one month after the decision of the arbitration tribunal was awarded. In its pro- ceedings to the ICJ Guinea-Bissau maintained that the arbitration 5. Upholding colonial frontiers award was null on the premise that it was not supported by a ‘real’ majority. While not disputing the fact that the award itself was It has previously been stated that the crux of the maritime framed to declare that the tribunal, by two votes to one, decided as boundary dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal was the it did, Guinea-Bissau contended that by the virtue of the declara- 1960 agreement between on behalf of Senegal and tion made by the president of the arbitration tribunal, one of the on behalf of Guinea-Bissau, which was aimed at ascertaining the two arbitrators making up the appearance of the majority in fa- maritime boundary between the two countries. Before its ascen- vour of the text of the award, expressed a view contradicting the sion to independence in 1960, Senegal was a part of the Republic one adopted by the final vote [20,23 (48–49),34 (216)]. of , while Guinea-Bissau which acceded to independence in In addition, Guinea Bissau argues that the arbitration tribunal 1974 was known as [20,34]. did not meet its entire mandate [2: 232]. The proceedings took an The 1960 agreement between their former colonial masters interesting turn when on the 18th of January 1990, while the case (the French and Portuguese) was necessary because it was to serve was still being deliberated by the ICJ, Guinea Bissau requested the as a correction for the misgivings of a 1886 Convention whose court to indicate a provisional measure prohibiting both parties purpose was to delimit the land boundaries between the Portu- from engaging in any activities in the disputed area. This request guese province of Guinea and the French territory of Senegal, now was presented on the grounds of actions taken by Senegal in a Republic of Guinea-Bissau and Republic of Senegal respectively. maritime area, which Guinea-Bissau sees as a disputed area [19: The Convention failed to define the maritime boundaries between 232]. In its request, Guinea Bissau asserted that, “in order to the two countries, a point agreed by both disputing countries [20]. safeguard the rights of each of the parties, they shall abstain from Although both countries agree on the meaning and scope of the exploiting the disputed area from any act or action of any kind 1886 Conventions which delimits the land frontiers but not the whatever, during the whole duration of the proceedings until the maritime boundaries, they do not agree on the validity of the 1960 decision is given by the Court” [19: 296]. This request was dis- agreement, which was aimed at delimiting the maritime bound- missed by the court in what seemed to be an almost unanimous aries not covered by the 1886 Convention [20: 17–18]. Another vote – 14 to 1 – on the ground that the subject matter of the aspect of the 1960 agreement was to determine the outer limits of provisional measure was not the same as that of the proceedings the territories of both countries, which was to be delimited by a before the court [19: 296]. straight line drawn at 240° from the meeting point of the exten- Similarly, in March 1991, while the original case remained sion of the land frontier and the low water mark [2: 231–232]. unknown, Guinea-Bissau brought a new claim against Senegal According to Underwood [40], the 1960 agreement was unable regarding the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the to clearly define the outer limit of the continental shelf boundary two states [19: 296]. For their part, the Senegalese representative between the two countries. An argument used by Guinea-Bissau to submits to the ICJ that a solution to the dispute would be nego- contest the validity of the 1960 agreement as they note that not tiating a boundary for the EEZ, but, if it proved impossible to reach only was the agreement null since it was entered into on its behalf an agreement, to refer the case back to the court [29: 36]. by its colonial masters, the maritime boundaries were also not After a careful examination of the issues raised by the appli- clearly defined in the agreement [2: 232]. cant, in addition to the latest submissions to the court, on No- As stated earlier, upon its ascension to independence, Guinea- vember 12, 1991, the ICJ acknowledged that the arbitration pro- Bissau contested most of its boundaries with its neighbours. One ceedings failed to resolve the dispute between the two parties. of which was the maritime boundary it shared with Guinea This was blamed on the vagueness of the wordings of the arbi- [18,43]. Yet, rather than question the validity of the 1886 con- tration agreement reached by both countries. However, it ruled vention entered on its behalf by Portugal as it did with the case that the arbitration award was valid, thus must be upheld [29: 36]. with Senegal, one of its arguments was that the agreement be- The ICJ concluded its final award by pronouncing that it is “highly tween the French and the Portuguese did not determine the desirable that the elements of the dispute that were not settled by maritime boundary between it and Guinea. In addition, while this 288 I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290

having failed to resolve it by way of negotiation and arbitration.

6. Implications

After careful perusal of the judgment and recommendations of the ICJ, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal resolved to enter an agreement as part of the negotiations for resolving the dispute amicably. It is worthy of note that, what lay before the parties, was the line of 240°, since the delimitation line for the territorial sea, the con- tiguous zone and the continental shelf, was not open for re-ne- gotiation [7]. The parties were free to choose either the same delimitation line or another line for the EEZ. However, they agreed instead on a zone straddling the boundary line for the purpose of joint development of EEZ resources [29: 1995]. As a result, on the 14th of 1993, Guinea-Bissau and Se- negal signed a “Management and Co-operation Agreement”, in . This agreement was aimed at providing among other things, the joint exploitation, management and administration of both petroleum and fishing activities [24]. Although one of many of such agreements signed by countries with contested maritime boundaries across the globe, it is arguably the first of its kind in the Gulf of Guinea region [29,33], and seeks to provide a framework for cooperation and joint Fig. 2. Guinea-Bissau and Senegal Joint Exploitation Zone [29]. development between the two States. The agreement was later im- proved upon by a subsequent Senegal-Guinea Bissau Protocol, which dispute was not resolved by negotiations, both Guinea-Bissau and brought into existence the machinery for the actualization of the Guinea accepted the judgement of arbitration in 1985 following agreement between the two countries [29]. the delimitation of a clear maritime boundary [18: 97–121]. Further, according to Articles 1(1), (2) of the agreement, the Contrarily, Senegal repudiates Guinea-Bissau's argument stat- joint maritime zone is situated between 268° and 220° azimuths ing that the boundaries were clearly settled i.e. the territorial sea, drawn from Roxo, with the respective territorial seas of the the contiguous zone and the continental shelf in the 1960 agree- parties excluded from it. This implies that the zones would lie ment. It cited the case for the sustainability of the principle of ‘utis across the 240° line as delimited by the 1960 agreement of an arc possidetis juris’ (inheriting the colonial territory in its entirety), of 48° of a circle with a radius of 200 nm centred on. Elsewhere, [2,9], a principle that had been adopted by the OAU (now AU) in Prescott opines that the distance of 200 nm is assumed because 1963 [2], AU, 2013. neither the 1960 nor 1993 agreement made reference to the length An interesting aspect of Senegal's argument based on the of the 240° line or boundaries of the zone [31: 2252] (Fig. 2). principle of ‘utis possidetis juris’ is the fact that a similar argument An interesting component of the agreement is that the ‘joint was cited by Cameroon in defending its claim to the Bakassi Pe- maritime zone’ is set up for the dual purpose of exploiting both ninsula, as it argues that the peninsula had belonged to Germany fisheries and continental shelf resources. The most striking feature since March 11, 1913. Hence, when it became independent in 1960, of the agreement being that although the exploitation of marine it inherited Bakassi based on this principle [22]. And although resources is to be shared equally by the two countries, 85% of the Nigeria countered the validity of the March 1913 treaty based on continental shelf resources is to go to Senegal while a meagre 15% its own interpretation of a different treaty signed in 1884 by Kings is to go to Guinea Bissau, with the agreement renewable in 20 and Chiefs of the Old Calabar, Cameroon's claim to Bakassi Pe- years [29 (37),38 (1969)]. It suffices to add that Article 2 of the ninsular was favoured against Nigeria's by the ICJ based on the agreement notes that this condition is reviewable in the event of ‘utis possidetis juris’ principle [1,22,44]. discovery of additional resources. While the adoption of this principle by the AU has not dis- Prescott observes that it is probable that the unequal division is couraged countries in the Gulf of Guinea from contesting pre-ex- based on the existing and proved reserves of oil and gas, which isting borders, it has foisted a certain degree of predictability on have already been explored, by Senegal and an Irish oil company. complex boundary disputes [18: 12].AsBrownlie [11] observes, On the other hand, there seems to have been no record of oil and although the AU formerly adopted the ‘utis possidetis juris’ in 1964, gas discoveries on the Guinea-Bissau side of the 1960 boundary its application was done in retrospect, taking boundary disputes [31: 2253]. back into the affairs of the former colonial powers. As a con- Notably, the president of the ICJ guided the disputing parties into sequence, much of the work of international arbitrators and the ICJ reaching an agreement by providing them with technical support in in boundary disputes was focused on the interpretation of colonial the form of an extended period of negotiations. By November 1995, treaties, maps and other documents as well as the actual state Guinea Bissau made an official submission to the president of the practice, as seen in the Guinea-Bissau versus Senegal's example. ICJ affirming, “by virtue of the agreement reached with Senegal on Nonetheless, as the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal's case would the disputed zone, it had decided to discontinue proceedings in- show, despite the application of utis possidetis juris, major dis- stituted by its application dated 12th March 1991” (Registry of the agreements over the interpretation of specific treaties and legal Court, [32]: 92). This was followed by the ICJ removing the case principles can still arise in boundary disputes. Consequently, in from its case list, recognizing that the two disputing parties have addition to applicable legal principles and criteria, any peaceful agreed on amiable terms (Registry of the Court, [32]:92). resolution of boundary disputes thus requires the willingness of Remarkably, a joint development agreement may be devised the disputing parties to resolve such disputes. To this end, the next alongside boundary delimitation or in the absence of an agreed section analyzes the efforts by Guinea-Bissau and Senegal to re- boundary. It follows that the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal joint de- solve their maritime boundary disputes with the help of the ICJ velopment agreement is unique. In the sense that it entails the I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290 289 joint development of oil and living marine resources, and also the continue to work towards improving their political relationships delimitation of their common maritime boundaries [29: 5–6]. [26 (577) 38(1969)]. This is evidenced in the 2001 joint statement The resolution of the maritime boundary dispute between issued by both countries reaffirming their commitment to a 2000 Guinea-Bissau and Guinea by arbitration paved the way for other agreement aimed at establishing a joint military force [35: 257]. countries in the Gulf of Guinea to seek to resolve their dispute Nonetheless, the relationship between both countries remains through that means [18,43,44]. Yet, it is probable that the Guinea- difficult in other areas/aspects due to the Senegalese military oc- Bissau and Senegal's resolve to commit to a joint maritime de- casional incursion into Guinea-Bissau's borders, justified mainly by velopment agreement paved the way for the Nigeria and Sao Tomé Senegal's claims that Guinea-Bissau government provides support and Príncipe joint development treaty signed in 2001 [33: 19–20]. to separatists. Unlike Guinea-Bissau and Senegal's agreement, the Nigerian On another positive note, the economic relationship between and Sao Tomé and Príncipe's agreement was in lieu of a maritime the two countries continues to flourish. This is exemplified by the boundary. According to Miyoshi [29], this sort of agreement is fact that in 2001, one of Guinea-Bissau's principal sources of im- more difficult to arrive at than those including boundary delimi- portation of agricultural produce was Senegal [35]. What is more, tation. This is because the states involved have been unable to in keeping with the common security narrative, Guinea-Bissau and agree on the delimitation of boundaries and their failure to agree Senegal have shown their commitment to collectively work to- implies that they have a fundamentally different position. Hence, gether by joining the recently formed alliance between West and they buy into the idea of a joint development, while leaving the Central African countries with central command based in Yaoundé, intricate issue of delimitation for future consideration, in favour of Cameroon [30,36,3,41]. a more immediate economic interest [29: 6]. Therefore, as Ghana and Ivory Coast engage with the UNCLOS, Whilst aiming to foster the need for joint maritime manage- there might be lessons to be learnt from the Guinea-Bissau and ment agreements as against outright delimitation requests, this Senegal's case [37]. Especially because trying to resolve such dis- article does not in any way suggest that such agreement is devoid pute by any other means i.e. negotiations and arbitration tend to of its challenges. However, although some joint development take years, and impede the exploitation of available resources. In agreements can sometimes serve as short-term solutions – in the addition, the examples cited so far have shown that the principles case of agreement devoid of delimitation. Nevertheless, over all, it of upholding the colonial frontiers will almost always be upheld. has the tendency of neutralizing tension between the agreeing As a result, by deciding to enter a joint maritime development states. As Miyoshi submits, while they remain unable to agree on agreement, although seemingly favourable to Senegal in the en- boundary delimitation due to the reluctance to give up their re- ergy and oil exploration sector, both countries have shown that they are able to effectively work towards the common good of spective claims, a joint development arrangement will generate their people, without allowing colonial miscalculations to distract revenue useful to the economies of both states [29: 6]. their resolve to do so. The joint development agreement between Nigeria and Sao Further, as the Gulf of Guinea region struggles with maritime Tomé and Príncipe is unique, as the presidents of the two countries security threats, it is imperative that countries in the region put instigated it. Without reference to the negotiating parties, the pre- their differences aside in a bid to collectively fight these threats sidents of Nigeria and Sao Tomé and Príncipe resolved not to seek to which present enormous challenge to both the human and na- reach an agreement on a definitive maritime boundary, instead, in tional security of their respective countries [3,4]. the interests of future co-operation between the two States, and in recognition of unresolved differences in their positions, they deemed it more desirable to create a joint development zone in the 7. Conclusion area of overlapping claims [8: 107–108]. And although a maritime boundary was not delimited, the joint development agreement This article has shown the intricate issues that come with between Nigeria and Sao Tomé and Príncipe specifies that the seeking to resolve maritime boundary disputes, by reviewing the petroleum and other living maritime resources of the EEZ of the Guinea-Bissau and Senegal's maritime boundary dispute resolu- two states would be shared on a 60% and 40% basis, with 60% Ni- tion. In doing so, it has also shown that in order to sustainably geria and 40% to Sao Tomé and Príncipe. In addition, the agreement exploit the resources that lie beneath their respective maritime specifically addresses maritime security issues, which continue to boundaries, there is an urgent need for existing maritime bound- – be a challenge in the Gulf of Guinea region [33: 19 20]. ary disputes in the Gulf of Guinea to be resolved. It is to be noted that agreeing a joint development zone can It also posits that since international law will almost always be fi sometimes be as dif cult as delimiting a boundary. It can take as in favour of upholding colonial frontiers, as the case of Guinea- long, and is most certainly very expensive to administer [16],how- Bissau and Senegal (plus Nigeria/Cameroon) have shown, joint ever, as the Nigerian and Sao Tomé and Príncipe example have management agreements present to be a better alternative to shown, the disputing parties can save time and resources by showing seeking outright delimitation which is both tedious, time con- commitment to resolving their differences. It follows that rather than suming and in extreme cases, difficult to achieve. spend years in fruitless negotiations and possible arbitrations, To this end, this article submits that rather than spend years countries in the Gulf of Guinea region can opt for a joint develop- and limited resources seeking an outright delimitation, which is ment agreement, which will see them enjoy the dividends of the less likely to be attained, countries in the Gulf of Guinea whose resources that lie within their respective maritime boundaries. maritime boundaries are currently contested should strongly fi Suf ce to add that since the resolution of their maritime consider joint development agreements. This is essentially be- boundary dispute, both Senegal and Guinea Bissau enjoy a strong cause whether the agreement comes with boundary delimitation political relationship. This is reflected in the actions of the Sene- or in lieu of it, it presents a better way forward, for a more united galese government in June 1998, as they militarily intervened to and secure maritime system for the Gulf of Guinea region. avert a military coup in Guinea Bissau [17: 5].1 Both countries

Acknowledgements 1 Also in 2008, following an attack on the president of Guinea-Bissau, Senegal deployed troops to its shared border and made a plane available for the Guinea- Bissau leader and his family to be evacuated should the need arise [26: 577]. Special thanks go to the author's husband Yarwood Derrick and 290 I. Okafor-Yarwood / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 284–290 family for their patient and continued support. In addition, the Senegal): Annex to the Application Instituting Proceedings of the government author thanks the anonymous reviewers of the Marine Policy for of the Republic of Guineas-Bissau, 1989. Available from: 〈http://www.icj-cij. org/docket/files/82/11289.pdf〉 (retrieved 11.01.15). their comments, which contributed to the success of this paper. 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