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Senegal and Niger Rivers Governance at the Basin Level: Senegal and Niger Rivers Foreword: The Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) and the Autorité du bassin du Niger (ABN) are recognised for their good practices in transboundary cooperation. Both Monthly Water Map institutions are characterized by robust cooperative frameworks on political and financial dimensions, information exchange, coordination mechanisms and public participation. As highlighted by the following visuals, the proper functioning of these institutions is tributary to multiple factors, but the level of uniformity between the parties seems to be a key facilitator of effective coordination. The illustrations bring a visual insight of the differences between the Senegal and the Niger River Basins’ components and contexts. n°3 The Senegal and Niger Basins1,2,3,4 Indicators 10° W 0° 10° E The Senegal and Niger Rivers are Senegal Niger Legend two development backbones in River Basin River Basin Sénégal basin LIBYA West Africa. The Senegal River Niger basin basin covers 1.6% of the African % Basin area share in country ALGERIA continent and spreads over four Total Population 3.5 146.7 Sénégal and Niger rivers countries according to the Million Other river proportion shown on the map. The Capital city Manantali and Diama dams were built jointly and co-owned through Major existing dams MAURITANIA the Organisation pour la mise en Secondary dams 9% valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS). Dams in construction 20° N Irrigated Land 116 279 924 610 References 5,6,7,8,9 Ha The Niger River basin covers 7.5% Nouakchott of the African continent. Although MALI its catchment is spread over ten 38% NIGER countries according to the Diama Taoussa 25% proportions shown on the map, Félou hydroelectric 17% Plant Cattle 2.7 26.3 Dakar 25% more than 80% is situated in Mali, Million SENEGAL 38% Niger and Nigeria. Mali and Niger Kandjadji CHAD Banjul Gouina Hydroelectric are almost entirely dependent on GAM Plant 3% Markala Niamey Goronye the River for their water resources. Manantali BURKINA FASO One must understand the asym- GUI Zobe Major Dams 4 13 -BISS 7% Bamako metry between the many riparian Existing Bissau Ouagadougou & under construction Selingué 26% N'Djamena states regarding their relation to Fomi 2% Zaria the River. There are a dozen major GUINEA Kangimi Chad 2 BENIN dams implemented in the Basin Burkina Faso 43 Benin 29 10° N 1% Zunguru Dadin Kowa 4% Shiroro 10° N Côte d’Ivoire Kainji Kiri but energy production comes 57 Conakry 1% Guinea SIERRA Jebba Abuja mainly from Kainji, Jebba and Mali 138 TOGO Lagdo 161 LEONE GHANA NIGERIA Lagdo dams situated in the inferior Sénégal Niger Cameroun Freetown 4% Water Withdrawl 201 188 COTE D’IVOIRE Lokoja Niger course. Since 2008, the Per Capita 557 Autorité du bassin du Niger (ABN) m3/year/capita Nigeria LIBERIA Yamoussoukro has authorised the construction of Mauritania 1310 Monrovia Porto three multi-purpose dams: Fomi, Lome 923 Mali Novo C.A.R Taoussa and Kandjadji. 0100 200 400 Accra CAMEROON Kilometres Malabo Yaoundé 3802 10° W 0° 10° E 10,11 OMVS & ABN Timeline Joint Venture Multi-purpose Mitigation and Monitoring Senegal River Organisation pour la mise 1986 Manantali Dam 1997 of Environmental Impacts Programme 2002 Chart of Water River administration under Independence of Basin en valeur du fleuve 1972 2006 Copyright © Geneva Water Hub, February 2016 the French colonial power countries from France Sénégal (OMVS) Birth Regional Infrastructure Programme Launch Guinea is Back in the Multilateral Cooperation Geospatial Sources: 5. UN Cartographic Section; 6. HydroSHEDS; 7. GRanD Dams Database V1.1; 1950 19681963 1974 1988 1992 8. OCHA; 9. Natural Earth. References: 1. World Water Assessment Programme Senegal PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV (United Nations). (2009). Water in a changing world (Vol. From Colonial Era to Independence West African Sahel Drought and OMVS Birth Dams Building Multilateral Cooperation From River Flow Control to Environmental Norms 2). Earthscan; 2. ABN 2014, Plan d’action de développement River Basin durable du Bassin du fleuve Niger. Evaluation des risques climatiques pour le BFN. ABN/Banque mondiale; 3. Frenken, West African Sahel Drought Today K., Faurès, J. M. (1997), Irrigation Potential in Africa: A Basin Approach (Vol. 4), Food & Agriculture Organisation; 4. Diarra. S. T. (2011), West Africa : Niger River under Pressure Niger PHASE I: 1950-1963 PHASE II: 1964-1979 PHASE III: 1980-1986 PHASE IV: 1987-1999 PHASE V: 2000 - 2015 from Dams. Inter Press Service News Agency; 10. Bolognesi From colonial era to independence The Niger River Commission (NRC) Autorité du Bassin du Niger Difficulties and Adjustment Cooperation Improvement T., Bréthaut C., Gouvernance transfrontalière du Sénégal et River Basin du Niger : analyse historique et identification des facteurs 1950 1963 1964 1980 1987 1999 déterminants, Geneva Water Hub Policy Brief n°4; Tignino, M., Sangbaba K., Le statut d’ouvrages communs et le partage des bénéfices dans les bassins du fleuve Sénégal Niger Development and Study Mission (MEAN) The Niger River Commission (NRC) Birth of 1988 Convention Revision 1992 2002 New Governance 2010 et du fleuve Niger, Geneva Water Hub Policy Brief n°5. Autorité du Bassin du Niger with new obectives Framework (ABN) Contact: [email protected] 1958 1963 1988 2002 The boundaries and names shown and the designations Basin countries’ Bilateral Agreements Signed Shared Vision Charte used on this poster do not imply official endorsement or Independence from France Outside the ABN of the Basin de l’ABN acceptance by the University of Geneva nor the Swiss Key dates and the UK Agency for Development and Cooperation..
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