Response J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2012-100664 on 1 May 2013. Downloaded from PAPER Infanticide: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva Jacqueline A Laing Correspondence to ABSTRACT on the desiccated diet of late 20th century utilitarian Dr Jacqueline A Laing, Alberto Giubilini and Francesco Minerva’s recent infanticide bioethics. A discussion of the equal-dignity principle Department of Law, Human Rights and Social Justice proposal is predicated on their personism and actualism. and any potential adverse implications of institutio- Research Institute, London According to these related ideas, human beings achieve nalising infanticide appears nowhere in the article. Metropolitan University, their moral status in virtue of the degree to which they are This imbalance deserves redress. In view of the impli- 16 Goulston Street, capable of laying value upon their lives or exhibiting certain cations of eroding further the dignity of human life, London E1 7TP, UK; qualities or being desirable to third-party family members. politically, psychologically, demographically, profes- [email protected] This article challenges these criteria, suggesting that these sionally and culturally, it is worth re-examining Received 12 March 2012 and related ideas are rely on arbitrary and discriminatory certain arguments against infanticide. So as to remind Revised 1 June 2012 notions of human moral status. Our propensity to sleep, readers of alternative and indeed traditional ways of Accepted 29 January 2013 fall unconscious, pass out and so on, demonstrates that we regarding the question of involuntary or non- often exhibit our status as ‘potential persons’ who are not voluntary euthanasia by lethal injection, or any inten- in the condition of attributing any value to their own tional killing of the young, unconscious, or disabled, existence. Our abilities, age and desirability can and do this article seeks to re-examine the infanticide pro- fluctuate. The equal dignity principle, distinguished in turn posal and the grounds and rationale for its recent from both the excesses of vitalism and consequentialism, is implementation in Groningen. analysed and defended in the context of human rights logic and law. The normalisation of non- and involuntary euthanasia, via such emerging practices as the self-styled PERSONISM: DEHUMANISING, Groningen Protocol, is considered. Substituted consent to DISCRIMINATORY AND ARBITRARY the euthanasia of babies and others is scrutinised and the In order to arrive at their conclusion that infanticide implications of institutionalising non-voluntary euthanasia is morally permissible, Giubilini and Minerva espouse in the context of financial, research and political interests a personistic ethic. What is personism? Briefly, t h i s i s are considered. The impact on the medical and legal the view that human beings do not have any inherent professions, carers, families and societies, as well as public dignity in virtue of their humanity. Merely being attitudes more generally, is discussed. It is suggested that human is not in itself a reason for ascribing value to eroding the value of human life carries with it significant someone. On the contrary, human beings get their value from their status, understood in technical terms, destructive long-term implications. To elevate some, often http://jme.bmj.com/ short-term, implications while ignoring others demonstrates as ‘persons’. Accordingly they announce: the irrational nature of the effort to institutionalise The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of euthanasia. a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life to an indi- vidual. Both a fetus and a newborn certainly are ‘ human beings and potential persons, but neither is a In a recent article entitled After-birth abortion: why ‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject of a moral right to ’i on September 28, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. should the baby live? Alberto Giubilini and life’.Wetake‘person’ to mean an individual who is Francesca Minerva unveil and rehearse an old pro- capable of attributing to her own existence some (at posal by Peter Singer. In his 1979 version of Practical least) basic value such that being deprived of this Ethics2 Singer argued that a 1-month-old baby, in existence represents a loss to her. This means that view of its youth, lacks rationality, self-consciousness many non-human animals and mentally retarded and autonomy. Accordingly, the child is, technically human individuals are persons,butthatall the indivi- speaking, a non-person that could be killed without duals who are not in the condition of attributing any moral compunction. The only reason against such a value to their own existence are not persons. Merely being human is not in itself a reason for ascribing proposal would be third-party feelings of distress. someone a right to life.ii Giubilini and Minerva recommend the same predict- able conclusion. They do so, however, without any This text as stated has two questionable features. allusion to the debate that surrounded the suggestion The first relates to its explicit dehumanisation of the even then and without any reference to a single alter- mentally disabled so that they, as a category, are indis- native philosophical account. The infanticide pro- tinguishable, morally speaking (though perhaps not posal is so much a part of contemporary bioethical physically speaking), from animals, as a category. The discussion, steeped as it is in the vested interests of second relates to its moral actualism so that only Open Access Scan to access more medical research, abortion provision, ‘liberal’ eugen- those who are in ‘the condition of attributing any free content ics, population control and elimination of social value to their own existence’ have any right to life. costs, that it will come as no surprise to those reared We repair to this second question in due course. The To cite: Laing JA. J Med – Ethics 2013;39:336 340. iSee reference 1, para 9. iiSee reference 1, para 15 The emphasis is mine. 336 Laing JA. J Med Ethics 2013;39:336–340. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100664 Response J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2012-100664 on 1 May 2013. Downloaded from first feature, the moral conflation of ‘non-human animals’ and idea of an individual’s forfeiting his right to life is at play, need ‘mentally retarded human individuals’,istroublesome.Itisatodds not compromise the principle of equal dignity. The concept of with the principle that human beings have an intrinsic dignity in forfeiture is entirely in keeping with the principle because it virtue of their common humanity so that however disabled, recognises that, in certain cases, it is necessary to permit inter- young, old, conscious, awake, ill, diseased, unproductive and vention in the interests of justice. The principle of self-defence, irrational we may be, we retain our dignity just by virtue of being for example, need not be predicated on arbitrary notions of per- human. A human being, notwithstanding illness or inability to sonhood, moral status, age or ability for that matter. In short, exercise higher mental functions, is human and does not thereby on an immediately appealing, non-discriminatory account, one degenerate to the level of vegetable or an animal. Although our does not derive one’s rights from one’s technical status as a ‘per- abilities and capacities may fluctuate, we retain our moral worth son.’iv Nor need we predicate concerns for justice on fluctuating and our relation to the human family. This is often referred to as concepts of personhood and diminishing moral status so that the equal dignity principle since it resists the temptation to discrim- unjust aggressors are somehow lesser persons. inate morally on grounds of disability or characteristics. It locates On this account we have value in spite of our fluctuating cap- value in our common humanity. On this view, human beings are acities, in spite of our dependence, age and weakness.12 The distinctive in part because they are the kind that has moral obliga- objection that infanticide ought to be permissible at inter- tions in a way that other kinds (eg, animals and vegetables) do not. national law and that plain readings of these conventions should Human individuals do not lose that moral distinctiveness however no longer be thought relevant given alterations in attitudes mentally disabled. Despite its absence from the authors’ analysis, merely begs the question about whether these proposed altera- the principle is a powerful one embedded both in international tions in Western thinking are morally sound. We have seen only law and traditional moral thinking. As a well-known alternative too clearly and frequently in the 20th century how alterations in position, it deserves some consideration however anxious the the- positive law and prevailing attitudes can be fundamentally mis- orist is to arrive at his preferred conclusions. Giubilini and taken and at odds with human dignity. Minerva assume the truth of personism, leave this question entirely unaddressed and then unsurprisingly conclude that killing MORAL ACTUALISM newborns is morally permissible because young babies are non- The equal dignity principle notwithstanding, the authors assert persons and thus more like animals than humans. without elaboration that ‘however weak the interests of actual The idea of intrinsic human dignity and inalienable human rights people can be, they will always trump the alleged interest of poten- iii is far from unfamiliar. Any plain reading of the Universal tial people to become actual ones, because this latter interest Declaration of Human Rights and European Convention on Human amounts to zero.’v This statement highlights another problem with Rights affirms the same. Unjust discrimination on the basis of age, their account and that is their moral actualism. On this view only disability or incapacity is among the numerous grounds available to those demonstrating actual capacities matter morally.