A"6?TO COMINCK P-OOI

MPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

DURING THEGROUP PERIOD 4 - T>owi»{ir*M at 3 yew intervals: ,\eelft. «fie !>»« J-"1 AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1943 Classify to DEC 1347

by aut by-n R. J* Maj., ivenwerth Custodiaa S PUBLICATION AND THE INFORMATION

CONTAINED HEREIN MUST NOT

FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

UNITED STATES FLEET Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

UNITED STATES FLEET HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER'IN CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT. WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 April 1944

This publication, "Amphibious Operations"* is a continuation of the series entitled "Notes on Amphibious War­ fare No. 1 and No. 2". It promulgates material originating from ; ^liable sources and arranged according to operations and the aieas in which they took place. It contains oomments and expressions of opinion concerning war experience that were available at the time the operation under discussion was com­ pleted.

This publication is classified as secret, non- registered. It shall be handled as prescribed by Article 76, U*S. Navy Regulations 1920. It should be widely oiroulated among commissioned personnel. When no longer required it shall be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction need be sub­ mitted.

This publication is under the cognisance of, and is distributed by the Cotnmander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Transmission by registered mail within the con­ tinental limits of the United States is authorized. - r

(cftS. R.8. EDWARDS, Chief of Staff. INTENTS

T Chapter I. LANDING OPBBATIONS Central Pacific...... 1-1 Gilbert Islands Operation ...... l_i Mediterranean Theatre. . 1-7 landing on North Coast of Sicily. . . 1-7 Landing at Salerno...... 1-8 South Pacific...... 1-12 Landing at Telia La Telia 1-12 Treasury Island Occupation...... 1-13 Landing at Bnpress Augusta Bay. . . . 1-1 It Southwest Pacific. 1-18 Landing at Lae...... 1-18 Landing at Ylnschhafen...... 1-19 landing at Arawe...... 1-22 Landing at Cape Gloucester...... l-2£ Chapter II. AIB SUPPORT Central Pacific...... < . . . 2-1 Control of Support Aircraft ..... 2-1 Air-Ground Liaison. 2-1* Mediterranean Theatre. . 2-lU South Pacific 2-16 Southwest Pacific . 2-19 Chapter III. NATAL GUN?IBS i Central Pacific...... 3-1 Mediterranean Theatre . . 3-12 South Pacific. 3-18 Southwest Pacific...... 3-21 Chapter IT. INTSLLIGINCI Central Pacific...... U-l Mediterranean Theatre...... 4-? South Paoific...... U-13 Southwest Pacific...... U-lf>

Chapter T. LOGISTICS Central Paoific...... £-1 Medical ...... 5-U Mediterranean Theatre...... 5>-6 South Pacific. * 5-9 Southwest Pacific...... £-16 Chapter TI. SHIP TO 8E0SS MOTBQfflT Central Pacific...... 6-1 Mediterranean Theatre...... 6-7 Southwest Pacific...... 6-11 Beach and Shore Parties ...... 6-12

* TOSSWll* * n&m , CONTENTS (Cont'd)

*- ,* Chapter VIZ. LANDING CRAFT 1ST ...... „ ... 7-1 Method of Unloading 1ST . . 7-3 LCT(5)...... 7-k LCKD ...... 7-5 LCM(3) ...... 7-6 IVT...... 7-7 ICS. . . . 7-8 DUKWS...... 7-9 LC(E)...... 7-9 SALVAGE CHAJT...... 7-10

Chapter VIII. COMMUNICATIONS Central Pacific...... 8-1 Mediterranean Theatre. 8-10 South Pacific...... 8-12 Southwest Pacific 8-12

Chapter IX. MISCELLANEOUS Balloons...... 9-1 Smoke. 9-2 Medina Tanks ...... 9-5

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Promulgating letter 1 Contents .... . • . . . ••. • •.. • • • • ill* iv List of Effective Pages • • • • . . . v . . • • • • iv Chapter X ...... • 1—1 to 1—27j inclusive Chapter II ..... 2-1 to 2-22, inclusive Chapter HI . . .. • .. . .. 3-1 to 3-21, inclusive Chapter IV .... • . • ..... 1a—1 to 1^—15$ inclusive Chapter V ...... 5-1 to 5-20, inclusive Chapter VI...... • .6—1 to 6—17, inclusive Chapter VII • •••••.•• • 7-1 to 7-10, inclusive Chapter VHI 8-1 to 8-12, inclusive Chapter IX • 9-1 to 9-7, inclusive

yi» » i '"Wi €HAPTBE X* * - -- :l> ;

f ''' k i : ' * £ LANDING OPERATIONS 11^fI |J P > cii „ " - " ~ J*. % £%&& CENTRAL PACIFIC

Gilberts Operation - November 1943. from: Commander Fifth Amphibious Force.

In the Gilberts Operation, the master plan required the simultaneous capture of Makin and Tarawa, and the subsequent oc­ cupation of APEMAMA. The following table is an outline of the rela­ tionship of the major elements of the amphibious organization.

Table of Maior Elements of the Amphibious Organization Assault Force. (TF 54). (1) Amphibious Corps. (2) Support (Amphibious) Aircraft. (S) MAKIN LST Groups 1 and 2 (9LST, SLCT, 2 DD, transporting LVTs and Defense Battalion). (4) TARAWA LST Groups 1 and 2 (12 LST, 5 LCT, 2 DD, transport­ ing LVTs, and Defense Battalion). (5) MAKIN Garrison Group (2 AP, 2 AK, 2 DE, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (6) TARAWA Garrison Group (2APt 2AK, 2 DB, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (7) AP1MAMA Garrison Groups 1 and 2 (3 AP, 2 AK, 4 LST, 3 LCT, 3 DB, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops. (8) APEMAMA Reconnaissance Group (1 submarine, transporting a Marine Reconnaissance Platoon).

NOTE: (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) (less the submarine) passed to command of the local Task Force Commanders on arrival at destinations. LCT were loaded on LST and launched at destina­ tions.

(9) Northern Attack Force (TF 52). (a) Transports, (4 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD). (b) Support Groups (4 OBB, 4 CA, 3 CVE, 13 DD, 1 AM) NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groups (o) Northern Landing Force. One Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Division, A.U.S., plus reenforcing units. (d) Garrison Force. Army and minor Naval garrison units. (e) Aircraft, MAKIN Base. Army base aircraft units. (Also com­ manded Support Aircraft, less Combat Air Patrol and anti­ submarine patrol, after shore headquarters were established).

^ ~'1ri-'... I,: (10) Southern Attack Forest®* 53)^ * * ^ " (a) Transports. (12 APA, 3 AEA, 1 AP, 1 LSD). (b) Support Groups (3 OBB, 3 CA, 3 CL, 5CVE, 21 DD, 2 AM).

UHOLASSIRED 1-1 £mm m is ^ er 'B m & r

LANDING OPERATIONS -

NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were "provicL

(c) Southern Landing Force, Two regimental Combat Teams of the SECOND Marine Division plus reinforcing units. Corps Reserve, one Regimental Combat team\0f SECOND Marine Division. (Not to be committed except on authority of CTF 54). (d) Garrison Force, TARAWA. Marine Corps Garrison Troops. Navy Acorns, Casus, Sea Bees, Marine and Naval air units, minor Naval garrison units. (Also commanded support air­ craft, less Combat Air Patrol and anti-submarine patrol, after headquarters were established ashore). (e) Garrison Force, APEMAMA. s Marine Corps Garrison Troops. Navy Acorn, Casu, Sea Bees, Marine and Naval air units, minor Naval garrison units.

The plan of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, en­ visaged three phases of the GILBERTS Operation. These phases necessar­ ily overlap, but in general terms were:

(a) The assault. (b) The occupation of the positions by garrison and development forces, and the evacuation of the assault troops. (o) The development of the positions as air and minor naval bases.

The assault forces comprised the SECOND Marine Divi­ sion and one Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Army Division, reinforced by medium tank companies and advance elements of the garrison forces. The assault forces on evacuation were to leave in the captured positions the infantry and field artillery elements initially assigned to the gar­ rison. Ihe bulk of the garrison forces were Marine and Army Defense Battalions, construction battalions, and aviation ground organizations. These were to be moved in behind the assault troops as rapidly as the tactical situation and available transportation would permit. Each unit of the assault and garrison forces was to take in, in general, five units of fire and thirty days* consumable supplies, plus necessary organizational equipment. The transportation of permanent base facilities, garrison e- quipment, and of supplies sufficient to establish a sixty-day level, was to be inaugurated as soon as the garrison troops were moved in. It was directed that ships of the first echelon were to be loaded to no more than 60$ capacity, in order to permit a balanced load and a reasonably rapid discharge in combat areas where ships would constantly be subject to enemy attack. Furthermore, due to the very difficult unloading condi- 1 tions at these atolls, only a few vessels could be expected to unload sim­ ultaneously at anything approaching a reasonable rate.

Owing to the imminence of succeeding amphibious opera­ tions, which would require all vessels of the FIFTH Amphibious Force,

V 1-2 , s PACIFIC and the fact that the Covering TonfW%Ri8t necessarily be withdrawn from the forward areas after about two weeks, it became essential, in spite of some disadvantages, to move all the garrison forces for­ ward very closely behind the assault forces, instead of spreading them out over a somewhat longer period. The Commander of Task Force 54 was charged with responsibility for these movements, which involved about four-fifths of the garrison forces. The Commander Service Force, U, S. Pacific ^leet, was charged with the responsibility of the move­ ment of the remainder, and for building up and maintaining the required level of supplies.

Forces destined for the various positions,, except the troops in NEW ZSALAND, SAMOA, WA1LIS, and the ILLICE ISLAUDS, plus large quantities of equipment and stores, were assembled in OAHU, reorganized, and prepared for final embarkation. A short period of time became available in which to give the assault troops a small amount of basic amphibious training, both in NEW ZEALAND and HAWAII. Abbreviated final rehearsals of the assault echelons were held in EFATE and HAWAII though some of the combatant vessels and a large part of the carrier aircraft could not participate. This training, and these rehearsals, curtailed as they had to be, were invaluable. This basic training and battle rehearsals are considered essential to success against defended positions.

Although operations for the capture of atolls have long been studied by the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, this is the first operation in which we have engaged in atoll warfare. There are many points of difference between this and amphibious assault against an enemy occupying large land masses.

Our lack of anything like adequate information of the atolls and the enemy situation in the GILBERTS was, after considerable effort, considerably rectified through:

(a) The employment of aircraft for taking large numbers of vertical and oblique photographs of land areas, beaches, lagoons, reefs, channels, and defense installations.

(b) The employment of the NAUTILUS (Submarine) on a special mission to obtain horizontal panoramic photographs of the atolls to observe enemy activities; and to obtain data as to surf, tidal, wind, and current conditions.

(c) The assembly of about fifteen British who had lived in the various islands, or had been shipmasters operating small steamers and schooners among them. Most of these individuals were either members of the British armed forces or of the British civil establishment. Under authority of the Navy Department, they were employed and paid as experts. The IM OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC

information obtained from them was invaluable, in spite of some of it being inaccurate in matters affecting many of the details particularly applicable to our operations.

It soon became apparent that, at least at TARAWA, landing boats could not pass through the protective wire and log barri­ cades which had been erected to seaward on the reefs and beaches. Ex­ periments in breaking up such barricades were nade with LVTs (Amphibian Tractors). These tests turned out very favorably. After some diffi­ culty, fifty additional amphibian tractors were obtained for the SECOND Marine Division, and fifty for the use of the 2?th Army Division. Eigh­ teen LVT(2)s could be loaded in one LST, which at the same time car­ ried one LOT on its upper deck. Each Attack Force used three LSTs so loaded. In addition, the SECOND Marine Division transported 75 LVT(l)s in transports, though this involved leaving behind a considerable num­ ber of landing boats. The amphibian tractors, though unarmored, proved invaluable for landing troops and supplies, for tearing out wire and log barricades, for dragging drowned trucks ashore, and for towing stranded boats off reefs. Hae capture of TARAWA would have been far more difficult had these vehicles not been employed.

Preliminary supporting operations by covering forces of the FIFTH Fleet involved shore-based air strikes on enemy bases in the MARSHALLS; carrier air strikes on NAURU and TARAWA on Dog minus TWO Day; carrier air strikes on MILLE, MAKIN, and TARAWA on Dog minus ONE Day; Ship bombardment of TARAWA on Dog minus ONE Day; and shore- based air scouting. Aircraft from the South Pacific Force also struck NAURU, and provided scouting by shorebased aircraft.

Atoll Attack

Attack on an atoll resembles in many respects the as­ sault of a fort or fortified locality with, of course, the added com­ plication of having to initiate the assault with the ship to shore movement. The successful assault of such a position requirest

(1) Early detailed information of the exact location, type, strength and character of the defenses.

(2) Early distribution of the above information to all echelons for the preparation of detailed plans.

(3) Training of all echelons down to the smallest units in the details they are to execute in the assault. Replicas and dummies of hostile defenses should be constructed for the training of small assault units.

(4) Protracted and intensive preparation fires by all possible supporting weapons with a view toward maximum destruction

1-4 "LARDING OPERATIONS - CENTRAL Pi

••• ••:..?• i * wm. > of enemy installations, guns, obstacles, communications " and supplies.

(5) Adequate cover and proteotlon for the assaulting troops to insure they arrive within assaulting distance of the defenses.

(6) Once the position is broken Into, the timely arrival of supports and reserves must be Insured for the reduction of the garrison.

It is believed the (GILBERTS Operation) has demonstra­ ted that the above requirements for the successful attack of a forti­ fied locality, at least in part, can be met for the attack of an atoll by Including the following in the plans and training for the attack:

(a) Repeated photographic coverage vill give accurate and dependable information as to the extent, strength, location and character of defenses to be encountered. Since the defender is confined to very small and clearly defined areas it is difficult, if not impossible for him to conceal the location and character of his defenses. Photographic coverage must be repeated at frequent Intervals. It should be aug­ mented by submarine and other reconnaissance as required when there is doubt concerning any important piece of information.

(b) Shis information should be disseminated so that realistic training can be conducted on areas laid out to full scale with accurately placed replicas and dummies of the actual hostile defenses. Assault tactics should be stressed to cover particularly the advance fromthe line of departure, and the debarkation, reduction of beach obstacles and the assault of the initial beach defenses.

(c) Air and naval gunfire preparation for two or three hours ^ / is not adequate. This preparation should begin several days prior to D-day and should be designed both for des­ truction and for unrelenting harassing effect. This pre­ paration may at times be augmented by secondary landing on adjacent islands either on or prior to D-day, for the pur­ pose of placing artillery in position. Maximum use of beach barrage rockets and boat guns should be made in direct sup­ port of the assault waves.

(d) To insure that the assault troops arrive on the beaches armored amphibian tractorsand turret mounted amphibians should constitute the leading waves. The assault waves must be prepared to remove obstacles and clear passageways through mine fields both beach and underwater. Medium tanks should a OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC

follow in accordance with the tactical plan.

(e) To meet the possibility of tide or surf conditions chang­ ing adversely after the landing of first wares, the ex­ peditious landing of supports and reserves must be assured by the presence of adequate LVT(2)s and DUKWs to get these troops, supplies and ammunition across the reefs and ashore.

1-6 LAMPING OPERATIONS lb*-* > ^

MEDITOBATfflAN THEATER * i

- *w« Landings on North Coast of Sicily - August. 1943.

Jrom: Commander IT. S. Naval Forces, North African Waters.

Task Torce Eighty-eight accomplished two successful assault landings of battalion landing teams behind enemy lines, (amphi­ bious envelopment) which played a major part in breaking through ene­ my defense positions and forcing a rapid withdrawal along the North Coast of Sicily towards Messina. The effective assistance rendered by these sea borne assaults became further evident when a third landing on a regimental scale was planned but was actually executed as a ferry trip behind friendly lines owing to the rapid advance of the ground forces as enemy resistance was overcome.

It 1b desired particularly to point out that it was possible to undertakefchese operations with little preparation and on short notice because of the thorough training, indoctrination and pre­ vious combat experience of the forces participating. To some extent, operations were hampered by inadequate air cover. It was necessary to exercise every effort in the operation of landing craft to quickly withdraw them from the assault beaches tinder cover of darkness and to reduce to the minimum the time they were required to remain in the loading areas. Also the risk of subjecting fire support units to air attack by maintaining them constantly in the immediate assault areas ready to deliver prompt fire support on call was not considered entirely justified under the circumstances. Complete fighter cover and strong anti-aircraft defense must be established and properly coordinated where important naval units are operating within close proximity to enemy airfields.

Jrom: Commander Cruiser Division Sight.

Operations carried out against the enemy force in furtherance of the mission consisted of (a) bombardment of enemy pos­ itions in the immediate front of the Seventh Army, (b) bombardment of enemy positions and communications in the rear by day and by night, (c) offensive sweeps nightly by destroyers to intercept attempts to supply or to evacuate, (d) nightly patrol by motor torpedo boats on j reconnaissance and on combat tasks, (e) the ferrying of artillery and / heavy equipment around blown tunnels and demolished bridges, (f) ex- ' peditions against outlying islands and (g) the conduct of amphibious operations behind enemy lines.

The part played by the uhgaJLnly LCT in 'supporting the advance of the Seventh Army was no minor one. Tive of these landing craft were sailed from Palermo to the front lines at Castel di Tusa on 1 August from which point they were employed in ferrying artillery and heavy mobile equipment to Caronia, by-passing demolished bridges and INQ OPERATIONS - MEDITEBBAHEAN THEATRE i-i

lenFlfxl in the wake of the retreating enemy, enabling the heavy armor to keep pace with the rapidly advancing infantry, thus in a measure countering the elaborate and through demolition and ground mining which marked the retreat of the enemy along the coastal highway, the one line of communication; other than the sea, available to the armios. Improvised amphibious operations carried out behind the enemy lines on 8 and 11 August undoubtedly contributed to the rapid advance of the 7th Army and the fall of Messina to U. S. Forces. That the third operation on 16 August proved unavailing and merely a ferry trip was due to the rapid advance of the troops on shore, their way cleared by the two previous operations and the advance of armor by the LCT group. That these landings were hastily organised and subject to criticism as lacking the planning and detail devoted to former larger expeditions is obvious. It was not, however, the intention of the Task Torce Commander that they should have the trimmings of beach parties and elaborate control and marking arrangements and beach surreys; with­ out which certain added hazards were Introduced but which under the conditions had to be accepted, The employment of trained landing craft commanders and crews was an initial requisite as was the employment of troops with previous experience. Given these and some slight knowledge of the beach approaches the existence of exit roads for the vehicles and suitable terrain for a beach head in the immediate vicinity, the success of the operation is then dependent on the offensive spirit and the will to win brought into the undertaking. This campaign has demonstrated that combatant ships may operate within range of shore based aircraft when suitably covered by friendly aircraft, that an unprotected flank on the seacoast may be turned by ground forces supported by sea forces and that the early fall of "Messina" can be accomplished by cooperation and coordination of air, ground and sea forces. •LnnrHrif at, Salerno - September. 1943.

Prom: Commander Eighth Amphibious Torce. Commander Task Jbrce Eighty-One, the Commander Eighth Amphibious Force, was in Command of the Southern Attack Force in Opera­ tion (SALERNO). She task of this Torce was to establish the 36th In­ fantry Division and attached troops of the 6th Army Corps ashore over beaches in the Gulf of Salerno, south of the Sole Biver. Task Torce Eighty-one consisted oft 9 APAS and XAPs 4 AEs and AKAs 3 LSIs (British) 1 ISO (British) 1 LCS (British) 3 British LSTs (of the"Killer" type) LANDING OPERATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE... • "T", •"§•if If

27 LSTe 36 LCI(L)s 3 CLe DDs 3 ODDs British "Flak"ship 1 British Monitor PGs 9 AMs YMSs 2 ATs British SS

This Force was organized into the following groups:

(a) Landing Force (81.1) (b) Transport Group (81.2) (c) landing Craft Group (81.3) (d) Beach Battalion (81.4) (e) Support Group . (81.5) (f) Screen (81.6) (g) Control Group (81.7) (h) Sweeper Group (81.8) (i) Salvage Group (81.9) (j) Beach Identification Group...... (81.6.5)

The Force deployed into the Transport Area on sche­ dule without event and the work of lowering boats and debarking per­ sonnel was conducted expeditiously. Boat waves were formed and led in by PCs acting as control boats. The boat waves followed YMSs sweeping a channel ahead of them for contact mines. A number of mines were ex­ ploded or cut adrift but no casualties resulted. The first wave of troops landed on all beaches at "H" hour or within a few minutes there­ of, and with few exceptions, succeeding assault waves came in approxi­ mately on schedule.

Resistance consisting of machine gun, artillery and mortar fire was encountered at all beaches, but landing continued steadily in spite of these and by 0600, the two assault regiments (141st and 142nd RCTs) had been landed. Landing of the Reserve Regi­ ment (the 143rd RCT) commenced at N plus 180 and continued without interruption until it too was landed.

As soon as the assault troops were landed in scheduled waves, a shuttle service, using LCV(P)s and LCMs was started, landing artillery, tanks, motorized equipment, ammunition and other supplies. The shipborne landing craft engaged in the shuttle service were augmented by 16 LCTe from the Northern Attack Force on the afternoon of D Day and by 11 additional LSTs on the morning of D plus One Day. Unloading pro­ gressed rapidly and by 2200, D plus One, all ships were completely un­ loaded except for about twenty-five tons of stores on one AK. The trans­ ports were then got underway and returned to ORAN.

Enemy minefields were known to be planted in the assault BEATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE area. Detailed sweeping plans provided for the following areas to be swept in the order named: A Transport Area to seaward of the minefields, a lane from the Transport Area to the beaches, the Northern and Southern Fire Support Areas and a Transport Area near the line of departure close to the beaches and inside the minefield. This plan was carried out, but despite its execution, the mines caused considerable interference with the operation, A few boat waves to one beach were delayed. The Fire Support Units were late in taking station in their areas. Transports were held far off the beaches until the evening of D Day. One ship, HMS ABERCOMBIE was mined. Information had been received giving the northern and southern limits of the field planted in the Southern Attack Force Area. It was suspected, however, that additional mines might be found outside this area and precautions were taken accordingly. The suspicious proved to be well grounded and the precautions justified. No mines were encountered in sweeping the initial Transport Area to seaward of the known minefield, but a number were found elsewhere outside the limits of that field. The south end of the field was marked by a PC and all boat traffic to and from the outer Transport Area routed through lanes south of this PC. In addition, the lead­ ing boat waves through this lane were preceded by sweeper's gear. Despite this, boat traffic went on continuously through this channel and later, destroyers and cruisers of the Fire Support Group and transports and landing craft of the Transport Group and Landing Craft Group proceeded through it without casualty. During the first two days a total of sixty-six mines were swept from areas outside the reported limits of the field.

Throughout D and D plus One Day, considerable enemy resistance was encountered. At intervals, all beaches were under fire from artillery, machine guns and mortars. Enemy tanks pene­ trated to the vicinity of Blue Beach on the southern extremity of the landing beaches and it had to be abandoned. Fortunately an additional beach, Red 2, had been set up to the northward of, and adjacent to the original Red Beach, and was already functioning so that unloading continued over four beaches during practically the entire period.

Cruisers and destroyers in the Fire Support Groups were late in taking their assigned areas because of the mines. They stood in about 1000 D-Day, however, and by noon all were in position. Some of them had difficulty establishing communication with the Fire Control Parties ashore due to the fact that some of the latter had been scattered and others had lost or damaged their radio sets. However, both cruisers and one destroyer did establish communication, the remaining ships of the Fire Support Group were assigned targets by Commander Task Group 81.5 on the basis of air information and Army requests through those channels which had been >; I LANDING OPERATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN WStfijm * - :« • <• *>

* f£ • A *i "v *;}T ?

estatlished, and considerable effective fire was delivered in the afternoon of D Day. Machine gun emplacements were destroyed, enemy batteries, including the railway battery, were knocked out or silenced and tanks destroyed or scattered.

Requests for the use of Array planes as spotting agencies had succeeded in obtaining four P-51 sorties of one half hour each covering the period 0800 - 1000 D Day, and during this period the ABERCROMBIE fired one problem with air spot. Later, cruiser planes were used with Borne success. During the night of D»D / 1, the Shore Fire Control Parties were able to reorganize and obtain needed radio parts, and by the morning of D plus One all the designed fire support circuits except that with the LUD­ LOW had been established. Naval gunfire support rendered on D / One was quite effective, although because of the confused and dis­ organized situation ashore as well as the terrain, which was rugged and unsuitable for naval gunfire, there were long stretches when no targets presented themselves to the Shore Fire Control Parties.

On the evening of D Day on signal from the Force Commander, transports moved in throu&n the swept channel and closed the beaches to facilitate unloading which continued steadily through­ out the night. LSTs had been started in the forenoon. Pontoons had been beached promptly and by nightfall of D Day, LSTs carrying the 36th Division equipment were being rapidly unloaded.

About 2200 on D Day oral orders were received from the Commander Western Naval Task Force to land the 179th RCT of the Floating Reserve. This unit was embarked in LSTs and LCI(L)s which were still outside the minefield. Because of a communication failure the sweepers which were ordered to lead them through the swept channel failed to rendezvous at the appointed time and landing of this unit was not commenced until 0700 the following morning.

Unloading of transports and of landing craft con­ tinued without interruption throughout D plus One Day. On the evening of D / One, it was discovered that due to a misunderstanding of orders from the Unit Commander, C.T.U. 81.3.2 the 157th RCT, also part of the floating Reserve, had commenced to land and a consider­ able portion had landed before the mistake was discovered and the movement stopped. As a result of this the remainder of the use 157th RCT was put ashore the night of D / One. By 2200 of D / One, all landing craft except those loaded with bulk cargo and those having reserves embarked were unloaded. All combat loaded transports and three LSIs which accompanied them had been emptied and at 2215 these ships under the command of the Task Force Commander sailed from the assault area for ORAN, escorted by DesRons Eight and Thirteen, plus DALLAS, BERNADOU and COLE. LAUDING- OPERATIONS IClASSfr SOUTH PACIFIC Landing at Telia La Vella - August 1943.

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force.

On 12 July 1943 Commander South Pacific Force proposed that the intended assault on KOIflMBANGARA, following the anticipated capture of MUNDA, be cancelled and VELLA LAVELLA seized as the next step in our advance through the SOLOMONS.

Commander South Pacific Force designated August 15, 1943 as D-Day, and made the following ground units, available for the operation:

Headquarters Detachment, Northern Landing Force 35th Combat Team 4th Marine Defense Battalion 58th Construction Battalion Naval Base Group including Boat Pool No. 8

From the Naval forces then tinder the operational con­ trol of Commander Amphibious Force, (plus four destroyers later made available by Commander South Pacific), the following were designated to participate in the initial landing:

12 Destroyers 6 APDs 12 LCIs 3 LSTs 2 SCs 26 MTBs from BENDOVA and LEVER HARBOR

The Main Body, under Commander Amphibious Force in the CONT, was divided into three groups. The Advance Transport Group con­ sisted of six APDB screened by 5 DDs. The Second Transport Group con­ sisted of 12 LCIs screened by 4 DDs. The Third Transport Group con­ sisted of 3 LSTs screened by 2 DDs and ® SCs. These three groups departed independently on August 14.

The several groups made independent passages without incident although enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL, the RUSSELS, and positions in NEW GEORGIA throughout the night. ?he groups leap-frogged prior to dawn in the area south of GIZO STRAIT, and the Advance Trans­ port Group arrived off BARAKOMA at 0610. Friendly air cover had ar­ rived from MUNDA at 0605. Debarkation of troops, equipment and supplies commenced at 0615, was completed by 0715 and at 0730 the six APDs de­ parted with a screen of four destroyers for GUADALCANAL, CONY, with Commander Amphibious Force, and PSINGLE remained to cover further op­ erations and as additional screen for the Second Transport Group on LAUDING OPERATIONS - SOUTH PACIFIC **5; '.-. *|jr ^j*-n 4 *--& ?'" ~ ^ #* if- ^ ,. ^ J-si: returning. |i *~* F~*K-•" "*" *"-v. , %"" «-'*.'* *" ~".-" ."- ,> |#? At 0715 thelSecdnd- Tr&nlipott Group had>arrived and commenced beaching. It was found that the three beaches would ac­ commodate only eight instead of twelve LCIs as had been planned, based on information from the reconnaissance party. This fact, and an im­ properly transmitted visual message from the beach party, delayed the completion of unloading the last four LCIs until about 0900.

In the meantime the Third Transport Group arrived at 0800 as scheduled and were awaiting retraction of LCTs in order to beach and unload. At 0740 and 0751 bogles were picked up by the Fighter Director Destroyer's radar, sighted at 0758, and at 0759 dive bombers commenced attack on destroyers of the screen, maneuvering at high speed. Hear misses were noted on destroyers. Few attacks were apparently made on the more favorable targets, the Immobile LCIs and the slow moving LSTs, although two near misses bracketed LST 395. Another air attack was attempted about 0845 but was broken up by friendly filters.

After retraction of LCIs, LSTs of the Third Transport Group commenced beaching, and LCIs commenced retirement to GUADALCANAL, The CONWAY and EATON were left to screen the three LSTs while beached and during retirement. All other ships retired with the LCIs. During retirement, the SAUFLEY destroyed an enemy barge north of SUMBOLAJ POINT.

THIS VAS THE FIRST INSTANCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC OF THE SUC­ CESSFUL EMPLOYMENT OF A TECHNIQUE OF BY-PASSING RESISTANCE. THIS LANDING WHICH BY PASSED THE ENEMY POSITION AT KOLOMRAN- GARA BROUGHT ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF THE LATTER.

Treasury Island Occupation - October 1943.

The Treasury Islands were seized and developed as a staging area for landing eraft as part of the offensive against lb- press Augusta Bay. from: Commander Task Group Thirty-One Point One.

(Commander Third Amphibious Force) made the following ground units available for the operation:

8th N. Z. Brigade Group (less detachments). 198th CA (AA) less detachments and 1 prov. battalion. Detachment Headquarters, ComAirNorSols, including ARGUS 6. 2nd Platoon, Co. A, 1st Corps Signal Bn,, IMAC. Advanced Naval Base: Comm. Unit No. 8; Boat Pool No. 10. Co. A87th Construction Battalion. 1 Bn. 14th N. Z. Brigade (in Reserve). LANDING OPERATIONS - SOOTH PACIFIC

ISlASSIFiEU:om the Naval Forces tinder the operational control of Comaander South Pacific, from the Naval Forces under the operational control of Comaander THIRD .Amphibious Fbrce, and from the landing craft • under the operational control of Commander landing Craft Flotillas, THIRD Amphibious Force, the following were designated by Commander (Third Amphibious ^orce) to participate in the initial landing on Treasury Islands and the Second and Third Echelons:

8 Destroyers 3 LCTs 8 APDs 2 APCs 4 LSTs 2 ATs 15 LCI(L)s 3 AMs 4 LCI(L) Gunboats 2 YMs

Landing at Empress Augusta Bay - November 1943.

From: Commander THIRD Amphibious Force.

In September 1943 preliminary plans were formulated for seizure of a position on BOUGAINVILLE from which aircraft of the South Pacific Force could operate to neutralize RABAUL. BUKA, SHORT- LAND ISLAND and KAHILI were all rejected as Immediate objectives —— BUKA, because too distant from HONDA and BARAKOMA to permit fighter aircraft to cover the operations SHORTLAND ISLAND because ground re­ connaissance in August disclosed there was insufficient usable beach area to permit a landing in force; and KAHILI as too strong to justify an attack with the forces available in the South Pacific.

Two alternate localities were finally selected, the ftapress Augusta Bay Area on the West Coast and either the Numa Numa or the Kleta Area on the East Coast. Should the latter be finally adopted Choiseul Bay (on Choiseul Island) was to be first seized and an airfield constructed as a preliminary to the seizure of Kieta.

In order to determine which of these two alternate plans should be adopted, three ground reconnaissance patrols were organized and landed at the areas in question. The fiapress Augusta and the Kieta Patrols were landed by submarine, the Choiseul Patrol by seaplane. After receiving reports of these patrols, Commander South Pacific determined upon the Northern Snpress Augusta Bay Area as the objective. It was directed that the Treasury Islands be seized and developed as a staging area for landing craft, as a part of this offensive.

The period October 13-30 was devoted to embarkation of troops at Guadalcanal, training and rehearsal at Guadalcanal and Vila, Efate, and rendezvous of the Attack Force for the approach to Bougainville.

1-lU LAUDING OPERATIONS - SOUTH |$JIFI€'- 4 v y/' r; 1 U. t V eff On October 12, 1943, Commander South Paclfi^ ^fiStoedf'? / *v t ' his Operation Plan, designated November 1 as D-Day, and directed (the Third Amphibious Force) on D-Day to seize and hold a suitable site in the Northern Sbpress Augusta Bay Area, to establish there at facili­ ties for small craft, and to construct such airfields as nay be dir­ ected by Commander South Pacific. (The Third Amphibious Force) was also instructed to lay defensive and offensive minefields as directed.

On October 15, 1943, Commander (Third Amphibious Force) Issued his Operation Plan. (For this operation the Transport Group con­ sisted of 8-APAs and 4 AKAs. The landing Force was composed as follows:

Third Marine Division (less 2lst Beg. C.T. and detachments) Second Provisional Baider Begiment Third Defense Battalion (less detachments) Corps Troops assigned by ComGen XMAC Detachment Headquarters - ComAirNorSols - incl. ARGUS-5. Detachment Naval Base Unit No. 7 including. Communication Unit No. 7 and Boat Pool No. 11. Total personnel - 14.321.)

H-Eour was tentatively set for 0715 Love but was changed on arrival to 0730 by signal. At 0545 WADSVOBTH and the Minesweeper Group commenced shelling the beach, covering own minesweeping operations and at 0615 the leading transport changed course to the left into the Transport Area. At 0643 the OTC directed the transports to anchor at discretion and at 0645 executed the signal "Land the Landing Force."

Fire on prearranged targets by the Fire Support Groups commenced at 0710, debarkation of assault waves proceeded, and the leading wave started for the beach. At 0721 friendly planes bombed and strafed the landing beaches for five minutes after gunfire had lifted. The first wave landed at 0726, slightly ahead of schedule. Resistance was light along most of the beach area, except on Puruata Island and Torokina Peninsula, the main bivouac area of the hostile force, in which locations heavy machine gunfire, with consequent casualties, was encoun­ tered.

Between seven and eight thousand troops (over half the landing force) were landed in the first trip of the boats and several signals "Landing Successful" were observed. In the meantime many bogies within thirty miles were picked >9 by radar and at 0738, after all as­ sault waves had cleared the ships, signal was made for ships to get underway to evade and repel air attack. For the next two hours the for­ mation was kept underway maneuvering by turn signals while our fighter cover broke up several attempts at serious attack on our ships. A few divebombing planes got through but without damage to vessels. Four planes were shot down by the transport group and screen. Daring this period the enemy fighter planes strafed the beach area, but few casualties OPERATIONS - SOUTH PACIFIC.

1(7 0930 the transport group had returned to the Trans­ port Area and resumed the debarkation. Ships dropped anchor underfoot and turned to seaward so as to continue unloading as long as possible before getting underway in the event of further attacks. Strong re­ sistance had been encountered at Beach Blue One (TOROKINA PENINSULA) but was finally overcome, so that stores could be received at that beach.

Beach conditions on the northwest flank of the land­ ing area wefre bad because of the high surf. Many boats were broached and lost in the leading waves and it became necessary to discard three of these beaches and double up at the next three. SIOUX was directed to assist hauling off broached boats but could not close the beach due to shoals in that vicinity.

In spite of frequent bogies over and beyond BOUGAIN­ VILLE, unloading continued until 1300 when the formation again stood out to seaward to avoid a large air attack coming in. The AMERICAN LEGION had meantime grounded on an uncharted shoal and remained at the anchorage, with APACHE and SIOUX attempting to pul her off. Numer­ ous bogies, totalling over 100 planes were over and around the formation. A number of bombs were dropped but without damage. Failure of the enemy to push through a strong attack was again frustrated by aggressive figh­ ter director group.

At 1500 the transport group had returned to the Trans­ port Area and resumed unloading. The AMERICAN LEGION was soon thereafter pulled clear, without any extensive damage apparent.

33jy 1600 it was evident that the ALCHIBA, AMERICAN LEGION, HUNTER LIGGETT and CRESCENT CITY could not complete unloading until late in the night. Hy 1730 the other ei&ht were completely un­ loaded except for 23 tons remaining in LIBRA. Decision was accordingly made to retire the entire disposition and to return the LIGGETT, LEGION, CRESCENT CITY and ALCHIBA in time to resume unloading the next day. This decision was influenced by several considerations:

The impossibility of maneuvering the formation in uncharted waters near Torokina in the event of night torpedo or bombing attack.

Difficulty in unloading both at the ship and on the beaches with­ out limits.

An enemy task force of four cruisers and six destroyers at 0750 had been standing toward RABAUL presumably from TRUX. Indications were that this force might be expected after fueling at RABAUL to move to EMPRESS AUGUSTA during the late afternoon and early evening. JKiiU&SlfiED iW 4 , : USDING PTMPSIOM - SOUTH PACIFIC^ - .

"HiviHAiWify «•*»»»•<.* *•-& 4#.f» ssmmf \£„>:$• Ju,+' At 0950 (the Cruiser Task Force) had been requested, "to intercept —Commander Aircraft SOLOMONS was requested to furnish further information of the enemy task: force previously reported and to make special search to detect movement of that force toward TOfiOKINA. The Escort Commander meanwhile had been informed of the enemy force and directed to be prepared to defend the transports if enemy attacked.

At 1800 the transport group got underway, and retired to the southeastward in the general direction of TREASURY ISLANDS.

At 0248 November 2, 1943, Commander (Cruiser Task Force) reported that he was attacking enemy surface force in latitude 6°20' South 154°30' East. Upon receipt of this information, Commander (Third Amphibious Force) directed Commander Transport Group to reverse course to southeastward pending developments but at 0438, on receipt of infor­ mation that Task Force 39 had defeated and driven back the enemy, in­ structed him to return to TOROKINA The transports mean­ time completed unloading, departed TOROKIKA at 1500, and reached GUAD­ ALCANAL at midnight November 3, 1943, without further Incident. ^ - - • LAMPING OPERATIONS !N0LA^iri£D ^ Landing at LAS - September. 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

The objective of the operation was the capture of LAE. This force landed the Ninth Australian Division which operated from the eastward of LAE in conjunction with a separate landing by air-borne troops to the northwest.

General Planning - The following three problems occasioned major attention during the planning stage:

(1) Would air protection of naval units and of landing beaches be afforded by air umbrella or air alert? (2) What time for H hour would best coordinate with related pro­ blems of accurate beach identification, naval bombardment, and air strafing prior to landing? (3) What quantity of freight should be carried in each craft consistent with the need for speed of unloading and the maximum period craft should remain on the beach?

Joint Planning - Each service involved in an opera­ tion should provide an adequate number of officers for joint planning that have the experience, knowledge, and authority which are necessary to insure early completion of the final plans.

Air Support Planning - Although senior officers of the Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon visited MILNE BAY on several oc­ casions prior to the operation to discuss plans for air support, there was at no time a representative present who had sufficient authority to make definite decisions. As a result, finality on the air plan was not reached until shortly before D Day.

Throughout the planning stage the air representative emphasized the efficiency of interception by aircraft upon ground alert, and proposed that this method of protection be adopted. Ultimately, however, a thirty-two plane air cover was provided, with additional squadrons on ground alert.

Selection of H Hour - 4 September, 1943, was set as D Day and H Hour was 0630, eighteen minutes after sunrise. This time was determined as the earliest at which the exact location of the beach could be determined with certainty. The landing force had requested an approach during darkness with a landing at dawn, about 0515. Ibis was considered impracticable as the shore was low-lying swampy jungle with no prominent features. Clumps of coconut palms and a river bed were the main aids to identification. Badar could not be used as a LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHV^S^I^IFltf

&j'lL * *4 "-"f'vFi. 5* 3 primary means of identification because of the unfavorable fthore con­ \t tours.

Initial landings - Red Beach, approximately fourteen miles east of LAS and just east of the BUSO River, was occupied by the main force. Yellow Beach, approximately three miles east of Red Beach, was occupied by one battalion. These beaches were believed to be un­ occupied and outside of the range of any known shore batteries.

The initial landing of 560 assault troops was made an the two beaches almost simultaneously. The initial wave on Red Beach consisted of 8 LCP(R)s and landed at H plus 2 minutes. The initial wave on Yellow Beach consisted of 8 LCP(R)s and landed at H plus 1 min­ ute. These waves were followed, at approximately 15-minute intervals, by waves of LCI(L)s which landed 3780 troops, 15 LCI(L)s landing on Red Beach and 3 LCI(L)s landing on Yellow Beach. LCT(5)s and LSTs fol­ lowed and landed antiaircraft batteries, vehicles, ammunition, stores, and 2400 troops. At about the same time, a Shore Battalion of 1060 troops and equipment of the Second Engineer Special Brigade was landed in LCVs, LCM(3)s and LCT(5)s. The last wave of the initial landing consisted of seven (7) LCT(5)s, each loaded with 120 tons of bulk stores and ammunition.

Seventy-eight hundred troops, together with a large number of vehicles, guns, ammunition and stares, were on the beaches by 1030 when LSTs commenced to withdraw. The last craft of the initial landing, seven bulk-loaded LCT(5)s, withdrew at 1430, at which time approximately 1500 tons of stores had been landed on the beaches.

Landing at rinschhafen - September. 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

The objective of the Operation was the capture and oc­ cupation of FINSCHHAFEN which is approximately 64 miles beyond LAE on the HUON GULF. The purpose of the occupation was to develop the area as a concentration point and staging area for further operations, and as an advance base for aircraft and light surface ships. Originally, it had been planned to stage the Operation four weeks after the fall of LAE. However, the quick capture of SALAMAUA and LAE made it de­ sirable to accelerate the operation against FINSCHHAFEN. 22 September was selected as the day to commence operations, six days after the fall of LAE. FINSCHHAFEN was captured on the morning of 2 October 1943.

General Planning

Acceleration of operation date - The capture of SALA­ MAUA and LAE in quick succession plus the Japanese failure and losses in the defense of these areas made it desirable to stage the FINSCHHAFEN

. - -r V 1-19 NG OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Operation four days after the fall of LAE. Up until this time no de­ tailed plans had been formulated and no target date set. Some preli­ minary planning, in anticipation of the possible acceleration of the Operation, ensued between 10 and 14 September between SEVENTH Amphibious Force and First Australian Corps staff at BUNA.

Selection of D Day - LAE fell on 16 September. After conferences at General Headquarters and with First Australian Corps on 17 September, it was decided to stage the FINSCHHAWSN Operation on 22 September.

Forces Involved - The Twentieth Australian Infantry Sr. sjade, reinforced, was selected to carry out the landing. A de­ tachment of the Second Engineer Special Brigade was provided as Shore Party. A fioyal Australian Navy beachmaster and small detachment accom­ panied the Shore Party.

The following ships and craft were allotted for the operation: Operation Reserve DDs 10 - . APDs • 4 - LSTs 6 2 (at Buna) LCI(L)s 16 - SCs 7 - APCs 1 several available Tug 1 - LCM(3)s 10 several available

LCVPs 15«~rf 9 1 0 Although the LSTs 0< had been going steadily since the commencement of the LAE Operation, they had received a few day8 of upkeep at MILNE BAT. CDs and APDs also had two days upkeep in MILNE BAY after a very strenuous two weeks of operation. FT boats of Task Group 70.1 assisted. A'tug accompanied LSTs to assist retraction, if necessary.

landing Plan - To minimize risk from air attack in the exposed area of VITIAZ STRAIT, the outline plan provided establish­ ing the force ashore in one operation, with its guns, vehicles and re­ quirements for 15 days. Subsequent supply by LCT(5)s and LCMs was to be provided as opportunity afforded in case enemy air opposition was strong.

No Time for Training or Rehearsal - Assembly of Troops - The speed with which this operation was launched was made possible large­ ly because of the experience of both Army and Amphibious Force plan­ ning staffs gained during the previous Operation. Hie Twentieth Austra­ lian Infantry Brigade had participated in the LAE Operation. Because L SOUTHWEST > «§ *'F *A»•

I ' I i* \ \*L* FT F1 ^ S •*> >'* I yi^^l f:*'i J-il£f i!fl II " v- ^;w-' ^ -;: • * ; v* of the"ttibftttftaifw'flwP dtmiidMaPa rehearsal was dut of the question.

The main difficulty confronting the Army was the assem­ bly of the Twentieth Infantry Brigade Group with its vehicles, guns, and equipment ready for loading in three days. The Ninth Australian Division had just completed an operations and troops were tactically dis­ posed in an area where time had not permitted development of tracks for vehicle movements.

Amphibious Scouts - A party of six white and four na­ tive amphibious scouts had been put ashore near the proposed beach dur­ ing the night of 11/12 September by FT and rubber boat and were with­ drawn on 14 September. They were unable to obtain the desired hydro- graphic information because of the native and Jap activity on the beach. No beach defenses were observed, but machine gun nests were thought possibly spotted at the north end of the beach.

Selection of H Hour - The determination of the time of H Hour was the result of a compromise. The Army desired a darkness approach and dawn landing. The Amphibious Force, however, in view of anticipated early morning air attack, desired all craft to be off the beach as early as possible, and accordingly proposed a landing at 0200 in moonlight. It was finally agreed that the landing would take place at 0445 on 22 September.

Boats from APDs approached the beach under cover of the destroyer bombardment which commenced on schedule from a range of about 5000 yards. No return fire was received. The first wave was seven minutes late in landing due to smoke and dust, following the bom­ bardment, obscuring the landing beach. The landing was unopposed.

Summary of troops and equipment landed - Troops, equipment, and stores landed totaled:

Personnel 5300 Vehicles 180 Guns 32 (25 pounders, Australian, and 40MM. AA) Bulk Stores 850 tons (15 days supplies, 12 days ammunition).

Rapid Planning and Execution of Operation - This op­ eration proved that experienced planning staffs and well trained troops who have worked together in previous amphibious operations can organize and effectively execute a small amphibious operation in very short or­ der. In this case, less than five days elapsed between the decision to stage the operation and H Hour.

THE FINSCHHAJEN LANDING IS AN EXAMPLE 07 THE EXPLOITATION 01

. £ (' -i i' .. • , ; ' . . '*• -r *. f f . r V -- 1-21 ; .: " 1 •" .. .• •• r. • ' NO OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC c SSS BY SPEED AND FLEXIBILITY lit PLANNING AND THERE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE MANY OCCASIONS IN THE FUTURE WHEN SPEED, FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY IN THE CONDUCT OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WILL ENABLE THE FORCES CONCERNED TO CAPITALIZE ON AN UNEXPECTED SUCCESS.

landing at Arawe - December 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force - Arawe.

On 22 November 1943, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, issued the directive for the seizure, on 15 December 1943 of Arawe, on the Island of New Britain. The object of the operation was to obtain a suitable location for the establishment of light naval forces which would protect the southeastern flank of our forces in the impend­ ing seizure of the Gloucester Peninsula.

It was anticipated that the occupation of Arawe would isolate Western New Britain from supplies and reinforcements proceed­ ing via the south coast and assist in protecting our use of Vitiaz and Dampier Straits in future operations. A successful landing was made at Arawe on 15 December 1943.

Composition of lending Force

112th U. S. Cavalry Regiment, reinforced, and with two AA(AW) Batteries and one SL Battery was selected for the task with the addition of; Naval Beach Party (reduced size) Amphibious Tractors and U. S. Marine crews. E.S.B. Boat and rocket dets. Radar Detachment Fighter sector control party. Shore Fire Control Party.

Organization of Assault Forces

Commander Seventh Amphibious Force was responsible for the overwater movement. Cruiser Task Force 74, PT Boats, and 5th Air Force co-operated. The force was transported in:

2 APDs 300 troops 1 LSD (CARTER HALL) 10 Buffaloes 29 Alligators 2 Rocket Dukws 940 troops 1 APA (WESTHALIA) 16 LCVP 2 LCM 660 troops 40 tons stores Essential

1.22 k gi It *3^ LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC,,.^

M equipment 'v'*7*' ?.

Additional echelons arrived from CAPE CRETIN after the landing as follows: 5 LCT 0900/Z 150 tons BW equipment and 7 LGK bulk stores, and 50 personnel per LCT. 2 tons stores per LCM 8 LCT 0800/Z -f 1 150 tons and 50 personnel per LCT

The force was reinforced on 18 December by 900 troops transported from G00DEN0UGH ISLAND in APDs, and by one Bn 158th Inf, about 29 December from CAPE CRETIN.

Subsidiary Landings

The plan called for two surprise landings in darkness (Z-l hour) each of 150 personnel in 15 rubber boats from the APDs. One party was to seize BLUE Beach 5000 yards east of Arawe and block both entrance to and exit from the narrow intervening peninsula. The other party was to land at the northern tip of PILELO ISLAND in order to seize a suspected enemy W/T station.

The rubber boat landing on BLUE Beach was repulsed with approximately 50$ casualties. That on PILEIX) ISLAND was successful and a small party of Japs were exterminated.

At each beach troops were embarked in rubber boats from APDs about 100 yards from shore. Enemy at BLUE Beach apparently observed the approach and opened fire with several heavy and light machine guns from both flanks before the leading boats beached.

Although it was considered that the moonlight might prevent surprise, the Landing Force Commander desired to attempt it without any preliminary bombardment. One DD, however, had been de­ tailed to engage targets of opportunity after the landing hour and si­ lenced the enemy machine guns on BLUE Beach very rapidly. This action was too late to save the situation. later it was learned that the leading rubber boats had nearly all been sunk and that none reached the beach. The darkness and the merging of the landing boats with the jungle background made it impossible for the supporting destroyer to accurately appreise the situation. Communication with the boats was never satisfactory. There were a number of casualties throughout the party. Boats in rear were apparently subjected to fire and did not press the attack. A number of survivors were rescued from the water after daylight.

Main Landing

Orange beach was situated on the western shore of LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

apporach to the beach was difficult owing to reefs and islands. The course ran roughly west through Pilelo passage and within 800 yards of Cape Merkus, on the mainland, then turned north parallel with the shore for 2000 yards, within effective small arms range, and finally east to Orange beach. Beefs along the shore were almost continuous and provided only two beaches about 75 yards and 100 yards long respectively and 400 yards apart. Offshore reefs limited movement. The main landing was to take place in daylight at Orange beach after 15 minutes initial destroyer bombardment of Cape Merkus, Orange beach and its flanks. Upon cessation of the bombardment, the final approach was to be covered by the fire of two rocket Dukws supple­ mented by rockets from the Control Subchaser. A second Subchaser e- quipped with rockets stood by to engage Cape Herkus if required.

The amphibious vehicles were launched in moonlight at 0500 hour8 at a point about 5 miles from Orange beach, l^ hours was allowed for their approach. Their slow speed and errors in leadership and station keeping resulted in delays and confusion during the movement. The few Buffaloes performed well. The difficulties encountered were due to the Alligators. In consequence timing broke down, the naval bombardment was insufficiently delayed and the main landing, fortunately very lightly opposed, took place during the period Z f 35 to Z / l*hour 15 minutes covered by fire of rockets from SCs and Dukws and bombing and strafing of the beach by one squadron of B-25s which was on call over the landing area. A number of amphibian vehicles actually landed on the coral shelf in the vicinity of the beaches with difficulty.

fy mid afternoon the landing Force had secured the eastern end of the peninsula, which was their final objective for Z day, against slight opposition.

HMAS WESTRALIA carried 16 LCV(F) and 2 LCM(S) from 2 ESB and manned by Engineer Special Brigade crews. These landing craft loaded at ships side between 0400 and 0500 and followed amphibious ve­ hicles to Orange beach in order to allow time for beach party to locate suitable landing points. The craft remained in the area for coastal patrol and supply work. After discharging their landing craft, HMAS WESTRALIA and USS CARTER HALL (LSD) left the transport area under escort at 0500 in order to avoid risk from air attack in the landing area after daylight.

Amphibious Scouts

A small party of Amphibious Scouts was landed at BLUE beach on Z - 5, remained about 2 hours and were withdrawn. Japanese were discovered in the area although no defences were seen. It has been suggested that the strong defences on Blue beach may have been due to this reconnaissance. There was no indication, however, that the party was detected, while the beach was the only practicable one known for many miles east of Cape Herkus.

1-2 91 • LANDING OPHUTIONS - SOUTHWEST PAC1JIC k, «' ~t :% ,: r . T t *

TtnH1rr »t &»>• Gloucester - D*c«nberiiMUbtf. -t94&l1943, ' * ^^ t"

From! Commander Seventh Amphibious Force - Cape Gloucester.

Object - The object of the operation was the capture and development of the Cape Gloucester area (Western New Britain) for subsequent operations agianst the Bismarck Archipelago.

General - Cape Gloucester is located at the northwest end of New Britain on a narrow coastal plain sloping to the- sea from Mt. Talawe,_an active volcano, which rises to a height of 6600 feet within 5 miles of the coast. The area is covered by jungle and scatter­ ed kunai patches. The airstrips are located north of Mt. Talawe and within 60 yards of the shore.

The bulk of Japanese troops (about 7500) were be­ lieved to be bivouacked in the vicinity of the airstrips and at Bor- gen Bay, about seven miles to the eastward. Fixed defenses of dual purpose guns had been located in both these areas. Small patrols were presumed to be maintained between these points and along the coast to southward.

Composition of TATwH|ftfr forces - The landing force con­ sisted of First Marine Division, together with two Battalions of avia­ tion engineers, AA artillery, air warning detaci-ents, and artillery units. A Naval Beach Party trained with and accompanied the Shore Party,

The assault force was formed into three groups:

(1) Regimental Combat Team "CH with additional artillery, Shore Party and Detachment ESB Boat Battalion (Main Landing Yellow Beaches). (2) Begimental Combat Team "B" less one Battalion landing Team with Detachments Shore Party and XSB Boat Battalion (to follow (l) on Tellow Beaches). (?) One Battalion Landing Team with Detachment ESB Boat Battalion and auxiliary units (subsidiary landing Green Beach).

Begimental Combat Team "A* was in reserve near BUNA ready to go in on D plus 2 Day if released by Commanding General Sixth Army.

Planning - Representatives of the Sixth Army, First Marine Division, fifth Air Force and Seventh Amphibious force, all of whom were concerned with the planning, met from time to time, but did not plan continuously as a group. This was prevented by the separation of the various headquarters at Qoodenough Island, Cape Sudest, Dobadura and Milne Bey. In spite of the delays and difficulties due to this separation, the final plans were well coordinated although the complete air plan was not available until shortly before the operation. f? i-.'

i • • ^

••• •' - . *• •. - -• „* -i:- .1 <- . -» * OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Training - A large part of the First Marine" Division were veterans of Guadalcanal, and although experienced in jungle fight­ ing and in APA landings, had no previous experience in LCIs or LSTs.

Assault elements were given landing exercises from APDs, LCIs, and LSTs. A training group of these craft was formed which conducted four dawn landings. Troops were embarked at staging points at Goodenough Island, Cape Sudest and Milne Bay and moved to the prac­ tice landing beach. A full day was occupied in landing and maneuvers in beaching. This training was pracitcal and realistic, and included a thorough test of the shore party organization for unloading vehicles and stores.

Three days prior to the final embarkation, a rehearsal with all craft participating in the main assault landing was held at Cape Sudest.

Outline landing Plan - The leading assault groups (Regimental Combat Teams MC" and "B" less one Battalion) were carried as follow8 and landed on Beaches Yellow One and Two:

9 APDs 1300 personnel, H to Efl5 min. 4 waves of LCP(R)s to each beach

14 LCIs 2800 personnel H / 20 to H jt 40 2 waves (6 LCIs) to Y.l min. 3 waves (8 LCIs) to Y.2

7 LSTs 3500 personnel, vehicles, guns H / 40 min to H / 5 and unit equipment 1050 DW tons bulk hrs.

7 LSTs 3350 personnel, vehicles, guns 1400 to 1800 D and unit equipment 1050 DW tons bulk

Total troops and equipment transported to the Cape Gloucester area and craft actually involved during the period D to D plus 14 amounted to the following} Craft employed Totals transported 9 APD 24000 personnel 19 LCI (approx) 2,300 vehicles and guns 12 LCT 11,475 JJ4 tons bulk stores 24 LST (45 LST loads)

Timing and coordination were excellent tJHuugnout the landings from the efficient and speedy work of the Harbor Control Unit in buoying and sweeping the reef-bordered approach to Yellow Beaches through the interlocking stages of the naval and air bombardment to the landing of the leading assault wave. There was* no '6]3position to the landings at either Yel­ low or Green Beaches, This was probably due to the naval and air bom­ bardment which preceded the landings as abandoned guns, rifles and documents were found in the vicinity of all beaches. Subsequent infor­ mation has shown that the only beaches on the north coast which were not defended in considerable strength by pill boxes and trenches were the two Yellow beaches chosen for the landing. Both the airstrip and Borgen Bey Area were particularly well defended from a possible amphi­ bious attack.

In spite of protection from the reef, a 3 foot to 4 foot surf was encountered at the Yellow Beaches which washed across the entire width of the narrow, hard sand. Conditions were worse on Yellow Two where a sand bank 50 yards off shore was also encountered. The use of Yellow Two was discontinued because of the surf after LCIs had disembarked troops.

Naval and Air Operations - Task Force 74, consisting of two Australian CAs, and two U, Sr CLs with four DD escorts, covered the convoy during movement to objective, took part in the Initial bom­ bardment under operational command of Commander Task Force 76, and later occupied a position of readiness to protect landing operations from surface attack. PT boats supported the operation. A destroyer was used as the headquarters ship for the (Naval) Attack Force Commander Extra communication facilities were installed. All local amphibious force communications worked satisfactorily during the operations. There appeared to be no delay in transmission of reports and the use of the destroyer as headquarters ship was satisfactory.

No attempt was made to oppose the landing although troops had obviously been in the beach area prior to the bombardment. It is assumed that the naval and air bombardment was responsible for the withdrawal.

The old problem of arranging efficient joint planning has not yet been adjusted.

'• . 1-27

\ A1B SUPPORT

omrrnAL paciko

Operation - November. 1943.

Iron J Commander fifth Amphibious Jbrce.

Mr Support for (the Northern Attack Force) during Gilberts Operation was furnished by three escort carriers of Car­ rier Division Twenty 7our supplemented by bombers and fighters from (Northern Carrier Group). This was the first extended operation of the Kaiser-built C7B. Bach vessel carried 16 fighters of either the 747 or JM types and 13 torpedo planes, type TB7t a total in the three carriers of 48 fighters and 39 torpedo planes.

The average availability of aircraft up until Dog Bay was approximately 40 Wildcats and 30 Avengers. There were numer­ ous operational losses due, it is believed, largely to the Inexperience of these air groups in carrier operations.

Air Operations by Task Qroup 52.3 on Dog Day and sub­ sequent there to while at the objective were under the control of Com­ mander Task Group 50.2 who was in direct charge of support of the land­ ing operations. Combat Air Patrols, Anti-Submarine Patrols, Bomber and Tighter Support Group, and Liaison planes were provided by the carriers, fieport of operations during this period is covered by the Support Air­ craft Commander, Gilberts Operation. It is of interest to note that only one plane, an Avenger, was lost in combat.

The operational requirements of Task Group 52.3 air­ craft over the long period of the operation were rigorous and placed heavy flight loads on both pilots and aircraft. Nevertheless, CVEs have rather limited usefulness in combat operations. 7or the future it is recommended that only fighters be carried by CVE, except for two or three TB7 to be employed for liaison with troops ashore.

from: Support Aircraft Commander, Gilberts Operation.

Summarizing, the following tasks were assigned for air:

Land based aircraft.

(1) Photographic reconnaissance of objectives and their sup­ porting bases. (2) long range searches in the objective areas and in the sea approaches thereto. (3) Night strike against objective and their supporting bases. (4) Boutine fighter protection of friendly land bases.

3—1 f |||r# p Ipi\ 1^i!i AIR SUPPORT - GBBTBAL PACIFIC

Carrier based aircraft. Establishment and maintenance of aerial superiority. Destruction or neutralization of enemy defenses on objectives. Support of the assault. Medium range searches forward of each Task Unit. Tighter protection of each Task Unit, and of objectives after friendly troops landed. •Anti-submarine searches adjacent to each Task Unit. Gun fire spotting for fires on objectives. Continuous observation and report of situation on objectives.

Total aircraft available. VB(S) TB(M) VSB VTB VJf

Land based 21 82 131 Carrier based - - 203 191 366 Total 21 82 203 191 497

Bach landing foroe unit, down to and including the bat­ talion, was furnished an air liaison team for the purpose of assisting the Unit Commander in the selection of suitable air targets, and convey­ ing these target designations to the Support Aircraft Comaander at each objective.

The Assault Force Flagship at each objective was equip­ ped with an air communications net containing sufficient channels to direct, or listen in on all phases of air activity. These channels were guarded by operators especially trained for the purpose. The nets were supervised by specially trained air support communications officers, for insurance of continuous efficient functioning. Over this system the Force Commander imposed his will on air activity through his Support Air­ craft Commander.

A mobile shore based air communication net, duplicating that installed in the Flagship, was furnished the commander of the land­ ing force for his use ashore, when command of Support Aircraft was re­ linquished by the Assault Force Commander.

Minor discrepancies in radio procedure wasted time and placed unnecessary traffic on the air net. This obviously arose from lack of thorough indoctrination of pilots in procedure due to inadequate time for stifficient preparatory exercises.

Sue to apparent misunderstanding, fighter direction was the weakest of all air activities. It was intended that the strongest possible combat air patrols should be automatically maintained over the objective area by the adjacent carrier group, that each patrol coming

J i, < s " $ f X k '*•, '* •* ' on station should report direct to the designated fighter director destroyer, and that the fighter director would keep the flagship in­ formed of the current combat air patrol strength. Combat air patrol flights upon being relieved on station, were to report to the Support Aircraft Commander for support strafing missions, prior to returning to base. The following discrepancies in the above plan were noted: (l) Some flights reported to the Support Aircraft Commander, rather than to the fighter Director, when coming on station. (2) Some flights failed to report to the Support Aircraft Commander upon relief from Combat Air Patrol. (3) The fighter Director base rarely informed the Support Aircraft Commander of the status of combat air patrols. (4) One Tighter Director was- out of oontact with his Combat ^ir Patrol for a long period without informing anyone or transferring control to an alternate Tighter Director. This resulted in failure to interoept a snooper who came near the objective area.

failure to insure proper functioning of the IFF on each aircraft entering the objective area, or failure of the aircraft commander to turn it on, caused an inordinate number of "friendly Bogies". This one item alone caused more trouble and unnecessary con­ fusion than any other. It applied equally to Army search planes and naval aircraft.

Anti-submarine search sectors were laid out in the Air Plan, and it was intended that the carrier group adjacent to the objective area should furnish and automatically maintain aircraft over these sectors. Tor the Information of the Assault Commander, each flight was to report on station to the Support Aircraft Commander, and, upon being relieved on station by the succeeding patrol, again report to him for a support mission prior to returning to base. Discrepancies in this plan were noted as follows: (l) Some flights failed to report on sta­ tion. (2) Some flights failed to report upon being relieved. (3) Some fligjhts upon arriving on station reported for assignment to a support target. One such flight was assigned a target and then*went on anti­ submarine patrol unarmed until the situation was ascertained and re­ medied. - / The Air Liaison Parties functioned as planned and by j their seal and resourcefulness kept the Assault and Landing Force Com- / maoders Informed of the situation ashore in so far as it was intelli­ gible to them. ^

lach Air liaison party was trained to supplement ra­ dio communications by the use of simple panel signals which assisted aircraft in the location of targets designated for attack.

TroopB of the landing force were furnished individual fluorescent panels for display preceding an air attack, for the purpose of marking their positions and thus avoiding accidental attack by friendly M - CENTRAL PACIFIC fjyys planes.

Liaison Planes. An experienced senior aviator conver­ sant with the ground, plan and in radio contact with the Support Aircraft Commander, maintained constant surveillance of the objective.

Fighter Direction. Tighter direction for Gilberts components was accomplished as follows:

(1) land bases - by established directors. (2) Task Units underway - by designated carrier in the Unit. (3) Task Units at objectives - two destroyers equipped with fighter director radio manned by experienced fighter director personnel were designated fighter director and standby fighter director respectively, in alternative standby fighter director was located in each of the Assault force Flagships. Tighter director units ashore at each objective took over when set up and established.

Air strikes prior to D-Day gained, and the covering carrier force maintained, complete aerial supremacy during the assault. Enemy air activity was limited to an occasional snooper and, in the later stages, unsuccessful night attacks.

She air schedule for D-Day was executed exactly as planned. Attacks were effectively coordinated with gunfire and furnished material assistance in landing troops. No beach resistance was offered during the primary landing on Beaches Bed, and only very minor resis­ tance met the landing on Beaches Yellow. Adequate support aircraft were available on station throughout the day and thereafter during the assault.

Contact was maintained between the Flagship, all air activities and the Air Liaison parties ashore throughout the entire as­ sault phase and thereafter.

She most valuable source of information concerning the situation ashore was the Liaison Plane.

She value of support aircraft was curtailed due to the failure of the ground troops to display their fluorescent panels. This was also a contributing factor to the dropping of one bomb on a target other than that assigned. Had these panels been displayed as planned, far greater assistance might have been rendered ground troops by aircraft,

jfiXTHACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A STRIKE COMMAND OPERATIONS OFFICER IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC ON THE SUBJECT OF AIR-GROUND LIAISON.

Air-ground support is practicable and can be done, if you have trained pilots and trained men on the ground. I am interested

2-4 , ; W ^ ? :• ? * < - CBNTHAl PACIFIC' : , J ... •,**g g .X* ; 1 in this 'because I worked with air-ground support for~a long time.

What happened in a couple of instances, and will happen every time you send a mission out where the pilots get a little rattled and the bo nib racks stick, was that every now and then a bomb went into our own forces. You can avoid a good bit of that by extremely careful briefing about approach and retirement from the target. I can recall many Instances in which it could be seen that an air mission was war­ ranted but couldn't go out because it wasn't requested. Air-ground support can be done well, but it does take a lot of understanding on both sides. Ve worked for about two months doing some good sound check­ ing here and there, and teaching people how to find ground targets. When the Third Marine Division went into Bougainville we knew what we were going to do for them, and they knew what we could do for them. Ve now give them air-ground support missions within 100 yards of their lines. They come back with these "very pleased" messages, and send their officers back every now and then to say, "Your support is wonder­ ful] You can really do it." We worked it out this way: The aircraft got on station, called for smoke on the target; smoke shells were put on the target. The target was never very far way, so it could be marked with mortars if desired, a smoke line was marked showing our front lines. Hie pilots were briefed very carefully. When a 100-pound bomb is dropped 100 yards away from any position everybody in that position has to be lying flat on the ground or someone is going to get hurt, because a few bombs will move around a little, they won't all be down the line. You actually can provide good air-ground support; we have done it repeatedly. It is practicable, but it does require training.

AH EFFICIENT MEANS OF SHOWING THE AVIATOR THE LOCATION OF OWN FRONT LINE TROOPS UNDER ALL CONDITIONS OF TERRAIN HAS NOT YET BEEN DISCOVERED. PANELS ARE USELESS IN JUNGLE COUNTRY AND THE FRONT LINE SOLDIER IN OPEN TERRAIN WILL NOT DISPLAY A BRILLIANTLY COLORED PANEL WHERE BY SO DOING HE WILL DISCLOSE HIS POSITION TO THE ENEMY.

ONE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FIELD OF TARGET DESIGNA­ TION RATHER THAN FRONT LINE IDENTIFICATION. SMOKE PROJECTILES SHOULD PROVIDE A MEANS OF OBTAINING CLOSER AND MORS ACCURATE AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS.

From: Support Aircraft Commander, Gilbert Operations (Cont'd).

As the operation progressed, air losses, particularly those from operation, took a severe toll of our air strength. These operational losses were particularly heavy on the CTEs and tended to increase as pilot fatigue became apparent. _• SOPPOET - CEHTEAL PACI7IC

HilWWwil believed that with our preponderance of carrier* and superior airmanship it is possible to establish mastery of the air at any given time and place in the Japanese held island bases. Main­ tenance of this mastery over any protracted period vill require main­ tenance of initial air strength by an adequate system of replacements for both fatigued pilots and damaged aircraft.

The system evolved for the utilization of aircraft for support missions is sound. The efficiency could be greatly increased by

(1) Going over the entire plan with all pilots prior to em­ barking on the operation. (2) Comprehensive rehearsals with the landing troops, air liaison parties and aircraft. (3) Chalk talks and CPXs enroute to objective. (4) The compilation of a pilot's cockpit file including: (a) Target chart and/or photographs. (b) Badio calls and procedure for each type of mission. (c) Panel code. (d) Shackle code for the day. (e) Authentlcator for the day. (5) Indoctrination of ground troops in the use of fluorescent marker panels. (6) Careful selection, special training and correct use of liaison pilots.

Tighter direction over the objective areas can be Im­ proved by:

(1) Unmistakably placing responsibility for its establishment and maintenance with the adjacent carrier group. (2) Selecting competent, experienced, aggressive fighter director personnel completely conversant with their grave responsibility and in­ doctrinated in procedure. (3) Eliminating "friendly bogies" by strict 177 discipline. (4) Indoctrinating CAP pilots in procedure.

Anti-submarine search over the objective area can be improved by:

(1) Unmistakably placing responsibility for its establishment and maintenance with the adjacent carrier group. (2) Eliminating "friendly bogies" by strict 177 discipline. (3) Indoctrinating A/S pilots in procedure.

Trom: Commander 7ifth Amphibious Force.

The outstanding deficiency observed in the Gilberts op­ eration was the failure of aircraft to identify themselves with proper H s#. .. AXH^JOWOBS - CXNTBA1 PACIFIC

y r~"' -,,MW%v? IIT, either as a refUT of faulty equipment or darelessnets ox per* v - * sonnel. On several occasions ships of Task Force 52 were obliged to get underway, form up, and prepare to repel air attack when approach­ ing planes were friendly. Considerable unloading time was lost, thus exposing ships in forward areas longer than was necessary. Positive steps should be taken by all activities operating aircraft to insure that IFF is on and functioning properly. Aircraft whose 177 is in­ operative should be grounded until equipment is placed in working order. Pilots and radiomen need Instruction in order to recognize when their 117 is inoperative, and radiomen need training in making minor emergency repairs in the air. In case of doubt, approaching air­ craft must make the proper approach procedure required by PAC-10, and be ready to identify themselves by light, using tht daily identification signals.

Pilots and radiomen need to be thoroughly familiar with the use of the proper codes available in the IFF equipment. Num­ erous cases were observed of aircraft on anti-submarine patrol showing the code assigned to search and attack aircraft. Many cases of impro­ per use of the emergency signal were observed.

In as much as it appears reasonable to believe that the Japanese are, or may some times be operating recovered United States aircraft, the desirability of periodically changing identification mark­ ings appears to be necessary. As easily applied and easily removed paint wash might be developed in various colors so that the identifica­ tion insignia could be varied in color, shape and location.

'Svery attempt should be made to fornlsh at least a minimum requisite of night fighters to all carriers so that each force containing a carrier will have night fighters to break up the Japanese night torpedo attack#. This is an extremely Important problem, whose solution should be vigorously pursued.

All vessels should be furnished and should use flash- less powder during night air attacks. On the night of 25 November one of the carriers of Task Force 52 was oompletely illuminated by the fltse of ordinary smokeless powder being fired by one of the destroyers of the screen. Tracers from automatic weapons also disclose ships posi­ tions. It might be well to eliminate tracers when firing at aircraft at night.

It is recommended that the system of using aircraft for support missions employed for Gilberts operations be generally adopted as standard. Sufficient air liaison and air command parties should be trained immediately for future operations. Methods of train­ ing and allowances of equipment of these parties should be standardized and should Include exercises with aircraft whenever possible, and pre­ ferably while attached to the ground units they will serve in action.

$ &! SJ "; ^ ^' ' •* Although radio equipment should be standardized, it should not be al­ lowed to become static, but should tend towards lightness, mobility and dependability as new development are evolved.

Future operations should include a definite progressive plan for maintaining carrier aircraft and pilots at initial strength. Bases in the GILBERTS should be stocked prior to the assault phase aad aircraft and equipment be staged forward as required.

Ear more attention should be paid to the destruction of enemy defenses before landings are attempted. Preliminary air at­ tacks should start many weeks in advance of the assault with the pri­ mary purpose of destroying fuel, ammunition and supplies of all kinds. Replenishment of supplies should be denied by air. The assault should be preceded by several days (not hours) of deliberate bombardment and day and night air attacks. Defenders should be given no rest day or night for at least a week prior to the landing. After bombardment and after bombers, employing two thousand pound daisy cutters, have neu­ tralized heavy and medium AA weapons, large formations of heavy bombers should saturate the defense area with one hundred pound demolition bombs and fragmentation clusters from such altitudes that misses are impossible. Prior to the landing the selected beaches should be subjected to a devastating combing and bombardment with part of the one hundred pound demolition bombs being dropped on the reef along the rdute to be followed by landing"craft for the purpose of detonating mines and des­ troying barriers.

From: Observers Reports.

In coordinated operations timing is most important and one of the criticisms of some of the strikes at Makin was the small regard for time element. It is desirable that air attacks commence on tirae, but it is mandatory that they cease precisely at the time set.

In the attack east of Kings Wharf on November 21st, the strike was to commence at 1000 and end at 1016. The air liaison officer with the 2nd Battalion had ordered all air attacks in that area to cease by 1015. This was acknowledged and relayed. Neverthe­ less, the strafing continued until approximately 1030, after which VTB dropped several bombs until 1045, holding up the infantry which was leaning against its restraining line. This introduced an element of uncertainty in the minds of the soldiers who feared they might get caught in our own aerial fires while advancing. Ihe last section of VF further confused them. In addition to this, the strafing attack was not well coordinated. It was not continuous, there being intervals of three and four minutes between attacking sections, and the troops could not be certain when the attack was completed. Strafing VP for­ mations should be so disposed in the air that the interval between attacking sections,or,plepgg if necessary, not be longer than 30 or V?-J Ifrf ::P *• 40 seconds, with perhaps a minute or so between flights. This should enable the first flight to arrive in position for its second "pass" by the time the last section in the last flight has "rushed over" into its attack. In this manner the attack can be made more continuous and effective.

Carrier pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the need for accurate timing when working with the ground forces. It may or may not be important if an attack against a naval target is not broken off on time, but it is almost always costly if this occurs in sup­ port of ground action.

A strafing attack by VP in support of HE" Company on November 21st Just east of Kings Wharf was effective, killing approxi<- mately 20 Japs and scaring hell out of the rest. However the last section of VTs strafed our own lines, despite the fact that panels were displayed and in previous "passes" these planes had fired in safe areas. One man was injured and the others forced to dive into nearby ditches.

Constant reiteration for care in observing safety lines and panels should be a part of every "briefing" session. Air liaison officers must furnish this necessary Information constantly for relay to the carrier groups.

Strafing attacks Just prior to the landing of the first wave should be related in time to the movement of the first wave and not to a specific time schedule related to H-hour. (Comment - Several other Commanders have mentioned this and concur).

SKI LANDING- OPERATIONS DOCTRIKI (MP-167, PAGE 130).

Air strikes should not be scheduled for any specific time in relation to gunfire.

Hie ability to conduct point target bombing after bombardment has commenced is questionable due to clouds of smoke and dust.

it is also recommended that carrier groups have adequ­ ate opportunity to maneuver with the air liaison units and ground forces they are to support prior to the actual operation. Ground force com­ manders are especially desirous of this. The exercises at Maui prior to the Gilberts operation were not, in the considered Judgement of those who took part, adequate in preparing the ground forces for air support operations, nor the carrier groups for working with the infantry. It is believed that a standard maneuver exercise to achieve this can be devised, and all troops assigned for an amphibious operation where air support is contemplated be put through this exercise as frequently as is necessary to assure complete understanding,iand coordination between i HMITEZJ% 4^f"if"MfiSWPP0BT - CENTRAL PAeiHC - , air and ground.

from: Commanding Officer - USS ESSEX (CV).

Pilots flying low over Tarawa after two days of steady bombing and bombardment reported that the entire surface installation appeared devastated, and that the subsequent assault should prove re­ latively easy. Visiting the island after its capture, these same pilots observed for themselves that the surface installation had in fact been virtually destroyed, but that shelters and gun positions underground, were relatively secure. It was here that the Japs survived all preliminary attack and were ready to meet our assault troops in strength.

Pilots also reported that the high velocity, flat trajectory fire of ship bombardment seemed to produce little effect against such surface targets as remained when the gun action started. A high percentage of the shells were misses, falling into the ocean or the lagoon, apparently due to only small errors in elevation. Like­ wise hits of major caliber shells failed to tear up the area In an im­ pressive fashion.

8XB "U. S. NAYA1 PROVING- C2R0UKD REPORT NO. 8-43 NOTES ON FEB~ 70RMANCE 0? PROJECTILES AND BOMBS AGAINST SHORE INSTALLATIONS" BATED 24, DECEMBER 1943 TOR INTOIOtATION ON EFFECTS TO BE EX- PECTED JROM NAVAL AND AIR BOMBAREMENT.

It is apparent that some better form of attack is ne­ cessary to destroy defense works of other bases which may be as strongly held as Tarawa. Air bombing and ship gun bombardment may be relied on to clear the above-ground structures, but the underground works remain relatively invulnerable. Large caliber mortar fire appears to be indi­ cated.

Air Support of Initial Landing Wave

Our fighter pilots believe that they could have ren­ dered effective support at this time by coming in directly over the landing boats to strafe shore firing posts whieh necessarily, on a low atoll, cover a very small range of elevation. Vith maximum number of fighters so used in a critical phase, the shore fire would certainly be greatly reduced.

Coordination of Air Support Missions

At times on D day, flights from CVs, CVLs, and CVEs, plus some float planes, operated over the target area - with little semblance of orderly procedure. Dive and glide bombing, and strafing attacks, were apparently carried out according to the taste of individual leaders, with the resulting serious confusion. The Support Air Commander 'a & ^1**1 - CENTRAL PACIIlC^\V aitif if y *** •**'' vast exercise positive control over all aircraft assigned him for sup­ port missions.

Stspport planes were called on station in the morning before daylight, and at least half an hour before ground objectives were distinguishable and planes could be usefully employed. On a long campaign this simply adds to pilot fatigue, already high, and confusion at the target.

Identification of friendly Ibrces

In an atoll area containing numerous small islands there is frequently doubt as to just where friendly forces may hare landed. Yarious of our units at Tarawa, either by necessity or design, landed on islands adjacent to Bitltu and thereby became liable to attack by fighter planes ordered to strafe hostile personnel. Suitable ground or beach panels should correct this situation.

Conclusions

The need is most evident for coordinated training and indoctrination of all elements concerned with future air support mis­ sions. k suitable program to this end should be considered an essential preparation for any further operations on the scale of those In the Northern Gilberts.

Iron: Commanding Officer, USS &JNKEHHILL (CT).

Is a result of this action, combined with previous ex­ perience at Casa Blanca and later experience at Nauru, the Commanding Officer makes the following recommendations:

That the opening bombing strike prior to assault sprinkle target areas with as many 100 pound bombs as the planes can carry with a view to doing some damage to as many targets as possible. In this connection, if it appears that complete surprise has been achieved the bombing at­ tack should precede the strafing attack. Whether to bomb first or strafe first should be left to the discretion of the.senior aviator in the flight. Heavy bombs can be used later in areas where strong resistance has been encountered by the assault troops.

That some discretion be allowed the fighters in strafing the beach as the boats come in. They are in a position to see the progress of the first wave and can coordinate the beach strafing to give most assistance to the landing wave. Where strafing is done upon a definite time sche­ dule - and the boats are late - the strafing is over and the enemy back up out of his dugouts before the boats hit the beach.

SXZ LANDING OPBBATIONS DOCTBINB (JTP-167 PAGS 130).

rf-., • . • • ' •" • .f.

: ^ w .• • * - • j ~ •' .2-11 SUPPORT - CENTRAL PACIFIC

That troops going ashore mark their front lines with smoke and panel signals and then the fighting planes strafe ahead of them. This valuable assistance cannot be safely utilised unless the ground troops mark their front line positions. We are not making the most out of this phase of support.

The target charts used in this operation, with the en­ tire island divided into target areas, each separately numbered, proved very satisfactory. It is believed that the use of numbered target areas is much superior to the grid system. It is suggested that where mosaic photographs of the target are furnished, the numbered target areas be overlaid upon the photographs to correspond with the charts. This was done by the squadron intelligence officers for this operation, and pilots found it most helpful in their study of the target. from: Commander Carrier Air Group Nine.

She apparent effects of the subject strikes were very disappointing to this observer. About ninety per cent of all bombs were seen to hit in the assigned areas. Hits were seen within 10 or 15 feet of assigned gun targets - but after a slight pause these guns were fir­ ing again. Direct hits were seen on buildings - but no fires started in the majority of cases. Incendiaries had no effect. The great ma­ jority of all bombs merely dug a nice crater and raised a great cloud of coral dust which hampered the bombing of other planes.

Against such an island target it is felt that dive bombing and glide bombing should be assigned only buildings and fuel and ammunition dumps. The accuracy required to hit a reveted gun em­ placement for example which is at best a 20 foot circle is not usually- obtained.

It is believed that the smaller bombs with the short delay fuses were most effective. It is recommended that for such strikes SBD type airplanes carry 1 500# and 2 100# bombs and that the TBF type carry 12 100# bombs.

It Is believed that horizontal bombing by the TBFs would have been much more effective against this target than their glide bomb­ ing was.

From: Commanding Officer - USS MARYLAND.

Air strikes should not be scheduled for any specific time In relation to naval gunfire. The naval gunfire support group must be free to fire at any time after its arrival within range until the first wave is approaching the beach if effective use is to be made of this means for demolishing enemy strong points. Bombs may be re­ leased at a height sufXl£j.$jrb to escape projectile explosions using

Z-1?* v1 hr'* ' «• • : ii i *I h% CENTRAL PACIFIC : ' - - 4 - >^ «? r*^$* w* S'lJtJ * f '* xi • - area targets instead of point targets. She ability to conduct point target bombing after bombardment has commenced is questionable due to clouds of smoke and dust.

Air bombardment group should use large cans of gaso­ line fitted to burst and born on impact to deny use of communication trenches, open machine gon positions, etc., to defenders, provided smoke does not interfere with assault wares.

Determine possibility of using numerous small (100 lb) HC bombs with delay action fuzes to countermine boat approach lanes and beach mines Installed by the enemy. from: Commander Task Force Fifty* (Commander Carriers). Use of airfields can be denied the enemy provided run­ ways are heavily bombed and with a lapse of time between strikes of no more than 25 hours. IFF must be kept on throughout flights when numerous strikes are airborne, and target is 100 miles or less from the (Cask force. Hits on the power house at MILLS eliminated M fire from all except automatic weapons. When the position of an enemy power house is known for an island attack, it should invariably be attacked by dive bombers on the first strike. CHI WPLOYMENT AND CONTROL 07 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT IN THE GILBERTS VAS MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN IN ANT PREVIOUS LARGE SCALE AMPHIBIOUS OP­ ERATION. THE ORGANIZATION PROVIDED A FLEXIBLE MEANS OF APPLYING THE FULL DESTRUCTIVE POWER 07 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT AT THE TIME AND PLAGE WHERE MOST NEEDED IN FURTHERANCE OF THE LANDING ATTACK. THIS FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL VAS OBTAINED BY J (A) HAVING ALL SUPPORT AIRCBA7T ENTERING THE AREA REPORT TO AND RECEIVE ORDERS FROM THE AIR SUPPORT COMMANDER. (B) HAVING ALL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WHILE IN THE LANDING ATTACK AREA UNDER TACTICAL COMMAND OF THE OFFICER RES­ PONSIBLE FOR THB LANDING ATTACK. AIR SUPPORT . * . -> • * * - : » '• '

Salerno

From: Commander, Eighth Amphibious force.

There was no direct air support of the landing opera­ tion in the form of tombing and strafing of enemy positions in the vicinity of the landing beaches. It is understood that indirect sup­ port by attacks on enemy reinforcements, supply lines, communications and air forces was strong and continuous - this cannot he confirmed by observation.

Air coverage up to the departure of this force from the assault area was much superior to that in Sicily, ®he Naval Task Torce Commander was better informed as to fighter cover provided but was still not told what A/S patrols or escorts were operating in the vicinity of the convoy. Air defense by friendly fighters during the stay of the transports in the assault area was excellent. The enemy succeeded in making only a few minor attacks on the ships in the Trans­ port Area prior to the eve of departure. There appeared also to be a definite improvement in the air raid warning service and in anti-air- craft fire discipline on ships of the Attack Forces. The exception was the occasion of the attack during the departure of the transports from the assault area. At this timet with no targets in sight there was a great deal of firing without director control, and with weapons whose maximum range was far short of the probable altitude of the enemy aircraft. In a night attack, such indiscriminate firing, while it may serve as a partial deterrent to low flying bombera or torpedo planes, provides an excellent point of aim for high level bombers above the max­ imum range of the short range automatic weapons.

The question of Tight*1* Director Control Units is still unsettled. There are several such units consisting of Army Air Force and Army Communication personnel on board ships of the Amphibious Force, with no apparent central command and very vague orders. The status of these units should be clarified and clearly understood by both the Army and the Navy.

THE AAF HAS ORGANIZED TWO (2) AIR COMBAT CONTBOL SQUADRONS, AMPHIBIOUS (FIGHTER DIRECTOR TEAMS) FOB DUTY ON AOCs OR FIGHTER CONTROL SHIPS. THESE ARB TEMPORARILY ALLOTED TO THEATRE COM­ MANDERS FOR THE DUTY INDICATED. ALL AOCs (EXCEPT THE USS ANCOff) HAVE A NAVY CIC COMPLEMENT OF 9 OFFICERS AND 38 ENLISTED.

In future operations a high altitude patrol should be kept over the transport area if there is any likelihood of rocket bomb­ ing.

A fighter director or radar warning guard ship should 2-14 MASSIF fI& tfv! ff |%#Pi00I'®S8£,- JOEDIfBHHAHBAK THBATHI; : ^ WAfibMWll) ' •'w.'V- ^ be spotted son* distance to seaward and up sun from the traa.sgpir'tr area *. where practicable to break up or give advance warning of low altitude fighter bomber* or torpedo plane attacks.

from: Commanding Officer, USS PHILADELPHIA.

Inemy air activity in the SAIJGRNO BAT area was in­ tense. Daring the period 9 to 19 September, inclusive, there were ap­ proximately 55 red alerts in the area during which time approximately 25 actual attacks were delivered, The attacks were of very short dura­ tion, except for four or five attacks during hours of darkness, which were prolonged to from thirty five minutes to seventy minutes. Friendly fighter cover was constant and excellent, considering the handicaps under which our fighter planes were compelled to operate. As in previous similar circumstances, a daring air foroe such as the Luftwaffe is, will always succeed in making hit and run attacks during daylight hours des­ pite superior fighter plane cover in the general area. The attacks by fighter bombers using standard type bombs were very costly to the enemy, as a large number of the attacking planes, and it is believed a goodly percentage also, were shot down either by friendly fighters or by Anti­ aircraft fire. The glider bombers, on the other hand did a great deal more by near misses. This vessel was directly attacked by hostile air­ craft in some twenty attacks and suffered very near misses from five glider bombs, the most Inaccurate one of which landed 100 yards distant and the closest one five yards distant. Since vessels engaged in shore bombardment activities became hi£i priority targets for the Luftwaffe, this type of enemy air attack will continue to be a very serious menace until methods which can successfully combat It are found. It is be­ lieved that the only effective defense at the present time against this form of attack, is that of smoking up the area to the extent that over­ head visibility is reduced very materially, The commanding officer also believes that high speed and radical maneuvers also reduces very slight­ ly the accuracy of this type of bombing.

Spotting by P-51 planes gave excellent results and is, by far, the most successful method of spotting so far tried.

From: Commanding Officer, HMS PALQMARES.

If no more accurate estimation by radar can "be supplied for future operations of a similar nature, patrols should be stepped up In height (2,000 feet between each flight) and each take station on the flight above. The highest flight only should be vectored and the re­ mainder conform. This would, to some extent, reduce the likelihood of missing an interception owing to bad height information, since with 6 flights 14,000 feet of sky would be covered. It is understood that a good deal of training would be necessary before this could be achieved. ; A2B SOPPOHT > :<* "=

SOOTH PACIFIC u landing at Vella toy 11a - August. 1943.

from: Commander Third Amphibious Force.

Tighter direction was conducted, at all times when destroyers were present, from the destroyers, using experienced Fighter Director Officers. This should obviously be done In the Initial move­ ment, until radar and fighter direction are set up ashoreIn this operation, however, it was not possible satisfactorily to control fight­ ers from the BAEAKOMA area due to poor radar coverage from within the perimeter of the initial position. In fact, even with shipborne direc­ tion, it was necessary, due to land masses interfering with radar re­ ception, to split the air cover over two general areas, the west side and the east side of VELLA LAV3LLA and to rely upon visual contact or radar advices from MUNDA for interception to the west. Inemy bogies were uniformly intercepted, although some dive bombers were able to get through to attack the ships,. In general, however, our aircraft were able to break up the enemy formation.

fighter cover can and did protect vessels by day, but the present skill and tenacity of the Japanese in night air attacks, as noted throughout the operation, when cover is ineffective and ship AA batteries of reduced efficiency, warrants every attention to 'the develop­ ment of means and methods of ni^it anti-aircraft protection for vessels in waters accessible to enemy aircraft.

Adequate and most efficient air cover was supplied over BARAKOMA daring all days when a convoy was present. Dae to shortage of fighter squadrons in this area and other requirements for air cover, as on striking missions, a continuous day-by-day coverage in protection of the BARAKOMA position could not be supplied by Commander Air, SOLOMONS, acting for Commander Air, South Pacific. While this exposed the position to somewhat greater hazard and damage from air attack, the efficiency of the AA batteries and the discipline of the troops prevented serious loss of life or material. The shore AA batteries (and those of LSTs when present) brought down many enemy planes.

Landing at Empress Augusta Bav - Spyember. 1943.

from: Commander !Qiird Amphibious Force.

Commander Air Third Fleet was directed by Commander South Pacific to support the operation by providing defensive reconnais­ sance, air cover and air support- for the forces engaged, and by strikes against airfields on BOUGAINVILLE and on any enemy units threatening the -attack force. A (cruiser Task Force) was directed to destroy enemy surface units threatening (the Amphibious Force) and to operate against hostile bases as directed by Commander South Pacific. In furtherance - UNCLASSIFIED 60018 mo flKl4"*"L • >»* -'WHPinr -- % v' j; iS - **" & M- "° -'• • "* 1' * * «* JF* -# *V ....4, ,f > „, • " •' •• 'LI.# j£f i of the latter task the airfields at BUKA were bombarded during*th& night f -» "£ of D minus 1-Day and SHQBTLAND ISIAKD in the early morning of D-Day.

from; Operations Officer, Strike Command, Commander Aircraft Solomons (Attracts from an interview}.

Paring the fire months 1 served as Operations Officer in Strike Command, we set up and sent out approximately 120 strikes, averaging 50 planes per strike during the first tvo months and increas­ ing to a maximum of 120 planes at the end. She fighter cover we had varied from none up to 100 fighters.

I think the greatest job ve had in that period was trying to knock out the airfields in southern Bougainville during the period in which the landings were made on Treasury Island and on Bou­ gainville at Cape Torokina.

There is quite a hit of discussion about whether air can knock out an airfield and how to do it, and so on. I'll state flatly that air can knock out airfields and can keen th«m knocked out. and can deny to the enemy the use of his fields. It took us about two weeks, of one strike a day with about 100 planes a strike to keep the three fields in southern Bougainville (Kahili, Kara, and Ballale) totally knocked out and their use denied to the Japs. In general^ our strike setup against those fields was to have the dive bombers go down and hit the guns, with as many diving simultaneously as possible. Torpedo planes came down and hit the field with a lot of variations, due to the fact that the Japs soon caught on that the.torpedo planes would hit the field and they would come out of their holes after the dive bombers went away and wallop the torpedo planes as they pulled out. So we had little sneakers arranged here and there — some dive bombers would lay up In the air until the SBDs had all gone over, then come down and hit some of the Japs who got sassy; or they would wait until after the torpedo planes had finished their attacks and come down; or a group of four to six torpedo planes would come down in the center of the torpedo plane attack on the field and hit any guns that happened to reopen fire.

Tromi Commander Transport Group, Biird Amphibious force.

The brilliant performance of our figjhter cover and Tighter Director Group who successfully turned back or completely broke up the concerted attacks of four separate groups of enemy planes. With­ out such effective air cover, severe losses or even failure of the oper­ ation may have resulted.

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Night Tighter Squadron 531.

The only reasonable employment of the CCI equipment for maximum effectiveness is to include it in the first or second echelons SUPP0ET ILu ~ south pacimc

of the landing so that night filters can efficiently cover the area during those first critical nights and during the time that bogey actiTlty Is the heaviest. With GCIs range of 60 or so miles, ample warning can be given for day fighter protection, and OCIs superior presentation of bogey information permitting control direct from the scope, plus giving altitude information makes it a more satisfactory radar to land with the first echelon than the SCH 270 as was the cape at both Treasury and Anpress Augusta, furthermore, the facts to date indicate that the mobile SCH 527 A can be set up quicker, with VHT communications than other radars.

2-18 Aff ygPQBi SOUTHWEST ^

Ifaftdjpfl £*« - September 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

Qround alert la not considered a satisfactory method of air protection.

It is believed that the proper air protection can be obtained only when fighter corer is available in the immediate vicinity of the ships feeing protected.

She fifth Air force provided an air umbrella over our convoys enroute to and from the beach and undoubtedly broke up a num­ ber of enemy plane attacks prior to their reaching an attack position on our ships. However, a proportion of a heavy enemy attack of about seventy planes broke through our air screen at about 1400 on D day and severly damaged, by torpedoes and bombs, LSTs 471 and 473 which were enroute to Bed Beach.

Inemy reconnaissance planes hovered in the general area of our convoys nearly every night. Our ships were seldom attacked until after anti-aircraft fire was opened. Hiere seemed some indication that the enemy was not certain of the exact location of the convoy. Instruc­ tions were issued to hold fire at night unless aircraft appeared to adopt an attack position.

at - September. 1943.

From: Commander Seventh fleet.

fifth Air force arranged to provide continuous cover by two fighter squadrons, seven squadrons were actually engaged in the mid­ day battle. '"f J*;' ' > "

The movement from BUM to LAE, the loading area at LAX, the convoy movements, and the beaching operations on 22 and 23 September were provided continuous cover at two levels by fighter planes. USS BIID (OS) acted as a fighter director ship with conspicuous success.

Estimates indicate that 70 to 100 Japanese aircraft were involved in attacks on 22 September. Of this number, 38 were des­ troyed by our fighters and 8 by AA fire. Our air losses were 3 fighters. One pilot was saved. from: Commanding Officer, USS BEID.

During the month of September, Allied Fighter Director Parties have been embarked from time to time in this vessel. During this period enemy losses total approximately 84 enemy planes which have

>;• f *:• f -* •'* 2-19 : ri. *- *•' ' ' - 'i ~ i; r I :%-4> >• z 'i. $ J 3RT - SOUTHWEST PACING ; been wurt down by the^flled Air force directed by the Jitter Director Party embarked in this vessel. Approximately four Allied planes and two pilots have been lost during these operations.

landing at Arawe - December. 1943.

From: Commander Seventh .Amphibious Force.

Somber aircraft on call erer the area of operations were most useful in providing impromptu support. Future use of this form of support is recommended.

Air cooperation consisted of:

Z - 1 Heavy bombers attacked ABAWX dropping over 200 tons of EX. Night Z - l/Z Tive Navy Catalinas provided A/S patrol over convoy. One Japanese snooper dropped bombs over the convoy at 0330/D with­ out damage. Z - 6 B-25s over ABAWX at 0625 hours on call for close support.

A Tighter Director Ship was employed. An Air Support Officer (Local Air Commander) controlled B-25s from HQ, Ship.

Tighter cover failed to intercept a bombing euad straf­ ing attack on the landing area by 33 enemy a/c about 0900 hours. The convoy had withdrawn into cloudy weather by this time. Beach and HQ Ship only were attacked.

From: A Digest of a Report by A Member of The Army Ground Force Board, SWPA Who Accompanied The Task Force Which Landed at Arawe.

First bombardment of the Arawe area was delayed until D-l as a secrecy measure. Prior to D-l air attacks were continued on the Cape Gloucester area, where 3,500 tons of bombs were dropped and where at least one of the two air stripe was rendered unserviceable by D-l day.

On D-l Arawe was hit by two groups of heavy bombers and two groups of attack bombers escorted by one fighter group, dropping 200 tons of high explosive. Meanwhile, the Gasmata airdrome, about 80 miles further east along the south coast of New Britain, was hit with one group of heavy bombers covered by one fighter squadron and using 1,000-lb. bombs with .i-second delay fuzes.

Daring the night of Dul Lakunai airdrome at Rabaul was hit hard by Beauforts.

Bombing: Bombardment operations on D-day were limited

2-20 Al£ SUPPORT - - S ' HHimrfi] ' to one strafing and bombing attack just prior t

Fighter Cover: Tighter cover was maintained in the area throughout the day, with two flights from daylight to 0800, four flights from 0800 to 0900, six flights from 0900 to 1400, and two flights from 1400 to dusk. Meanwhile, fighter sweeps of one flight each were sent out every two hours along the north and south coasts in the direction of principal Jap air bases.

Although our forces were subjected to two enemy air raids on D-day, it was quite apparent that the effectiveness of these attacks had been minimized by the friendly fighter cover. Other attacks attempted by the enemy were completely diverted.

Air support missions on D/l and subsequent days consisted principally of reconnaissance and strafing of rivers and trails. In one instance, however, the flight leader of a flight of A-20s, part of a squadron en route to perform a strafing and bombing mission some distance from the beachhead, picked up a message from a detached unit stating that they had been driven back and calling for bombing and strafing support. The flight leader, after verifying the call, diverted his flight from the squadron mission and bombed and strafed the area specified. This action was in violation of SOP, which prohibits diversion of elements briefed for a specific mission. However, the original mission was in this case a routine area coverage where no targets had been definitely located, and the flight leader, who alone had received the message, as­ sumed responsibility for diverting his flight to the attack of a definite! located target and thereby assisted materially in relieving the pressure on the ground troops.

An Air Liaison Officer and his party accompanied the Arawe expedition and maintained constant and effective communication with the advanced echelon of the air force except for a short period several days after the landing.

The SOP for attack aviation in close support of ground troops in the Southwest Pacific Area requires a unit or task force coot- Dander to include the following information in any request for close air support i

(1) l|ype or designation of target. (2) Exact location of target by best means available. AIR SUPPORT - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Q^Cion movement of target, if any. 4)'All particulaly distinguishing characteristics of target. (5) Time limits of requested support, if necossary. (6) If target designation is by map or aerial photo­ graph, specific reference to same. CHAPTER III

HAVAL QUOTIBB

CENTRAL PACIFIC ft

Gilbert Islands Operation - Makln, November 1943.

Jrom: Commander fifth Amphibious Force. PLANS Representatives of the 7IFTH Amphibious Corps, ComGen 27th Division Artillery and Commander ?IPTH Amphibious Force collabor­ ated on the preparation of Nsval Gunfire Flans. The Dlrision represent­ atives specified the location, timing, and quantity of gunfire desired, after a thorough study of intelligence charts, plan of maneuver, etc. The force representative was then responsible for scheduling the gun­ fire to achieve these results considering the following:

Bombardment ammunition allowance of each ship. Bates of fire considered reasonable. Xnfilade effect on narrow necks of land to avoid excessive overs and shorts in the water. A variety of range bands to obtain both plunging and point-blank fire. Necessary maneuvers of ships to stay in sectors assigned. Visibility of target area. Covering important areas with all 3 calibers from several differ­ ent ships to minimise effect of possible lnterxruptlon of fire. Avoidance of cross-fire. Avoidance of two ships or batteries firing at same or adjacent targets at the same time. Minimum hazard to own ships, boats and troops.

All the above requirements are so intimately related that all those concerned actually worked together as one planning group. The close cooperation achieved was most satisfactory.

Several conferences were held. The following officers from troops and ships attended one or more of these:

Artillery Officers and Shore Tire Control Officers. Gunnery Officers. Communication Officers. Commanding Officers of Destroyers. Senior Aviators. Savigators.

These conferences were invaluable in ironing out misunderstandings and improving the plans. They give the personal touch so necessary,to mate ! any plan function smoothly-. \ * v;

The following observations were made:

fl.® r*~ § rn 3-1 rftf. *1 & ?P!P»i .VAL GUNTIRB - CKSTBAL PACITIC

Harrow sectdivr forced ships to steam at very slow speeds and M'"• to Tpveirse course often. Course reversal is undesirable tout tras necessary to obtain fire effect sought. Bange patterns were in many cases rery large. Deflection pat- § terns were too small. Many shots fell into the water, principally in the lagoon, due to failure to keep MPI on the land. Plane spotting seemed ineffective. Half-salvos were fired by firing half the turrets, lfcr firing all turrets every salvo, one or two guns from each, pattern should be reduced by less mutual interference between projec­ tiles. Also, shift of MPI, toy difference in turret alignment, will be minimized. Angle of fall was not great enough. Velocities are too great. If the range is Increased to 15,000 yards to get a fairly large angle of fall low lying atolls are not visible enough to allow good accuracy, this is a matter of great urgency.

In assessing the effect of naval gunfire, it is diffi­ cult to distinguish between damage and casualties directly resulting from such fire, and those caused by aerial bombardment and strafing. This is particularly true in the area lying between the east and west tank traps, which was subjected to heavy attack by surface vessel fires and by aerial bombardment on B-Day, and by aerial bombardment on D-l.

Shore ?ire Control Communications were excellent and were for a time the only link between the Task Force Commander and the authorities ashore.

From: Commander Cruiser Division Pour.

The battleships and cruisers remained in their respec­ tive fire support sectors for a period of two and one-half hours after the completion of the bombardment to provide call fire if requested. During this period these ships were vulnerable to submarine attacks in that they operated at slow speeds in a confined area and without anti­ submarine protection. It is suggested that large ships in a potential standby for call fire duty, but not primarily designated therefor, be recalled to operate in company at higher speeds than are permissible in their limited firing sector areas.

from: Commander Task Unit 52.2.3 (Tire Support (fcroup).

The fflW MEXICO had sixteen prostrations in magazines due to high temperatures and ether fames. MISSISSIPPI and IDAHO avoid­ ed this condition by ventilating between phases. Until magazine ven­ tilation is provided this will have to be done during prolonged fir­ ing in the tropics. No such difficulty was experienced in Aleutian waters. *,331 n# sr*.* • .

3-2 Is-* HAVA1 GOTFIBS - CXNZBAL PACIFIC, $

Fro® J Commander MIffl imphibioua ^IfC*|J^f*'

Two items that affected the performanoe of'bo^igvJp bombardment ammunition and aerial 'bombs were the unusual consistency1 of the coral making xq? the island, and the growth of tall coconut palms that covered a good deal of the surface area. She coral, being of com­ paratively equal consistency and without striation or lamination, appar­ ently permitted a deeper penetration of a projectile on impact than that encountered in true earth, with a resulting tendency to funnel fragmentation upward. It also impacted more uniformly from the point of detonation, the craters of both bomb and shell being noticeably deeper, but less conical in form than those produced in earth. In sev­ ered cases where 14" shells had landed at some distance from the center of the concentration, it was possible to obtain an excellent observation of the effect of the individual projectile. It was noted that in many cases, low brush from 2 to 4 feet in height and within four feet of the crater-lip was mud splashed and seared on the side near the crater, but was otherwise undamaged; coconut trees were out off at heights ranging from 8 to ten feet at 10 yards from the crater, to 26-30 feet at 35 yards. Fragmentation was indicated on some trunks as low as three feet at 36 yards. Die coconut trees, where dense, caused several heavy cal­ iber shells and bombs to burst at heights estimated from six to twenty feet above the ground; and where this occured, destruction of growth was exceptionally heavy for radii of from twenty-five to seventy-five feet from the estimated point of impact.

One other item to be taken into consideration in ass­ essing the effect of naval and air bombardment in this operation, is the construction of defensive works encountered. She low land level of the island, with a resultant high water table, caused the defenders to construct the bulk of their shelters, revetments, pill-boxes, and other wtructures at least partially above ground. Very few excavations over two feet in depth were encountered, and although considerable quantities of cement were found on the island, very few structures were of concrete. The bulk of the shelters, pill-boxes, And other de­ fensive works were constructed of logs and covered with coral blocks and earths for depths of from one to four feet. Living quarters, ware­ houses, and other administrative structures were of very light frame­ work with galvanized iron covering or roof.

Control of gunfire can be divided into 3 periods:

From arrival at objective until after all prearranged fires are completed. Commander of Groups and Units must have control during this period due to the complexity of the situation.

Prom end of scheduled fires until demand for called fires tapers off. The Task Force Commander can best control the assignment of sup­ port ships during this period because he has the best information GUHFIKB - CENTRAL PACITIC regarding the" situation.

After the second period there is so little demand for called fires that it is much more convenient, and satisfactory to have all ships and shore fire control parties on the same frequency, the T.J1. Commander still controlling.

Iron: CO USS BASBISLL - Tarawa.

One rapid fire gun or field piece was spotted 100 yards east of the Barns Phillips pier. This gun was firing into the boats and against advancing troops. Our visible troops on the north shoreline were close to this gun and may have teen trying to outflank it. This vessel could not open fire. The shore fire control party was notified at 1226 tut we were not allowed to open fire on this gun. At 1258 we again reported to the S.I.C. that this gun was firing from east edge of area 216 and tried to get permission to open fire on it without avail. The call fire had all teen directed well to eastward of this point and I still did not have stifficient knowledge of own troop movements to open fire on my own initiative. At 1422 received word that our own troops were 100 yards east of Barns Phillips pier which was our estimate of the enemy gun position, so 1 still was unahle to "get that gun". Furthermore, it appeared to me that all our fire was "being directed too far to the eastward of our own troops. I couldn't see across the is­ land and so formed this opinion from visual observation of only the troops on the north shore. I then moved in as close to the beach as possible and at 1452 was convinced that we could get that gun without damage to own troops. 1 so informed the S.F.C. and was finally given permission to "get it". We opened up purposely short waiting to see if there would be any "complaint" from the S.F.C. There was none so we spotted on and obliterated this position. The fire also unearthed a lot of Japs just east of the guns position so we opened on them.

A twin battery of about 5 inch caliber was located at the western edge of area 207. This battery Opened fairly on the RING­ GOLD and DASHLELL when we came through the smoke screen. This vessel was, at the time engaged with another battery, but a heavy offshore battery was straddling it frequently. 1 should judge a dozen heavy salvos landed "on" this battery without even slowing its fire. We were able to shift to this battery and shortly put it out of commission with a minimum of salvos. I presume the heavy battery was firing indirect prearranged fire, but its inefficiency was noted.

A five or six inch hit will silence almost any land emplaced gun as effectively as a 16 inch hit or bomb since direct hits are required in any case. Die five or six inch battery has all the advantage due to volume of fire and small pattern. It therefor takes much less time and less expenditure by weight of metal to silence the shore battery. This comment does not belittle the use of heavy gun NAVAL GUNFIRE - CENTRAL PACIFIC#-!gt "•*** £"V ft k* and bomb attack on installations, magazines, runways,VifUtW^h etc.**

Because of the lengthening of the range pattern and flat trajectories at short ranges, this vessel and others outside the lagoon got many "overs". Two to three shots per salvo would clear the slight elevation of the island, carry clear over and down the reverse slope and ricochet. Spotting down only put shellB short on the near side. Tor this reason, bombardment of a flat atoll should not be from less than 2500 yards range unless visual observation is necessary. Many of these "overs" from outside the lagoon caused anxious moments to boats transports and fire support ships inside the lagoon and delayed fire by the support ships. These "overs" were not often visible to the ship firing because the smoke from the land bursts intervened. She ships in the lagoon had a lot of luck and a lot of poor Jap shooting on their side.

From: Gunnery Officer, U3S DASHISLL(BD).

loo much emphasis was placed on trying to follow a schedule after the landing boats were in the lagoon. Although H-Hour was delayed until 0900 the boats did not actually land until 0913 and Fire Support #4 had to cease fire at 0855 according to schedule* and order. Not enough reliance is placed on individual commanding officers judgment as to necessity for continuing fire and probable delay of boats etc. In this case everything was very clear and the necessity for con­ tinuing fire appeared to be quite obvious but it could not be continued because of a schedule and because apparently the commanding officers of Fire Support #4 could not be depended upon to make a clear estimate of the situation when they were only 1500 yards from the scene of action and the controlling authority was over the horizon.

REGARDING THE 16 MINUTE OAF BETWEEN "CEASE FIRE" OF THE FIRE SUPPORT GROUP AND THE LANDING OF ASSAULT BOATS. LANDING OP­ ERATIONS DOCTRINE (FTP-16?) STATES — "BUT LAST MINUTE DELAYS OCCASIONED BY MANY CAUSES MAY RESULT IN THE ARRIVAL OF THE ASSAULT WAVES SO LONG AFTER THE PLANNED TIME THAT THE PREPARA­ TION FIRES, IT DELIVERED ON SCHEDULE, WILL HAVE LOST SOME 07 THEIR EFFECTIVENESS TO AVOID THESE EVENTUALITIES FIKE- SUPPQRT GROUPS SHOULD ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE DELAY THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF THE PREPARATION FIRES (OR REPEAT THEM) SHIP OBSERVERS AND AIR OBSERVERS MUST BE ALERT DURING THE CRI­ TICAL PERIOD OF THE BEACH ASSAULT TO FOLLOW THE ACTUAL MOVE­ MENTS OF THE BOATS AND MAZE FIRES CONFORM." ftom: Commander FIRE SUPPORT GROUP (53.4). (Commander Battleship Division Two.)

The term "Fire Support Commander" as applied in this operation is a misnomer. At no time during the fire support phases GUNFIRE - CENTRAL PACIFIC did the Task Group Commander hare nor was he in a position to exercise control over any fire support section other than fire support section ONE. All requests for fire support originating on shore were made di­ rect to the Attack Force Commander who assigned fire support ships and STC parties to work with those ships. The primary function of the lire Support Commander was to take charge of vessels not engaged in fire support and cover the transports. A more suitable title would hare been "Support Commander", which function and title was assumed when Operation Plan A105-43 was made effective the evening of B~day, 20 November 1943.

From J Commanding Officer USS ANDERSON (DD).

During the morning of the twenty-first patrolled the south shore as closely as possible at minimum speed to answer callfire without delay.

Deployment behind both lines could readily be seen and information of enemy movements was given to Shore Tire Control Party 82 in hope that it could be transmitted to field forces. We had pre­ viously, however, been directed to fire only on specified targets.

HERE AN OPPORTUNITY TOR EFFECTIV! CLOSE SUPPORT WAS APPARENT!! MISSED OWING TO LACK 07 CLOSE COORDINATION.

From: Commanding Officer, USS RUSSELL.(DD).

After our ships entered the lagoon north of Bititu Island, and "began shooting at the island in a southerly direction, the area for a considerable distance south of the island became dangerousk because of many "overs'4. An increase in speed and turn away from the island to avoid being hit by this firing was found necessary several times by this ship. In addition, it is known that many shells, fired by ships located south of the island, landed dangerously close to our ships and boats in the lagoon, north of the island. At such short ranges, "overs" missed the flat island and landed at great distances beyend the island. from: Commanding Officer, USS PXNSACOLA.(CA).

The comparable rate of fire delivered is also of interest. Planes from 2 CVs and 1 CVL were scheduled to drop a total 258 tons of bombs over an operating period of 2 days, The 3CAs were scheduled to fire 252 tons of HC projectiles in a period of 2 hours, the use of maximum rate of fire, this could have been done in 30 minutes, allowing for delays and fatigue.

From: Commander Cruiser Division Thirteen.

She value of deliberate bombardment of atoll objectives, possibly for an entire day prior to "D" Day, is believed evident. Baploy- ment of plunging fire, whether by means of firing at longer ranges or by L n.t CI?IC • i i \ -k • * -/ r" V*'* - :& C, •»./ f I * * in J l,,! 12 4;*l|J use of reduced charges, is obviously rxsosssary for store thorough des­ truction of heavily protected eneny positions.

Irom: Commander Task Unit 50.3.2.

This operation, as did the bombardment of WAKE, demon­ strated the difficulty of destroying well outplaced guns either by air or surface bombardment. Many straddles were obtained on the guns, but hits were a matter of chance. rrom: Observers Beport.

Jbpty shell cases, boxes and trash carelessly thrown overboard during the bombardment hinder evaluation of periscope "sight- lags".

Tarawa provided the first test on a large scale of naval gun fire against strong atoll defenses. from: Commander Southern Attack Force.

Pillboxes for automatic weapons and even riflemen had been scientifically constructed to withstand heavy bombardment. Around a concrete floor In a three to five foot excavation was built a 12-inch reinforced concrete wall. Outboard of this were alternate layers of coral sand, cocoanut logs and sand bags to the final thickness desired. The roof was constructed in the same way. Coral sand covered the en­ tire outside, tapering off gradually to prevent casting of shadows for photographic revealment and to provide effective camouflage. The en­ trance to these pillboxes, dugouts, and shelters almost invariably was made through a trench constructed.to prevent direct frontal entry and direct fire into the shelter. Flame throwers appeared to have been the only effective weapons against these.

Larger dugouts and bomb proof shelters were constructed in the same general manner. A large caliber hit on the side of the shelter used later as headquarters by the Commanding General, Second Marine Division, had blown away a little of the outside layer of coral rand and penetrated approximately three feet.

In most instances, H.C. major caliber shells penetrated unprotected reinforced cement if directly hit. 5"/38 AA common pro­ jectiles, made repeated direct hits on unprotected concrete without pene­ trating. Concrete, unprotected by several alternate layers of coral sand, cocoanut logs and sand bags, was unusual, and was noted only in the case of the famous blockhouse in area 214, which withstood destroyer fire and bombing for three days, and the coast defense gun barbettes on the south­ west point of the island.

•103* g t 'I =1® If 5 "* "-f ?. 'I •h- ~ '|| '*£• iJS f KSSiS % P ^ 1 till /a 3 ', * ; '* s GUNFIRE - CENTRAL PACIFIC >

Concrete, protected as described, will apparently re­ quire direct hits of heavy caliber A.P. projectiles before penetration is made.

SUE "U. S. NATAL PROVING GROUND REPORT NO. 8-43 - NOTES ON PER. TORMANCE 0? PROJECTILES AND BOMBS AGAINST SHORE INSTALLATIONS" DATED 24 DECEMBER 1943 TOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.

Recommendations.

That, if fire support ships can be assigned early, the initial fire support plans outline only in broad form the overall bom­ bardments effect desired, the general areas to be covered, and the type and amounts of ammunition to be expanded for its accomplishment. That the details of fire schedules and their coordination with maneuvers required, track charts, and other details of section and individual ship problems, be delegated to Tire Support Section Commanders for plan­ ning and solution.

That gunfire support plans for future bombardment of enemy held islands similar to BITITU embody the following:

Five general phases of bombardment as follows:

Initial counter-battery fire against known strong points using HC and AP projectiles, and commencing at ranges producing an angle of fall of 15 degrees.

General area bombardment using HC and AA common projectiles de­ livered at ranges between 10,000 and 5,000 yards.

Destruction of heavy defenses, pillboxes, and dugouts along the landing beaches by slow, accurate, and deliberate fire, AP and common projectiles. This fire is to be delivered at close ranges using pointer fire if practicable.

Heavy concentration fire at close range on landing beach areas during the boat approach.

Delivery of call fire by ships assigned after H-Hour.

Use of a rolling barrage system of fire rather than rad­ ical shifting of target areas during area bombardment.

Restriction of air burst firing for use only as a wea­ pon of opportunity against exposed personnel.

Maximum use of 40 mm batteries whenever range and other conditions permit, and control of these batteries by 5-inch gun directors if fire control installation* permit.

Stationing of close fire support ships in a favorable position relative to the landing beaches, and at closest safe naviga­ tion range, so as to provide their continuous observation of the as­ sault boat waves, permitting these ships to decide at what time their fire must be ceased for safety of landing personnel.

Destruction of hulks, latrines, and similar potential machine gun nests located in favorable beach enfilading positions.

Plans for local supply of destroyer and light cruiser replacement ammunition, and depth charges. from: 00 USS BUNKER HILL (CV).

Comparative Results of Surface Vessel Shelling and Air Bombing.

It already has been stated that because of the lack of suitable photographs token at the right moments, it is difficult to assess what damage was caused by air bombing and what was caused by shelling of the surface vessels. However, using the available photo­ graphs, and the reports 01 pilots and gonners who observed the areas just before and after the surface shelling, it is possible to formu­ late some general conclusions.

During the dive and glide bombing by this squadron on D-2 and D-l Days, and before the shelling by surface vessels, a num­ ber of the targets selected had been hit, a number of large fires started among buildings and fuel dumps, and substantial damage evi­ dently had been done. The island, however, presented no general pic­ ture of devastation. Except for the targets which had been under sped fic attack, the island looked as intact as it did prior to the start of the attack. Our pilots did not see the island again until after the cruisers had shelled it on the afternoon of D-l Day and after the BBs and other surface vessels had bombarded It for some time on the morn­ ing of D-Day. The island at that time was almost completely devas­ tated. Buildings in some of the areas were levelled to the ground. What buildings were left standing were shattered and blasted. !Qxe em­ bankments and gun positions along the shores of the beaches were torn and broken up. The coast defense guns were out of action. The entire island seemed to be on fire. Sven the palm trees were stripped of their leaves and were burning.

It seems clear that the shelling by heavy units did more damage to the buildings and gun positions in several hours than the bombing and torpedo squadrons accomplished in two days. It has been pointed out that destruction of any of the gun positions would have required direct hits from the planes within areas averaging only OUNJIEE - CZNTRAI PACI7IC t'*~ in diameter. Such accuracy seems not within the capability of the dive-bomber. Of course dive-bombing could destroy such positions if maintained long enough, but this operation indicates that the dire-bomber cannot do it efficiently. The percentages against a direct hit within such a small area are too great. Even against the buildings, some of which were much larger in area and in many cases, clustered close together, the results of dive-bombing were not too sat­ isfactory. A large number of bombs were dropped in the buildings areas, and a very small number of buildings actually were destroyed.

This operation seems to indicate that heavily revetted gun positions and large numbers of buildings can be moBt quickly and efficiently destroyed by a type of "saturation" bombing or shelling. In a naval task force, such saturation can come only from the heavy sur­ face units. It seems obvious that the dive-bombers, with their limited loads, cannot provide the necessary saturation of an area to accomplish its complete devastation within a short period of time.

Where sufficient carriers are present to completely cover and protect the heavy surface forces, as there were in this operation, it would seem practicable to have all the preliminary "softening up" and wrecking of the target installations accomplished by shelling from the surface ships. The function of the carriers during this period would lie to provide a strong fighter cover over the surface vessels. The dive bombers and torpedo planes would be used to bomb selected areas during the actual landing ef the troops and for airground support missions.

From: Commander Southern Attack force.

Recommendations.

That the following conclusions be used as a basis for coordinating air and gunfire support in future bombardments of enemy held islands similar to BITITU:

Haval gunfire can effectively silence enemy coast defense and AA batteries, and will probably have to commence before there is sufficient light for air bombing.

Once gunfire has commenced, air bombardment against spec­ ific point targets such as guns, dugouts, bomb proofs, etc., will be impracticable, as the entire target area will be completely covered by a cloud of dust and smoke. Even area bombardment will be difficult.

Naval gunfire, should hot be ceased for air bombing attacks, This was demonstrated by numerous air strikes conducted in conjunction with gunfire, with safety to bombing planes.

Strafing of beaches is ineffective against type of beach defenses found on BITITU Island and should be considered only as a weapon CENTRAL PACI7IC ., . .

, /£ *5 * ,,-r / >, *\ * -•/ « _ > ";i. it- 5 ' * r ' jl '? ",~^ of opportunity against expofrfe&personnel to be used&fter gunfire in *• y * ' an area has ceased.. The designation of a fixed houraqd area for this type of attack should be diecontinned.

It is believed that gasoline bombs nay prove rery ef­ fective against enemy beach dugout personnel. Tests should be conducted as soon as possibls.

TESTS ARE BEING CONDUCTED BT THE U. S. ABMY AIR-TORCE 09 TUB E1TOCTIVENESS 07 7UBL OIL, NAPAIM 3HICKMED GASOLINE (GELLED GASOLINE), DIESEL OIL, AND MIXTURES 07 VARIOUS PERCENTAGES 07 BAPAIM THICKENED GASOLINE WITH DIESEL OIL TOR SATURATING AREAS USING AIRCRAFT TOR THE PURPOSE 07 DESTRUCTION BT C0S7LAGRATI0N.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITORES

Based on the allowances and incomplete reports from ships giYing amounts remaining on hand, the following expenditures were made in the bombardment of TARAWA.

Tor scheduled Tor other Tire Missions Total 16"H.C. 540 200 740 14»H.C. 450 140 590 8MH.C. 690 120 810 68H.C. 1590 770 2360 5"H.C. 1140 80 1220 5*/S8AA com 6950 8900 15850 5"/25AA5"/25AA comcom -.2815 590 3405 ;if, < 1 & 2 4,^7& (523 tons of bombs were dropped on TARAWA during November — 55 tons by shore based and 468 tons by carrier based aircraft.)

EXPERIENCE AT TARAWA DEMONSTRATED THAT: THERE WAS NOT EN0U£ffl PREPARATION BT AIR AND SHIP BOMBARDMENT. THE DELIVERY OT NATAL GUN7IRE AND AIR BOMBARDMENT DID NOT CONTORM TO THE MOVEMENT 07 ASSAULT BOAT WAVES. NAVAL GUN TIBS WAS HAMPERED BT SHOTS AND RICOCHETS 7R0M ONE TIRE SUPPORT AREA PALLING AMONG SHIPS IN ANOTHER AREA. DESTROYERS AND SMALL CRAFT WERE NOT USED TO TOLL ADVANTAGE TOR CLOSE SUPPORT OT TROOPS ASHORE. - , ^ HA.TAI OCT TIHB

MBDIEBBBAKB*" mreimro

Salerno - September 1943.

from: Observers Beport.

Bogkefr llrf

Immediately after enemy fire broke out as our first assault wave was advancing orer the beach, the scout began firing roc­ kets at the eneoqr positions ashore. Closing the beach to within about 80 yards of the shore, on the left flank of Green beach, salvos of 3-4 rockets at a time were fired in a pattern of an arc ranging from the left flank limit down the beach to the right flank,, covering the entire area of Green Beach.

Bange of rocket fire was 760 yards, 30° angle. A total of 34 rockets were fired in this Banner sweeping the beach. Tiring period was about 20 seconds.

Scout boat officer node sure rocket fire was over our troops, who were pinned down on the beach, and directed against the flash of enemy firing positions.

Oaring the period of rocket fire, all enemy fire ceased. When rocket fire was terminated, enemy fire resumed but was noticeably less in volume and intensity. It was farther noted that from then on, enemy fire was directed mainly towards the scout boat.

later, through the interrogation of a wounded German prisoner, it was learned that this prisoner had been part of a machine gun crew on Green beach that had been hit by a rocket. This direct hit destroyed the machine gun position, killing three members of the crew and wounding the prisoner, he being the only survivor. The prisoner was still dazed by the explosion, but attested to the effectiveness of rocket fire on a target as well as to the demoralising effect of the explosion.

from: Marine Corps Observer Beports - Salerno.

On shore, there was no evidence of extensive materiel damage caused by the ten-minute rocket barrage fired Just twelve hours earlier. In fact, most of the probable targets appeared unscathed.

from: Commander Eighth Amphibious Torce.

The LCT(R) opened up short of the beach with ranging salvos and delivered her full fire eight hundred yards south of the des­ ignated beach. The first four Green assault waves then had a choice of HA7AL GU1JPIBE - MEDITERRANEAN THEATJR

either landing on the correct beach without the benejfit of 't3|£ jrtre*; • ^ t effect of the rockets or landing south of the designated beach"; *-Iiiey ' %* * chose the latter, a choice which left a pocket of enemy resistance be­ tween the Bed and Qreen beaches and later resulted in the abandonment of Green beach for several hours until the pocket could be wiped out.

THE LCT(R) IS A CONVERTED LCT(2) OR (3), BOTH BRITISH TYPES, riBIHG BETWEEN 800 AND 1000 5" ROCKETS WITH 3500 YARD MAXIMUM RANSB.

Recommendations.

That all close fire support craft be instructed to open up over and then decrease the range so as to avoid hitting scout craft,

That more LCT(£)s be used in Mature assaults with a min­ imum of two assigned to each beach. All LCT(R)s should be more thorough­ ly trained in order to insure that the correct beach is fired upon. More practice firings should be held by LCT(R)s to determine the correct ballistics of both incendiary and H.Z. rockets,

Tron: Commanding Officer TJSS 1ST 356.

Sighted through binoculars one source of shelling on the beach about two points off starboard bow. Opened fire with bow 40MM gun and held it steadily on target for about ten minutes. One German Mark 71 Tiger Sank was destroyed by our fire and another forced to abandon his shelling attack. Other shore batteries which we were un­ able to locate continued their fire.

From: Commanding Officer TJSS SC-770.

It is recommended that SCs be sent in as close to the beach as possible to assist LCIs in fighting machine gun battles with machine gun nests ashore. Boring the morning of September 9, 1943, we observed several LtfTs fighting such battles with one 20HM machine gun. SCs could comfortably get as close to the beach as the two fathom curve and could turn loose fire from one 40MM gun, three 20MM guns, two fifty caliber and two thirty caliber machine gone against shore installations. Such a barrage should be reasonably effective.

8KB COMMENT OH LCI(L)s AS GUNBOATS ON PAGE 19 07 THIS CHAPTER.

from: Commanding Officer USS PHILADELPHIA.

The standard shore bombardment doctrine which limits the number of rounds per gun per minute which it is permitted to fire at rapid fire rate is unsound when enemy tanks are under fire. Tanks move so rapidly when in the open, that maximum rate of fire or near maximum rate should be permitted when tanks are discovered in exposed locations.

3-1? . GUOTIES - MEDITXRBANXAN TE3ATSR

Such, a prode

After four days of shore bombardment during day and night periodst and under the constant harassing of enemy air attacks, the ship's company began to show definite signs of strain and loss of efficiency due to loss of sleep and fatigue. This was partially corrected by an oc­ casional sortie to sea for the night, but the air attacks were so numer­ ous that it was never possible to allow the men to catch up on their sleep. It was found, also, that the constant necessity to go to gen­ eral quarters to repel air attacks made it impossible to prepare and serve regular meals. Battle feeding on stations was resorted to and worked very well.

Iron: Commander Cruiser Division Sight.

®here was an almost complete failure of the Shore Tire Control Parties to function in the early stages of the landing. This statement may be modified after receipt of reports from the firing ships. A number of requests for fire were reoeived from the Division Artillery Headquarters on the CHASTE and from the beachmaster. Tiring tasks in the vicinity of beaches were assigned by Commander Task Group 81.5 on very hazy descriptions and dependence placed on destroyer top observa­ tion and, after 1000, on that of the cruiser aviation pilots. Die SOC pilots were instrumental in clearing up a bad situation. They spotted A3ERCR0MBI2! and destroyers at times in addition to the cruisers, fall of shot corrections being relayed through PHILADELPHIA. In the after­ noon several targets Identified as tanks by the aerial observers from PHILADELPHIA and SAVANNAH were fired upon and the attacks turned back. One group of seven tanks and a mobile gun were flushed from a brush covered area near 795100 close to the beach Just north of the mouth of the Sole Hiver between the North and South forces and were dispersed to the eastward.

Conclusions.

If naval gunfire support is to be effective at daylight the shore fire control parties must function. Investigation of the use of a walky-talky in this connection is recommended.

Aerial observation with good work by destroyers and SAVANNAH served to clear up firing on the beaches but too tardily. Die job was well within the cruiser capabilities had there been adequate shore observation.

The spotting by the P51 planes was quite successful. The passing of spots to ABBRC&OMBIE by group circuit was slow but 15* guns should not be fired rapidly. The spotting of cruiser gunfire by F51s

3-u iv* v-*- If k m " * 4rfj" • # |jg - KA7AL QUKTIES - MIDII]SERA1JI^|^|||3^| ^,|| pi life* jSr&V/t £» &*$;•* •; 4- ct 1: if ill --. It entirely practicable. Die short st&y of each flight of P51s ofer*mlMf the target, one-half hour, was a handicap but the two hours the planes were on station was of great assistance. The report of the F51 ob­ server that there was no enemy resistance at the beaches nor any fir­ ing on the landing craft was misleading but did not serve to alter the planned action. Some form of aerial observation over the landing at first light, preferably one capable of controlling gunfire is an essen­ tial element to success.

The assignment by the Division Artillery Headquarters of targets to be covered by naval gunfire without the benefit of obser­ vation is considered wasteful of ammunition and dangerous to personnel and conducive to a dangerous line of wishful thinking. Barely is a ship's position so accurately fixed that hitting can be established without initial spotting. The only benefit of such firing that can be advanced is the moral effect on the troops having what they conceive to be supporting fire.

The outstanding feature of the gunfire support (at Salerno] was the observation and spotting by the cruiser aviation pilots fol­ lowed closely by the performance of LUDLOW, BRISTOL and EDISON in clo­ sing the beaches in the face of alarming reports by the mine sweeping group commanders and operating in unewept waters close to the beaches to deliver gunfire support by top spot. The cruiser commanders, SAVAH- HAH and PHILADELPHIA, deserve credit no less for taking their valuable ships into waters announced unsafe and maneuvering in unswept areas to deliver supporting fire in depth and against tanks and artillery which might well have proven costly objectives for troops.

From: Commander Eighth Amphibious force.

Saval Gunfire Support in the first two days was not as effective as it had been at (Sicily). This was due mainly to the following factors:

The lesser damage to SFC radio equipment in the landing. The reports of sweeper unit commanders which led commanding officers of Tire support vessels to delay passage through the minefields. She difficulties encountered by the Landing Force in organ­ ising ashore in the face of eneny action close to the beaches.

The original plan provided supporting fire by four sup­ port groups, three of them consisting of a cruiser and a destroyer each; the fourth, of the Monitor, HMS AGERCHQMBIB. This plan had to be changed on D - 1 Bey due to the withdrawal of the BOISE from the attack force. The changes in the Tire Support Plan necessitated by this withdrawal had to be promulgated by visual, and were not re­ ceived by two of the fire support destroyers. The fire support prob­ lem was further complicated by the restrictions imposed on supporting

t": rfS } 3-15 - MZDITEBBAHXAIT wmw fire dTifri&g^tf*e fending, due to the surrender of the Italian Govern­ ment wi$£ its. military «nd naval forces.

Because of the interference from minefields, fire stu­ port groups vers not in position to deliver supporting fire during the early hours of the assault. When they did get into position, they had considerable difficulty establishing conaunioation with the Shore Tire Control Parties, several of idiom had either lost or damaged their ra­ dio sets or beeame separated from each other. This lack of direct com­ munication resulted in some of the fire delivered om D-Day being un­ observed. Because it vas unobserved, its effectiveness cannot be ac­ curately determined, but it Is believed that it vas of considerable assistance to the landing force, as evidenced by the message from the Deputy Division Commander of the 36th Division who stated that the troops could not have stayed on Blue and Yellow Beaches had it not been for the Haval gunfire; and by an unofficial report from the Store Tire Control Party to one destroyer, crediting it with having knocked out eleven Mark VI German tanks. It is probable, however, that It would have been even more efficient and productive of greater results had the fire control setup functioned as well as it did (at Sicily). Occasional shots from shore batteries fell in the vicinity of the fire support groups, but these caused no damage and interfered but little with their movements and activities.

Comments from various units within the Force indicate a general belief that had the landing been preceded by a bombardment of the beaches by cruisers and destroyers, in addition to the direct sup­ port of LCSs, much of the opposition encountered there would have been knocked out and the assault rendered such easier. Some even go so far as to intimate that tactical surprise by large landing forces is a practical Impossibility and that prelanding bombardment by naval gun- . fire should be standard procedure. Had the landing (at Salerno} been preceded by heavy bombardment of the beaches, some of the machine guns emplaced there might have been knocked out and the resistance propor­ tionately weakened.

However, the force Commander is of the opinion that a bombardment of beaches prior to the landing is by no means a panacea for all troubles in the form of enemy resistance which may beset an assault force. It may, and probably will, knock out some of the beach defenses, but it most certainly will not eliminate all of them, par­ ticularly in a night bombardment - without illumination of the target area; and it moat certainly will destroy the last vestige of surprise, tactical or otherwise. It is not only a flat declaration of Intent to land at a given point, but it is also an excellent way to alert all enemy defenses within a radius of many miles. The reasons that lead an Army Commander to favor an assault during darkness are the same reasons that make naval gunfire support and direct air support less effective during darkness.

«• HMmsssif* 4 * , i ,"«n '2 d & RATAL OTOTIBB - MKDISKBBiflUUf^^l^| tfgk* %

RftftftwmwnAatlonS. That the organisation for naval If tinned In its development along its present sound lines.

That Army artillery units of the landing Force be as­ signed well qualified radio technicians and radio operators, and that frequent communication exercises 1>e held during the training period he- tveen fire support ships and Shore lire Control Parties.

That during the planning and training period it he im­ pressed upon commands concerned that the effectiveness of Naval gun­ fire support depends largely upon the knowledge of its capabilities possessed by the Army artillery command, and the efficiency of ship to shore communications.

That in amphibious operations conducted from nearby bases, land based aircraft be made available for fire observations.

AMMUNITION EXPMDITUEES Sicily Salerno 6"/47 caliber HC 7537 4679 5"/38 caliber AAC B912 3527

' * m

a 1- •*« w 3-17 * ' * - NAVAL GUN?KB TO ? * SOUTH PACIFIC

Treasury Island Occupation - October 1943. from: The Commandlag Officer, TJSS LCI(L) 23.

As the first operation for the converted LCI(L) type gunboat, this action appears to this writer to have demonstrated the great potential value of heavily armed small craft in supporting landing operations against hostile beaches. Some recommendations re­ garding their use have suggested themselves in the meager light of this one experience. The recommendations follow:

(a) That support gunboats accompany assault waves all the way to the beach, turning away- only in time to avoid beaching themselves. Diis would provide flank cover for the assault wave to the last possible moment, in­ stead of exposing the flank as occurred in this action when this vessel turned astern of the LCPs at point (A).

(b) That support gunboats whenever possible, be free of troops, in order that they may retain complete mo­ bility throughout the operation.

(c) That liaison be established between gunboats and shore fire control parties to enable gunboats to provide in­ telligent supporting fire after landings.

Prom: Commander Task Group Thirty-One Point One.

APDs commenced debarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies at 0540 and the boats proceeded toward assigned beaches, covered by destroyer gunfire and led by LCI Gunboats of the Second Transport Group, which had been detached at 0230 so as to arrive BLANCHE HARBQB. with the First Transport Group. During the approach to the beaches, the LCI Gunboats protected the exposed flank of the assault waves by counter battery fire against machine gun emplacements on the south coast MONO ISLAND, and just prior to the landing, silenced a twin- barrelled, medium caliber automatic weapon on the landing beach between the SAVEBS EIVEB and FALAMAI POINT. Destroyer gunfire ceased at 0622 and the first wave of boats hit the main beach between the SAVEKE RIVEE and TALAMIA POINT (OBANGE BEACHES) exactly at 0626, the new H-Hour. She landing was successful although opposed by machine gun and sniper fire.

The first use of the recently converted LCI Gunboats was made in this operation, and they proved to be very valuable. Having been converted in NOUMEA, they arrived only one day prior to departure of the LCI(L)s on this operation. The armament was Increased to 1 - 3"/ 50 cal., 1 - 40mm single mount, both centerline, 4- 20mm and 6-50 cal. machine guns, with additional crew to man the greatly augmented battery. It was immediately decided to add the two which were ready,

3-18 1IIip| 1PPWIfl NAVAL GUNFIRE - SOUTH PJ3d|I0fj • 2g^» 'i*i-

THl EMPLOYMENT 0? THE LCI(L) AS A GUNBOAT AFFORDS A MEANS 0^ KEEPING IMMEDIATE BEACH DEFENSES NEUTRALIZED DURING THE CRITI­ CAL PERIOD AFTER NATAL GUN FIBS FROM LARGER UNITS LIFTS AND UNTIL LEADING ASSAULT WAVES HIT SHE BEACH. THEY PROMISE TO BE OF GREAT VALCJE FOR GLOSS SUPPORT OF UNITS ASHORE. THE LCI(L)S WHICH ARX BEING CONVERTED FOR GUNFIRE SUPPORT GRAFT HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED LCS(L)(3). THEY WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH 1-3"50, 2-40MK TWIN AND 4-20MM SINGLE AND VARYING COMBINATIONS OF ROCKET LAUNCHERS.

aroress Augusta Bmt - November 1943.

Front 00 USS TERRY (DD).

The results of the TERRY*s fir* support of this landing emphasized, the importance of position in the utilization of destroyers as fire support ships to neutralise a beach area preparatory to a land­ ing. The present flat terrain, thiok tropical growth, and lack of other structures in prepared defenses, which are characteristic of beaches in this area, make it almost absolutely necessary that destroyers fir­ ing in support of a landing fire from extremely short ranges and dir­ ectly at the targets which are desired to be neutralised. From medium ranges, the angle of fire is not sufficient to give a plunging fire and is subject to interference from trees and other high objects in the area. Fire from extreme ranges would take advantage of the trajectory of the destroyer's 5H/S8 battery and the angle of fall would be steep enough to effectively reach various targets. However, to properly cover a target area from extreme ranges, it is absolutely necessary that air spot or shore spot be provided. In. the Initial phases of the landing this is not always possible.

With the present type beach defenses used "by the Jap­ anese, our fire support ships must either keep up their fire until the troops are almost at the beach or means of effecting direct hits against gun emplacements and other defenses must be used. While it is realised that the knocking out of defenses by direct hits is not neutralisation, nevertheless, it is believed that with the present Jap­ anese tactics and structures, that direct fire against their beach de­ fenses becomes a necessity in the neutralization of any target area. This is because their structures are so strong and well concealed, and so close to the beach line, that they are able to survive all except direct hits, and the minute the neutralizing fire is lifted, the weapons which they contain are swung into action. For this reason, where hydro­ graphy permits, it is believed that a fire support destroyer should be as close to the beach as possible, as this allows them to continue their fire for a great length of time before interfering with troop movements, places them close enough to make visual observations as to enemy defenses which are being used against troop movements, and allows them to get full force and effect of direct fire with their flat trajectory guns against 'ALtGUNFIRE - SOUTH PACI7IC ••*#*-1 a-VW< these defenses.

If the hydrography does not permit the fire support destroyers to close range, then the use of some shallow draft gunboat to carry out direct fire against teach strong points becomes a necessity for the proper neutralization of the beach area.

Prom: Commander Destroyer Division Ninety.

Due to a combination of early morning haze, mountainous background and an early morning sun, it was impossible for the (Anthony) to observe either the target area (Puruata Island) or the fall of shot, making reliance upon plane spot mandatory. It is believed that the same conditions plus smoke and dust from the dire bombing attack by Blue planes, and the bombardment of Torokina Point area by the other units, interfered with the plane spotter reducing the (Anthony's) rate of fire. As it dev­ eloped, the position of the (Terry) permitted close observation of the (Anthony's) fire and more effective spotting could have been done from the (Terry) than from the plane. As a total of only twenty nine Japanese armed with rifles were eventually located on Puruata Island failure of the (Anthony) to expend all of the ammunition allotted to this target did not materially effect the operations.

It is suggested that in a similar future situation, the inclusion in the assault wave of one or more armored LCI type gunboats employing a high rate of fire from a 3" gun could materially neutralize the return fire and lend some fire support until the boat waves aotually touch the beach. The time elapsing (in this ease five minutes) between the ficease fire" to the Tire Support Units and the time that the boats of the first wave reach the beach is sufficient for the defense to man key defense posts not actually destroyed by the preliminary bombardment. The 5N shells of the destroyers can do little more than temporarily neu­ tralize prepared defenses.

IV A SITUATION WHERE OTHER METHODS 01* OBSERVATION ABE INUTECTIVE, THE POSSIBILITIES 07 STATIONING A VESSEL TO OBSERVE GUN7IBE SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND. SHE UTILITY 07 THE LCI(L) CONVERTED INTO A OUN- BOAT WAS ALSO DEMONSTRATED IN THE OCCUPATION 07 IBS TREASURY ISLANDS.

Imvl •' UiVi &va1 k'imij}

3-20 havai gunfibb J&m%l $ I" I

SOPTHWSST PACIFIC §|V^. ;| =: | *&*$§ jfjr § g lA^AinfT at Arawe. Hew Britain - December 1943. from J Commander Destroyer Squadron.

Attention was next directed to tracking the leading boat ware for OIULNGS MACE with a view to coordinating the bombardment on the beach with the approach of the boat ware to Point Able (S. en­ trance to PILSLO PASSAGS). She tracking was done both visually and by radar. At the outset it was found that the boats would be approx­ imately five minutes late in reaching Point Able and accordingly a five minute delay was authorised In opening the bombardment. Thereafter, it developed that the boats would be further delayed in getting to Point Able and the Tire Support Groups were authorized to prolong the bombard­ ment for fire minutes. Subsequent observations revealed that after reaching Point Able the boats did not immediately proceed into PILELO PASSAGE but cireled at the entrance; the bombardment had ended by that time and the cause of the delay in entering the Passage is unknown.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

She main bombardment for the landing on OBANGE Beach was timed to cease as the head of the amphibian column reached the passage between CAPS MEHXUS and PILSLO ISLAND. The five bombarding destroyers were forced by the configuration of the coast and islands to bombard from outside ASAMS ISLAND. Observation over the island and through gaps between islands was poor. Overhead fire was, therefore, not employed.

Unfortunately the delay and disorganization in the amphibian column could not be clearly appreciated by the Commander Bombardment Croup. Although he delayed the bombardment in accordance with the estimated progress of the leading Buffaloes, the column was strung out and the leaders subsequently waited an additional period to allow the rear to close up.

HXBJE AH EFFORT WAS BIGHUT MASS FOR GLOSS GUNFIRE SUPPORT TO CONFORM 10 MOVEMENTS 07 SHE LANDING BOATS.

r? •;<.

'U-

v I ^& *' %'

V. *

3-21 CHAPTER - IV

INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Gilbert Islands Operation - November 194.3

From: Commander Fifth Amphibious Force.

The following listed material is considered to be ^ essential to any amphibious operation against a coral atoll: jf II (a) Charts, Maps, Diagrams, etc. ^

1. Combined chart and Intelligence map. This chart should be sufficiently accurate and complete to permit safe navigation of limited off shore areas and within lagoons. It should show location of beaches, nature of approaches to beaches, landmarks, important enemy installations ashore (particularly those near beaohes), tracks of mine sweeping and fire support groups with­ in lagoons, transport areas within lagoons and any other information of value to naval personnel operating close off shore, within the lagoon, or ashore. The scale of this chart should be one inch - 1000 yards and the chart should be printed on sufficiently translucent paper as to permit its use on D.R.T. screens. Inasmuch as this chart should be of convenient size for use by small craft it cannot include very much off shore area. It is intended principally for use of mine sweeping vessels, lagoon fire supporting vessels, landing and other small craft, transports and cargo vessels.

2. Offshore Chart. This chart should be accurate as to position, shape, and orientation of objectives and include principal features such as land marks, lagoon entrances, off shore navigation hazards, etc. It should show transport areas, landing craft and ship approach lines, lines of departure, gunfire support areas, location of assault beach­ es and other information necessary for units operating off shore. It should include Off shore areas at least ten miles to seaward of the objective. The scale of the chart should be 1" = 2000 yards and the chart should be printed on paper suitable for use on D.R.T. screens. It is intended principally for use by off shore fire support vessels and transports.

3. Air and Gunnery Target Maps (large). This map should be of large scale and show all possible enemy installations as well as location of assault beaches. It should show all targets and target areas clearly marked and designat­ ed by number or otherwise. It is intended principally for use on board ship or ashore in directing ship and plane bombardment. Air and Gunnery Target Maps (small). This map should be a small reproduction of item (3) above iIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC far use in planes and by shore fire control parties. >V * 5« Beach Diagrams. These diagrams should show graphically all possible details of assault beaches and approaches, approach lines, lines of departure, obstacles on beaches and off shore, beach defenses, beach exits and other information of value to landing craft to insure their scheduled arrival and disembarkation on designated beaches. In addition to plan views, enlarged contour and detailed sketches should be added if in­ formation is available. These diagrams are for use of transports and landing craft.

(b) Photographs.

1. Mosaics (large). These mosaics should be reproduced in as large a scale as possible consistent with retention of essential details and reason­ able convenience in handling. Separate mosaics showing both the prin­ cipal objectives and also the atoll as a whole should be issued. These mosaics are for use of Group Commanders, Commanding Officers of ships and Gunnery Officers, and also for use on board ships to famil­ iarise personnel with general features of the objectives.

2. Mosaics (small). These mosaics, a small reproduction of (1) above, should be of convenient size for issue to planes and small craft.

3. Vertical Photographs. i-arge scale vertical photographs or mosaics of landing beach areas should be prepared for issue to landing craft and trans­ ports. They should be of appropriate size for use in landing craft and planes.

A. Oblique Photographs (large). c These photographs should be from both high (30 ) and low (5 ) angles and show important features of the shore approach, reefs, beaches, and inshore terrain. They should be of large size, as in the case of large mosaics, and should be issued to group commanders and all ships. They are of particular value to ships engaged in fire support and to carriers for use in connection with bombardment.

5. Oblique Photographs (small). These should be conveniently sized reproductions of (4) above for issue to planes and landing craft.

6. Panoramas. These should consist of overlapping photographs of shore line taken from low altitude. They should show assault beach limits and prominent landing marks should be indicated. Submarine periscope INTELLIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC ^ S y v

photographs have been found to be excellent;,fortthis; purpose.s, Pano-^ ramas should be issued to all landing craft and be of appropriate sise. If they can be enlarged and still retain sufficient clarity of detail they are of value in indoctrination of boat oreirs aboard ship.

The following recommendations are made for the con­ duct of aerial and submarine reconnaissance which, it is believed, will provide the necessary detailed and accurate intelligence for use in future amphibious operations:

A Aerial Reconnaissance*

(1) Photographs.

(a) Photographs must be taken from angles that will elim­ inate glare. These photographs should be taken with camera pointed downward; which usually discloses sunken reefs more clearly.

(b) Vertical Photos. Complete stereo coverage of all reef, land and lagoon areas at different tide stages is a necessity. These sorties must be flown when sun-glare is at a minimum, preferable before 0900 and af­ ter 1600 local time. The scale of the photos of the land areas should be between It5,000 and 1*10,000, preferably the former. The larger the scale of photos of reefs and beaches, the more valuable they will be, and one stereo coverage of the lagoon and ocean reef at a scale of 1:5,000 or larger, at low tide, is necessary. Photos covering the entire lagoon are needed for charting channels, shoals, rocks, and for locating land areas correct­ ly. These may be at a small scale, around 1:4-0,000. Photos of large areas such as lagoons are preferred at this scale for reasons of economy and ease of handling. Certain' portions of the lagoons will be designated by Task Force Commanders as Operating Areas and photographs at larger scale, both verticals and obliques, of these areas showing reefs and channels and shoals will be required. Color photographs have been found valuable in the interpretation of reef and beach conditions and in estimating relat­ ive depths of water in lagoons. At least one sortie at a scale of 1:10,000 is recommended.

(c) Oblique Photographs. Vertical photographs have been used as sources of information beyond the limitations of such photographs chiefly be­ cause no other sources were available. Underwater depths cannot be measured in vertical photographs. Therefore, oblique photographs of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches at different stages of tides, in­ cluding a sortie at low tide, are necessary. On many of the islands the stand of palms and other

4-3 1st Mi INTELLIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC trees^sHSo of the beach that defenses and beach details cannot -be seen in vertical photographs; their existence can only be suspected and no details can be given. Oblique photographs will be invaluable where such conditions exist.

(1) Low obliques. Low obliques of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches are vitally necessary for the study of de­ tail in the selection of landing beaches. These should be Bade at as close a range and low an alti­ tude as possible consonant with the risk involved. Sorties at different stages of tides, including one at low tide, should be flown. Care must be taken that the outer edges of the reefs are included in the photos. Photographs made with a 12" or longer focal length camera at a range of 4*000 feet, at an angle of approximately 5 with the horizontal are recommended. These are to be made of the ocean and lagoon reefs and areas designated by the authority issuing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(2) High obliques. High obliques taken at an angle of about 30 with the horizontal, showing the approaches to the objectives, are desired.* The areas will be desig­ nated by the authority issuing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(3) Reconnaissance reports. A pilot's report of photographic reconnaissance mission containing information regarding visual re­ connaissance by pilots and crews, such as weather, wind, direction and velocity, AA fire encountered and estimation as to the source of it, planes and vessels seen in area but not shown on photos, etc., is requested.

(4) Labeling of Photographs. Photographs must be carefully labeled with the following information: Date and Time. This must be accurate, and labeled either GCT of the Local Time Zone that is used. The derivation of tidal data is de­ pendent on the accuracy of this information. Focal Length of the camera. Altitude or range. In order to obtain an accurate scale of the photos, this must be given accurately. Name of island or atoll photographed.

U-U " INTELLIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC

B Submarine Reconnaissance*

(1) General. A complete reconnaissance of the atoll Is desired and any evidence of activity should be located, photographed axkl described. Portions of the atoll believed to contain installations or features of major interest should be clearly designated by the authority issu­ ing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(2) Photographs. Complete photographic coverage should be made of sections designated in accordance vith paragraph (1) above and photographs should be taken so as to fora a complete panorama of the area con­ cerned and be at maximum periscope height and minimum range conson­ ant with risk of discovery. Views of prominent objects should be taken from several different angles. Wherever possible photographs should be taken from such points as to show the maximum amount of lagoon shoreline detail. The following information should accompany each photograph:

(a) A general description of the object photographed, with any information gained from visual observation which might aid in understanding the photograph.

(b) The distance of the submarine off shore, and suffici­ ent simultaneous tangents on nearby islands so that the submarine's position may be plotted with reason­ able accuracy.

(c) Date and time of taking photograph, carefully noted as either GCT or Local.

(d) The true bearing on which the photograph was taken.

The results of visual observation at the time photo­ graphs were taken should be reported in detail. Sketches ot annota­ tions on maps or charts aid greatly in an understanding of such re­ ports. When locating an object such as a tower, true bearings should be taken from at least two locations, together with sufficient tangents on nearby islands- to locate accurately the position of the submarine at the time each bearing was taken. If at all possible, photographs should be developed daily as a check on results being obtained.

(3) Radar Coverage desired.

Any information from the P.P.I, radar equipment aboard would be highly valuable. The radar might be used to secure navigational in­ formation and fixes, and the manner in which the radar works for these purposes will furnish most useful information.

U-5 - CENTRAL PACIFIC

:' Photographs of the radar P.P.I, screen are useful to correlate the appearance of the P.P.I, screen with the position of the ship, so that radar operators approaching the island for the first time may identify blips appearing on the screen. In sons cases the islands are low and flat and apparently almost totally lacking in distinctive radar targets. Those that do appear should be identified so far as practicable.

Negative information is also desired9 i.e., those locations where no identifiable blips appear. If practicable, infor­ mation is desired regarding the sectors in which each target is vis­ ible on the screen and the range at which it fades out. Suggested procedure: During darkness observe island on F.P.I, from as naxgr angles as practicable; record ship positions where no distinctive screen exists; when a distinctive screen appears, photograph it and record position of ship. Identification of blips may await later study of charts, aerial photos, etc., but comments or opinions made at the time of photograph should also be recorded. During retire­ ment from the island, record position of ship at which blip disap­ pears. It is recognized that it may not be practicable to do much night work, owing to the necessity for charging batteries.

A radar intercept receiver should be used whenever possible, tuning over the entire radar frequency bands, searching for possible enemy radar signals. A log of signals heard, their frequen­ cy, pulse rate and other signal characteristics, and position at which intercepted should be recorded. Whenever possible take photo­ graphs of shore radar installations and also note locations, struct­ ural details and surrounding terrain.

From: Observer's Report.

It is believed that the delay in developing and de­ livering photographs was not caused by photographic laboratories, but resulted from waiting for scheduled landing and take-off times on the carrier to which the photographic plane was assigned. The plane should be permitted to land on the first carrier prepared to recover planes, even if it is not the regular base. Delivery of the prints should be given highest priority once they are ready, to the extent of making special catapult launchings if practicable* Front

Introduction*

This report, which is based on experience acquired during the assaults on FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (8 November, 1942), on SICILT (10 July, 1943), and on NAPLES (9 September, 1943), and during the planning phase of several operations which were never executed, lists the information concerning en«gr ground forces and coast defen­ ses which has been found necessary for amphibious planning and the methods developed for the presentation of this information to the Attacking Forces* Other phases of intelligence required for amphib­ ious operations will be made the subject of separate reports.

A Naval Attack Force Commander, whether embarking and landing in assault an Amy, a Corps, or a Division, has need of certain information concerning the enemy ground forces. In particu­ lar, he requires information concerning the enemy ground forces battle order and the enesqr coast defenses, that is, both harbor defenses and beech defenses.

The Naval Attack Force Commander needs battle order information in order to form a proper idea cf the totality of the armed forces opposing him In his capacity as commander of the joint forces during the assault phase of an amphibious operation. He needs coast defense information not only in order to have a general idea of the total enemy resistance but, more specifically, because enemy coast defenses, and especially coastal batteries, constitute a direct threat to the naval units under his command and their destruction is consequently a primary naval concern.

Necessary background information.

The intelligence section should collect and assimil­ ate a thorough background in the following subjects, for the mastery of which an acquaintance with the enemy1 s language is a distinct ad­ vantage:- the general organization of the enemy's amy, with special reference to infantry and artillery; his infantry weapons (rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns, infantry cannon, etc.); his artillery (field, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, coast, railway, and naval); and his tactics in the defense, with emphasis on the infantry battalion.

Vhen studying eneasy artillery organization and weap­ ons it should be borne in mind that the responsibility for coast and anti-aircraft defense rests with different services in different na­ tions. Within our own forces coast artillery and AA artillery make up the Coast Artillery branch of'the army. -i» the German aimed "M£Dir£KBAH£Ai1 theatre forces coast artillery comes under the Navy and AA artillery under the Air Force. In the Italian armed forces coast artillery was di­ vided between the Navy and the Fascist Militia,

In describing enemy artillery considerable confusion arises from the loose use of the terms "light", "medium", and "heavy". Thus a 90mm gun when used as anti-aircraft artillery is heavy, but when used as coast defense artillery is light. The terms should be carefully defined in the light of a study of the artillery of the par­ ticular enemy and a decision reached in connection with the present­ ation of information as to whether to adopt the U.S. system, in which, for example, the 155mm gun is "heavy" but the 155mm howitzer "medium", or to adopt the eneoy*s system. The new German terminology, for in­ stance, divides German artillery into the following categories: leichte. mittlere. schwere. and schwerste.

Ground forces battle order.

The Naval Attack Force Commander is interested in a complete eneoy ground forces battle order of the following units only: infantry, artillery, mechanized cavalry, and armored force. The cog­ nizant intelligence officer should present this battle order graphic­ ally by the use of Any conventional map symbols on an outline map. The symbols for artillery units should indicate the caliber of their armament. Those for armored units should indicate the type of tank with which they are equipped, for tanks can, and do, fire at landing craft and even ships.

Information for the battle order map should normally be obtained from the Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Landing Force Commander or from a higher Arny/Marine echelon or intelligence agency. It is an unnecessary duplication for the naval intelligence officer to draw up his own battle order, as he will usually not have access to the sources available to the Landing Force: censored pris­ oner of war mail, interrogation of prisoners of war, radio intercept service, secret agents, etc. Further, it is highly desirable that the Amy/Marines and the Navy agree on the battle order. As the.eneoy ground forces, with the exception of coast artillery, are primarily an Amy/Marine concern, the Navy should accept the Army/Marine battle order, bringing to the attention of the cognizant 0-2 aqy information from naval sources bearing on the subject.

Coast artillery (harbor defense).

Ebeny coast artillery is primarily a Navy concern, Consequently, the naval intelligence officer should make an exhaust­ ive study of all sources.

The sources of information required for the different

A-B INTELLIGENCE - MEDITERRANEAN r? types of coast de?6txsde' are frui^ou^: old military and naval attache reports, secret agents, aerial photograph interpretation, interroga­ tion of prisoners of war, the study of the battle order of artillery units, and the study of the enemy's artillery ordnance. Inasmuch as many coast defense installations are of a more or less permanent nature, proper attention should be paid to so-called "old" information, such as that contained in coast pilots, on scenic post-cards and other ground photographs, and in military and naval attache reports.

More often than not, the primary, and occasionally the oniJy, source of information will be the interpretation of aerial photographs. This information must be supplemented* Not only do aerial photographs fail to reveal maqy CD batteries which are in the sides of cliffs, in permanent forts, in buildings, or very skillfully camouflaged, but they, at best, merely give the exact location of a battery, the diameter of the emplacement, and possibly the length of the gun within the emplacement. Thus, an aerial photograph interpret­ ation report will say that "at N 933475 on the ISLAND OF X there is a gun CD battery facing SE, diameter of emplacements, which are circu­ lar, 42 feet".

An examination of the battle order reveals, however, that Battery D of the 141st Artillery Regiment, armed with 4-152/37 guns, is stationed on the ISLAND OF X. An examination of the data on the enemy's artillery reveals further that the 152/37 Ansaldo gun has a maximum range of 23,800 yards, a rate of fire of one round in two minutes, a maximum elevation of 45°> etc. A study of the enemy's engineering principles used in the emplacing of artillery may indic­ ate that guns of the order of 75 nun to 105 mm generally have emplace­ ments 15 to 25 feet in diameter, those of the order of 120 mm to 149 mm: 25 to 35 feet, those of the order of 152 mm to 165 mm: 35 to 45 feet, etc. A more detailed study may bring to light that the enemy normally emplaces the 152/37 gun in a horseshoe concrete em­ placement 43 feet in diameter.

By thus correlating the information derived from aerial photograph interpretation with that gleaned from the enemy- battle order, from a study of the enemy ordnance, and from a study of the enetoy's principles of fortification engineering, the intelli­ gence officer may state: "At N 983475 on the ISLAND OF X Battery D of the 141st Arty Regt is emplaced facing SE; armament 4-152/37 Ansaldo guns, max. range 23,800 yds, rate of fire 1 round in 2 min­ utes, max. elevation 45°"•

It has been found preferable to present intelli­ gence graphically. Descriptive text should be kept to a minimum, for fighting personnel just do not have the time to study long writ­ ten texts.

H ir% 4-9 *• -;..k ft •,

- MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

For thegunnery officers of the cruisers and des­ troyers assigned to silence coastal batteries, for the pilots of the cruiser spotting planes, and for the infantry who are assigned the mission of capturing a coastal battexy by surprise attack, it has been found most useful to distribute a sketch of a CD battexy which is a direct tracing from an aerial photograph accompanied by a con­ cise written description. Sixteen such sketches were included in the Intelligence Annex for North African Operation* For Salerno Op­ eration, these sketches and accompanying descriptions were issued as separate "coast defense battery reports".

Normally an intelligence report, be it an aerial photograph interpretation report or otherwise, employs a special set of identifying numbers or letter-number combinations, when listing the coast defense batteries in a given area. These are rarely in harmony with those in other reports concerning the same batteries. Consequently, it has been found most useful to use the coordinates to identify the batteries. Thus all reports refer to the same battery in the same way, and the designation is meaningful.

Beach defenses.

Information on pill-boxes, weapon pits, trenches, wire, etc., is required for the different Igrpes of beach defenses. The most important, and usually the only, source of this information is aerial photograph interpretation. This material should be present­ ed graphically as far as possible, employing Amy conventional map symbols.

Aerial photograph interpretation must be supplement­ ed. The Intelligence officer must evaluate the beach defense in the light of his background concerning the organization of the eneny in­ fantry units and concerning the enemy's defensive tactics. Thus, when examining the defenses of a given beach and the terrain immedi­ ately inland, he should endeavor to determine the general defensive plan of the opponent. For example, he may be able to deduce whether the given area is a company, battalion, or regimental defense sector. By studying the battle-order simultaneously, he may be further able to deduce what unit is defending the area. Such a study of enemy de­ fenses in the light of the battle order also assists the aerial photograph interpreters themselves, who thus have a guide as what to look for and where to look for it.

Mobile artillery.

To supplement his harbor and beach defenses, the enemy is making a constantly increasing use of mobile artillery, rail­ way artillery and mobile field artillery. INTELLIGENCE - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE^ >* ,

p^f2| >*A

Railway artillery, which renders any stretch of rail­ road track a potential battery, is subdivided into "railway artillery" proper, that is, heavy caliber guns on railway trucks, such as the Italian 381/40, and so-called "armored trains". The term "armored train" is misleading, for the Italians had two tjypes: treni blindati, or "armored trains" proper, and treni armati, or "armed trains". The "armed" trains usually mounted guns of 152 mm caliber or less, and were normally well provided with AA protection. Railway guns usually employ prepared spur tracks which can frequently be detected in aer­ ial photographs. Tunnels furnish excellent concealment and protec­ tion for all forms of railway artillery, and should consequently be given considerable attention by the intelligence officer. A map or plot of defenses should include all railroad tracks, including spurs, and tunnels.

Mobile field artillery, or better "mobile coast ar­ tillery", is very elusive, and frequently combat intelligence alone will reveal its presence. It is of two general types. The first is the mobile heavy gun, of the order of 149 mm to 155 nun. The second is the light highly mobile "multi-purpose" gun, anti-aircraft, anti­ tank, anti-shipping (AA/AT/CD). The German 88 mm is an excellent ex­ ample of the latter type. Examination of the emplacements for a bat­ tery of German 88's ("8, 8 cm. Flak 41") near SALERNO, ITALI, reveal­ ed that they were about 25 feet square and that the blast walls were hastily constructed of wood, hay, and straw.

Mobile field artillery is frequently held in reserve and moved into prepared positions when an alert is sounded. A given battery may thus have several alternate positions to which it may move. Consequently, the intelligence officer must remember that "empty emplacements" do not neeessarily mean "abandoned emplacements"; they may be "prepared emplacements" for a mobile battery.

Conclusion.

The intelligence section of the staff of the amphib­ ious task force commander must be prepared to collect and evaluate all the detailed and up-to-date information required to supplement the basic reports. In the usually limited time there must be prepar­ ed for issue to the assaulting and supporting units the various dia­ grams, graphic presentations and operational aids which have been found of great value in large scale landings. The information re­ quired to be worked up for this purpose includes:

(1) latest beach defenses from photographs; (2) new enemy emplacements and batteries; (3) latest information on enemy battle order; U> estimate of enemy local scheme of defense. IE- MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

The following types of information should be collect­ ed, evaluated and disseminated by the Office of Naval Intelligence for strategic planning and as basic information to which Force Commanders can, in minimum time, add the specialized and recent detailed inform­ ation required for an amphibious assault:

(1) organization of enemy forces; (2) data on enengr weapons; (3) enemy tactics and doctrine of defense; (A) fixed fortifications; (5) terrain features, communications, etc.

LIGHT FLEXIBLE RUBBER RELIEF HAPS WILL EE MASS TO ORDER ON SPECIAL REQUEST ADDRESSED TO C0M2NCH. THESE RELIEF HAPS ARE MADE OF A FOAM SPONGE TIPE RUBBER IN QUANTITIES UP TO 20 OR 30 COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL. THE RELIEF MAPS OF A COASTAL AREA WOULD BE MADE IN SECTIONS APPROXIHATELY 3" 15',

WORK ON 100 TO 200 SECTIONS CAN NORMALLY BE COMPLETED AND SHIPPED BY AIR BY THE HODEL SHOP, COHPHIBTRALANT WITHIN 4 WEEKS FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF ALL NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE INFOR­ MATION AND INSTRUCTIONS WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) AREA AND GRID COORDINATES OF MODEL SECTIONS. (2) NUMBER OF EACH SECTION IN PRIORITY. (3) SCALE - 1/5000 WITH VERTICAL EXAGGERATION RECOMMENDED. (4) BEST MAPS AVAILABLE. (5) COMPLETE VERTICAL AERIAL COVERAGE. (6) OBLIQUE COVERAGE OF COASTLINE. (7) SAMPLE COLOR SCHEME OR COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS OF AREA. - rv i, ISTELLIGEMCE ' & hHM SOUTH PACIFIC

"**•*' -Ik Jt Ml Treasury Island Occupation - October 1943

From: Commander Landing Craft Third Amphibious Force.

Prior to the issue of Commander South Pacific Opera­ tion Plan 16-43, but as a preliminary to such operations, a reconnais­ sance party consisting of two Naval officers and Marine officers and men was landed on MONO ISLAND of the TREASURY GROUP by rubber boats from a submarine the night of 22-23 August 1943. This party was evac­ uated by the same method on the night of 27-28 August 1943 and submit­ ted its report. The reconnaissance party determined that the best landing beach on MONO ISLAND was in BLANCHE HARBOR between the SAVEKE RIVER mouth and FALAMAI POINT. This beach appeared suitable for all types of landing craft. Other small beaches appeared useable, one between MALSI and LUA POINTS and another at SOANOTALU. The western cove of STIRLING ISLAND also appeared suitable although observed only from MONO ISLAND. All beaches on MONO ISLAND had ample water supply nearby, but only that between the SAVEKE RIVER and FALAMAI POINT had sufficient dispersal and bivouac areas for the necessary troops. There were signs of enemy patrols and activities such as tracks and cut trails, but no Japanese were sighted.

To obtain last minute information a reconnaissance party consisting of two N.Z. Army non-commissioned officers and some natives was landed by PT boat the night of 21-22 October 1943. The reconnaissance party reported that friendly natives stated that the enemy had recently landed reinforcements and that their present strength was about 225; that medium caliber guns had been emplaced on both sides of FALAMAI POINT; that machine guns were emplaced on MONO ISLAND along the approaches to the landing beaches; that there was an observation post at LAIFA POINT with direct wire communication with the radio station near the SAVEKE RIVER; and that STIRLING ISLAND was unoccupied by the enemy. This party was evacuated by PT boat the night of 22-23 October 1943> bringing some MONO ISLAND natives with then to act as guides for the landing.

Landing at IMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY - November 1943.

From: Commander THIRD Amphibious Force.

On the night of October 27 an advance party composed of two marine officers, one coast watcher and several native police boy3 was landed in the vicinity of ATSINIMA BAY to secure latest in­ formation of enemy strength and dispositions and to communicate this information to Commander Third Amphibious Force by radio. Efforts to establish radio communication were unsuccessful however.

The only available means of obtaining hydrographic information was by submarine.--cA^Lr- photos do not show reefs of pinnae- ^ ^ •€ < •£- jt - -• - fu? wMa t n t tLU les unless quite close to the surface, nor can they be tied in with known shore positions. Charts of the Iknpress Augusta Bay Area were Incorrect and incomplete. It was possible from submarine observa­ tions to select an approach course that promised to be free of danger but this was a narrow one-ship lane. It was discovered later that many reefs existed on either side of it.

From: Commander Transport Group Third Amphibious Force.

Too much assurance was placed in the accuracy of reconnaissance reports and in the interpretation of photographs as to the suitability of the western beach areas where heavy loss of boats occurred. At a distance they appeared to be excellent, but actually were found too steep to properly beach landing craft in a moderate surf. This condition might have been determined by a low flying plane at the risk of machine gun fire from shore. The importance of accu- rate knowledge of character of landing points whether they be sand beaches or coral reefs is obvious.

4-14 INTELLIGENCE*!i# f f f •/$f ? v"f^ if SOUTHWEST PACIFICnti **j'...V - ' - v I4|J Landing at Flnschhafen - September 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

Only one set of obliques was available to the Seventh Amphibious Force by 17 September. Special low obliques and verticals had been previously requested, but had not been supplied. Sets of low verticals were taken on 19 September and delivered that night. The set of black and white prints unfortunately included only one corner of the beach and were valueless for beach information. A color photo, however, covered the beach and indicated shoal water off its southern half. This confirmed and interpretation of a photograph seen in Port Moresby, print of which was not available. On the basis of this fac­ tor it was decided to beach only three LSTs simultaneously, instead of six as originally planned.

Sellable charts and maps of enemy-controlled waters and beaches have thus far been obtained only through special photo­ graphic reconnaissance, but the means available have proved inadequate to produce the requisite pictures in time for proper study and mapping of objective areas.

Landing at Arawe - December 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

Planning was further complicated by the wide separa­ tion of the various headquarters involved.

Few air photos were available for planning, but good photos were secured later and proved invaluable in final studies of the operation.

Enemy strength in the Arawe area was not expected to be more than 500.

The operation was designed initially for the capture of Gasmata, but this plan was dropped when it was decided that air facilities there were not required. This change delayed planning con­ siderably and little more than three weeks was ultimately available.

4-15 CHAPTEB V

LOGISTICS

CJHTRAL PACIFIC

Gilbert Islands Operation - November 1943. from: Commander Fifth Amphibious Force.

Sectional pontoons were brought in on LSTs and launched in the lagoon but early or effective use was not made of them. This fail­ ure is believed to be due to the lack of training and indoctrination, on the part of the Shore and Beach Parties, in the employment of these pon­ toons. The employment and usefulness of these pontoons should be exploite to the naximum. The availability of KING'S WHAEF in good usable condition! at MAXIN considerably reduced the necessity for employment of pontoons. In future operations wharves in immediate usable condition may not exist.

It is recommended that:

(1) Army, Navy,and Marine authorities agree on curtailed Tables of Allowances of equipment and supplies for ground troops and shore based air vuiits, appropriate for atoll warfare, and applicable both to assault elements and garrison troops. The tables should also take into consider­ ation the probable duration of occupation of the captured positions. Troops going into the islands should be equipped only for that particular service.

(2) Xquipment, ammunition, and supplies of assault and garrison troops be consolidated into a single list, so as to avoid duplication of the types of material carried by both categories of troops.

3}y a combination of LCls and LSTs it is practicable to bring/ troops into the landing area from distances as great as six to eight hun-// dred miles.

Additional LCT(5)s are required for rapid unloading of AFAs and AXAe. These craft are not useful where long distances are involved, but are most valuable for harbor unloading. If advance preparations are made for launching from LSTs, they can be ready for use in a very short tine. In one instance, at MAKIN, an LCT was launched, in commission and equipped, and operating within one hour after immediate preparations began

The use of the sectional pontoons should be exploited to the maximum in spite of the difficulty of transporting them. Trained crews for installing causeways have not yet been assembled and made avail­ able.

For waves other than assault waves EUKWS should prove a val­ uable supplement to crossing coral reefs. However, the transportation problem for both types of vehicles is very serious. i LOGISTICS - CENTRAL PACIFIC VA DETAILS OF LOADING OF SHIPPING V HjHXUJJEO Vs

- PERSONNEL TRKS & SHORTC; SHIP ORG'N EMBARKED OFF EM TOTAL TYPE CARGO TRKED TRLR GUNS CU FT. TONS V» ,4 FT. I. MAKIN is# «» 1 ife* C'.»*V aBr'^' ' '"ma:-. MAKIN-ASSAULT ECHELON iflWfce*' CvHi:v Combat 0tf. -yj LEONARD TOOD Hq27Div.BLT3-l65 115 1675 1780 Equip St Supp. 59 5 17 60156 101*9.3 m^k- - W' •V**- PIERCE Div Spec Troops 89 1001+ 1093 same 71+ 10 18 80781 710.1 w. iwiflf.'.' ^vv<")A. CALVERT HLT 1-165 56 1311 1367 same 60 9 12 106600 996.0 r , &• •.» I'^vMtiU jft, 1 «Si? NEVILLE BLT 2-165 59 1210 1269 same 56 5 . 8 91189 101+3.0

ALCYONE 27th Division 15 273 288 Combat Equip 57 10 11 132933 11+56.0 St Supply, Re- supply, Init. Def. Equip.

LST No. 31 Detachment "X" Hi 180 191+ LVTs, Assault 16 mm - 1+31+30 172.0

M LST No. 78 Detachment Y" 15 177 192 LVTs, Assault 17 - - 1+6010 180.0

LST No. 179 Detachment "Z" 15 181 196 LVTs, Assault 17 - — i+6010 180.0

BELLE GROVE Co. A, 193d Tank Hi 195 209 Medium Tanks 16 — - 1+31+00 1+86.2 Battalion Sub Total, ASSAULT ECHELON - 392 6206 6598 372 39 66 650509 6272.6 MAKIN - LST GROUP TWO

LST No. 1+76 80l+th Eng Bn & 10 193' 203 Construction 31+ 19 - 108387 1+85.5 Det. ASSRON 3 Mat'l.

LST No. 1+1+7 Btrys A.C.98th CA 8 191+ 202 AA St Coast 35 23 8 80810 1+82.5 K,93d CAJA,57thCA Def. Equip.

LST No. 1+79 80l+th EngBn St Det. 8 190 198 Constr Equip. 35 22 0 108028 515.1+ ASSRON 3

LST No. U80 Btrys A,B/98th CA 9 188 197 Defense Equip. 30 23 8 89687 U73.0 K/98d CA, ASSRON 3

LST No. I+8l Btrys A,D/98th CA 5 193 189 Defense Equip. 1+2 11 8 81855 1+U+.1+ L/98d CA, D/57th

LST No. 1+82 Hqlst Bn, 98th CA 5 162 167 Defense Equip. 37 12 5 831+99 1+61.8 other CA Elements

Sub Total LST GROUP TWO 1+5 1120 1165 213 110 29 552266 281*2..6

TOTAL, THROUGH D PLUS ONE DAT 1+37 7326 7763 585 11+9 95 1202775 9115*0

MAKIN - GARRISON GROUP

CAFE CONSTANTINE 7th Def.Bn. 2 110 112 Construction St 1+ 0 0 2U1367 5005.0 Camp Materials, Def. Eqiip.

CAPE SAN MARTIN ASSRON Detach. 3 100 103 AAF Supplies, Ul 20 0 225507 2352.1+ equip., resupply items.

ISLAND MAIL 7th Def. Bn. 1+9 102lj. 1073 Def. & Constr. 31+ 12 0 1651+76 3989.3 personnel St Equip.

YOUNG AMERICA 7th Def. Bn. 68 952 1020 Def. St Constr. 31 18 6 128886 1213.3 ASSRON 3 Personnel Si Equipment

Sub Total, MAKIN GARRISON GRP. 122 2186 2308 110 50 0 761236 12560.0

Sub Total, MAKIN ASSAULT ECHE­

LON & LST GRP TWO 1+37 7326 7763 585 ll+9 95 1202775 9115.2

TOTAL - MAKIN, ASSAULT AND FIRST GARRISON ECHELONS 559 9512 10071 69$ 199 951961+01121675.2 LOGISTICS - CENTRAL PAC!Plff |^ A"">i:--a I Prom: Commanding Officer TJSS CALVERT.

It has been proved that LSTs and LCTs are needed to exped­ ite the unloading of transports. During this operation, it took this vessel two and one-half (2^-) hours to remove skids from LST 31 before vehicles could he unloaded.

Recommendation: That when LSTs launch their LCT, they also dump their skids.

Prom s Commander Transport Division Pour - TARAWA.

After D plus 1 day, conveyor rollers were laid from the ramp to a point halfway along the pier to the beach, where trucks were used to pick up supplies and run them to a dump. Cases and boxes of supplies were pushed along the conveyer rollers from the ramp to the truck loading point.

Because of their light draft (fourteen inches) LCP(N) plas­ tic boats, if fitted with proper type outboard motors, would be ideal for landing supplies and equipment, as well as the rear echelon, on coral reefs. Combat loads carried in APAs should be reduced to 450 tons. This can be effected by reducing the number of rations carried to a ten day supply. The number of vehicles should also be reduced thus cutting down the amount of fuel required. Practically all low priority equip­ ment as well as a small percentage of high priority equipment should be eliminated. Loads in AKAs should also be reduced although not to the same extent. Cargo in AXAs would be used to take care of shortages in APAs in the event of unforeseen eventualities. Low priority equipment could also be carried.

THE DECISION AS TO DAYS RATIONS, UNITS OP PIES, AMOUNT OP PUEL| AND OTHER SUPPLY TO BE EMBARKED IS BASED ON STRATEGIC AS WELL > AS TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HENCE NO ARBITRARY TONNAGE TOTAL ( CAN BE ESTABLISHED. J

IN GENERAL, THE MORE VEHICLES AVAILABLE IN THE BEACH AREAS, TEE MORE RAPIDLY UNLOADING AND CLEARANCE OP TEE BEACHES PROGRESSES.

Each APA, AKA, LST and LCT should be equipped with conveyor rollers.

Balsa wood life rafts were loaded with supplies and in sev­ eral cases with 75 MM guns, and were pushed or paddled through the shal­ low water from the end of the pier to the beach. These were in constant use until after D plus 2 day. The first two days these life rafts, after being unloaded at the beach, were reloaded with casualties and pushed out to the boats awaiting. , rf&iTicr-CENTRAL PACIFIC MEDICAL

From: Commander FIFTH Amphibious Fore*.

The evacuation to hospital ships at Funafuti seven hundred miles away during early stages of operation was not practicable. It is my opinion that hospital ships should be brought into the combat area on £ plus 3 and 4 for evacuation of the most severe casualties, if the AFAs are to be used for removal of combat teams. An ambulance plane (Coron- ado type) was used for evacuation of casualties from the APAs and support groups at Makin to Funafuti on D plus three. Some difficulty and delay in loading the plane was encountered due to anchorage of the plane in the channel in which boat traffic was heavy. LCF(L)s which were the only boats suitable for this operation, were not equipped with cleats for stretcher loading thereby cutting down the capacity of the boats and slow­ ing loading operations. The use of a float such as a modified life raft of the square box type used on some AKAs would expedite loading of casual­ ties into an ambulance plane of the Coronado type.

The doubling of the medical section of beach parties proved unnecessary on this operation due to the light casualty load and the fact that practically no opposition was encountered on Red Beach. I believe the augmented portion of the medical section should be retained aboard ship until operations show the best location for their utilization. On D plus two the augmented sections of the beach parties were recalled to the transports where their services could be better utilized.

Recommendations:

A. That one hospital corpsman be trained and detailed in recording and reporting of casualties aboard each AKA and APA. B. That each LCP(L) of the force be equipped for handling of stretcher cases for loading of Coronado type ambulance plane. C. That Augmented Medical Section of beach party be retained aboard the transport until their best utilization becomes apparent. D. That one life raft aboard each AKA be modified to furnish a landing float for use in loading Sea Plane Ambulance. E. That the flag ship of each division of APAs be supplied with pin fixation apparatus for fracture reduction, of "Roger Ander­ son" or MStaderHtype. F. That a hospital ship be made available on D plus three or four in combat area for evacuation of casualties from transports.

IVom: Observers' Reports.

Evacuation of casualties was not according to plan in that they were not returned to the ship from which they had come. The ship was not notified before their arrival alongside, and the total number was grossly under-estimated. It seems that the system of evacuation to

5-4 %m3 LOGISTICS - CENTRAL PA^fCf J 3U Wt5|. sp .«W* '. ..*• «.* >. - iiTH * the nearest ship was "better than the planned removal to the parent ship, as this considerably reduced the time before medical treatment could be given. The lack of an approximate estimate of number expected, however, could have resulted in inadequate preparation.

In future operations, where the medical forces of the beach party and shore party are unable to land on the beach, it is suggested that they be stationed in an LGM off the beach and that all boat coxswains carrying casualties be directed to report to this LCM for first aid treat­ ment of the casualties and for instructions as to which transport the casualties will be delivered. from: Commanding Officer USS OHMSSY - TARAWA.

It is believed that boats and not amptracs should be used in evacuating casualties from beaches to ships, and that casualties be so arranged in boats so that the entire boat can be picked up at the rail and wounded taken to sick bay. This is particularly important dur­ ing night hours. ORMSBT boats all carried out these instructions and are so fitted to hoist either by boom or at the davits. A considerable number of boats from other vessels neither could be hoisted by boom or at davits due to slings having been missing in some cases, and in others the slings were in bilges of boats under the stretchers.

5-5 LOGISTICS

IEDITEBBMEAK TKEATBB

Salerno - September 1943.

From: Commander EIGHTH Amphibious Pore*.

Opinions formed after Sicily as to the efficiency of various types of craft in unloading were confirmed in operation at SALERNO. One LCM is worth several LC?(P)s, and LCTs are the most satisfactory cf all landing craft for unloading vehicles and bulk cargo. 'The actual unloading time for transports in this operation varied from 25 hours to 36 hours. This is a considerable improvement over SICILY when the average time was 55 hours. Much of this improvement was due to the employment of LCTs from the Korthern Attack Force. Other factors were the excellent weather, extensive use of cargo nets, faster unloading at the beaches, etc. Sven this time can be substantially reduced if a sufficient number of LCMs and LCTs are available and if craft are unloaded promptly on arrival at the beaches. It is estimated that given good weather and enough LCTs to work the hatches continuously with­ out the necessity of waiting for carriers, a combat loading transport can be emptied in from 24 to 30 hours. LCI(L)s were also used to advantage to un­ load troops from the 3 LSTs which accompanied the combat loaded transports.

In Operation SALEBHO, as in Operation SICILY, DUXWS were not used to best advantage. A few of them were employed unloading LSTs near the beach, but for the most part they were either idle or used for trans­ portation ashore. It seems that no matter what assurances may be given beforehand regarding the employment of DUKWS, circumstances will always arise which will prevent the Army command from ensuring that they are em­ ployed for the special tasks for which they were designed. The only sol­ ution for this seems to be that after they have landed their initial loads they and their drivers revert to direct naval control until the un­ loading is completed.

Recommendations.

1. That rail loading be employed to the maximum extent practicable. It is far faster and more satisfactory in every respect than net loading.

2. That the maximum number of LCM(3)s and LCT(5)s be pro­ vided for unloading cargo from transports and cargo ships. The latter craft are particularly valuable. They are too large to be carried on deck and because of their slow speed, limited radius and poor sea going qualities, the problem of getting them to the assault area may prove a difficult one, but once there, they are easily the most valuable of all the landing craft to handle cargo between the ships and the beaches. Next to them the LCM(3) is most valuable. It is just too small, however to handle mediiam tanks and very large trucks satisfactorily.

3. That when using J»CY4®)*s to transport cargo, maximum use LOGISTICS - MEDITJHHAKBAH SB1ASHPM g. % i: - r •*.• I be mad* of cargo not*, a net load being loweredUfi into into the teach with the load still in the net, and lifted out at the beach either by an "A" frame on a OTKW or by a tractor crane. This requires four or more nets per boat.

4. That every effort be made to provide sufficient manpower at the beach to unload all bulk cargo promptly.

5. That DIIKVS assist in unloading.

Unloading of LSTs on £ and D plus One Bays was done mainly over pontoons inasmuch as all available LCTs were being used to unload transports, and the beach gradient was such that they could not load directly onto the beach. This included three British LSTs of the Killer type (BOXER, BRIJISJR and THHUSTBR). When fully extended, the ramps of these LSTs projects about 79 feet beyond their bow. The officer in command of these craft reported that there %ras about six to seven feet of water at the outboard end of the ramps and therefore they had to be unloaded over pontoons.

In this operation, two LSTs (carrying Air Torce equipment) were completely loaded with bulk stores and material totaling some five hundred tons apiece; also LSTs in which the 157th and 179th BCTs of the Floating Beserve were embarked, carried in addition to their vehicles, tanks, etc., an estimated 150 to 200 tons apiece of such stores and equipment. There were three double pontoons available in the force, all of which were beached promptly and used continuously.

Experience to date seems to indicate that there is little probability of ever finding beaches whose gradient will permit unloading LSTs over the ramp directly onto the beach, and therefore, it must be accepted that LSTs normally will be unloaded by one of three methods:

(a) If a port is available, by mooring bows on to a dock or pier; (b) and (c) - If unloading is done over the beaches, by pontoons, smaller landing craft and/or DUKWS.

Since it is impracticable to carry more than a few pontoons with any Attack force and since unloading bulk cargoes from LSTs must be done entirely by manual labor, those LSTs carrying bulk equipment auto­ matically become the last to unload because otherwise they would tie up the pontoons for an extended period and thus delay unloading vehicles, tanks, etc., from other LSTs.

It is estimated that unloading bulk cargo from an LST over pontoons can be done at the rate of roughly one hundred tons per day. At this rate, it will take from four to six days to completely empty a fully loaded one. LOGISTICS - i KEDITEEaANEiUJ THEATRE H Many U. notably those in the Milazzo and Termini to Salerno shuttle service, were loaded with from two to five hundred tons of hulk stores. This practice caused then to he held on the beaches for periods as long as 24 hours because all these stores had to he man­ handled in the unloading process. This likewise slowed down the general unloading picture.

AN LST IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC LOADED WITH 26 CARGO TRUCKS, 23 MISCELLANEOUS VEHICLES, AND 367 TONS OP BULK CARGO ON THE TANK DECK CONSISTING OP RATIONS, FUEL IN DROMS, AMMUNITION AND OR­ GANIC GEAR, BY UTILIZING TRUCKS AND CARGO TRUCKS WAS UNLOADED IN APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. SEE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OP METHOD EMPLOYED IN CHAPTER DEVOTED TO LANDING CRAFT.

Some merchant vessels were found to he loaded with cargoes of mixed tinned gasoline and explosives such as land mines. In one in­ stance a small fire caused by a single bomb hit caused the loss of the entire ship and cargo when land mine explosions drove off the fire fighters This ship could otherwise have been saved.

Because of the lack of mechanical means for handling hulk cargo, LSTs are not well suited to transportation of this type of ma­ terial or equipment and it is recommended that they not he employed for this if other ships can possible be made available.

Prom: Commanding Officer USS ARCTUBUS.

Whenever a boat suffers engine trouble or hull damage, as they frequently do in this type of operation, the boat is brought back to the ship for repair. Because of the need of all boats to send cargo ashore in the shortest possible time, the damaged boa.ts must be repaired immediately. In most cases the boats have to be hoisted aboard for re­ pair which suspends discharging at one hatch while the boat is being hoisted aboard and sometimes while it is being repaired as well. If a special ship were designated for repairs with special booms and adequate deck space (an LST could be specially fitted) all damaged boats could be sent to that ship for repairs, leaving the cargo ship free for the important task of getting cargo ashore. If the Repair ship carried extra personnel for repair purposes and sufficient spare parts, it is believed she would be able to get the boats back into service faster than the cargo ship, which often has to improvise replacements for damaged or missing gear. In this line, the Salvage Tank Lighters could be carried on the Repair Ship instead of taking one of the tank lighters from the service of the cargo ship for salvage purposes. LOGISTICS

SOUTH PACIFIC *>/ »ur, Treasury Islands Occupation - October 1943. ^$L4? f From: Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT ONE.

The transport units under Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT OHB in EATON, were divided into five groups, each with tactical commanders cited. The First Transport Group consisted of eight APDs screened by (three DDs). The Second Transport Group consisted of eight LCI(L)s, two LCI Gunboats, screened by (three DDs and three AMs). The Third Transport Group consisted of two LSTs screened by (two CDs), and YMSs 197 and 260. The Fourth Transport Group consisted of one APc and thres LCTs, screened by two PT boats. The Fifth Transport Group con­ sisted of one APc, six LCMs, and an aircraft rescue boat. The five transport groups departed independently as indicated in paragraph 10, so timed to arrive at BLANCHE HARBOR on 27 October as follows: Arrived Unit Departed BLANCHE HARBOR 27 October lit Transport Group GUADALCANAL 1230 26 October 0520 2nd Transport Group GUADALCANAL 0400 26 October 0555 3rd Transport Group GUADALCANAL 1930 26 October 1640 4th Transport Group RENDOYA 1200 26 October 0830 5th Transport Group LAMBU LAMHJ 1900 26 October 0830

The varying times of arrival were set to give each group full use of the beaches and permit its clearing the area prior to arrival of the next group, thus avoiding undue exposure to air attack of vessels awaiting opportunity to unload.

During the eleven days elapsing from the initial echelon until the unloading of the Third Echelon, the following troops and sup­ plies were delivered at the TREASURY ISLANDS by ships and landing craft under Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT ONE:

Personnel 6,315 Rations 367 tons Drummed petroleum products 422 tons Ammunition 1,152 tons Vehicles: 169 cargo type 576 tons 29 const.type 187 tons 155 special type 394 tons total 1,157 tons 1,157 tons General cargo 772 tons 772 tons 3,870 tons

While this was not a large operation, it was somewhat com­ plicated due to the many types of craft involved and their great differences wa» urii**. |UavJ;Ol % fl *1 ..SOUTH PACIFIC

In speed. In all, there were ten types, with speeds varying from 35 to 6 knots. Sine* none of then could carry LCM(3)s, it was necessary for the LSTs to tow one each, and to send six ethers, escorted by an APc, on their own power, on the eighty-five mile, open water trip from TELIA LAVXLLA. Since but two LSTs could be spared for the First Echelon of this operation, additional equipment had to be carried in three LCT(5)s. This Included the very important Radar equipment, loaded in one LCT, to­ gether with bulldozers and other engineering equipment for immediate tran­ sfer from BLANCHE HAftBOB, to SOANOTALU, when that position was reported occupied and suitable as a Badar site. This was done on D minus 5 Bays and, in spite of very difficult terrain conditions at SOANOTALU, with dense forests up to the beach, the Radar was placed in full operation, at the selected site, about 1600 yards inland, within less than four days, and was ready before Cog Day for the BOUGAINVILLE Operation.

Landing at Ifaroress Augusta Bay - November 1943.

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force.

On November 2 the second assigned objective was reached, fy November 4 access lateral roads running inland had been started. Sup­ ply of advance units was difficult due to swamps and absence of roads. Amphibian tractors proved invaluable in getting supplies and ammunition forward and wounded back to the rear. It was found that a small fighter strip could be constructed on PUHUATA PLANTATION but a reconnaissance patrol of one company was sent to determine a site for the main two-strip airdome. A suitable site was located in the PIVA Area about two and a half miles north of TOROKINA POINT. The patrol was engaged by an enemy force on its return, losing one killed and three wounded. In the mean­ time patrols were pushed in all directions and new positions for exten­ sion of the perimeter were located.

Unloading details of 120 men on each ship and 200 men per ship on the beach with the sole duty of unloading boats were required and furnished. By repeated experience these numbers have been found to be the minimum which can keep the ships' booms working constantly. The training exercises at EFATE were invaluable, not only as a refresher in the mechanics of landing assault troops but particularly in teaching the details of rapid and efficient unloading.

On November 4, 1943, the 2d Echelon, LSTs 70, 207, 339, 341, 354, 395 and 488, Transdivs 12 and 22 (8 APDs), with additional troops, supplies and equipment embarked, and escorted by WALLER, SAUFLEY, PEILIP, RENSEAW, EATON, SI(JOURNEY departed GUADALCANAL and arrived at TOROKINA at 0600 November 6, 1943. Unloading proceeded slowly due to lack of develop­ ment of beach facilities. Most of the cargo of the eight LSTs had to be unloaded at PUHUATA ISLAND where beaching conditions were good but crowded. Unloading was not completed until 0300 November 7, when the convoy withdrew and returned t^|SU4^£f^|L. • The APDs were detached 8 & ftt? j ? V*Ifi 3! >-.«k ->'* LOGISTICS - SOUTH PA&lfie ?». tj enroute and proceeded ahead in order to debark casualties and to refuel at TULAGI in time to load for the 3d Echelon.

Echelon 2A, PRESIDENT JACKSON, PRESIDENT ADAMS, PRESIDENT HATS, PULLER, LIBRA and TITAUIA with the 148th CT Infantry Division en- barked, escorted by QUEST, WARRIGNTON, BENNETT, HUDSON, ANTHONY, WADS- WORTH, HOPKINS, HOVET, DORSEY and SOUTHARD departed GUADALCANAL at OlOO on November 7 for TOROKINA, arriving November 8 at 0800. Unloading com­ menced at once but at 1140 the approach of many bogies necessitated get­ ting the formation underway to repel air attack. The enemy was able to launch a well-coordinated attack by about 30-30 dive bombers and 12-14 torpedo planes covered by 50-60 fighters. Seven planes, mostly dive bombers, were shot down by the convoy and screen. The PULLER received one bomb hit, which though not disabling, killed five and wounded twenty, and seven near misses. The JACKSON was hit by one bomb which did not explode. Unloading was resumed but at 1600 ships again got underway in view of impending air attack which was broken up by our fighters. At 1720 unloading was again resumed, completed at 1830 and at 1837 ships departed in heavy rain with many bogies to south and west.

The 3d Echelon, with LSTs 446, 447, 449, 390, 397, 398, 472 and 166 with (8 APDs) escorted by WALLER, SAUTLEY, PHILIP, RENSHAW, CON­ WAY, and EATON departed GUADALCANAL on November 9 and arrived TOROXINA at 0600 on November 11. Beach conditions were somewhat better developed and, although loading had been heavier than in the second echelon, un­ loading was completed and ships departed for GUADALCANAL at 1835. The APDs with casualties embarked had departed at 0830. The return to GUADALCANAL was made without incident.

The 4th Echelon, CLYMER, HUNTER LIGGETT, AMERICAN LEGION, CBISCENT CITY, ALCHIBA, ALHENA, with the 129th Combat Team of the 37th Division embarked, escorted by GUEST, WADSWORTH, BENNETT, ANTHONY, TERRY, BEAINE, DORSEY and TREVER departed GUADALCANAL at 2300 on November 11, 1943, and arrived TOROKINA at 0700 November 13, having been molested but unharmed by many bogies during the night of November 12-13. Unloading was completed and the ships departed at 1630, returning to GUADALCANAL. Mine­ sweepers DORSEY and TREVER continued search for shoals to eastward of previously searched areas.

At noon Love on November 13, 1943, command of BOUGAINVILLE position passed to the Commanding General Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps, by agreement with Commander Task Force 31. Task Force 31, however, con­ tinues to furnish naval and logistic support.

During the period November 1 to 13, 1943, the following troops, equipment and supplies were delivered at the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY positions: - SOUTH PACITIC

SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT. TOMS. Echelon 1-8 APA, 4 AKA 14,321 6,177 2-8 APD. 8 LST 3,548 5,080 2L- 4 APA', 2 AKA 5,715 3,160 3-8 APD, 8LST 3,599 5,785 4-4APA. 2 AKA 6.678 2,935 TOTAL 33,861 23,137

Including the above amounts, a total of 44,430 officers and men, and 40,338 tons of equipment and supplies hare "been delivered from November 1-30, 1943. Daring this period a total of 1434 casualties have been evacuated by ships of this force, including sick.

Prom: Commander Transport Group, Third Amphibious Force.

The loading was limited as follows:

JACKSON, ADAMS, HATES 520 tons each. CLIMEH, LEGION, LIGGETT, POLLER 500 tons each. OSESCENT CITY 440 tons ALCHIBA, ALHENA, LIBRA, TITANIA 550 tons each.

Total Tonnage - 6,177 tons.

Prom the actual times of unloading during the training per­ iod and with the improvements made in reloading, the predicted average time of unloading all APAs and AKAs was 4| hours with a 2500 yard run to the beach.

The debarkation interval for the first and second assault waves of the Transports varied considerably between different ships, particularly between those capable of "rail-loading" and those which could not do so.

The limitation on loading of APAs and AKAs to 500 plus or minus 50 tons was based on previously determined discharge rates. The amount carried was about £ a combat load for APAs and about £ for AKAs (about l/lO deadweight capacity of AKAs). Careful planning on the part of Troop Commanders resulted in the elimination of all items not abso­ lutely necessary for the first echelons and it was found not difficult to stay within the limits imposed. Additional advantages accrued in that adequate space was thus made available for stowage of cargo to permit:

(1) Equal balance in unloading time between all holds. (2) Easy handling. (3) Proportionate discharge of the various classes of supplies, such as ammunition, rations, fuels, etc., at a given time during the unloading. LOGISTICS - SOUTH PACI$lg3|¥^4^ •:'% } [' •>' "vFV- - V; '••. -••' = • ' • ;, -.'-f Sufficient cargo nets were carried to permit stowing most of the loose cargo in nets in the holds. This cargo was then unloaded from the nets in the boats at the beach. This type of loading insures' unloading daring a single daylight period when the transport group is less vulnerable to air attacks by reason of adequate cover and maneuver­ ability. It is based, of course, on the early follow up of subsequent echelons with the remainder of supplies and equipment essential to con­ tinuance of the operation.

Probably the most important modification with respect to cargo handling in an assault landing is modernization in hatch design. Tor an example, 56 power lifts are required in LIBRA and TITANIA simply to open up from main deck to number three hold, an operation which takes nearly three hours. Some means also is necessary to open hatches prior to arrival in the Transport Area. In the South Pacific, blessed with warmth and usually calm seas, hatches generally have been left open upon departure from the port of embarkation and hatch covers hauled over, and much valuable time saved in all ships.

The nearest possible balance in area and volume of cargo holds should be obtained to permit flexibility in stowage of cargo. Ir­ regular hold shapes should be avoided.

Bail-loading of LCTPs has again proved itself on ships so equipped, particularly for the first waves, and every effort must be made to equip maximum number of AFAs to operate in this manner.

NOT CONSTRUCTION APAS ARB EQUIPPED TO PERMIT BAIL LOADING 07 LCVPS, AND THIS WILL 38 POSSIBLE IN APAS IN SERVICE WHEN THE PRESENT VIBE IS REPLACED WITH A STRONGER APPROVED TYPE.

Alteration to provide accommodations for 400 troops on AKAs is advocated. This will permit AKAs to handle their own beaches and ship unloading details from troops embarked with consequent elimination of the confusion and delay attendant upon transferring working and beach parties after arrival in the Transport Area. With AZAs loaded as des­ cribed in a foregoing paragraph, space on the second deck can be made available for this purpose without detriment to the ship, particularly if bunks are of a portable type. In effect, then, the present AKAs will become transports of small troop capacity but able, by reason of their larger number of LCM(3) and heavy lift booms, to carry a higher percent­ age of heavy weapons (155 m/m, large vehicles (radar vans, 2^ ton trucks) and CB construction equipment, than can now be done in APAs. Two AEAs will be able, if so arranged, to carry a Marine Defense Battalion, or a CB complete (except rear echelon) without assistance from other types.

APPROVED PLANS PROVIDE FOR NEW AKAS TO HATE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 162 TROOPS, AND THOSE IN SERVICE HAVE BEEN ALTERED TO PERMIT SAME LIFT.

3 •< V V.i, 5"13 >"•-? s, • -v.- ~ -* 1 i SOUTH PACIFIC iIL- __ LIraa 2^jumbo" booms on all APAs with independent handl­ ing equipment. This will permit carrying 4 LCM(3) in these ships and make them independent of assistance from other ships in assignment of LCM(3) in unloading. Standardize on 4 "jumbo" booms in AKAs with allowance of 8 LCM(3) in order to handle heavy equipment from four holds expeditiously. All "jumbo" booms should have -power operated guvs.

POUR APAS IN SERVICE HAVE BEEN ALTERED TO PROVIDE TWO HEAVY BOOMS AND ADDITIONAL LCMS. ACTION IS BEING TAKEN TO MAKE SIMILAR ALTERATIONS IN ALL OTHER APAS IN SERVICE EXCEPT SPECIFIED ONES TO WHICH THE ALTERATION IS NOT APPLICABLE BE­ CAUSE OF CHARACTERISTICS OR PROSPECTIVE USE.

PRESENT PLANS FOR OTHER THAN THE SMALL AKAS PROVIDE FOUR BOOMS AND AN ALLOWANCE OF EIGHT LCM(3)S.

From: Commanding Officer, USS GEORGE CLYMER.

SUMMARY.

Debarkation of troops: (Zero time - "Lower all boats"). All boats launched 19 min. Assault waves debarked ..... 37 min. Discharge of cargo: Overall hold working time 5:10 Deduct time underway during 1:49 Air Attack (1300-1449) Net hold working time . 3;21 Total load in tons 456 Tons per hour discharged 137

From: Commanding Officer LST 395.

Pontoon trestle bridge was loaded aboard to be used to bridge space between ship and shore.

Ship was beached at flank speed at Torokina Beach, Bougain­ ville, with all ballast tanks empty. There was 18 inches of water at bow and the sea was moderate. Ship grounded at 0620, 28 November 1943, and all ballast tanks were filled to anchor ship in position. Bridge building team augmented by Army Engineers from shore party immediately connenced setting up the bridge. Trestle bridge completed at 0804 and ready to commence 'unloading. Although bridge took considerable time to erect, it proved its value by expediting unloading and all vehicles were able to leave the ship under own power. Approximately 45 feet of water was bridged, leaving a scant 10 feet of shallow water to travel in. Unloading commenced about 0830 and all cargo, including 780 drums of gasoline, was unloaded by 1220. Drums were rolled over the bridge. Shuttle trucks used for cargo were brought back aboard after their loads |in r.. i':: ^ Si" n -i x -• ar * 1 5-14 'I N.Y -i "15 «*•' - T ? • V V*-> LOGISTICS - SOUTH PACIFIC & '

J :rk T7: * h^J^f -t ? were rmoved. Eighteen tracks and 1 Jtaehauf type trailer were ^loadjsdsl^^' return to Kukna. Treetle bridge dismantled and placed aboard by 1330 and •hip ready to retract.

The nee of portable pontoon treetle bridge proved on this echelon to solve the problem of adverse beach conditions. A heavy surf was running by 1100 and structure was steady throughout unloading. Loads up to 23 ton were taken across the trestle. The time taken to erect bridge was definitely worthwhile to both ship and disembarking units as all ve­ hicles were dry and moving tinder own power. With one additional bay in bridge, vehicles would have been on dry land. It is proposed to use 3 bays and 2 ramps in future which will span 60 feet. Two bays and 2 ramps were used on this trip. With experienced erection crews, time to erect bridge dm be reduced one half.

from I Commander 1ST Flottila live - Comment on Trestle Bridge.

One of the very valuable features of this equipment is that it can be completely disassembled so that there are no heavy members, each of which can be readily handled by man power. This bridge has been satisfactorily tested a second time at Torokina, and its continued use there desired by ComQenJMAC and. Commander Task Force 31. This equipment is considered to be especially valuable whop LST moves initially on to strange and questionable beaches where surf and other beaching conditions as prevail at Torokina are apt to be encountered. Zt is interesting to note that it took experience to bring this valuable equipment to light, indeed, experience has proved a most adept teacher in LST operations. One of the requirements of this bridge is that its erection must be ac­ complished by personnel familiar with it, and the time element involved is dependent upon its skill. It is therefore necessary to have trained teams available to be placed aboard LST together with this equipment in order that a satisfactory set up could be efficiently and quickly achieved when landing.

Cftnmiant on trailers.

Realizing we had some *jury-rigged" trailers and that even with the good La Crosse and Fruehauf Heavy Duty trailer the optimum trailer for LST was still not had Commander LST Flotilla FIVE requested in reference (o) that an experienced trailer engineer or designer be associated with LST on its move to Bougainville in order that this re­ presentative might study the problem of designing a suitable trailer far LST- under its present and prospective operating conditions and make specific recommendation in regard to the procurement of this optimum trailer. (Two U. S. Army, ordnance officers accompanied LST 395 on its second visit. Thus was professional knowledge of the trailer under first hand contitions acquainted with the problem of unloading LST by its use and by actual practical demonstration. These gentlemen have recommended the ATHEY 20-ton trailer. War Department Technical Manual, TM9-790B of December 15, 1942, as the optimum trailer. LOGISTICS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Occupation of Woodlaxk and Kiriwana Islands - July 1943.

From: Commander SEVENTH Acrphibious Force.

Experience in this operation indicate that LSTs can be un- loaded relatively quickly with properly organized and adequate unloading details. A team composed of about 300 men, fortified "by a good beach, developed accesses, and with ample trucks available, completely un­ loaded an LST of approximately 1100 tons of bulk loaded cargo in four­ teen hours. Loading and unloading times of course vary considerably with the nature of the load, conditions of the beach, and the efficiency of the unloading crew. The maximum time required for actual unloading dur­ ing the operation was about 23^ hours. The average time was 18 hours.

Completely mobile loads proved to be a most expeditious means of transporting equipment and supplies in LSTs. With accesses and dispersal prepared in advance mobile loading permits rapid unloading of the LST on the beach, and also permits rapid transporting Of supplies to the dispersal areas without rehandling on the beach. LSTs with completely mobile loads were unloaded at Woodlark in as little as 1 hour 20 minutes. The average time was 2^ to 3 hours.

In tropical waters it is feasible to transport a limited number of personnel in LCT(5)s. In this operation about twenty men from the loading detail were transported on each craft without hardship.

Landing at Lae - September 1943.

From: Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force.

Unloading on D day was satisfactory with the exception of LCT(5)s. Each of these, containing 120 tons of bulk stores, beached at 0800 and were not clear until 1430. This was due to insufficient troops assigned to unloading. It is essential for rapid unloading that suffi­ cient personnel be assigned to each ship for this purpose only.

On the other hand, unloading of LSTs each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles and 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in 1 hour 42 minutes. Unloading of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.

Subsequent to the initial unloading on the morning of D day, all beaching and unloading was done at night. The rate of unload­ ing was generally unsatisfactory. One cause was undoubtedly intermit­ tent bombing of the beaches by enemy aircraft.

The need for supplies on the beach must be balanced with the LOGISTICS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC >: *j :4. 1 *?# w1 period of exposure to air attack enroute to and from the beach during"' daylight hours. Three hours appears to be the maximum time which LSTs and LCT(5)8 should be permitted to remain on the beach.

Bnbarkation staffs, loading officers, naval headmasters, and unloading detail should be appointed sufficiently well in advance of the operation to enable them to obtain the necessary loading and Tin- loading experience in preliminary movements, training, and rehearsals. Sapid unloading of bulk stores is a most important requirement which can be achieved only by an experienced organization. The need for effi­ cient control and adequate, trained personnel in this phase of the op­ eration cannot be too strongly stressed. Because of an insufficiency of troops assigned to unloading in this operation, unloading of LCT(5)s was generally unsatisfactory.

Eapid preparation and surfacing with matting of beach exits and roads to dumps are essential if vehicles and stores are to be cleared from the beach promptly. Although an effort was made to meet this requirement in both the rehearsal and the actual landing, in neither case was it satisfactory.

UNLOADING- DATA Load Period on Remaining Bate per Echelon Craft Vehicles M Beach-Hours on Board hour-tons

4 6 LST 20 80 2.25 35.5 5 7 LCT(5) — 120 6.00 - 20.0 6 4 LST 39 84 3.00 - 28.0 8 7 LST 35 80 2.5 • 32.0 9 6 LCT(5) - 130 2.7 60$ 27.0 12 6 LCT(5) — 125 3.0 20$ 33.0 14 7 LCT(5) - 110 3.2 - 34.0

Repairs were made by USS RIGEL and ISTs 453 and 455. These LSTs were fitted out as repair and supply ships. LST 455 was stationed at MOROSE a* control and repair ship for northward movements of landing craft until 12 September, when she was disabled by bombing attack. She was then relieved by LST 453, stationed at BUNA, because of inadequate air protection at MOROSE. The services of these ships at a point between the staging and assault areas proved to be of the greatest value.

Medical

In outline, this plan involved the use of a first aid ship at BUNA as a collecting point for naval casualties. LST 464 was em­ ployed for the purpose and was equipped with personnel and a considerable part of the equipment of one standard fifty-bed hospital unit.

The Australian Army medical plan necessitated evacuation to

5-17 ll OUTHHEST FiCIlIC

since .t&eirho8pitaI "kccommodatione at MGROBE were very limited. Army casualties were to be evacuated from the beach, insofar as was possible, only in LSTs and LCI(L)s. Thoee LCI(L)s which carried medical officers were distinctively marked, Each LST carried a medical officer. In practice, LCT(5)s were employed principally for supply to the far shore after D plus 3 days. These returned carrying wounded to HOBOBB where they were inspected and serious cases put ashore. Other cases were brought to BUHA by LCT(5)s or any other ship available.

Casualties from the LSTs bombed on D day were partially collected before dark by two destroyers and brought to MOBOBE. Eva­ cuation from there was handled by destroyers and APDs.

As a result of the operation it was found that stretcher cases can be accommodated best on the tank decks of LSTs. In an emer­ gency LCI(L)s can accommodate 6 stretcher cases, but this type of craft is not entirely satisfactory for the work. AFCs have been used for stretcher cases, they lack adequate shelter and medical staff azxd accord­ ingly should not be used if more satisfactory oraft are available.

Walking wounded can be accommodated satisfactorily in troop compartments of APDs, LCI(L)s and LSTs.

Landing at jPins^^^f" - September 1943.

Prom: The Commander SEVENTH fleet.

Supply - The proven ability of the Amphibious Force to run supply echelons to unload in darkness should overcome any fear Of troops being stranded without supplies. In this operation supply for seven days only was landed at dawn on D day with the result that LSTs were on the return movement before any serious air attack developed. the eame token, the ground forces had fewer vehicles to conceal, less bulk to move to dumps, and smaller labor requirements during the first twelve hours ashore. The remainder of the total 15 days supply was landed in 3 LSTs on the night of D-D 4-1.

Unloading detail - The provision of a large trained un- loading-detail with each load of bulk stores paid dividends by enabling rapid unloading and reducing the time craft remained on the beach exposed to air attack.

Naval Beachmaster - A naval officer as Beachmaster is essential. The army officers in the shore party are not qualified to handle adequately purely naval functions.

Landing at Arawe - December 1943.

Prom J Commander SEVENTH Amphibious,.Jkrce LOGISTICS - SOUTHKIST FiCIKE"Sf **i.r i --" - 'j s

I Vi '-Z-i f ft •*,--••% I 4-#| ? i- 3 $&• "%. •&. if !U ha Except for the troops and sTcppSsw xayU&BfS^ti^^g^ waves, all troops and supplies for the ABAWE Operation were transported by LCTs and LCMs, escorted by PCs, AFcs, SCs and TMSs from CAPE CRETIN, New Guinea, a distance of about 70 miles across sea.

During the period 15-31 December 1943, the following ships of Task Group 76.5 (which was comprised of small craft only) were dam­ aged or sunk from enemy action:

APC # 21 sunk APc 2 and APc 15 damaged LCTs 82, 382, 384, 386, 387 and 396, damaged

The following enemy planes were shot down by these small craft J

22 definite 6 probables

As of 10 January 1944, the LCTs landed 3,100 troops, 6,287 tons of stores, and 451 vehicles and guns at ABAWE.

Prom: Commanding General, 2nd Engineer Stoecial Brigade - GENERAL BEPORT

Sled pallets and similar devices, such as the Inverkip sled, should be exploited to get maximum advantage of their use. This brigade has six Inverkip and six improvised sleds; 12 more Inverkips have been ordered. The tendency to overload these sleds must be avoided.

The 3/4 ton weapon carrier has proved to be the most sat­ isfactory vehicle for use in the initial stages before the roadways are ready. It has more power and maneuverability than the i ton and carries three times the tonnage. Instead of trailing 37 mm guns, it had proved better to preload them in the weapon carriers and unload them at their emplacements. The 3/4 ton trucks return to the craft after unloading the gun and then shuttle stores to the dumps. Jeeps trailing 37 mm guns often bogged down.

DOKWS take up so much cargo space (31* long, 81 wide 8' tall with top dovm) that they are not recommended for initial landings. They are very useful in unloading vessels not able to beach of subsequent echelons. Their use from LCTs and LSTs which can beach is not recommended. In that connection, it is emphasized that DUXWS will operate land-water satisfactorily if maintenance is thoroughly performed. The bad name these vehicles got at Milne Bay was due, in our opinion, to the poor main­ tenance and peculiarly choppy waters in that area. Our Amphibian Truck Company (5304th), by systematic maintenance, has kept a very high percent of theoperationboth at Ore and at Lae where 24 hour oper­ ation vaii necessary. These trucks weigh 13,600 lbs. Even when preloaded with their maximum capacity of 5000 lbs, they can be unloaded by the gear of Victory, Liberty, or equivalent ships. DUKVfS have definite value when properly used and maintained. Unloading chutes, cargo nets, etc. must be included in their equipment.

Another advantageous use of DUKWS is moving supplies from one beach to another as troops advance along the coast after the initial landing. Much rehandling will be avoided. When thus used, the forward beach should first be made ready by shore engineers and mats taken up by landing boats.

Still another use for DUKWS is to lay alongside a beached LOT and take cargo over the sides while it is also being unloaded via the ramp, thus decreasing the time for the LOT to remain on the Ear Shore. CHAPTER 71

SHIP TO SHOEB M071MMT

gapPBAT. PAfTTTip

Gilberts Operation - Norember 1943. from! Commander Pifth Amphibious Porce.

Instruction of the individual and of mite assigned to an operation must be based on the situation as known and estimated for the terrain and enemy disposition, and must be detailed in every phase that can be foreseen. The final rehearsals in particular should be car­ ried out as much in detail as possible, and should include the movement of material, vehicles, and supplies from ship to shore, the use of demo­ lition units clearing obstacles for the improvement of beaches and the tactical deployment of troops. Training and instruction in basic am­ phibious operations is not sufficient; it must be directed specifically toward the accomplishment of the operation intended.

The inclusion of a considerable number of LVTs in the boat group landing an assault battalion landing team, as is now clearly indicated, is going to require some changes in the technique of the ship to shore movement. If the LVTs have to be transported in LSTs while the troops are in APAs the problem of the ship to shore movement becomes more complicated and a satisfactory system has to be worked out. Due to the slow speed of the LVT it is best to launch them from the LSTs near the line of departure. LCIs, LSTs, or even the standard landing boats could be used to get the troops from the APAs to the vicinity of the line of departure.

Each battalion landing team must be adequately prepared with the proper materials and trained personnel to remove beach mines and obstacles as indicated by intelligence, and be prepared to improve landing beaches by use of demolitions on coral heads and boulders.

When available, armored amphibians should constitute the leading wave. from: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Pleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. (LAUDING AT TARAWA).

Plans had been made for Battalion Landing Teams to make the initial landings, one team designated to land on each of the landing beaches (Bed 1, 2, and 3). The schedule for this initial landing was as follows: Boats Land at First Wave LVTs H lour Second Wave LVTs H plus 3 min. Third Wave LVTs H plus 6 min. Pourth Wave t5, .; ^CVPs - • - : , H plus 14 min.

iM 6-1 *r • W a .JSSI* JO SHOES MOVEMENT - CENTRAL PACIJIC

iCtO LOMs ' H plus 20 min. Sixth Wave LCVPs H plus 25 min.

Loaded LVTs of the first three wares proceeded, from tran­ sports to the Rendezvous Area, and proceeded from there into the lagoon to the Line of Departure. Overloading, wind, sea, and an ebb tide, to­ gether with poor mechanical condition of a number of the leading LVTs, combined to slow the first wave to a speed of 3^ knots. A speed of at least 3 knots had been expected, and thus the first three wares, although they had left the Rendezvous Area on schedule, reached the line of De­ parture about 39 minutes late.

Shis delay made it necessary to change the time of H- Hour, the final announced time being 0900. Actually, however, the first wave did not reach the beach until about 0917, so that a considerable interval of time (22 minutes) was left between the cessation of bombard^ ment by surface vessels and the landing of the first assault wave. Even though aircraft conducted the H-Hour strike more or less according to sche­ dule, this breakdown in timing probably allowed the enemy a valuable breathing spell. One observer commented that "the third wave appeared to have heavier casualties than the first two waves. This may have been due to the fact that enemy reinforcements were received from the south side of the island just prior to the arrival of the third wave, or be­ cause a number of occupants of the pill-boxes had recovered from shock caused by the bombardment.11

The first three waves of LVTs had no difficulty in cross­ ing the reef. Ho serious underwater or beach obstructions or mines were encountered. All waves, however, were under heavy enemy fire. It is estimated that about 95jb of the LVTs reached the reef, and that 85$ reached the beaches.

The fourth and succeeding waves (LCVPs and LCMs) could not pass over the reef, and were considerably delayed. Troops and equip­ ment of these waves were put ashore either by loading into LVTs or on rafts, or by landing at the pier which extended out across the reef to deeper water. Troops attempting to wade ashore over the reef other than along the pier met intense fire and suffered heavy casualties.

At about this time the situation in the lagoon became considerably confused. Dae to the fact that no suitable beachheads had been established on any of the beaches, no beach parties were able to land. The LVTs of the 1st three waves, after leaving the beaches, were apparently more or less leaderless. Some proceeded back to the trans­ port area, others stopped on the reef to the northwest of BITIOT Island where it was difficult to signal them, and others stopped just outside of eneny fire with complaints of mechanical trouble. Later in the day it was estimated that nearly 200 other landing craft, practically all of which were loaded with either troops or supplies, were floating around SHIP 10 SHOES MOVEMENT - GBNTBAl PACIFIC the lagoon. la the meantime two more Battalion Landingsap" jw|fc§W "r committed to the beach. One of these suffered extremely heavy losses**^ while its men were attempting to wade in over the reef. The fighting ashore was bitter, and became a matter of destroying the enemy in small groups entrenched in pill-boxes, ma­ chine gun nests, and other strong fortifications, fy nightfall of D- Day, 5 battalion landing teams had been committed, but the situation ashore was not clear to the Task Itorce Commander. It was later deter­ mined that a fair beachhead was held on the western beach, but that the two beaches to the eastward had practically no beachheads. About daylight on the 21st (D plus 1 Say) the 6th Bat­ talion Landing Team was committed and landed on the beaches, fy noon the situation ashore showed marked improvement, beachheads were improved, and tactical communications were established. Late in the afternoon troops were landed on BAIBIKI Island, (next adjacent island to the east­ ward of BITITU), with no oppostion and artillery was emplaced. Also about the same time troops were landed on Green Beach, western side of BITITU Island. About noon on the 22nd (D plus 2 Bay) the Division Command Post was established adiore. Mopping up operations proceeded successfully on the western end of the island on D plus 2 and D plus 3 Days, while troops continued pushing the enemy to the east, assisted by air and naval gunfire and artillery ashore. noon of the 23rd (D plus 3 Days) BITITU Island was completely in our hands. A major difficulty developed when beach parties were unable to land at TABAIfA until about noon of D plus 1 Day. In the in­ terim, due to the lack of a directing head in the lagoon, considerable confusion resulted, which was not corrected until the early morning of D plus one day, when Commander Transport Division Tour took station on board the control vessel at the Line of Departure. Uhls incident in­ dicated the necessity of having an experienced ranking naval officer to take station on or near the line of departure, probably in the control vessel, In order to regulate the general movement of landing craft and their cargoes. from) Observers Beports - Tarawa. A number of boats were lying off the beach for as much as three days with gear and equipment that could not be used on the beach. This tied up boats that could have been used for unloading necessary sup­ plies and equipment. Initial planning in future should include stationing of a control boat off beach and out of aimed small arms fire. Officer in charge to have communication with CT on beach and with control ship.

m -4 *^8$ f % -7. v ** se B ft *' .if W f */ S H I PT O SHOfiS ^VEMEHT - CSNTEAL PACIHC yifUim?Wi i-M This officer to be kept Informed of situation ashore with special re­ gard to location of secure beaches and secure avenues of approach. He is then in position to explain to leaders of subsequent reserve units, supply groups, etc., the topography of beaches and safest routes of approach, Such a control boat would have enabled LT 1/8 to land on BED 2 via 100 yard wide corridor immediately west of pier, reducing casualties and increasing control on arrival at beach. All units fol­ lowing assault troops to beach should check through control boat.

Bverything must come thru the control boat. Too many cases where Shore Party send boats directly back to ships on long run for items already ashore, on another part of beach. Control boats could catch this error. TQM aboard transports could radio reports and progress of unloading to control boats.

The control boat is the heart of the supply system. 0-4 and T($( representatives should be in close coordination with navy to dispatch boats going back to ships. LC7s should be standing by as float­ ing ammunition reserve for quick dispatch to beach when needed.

Priorities on (GILBERT Operation) set-up were entirely false. Instead of first sending in the organizational equipment, bar­ racks bags, etc„, which were 1-A priorities; such things as water, am­ munition, and rations should be given the preference.

From: Commanding Officer USS MONROVIA,

Flexibility of Assault Plans: - In the assault of a strongly defended beach, such as existed at Bititu, and which may be ex­ pected in operations against any important atoll, the probability of failure to establish beachheads at one or more of the designated beaches should be considered and provision for this eventuality made in the as­ sault plan. It would seem that rapid exploitation of a single beachhead would be more effective than withdrawal of succeeding waves, due to the failure of the assault on one or more beaches. Braining exercises should simulate failure to clear one or more belches.

Retirement of Boats: - When boats are unable to land and disembark troops or equipment and their Immediate diversion is not practicable, they should be withdrawn out of range to await new orders. Boats milling around in close proximity to the beach as at Bititu offer an excellent target for enemy fire. While any fire directed into the off-shore boat group on this occasion, appeared, from this vessel, to be largely sporadic and Ineffectual, It may be expected to be heavier in subsequent operations. An adequate number of boat control officers should be provided to prevent a repetition of the apparently aimless concentra­ tion of boats in close proximity to the beach which existed during D day at Tarawa. SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT - CENTRAL PACIFIC "4: * f V. j ^

jfjj J .* ^ Trout: Commander Southern Attack Forcsi,~ *W^,/r i r > *. u ** ™ $ jjg|ma j$J£

Unloading ships of the Assault Transport Group. As boats became available cargo was unloaded into them in accordance vith a prearranged plan. This included boats returning from the reef edge after disembarking troops. The basis of the prearranged plan was that beach heads would hare been established; the boats would discharge their cargo at the beach; return to parent ship for more while the beach was being cleared into dumps farther inshore. At Tarawa a beach head in this sense was not established until late S plus 2 or early D plus 3. The result was that practically all available boats were loaded with ma­ terial which they could not land, and they were beyond control of par­ ent ships and shore party. The Shore Party Commander and the Beach- master did succeed in landing appreciable quantities of water and am­ munition on the dock between Beaches Bed Two and Three, but snipers and a few well placed automatic weapons seriously hindered its movement further inshore. Furthermore, Shore Party and Beachmasters communication set up failed to function.

It is recommended that unloading plans and Shore Party organization be revised along the following lines) After assault troops have been boated and landed, only such equipment and supplies be boated as will probably be immediately required by troops ashore; that these boats be dispatched to the control vessel or near the line of departure; that further movements of those boats be under the control of a senior naval officer (title "Control Officer" suggested) who will act upon and with the advice of a representative of the Commanding General who is thoroughly cognizant of what each ship's boats contain, of the cargo in ( each ship of the Transgroup, and its location therein; that until the beachhead is established, requests from troops in field be sent direct to the "Control Officer" who will order it from the proper ship if It is not in the boats under his control.

THE PLANS FOR THE SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT ARE NORMALLY BASED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT 07 A BEACHHEAD WHICH INSURES THE CONTINUOUS LANDING OF TROOPS AND MATERIAL. IF A SUCCESSFUL LANDING IS NOT EFFECTED BY THE LEADING ASSAULT WAVES, THE SUBSEQUENT FLOW OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES FROM SHIP TO SHORE IS STOPPED SHORT OF THE BEACH. FURTHERMORE, TEE ORDER OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT MOVING TO­ WARD THE BEACH IS NOT THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE REQUIRED AFTER THE INITIAL LANDING HAS BEEN HALTED AT THE SHORE LINE. THIS WAS THE CONDITION ENCOUNTERED AT TARAWA.

TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES ABE NORMALLY BOATED IN ACCORDANCE / WITH PRE-ARRANGED FLANS WHICH ENVISAGE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING ON SELECTED BEACHES. THIS RIGIDITY OF THE SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT IS DIFFICULT TO CHANGE WHEN THE ASSAULT IS STOPPED AT THE BEACH BE­ CAUSE THE LANDING CRAFT WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN LOADED AND LAUNCHED,

: if % 6-s OVEMENT - CENTRAL PACI7IC

COMMITTED IPO A MOVEMENT WHICH DOSS NOT C0N7QHM TO TEE TACTICAL /SITUATION CHEATED BT A 7AILURE TO E7FECT A SUCCESS7UL INITIAL LAND- ING. THE PLANS TOR SHIP TO SHOES MOVEMENT SHOULD STRIVE JOB 7LEX- IBILITT TO MIST CHANGES REQUIRED BT 7AIIDRES 07 ASSAULT TROOPS AT THE BEACH. IN THE LATTER CASE THERE IS THE NEED TO BEGULATB THE SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT 07 TBOOPS AND MATERIAL.

7LEXIBILITT IN THE SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT CAN BE INCREASED BT THE USE 07 A CONTROL BOAT STATIONED 077 THE BEACH IN DIRECT COMMUNICA­ TION WITH THE TROOPS ASHORE AND THE TRANSPORTS SO THAT WHEN THE INITIAL LANDING IS HELD UP, EQUIPMENT CAN BE SENT IN BT THE CONTROL BOAT AS REQUESTED BT THE TROOP COMMANDER ASHORE, AND MATERIAL NOT REQUIRED CAN BE KEPT CLEAR. THIS CONTROL BOAT WOULD SERVE TO RE­ GULATE THE FLOW 07 TROOPS AND MATERIAL TO CONFORM TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION ENCOUNTERED ON SHORE.

THE NEED TOR DB40LITI0N UNITS TO REMOVE BEACH MINES AND OBSTACLES AS INDICATED BT INTELLIGENCE, AND TO IMPROVE LANDING BEACHES BT USE 07 DEMOLITIONS WAS DEMONSTRATED BT LANDINGS IN THE GILBERTS OPERATION. SHIP TO SHORE MOTSMin^

mDigrommN thbatrs Vfj?$

Salerno - September 1943 * '•hii front Boat Officers - USS JBEDEEICK JTJNSTON.

We left the rendezvous area fifteen (15) minutes late, but made very good time in our trip to the line of departure. Upon reaching the line of departure I received word from the control Teasel that there was a dire need for troops on my beach (red). She control sent me in very shortly after the first ware had shoved off, a distance of approximately 100 yards behind.

Half the distance to the beach was run through a rery veil laid smoke screen, the coxswain had to steer solely by compass since the silhouette of the beach was not visible through the smoke. I found that I had closed in on the first wave to two hundred yards. The beach was dead ahaad, no alteration of course was necessary, Z had only to open up my wave to proper daylight distance since 1 had come through the smoke in night positioning-less than a boat length apart.

The last and perhaps most isiportant observation as Tirst Wave Commander, a criticism. The enemy had set up a zone plan of fire for both machine gun and artillery fire, even with an adequate smoke screen and air protection, the men "were "unnecessarily exposed."

It is my opinion, based on observation, had a "power play" instead of a "sneak" through the line been attempted, a more successful "Touchdown" with more "yardage" and less casualties would have been the result.

The fourth wave was shoved off from the Line of Departure about three minutes after the third. We were behind a formation of "Ducks" which held us up because they were slow. About two hundred yards off the beach I decided to go through them and hit the beach at the same time or ahead of them. As we were passing, they turned crossways and started back. There was considerable backing down and dodging but no collisions. from! Commander Transports, Xighth Amphibious Force.

DOKWS were landed from transports, AKAs, and LSTs (Brit­ ish). No DUKWS returned to assist in unloading as had been promised. This repeated their unsatisfactory performance in the (SICILY) operation, showing that when they have once reached dry land, they cannot be depended on for further unloading.

Prom: Commanding Officer USS JOSEPH f. DICKMAN.

The primary control vessel, PC-625, led the first three waves of boats from the rend«zvon» area, passed the restricted area marker

SHU, 6-7 JSHI& 50'5H0EE MOVEMENT - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE tss^Mms^il Ilu "boat PC-542 and proceeded on to the line of departure. All boats landed on the correct beach in excellent line and veil spaced, but were 10 min­ utes late in scheduled times; this delay was due to the primary control boat being held up behind the mine sweepers. When the ramps of the first wave were lowered and troops crossed the beach heavy machine gun and H.S. shell fire were encountered. The quick action on the part of the DICKMAN LCS(S) scout beach marker boat in firing a barrage of 34 rockets caused a decided lull in the enemy fire and drew their fire on the boat itself. It is believed that this factor contributed much to the safe landing and retraction of all boats in the assault waves.

Prom: Commanding Officer USS LCI(I) 238.

This vessel was scheduled to beach at "Green Beach" at H hour plus 70 minutes (0440) on D-day. As we lay to at the "Love" con­ trol vessel, it seemed to me that the rocket ship's barrage was layed down a little to the left of our objective - and not deep enough inland, (At any rate, there were many 88MM guns and machine guns and mortars to receive us as we beached.)

In 8 minutes, (0451, that is) all troops were disembar­ ked. During these 8 minutes, enemy fire was rather concentrated. The first man to leave the ship was killed, a victim of machine gun fire. At least a half dozen others were also killed as they left the ship - all from machine gun fire.

from: Commanding Officer USS 1ST #385 - Salerno.

Many casualties were avoided by the passengers being kept below, dispersed in the most protective compartments. In our case the gunfire was coming from the starboard side, most of the men were in the port side compartments, as a result when we sustained 2 hits on our starboard side no casualties to personnel resulted. In this instance we had plenty of time before getting within range of the 88mms to warn the men. 1 don't think it can be over emphasized to the passengers the need of their being below. J*irat, they are afforded protection. Second, they are nearer the bow door and ready to leave at a moments notice. Kapok jackets should be worn by all men who have duties topside. When equipment aboard was hit, the screening wire and shrapnel flew in all directions; although several men were injured by it their injuries were less severe. In many instances wire was found Imbedded in the jack­ ets of men who had not suffered any injury.

from: Commander Task Unit 81.8.2 - Minesweeping.

A total of fifty-seven moored mines were destroyed by vessels of this group while sweeping southern channel and anchorage area, and at least fifteen moored mines were destroyed in the same area by sweepers of TU 81.8.1. All except five of these mines were destroyed on SHIP TO SHORE MDVJ8MJNT - MEDITERRANEAN £• rj* if

D-day. No definite pattern of planting was indicated; however, the ma­ jority of the mines were planted in forty to forty-five fathoms in a general north-easterly, south-westerly direction.

From: Commander Eighth .Amphibious Force.

Scouts and Haiders

The scouts again correctly located the precise "beaches assigned, in time to accurately position the scout boats off these beaches to guide the incoming wares.

The Green scout boat subsequently moved about 800 yards south to guide the assault waves into that section of beach on which the LCT(R) had fired. This caused some inconvenience to the Army forces ashore, which later caused Green beach to be shifted, but undoubtedly saved many lives in the initial assault.

While engaged in beach identification one officer scout was subjected to fire from our gunfire support vessels which landed sea­ ward of the scout boat and ricochetted over their heads onto the beach. This officer was also in the water off the beach while the LCT(R) was firing.

Recommendations.

That scouts continue to be> used in their present capacity.

That the scouts proceed with beach Identification suf­ ficiently ahead of time to be clear of the beach before gunfire support commences to land on the beach.

That gunfire support vessels, particularly the LCGs be instructed to make sure that ranging shots are over before reducing the range, to avoid firing on own vessels between them and the beach.

Beach markers were properly placed on the limits of the beaches by the time the fourth assault wave containing LCTs landed.

These beach markers were easily visible from one mile to seaward and highly satisfactory as a guide to the fourth and subse­ quent waves.

Recommendations.

That beach .marking personnel be sent in no later than the third assault wave. ft&jJ? ; w J-

6"9 SHIP TO SHOES MOVEMENT - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE 4 ' w-Sar " While no bare existed upon first landing, bars and run­ nels were built up to such an extent by the scouring action of the LCT propellors which were kept turning over to hold these craft on the beach, that after a few days LSTs were unable to beach high enough to enable unloading on dry land.

That where possible beaches with suitable gradients to allow LSTs to beach without the necessity of using pontoons for unload­ ing will be selected.

That beaches be divided into two sections in order to afford LSTs and LCTs their own beaching area. This should allow beach­ ing and unloading of LSTs to continue throughout a prolonged build-up without interference caused by bars and runnels which are built up by LCTs.

That consideration be given to the employment of LCI(L) as control craft and having them lead boat waves all the way in to the beaches, instead of to the line of departure only.

That an SC, PC, LCI(L) or other craft of suitable size be fitted with a voice projector and detailed to act as traffic control boat off each beach. That each inbound boat, be required to call at this traffic control vessel to receive orders before beaching.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS 0? COMMANDEB EIGHTH AMPHIBIOUS PORCE AT SALER- NO AND THOSE OF COMMANDER SOUTHERN ATTACK TORCE AT TARAWA DEMON­ STRATE THE NEED TOR REGULATING THE PLOW Of TROOPS AND MATERIAL IN THE SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT. ADDITIONAL COMMENT ON THIS SUBJECT MAY BE POUND IN THE SECTION OP THIS CHAPTER DEVOTED TO THE GILBERT ISLANDS OPERATION.

6-10 SHIP TO 8HQRX MOVEMENT

SOUTHWEST PACIflC »

Landing at Arawe - December 1943. * !i j N Tur .ti...... ; ;U ¥ ; .; I from: ComDesRon Five.

Landing "boats headed for high cliffa on Cape Merkus, away to right of prescribed boat lane. 80s finally rounded them up and straightened them out, Socket SC boats meanwhile bombarded Cape Herkus. Ire looked very effect ire. Socket fire corered boat passage through Pilelo Passage. Landing boats by this time were rounding Cape Merkus and rocket DUXWS commenced spraying beaches.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

Armoured amphibian tractors, LVT 2 (Buffaloes), ap­ peared to perform satisfactorily. Alligators (LTT l), which were in­ cluded owing to a shortage of Buffaloes, are unsatisfactory owing to slow speed and lack of armour, The Alligators were probably the cause of the delay In the main landing.

The Shore Party had been hurriedly collected. It was largely untrained and unorganized. In consequence, the beach became congested although conditions were good.

Responsibilities of Naval Beach Party are greatly re­ duced when APAs and AKs are not used. A small Beach Party, of strength 20 - 30 personnel, depending on the number and extent of beaches, can operate efficiently in these circumstances. Adequate training and re­ hearsal are essential. USS CASTER HALL, (LSD), commenced taking in ballast prior to arrival in the transport area. All vehicles were launched in 9 minutes.

APDs arrived with the convoy l£ hours before their rubber boats were due to beach but remained well to seaward until re­ quired. Troops were disembarked in 13 minutes. This time exceeded by 6 minutes the times achieved in training. One reason for the in­ crease was due to additional stores, S/T sets, and heavier personal equipment which had not been carried in the rehearsal.

Landing at Cape Gloucester - December 1943.

Prom: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

TWo small beaches (yellow 1 and yellow 2) about mid­ way between the airstrip and BOHGEN BAT were finally selected for the main landing as it appeared that these points offered the least like­ lihood of encountering fixed shore defenses; egress from the beaches appeared satisfactory; .surf appeared-moderate; and it was hoped to develop a passage through the outlying f^e?^f?om photographs and subsequent

' f ? 11 It * - > •• v* ;j;j«|* 6-11 - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 4I :|asPv%,7. 3s y 1

buoying. Eie buoying was accomplished Just prior to the landing by a Harbor Control Unit consisting of one SC and throe IMS, all under com­ mands of a quite senior officer. She SC with two escorting destroyers located the entrance and the reefs flanking the channel toward the "beaches. Two YMS buoyed reefs as located by SC, One IMS swept the channel for mines. Finally, the SC took up a position, 3,000 yards from beaches in order to control landing craft and direct waves to correct beach. (Oils was a difficult operation planned about one hour during the naval bombardment and was executed on schedule.

BBACH Am? SHOES PARTIES.

from: Observer at Salerno.

UNLOADINS. The entire unloading program over the beaches was affected by the following factors:

Die enemy was not driven back from Yellow and Blue beaches until D plus lt thus eliminating these two beaches for unloading and causing the entire burden to fall on Bed and Green with resultant congestion.

The Army did not supply sufficient personnel to unload cargo from landing craft and remove piled up supplies and equipment off the beaches, which resulted in Navy personnel (boat crews) doing a large part of un­ loading from D-day to D plus 2, and congesting the beaches so much that beaches were secured for hours at a time due to piled up material and no room to unload.

The enemy mine field prevented the transports from closing the beaches and resulted in an extremely long water haul from the transports to the "beaches, which, in turn, caused delay in unloading.

On the morning of D-day, the senior beach master of Bed and Green beaches reported that there was not sufficient Army personnel nor ve­ hicles to handle loose supplies that had been unloaded on these beaches. He further reported that Navy unloading personnel were working Bed beach practically on their own with little assistance from Army. He further reported that on Bed and Green beaches during the morning of D-day, there were only about 10 Army enlisted men who seemed available to assist in unloading, Jfcr noon of D-day there were platoons of Navy personnel on the beaches. On D plus 1, from 0400 to 0730, Bed and Green beaches were secured due to congested beaches.

• from reports of Navy beachmasters on Bed and Green, it appears that the Navy received little Army assistance in unloading on D-day. On D plus 1, when unloading was resumed at 0700, more Army assistance was rendered. However, the beaches were greatly congested, particularly Green Beach, where loose supplies were piled up on the beach. SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMEHT - BBACB AKD SHI

From: Commander Eighth Amphibious Force - Salerno

There are still not enou^i personnel in the Shore Party to unload landing craft at the beaches as fast as they can be loaded and sent in from the ships. Unloading can be expedited in this opera­ tion >7 extensive use of cargo nets and supplying naval personnel from the transports to assist in the unloading at the beach. LCV(P)s were loaded with one or two cargo net loads of equipment and the net and its contents lifted together from the boat by a crane or BUKW at the beach. . Some transports put extra men in each boat to assist in unloading while others transferred a working party ashore to unload their boats. Des­ pite these measures the beaches were badly cluttered on the night of D- day and the morning of D plus 1. This situation was alleviated somewhat by employing Fifth Army Headquarters troops landed from the DUCHESS OF BXDTOBD as labor troops to help clear the beaches.

There is no single solution for this condition. Bather the solution appears to be a composite one, embodying all possible means of reducing the amount of equipment carried by the combat loaded trans­ ports, utilizing all possible mechanical aids in loading and unloading landing craft and supplying more manpower at the beach.

Recommendations.

That the amount of equipment on combat loaded transports be held to a minimum. This is particularly difficult with inexperienced troops who have received a minimum of amphibious training. It requires the utmost firmness on the part of the naval personnel concerned with combat loading in order to eliminate all unnecessary items. There ap­ pears to be pressing need for some form of guidance to combat team com­ manders and to higher headquarters to assist them in determining what equipment will be needed in the assault convoy and what may be left to follow-up convoys. Preparation of check-off lists based on previous operations is suggested as one possibility that does not seem to have been exploited. Air force stores and equipment have during the past two operations been added after loading plans had been completed. Army head­ quarters personnel and equipment that appeared unnecessary in assault has been given priority over personnel, vehicles and equipment that might be valuable to combat teams in gaining a bridgehead. It is strongly re­ commended that these Important matters be given the most careful study by the joint services.

That loading LCV(P)s and LGMs with individual cargo net loads and unloading them with MAM frames on DUXVS or small traveling cranes be employed to the utmost.

That the personnel of the Shore Regiment be augmented in order to furnish the additional labor necessary to handle cargo which must be man-handled out of the boats.

ft,?-'* 6-13 „ TpJ|g<^^pVEMl!RT - BSA.CE AHD SHORE PARTIES

b "fts«-w»rl®a few instances of Army Officers at the beach frying to direct boat traffic with resultant clashes between these offi­ cers and personnel of the boat crews. Bie problem of boat control is strictly a Naval function to be handled by the beachmaster or his re­ presentative. It has been found that senior Army officers unfamiliar with standing Operating Procedure of the Amphibious force sometimes in­ terfere with the work of the relatively junior beachmasters, resulting in confusion and friction which could not occur if these officers pro­ perly took their problems to the Shore Party Commander through whom they should deal.

from: Commander 1ST Group Fifteen - Telia Lava11a.

At 0740, five minutes after beaching, both vessels (1ST) were subjectected to fire from an 80mm mortar battery, two or more 30mm mountain guns, and considerable sniping with small arms. The artillery fire continued until 0830, then broke off until 1130 when mortar fire was resumed, lasting until 1208. Sniping was continuous during stay on the beaches, but was only of marked intensity during the periods of art­ illery fire. LST 399 received two direct hits, one on the port side amidships, and one on the breach of a 40mm gun embarked for transporta­ tion. These wounded two men, demolished the 40mm gun, tore a 3' x 4' hole in the port side and started two small fires which were speedily extin­ guished. In addition this firing killed three passengers manning the 40mm gun, and wounded numerous others on both vessels.

At 0815 the 399 requested permission to leave the beach. Signalled her "Not Granted". She then exterminated a sniper strong- point located about ten yards from her bow door by running the embarked bulldozer up to and over it, covering the pillbox with dirt and taisp- ing it down well all around, effectively silencing its fire. front Commander Third Amphibious force.

The usual reluctance of shore unloading details to re­ turn promptly to their tasks as soon as an air attack was completed was overcome during the later echelons. This was reflected in the dispatch with which ships were unloaded,

Trom: Commanding Officer LST 354 - finpress Augusta Bay.

It should be noted that the well organized and compet­ ent 156th Held Artillery, USA, were able to unload a difficult cargo despite confusing directives, and lack of assistance from the shore, in six hour8 and twenty four minutes. Shore parties mast cooperate with LST if it is desired to reduce the risk of cargo loss due to lack of dispersion. Cargo on LST is in great danger. We feel that given a pro­ per ship and shore organization the present type cargo should be unloaded in a maximum period of six hours. SHIP TO SHOBX MOTSMKHT - SUCH AHD — Ijr* C

.... * •& Prom: Commander Transport Grotip Third. Amphib Aopress Augusta Bsy.

lech ship at Bougmimrille was assigned its own beach. Sach ship provided. Its own shore party details completely, except that the naval platoons for AXAe were formed from embarked personnel of the Haval Base Unit. The shore party for IPAs consisted of details about as shown in PTP 211 except that ship details amounted to 20 men per , hatch worked, boat details of 3 men per LCM and 2 men per LCVP, and 200 sen for the service platoon, for AKAe, a shore service platoon of 200 and ship and boat details as above were required. She total of troops eaployed in the shore party for the Division landed was roughly 5700 or somewhat over one-third of the total embarked. The results were gratifying.

fixe Haval Base Unit was landed just after the assault waves, fixe Commander of this unit and his Executive were assigned duty as Beachmaster and Assistant Beachmaster. Headquarters and Control Groups, Hydrographic Unit, Communication Unit were formed from officers and per­ sonnel of this unit, as was also the central naval medical unit with branches up and down the beach. A similar system used at Rendova on a somewhat smaller scale proved most effective in coordination of effort by officers and personnel who were detailed to remain as members of the advanced Haval Base. This permitted a most desirable reduction in size of the individual ship's beach parties with consequent reduction in number of men who had to be re-embarked and accounted for..

That this system was not so effective at Bougainville as anticipated is attributed to the following:

(a) A division beach - in this case about 8,000 yards - is too large for effective control by one officer. (b) lack of training in amphibious operations on the part of some units.

Ships beach parties consisted of two officers and about twenty men, the reduction from the number noted in RP 211 being pri­ marily in the hydrographic and boat repair sections, as a result of per­ sonnel provided to accomplish these functions, from the Haval Base Unit. Some of the officers assigned were too Junior to exercise effective con­ trol or lacked sound judgement and initiative in the execution of their duties. Biey should, when a beach was found unsafe, have immediately held boats off until new beaches had been assigned.

It is recommended that the system outlined above be continued but that the size of beach for which one chief beachmaster be responsible be limited to that required for a regimental combat team plus headquarters and attached units, i.e., 4 APA and 2 AKA or equiva­ lent. She Naval Base Unit shpuld be given Amphibious Training from the : k : Aft - BEACH AKD SHOEE PARTIES ship* in which they will he embarked separately and. in advance of any such training afforded embarked troops. This should encompass all phases of the landing and then extend to making camps both for Naval Base and the boat pool unit thereof. Although several officers of Jun­ ior rank turned in creditable performances as be&chmaster f it should be generally specified, that a deck officer of head of department quali­ fications be assigned as ship's beachmaster. His assistant should be specifically qualified in boat salvage and be in charge of the salvage boat acting when not employed in salvage work as traffic control officer offshore. from: Commander Seventh Amphibious force - Caps Gloucester.

The Shore Party was a completely Marine organization except for the addition of an Engineer Special Brigade Boat Company. The Shore Party was organized on normal lines with a strength of approx­ imately 1300 of all ranks.' It was trained in conjunction with the Naval Beach Party prior to the operation. In spite of the heavy surf, no difficulty was experienced in getting vehicles or bulk stores off the beaches quickly. Two echelons of seven LSTs each were unloaded on 1) plus 1 day. Each echelon remained on the beach the full daylight period or until unloaded.

The unloading rate improved considerably after D plus 1 day and up to 300 W tons bulk stores per LSI plus a full load of vehicles were being unloaded in under 6 hours. An increase in bulk ton­ nage up to 500 DW per LST was finally found satisfactory. Unloading rates up to 80 tons per hour were maintained. Boiler runways were used with success.

from: Commander in Chief Pacific fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas - Gilberts Operation, November 1943.

A universal difficulty experienced in almost all amphi­ bious operations has been that of unloading supplies and transporting them ashore. It arises regardless of whether cargo is carried in a large vessel (APA or AKA) and then reloaded into smaller landing craft, or whether it is transported in LSTs. Even when large ships unload directly onto docks, trouble is experienced. The words "confusion," "disorder," "failure," "inexperienced personnel," etc., appear in nearly every report of unloading operations. All reports indicate that neither perfection nor even a satisfactory standard on this phase of amphibious operations has been reached.

The report (of the Commander LST flotilla 5) points out that "unloading is the world-wide .difficulty of amphibious forces the rapid unloading of our ships is;noi appreciated or understood by the Agencies whose cargo we carry it seems to be a point that entirely escapes those responsible for its enforcement, and appears to be a mw* 6-16 as SHIP TO SHOBE MOTBffiHT - BKkC&rXB& $BClBv^lS£$£j t- V?1$ •_ ' ;' ;'. l{ f">'r condition brought about largely by Ignorance and lack of understanding of what it expected rather than desire to avoid this all important duty, It is considered that it is decidedly the weakest link in the whole chain of our amphibious operations, in fact it is believed to be the only real weakness.

!Mf*I 6 % J. \, t si?,* t 4 ?/ if Hf %i? %L$ i§

6-17 *. * 4* ;* CHAPTER 711

IAHDINft CRAFT Wrfjifi,,*v i f " m ''^.4/ ?. ,,. • .. ,... ,,, ... «r|^ From: Commander 1ST Group Three - Salerno. 3ij*{•!9

* Bars were formed about 150 yards off shore after D-day. These apparently resulted from propellor currents washing up sand when LCTs used their engines to help hold themselves in position on the beach.

The raaps of British LCTs are vastly superior to those of U. 8. LSTi ea steep beaches. Roadways must lye built up in front ef the ends of the raanos ef the latter. from: Commander Eighth Amphibious Force - Salerno.

LSTs were successfully employed te unload vehicles directly ea the beaches, but, in the case of some two wheel drive British vehicles, difficulty was experienced in negotiating the one-feet drop off the LST ramp and in moving off the ramp ence the front wheels were in the sand.

If an LST elevator breaks down it was found possible by knocking down a few stanchions to move vehicles from the main deck of one LST te another with a good elevator.

From: Commander LST Flotilla Five - finpress Augusta Bay.

A great percentage of the cargo carried by 1ST is bulk - powder, fuel and lube oil drums, boxed rations, ammunition etc. - stacked up in the tank room from its after bulkhead te well forward. The loads (bulk and vehicular together) carried vary from 350 to 1400 tons with an average of about 700 tens. After the vehicular cargo is landed, the bulk cargo is discharged by backing trucks late the tank room, there load­ ing them, they in turn leaving 7ST via its ramp, and unloading in an area contiguous te the ship, returniag empty for a repeat. Much of the bulk cargo is manhandled by carrying it piecemeal from the tank room te the beach, and parallels the unloading by trucks above described. This at best is a slew process, and for an average load requires about eight (8) hours time working full blast to finish.

An alternative method is to make the load entirely mobile by putting the bulk cargo In trucks at loading points, placing them in LST, and upon arrival destination trucks simply move off the ship via the ramp. Such a method would insure rapid delivery, the "one hour" at the beach the designers had In mind. The only drawback te delivery in this manner is that there is to much "tare" in the trucks, and the "pay load" delivered is about one-fourth, if as much as that, as by the pre­ viously described method, the one now being followed. When delivery aIT certain materials must be had in dangerous areas the chances of accom­ plishment by use of a,"completely mobile load" are obvious.

, 7-1 W 1| FBUEHAUT «pRATf.TOS API BUNG PHOCUEED JOH THE rmmm. jLSD SOUTH PACIFIC TO INCREASE MOBILITY 07 THE BULK CABQO LOAD.

Since there are now few LSTs In the South Pacific, the haul * long, it seems the only practicable means of delivery is the "pay load" method, with consequent long stay of 1ST at destination.

It is this stay at destination that oust be considered. It is the period that LST and its cargo are wide open to attack. Much con­ trol over the length of stay can be exercised beforehand by varying the method of loading from an entirely "mobile" load to any compromise there­ of by "bulk". It has been stated that for an average "bulk" load about eight (8) hours time working full blast is required. The writer knows of no way to materially improve this rate for this type of load. It must be borne in mind that 1ST has only one "hold", Its ramp, which will admit of so much help and no more. It was this rate that the Force Com­ mander had in mind when he ordered a retraction at 1600 based on a beach­ ing at 0800 - LST had an average load plus at Telia Lave11a. Once 1ST is beached at destination the rate at which it is unloaded will depend upon the efficiency of the shore unloading party. This efficiency must take everything 1ST will allow to be delivered which is the "average load" rate. The variables that will affect overall stay are character of beach with time required to render a "dry ramp", and enemy opposition. The latter has taken only one form to date - air attack.

from the above little hope was held of approaching the optimum, "one hour at the beach" for LST operating in these waters under the conditions they imposed. The only hope held to reduce the stay of LST at the beach somewhat was by an all-together, all-out, bang-up job by the shore unloading party.

A recapitulation of the armament carried by LSTs of the echelon moving into Bougainville on November 6th, 1943 is as follows:

LST 37 MM 4Q MM SO MM .50 Caliber 3"/.50 TOTAL PES SHIP

207 4 13 6 1 24 70 3 12 5 1 21 353 5 18 4 1 28 468 4 14 18 37 341 3 11 15 1 30 395 4 16 13 1 34 354 3 4 18 9 35 339 4 JL4_ -IQ_ JU . 2?, , TOTALS 3 31 116 80 8 238(GRAND)

A grand total of 238 guns were carried by LST. The above was augmented .• •-Z-kfjr' ~ fc'. " xf tfi'4 -%i a Prom J CO USS 1ST 395 - Vella lave11a.

Member* of the 35th. Combat Team who manned, our extra gone are particularly to be commended. Although not experienced with 40 mm guns they steadied well on the targets and behaved throughout as if they were fighting their own ship. After all unloading was completed they remained voluntarily at their gun stations on the ship until a few min­ utes before we retracted and after all other passengers had left the area. As the ship was completely unloaded previous to the afternoon attack their action provided the ship with invaluable additional pro­ tection during the heavy attack at 1515. from: Commander SEVENTH fleet - Finschhafen.

the beach party landed in the first wave. Unloading detail - A new method was tried to decrease the unloading time. Each 1ST was to have carried 200 men who were to be assigned exclusively to unloading and who would return with the ship after unloading. They were not part of the landing force. Actually only 100 men were available for each LST, but these proved the success of the scheme by clearing ships by hand at an average of 50 tons and 20 vehicles per hour; a considerable faster rate than had heretofore been obtained.

A METHOD 01 UNLOADING LSTS EMPLOYED IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC.

The ship hit the beach at 0715, by 0725 the first vehicle a was ashore, and by 0920 the cargo had been completely discharged. At \ 0930 Jap dive bombers attacked.

In this operation we unloaded forty-seven (47) vehicles and 367 tons of dead-weight cargo. The fuel, rations, and organic gear were stowed aft against the aft bulkhead in the tank deck. Additional fuel was stowed approximately nine (9) feet wide against the fore and aft bulkheads of the tank deck on both sides. Leaving approximately fifty (50) feet between the forward end of the cargo stowed aft and the after end of the cargo stowed amidships. The above plan allowed the loading of seven (7) trucks at one time. The first two (2) trucks were run in forward heading aft and then backed against the cargo stowed against the fore and aft bulkheads, the next three (3) trucks were backed into the cargo stowed aft, the last two (2) trucks were run in and kept in readiness to immediately replace loaded trucks as they were pulled out

The tractor was the first piece of rolling stock ashore. As soon as all rolling stock was ashore, nine (9) empty cargo trucks were run aboard and loading started immediately. Then and only then was the elevator allowed to bring the rolling stock down from the top deck The unloading of the top deck load was all sandwiched in between the movements of trucks an the tank deck. In this way the top deck load did not add a minute to the dischargingj time. s „ « tk s.; i^V

I. 7-3 J* .1- •* *.? _ mm IN3 CBATT HW It mast be noted that the cargo of different kinds was stored so that all trucks did not load the same cargo, the routes spread the trucks to the different dumps and kept the trucks from jamming any one dump.

It must be borne in mind that this improvement was due to the improvement in handling methods aboard as well as at dumps, and the experience gained by the working parties in the surf.

^st

Soiling Stock Dead Cargo (on Tank Deck)

26 - 6x6 Cargo Trucks 115 tons - rations 4 - Jeeps 200 tons - fuel in drums 6 - 4x4 Cargo Trucks 40 tons - ammunition 1-4 Wheel Machine Shop Trailer 12 tons -organic gear 2 - Grease Trailers 2 - Water Trailers 1 - T.D.A. Tractor 1 - Insley 5 Ton Crane 2 - New Zealand Prime Movers 2 - 40 mm Bofors Quns on Mobile Carriages.

LCT(S)

Prom: Commander Slgith Amphibious Force - Salerno.

The LCT(5) has again proved itself. In Salerno, LCTs des­ patched from the Northern Attack Force after they had landed their cargo were employed very successfully in unloading transports. Because of their relatively small size, slow speed and poor seagoing qualities, getting LCTs to the assault area in large numbers presents a difficult problem. Once there, however, they are invaluable. They represent the most efficient means of transferring cargo, vehicles and tanks from ship to shore. They are large enough to carry a very useful payload, yet small enough to un­ load either directly onto dry land or into'water of wading depth under most beach conditions. The number of men in a crew as augmented in this area is such that they can be run continuously — twenty-four hours per day. Their emplqsrraent in this capacity was one factor in the rapid unload­ ing of the transports which enabled them to depart from the assault area on the evening of D plus One Bay.

BjiiffnmmopriatlOnB

The ICT(R) was an innovation and showed remarkable possibi­ lities. It is believed that more thorough experimentation and training is necessary to realize fully the capabilities of this type craft.

7-4 LABDIHG CHAl* ;. '')^11 i f;*T^ • V -ZT'tiH :$% ;• $

That LCT(5)t be included In ship to shore assaults even - though they nut be towed la an overseas movement..

Iron} Commander Seventh Jnphibious Torce - Woodlark.

L0T(5)s in general exceeded performance expectations. While numerous engine failures and breakdowns were experienced daring the oper­ ation, most of then were of a minor nature and were traceable to inexper­ ienced personnel. While this craft's seagoing qualities are good in fair weather, their low speed and lack of navigational facilities are definite handicaps to their usefulness. Although rated at 10 knots full speed, in this operation schedules were based on an estimated speed mads good of 5.0 knots. This proved to be a fair average figure. With a following wind and sea 7 knots could be attained; against the wind and sea approxi­ mately 3 knots is all that can be expected. Tor this reason LCT(5)s can­ not be expected to maintain a rigid schedule, and sufficient latitude should be allowed in an active operation, to provide for wind and sea con­ ditions, weather, and other variables. hSULI front Commander llghth Jnphibious Torce - Salerno.

The LCI(L) has proved Itself to be a very useful and versatile craft. It has fulfilled its primary function of transporting trOops from shore to shore and after discharge of those troops, has been utilized in various capacities in the assault area. In (SALEBHO), a considerable por­ tion of two fieserve BCTs were embarked in LCl(L)s. In addition to these there were six other LCI(L)s which had been intended to carry Bangers, but due to a last minute change in plan, were empty. These were employed most advantageously in transporting troops from three British LSIs whose boats are woefully inadequate as compared to their troop carrying capacity.

ltaring the training period for (SAUEBNO), the LCI(L)s had to be substituted for PCs and SCs as control craft. They acquitted themselves admirably in this capacity despite their lack of navigational equipment.

experiments were also conducted using X£I(L)s to salvage LCT(P)s and LGH(3)s broached on beaches. They proved well adapted to this duty also.

Secause of their size and ability to anchor close to the beach they are also useful as traffic control boats and have been so employed in training exercises.

With some increase in their armament, it is believed that they can be most useful as support boats. In fact, about the only thing they do not do well is carry cargo — although they were employed for that pur­ pose too, in (SICILY), helping to unload transports. f , „ /

^ ziii$ ti *. J" •* • 'I h e . , WA S 4^-2 -£4.^

SSK COMMEHT IK CHAPTER BEVOTKB TO HATAL OUHTIBB 01 CHI USE OT LCI(L)s A3 GUNBOATS IOR IBS MLIVIRT OV OLOSS SUPPORTING ?IB1.

The rariety of purposes for whioh the LCI(L)s vera used and the success with whioh all their Missions were accomplished prored one* more the worth of these craft in amphibious operations.

Zrom: Hag Officer Sicily Export - British.

SBOL's used specially fitted LC1(L) as Headquarters Ships. They prored Tory satisfactory, The So. 2 troop space makes an excel­ lent operations room and the additional communications fitted, worked well.

From: Commander SBT1HTH Amphibious Jorce - Voodlark.

LCI(L)s prored to he rery reliable in the operation and were most useful troop carriers. In this operation they encountered Moderate and choppy seas during the southeast monsoon and experienced considerable motion at sea. Is a result, seasickness at times reached about 50jt, and as a consequence, the orerall combat efficiency of troops on landing was definitely reduced. This is a condition to be expected and should be considered in planning any operation.

raw front Commander lighth Amphibious Jorce - Salerno.

The LCM(3) is, next to the LCT(5), the most useful of all the landing craft for unloading in the ship to shore morement. It is variously estimated among the Transport Commanders of this Command that one LCM(3) is equiralent to from three to fire LCY(P)s as a cargo car­ rier. It is seaworthy, carries a good pay load and handles most rehi- cles and artillery. Officially it will carry a medium tank — actually its use as a tank carrier is seriously restricted by practical consider­ ations. The width of the tank is such that there is only about eight inches clearance between the sides of the tank and the sides of the LCM(3), and the booms on the transports which handle tanks are slow and cumbersome. The result is that if there is any morement at all on the ship and/or the LCM(SJ, loading a tank from the ship into an LCM(3) is a rery slow and laboring procsss and in some casss an impossibility. Generally speaking, LGM(3)s are better at handling bulk cargo than rehi- cles because the tight fit of the latter into the craft makes it diffi­ cult to load thsm in any wsather other than a flat calm. R^^mrgpindation. That LCM(3)s continue to be carried aboard transports as at present and that consideration be glren to increasing the number from two to four. This would entail the installation of a second Jumbo Boom to handle the additional LCH(3)s. SIB FAQS 5-14 07 LOGISTICS CHAPTER JOH INFOHMATIOITOH -ALTERATIONS TO APIS.

ITT (Amphibian Tractors) from: Commander fifth Amphibious Force - Gilbert Islands Oporation. (Sovember 1943)

Intelligence Indicated that, for the (GILBERT Operation), the nature of the beaches, reefe, surfs and tides were such that the standard landing craft carried by APA's and AXA's would experience great difficulty in landing and would be seriously limited as to times of landing with respect to stages of the tide, furthermore, it was highly probable that obstacles, both natural (coral pinnacles and boul­ ders) and artificial (wire, barricades and stone fish-traps) would hare to be negotiated in the approach to the beaches over the wide flat coral reefs. To insure success in crossing the reefs and negotiating beach obstacles LTT's were provided for the assault wares. lor MAKIN fifty LTT's were provided; sixteen being assigned to each battalion landing team and two held in reserve as spares. These vehicles tore up and cleared away wire most successfully, and knocked down heavy-looking barricades made of light iron or cocoanut logs. They were most useful in pulling drowned trucks out of the water, and in freeing stranded boats from reefs and beaches.

The amphibian tractors, together with their crews and the assault troops to be landed in them, were transported from F1ABL to HAKIH in LST's, sixteen or seventeen being assigned to each 1ST. This method of transportation proved highly satisfactory and simplified the execution of the initial ship to shore movement. The LST's were placed just to seaward of the line of departure; the doors were then opened, the ramp lowered and the LYT(2)s then run out into the water where they quickly formed up and joined their assigned boat groups from the APA's. They had previsouly been trained as boat divisions and groups, and one LCTF was assigned to guide and maneuver each division,

Vhile transportation of LVT's by 1ST is satisfactory in other respects, one serious handicap is involved. Due to their reduced speed these ships must, under separate escort, precede the transports and support groups into the hostile area and In so doing are subjected to considerable risk from air attack. They also may disclose the destination. The advan­ tages of this means of transportation for LTT(2)s justify the risk, but the dangers should be recognized in planning.

A disadvantage of the LVT(2) is its low speed (4 to 4.5 knots). This low speed no doubt has to be accepted as an inherent characteristic. Other disadvantages are its lack of armor and difficulty of unloading troops and stores due to height of gunwale from the ground. In future operations the armored cargo'type should, be employed for the assault wares but the addition of a ramp at the stern would be a decided improvement. The LVT is veil adapted for mounting rocket launchers. In addition its armament of three .30 caliber machine guns and one .50 caliber give it high fire power.

Ho armored amphibian tractors or armored amphibians mount­ ing the 37mm gun were employed in the (GILBERTS OPERATION) but the need for them existed. Hie armored amphibian with turret mount is particular­ ly required for employment In the leading ware. While it is not believed that this amphibian tank is in every respect an adequate substitute for the light tank ashore yet its inclusion should reduce to some extent the total light tank requirements for any given operation. Due to shipping limitations serious consideration should be given to elimination of light tanks as turret mount armored amphibiansbecome available,

Tromi Observer's Beport - Gilbert Islands Operation.

The support boat acting as right flank guide was probably more helpful than anything else, as it could be easily seen, while the division officer in the LVT was difficult if not impossible to distinguish This would be even more important in landings made under smoke screens or in conditions of low visibility. It is earnestly believed that one of­ ficer in an LCVP could handle a wave of LVTs better than two division officers in LVTs. This based on the fact that the LCVP Is easily spotted and is fast enough to easily maneuver all LVTs into correct position and to pass along any late information which may affect the operation on the beach itself.

££S

from: Commander Eighth Amphibious Tores - Salerno.

Sockets from the LCSs accompanying a wave of landing craft effectively silenced machine gun fire from the beach on advancing waves; also, LCSs were useful in laying smoke screens to cover the advance of landing craft from enemy machine gon and artillery fire. The LCS is generally unpopular with Transport Commanders beoause it is heavy, com- bersome, requires a special supply of gasoline on board to run it and cannot be employed for the transportation of troops and cargo. The consensus seems to be that LCSs should be discarded and LCY(P)s sub­ stituted therefor. The Task Force Commander considers that the LCS or equivalent craft have a definite place in the scheme of assault and should be retained as an integral part of the boat equipment of trans­ ports, but that it is susceptible of a great deal of improvement. Act­ ually all of its function as a support boat could be performed better by an LCI(L) modified in accordance with suggestionc made in separate correspondence. LAHDING CBAJ? s *** Hii•H'fii i/M* i f*vV,:.vf? Bo^nrmar^^fttloaa HB&

Chat the LCY(P) continue to be carried, on LSTs and transports in the maximum number possible.

TOWS.

from: Observer Report - Salerno.

the plan to land the Army's artillery (105s) immediately fol­ lowing the assault infantry waves in order to make this artillery avail­ able to the assault troops — much earlier —————than in previous opererations by neans of 1XI&.W8 (was successful). (It provided) a new method for supplying the assault troops with vitally needed artillery at the e&rlisst possible moment.

from: flag Officer 8icily Report (British).

The 300 HJBfS used were most successful in the fine weather conditions and calm seas of the Straits. They operated in daylight only, shepherded by an M„L. and in the early stages there was a continuous stream of then crossing from one side to the other.

Tron: Commander Xighth Amphibious force - Salerno.

CUZVS again proved their worth hut could have been used to better advantage if they had not diverted, to Army use at such an early •tage.

LC(B) (Rubber Boats)

from: Commander SE7ZNTH Amphibious force - Arawe.

This Command concurs in the observation that rubber boats are not suitable assault craft during an opposed landing. Amphibian tracked vehicles were employed to negotiate the coral in the main landing. In­ sufficient numbers of such vehicles required the use of rubber boats for the subsidiary landings, therefore, the best possible means available for achieving surprise, however remote, were utilised.. The landing force had determined to accept the risk of detection because of the advantages expected to attend successful landings.

from: Commander Transport Group - Tarawa.

Under conditions similar to those met at Tarawa Atoll, where a fringing reef extends for a considerable distance from the beach and 8hip*8 boats are prevented from reaching the beach except during a ris­ ing tide and high water, rubber.boats offer an excellent means of trans­ porting troops in numbers in .unopp^^ed .landings( night landings, etc. Front \ Observer Report - Tarawa.

Bobber boats embarked in LCM and LCVP can 1>e effectively em­ ployed to ferry troops and light equipment from landing craft to the beach.

SALVAGE CRAFT

From: Commander lighth Amphibious Fbrce - Salerno.

She problem of landing craft salvage at (SALSRNO) was a re­ latively simple one due to the excellent weather, the absence of tide and the good gradient of beaches. In anticipation of troubles similar to those experienced at GELA, in the SICILIAJT operation, the Beach Battalion had been equipped with six bulldozers to aid in pushing stranded craft off the beaches. Xach Beach Platoon had been increased by twelve deck ratings and each transport had prepared one LCM(3) for use as a salvage craft. The LCM(3), go prepared, was equipped with a motor driven trailer pump with a capacity of five hundred gallons per minute and sufficient hose to enable it to pump out stranded LCT(P)e, special towing cleats and tow lines already made up. In addition to these preparations the Force Commander intended to use LCI(L)s for salvage work if necessary but the organization provided was more than ample to care for what was required. Only eleven landing craft (two LCM(S)s and nine LCV(F)s were left in the assault area when the transports departed, and with one exception, all of these were damaged or sunk by enemy action. ®ie exception was an LCV(P) which was sunk by collision with another landing craft on its way to the beach.

Recommendations.

A salvage unit equipped and trained for immediate salvage is a necessary part of any assault force. More and better equipment based on the needs of the salvage unit as commented on in separate correspon­ dence should be provided. The equipment should include at least one Xyle gun for each salvage craft.

Salvage during high surf conditions should be stressed dur­ ing training for any future operation.

Slings for hoisting LCVPs and IGMs should be increased in number to ensure that craft salvage in a sinking condition may be hoisted without delay. Merchant vessels designated to hoist aboard salvaged small craft must be ready to carry out this operation without delay when craft are delivered alongside.

An LOT repair ship adequately stocked with LCT spares should be included in an early follow-up convoy if protracted build-up over beachei is contemplated, An LCM repair unit should be Included in this repair ship, CHAPTER Till

COMMUNICATIONS III!\%I £1 „ -. - • £ ^ f ? *| $ * 'T^ .* * ' ^ CENTRAL PACIFIC '-/*-• ' •*| .*

Gilbert Island* Operation - November. 1943.

From: Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force.

Strenuous efforts were made to assemble adequate com­ munication personnel and equipment considerably in advance of receipt of plans for (GILBERTS) Operation, This was difficult because of the general scarcity of necessary types of radio equipment and trained per­ sonnel and because of communication needs for such an operation have not previously been thoroughly set forth and fully understood,

Experience has again demonstrated that no other type of operation requires such a large amount of communication personnel and equipment and such eareful training, organization and coordination of communications. Adequate coordinated communications are one of the most important essentials of successful amphibious operations.

. For Ships: TCS; TBS; TBX; SCR 610; voice modulators for TBL and TBK transmitters; High Frequency receivers of the selective type suitable for voice reception; VHF of SCR 639-640 type suitable for communication with aircraft.

For assault troops and shore objectives: SCR 610; SCR 399 in jeeps with full frequency range 1500 to 9000 kcs; portable sets somewhat like TBX and SCR 284 but superior to both, (light weight but powerful and rugged portable equipment having full frequency range and capable of sustained operation does not appear to be available in any standard type); powerful, reliable, mobile VHF for airground communications, (SCR 522 and Navy 23SA proved inadequate on the ground).

No portable radar equipment of sufficient range and reliability was available for use either ashore or afloat.

All major commands required more radio technicians and trained opera­ tors than were available. Material failures due to lack of technicians proved a serious handicap. Delays and confusion were caused by inex­ perienced radio operators.

The Communication Plan wits made from scratch in a very short time, yet it was received too late by all concerned. One coordinated plan for (GILBERTS) was achieved. Despite many minor er­ rors and considerable room for improvement the basic plan appears sound. One plan, rather than a number of small plans, is essential and proved its worth. The size of the Communication Flan caused considerable comment. Some reduction can be made in future plans, but only if the same information is made available in other publications. Simple Tactical voice and CV calls are a problem requiring a better solution. Detailed comments and recommendations for improvement in the Comm Plan will be made in separate correspondence. The essential point to be noted here is that adequate organization and training could not have been achieved without the Comm Flan, even had time been available.

USF 70 is not adequate; it needs improvement and ex­ pansion. A detailed Comm Plan for each operation must be distributed sufficiently in advance of departure dates of all forces concerned to permit organization, drills, check and calibration of equipment and practical rehearsals of communications. The Comm Plan should if possi­ ble precede the Operations Plan.

USF 70 WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR JOINT OPERATIONS BUT WAS DESIGNED FOR INTRA-FLEET USB AND HAS ADEQUATELY SERVED THIS PURPOSE. THE NEED FOR A BASIC ASSAULT LANDING COMMUNICATION PLAN IS RECOGNIZED. THE DOCTRINE GOVERNING AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT HAS BEEN IN A STATE OF EVOLUTION AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND COM­ MUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPRACTICAL TO PROMULGATE A BASIC ASSAULT LANDING COMMUNICATION PLAN. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE IS RA­ PIDLY BECOMING CRYSTALLIZED HOWEVER, AND THE TIME WHEN A BASIC PLAN CAN BE FORMULATED IS NEAR AT HAND. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A PLAN IS PUBLISHED, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EACH FORCE PREPARE SUCH A DOCUMENT WITH A VIEW OF REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE OPERAT­ ING PLANS REQUIRED AND TO ASSIST IN THE FORMULATING OF A BASIC ASSAULT LANDING COMMUNICATION PLAN.

*Communicationtraining and organization was divided | into the following general groups and accomplished separately during early stages of preparation: Air Liaison Parties; Shore Command Com- **** munication Stations; Shore Fire Control Parties; Fighter Director and Radar Groups; Beach Parties; Transport and Boat Group Communication Teams; augmentation of individual ship installations and personnel; Island Base Shore Stations. Each part was important but the combina­ tion of all into a coordinated network of communications was most im­ portant. Lack of time and inexperienced personnel made proper coordi­ nation impossible in the time available. Unification of communications in the most important single point to be stressed in preparations for future operations. This can only be achieved by having all groups study and have conferences on a single complete Comm Plan distributed well in advance.

Radio Silence was broken by (Commander Northern At­ tack Force) at minus 2 hours 20 minutes on D day. All necessary units of (Commander Northern Attack Force)were contacted on the various cir­ cuits without excessive testing or delays. Air Support, Fire Control and Task Force channels worked well between ships and aircraft through­ out the attack on Makin. g rsri *1 StiP f

8-2 There was interference, between tfiie Nortk*'dn'd'South At­ tack Force Gunfire Control channels 2I4.96 and 2$00 kcs, but at no time did this interference interrupt or delay communications within (Comman­ der Northern Attack Force) on 2$00 kcs. Some interesting information was intercepted from Southern Force on 21*96. On the whole it would have been better had the channels been at least 20 kcs apart. Communication between ships and most Shore Fire Control Parties was reasonably good as soon as parties got ashore. At one time (Commander Northern Attack Force) communication with NLO 1$ was the primary channel to CO Landing Force ashore. However, the equipment of the Shore Fire Control Parties left a lot to be desired in quality and reliability. This was not too important as the parties needed were contracted and the opposition was light.

Interference among circuits in the Pennsylvania was most annoying and caused delays several times. Difficulties can be at least partially removed by better radio engineering and improvement of Pennsylvania installation. However, trouble will always be experienced -where a large number of transmitters and receivers are in use so close together. The new headquarters ship will probably have similar troubles. A large number of circuits can only be run perfectly from a sliore base where receivers and transmitters can be separated. Beachmasters were slow in getting communications es­ tablished. Lack of training in use of equipment and lade of understand­ ing of who to communicate with and how were evident. The communications between transports and boats appeared reasonably good. The SCR 610 equip­ ment was very valuable and quite reliable. It proved superior to any­ thing else so far used for this purpose. A separate channel was provided, for each transport and another for Local Command. These SCR 610 sets provided useful and reliable ship to shore communication for several days and were often the only means of communication with and between parties ashore. More batteries were needed. Landing Force Communications ashore were largely non­ existent. There were no beach laterals and no command channels. Some breakage of equipment, delays in unloading usual losses and confusion and a lack of command organization appear to be the major causes of an outstanding lack of communications. Equipments which were finally got­ ten ashore and in working condition were not utilized on channels as planned. The SCR 610 supplied for Local Command Channel was the only communications to forces afloat and to rear bases in accordance with plans were never established, as far as is known while CTF 52 was in the vicinity. ComLanFor ashore did come up on the Task Force Common CV7 channel at 0300 Z, D plus Two Day, but then had difficulty in decoding and internal rout­ ing of despatches. It was necessary for CTF $2 to communicate direct with Beachmasters. "Wire virauBS- laid ashcrf> vith reasonable speed. However, it was not used to advantage since ther® a^fe^EeS to be little if any informa­ tion. - 5 COMMUNICATIONS - CENTRAL PAC available on what commands could be reached over what wires. It is believed that the general delay and confusion in communications ashore contributed to delays in unloading and in mopping up operations.

The wide coral reefs, conditions ashore* and need for all available craft in patrolling and unloading will probably always make it inadvisable to tie a vessel to shore by telephone wires and use the vessel as a radio station. It is absolutely essential, and not difficult, with reasonable organisation and training, to set up necessary radio and visual communication centers ashore using mobile equipment. Only by so doing can beach conditions and unloading be improved and expedited. Limited range . but reliable voice channels are of tremendous value and must be provided, with plenty of spaoes, for ship and boat to shore circuits and between shore parties.

High frequenoy circuits between 2000 and 5000 kcs used by (Commander Southern Attack Force) and Tarawa landing foroes were intercepted with little difficulty during the entire operation. It appeared that the Southern Attack Force had considerably more difficulty with communications than did the Northern Attack Force. There was a good deal more calling, testing and unnecessary transmission. It is believed that large power outputs were used on most circuits. Stations apparently within ten or twenty miles of each other at times and on frequencies where no skip distance was possible frequently had great difficulty in establishing and maintaining contact while CTF 52 heard both stations loud and clear. It is believed that the communication difficulties of (Southern Attack Foree) were largely due to untrained personnel, inadequate equipment and an insufficient number of radio technicians to keep the equipment adjusted and in operating condition. Lack of opportunity to train and rehearsepereonnel in communi­ cations and late receipt of the Comm Plan was probably the cause of the generally poor circuit discipline observed.

After the assault of Tarawa had been completed, and during the consolidation phase when the necessity for plain language had apparently passed, an execessive amount of plain language, which was probably of con­ siderable value to the enemy and which was certainly intercepted by him, was heard on various circuits from the vicinity of Tarawa, such as TF common, TransDiv Warning Net, and Aircraft Control channels. It is probable that TF 52 also made some unnecessary transmissions in plain language but the use of SCR 610 reduced to a minimum the plain language on high frequency ohannels.

Conclusions.

Communications during (GILBERTS OPERATION) between ships and ships, and ships and aircraft, were better thar in previous operations.

Communications between ships and forces ashore at the objectives were not satisfactory, probably because of inadequate training of shore personnel at Makin and strong opposition encountered at Tarawa. ; { r * . ;r * »-* - ** 'VllAla • A iS ** * it gOMMWijfcAKatS - CENTRAL PACIFIC C#f|tfj,I Jj

Circuit discipline particularly on aircraft channels c&i and must be improved.

Early establishment of complete and coordinated communica­ tions ashore is vital to the success of the operation said must be more heavily stressed by landing force commanders.

The Comm Plan should be distributed at an earlier date. More time is required for training and organisation of personnel and for calibration and adjustment of equipment.

Communication equipment for the Northern Attack Force was adequate in numbers but not in quality.

- Communication equipment for the Southern Attack Force was not adequate in either amount or quality.

A larger number of more skillful radio technicians was needed in both forces, particularly ashore.

More TBS and VHF equipment is urgently needed. Ships and forces ashore require from two to six equipments depending on mission and should have a selection of several channels•-

The SCR 522 and Navy Model 233A VHF are not satisfactory aboard ship or on the ground for fighter direction. A more powerful and rugged equipment is required.

Lessons learned in previous operations and needs for personnel and equipment already requested were amply confirmed.

VHF, ship to shore channels, are worth a great deal of effort and should be provided for next operation if possible.

Shipboard installations and aircraft installations of BK equipment are not reliable. Equipment requires tests and adjustment; personnel require instructions.

Vessels to be used for headquarters ships must have all transmitters specially lined up, checked and adjusted by expert radio engineers and thoroughly tested to reduce interference among channels to a minimum. Special antenna systems and wave traps may be required. Elimina­ tion of interference and reduction of noise level requires time and skill but is most essential to successful exercise of major functions of commands afloat.

Standard communication publications should be improved and brought up to date in order to reduce size of communication plans required for a specific operation. f if.um 8-5

U y V ^ COMMONICAXICHS - CENTRAL PACIFIC ? • i .r-r-'- '• Pt*irirr% gig* §»£* § Recommendations. 1 S Jw,# 4* -"Wa ij \flw aj?|a Prepare and distribute communication plan for next operation as soon as possible.

Designate Island Base Communication Officers at least two months in advance. Give them special training and have them assemble and train Island Base Communication Parties at least one month in advanoe. Designate and equip first and seoond echelons of Island Base Communication Parties to go ashore on D and D plus One Days to establish neoessary command communications for Landing Force Commander ashore.

Provide each vessel, down to and including LST's with TBS and SCR 610 or equivalent. Accelerate installation of second TBS in all large vessels and TBS AC heating modification in all vessels.

Provide for more drill, operation, practical use, and calibration of shipboard radio equipment while snips are in rear area.

Increase number and quantity of training of radio technicians and operators.

Provide VHF equipment for ship to shore work at outlying bases.

Provide portable Radar equipment for use by amphibious forces in next operation.

Authorise a special Navy Yard project for reduotion of noise levels and inter-circuit interference on flagships and headquarters ships.

A SPECIAL PROJECT HAS BEEN SET UP BY BUSHIPS TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN INSTALLED RADIO EQUIPMENTS IN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FLAGSHIPS (AGCs) AND RELIEF AGCs. APPROVED CHANGES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WILL BE PROMULGATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Reiterate and renew previous requests for communication personnel and equipment based on recent experience in (GILBERTS) operation. As stated by ComCenPac, communication personnel and equipment requested have been the minimum required.

From: Commander Carrier Air Group NINE- - (TARAWA)

The only big trouble here was communications. VHF was employed by the (Support Aircraft Commander) for target designations. The four available channels were already overloaded by some 20 fighters director stations. On station over TARAWA planes could hear other planes and base stations operating £ MAKIN - Ipud and clear. COMMUNICATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC FIWO A Those transmiBsSoni^probabljf were eat;Heard by the ground station# % I 'M TARAWA but caused many requestsf'or 'repetition of orders. These order!# M'rl then had to be passed -by flight leaders to their flights on the same frequencies. Clear ohannels for support missions are imperative if close coordination is to be obtained. Throughout these operations there was much needless radio chatter on aircraft circuits. This was, of course, mostly on the VHF circuits which were already overloaded. Planes and base stations were guilty alike. There was also much traffio which was considered unjustified on these circuits. The most glaring example was the use of airborne planes to relay messages to various base stations often for further relay to other stations. Often these messages had nothing to do with aircraft operations but they did successfully jam the air and interfere with such operations.

The "VHF (233A) radio equipment is a super colossal improve­ ment in aircraft oomnunioations. Its installation in all carrier based planes should be expedited by every means possible. However, to fully utilise it8 capabilities more channels must be provided or its use must be strictly limited to essential airoraft communications. Except in the case of the leader of one support flight, communication between planes in the air and the Support Aircraft Commander on the beach was generally good. However, many pilots complained of ex­ cessive traffio on the same frequency with the Support Aircraft Commander. Pilots reported hearing as many as fifteen different bases on the same frequency. Fromj Commanding Officer USS ESSEX- (CV) - TARAWA (a) Use of the TBS. The problem of the TBS in maneuvering and administration is apparently one which is always with us and requires a constant fight to prevent retrogression. In the Tarawa occupation the undesirable feature of this was magnified by the fact that many Task Groups operated within TBS range of each other with resultant chaos on the air. Would not a simple push button change of frequency for the TBS (similar of the VHF equipment used in aircraft) be a great improvement? (b) Fighter5Direction was hopelessly complicated and effectively nullified in many cases during the Tarawa campaign by the fact that the VHF was used as a primary communication circuit by ships and Task Forces* When a Task Force Commander found that he could relay a message through a fighter plane in the air and by no other means, he frequently attempted to deliver his administrative traffic over this channel. This prevented the fighters from being able to listen to their own fighter director even though their own base was not the offender. This method of communication at best is very inefficient, with endless repetitions and verifications. Task Force Commanders must appreciate the fact that by attempting such methods of communication they not only seriously handicap any fighter direction in their own force, but place an equally great i ' r 1 . . -• *"? *>.< • „ * -,t -*• "* i'-i ' •' • 1 4 " ; • ^ 8-7 COMMUNICATIONS - CENTRAL TAi handicap on the fighter direction activities of the other forces in the area.

(c) Communication with Rescue Submarine and "Dumbo". There was considerable uncertainty and difficulty in getting word through to pilot rescue units when circumstances required. A standard communication arrange­ ment should be set up for this specific purpose, which is a matter of decided consequence to pilot morale.

Throughout the operation there were many instances of long range planes (B-24's, PB4Y's, PBY's) passing through the area of our radio scan (say, 10 to 50 miles) not showing IFF. This resulted in vectoring out fighters at times when the combat air patrol was particularly needed to take care of actual snoopers and shadowers. Suggest the IFF "on-off switch be operated by the main ignition switch.

From: Commander FIRE SUPPORT GROUP. Commander Battleship Division Two - TARAWA.

TBS voice circuit was used indiscriminately for traffic other than that specified in basic communication plan, causing unnecessary interference and delay in tactical signals. Assigning all ships a common TBS frequency is a good plan for initial movement but, in later phases in operating areas, task groups should be assigned different frequencies to avoid interference in tactical communications.

Lack of circuit discipline resulted in interference and unacceptable delays on TBS and Task Force Common circuits*

Operators on voice circuits speak too fast and fail to articulate properly. The combination of these faults slows down communica­ tions. Voice circuit logs must be as complete as CW circuit logs; each addressee must have a correct and complete copy of all messages for action and later reference.

Fromt Commander Southern Attack Force - TARAWA.

That in future operations against an atoll objective the number of gunfire support channels be reduced so as to provide greater spacing within the available spectrum and reduce mutual interference to a minimum.

That the TBY be di/carded in war operations and replaced by the Army SCR 610 or similar equipment? that adequate equipment be pro­ vided to insure reliable radio coamunication between transports, their land­ ing craft, the boat control vessels, and shore components.

That the VOS airplane used by the Commanding General*s observer be fitted with VHF equipment. • - 3? ^ * <• i iT* • 4% > .v.r ; '•. / I -• * • ' ? •• ••;*' ^ ' "7 - • ^'8 i'ZcS t? ^ 1 C"0MMUNICATI0NS - CENTRAL PACIFIC " |* \ - ^ m m a ^ m m ™ahmbmbmn^m^mm^mr Jj& fa .:• ':T ••• "'-r •"•*4 .-I That present methods of training operators to expect interference and to copy through it be continued.

That emphasis be placed on the necessity for constant use of authenticators.

That after several days enroute to the objective, radio silence be broken just prior to arrival in the transport area and the most important circuits tested, in order to insure satisfactory radio communica­ tion on these circuits.

THE ONSUITABILITY OP GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHIPS AS AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FLAGSHIPS (AGCs) HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED. NUMEROUS C-2 HULLS HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING FITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING AMPHIB­ IOUS FORCE AND GROUP COMMANDERS WITH FLAGSHIPS (AGCs) CAPABLE CP FURNISHING THE NECESSARY COMMUNICATION AND OTHER SPECIAL FACILITIES RE­ QUIRED TO EXERCISE COMMAND IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERA­ TIONS.

8-9 COMMUNICATIONS f:|1£ .,*» *

MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE V*f ff*|

Salerno - September 1943.

From: Commander, Eighth Amphibious Force.

Every vessel taking part in an Amphibious Operation so large and so complex as Operation (AFRICA), (SICILY), or (SALERNO) must be able to deal with at least three circuits, namely; the force fox and/or warning cir­ cuit,Unit commanders circuit, and the force command circuit. As most ships from AMs down have but one transmitter and receiver this command normally in­ stalls extra equipment In them. For this operation, however, vessels were assigned to the force too late to permit the necessary installations to be made. It is therefore recommended that all vessels assigned to amphibious operations be permanently provided with six radio operators, a TCB, one other transmitter and two other receivers with ranges of .3 to 12 MCc.

TBX and TBY sets were employed for small boat aid shore communications in the manner which has now become standard practice (see Joint Air Amphibious Communication Instructions). The results were good. In addition, the Frequency Modulated SCR 609 was used with excellent results. FM sets are simple and rugged. They are crystal tuned, without special prior training. They give a good signal at fifteen, or twenty miles and are not impeded by fog or static. The life of their batteries is about 5 hours. 609 FM sets can have only two channels set -p at one time. The shift is made by throwing a switch. In Operation (SALERNO) Red and Green Beaches and all boats and transports working those beaches used Channel 1. Yellow and Blue Beach and corresponding boats and transports used Channel 17. Vessels which worked all beaches could reach any beach by throwing the switch. A disadvantage might develop if more than two main beaches were involved in an operation. FMs were also placed aboard British merchant ships which were attached to the Force on short notice. Satisfactory communications resulted.

. Beach communications were more or less interrupted from time to time by enemy activity on the beach. Occasionally operators had to take cover, and several times TBX and TBY, but not JW, antennae were destroyed by enemy machine gon fire. Such loss of antennae is not normal since normally the enemy has been driven from the beach before the communica­ tion teams land. It is recommended that FM sets similar to the 609 replace TBY in future amphibious operations.

THE SCR 600 SERIES OF ARMY 5W E^UI^MENTS (SCR 608 and SCR 610-A) HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE NAVY FOR AMPHIBIOUS PURPOSES. LARGE QUANTITIES OF THRSE E^IPMENTS ARE UNDER PROCUREMENT FROM THE ARMY AND DISTRIBUTION IS BEING EFFECTED AS FAST AS THE SETS CAN BE PROCURED.

TO UTILIZE 'A DIFFERENT PART OF THE SPECTRUM FROM THE SCR 600 SERIES EQUIPMENTS AND BECAUSE OF ITS ADAPTABILITY -TO USE IN TRACKED VEHICLES, THE SCR 500 SERIES OF ARMY COMMUNICATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN K' V r'

--:/g vlr V' ^ -' EQUIPMENTS ABJC BBING PROCURED FOR INSTALLATIONS IN LVTS. #/

Late on D Say, 75 vat SCR 188 mounted on a jeep was set up at Beach Battalion Headquarters. This equipment is powered by the Jeep's electrical system. It having been proved feasible to take heavy equipment ashore, it is recommended that at least two radio equip­ ped jeeps or amphibious jeeps be supplied beach battalion communication team, calibrated on the assigned frequencies. These equipments should be taken ashore and set up to replace the TBX as soon as the beach is safely cleared.

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Forces- Northwest African Waters.

^he experiences of the ANCON (AGC), in this assault indicate the need of a separate Fighter Direction Ship. The Headquarters Ship in order to accomodate the Sea, Land and Air Commanders with their staffs must necessarily be a large and expensive ship. ?he Headquarters Ship must then be anchored in the transport area where it is less con­ spicuous, which oftentiiaes results in poor radar reception. Because of Its value the Headquarters Ship must be removed from the assault area as soon as practicable. This results in influencing the Air Commander to establish his control ashore as soon as possible, and in this assault before air control was fully established ashore. During the interim, air control was shifted to HMS HILARY.

IT IS NOT PLANNED TO PROVIDE A VESSEL SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO FUNCTION AS A FIGHTER DIRECTOR SHIP. DESTROYERS HAVE SERVED IN THIS CAPACITY SATISFACTORILY UNTIL FIGHTER DIRECTION UNITS HAVE BEEN SET UP ASHORE. COMMUNICATIONS

* Landing at impress Aagusta Bay - November 1943.

From: Commander, Third Amphibious Force.

The facilities of an APA are entirely inadequate for proving necessary communications required for the Command functions of Commander Naval Force, Commander Landing Force and Commander Aircraft in a major amphibious operation. Vhen designated as Flagship for this operation the GEORGE CLYMER had only three CV operating positions in­ stalled in radio control* and the TBM equipment taken on board in the Rear Area could not be used because of lack of 440 volt AC supply . An old TBM from Radio GUADALCANAL, which was in need of overhaul, was hastily substituted. Two of the three power amplifier tubes were found to be bad after the third failed diring the first night of the operation. Antenna arrangements were poor causing excessive receiver interference on practically all circuits when transmitters were keyed. Considerable portable equipment had to be installed to meet the requirements of the relatively simple communica­ tion plan used. Numerous minor equipment failures veffe experienced and it was only by constant work and Improvisation on the part of the limited radio material crew available that essential communications were maintained. The ship's personnel were highly cooperative, but the material limitations and failures combined with the local interference created in other circuits incident to use of own transmitters made communications most difficult. It is strongly recommended that an adequate command ship be made available for each major amphibious operation.

Landing at Lae - September 1943.

"Prom: Commander, Seventh Amphibious Force.

Communications during the operation were generally satis­ factory. During the approach and landing phases, control of ships and waves was accomplished by use of Army Type SCR 300 sets in addition to regularly installed equipment. The SCR 300 sets proved to "be excellent for smphibious operations.

When the Ninth Australian Division Headquarters moved in­ land, direct communication with the Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SIX was not established according to plan. This mas due to equipment failure ashore. The Army Type 133 radio equipment obtained by the Ninth Australian Division proved to be unsuitable for this type of operation due to its weight and resultant lsvck of mobility in the jungle terrain encountered. It is felt that the Army Type SCR 188 set would have proved more satisfactory. CHAPTER - XX / * i• WjJt* /f /-j _ MISCELLANEOUS %

From: Cosmander Landing Craft Third Amphibious Force - Treasury Island.

Both LSTs were carrying barrage balloons as experi­ mental protection against air attack. The oalloons were streamed the night of 31 October - 1 November and were hauled down on arrival at the landing beach. Friendly AA shore batteries fired on the balloons as the LSTs were approaching the harbor. The firing continued for twenty minutes before it could be stopped, although no hits were made. The forces ashore sighted the balloons before they sighted the LSTs, which were obscured by STIRLING ISLAND, and apparently thought the balloons were some type of enemy airship.

From: CO USS LST 354 - Empress Augusta Bay.

Two enemy aircraft attacked £n» the port beam. One of these planes was under our concentrated fire and after veering a- stern to avoid the balloon it was observed to crash into the sea. None of the attacking planes closed to the effective dive bombing distance and all showed a great deal of respect for the barrage bal­ loon. Observers are divided as to whether the plane damaged by our fire crashed as a result of that dsmage or as a result of collision with the balloon cable. It appears that the cable was severed at mast height by AA fire from a nearby ship. This caused the balloon to rise rapidly into the line of approach of the plane and forced the enemy pilot to take radical evasive action which ended in a crash dive.

Whether the barrage balloon caused the enemy plane to crash is' unimportant. The outstanding fact is that these balloons prevented a proper dive attack and successfully held torpedo planes clear of this ship. At no time did a torpedo plane make a direct at­ tack on a ship carxying a balloon.

From: Commander LST Flotilla Five - Bnpress Augusta Bay.

Prior sundown November 16th, 194-3 Group Commander especially directed all LSTs to be on the alert and to hesitate not at all to make full use of their guns when attacking planes were seen, and since the LST formation witji. interval and distance of 300 yards could not be effectively covered by smoke each was doubled in order that LST would have more rocan in which to maneuver evasively with less risk of collision. Attacking planes were readily seen and brought un­ der fire, some destroyed, tracks of some of the torpedoes fired were observed which permitted vessels to maneuver to avoid. In this attack barrage balloons were elevated, and it is thought they exercised a de- terrant effect upon attacking planes, to an extent which coupled with

§

j.,* -'K-Vk/ii 9-1 automatic weapon fire from LST and the maneuvers they resorted to caus­ ed them not to (dress hone effectively their torpedo attacks on LST.

In the dive bombing attacks about 0800 eneny planes seemed not to attack with much determination. That such was the case is thought to be due to the large volume of fire from automatic weap­ ons of LST and deterrant effect of barrage balloons.

From: CO DSS LST 395 - Etopress Augusta Bay.

At 0745» after receiving word of a large "bogey" ap­ proaching, the LSTs beached at Torokina were attacked by six Val 48s. This snip Drought all guns to bear on three of the dive bombers. They approached off the stem, height about ten thousand feet when first observed. The enemy released bombs at about 2,000 and dispersed. None of the planes came within effective range of our 20mm or .50 cal. machine guns, although these guns were firing. The planes showed no indication to press home the attack as had been experienced in prev­ ious action. Although the veiy heavy AA fire was undoubtedly equally responsible, it is my "belief that the barrage balloon on the LST 354 abeam to starboard was a real protection to us. It was noticeable that planes came out of their dives and that bombs were dropped at a higher altitude than in previous daylight attacks.

From: Commanding General, 2nd Engineer Special Brigade - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

The frequent strafing of beaches and bombingB from low altitude by enemy planes prove that barrage balloons should be taken over in the first echelon and immediately erected for both night and day.

*1 iiix-Lisf- ...... From: Commander Transport Division FIVE - Salerno.

At 2139 ships of the Transport Group and 6ome small boats were making a smoke screen to blanket the boat fire and the Transport Area in general from the air, and a veiy heavy screen was soon laid down. From about 2125 until 2200 enemy planes ranged over the entire attack area. Flares were dropped about 12 miles away to the Westward, and then there were more flares, tracer, and anti-air­ craft fire on bearings from 250°T to 320 T. Some bombs were dropped at considerable distances from this unit, but none close to these ships. There was some firing from Task Force 81, but on the whole the smoke was relied on for defense and gunfire was well controlled.

From: Commander Eighth Amphibious Force - Salerno. During the Id by various

9-2 ilia h:i ys SMOKE fKiiWipe jk craft to good effect to screen the Transport Area from enemy shore tery fire.

When the enemy shore battery fire on Green Beach be­ came too intense to permit continued unloading an effort was made to screen the beach area by laying smoke inshore and on the flanks of the beach. This screen was effective in that it prevented spotting, but, as the enemy had registered the range prior to the time the screen was laid, the attempt was not altogether successful.

At night, during red alerts, the transport and beach areas were covered with smoke by using pots and smoke generators ashore and using all types of smoke producing apparatus and smoke floats offshore. A smoke patrol of YlfSs or SCs upwind laid the init­ ial screen using smoke pots, floats and generators. Offshore, the A/S patrol craft made funnel smoke and, through the transport area, smoke was laid by PTs, SCs or LCVPs. In this manner the entire area was covered with smoke within the minutes of receipt of air raid warn­ ing.

Several vessels which were laying smoke by the use of small smoke pots were attacked by glide bombers which evidently. used the glow of the smoke pots as a point of aim.

ffhile the area was subject to periodic attack by rocket bombers one attempt was made during daylight to spoil their aim by using a smoke blanket laid by all available craft. While this may have been effective it slowed down the unloading to such an ex­ tent that the attempt was not repeated. Thereafter* during daylight alerts the A/S patrol to seaward made funnel smoke in an attempt to provide haze overhead.

Recommendations.

1. That all craft taking part in the assault be provided with one or more Besseler smoke generators and at least four drums of fog oil. 2. That the use of smoke pots by small craft be discontinued to prevent attack on them by bombers using the glow as a point of aim. 3. Should a beach become untenable because of enemy shore batteiy fire the beach should be shifted to a new site coincident with the laying of smoke on the new site. 4* Plans for future operations should include a smoke plan for designating vessels assigned to the smoke patrol and these vessels should carry a supply of smoke sufficient for ten days. 5. To deny a point of aim to rocket bombers it might be worthwhile if a high patrol cannot be maintained to consid­ er using smoke laid by own aircraft. SMOKE

waasfi From: CO USS SC-508 - Salerno.

That ships assigned to lay ing smoke cover supply them­ selves with some sort of screen to be placed above smoke pots after lighting tp prevent the glow being seen clearly from above. While at times smoke pots can be left floating to provide effective cover, this is often not practicable. The German night bombers appear to have us­ ed smoke pots as targets, possibly because the use of smoke at night seems to have helped prevent any bomb hits in the area which this ship was assisting in covering.

From: Commander Cruiser Division Eight - Salerno.

Smoke released by scout boats obscured the landing beaches and prevented any attempt to deliver supporting fire control­ led by top observation.

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force - Vella Lavella.

At 1800 the Third Transport Group completed unload­ ing, save for a residual small quantity, and retired to avoid expos­ ure to night bombing while immobile and without fighter cover. Dur­ ing the night it was subjected to six horizontal bombing attacks, each a pattern of eight bombs. Enemy planes dropped colored flares and float lights in a box in front and on the flanks of the formation. The escorting destroyers, CONWAY and EATON used smoke to cover the disposition. This was without doubt the means of preventing serious damage to the Third Transport Group, which arrived safely at GUADAL­ CANAL August 16.

The Second Echelon, consisting of LSTs 339, 396 and 4.60, screened by Destroyer Division FORTY-THREE (less RENSHAW) and SC 1266, departed GUADALCANAL area on August 16 and arrived and beach­ ed at BARAKOMA at 1625 on August 17. The task group retired at 2040, although unloading was not completed, on orders of the Commanding Gen­ eral, Vella Lavella, who considered their position highly hazardous both to ships and to unloading personnel due to constant enemy night air attacks. Underway, up to midnight, frequent aircraft attacks, both by bomb and torpedo, were successfully repulsed without damage, the escort again using smoke to screen LSTs. Apparently the Japan­ ese attacks were directed primarily at the vessels of the screen whose rapid maneuvers fortunately made them less favorable targets. Smoke at ni^it to screen the convoy was effectively employed on several occasions. This was so effective that not only was air attack made more difficult, but in some cases entirely avoided. From: Commander Seventh Miphibi«o® ¥f>rcm - Cape Gloucester. The use of smoke by planes appears effective, but the

** 111 if s ... * v' ,* possibilities of smoke back firing are demonstrated by the unexpected screening of the beach, which, however, was not a disadvantage inl this case.

This was the first time smoke has been used in amphib­ ious operations in this area. Aircraft dropped eight tons of white phosphorous smoke on TARGET HILL which was about 1000 yards south of the landing beach. This was done to cut off observation posts and possible gun positions overlooking the beaches. It was effective. The faint land breeze from the southeast blew the smoke slowly down to the landing area. By H-Hour both beaches were completely covered and with­ in another half hour the approach lanes were obscured to a point 3000 yards from the beaches* Although the smoke cover was unexpected, land­ ing craft were handled boldly and successfully in it.

Front Commander Transport Division Four - Tarawa.

As protection against night bombing attacks, six land­ ing craft, each in charge of an officer and equipped with a TBY and smoke pots, were stationed each night in various positions to windward from the ships anchored in the lagoon* LSTs when not discharging cargo on the beach were also anchored around the ships ready to light off their smoke-making apparatus if ordered to do so. An operation order covering action to be taken in the event of an air attack was sent to each ship as soon as it anchored.

From: Commander Southern Attack Force - Tarawa.

It is believed that many opportunities were overlook­ ed in this operation for the use of smoke to blank out strong points on the shore which were so effectively delaying the establishment of our beachheads each ship of the fire support group had been provided with white phosphorus projectiles and was prepared to deliver than at the appointed spot, on call of the shore parties.

Fran: Combined Operations Headquarters - British.

When a harbour, open anchorage or beach maintenance area is being protected from air attack by means of an area smoke screen it is advisable that AA fire should be restricted to those guns which have flashless charges and are not firing tracer, otherwise the effect of the screen will be largely lost.

MEDIUM TANKS

From: Commander Fifth Amphibious Force - Gilbert Islands Operation.

Medium tanks and their crews were transported in ff " Ji: 3 i?

• 9-5 •; =• * i-r- : ••• • , if

• '* • ' ' '• MEDIUM TANKS

LSD-2. This method of transportation proved efficient and highly sat­ isfactory. LSD-2 (BELLE-GROVE) entered the lacroon. and without diffi­ culty flooded and launched her LCM(3)s, each loaded with one medium tank, in time to meet the schedule far landing at Beach Tellow-2.

They successfully launched from LCM(3)s in 4.5 feet of water, and crossed the 500 yard fringing reef. The water was smooth. These tanks were of great value ashore, when properly employed. All tank traps and obstacles could either be crossed directly by those tanks or circumvented without great difficulty.. In crossing submerged reefs which have been subjected to bombing attack, caution must be ex­ ercised. Tanks are apt to turn over or be completely submerged if they fall into a bomb crater on a reef at high or half tide. This occurred in one or two instances. The addition of a considerable number of tank lighters for unloading cargo is a secondary tout important benefit deriv­ ed from the presence in the landing area of the LSD. It is highly probsble that one company of medium tanks supported by turret mount amphibians will be adequate for any one ob­ jective island. The elimination of all or any Considerable number of light tanks would greatly simplify the ship to shore movement and ease the shipping requirements for all LVTs. Such is recommended if the tactical requirements will permit. It is believed that the medium tank is superior to the light tank in operations on coral atolls and islands for the fol­ lowing reasons: (a) Even when not waterproofed, it can move through deeper water than the light tank without flood­ ing. (b) Its heavier armor and armament will permit it to engage AT and emplaced weapons at closer ranges and with greater penetrating power of projectiles. (c) Its speed is approximately equal to that of a light tank. (d) Its ability to reduce field fortifications and obstacles is superior to that of the light tank.

(e) In the type of terrain and soil generally found on atolls .of this type, it can move over the same ground as the light tank, and at the same speeds. The disadvantages in using a medium tank are those inherent in bu?k and weight. They are difficult to load and handle aboard, an APA or Mi, most of which do not have booms of sufficient capacity to make the lift from a deep hold. They are, however, read­ ily transported, in LCM(S)s docked in an LSD, as vas done in this op­ eration. There is, however, the deeper draft of an LCM(2) when load­ ed. with a medium tank to consider in the landing.. In this operation, they were successfully landed orer the coral shelf in 4.5 feet of water, with the drowning of only one or two tanks due to falling in holes. She maintenance, repair, and supply of the medium tank is not appreciably greater than that of the light tank in a limited opera­ tion of this type; the most difficult item of equipment in connection with those activities being the wrecker, which is bulky and heavy, but can be loaded and operated out of an 1ST similar to the tank it­ self. It does require better landing conditions than the tank.

In similar operations for the future, it is recom­ mended that medium tanks be employed and supported by light tanks in the ratio of light platoon or equivalent number of turret mounted armored amphibians to a medium tank company.

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

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