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Jump TO Article The article on the pages below is reprinted by permission from United Service (the journal of the Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales), which seeks to inform the defence and security debate in Australia and to bring an Australian perspective to that debate internationally. The Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales (RUSI NSW) has been promoting informed debate on defence and security issues since 1888. To receive quarterly copies of United Service and to obtain other significant benefits of RUSI NSW membership, please see our online Membership page: www.rusinsw.org.au/Membership Jump TO Article USI Vol66 No2 Jun15:USI Vol55 No4/2005 27/05/15 3:26 PM Page 24 CONTRIBUTED PAPER The 1915 Dardanelles Campaign Stephen Chambers Military historian and battlefield guide1 In late 1914, when Turkey closed the Dardanelles to foreign shipping, Britain and France determined to open it by military force to knock Turkey out of the war and re-establish the warm-water route to Russia. Contrary to the tactical wisdom of the day, a naval-only campaign was launched in February-March 1915. While it achieved some early successes, the heavily mined passage leading to the Narrows could not be overcome and the attempt was abandoned with heavy losses of men and ships. Key words: Dardanelles; Gallipoli; 1915; Turkey; Britain; France; Enver Pasha; General Weber Pasha; Winston Churchill; Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden; Vice-Admiral John de Robeck. No part of the Dardanelles, from its Aegean political and public opinion swung towards Germany. entrance to its junction with the Sea of Marmara, was This was dreadful timing for the British on the eve of free of defence. From the days of Xerxes, Alexander war. It did not take long for Germany to exploit this. the Great and the Roman Empire, this stretch of Already running the Mediterranean gauntlet was the strategic waterway had been fought over. By 1915, the German battlecruiser Goeben and the light cruiser combined defences of the Dardanelles comprised of Breslau, under the command of Rear-Admiral Wilhelm not only forts with large calibre guns, but minefields, Souchon. Through guile and British incompetence, shore-based torpedo tubes, mobile howitzers and field Souchon had successfully evaded the Anglo-French guns, the main concentration of which was at the Mediterranean Fleet embarrassing the British. Having Narrows. This natural bottleneck was the key to arrived off the entrance of the Dardanelles, the Turks opening the Dardanelles. allowed the Germans safe passage through, and onto Both Britain and Germany had been energetically Constantinople for all to witness. Now the Turks had wooing the Turkish Government during 1914; if Turkey two new ships that showed that Britannia did not rule and its Ottoman empire could not be kept neutral, its the waves. presence as an ally, however shaky its military In direct contravention of international law, German capacity, was essential to interests in the east. The General Weber Pasha, swiftly closed the Dardanelles German military mission in Turkey was charged with and began making desperate efforts with the Turks to modernising the Ottoman Army under the lead of strengthen the Dardanelles’ defences. Turkey then General Liman von Sanders. Similarly, a British naval progressed plans to attack Russia in the Caucasus, to mission in Constan tinople, under Vice-Admiral Arthur regain her former territory, and to attack British Limpus, had the task to prepare the Ottoman Navy. Two interests in Egypt, namely the Suez Canal, with a view new generation dreadnoughts, named Sultan Osman I to severing Britain’s connection to India and the Far and Reshadieh, were under construction at this time in East. There was also another threat. When the Sultan British shipyards. They had been largely purchased by called for a Jihad, Britain had concerns that this could nationwide street collections and special taxes in stir up Islamic agitation against Britain, particularly in Turkey that paid for their completion. Egypt and India. If Britain could teach the Turks a lesson, this would weaken their Muslim prestige and The Prelude to War with Turkey thus reassert British power. What happened next was an act of realpolitik. Just The triumphant Souchon was quickly appointed before Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August head of the Ottoman Navy. Britain was not blind to what 1914, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was happening, and protested that the ships should be seized both Ottoman ships, renamed them HMS impounded and the German crews sent home. Turkey Agincourt and HMS Erin, and added them to the British nevertheless maintained her ‘armed’ neutrality, and still Grand Fleet in the North Sea. Although it was a logical would not commit to war. This inertia, however, did not decision, its insensitivity outraged the Turks, and both last for long. Under the direction of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, the Goeben and Breslau (renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli) were dis - 1A presentation on the Dardanelles Campaign to the Institute on 28 April patched with a rag tag fleet of Turkish cruisers, des - 2015 by Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Sweeney RFD (Ret’d) was based on troyers and torpedo boats to raid the Russian Black this paper, an earlier version of which was published in The Gallipolian, Sea ports. On 29 October they began bombarding The Journal of the Gallipoli Association No. 136 (Winter) 2014, pp. 10 – 19. Email: [email protected]. these ports, which clearly showed where Turkey’s Page 24 United Service 66 (2) June 2015 USI Vol66 No2 Jun15:USI Vol55 No4/2005 27/05/15 3:26 PM Page 25 allegiances lay. Britain and France sent an ultimatum to express condition that it should be a naval operation Turkey that night and then severed diplomatic relations. only; it was under no circumstances to involve the use On 2 November 1914 Russia declared war on Turkey. of troops ..... If it did not succeed, it was to be treated Although Britain was not officially at war with Turkey, as a demonstration and abandoned” (Ellison 1926: 38- on 3 November, in a rapid response to Souchon’s 39). It was on these conditions that Lord Kitchener, unprovoked attack on the Black Sea ports, Churchill Secretary of State for War, agreed to the operation. The ordered the navy to bombard the outer forts that Admiralty was also suitably stocked with shell, and if guarded the mouth of the Dardanelles. This was to be this could be won by ship alone, a cheap and easy a demonstration only and, to reduce risk to the Anglo- victory would be welcomed. Kitchener had spoken and French fleet, it would be conducted at long range. As nobody, not even the British Cabinet questioned him. one admiral2 remarked at the time, “a little target The elderly First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, practice from 15 to 12 thousand yards might be useful”. impressed by the young Churchill and intimidated by HM Ships Indomitable and Indefatigable bombarded Kitchener, openly agreed to this naval operation. Only the forts at Sedd el Bahr on the European side, whilst older ships were allocated to the Dardanelles, thus the French ships Suffren and Verite, targeted the forts Fisher could retain the main fleet to counter the at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side. After ten minutes of German threat to the United Kingdom across the North negli gible return fire, a lucky shot detonated the Sea. magazine at Sedd el Bahr, killing eighty-six Turkish The plan was to send the fleet up through the defenders and destroying large parts of the fort. Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmara from where For this early British ‘success’ there was much it would create havoc, paralysing all Turkish move - criticism amongst the Admiralty. Vice-Admiral Sackville ments in the area. The fleet would then proceed to Carden was accused of ‘lunacy’, ‘irresponsibility’ and Constan tinople. It was hoped that the sight of this great for making an ‘unforgivable error’ of judgement, giving armada would be enough to get the Turks to transfer the game away. Although partly true, this was a bit of their allegiances to the Triple Entente.4 If not, the navy an over-reaction as for three months the Germans and would destroy the city. The plan did have its flaws. Turks had been improving the defences. Additionally, Sustaining an operation here would be a problem where else were Britain and France going to attack, if without military support to keep the Dardanelles open not at the Dardanelles? That aside, any surprise the for re-supply. Co-operation with Russia would also Entente may have had, was now gone. Worse still, and have been necessary, so control of the Bosporus could in defiance of prior ships versus forts wisdom3, it gave be affected. Putting all this aside in the short term, it the navy confidence that their guns could destroy forts, was a risk that Britain and France were willing to take and force the Dardanelles by ships alone. On 5 to knock Turkey out of the war and re-establish the November, Britain and France declared war on Turkey. warm-water route to Russia, along which she exported half of her goods, including nine tenths of her grain. It Strategic Considerations was also hoped that this show of might could influence Apart from blockading the entrance to the Greece, Bulgaria and possibly Romania to join a Dardanelles, and a little submarine activity with varying Balkan coalition against the Central Powers. If it went results, the area ceased to be a focus for the British. wrong, however, the effect was unthink able.