Lebanon 1982-1984
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The London School of Economics and Political Science From Peacemaking to ‘Vigorous Self-Defense’: US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon 1982-1984 Corrin Varady A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2015. 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 100,326 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Ms Demetra Frini. 2 Abstract This thesis is a study on the use of military force in United States peacemaking in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984. It argues that the failure of the Reagan Administration to understand accurately the complex political landscape of the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the US and the Multinational Force in Beirut becoming intertwined in the broader Lebanese conflict. Because of this, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz applied a policy focusing on military force with a vague peacekeeping vision which led to catastrophic US casualties. This thesis also argues that US policy in Lebanon was inaccurately designed because, from the outset, Washington did not see Lebanon as a key policy frontline. However, the Administration’s failed attempts to resolve the crisis and Reagan’s personal pursuit for international credibility bound the US to one of the world’s most complicated and violent conflicts. By examining newly released archival material this thesis will show how the foundations of the US’ interventionist policy in Lebanon came from the Reagan Administration’s desire to see the US as the key military power in the Middle East rather than protecting Lebanese sovereignty or containing the Soviets. This thesis offers a fresh perspective on the impact of the US intervention and the decision- making drivers that led Reagan into the Lebanese Civil War. It challenges the notion that Reagan deployed US Marines under the ideals of international peacekeeping. Rather it will argue that the Multinational Force withdrew from Lebanon as a failed military force having made little progress. 3 Table of Contents Abstract 3 List of Abbreviations 5 Introduction 9 Chapter One Lebanon: A crowded state without a nation 36 Chapter Two Discontinuity and Legacy: US policy in Lebanon and the Middle East 66 Chapter Three Operation Peace for Galilee and the Establishment of the MNFI 105 Chapter Four Return of the Marines and the Multinational Force II 146 Chapter Five The Soviet-Syrian alliance and the Battle of Souk el Gharb 186 Chapter 6 The Marine Barracks Bombing and a ‘vigorous self defense’ 215 Chapter 7 Leaving through the back door: The final days of the US intervention in Lebanon 271 Conclusion 311 Bibliography 327 4 Acknowledgements I would first like to acknowledge the extraordinary people of Lebanon whose resilience and positivity captivated me during my Master’s dissertation. Thank you to my Lebanese friends Vicken Vanlian and Samer Sakr for their generosity and support during my many trips to Beirut. I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Kirsten Schulze who inspired me to make that first trip to Lebanon and who has guided me through the various iterations of the thesis. Thank you also to Dr. Piers Ludlow and Professor Matthew Jones for their advice and feedback as the chapters came together. A very special thank you goes to Louisa Greene at the LSE’s Research Degrees Unit for her encouragement. You have greatly assisted me in making it to the end. Deepest appreciation goes to Dr. Kaoukab Chebaro, Claude Matar and Hrag Vosgerichian from the American University of Beirut Archives as well as Drs. Fawaz Traboulsi and Aliya Saidi from the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies at the AUB for their outstanding expertise on all things Lebanese. I owe a big thank you to US Archivists Ray Wilson, Keith Shuler and Mary Burtzloff at the Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter and Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives as well as Amanda Leinberger at the United Nations Archives in New York. On a personal note, I would like to thank my friends Jacqueline Rolfe, Andre Pierre Marais, Martin Prosezky, Gary Peroy, Hayley Lyons, Max Pugh, Anna Moshi and Jonathan Okwir. The latter has always impressed upon me to ‘pe abino jalo’ (never give up). However, this thesis is ultimately dedicated to my parents, Dr Margaret and Dr Miklos Varady, without whom it would never have been completed. Your love, support and incredible wisdom are what I acknowledged here beyond anything else. 5 List of Abbreviations AAPSS- The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science AIPAC – American Israel Public Affairs Committee APP – American Presidecy Project! AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control Systems CENTO – Central Eastern Treaty Organisation CIA – Central Intelligence Agency! CLOHP – Carter Library Oral History Project! CMF – Combined Maritime Forces CPPG – Crisis Pre-Planning Group DDEPL – Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library DNC – Democratic National Committee! DNSA – Digital National Security Archive! DOD – Department of Defence DOSA – Department of State Archives DSB – Department of State Bulletin! FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office FMS – Foreign Military Supplies FOIA – Freedom of Information Act FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States GOL – Government of Lebanon IDF – Israeli Defence Force IPPRC – International Public Policy Research Corporation IPS – Institute for Palestine Studies! 6 JCPL – Jimmy Carter Presidential Library JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff JVL – Jewish Virtual Library! L’OLJ – L’Orient Le Jour LAF – Lebanese Armed Forces LAT – Los Angeles Times LOC – Library of Congress! MAPS – Military Assistance Programs MARG – Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group MAU – Marine Amphibious Units (United States) Memcon – Memorandum of conversation! METO – Middle East Treaty Organisation MFO – Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai MNF – Multinational Force in Lebanon MNFI – First Multinational Force (18 August – 10 September 1982) MNFII – Second Multinational Force (20 September 1982 – 30 March 1984) NARA – National Archives and Record Administration! NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NER – Near East Report! NPO – Popular Nasserite Organisation NSA – National Security Affairs! NSC – National Security Council NSDD – National Security Decision Directive NSPG – National Security Planning Group NYT – The New York Times! 7 ONA- Office of National Assessment OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries! PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization! PPP – Public Papers of the Presidents! PREM – British Prime Minister’s Papers! PRM – Presidential Review Memorandum! RAC – Remote Archive Capture Program ROE – Rules of Engagement RRPL – Ronald Reagan Presidential Library SAF – Syrian Armed Forces SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks! SAM – Surface-to-Air Missile SARG – Syrian Arab Republic Government SFRC – Senate Foreign Relations Committee! TARP – Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod UKNA – United Kingdom National Archives! UNARMS – United Nations Archives and Records Management Section UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNSC – United Nations Security Council! USG – United States Government USMNF – United States Marine contingent of the MNFII WHCF – White House Central File! WP – The Washington Post WSJ – The Wall Street Journal 8 Introduction On 25 August 1982, Reagan appealed to the heroism of the 850 US marines who were bound for Lebanon under the Multinational Force (MNF),1 stating that ‘you are tasked to be once again what Marines have been for more than 200 years - peacemakers.’2 The Reagan Administration charged the Marines with a mission, beyond the realms of the UN or NATO, to intervene militarily in what Reagan called ‘this long-tortured city.’3 The Multinational Force I (MNFI) arrived as a limited force of fewer than 2000 international troops, entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the Israeli- Palestinian ceasefire agreement and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) fighters’ expeditious withdrawal from Beirut. Following the massacre of many hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, from 16-18 September 1982, Reagan held a press conference at the Oval Office, declaring that ‘there is little that words can add, but there are actions we can and must take to bring that nightmare to an end.’4 Little did Reagan realize that his commitment to action over words would mark the beginning of a nightmare for the US itself. As Reagan unwittingly committed himself to a violent conflict, he failed to realize that this would eventually have tragic and humiliating consequences for the 1 For reasons of specificity, the Multinational Force (MNF) will be spilt into two distinct bodies, namely Multinational Force I (MNFI), from 29 August-10