Rail Accident Report
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Rail Accident Report Fatal accident involving a train passenger near Balham 7 August 2016 Report 09/2017 May 2017 This investigation was carried out in accordance with: l the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC; l the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003; and l the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005. © Crown copyright 2017 You may re-use this document/publication (not including departmental or agency logos) free of charge in any format or medium. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and you must give the title of the source publication. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This document/publication is also available at www.raib.gov.uk. Any enquiries about this publication should be sent to: RAIB Email: [email protected] The Wharf Telephone: 01332 253300 Stores Road Fax: 01332 253301 Derby UK Website: www.gov.uk/raib DE21 4BA This report is published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Department for Transport. Preface Preface The purpose of a Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) investigation is to improve railway safety by preventing future railway accidents or by mitigating their consequences. It is not the purpose of such an investigation to establish blame or liability. Accordingly, it is inappropriate that RAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame, or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose. The RAIB’s findings are based on its own evaluation of the evidence that was available at the time of the investigation and are intended to explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner. Where the RAIB has described a factor as being linked to cause and the term is unqualified, this means that the RAIB has satisfied itself that the evidence supports both the presence of the factor and its direct relevance to the causation of the accident. However, where the RAIB is less confident about the existence of a factor, or its role in the causation of the accident, the RAIB will qualify its findings by use of the words ‘probable’ or ‘possible’, as appropriate. Where there is more than one potential explanation the RAIB may describe one factor as being ‘more’ or ‘less’ likely than the other. In some cases factors are described as ‘underlying’. Such factors are also relevant to the causation of the accident but are associated with the underlying management arrangements or organisational issues (such as working culture). Where necessary, the words ‘probable’ or ‘possible’ can also be used to qualify ‘underlying factor’. Use of the word ‘probable’ means that, although it is considered highly likely that the factor applied, some small element of uncertainty remains. Use of the word ‘possible’ means that, although there is some evidence that supports this factor, there remains a more significant degree of uncertainty. An ‘observation’ is a safety issue discovered as part of the investigation that is not considered to be causal or underlying to the event being investigated, but does deserve scrutiny because of a perceived potential for safety learning. The above terms are intended to assist readers’ interpretation of the report, and to provide suitable explanations where uncertainty remains. The report should therefore be interpreted as the view of the RAIB, expressed with the sole purpose of improving railway safety. The RAIB’s investigation (including its scope, methods, conclusions and recommendations) is independent of any inquest or fatal accident inquiry, and all other investigations, including those carried out by the safety authority, police or railway industry. Report 09/2017 May 2017 Balham This page is intentionally left blank Report 09/2017 4 May 2017 Balham Fatal accident involving a train passenger near Balham, 7 August 2016 Contents Preface 3 Summary 7 Introduction 8 Key definitions 8 The accident 9 Summary of the accident 9 Context 9 The sequence of events 14 Key facts and analysis 16 Identification of the immediate cause 16 Identification of causal factors 16 Identification of underlying factors 25 Management of the aftermath 27 Previous occurrences of a similar character 29 Summary of conclusions 31 Immediate cause 31 Causal factors 31 Underlying factors 31 Management of the aftermath 31 Previous RAIB recommendations relevant to this investigation 32 Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report 33 Actions reported that address factors which otherwise would have resulted in a RAIB recommendation 33 Other reported actions 34 Background to the RAIB’s recommendations 35 Recommendations and learning point 36 Recommendations 36 Learning point 37 Report 09/2017 5 May 2017 Balham Appendices 38 Appendix A - Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms 38 Appendix B - Glossary of terms 39 Appendix C - Investigation details 41 Report 09/2017 6 May 2017 Balham Summary Summary At about 17:24 hrs on Sunday 7 August 2016 a passenger, travelling on a Gatwick Express service from Gatwick Airport to London Victoria, suffered fatal injuries as a result of having his head out of a window and striking it on a signal gantry near Balham in south London. The train was travelling at about 61 mph (98 km/h) at the time of the accident. The window concerned was on a door opposite a guard’s compartment in the train; this door was accessible to passengers but it was not intended for passenger use. The RAIB has found no evidence to explain why the passenger put his head out of the window at that time. The accident occurred because the passenger’s head was out of the window, there was nothing to prevent passengers from opening the window or putting their head out of the opened window, and because there was less than the normal standard clearance between the train and the signal gantry. Although the clearance was compliant with standards for existing structures, it was less than an industry recommended minimum for new structures where there are trains with opening passenger windows. An underlying cause was that the process for assessing the compatibility of this train on this route did not identify the risk of the combination of reduced structure clearances and opening windows. The RAIB has made two recommendations and identified one learning point. One recommendation is addressed to Network Rail, and seeks to improve the industry’s management of the interacting risks between infrastructure and rolling stock. The second recommendation is addressed to relevant train operators with the intention of reducing the risk from people leaning out of opening train windows. The learning point reinforces the need for regular monitoring and management of structure clearances when those clearances are reduced from normal. Report 09/2017 7 May 2017 Balham Introduction Introduction Key definitions 1 Metric units are used in this report, except when it is normal railway practice to give speeds and locations in imperial units. Where appropriate the equivalent metric value is also given. 2 The report contains abbreviations and technical terms (shown in italics the first time they appear in the report). These are explained in appendices A and B. Sources of evidence used in the investigation are listed in appendix C. Report 09/2017 8 May 2017 Balham The accident Summary of the accident The accident 3 At about 17:24 hrs on Sunday 7 August 2016, a passenger travelling on the 17:05 hrs Gatwick Express service from Gatwick Airport to London Victoria suffered fatal head injuries as a result of having his head out of a window and striking it on a signal gantry on the cess side of the train approaching Balham junction in south London (figure 1). The train was travelling at about 61 mph (98 km/h) at the time of the accident. Location of accident © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. Department for Transport 100039241. RAIB 2017 Figure 1: Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of accident Context Location 4 The signal gantry is located at around 5 miles 12 chains1 on the line from London Victoria to Brighton (engineer’s line reference at this location is VTB1). The railway at this location comprises four tracks: the up and down Brighton fast lines, and the up and down Brighton slow lines (figure 2). 5 Signalling in this area is controlled by the Victoria Area Signalling Centre (ASC). 6 The train was travelling on the up Brighton fast line. The maximum permitted speed is 70 mph (113 km/h) at this point, reducing to 60 mph (97 km/h) shortly after the signal gantry. 1 Measured from a datum at London Victoria. Report 09/2017 9 May 2017 Balham The accident 7 In the direction of travel of the train, the gantry is located on a left-hand curve with a radius of 600 m. Wandsworth Common station Balham station aa a 1 a 1 ya aa a 2 ya aa a 2 a a a a a a V C 6 3 8 V V C C 6 6 4 3 3 T a 6 V C 6 4 1 D V o C V w 6 C U n 3 6 p 6 4 B B B 4 r ri 1 ay R ig g h h D t ton o o V n U w s sl C n lo o 6 p B w w 4 B r 2 r ig ig h h t to on n f fa a s st a t a a a ay T a Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the track layout Organisations involved 8 Gatwick Express is a trading name of Govia Thameslink Railway Limited (GTR), which is a subsidiary of Govia.