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Challenges of Real National Defence | Jonatan Vseviov | November 2018 Title: Challenges of Real Natonal Defence Author: Vseviov, Jonatan Publicaton date: November 2018 Cover page photo: SIIL 2015/ Estonian Defence Forces (pildid.mil.ee) Keywords: natonal defence; natonal security; Estonian Defence Forces; Estonian Defence League; NATO; allies; reservists; defence expenditure; mobilisaton Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its author and do not necessarily represent the ofcial policy or positon of the Internatonal Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisaton. Internatonal Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd., 10152 Tallinn, Estonia infoicds.ee, www.icds.ee Challenges of Real National Defence I 3) The most difcult part is that the deterree must believe that any crossing of the red line will invoke a reacton from the deterrer without hesitaton. There are two ways to send deterrent messages. The message we want to convey is supported by the standpoints we express – speeches, agreements, conversatons between diplomats – Introduction as well as our actons, which are at least equally important: military exercises, infrastructure and Natonal defence is a whole. In the course of other things happening in the physical world its development, a number of decisions may that indicate our intentons and capabilites. be taken which are right when taken separately Actons and words are part of internatonal but, as far as the big picture is concerned, lead communicaton – a dialogue in which partes try to a dead end. The result is hollow natonal to protect and further their interests with the defence that exhibits grand words and messages they send each other. structures, while either partally or completely lacking in real combat power. An inefectve In recent years, European security circles paper army is also useless for deterrence. have ofen discussed whether NATO’s relatons with Russia should focus An inefectve paper army is also useless for more on deterrence or dialogue. In reality, the choice is far from easy – deterrence deterrence presupposes the presence of a dialogue, yet not every type of In recent years, a comprehensive approach dialogue is useful for deterrence. has been taken to the development of natonal defence and the goal has been set If the goal is to maintain the stability of to develop real natonal defence, not just on internatonal relatons, the credibility of your paper. The following analysis will focus on the own and your potental opponent’s deterrent developments over recent years and future posture is everything. Weakening this is not challenges. necessarily in a country’s interests, as it may lead to dangerous destabilisaton. In order Estonian natonal defence is focused on the for two sides to coexist peacefully, both need deterrence of potental threats, but frst and to believe that peace is more proftable than Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine foremost on their preventon through the use of confict. This can only be believed as long as a convincing deterrent posture. Deterrence is a a country thinks it is capable of guaranteeing process in which one side tries to convince the its security during peacetme, primarily due other that taking a certain step is inadvisable, to confdence in its deterrent abilites. Losing as it would be detrimental to it. If one country that faith commonly leads to an atempt to wishes to prevent an armed confict with change the internatonal situaton rapidly and another, deterrence does not need to convince fundamentally, ofen by military means. a potental atacker that the atack would fail – it is sufcient for the atacker to believe that Of course, creatng a convincing deterrent the cost of even a successful atack would in posture in practce is complicated and needs the end prove higher than the value of the constant adjustment, including in areas that desired goal. This constant message-sending may seem simple at frst glance. For instance, is called a deterrent posture and comprises, in let us consider the “red line”. NATO member general, three important components: states have promised to collectvely protect 1) It must be clear to everybody what is being one other; driving tanks over the NATO border prevented – what is the red line that must would therefore obviously be a clear violaton not be crossed, and what would happen of the red line. What about cyber-atacks? when it is. Or using chemical weapons to kill a single 2) Everyone must believe that the deterrer has individual in a NATO member state? What the capability to cause sufcient harm to should be our reacton then, and how do we the aggressor if the red line is crossed. make sure everyone understands it even before Challenges of Real National Defence 1 the atack is commited? Or if not before, how to support its allies when necessary. I will do we ensure they will in the future? elaborate on this later; however, here it must be stressed that a common misconcepton – These are just a handful of questons people that a government needs the consent of other involved in natonal defence tackle every day, member states to fulfl its obligatons under in Estonia and abroad. This is also why it is the North Atlantc Treaty and come to the help wrong to think that a country does not use the of an ally in trouble – is not true. And naturally, armed forces it has acquired and developed no ally needs the consent of others to ofer in peacetme, as if everything acquired for military assistance to its own troops who are natonal defence were an insurance policy that already in Estonia. The deterrent capability of would hopefully never see any practcal use. On NATO’s collectve defence is, therefore, not the contrary – each weapon and serviceman diminished by the organisaton’s dependence is used for deterrence, every day. If it is done on consensus between allies. well, there will be no war. The NATO treaty is intentonally vague Each weapon and serviceman is used for when it comes to defning an atack and allies’ reacton to it, leaving plenty deterrence, every day. If it is done well, of room for interpretaton. More clarity there will be no war comes from everyday actvites and constantly communicated messages: defence starts right at the border; the reacton is collectve and, if necessary, 1. The Structure of efected by a coaliton of the willing. However, these messages can only be communicated if Estonia’s Deterrent speeches and declaratons are accompanied Posture by a physically extant, real defence capability. A few years ago, both Estonia’s independent Estonia’s natonal defence – and, of course, and collectve defence capabilites existed its deterrent posture – consists of two pillars: only on paper, at best. Today, the situaton has an independent defence capability (or the changed. capabilites we develop ourselves), and NATO’s collectve defence or the knowledge that we are not alone in defending the country. These pillars 2. Realistic Plans functon together and depend on each other. Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine I will start by exploring Estonia’s independent For deterrence to work, the potentally hostle defence capability and the equipment, opponent must believe that an atack on manpower and supplies that consttute it. Estonia would be followed by an immediate, substantal reacton. An immediate response In 2012, Estonia began work on its next ten- would frstly derive from Estonia’s own military year plan, the Natonal Defence Development capabilites. Their aim is, among other things, Plan (NDDP) 2013–2022. For the frst tme, to ensure that there would be a reacton to an this used a methodology that, in additon to atack so that the atacker would not be able describing threats and military needs, also took quietly to accomplish its aggressive goals. into account the costs of the capabilites. This plan accounted for not only the purchase price However, Estonia does not stand alone in of the weapon systems, but also maintenance, natonal defence; this message must be which forms the main part of a capability’s conveyed by the presence of allied forces and cost. This methodology has now taken root their integraton into Estonia’s own capabilites. and become the norm. This presence must be smart; bigger is not always beter. The frst steps in capability planning focus on threat scenarios and the capabilites necessary That the reacton would indeed be substantal for neutralising threats. Next, a thorough audit is demonstrated by NATO through the of existng capabilites is conducted, afer development of extensive military capabilites which the costs of both existng and potental Challenges of Real National Defence 2 new capabilites are calculated. Finally, possible weapons and equipment were thinly stretched solutons are tested in war games, afer which between numerous structural units. it is tme to make choices – not between necessary and unnecessary, but between How did Estonia get into that positon? There required capabilites. The queston is therefore were a number of reasons, the three most not only what is needed to protect Estonia, important of which were as follows. but also what can realistcally be created and maintained with the resources allocated for First, Estonia had broken the cardinal rule natonal defence. of military capability creaton: its structure and ambiton considerably exceeded realistc In discussion in 2012 of threat scenarios capabilites, and instead of developing and military capabilites arising therefrom, something afordable it tried to do everything no signifcant diferences from earlier plans at once. The same recipe had been used before emerged. Neither did the threats and military in other countries, and will doubtless be used requirements difer much from the plans that in the future, always with the same outcome were in place at the tme, providing for tanks, – a hollow structure and units that are not medium-range air defence and helicopters, combat ready.

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