Challenges of Real National Defence

| Jonatan Vseviov | November 2018 Title: Challenges of Real Natonal Defence Author: Vseviov, Jonatan Publicaton date: November 2018

Cover page photo: SIIL 2015/ Estonian (pildid.mil.ee)

Keywords: natonal defence; natonal security; ; ; NATO; allies; reservists; defence expenditure; mobilisaton

Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its author and do not necessarily represent the ofcial policy or positon of the Internatonal Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisaton.

Internatonal Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Rd., 10152 , infoicds.ee, www.icds.ee

Challenges of Real National Defence I 3) The most difcult part is that the deterree must believe that any crossing of the red line will invoke a reacton from the deterrer without hesitaton. There are two ways to send deterrent messages. The message we want to convey is supported by the standpoints we express – speeches, agreements, conversatons between diplomats – Introduction as well as our actons, which are at least equally important: exercises, infrastructure and Natonal defence is a whole. In the course of other things happening in the physical world its development, a number of decisions may that indicate our intentons and capabilites. be taken which are right when taken separately Actons and words are part of internatonal but, as far as the big picture is concerned, lead communicaton – a dialogue in which partes try to a dead end. The result is hollow natonal to protect and further their interests with the defence that exhibits grand words and messages they send each other. structures, while either partally or completely lacking in real combat power. An inefectve In recent years, European security circles paper army is also useless for deterrence. have ofen discussed whether NATO’s relatons with Russia should focus An inefectve paper army is also useless for more on deterrence or dialogue. In reality, the choice is far from easy – deterrence deterrence presupposes the presence of a dialogue, yet not every type of In recent years, a comprehensive approach dialogue is useful for deterrence. has been taken to the development of natonal defence and the goal has been set If the goal is to maintain the stability of to develop real natonal defence, not just on internatonal relatons, the credibility of your paper. The following analysis will focus on the own and your potental opponent’s deterrent developments over recent years and future posture is everything. Weakening this is not challenges. necessarily in a country’s interests, as it may lead to dangerous destabilisaton. In order Estonian natonal defence is focused on the for two sides to coexist peacefully, both need deterrence of potental threats, but frst and to believe that peace is more proftable than Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine foremost on their preventon through the use of confict. This can only be believed as long as a convincing deterrent posture. Deterrence is a a country thinks it is capable of guaranteeing process in which one side tries to convince the its security during peacetme, primarily due other that taking a certain step is inadvisable, to confdence in its deterrent abilites. Losing as it would be detrimental to it. If one country that faith commonly leads to an atempt to wishes to prevent an armed confict with change the internatonal situaton rapidly and another, deterrence does not need to convince fundamentally, ofen by military means. a potental atacker that the atack would fail – it is sufcient for the atacker to believe that Of course, creatng a convincing deterrent the cost of even a successful atack would in posture in practce is complicated and needs the end prove higher than the value of the constant adjustment, including in areas that desired goal. This constant message-sending may seem simple at frst glance. For instance, is called a deterrent posture and comprises, in let us consider the “red line”. NATO member , three important components: states have promised to collectvely protect 1) It must be clear to everybody what is being one other; driving tanks over the NATO border prevented – what is the red line that must would therefore obviously be a clear violaton not be crossed, and what would happen of the red line. What about cyber-atacks? when it is. Or using chemical weapons to kill a single 2) Everyone must believe that the deterrer has individual in a NATO member state? What the capability to cause sufcient harm to should be our reacton then, and how do we the aggressor if the red line is crossed. make sure everyone understands it even before

Challenges of Real National Defence 1 the atack is commited? Or if not before, how to support its allies when necessary. I will do we ensure they will in the future? elaborate on this later; however, here it must be stressed that a common misconcepton – These are just a handful of questons people that a government needs the consent of other involved in natonal defence tackle every day, member states to fulfl its obligatons under in Estonia and abroad. This is also why it is the North Atlantc Treaty and come to the help wrong to think that a country does not use the of an ally in trouble – is not true. And naturally, armed forces it has acquired and developed no ally needs the consent of others to ofer in peacetme, as if everything acquired for military assistance to its own troops who are natonal defence were an insurance policy that already in Estonia. The deterrent capability of would hopefully never see any practcal use. On NATO’s collectve defence is, therefore, not the contrary – each weapon and serviceman diminished by the organisaton’s dependence is used for deterrence, every day. If it is done on consensus between allies. well, there will be no war. The NATO treaty is intentonally vague Each weapon and serviceman is used for when it comes to defning an atack and allies’ reacton to it, leaving plenty deterrence, every day. If it is done well, of room for interpretaton. More clarity there will be no war comes from everyday actvites and constantly communicated messages: defence starts right at the border; the reacton is collectve and, if necessary, 1. The Structure of efected by a coaliton of the willing. However, these messages can only be communicated if Estonia’s Deterrent speeches and declaratons are accompanied Posture by a physically extant, real defence capability. A few years ago, both Estonia’s independent Estonia’s natonal defence – and, of course, and collectve defence capabilites existed its deterrent posture – consists of two pillars: only on paper, at best. Today, the situaton has an independent defence capability (or the changed. capabilites we develop ourselves), and NATO’s collectve defence or the knowledge that we are not alone in defending the country. These pillars 2. Realistic Plans functon together and depend on each other. Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine I will start by exploring Estonia’s independent For deterrence to work, the potentally hostle defence capability and the equipment, opponent must believe that an atack on manpower and supplies that consttute it. Estonia would be followed by an immediate, substantal reacton. An immediate response In 2012, Estonia began work on its next ten- would frstly derive from Estonia’s own military year plan, the Natonal Defence Development capabilites. Their aim is, among other things, Plan (NDDP) 2013–2022. For the frst tme, to ensure that there would be a reacton to an this used a methodology that, in additon to atack so that the atacker would not be able describing threats and military needs, also took quietly to accomplish its aggressive goals. into account the costs of the capabilites. This plan accounted for not only the purchase price However, Estonia does not stand alone in of the weapon systems, but also maintenance, natonal defence; this message must be which forms the main part of a capability’s conveyed by the presence of allied forces and cost. This methodology has now taken root their integraton into Estonia’s own capabilites. and become the norm. This presence must be smart; bigger is not always beter. The frst steps in capability planning focus on threat scenarios and the capabilites necessary That the reacton would indeed be substantal for neutralising threats. Next, a thorough audit is demonstrated by NATO through the of existng capabilites is conducted, afer development of extensive military capabilites which the costs of both existng and potental

Challenges of Real National Defence 2 new capabilites are calculated. Finally, possible weapons and equipment were thinly stretched solutons are tested in war games, afer which between numerous structural units. it is tme to make choices – not between necessary and unnecessary, but between How did Estonia get into that positon? There required capabilites. The queston is therefore were a number of reasons, the three most not only what is needed to protect Estonia, important of which were as follows. but also what can realistcally be created and maintained with the resources allocated for First, Estonia had broken the cardinal rule natonal defence. of military capability creaton: its structure and ambiton considerably exceeded realistc In discussion in 2012 of threat scenarios capabilites, and instead of developing and military capabilites arising therefrom, something afordable it tried to do everything no signifcant diferences from earlier plans at once. The same recipe had been used before emerged. Neither did the threats and military in other countries, and will doubtless be used requirements difer much from the plans that in the future, always with the same outcome were in place at the tme, providing for tanks, – a hollow structure and units that are not medium-range air defence and helicopters, combat ready. When Estonia’s Natonal Audit and a total of over 40,000 personnel in the Ofce reviewed the earlier period in 2013 it, army by 2018. too, came to the conclusion that the Estonian Defence Forces had no realistc long-term The diferences appeared in the next phase, goals, agreed priorites or approved long-term when we considered the current structure. It procurement plans for planning and procuring was depressing: not a single unit of the Estonian material resources. Defence Forces was combat-ready and every unit was undermanned. Estonian Defence Forces had no realistc As far as equipment was concerned, ammuniton and communicaton tools long-term goals, agreed priorites or were in the most critcal conditon, approved long-term procurement plans for but there were also extensive shortcomings in transport capability. planning and procuring material resources Combat engineering technology was almost non-existent. Many existng weapons The second reason lies in the specifcs of systems were not in working order, and there Estonia’s reserve forces and the sensitvity of were no resources to improve the situaton. The informaton about them. To be precise, most Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine handheld frearms and machine guns purchased of Estonia’s units consist of reserve forces, and in the early 1990s were beginning to show signs if brigade-size and larger exercises such as SIIL of wear and tear, but there were no realistc were not organised, nobody would know that plans to replace them. Ant-tank equipment had most units did not even have enough personal become obsolete. Most of the largest (155mm) equipment for every soldier, let alone more artllery did not work; the Artllery Batalion had complex systems. The exact situaton concerning never fred all its weapons at the same tme weapons and ammuniton is a state secret. This (the frst tme it managed this was in 2015); the means that when there is no will or skill, there is navy’s fagship was unable to leave its berth; also no public pressure to maintain a real army the air force base in Ämari could not host allied – a paper army will do, and it stll manages to be aircraf; conscripts lived in run-down barracks. quite impressive in a parade. The list went on and on. Third, strategic planning must be comprehen- A quick calculaton made it clear that the sive. Every need must be weighed up, together structures in place, let alone future plans, were with optons for addressing them; it can then not achievable with the defence expenditure be decided what to develop and what not target at the tme (2% of gross domestc product on the basis of available funding. If every (GDP), which had not then been achieved); queston is approached separately, there is the neither would it have been possible with 3% risk that the capability need currently most or 4%. Money was being spent, but it did not prominent on the agenda is developed to result in combat-ready units, since inadequate world-class quality levels, using up all available

Challenges of Real National Defence 3 resources, while other areas are lef completely As part of four-year plans, all wartme units’ unatended. As military capability is a whole, supplies are thoroughly examined, how they the end result in this case stll comes to nought – difer from requirements is checked at the even the world’s best weapons system is useless level of every individual piece of equipment, without ammuniton and trained personnel. and every single requirement and cost item Since military capability does not develop is accounted for. Thus, keeping an eye on the overnight, comprehensive strategic planning actual situaton and desired goals, decisions must also include a long-term vision. are made on how to use the defence budget for the next four years. This is also an important means to ensure clarity and Even the world’s best weapons system is transparency – with detailed planning, useless without ammuniton and trained specifc choices and ability to perform personnel them mater, and there is no room for empty dreams in such conditons.

When compiling the ten-year plan in 2012 Taking control of resources made it possible to the choices were either to contnue with a supply units in a focused manner. Substantal hollow paper army or to actually start creatng ammuniton procurement began, and the independent operatonal defence capability. Five decision was made to spend a total of over 500 years afer the Bronze Night revolt, four years million euros from Estonia’s defence budget on afer the Russo-Georgian war and three years ammuniton in 2013–22. This is ten tmes more afer the frst large-scale post-Cold War military than in 2002–11. We managed to convince exercise near Estonia’s border (Zapad), it was our allies that our plans were realistc, which obvious that the later was the correct choice. is why this procurement from Estonia’s budget was signifcantly boosted by the US. Those 500 In order to ensure real defence capability with million euros could have been used to buy proper equipment, personnel and guaranteed plenty of things that look great in a parade but supplies, the structure had to be brought into are useless in combat. In 2012, however, we line with what was actually possible. To reduce chose real combat readiness. the chances of returning to a hollow paper army, defence planning was made more systematc and transparent, which is Those 500 million euros could have been also useful in avoiding demagogy and beatng around the bush: just talking used to buy plenty of things that look great Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine about engaging in practcal capability in a parade but are useless in combat development is the fastest way to return to defence incapability. Developing military capabilites takes tme, Alongside making realistc plans and establish- ofen many years, but (without revealing any ing a structure conforming to them, the plans state secrets) the results of some choices made had to be realised. This meant that the in 2012 can already be seen. The frst large- resources used daily had to be brought under scale SIIL military exercise was organised in control, and detailed budgets, acton planning 2015, involving the entre 1st Infantry Brigade and management systems introduced. (as well as some parts of other units); in the past, this would have been impossible due While ten-year plans identfying broad goals to lack of equipment alone. In 2018, the next are prepared every four years, daily resources SIIL exercise took place, this tme focusing are managed by the Ministry of Defence using on personnel from the Estonian Defence four-year plans that are compiled each year. A League’s territorial forces. This, too, would four-year plan does not ask what kind of army have been impossible in the past. Since 2016, we need and can aford, since it gets those the readiness of wartme units has been tested directons from the ten-year plan. However, at unannounced additonal training exercises – four-year plans decide how every cent in the these too will be discussed in more detail later, defence budget should be used on procurement, but I underline here that the preconditon of infrastructure and staf. randomly selected unit gatherings is naturally

Challenges of Real National Defence 4 the availability of equipment for them. If Compared to 2012, every aspect of the current the choices made in 2012 had not been Estonian independent defence capability implemented, the additonal training exercises is completely diferent, giving Estonia the would have been impossible. opportunity to actually use its capabilites should the need arise. Volume of ammunion procurements, without foreign aid

600 536.9 3. Is Estonian 500 National Defence

400 Adequately Funded?

300 In recent years, the media have repeatedly published opinion pieces statng that Estonia’s 200 army is too small; that it lacks capacity in 100 48.4 the air and on the sea; that, without tanks, armoured forces lack manoeuvrability; that 0 not enough self-propelled artllery units 2002–2011 2012–2022 have been purchased. Are these opinions substantated? Yes, they are! Our army is small, The Natonal Audit Ofce of Estonia has evaluated no doubt about it – you can ask any defence the development of the defence feld and in planner or serving high-ranking ofcer. We 2017 concluded that “the NDDP 2013–2022 agree! With the current budget, it is possible to has been one of the best examples of aligning rethink priorites or tghten a few belts to take long-term objectves with available means, thus opportunites elsewhere, and it is also possible, allowing its gradual implementaton”. It also to some extent, to be more economical with found that “[t]he level of stafng and equipment the current defence budget. But the big picture of the Defence Forces’ units has improved in is that Estonia can only develop greater combat comparison to 2012 – mostly in conformity with power if the defence budget is increased. the tmelines set out in NDDP 2013–2022. The stafng and equipment of war-tme structures The size of the defence budget is a mater … has improved in almost all units over the last of politcal choice, made by individuals who four years.” have received a mandate from the people for that purpose. In order for the choice to be Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine Hence, Estonia is developing a real operatonal reasonable, it must be informed. However, independent defence capability. If we can when it comes to the choices involved in the contnue to stck to these plans, then by 2022 defence budget, the problem is that detailed Estonia will have a completely armed, equipped data in the feld (especially its current status) is and supplied army with approximately a state secret, which does not facilitate public 21,000 troops, which by 2026 should grow debate. by an additonal two batalions and several companies, i.e. to around 25,000 troops; Some basic truths are stll publicly available in the largest components of Estonia’s defence a somewhat generalised way: for example, the forces are to be two combat-ready brigades queston whether our defence budget is big and territorial forces; the Scouts Batalion will enough in comparison to other NATO states. be equipped with modern infantry combat vehicles; the air defence of both brigades will For years, Estonia has basked in the knowledge have been comprehensively developed; and that, at 2% of GDP, it is among the top NATO ant-tank units are to be state-of-the-art. Self- defence spenders. The problem with this propelled artllery is on the way and both this reasoning is twofold – frst, the NATO 2% club and other systems providing indirect fre should has rapidly begun to increase and while last be operatonal. And – most importantly – the year Estonia had only three other allies to entre structure of the Estonian Defence Forces keep it company, it is expected that in a few will be equipped with at least the minimum years the club will comprise at least half of the required amount of ammuniton. member states. The symbolic separaton from

Challenges of Real National Defence 5 the “low spenders” on defence is beginning to equipped defence force. One possibility is to fade; but this is an image problem, not related equip units with beter-quality weapons, which to actual defence capability development. means beter frepower, mobility and defence. The second opton is to increase the A percentage does not buy a single missile, number of units, with more troops than in the current two brigades and armoured vehicle or radar. Procurement, territorial force units. We won’t even infrastructure development and recruitment discuss a credible naval, air force and are done with euros (and sometmes dollars) cyber capability here. Given Estonia’s locaton and the Second, a specifc proporton of GDP does personnel trained during conscripton, the not infuence actual defence capability, since country could easily spend 3%, 4% or even a percentage does not buy a single missile, 5% of its GDP on defence without having to armoured vehicle or radar. Procurement, worry that it is creatng unnecessary or useless infrastructure development and recruitment capabilites for natonal defence. Of course, the are done with euros (and sometmes dollars). Defence Forces’ military assessment is crucial In other words, in developing defence capability when it comes to deciding what to create and only the absolute value maters. However, in in what order, but the size of the funds available absolute terms, Estonia has one of the smallest is a mater of politcal choice. defence budgets in NATO. In 2018 it is also the smallest in the entre Baltc region. Only four The tme-critcal nature of the debate NATO member states spend less on defence: concerning the size of the defence budget is , , and . also caused by another uncomfortable fact. However, the territory Estonia needs to protect That is, with the current “2%” defence budget, using those funds is larger than , the Estonia’s independent defence capability or Switzerland – not to menton its will peak in 2026, afer which it will rapidly more difcult geographic locaton. decrease. The reason for this lies in the rapid The Ministry of Defence and the Estonian infaton conventonally associated with the Defence Forces have naturally calculated the defence feld – in other words, when the tme funds needed to create a bigger and beter- comes to replace weapons systems, one has

NATO defence expenditure in 2018 Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine

UK FR

IT US DE

CA

NO BE TR NL GR PT CZ

RO HU SK LT ES PL DK BG LV EE HR SI LU

Challenges of Real National Defence 6 to take into consideraton much higher prices. are mostly replaced by younger recruits, With Europe’s growing defence budgets, the although in the case of some specialites and secondary market for equipment is constantly other special cases wartme units may include shrinking, which means that, when replacing reservists with much longer experience. equipment that was purchased pre-owned, Infantry batalions in Estonia usually only have a handful of actve (professional) If Estonia wants to maintain the level reached servicemen in certain positons; most of the leading positons (platoon and by 2026 or even surpass it, the defence squad commanders) are flled by budget will have to involve a consistently reservists, not to menton other ranks. Estonia is thus completely dependent higher proporton of GDP than at present on an efectve mobilisaton system.

Estonia must take into account both the need Mobilisaton capability begins with the right to purchase new systems and their much mindset: an understanding shared by the higher prices in the future. This is a fact, not a Defence Forces, the top of the Ministry of prognosis; the efects of defence infaton can Defence, natonal leaders and society as a whole already be seen. about the critcal importance of mobilisaton. In This means that, if Estonia wants to maintain additon, mobilisaton can only succeed if four the level reached by 2026 or even surpass it, the important preconditons are met. defence budget will have to involve a consistently higher proporton of GDP than at present. Since the creaton of Estonia is thus completely dependent on an military capabilites takes tme, it is efectve mobilisaton system high tme that these discussions begin.

First, the Defence Forces and every actve service- 4. Mobilisation man and woman therein must be completely focused on performing their war-tme tasks: The material supplies of Estonia’s units are only proper preparaton, training and planning. This one component of an independent defence may sound obvious, but far from it: in a situaton capability. The queston whether and how where one’s unit is in reserve but daily life keeps fast the army can be mobilised to begin tmely throwing countless bureaucratc challenges defence is at least equally relevant. in the way, the risk of losing wartme focus is Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine signifcant. Just a few years ago, many actve An independent defence capability must service personnel did not even know what their actvate immediately or it simply will not work, positons would be in wartme, so deeply rooted either independently or as a startng point for was the focus on peacetme bureaucracy. collectve defence. A schoolboy can be late for a few classes and stll graduate successfully, as The mater was further complicated by did the protagonist in the Estonian novel Spring Estonia’s legal space: the Defence Forces did by Oskar Luts; being late for a war to defend have a wartme structure, but it was scatered Estonia will not have such a good outcome. across three diferent documents (one of them classifed), and even understanding the The Estonian Defence Forces are a reserve Defence Forces’ actual (wartme) organigram army. This means that Estonian troops are needed all of them to be read in parallel. One’s not the current uniform-wearing conscripts – success as a member of the Defence Forces those are units in training – but the men and (or any other organisaton) presupposes an women we see in the streets, at shopping understanding of one’s role as a member and centres and elsewhere: lawyers and teachers, the ability to place one’s actvity in a wider builders, cooks and drivers, real estate agents context. Only then can initatve and target- and musicians, farmers and actors. Personnel based leadership be assumed. trained during conscripton remain in the reserve of the Defence Forces’ rapid response In order to improve the situaton, the logic of units for three to six years, afer which they the Defence Forces’ structure has now been

Challenges of Real National Defence 7 altered – in late spring this year, the Estonian of communicaton – especially social media – parliament () approved a legislatve provide new possibilites for keeping in contact amendment, and subsequent changes to with reservists. lower-level documents established a single structure for the Defence Forces, and all However, reservist awareness and the actve service personnel have been appointed proper functoning of the mobilisaton wartme positons and are expected to focus system as a whole can be no longer taken for mostly on preparing for their wartme tasks. granted without constant practce. Since the Natonal Defence Act entered into force on For the Defence Forces to be able to organise 1 January 2016, additonal reservist training military planning, actve service personnel (unannounced assemblies for individuals in cannot have their hands ted when it comes reserve) may be organised for monitoring and to the supportng bureaucracy. Only service practsing mobilisaton readiness. Given the personnel who have received proper training key role that mobilisaton plays in Estonia’s and experience can prepare military plans, lead natonal defence system, it is strange that this military units and perform military training. opton was made legally possible only a quarter However, the daily peacetme routne consists of a century afer regaining independence, and of many other actvites necessary for the on the initatve of ofcials from the Ministry functoning of the Defence Forces – someone of Defence, but it’s a good thing it now exists. has to build, heat and clean barracks, organise defence procurement, guard buildings etc. All Naturally, a legal right alone is not enough. of this can ofen be done by civilians. In fact, In a way, laws are like development plans – if the less tme actve service personnel have to not implemented, even the best are of no use. spend on support actvites, the more they can Additonal reservist training has now been spend on military ones. tested in practce three tmes: once with one Support and Signal Batalion Company and a Many of these support functons are now territorial defence company, second with the covered by civilian organisatons under the entre 1st Infantry Brigade batalion, and third Ministry of Defence. Procurement, infra- with one air force company. structure and maintenance have been moved under the responsibility of the Centre for Organising additonal reservist training is Defence Investment; recruitng actve service critcally important for a number of reasons. personnel and calling up conscripts, and First, it is the only real opportunity to test actual keeping count of civil supplies necessary for defence readiness and discover shortcomings Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine mobilisaton, is now the task of the Defence and learn from them. Second, it is the best way Resources Agency; introducing Estonian military to check actual communicaton with reservists history and tasks concerning war graves were and to ensure reservist awareness. Third, passed to the Estonian War Museum. Naturally, routne additonal reservist training exercises this arrangement can only work if the Ministry involve the entre politcal establishment: every of Defence can guarantee the daily coordinaton exercise so far has been organised without the of the organisatons under its jurisdicton – if prior knowledge of the ministry, the general things are procured without the Defence Forces’ staf or the government. This means that every advice, or unnecessary people are recruited, tme the exercises have taken place, all these the whole system will soon collapse. Of course, insttutons practsed procedures that must this area also needs further development: work fawlessly in tmes of crisis. the Defence Forces stll (sometmes a litle excessively) play a part in the realisaton of Additonal reservist training must become support functons. as normal a part of the natonal defence system as the annual call for conscript service, The second important preconditon for a which comes as a surprise to nobody and successful mobilisaton is reservist awareness is an ordinary part of the routne. We are of tasks and the Defence Forces’ capability to moving in that directon. The frst additonal quickly summon units even while communicatng reservist training made front-page news, but with every reservist individually. The frst steps the second and third didn’t. This is the way it are being taken in this feld. Modern means has to be: additonal training is nothing out of

Challenges of Real National Defence 8 the ordinary, either for the people preparing civilian sector. This applies to some combat the decisions or making them, organising the engineer equipment (tractors, excavators) and training or partcipatng in it. other heavy-duty vehicles, but also tmber and other consumables, as well as some However, the three success stories are no services – mobilised service personnel can be reason to rest on our laurels; we can be truly transported swifly from primary rendezvous satsfed only when every reservist in the points by buses and drivers from peacetme rapid-response structures partcipates in at intercity lines. This is the point of the Natonal least one additonal training session during Defence Dutes Act (which entered into force in his reserve service in additon to one normal 1995), but getng the corresponding system to training exercise announced well in advance. work requires more than a law. This means the Defence Forces need to organise several pieces of additonal training First, the exact needs of the Defence Forces for reserves every year. must be identfed, and it must be checked whether the country has the necessary In that sense, a paper army is more convenient provisions. It must then be decided when it would be appropriate to enter – reservists are lef in peace and there are into wartme supply contracts with no noisy exercises. But no defence capability, private enterprises, and when defence dutes should be enforced. According either to the law, the government will then approve the summary plan of natonal Naturally, additonal reservist training is defence dutes that lists every item taken on in demanding, frst and foremost for reservists tmes of crisis. and their families. However, as long as Estonia’s independent defence capability is based The frst tme the Estonian government on a reserve army, real capability requires approved such a summary plan was in 2016 additonal training for them. In that sense, a – over 20 years afer the act had entered into paper army is more convenient – reservists are force. However, the master plan alone is not lef in peace and there are no noisy exercises. enough. Property owners must be notfed, But no defence capability, either. operatonal informaton systems must be created and the entre procedure should be The third important preconditon for a constantly practsed, like additonal reservist successful mobilisaton is the preparaton training. This work is ongoing. Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine of the Defence Forces, especially the proper storage of equipment and the capability to provide incoming reservists with equipment 5. Human Resources and weapons, in order to move out from rendezvous points to the feld as soon as Reservists can only come together in the possible. This preparedness does not happen case of a mobilisaton if they exist in the frst automatcally – constant practce is the key place. Here, Estonia’s natonal defence system here as well. This is why it is important that the appears simple at frst glance: the consttuton aforementoned additonal reservist training states that all citzens of Estonia have a duty takes place and that actve service personnel to partcipate in natonal defence; other laws focus on wartme tasks. specify that compulsory conscript service applies to male citzens. The fourth preconditon concerns the involvement of civilian resources. A reserve What is it, then, that Estonia is really asking army that wants to be capable of a rapid for from the individuals liable to the natonal response must have the majority of equipment defence obligaton when it comes to natonal ready at hand, but there is also plenty of defence? First, 8–11 months of their tme equipment that the army does not need to to complete conscript service, as a result of maintain constantly, since it is much simpler which a citzen is trained to be a soldier, non- (and ultmately cheaper for society) to use commissioned ofcer or ofcer; these are in wartme what is already available in the then formed into a unit. For most people,

Challenges of Real National Defence 9 conscript service ends afer completng the men subject to conscript service in a partcular annual Kevadtorm training exercise, when they year actually atend it. Voluntary conscripton become reservists. Even though actve reserve for women is gaining popularity and support, service usually lasts for a shorter tme for but the number of women in conscript service the wartme units of the Defence Forces, the remains marginal. This means that the general law states that a citzen who has completed natonal defence duty is a real obligaton for conscript service remains in reserve, and less than one-sixth of the populaton. therefore a member of the natonal defence system, untl the age of 60. This is neither fair nor sustainable. If a reservist must appear at his or her unit’s assembly point However, this is not all. For independent in a crisis, abandoning family, work, friends defence to work, Estonia expects its citzens and hobbies, it is hard to explain to them why who have fulflled their civic duty and most of their peers, class- and course-mates completed conscript service to be ready to will probably not have to do the same. As the partcipate in additonal reservist training saying goes, it doesn’t mater who you have at any given moment. What is even more to face when you know who’s standing next to important, Estonia also wants the same citzen you. The uniform natonal defence duty works to be ready to come to additonal reservist on the principle that everyone stands by our training exercises or respond to mobilisaton reservists. In practce this is not so, since only when our security is under real threat, when a minority of each year’s call-up selectees war may break out. The country also wants the actually atend service. Why is that? citzen to be prepared to fght bravely in that war as part of their unit. For years, the small number of people atending conscript service was blamed on the poor health At any given tme, the Estonian Defence Forces of young Estonian men. This was untrue then and have 13,000 conscript-trained reservists in it is untrue now. First, conscript service must be armed, equipped and rapid-response wartme and increasingly is fexible enough to allow (with units; by 2026, this number will grow by a few small exceptons) almost everyone to atend it. thousand; there are also territorial defence There is no desire or need to train an entre units manned by the Defence League, and army of Rambos. If a large majority of Estonia’s actve service personnel. This is Estonia’s young men are able to obtain lower secondary army. These are the people who are asked, to educaton, there are no reasons why almost the paraphrase Winston Churchill, to be the few to same proporton could not atend compulsory whom so much is owed by so many, and we conscript service. Second, telling the Estonian Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine substantate this with a general obligaton – public for years that the new generatons of something everyone must contribute to, as the males are weak and sickly is simply wrong and consttuton demands. undermines society’s confdence.

Of course, practce is very far from theory. For In order to have a sustainable conscript service- years now, only about a third of the young based reserve army, this situaton needs to

No. of acve serviceman 3500 3250 3000 2750 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018

Challenges of Real National Defence 10 change; for a system based on general duty to approach should be extended to all reservists contnue, the duty itself must become either who have completed conscript service. common or at least widespread. We are moving in that directon, but there is stll a long way to go. Third, we have reduced the number of legal optons for evading conscript service. Telling the Estonian public for years that A long tme ago, even acquiring higher educaton exempted one, but this is the new generatons of males are weak no longer the case. In 2017, health and sickly is simply wrong and undermines requirements were jointly reviewed with doctors, and a number of obsolete society’s confdence and unnecessary disqualifcatons were removed. Let me start with resources. In 2017, a new NDDP was approved, with which it was decided The work of the medical commitees in the to raise the number of conscripts from the Defence Resources Agency (KRA) has also been current 3,200 per year to 4,000. Combined with made more efectve, making it harder to abuse demographic trends this means that, from 2022, the system. Just a few years ago it was possible instead of the current one-third, some 60% of a to evade conscript service by convincing the year’s young call-ups (and, it is to be hoped, a KRA’s medical assessment commitee of one’s growing number of young women) will atend mental instability. At the same tme, a person conscript service. For this purpose, additonal who had evaded conscript service due to barracks and a growing supply of instructors for mental health could stll, for example, apply service personnel will be needed (the number for a weapon licence by proving their mental of actve service personnel in Estonia has stability to the Police and Border Guard Board. constantly increased, but must increase even faster; see Table 1). At the same tme, a person who had evaded

Second, society must show much conscript service due to mental health could greater appreciaton for people in stll, for example, apply for a weapon licence conscript service and in reserve. Given the contributon expected of by proving their mental stability to the Police reservists, their current role in society and Border Guard Board is embarrassingly underappreciated. It has been decided that, from 2018, people We may have an e-state, but the right hand Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine who have completed conscript service will didn’t know what the lef was doing. Thanks receive a certfcate and a badge confrming the to the KRA now joining the e-health portal, the fact; the role of reservists will receive greater possibility of that happening is much smaller. emphasis in public, similar to how, a few years ago, an appreciaton campaign was initated for Another inescapable aspect of appreciatng veterans of the Estonian Defence Forces. Much reservist service is society’s condemnaton can now be done in cooperaton with the heads of illegal conscript service evasion. It is like of enterprises and natonal authorites, who paying taxes – honest taxpayers are recognised could set the completon of conscript service by raising awareness, while tax evaders are as a possible criterion for preference when condemned. However, untl recently, both deciding between otherwise equal candidates public condemnaton and government sanctons for employment. This is useful for the businesses were mild in relaton to illegal conscript service and insttutons, as completed conscript service evasion: the evader had to pay moderate fnes frst and foremost speaks of a person’s sense of untl turning 27 (afer which people are no duty, courage and consistency. longer called up for service). This means that a few thousand euros are enough to buy freedom Several companies already provide discounts from an obligaton that will send honest citzens on their goods and services to partcipants in to batle in a crisis. the large-scale training exercise SIIL, thereby showing their respect for reservists and at the An even cheaper way to evade one’s dutes same tme improving the company’s image. This illegally is to “hide” and not receive the summons

Challenges of Real National Defence 11 from the KRA and the Defence Forces. In an the number of women in conscript service e-state, this is of course absurd – one natonal could not signifcantly increase. insttuton is searching for a citzen to hand him a summons to appear at the medical assessment It is to be hoped that these measures will soon commitee and cannot reach him, while another create a situaton where completng conscript (e.g. the Estonian Road Administraton) issues service is the norm, not an excepton. This him a driver’s licence, or the Estonian Tax and way the current general duty-based natonal Customs Board returns excess income tax. That defence system will achieve a much more this kind of selectve hide-and-seek is possible certain sustainability. is a mater concerning not just natonal defence but the credibility of the entre state. 6. Collective Defence From the summer of 2018, the frst of these problems has been resolved. By a large Estonia’s deterrent posture can functon majority, the Riigikogu voted to change the comprehensively if real independent defence law so that systemic evaders of conscript capability is supplemented by real NATO service would be subjected to other sanctons collectve defence. Collectve defence is only real in additon to fnes. To be more precise, they if it carries a message of both politcal readiness will be deprived of natonal benefts: a person and military capability to react to an atack who evades repeated summons and fnes against an allied naton (in this case, Estonia). will eventually lose the opportunity to hold a For this, three basic preconditons must be met. driver’s, weapon or huntng licence, and other benefts. This change sent a message from the First, it is of course important that NATO should state: we value our dutful citzens, among functon; the Alliance and the relatonships other things by not allowing people evading framing it should be politcally benefcial for their duty to enjoy the same benefts as those Estonia and other allies. While Central and who do perform their dutes. Eastern European member states see Russia’s growing aggression as their main security However, the “hiding” problem stll needs concern, for countries situated further away the to be resolved. In an e-state, it should not primary security issues lie elsewhere. In order be too difcult to establish a measure by for NATO to work, it must address both Estonia’s which every message and notce sent to a and other members’ security concerns. citzen from the state is delivered through all government insttutons, regardless of which When speaking of NATO’s overall health, there Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine one issues it. At present, state insttutons are is no point in ignoring the fact that internatonal stll separate islands in this respect; however, relatons over the last few years have been if natonal registers and the legal space are turbulent, and this has put pressure on Western developed appropriately, in future a citzen’s insttutons. Several traditonal insttutons communicaton with the state should work the have found themselves in the biggest crisis same, irrespectve of which insttuton is being of confdence of their lives; this, in turn, has communicated with. been accompanied by growing polarisaton in society and an increasing number of assorted Real pressure from society that urges a person irritants in Western internatonal relatons to do their duty will only emerge and become (diferent opinions about trade policy, Brexit the norm when an overwhelming majority of negotatons or immigraton are just a handful citzens subject to the duty actually perform it in of examples that have tested Western unity). practce. In 2022, some 60% of male citzens of For NATO – and, of course, Estonia – it is that year’s call-up selectees will enter service; important that these disputes are kept under however, it would be premature to be content control and do not carry over to security issues. with this result. Work should also contnue This has generally worked so far, but it will take to create equal opportunites for women to some efort in the future. enter conscript service. Since females account for over half of voluntary natonal defence Paradoxically, the Western security system has in programme partcipants in upper secondary some ways even been strengthened by the storm and vocatonal schools, there is no reason why clouds gathering above it. While just a few years

Challenges of Real National Defence 12 ago there was a real threat that NATO would only populaton and GDP of the European allies are be of interest to small groups of security experts, on a par with those of the US. It has been without wider politcal atenton, the trouble pointed out that, sooner or later, US taxpayers brewing over NATO in the media has mobilised will begin asking why they have to contribute the politcal circles in member states to pay so much to European security while Europeans atenton to the Alliance, to appreciate it and to do not seem to take their defence as seriously. take steps to protect it. In these turbulent tmes, These issues have now become the centre of previous occasional ignorance has been replaced discussions over NATO. with the desire to act. When discussing burden-sharing, it has been argued that not all US defence Paradoxically, the Western security system spending has been targeted on the has in some ways even been strengthened security of Europe and the North by the storm clouds gathering above it Atlantc region; as a global superpower, the US actvely partcipates in other countries’ security policies, which This does not mean that turbulence is not naturally consumes a large part of its defence dangerous – it is, and mainly for two reasons. expenditure, while in Europe defence is mostly First, the overall confusion increases the risk of focused on the NATO area. This is true, but miscalculaton, with potentally regretable it can also be said that European countries’ consequences. And second, while turbulence defence spending is fragmented and used is generally not dangerous, the frailest less efciently than in the US, which is why passengers can stll be hurt by it. The most actual military capability is weaker than the important thing, as always, is to keep calm and US in terms of every euro or dollar spent. This, focus on facts rather than emotons. too, is true. Since NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, this polemic is no longer an issue – it was The current situaton over NATO unity has some unambiguously agreed that all member states positve aspects, not only worrying ones. While would aim for the goal of spending 2% of GDP the media like to speak of the gap that separates on defence, cuts in defence budgets would end NATO into east- and south-oriented member and defence expenditure would be increased states, the actual solidarity within the Alliance to ensure greater equality in burden-sharing. has proved stronger. Southern member states The queston now is whether the allies will actvely contribute against the threat from the take this obligaton seriously and actually move east; among other things, they police Baltc towards the agreed goal. The current trends Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine airspace and partcipate in NATO batlegroups are largely positve: the number of member situated in these countries. Eastern allies states that have fulflled the 2% requirement contribute to operatons in the Mediterranean, is growing, defence budget cuts have mostly Africa and the Middle East; their per capita ended and, for the frst tme since the end of involvement is sometmes even more actve the Cold War, the defence expenditure of the than that of the other allies. European NATO allies has begun to grow.

One of the Alliance’s more acute The number of member states that have solidarity issues in recent years has been over defence expenditure – fulflled the 2% requirement is growing, “burden-sharing”, as it is ofen called. defence budget cuts have mostly ended For years, both observers and American ofcials (including in the and, for the frst tme since the end of the Obama and Bush administratons) Cold War, the defence expenditure of the have pointed out that US taxpayers covering a disproportonately large European NATO allies has begun to grow part of NATO defence expenditure is not politcally sustainable. The cuts in European Since collectve defence is critcally important defence budgets have resulted in the US to Estonian security, the country must provide making up some 71% of all NATO defence everything for NATO to functon and maintain expenditure, even though the combined its politcal importance for other member

Challenges of Real National Defence 13 states. In order to make that happen, Estonia are dangerous; Estonian lives have been lost, must have its say in the development of many have been wounded and even more the Euro-Atlantc security space. To achieve have been lef with mental scars. However, credibility, Estonia will need diplomats with the achievements of Estonia’s troops, non- a thorough knowledge of the situaton in commissioned ofcers and ofcers during their host states who are able to partcipate those operatons have helped to ensure the in discussions there and on an internatonal security of the entre country. We can never be level; in additon, we need strong practcal too grateful to and atentve towards them for cooperaton to strengthen tes with our allies. their service.

In the defence feld, the most intensive form of Estonia’s credibility largely depends on its cooperaton is joint operatons, which is why internatonal reputaton. Here, a useful tool smart partcipaton in internatonal operatons would be a serious contributon to solving is an important way to raise Estonia’s credibility, other allies’ and wider internatonal security develop closer relatons with allies and create issues, as well as setng a positve example opportunites to partcipate in internatonal in general. Estonia’s image as a successful developments. As a small state, Estonia’s and democratc small state is imperatve to its contributon cannot be massive, so quantty security, as is everything that sets it apart from cannot increase our credibility. This is why it is the general mass. more important to focus on quality. The media are actve 24/7, and Estonia Estonia’s advantages are speed and fexibility: when needed help in must keep up with the pace, e.g. by Africa, Estonia was one of the frst to responding swifly to negatve messages show support in both words and actons, i.e. to make actual with the facts as needed contributons. This helped to take Estonia’s relatons with Paris to a new level. The best image-creatng argument is a fact – Estonia has helped the Britsh mission in this means that if Estonia wants to stand out Afghanistan, with Estonia’s contributon in any way, it has to practse what it preaches. calibrated to give the maximum politcal result. This alone is not enough; Estonia must be able For this, it was important to demonstrate to have its say in the internatonal media, and readiness to go in and do what the partner not only in Estonian and English. The media state was doing – contribute without natonal are actve 24/7, and Estonia must keep up with Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine limita-tons, even in very dangerous areas. the pace, e.g. by responding swifly to negatve Cooperaton in Afghanistan raised Estonia’s messages with the facts as needed. relatonship with London to a whole new level, both in the general politcal and the practcal In additon, Estonia’s trustworthiness and ability sense. Estonia has contributed to the US-led to partcipate in NATO developments also depend mission in . There are more examples, in on whether fll their designated operatons under NATO, the positons in NATO structures and the capability of and coalitons of the willing. those ofcials, ofcers and non-commissioned ofcers deployed to NATO structures. It will also All of this has given Estonia a more credible role in depend on whether Estonia is able to get any key its relatonship with its allies than the country’s positons, since there are plenty of other small size would allow in other circumstances. As and medium-sized NATO states whose politcal a result, it has become possible to expand strategy seems to include grabbing as many bilateral military cooperaton into other areas, internatonal positons as possible. This is a smart from intelligence informaton exchange to approach for a small country, one that requires cyber cooperaton and joint military exercises. determined work in choosing suitable positons and supportng its candidates. The importance of foreign operatons in increasing Estonia’s internatonal credibility Of course, NATO’s politcal vitality is not enough requires the contributon of Estonian veterans for collectve defence to work; it needs actual to be recognised and appreciated. Operatons capability to realise collectve defence, if

Challenges of Real National Defence 14 necessary. This depends on the second and third ment of numerous elements, with a signifcant elements – a credible allied presence in NATO total cost. In 2010, it was decision tme – border states and the Alliance’s capability to whether to contnue with the development of support its distant border areas with additonal Ämari and bear the considerable additonal military capabilites, i.e. follow-on forces. expense or be satsfed with a half-completed base. In order to be able to receive allied air- craf, the base had to be completely developed. 7. Allied Presence At the tme the topic was treated as bar-room When Estonia joined the Alliance in 2004, NATO chater. There was critcism of both the Ämari had neglected its collectve defence actvites. base development and Estonia’s pursuit of For many it seemed at the tme that confict allied presence in general afer it openly raised between states was a thing of the past, history the need for the deployment of army units at a was over for European security, and NATO – if 2014 conference in Washington. The critcism it was stll even necessary – had to concentrate was both internatonal and domestc. on operatons guaranteeing stability in more distant areas. NATO’s military leadership had Following the annexaton of the Crimea, when been reduced and was signifcantly further the stability of Europe more broadly came decreased in subsequent years, a large part into queston, it was more widely understood of collectve defence planning had been that an allied presence was one of the more neglected, and atempts to discuss deterrence important underlying bases of a convincing were seen in as inappropriate. Even collectve defence. In order to prevent though Russia’s aggression in Georgia brought Moscow having misconceptons about NATO’s a certain awareness, it was limited in terms of credibility, the US deployed both fghter extent and duraton. The true breaking point aircraf and company-size army units to the came with the annexaton of the Crimea. Baltcs. Their arrival was the result of a hastly made decision that was also executed Even though Russia’s aggression in Georgia with great speed. brought a certain awareness, it was limited However, it was clear that the restart of in terms of extent and duraton history was here to stay, which is why the credibility of NATO’s deterrence needed a long-term soluton. The Estonia, however, constantly (frst quietly, corresponding analysis focused on several Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine but then with increasing actvity) worked to issues – frst, what would have to be done to increase allied presence. The logic of this make deterrence credible; second, on what presence is simple – in order to convince scale; and third, how it should be done. somebody that allies would come to the aid of the region it is necessary to demonstrate a NATO soon reached a unanimous decision, direct and constant allied integraton into the formulated by heads of state and government area’s security. The more militarily convincing at the 2016 Summit: in guaranteeing and integrated the presence, the more difcult deterrence, there is no opton for credible it is for a potental aggressor to imagine an collectve defence other than an allied military atack that would leave the allies neutral. presence.

Preparatons for creatng a convincing presence The analysis showed that the presence must be began a long tme before the topic began to be visible on land, in the Baltc Sea and in the air, seen as acceptable. Let’s take the air force base and as far as the army was concerned, at least a in Ämari, for example. By 2009, the preliminary batalion-sized unit was needed in every Baltc infrastructure needed for the operaton of an state. There are two reasons for that size. First, a air force base there had been completed with batalion is a unit that can independently (with the help of NATO investment, but the base was its military staf) plan complex operatons and not yet ready to accept allied aircraf. Additonal therefore have a degree of military autonomy infrastructure was needed for its completon that a company lacks. This autonomy helps to along with, even more important, the procure- send the message that a subunit of an allied

Challenges of Real National Defence 15 batalion can deploy to meet an atacking state’s infrastructure and the entre complex enemy in any part of Estonia, regardless of set of legal agreements was completed by where it is situated in peacetme. At the same Estonia in less than six months. Thus, the tme, a batalion – or even four of them – is not Kevadtorm exercise the following year saw a unit that could sway the regional let alone an equipped and supplied NATO batlegroup that also partcipated in the exercise’s batles as part of Estonia’s 1st Infantry A subunit of an allied batalion can deploy Brigade. to meet an atacking enemy in any part of Estonia In the air, the allied presence is mainly ensured through the Baltc air- policing mission, which (thanks to the the global balance and appear legitmately completon of the Ämari base) now operates dangerous to a neighbouring state, therefore from bases in both and Estonia. The promptng it to irratonal actons. In other naval presence is ensured mainly via allied navy words, deployment on this scale is a defensive vessels being a constant presence at training actvity by NATO which cannot be credibly seen exercises on the Baltc Sea. as aggressive or dangerous. In additon to local military personnel, a In order to realise deterrence, the batlegroups further part of NATO’s presence in the Baltcs must be militarily capable (which among other takes the form of staf elements and centres things means fully equipped and supplied) and of excellence. The NATO Cooperatve Cyber integrated with the troops of the host state in Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn has every way (this also means they are part of the now grown to be the biggest in NATO in terms chain of command and involved in the country’s of the number of contributng allies. defence planning). This is the case today. The progress made in allied presence in recent In additon to military capability, allied The NATO Cooperatve Cyber Defence Centre batlegroups must carry a message of politcal credibility; they must involve as of Excellence in Tallinn has now grown to be many states as possible in deterrence the biggest in NATO in terms of the number policy, without sacrifcing their own capability to act militarily. Since mult- of contributng allies natonality is good from a politcal Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine point of view but bad from the military efcency years has generally been an impressive success. standpoint, a suitable balance must be found. Naturally, this does not provide the luxury of being able to rest on one’s laurels. An analysis The credibility of our analysis was supported by of how the allied presence should be adapted the fact that this approach was also approved as appropriate should contnue (and does), at the Warsaw Summit, at which a heightened both in Estonia and in NATO insttutons. The NATO presence in the Baltc states and issue of naval and air force presence needs the was decided. The aforementoned batlegroups most consideraton. In additon, the contnuing are commanded by the UK, Canada, implementaton of earlier decisions should be and the US, and various other allies contribute ensured, which includes the contnued stafng to them. Allied units are completely integrated of allied batalions in the Baltc states and their into the host states’ natonal defence and integraton into the defence of host states. constantly partcipate in planning and military exercises. The allied presence and its military and politcal credibility have made the deterrent aspect of The speed with which the presence was collectve defence much more convincing than implemented is worthy of note. The Warsaw it was just a few years ago. However, a presence Summit took place in July 2016, most of the alone is not enough. NATO must have actual details concerning its implementaton were capability to militarily strengthen its borders decided by the autumn of that year, and the to launch wider collectve defence operatons actual deployment, constructon of the host together with a member state’s independent

Challenges of Real National Defence 16 defence capability, if necessary. In other words, important North Atlantc area, has been NATO must be able to come quickly to the aid restored. Conductng any type of large-scale of units already in Estonia with additonal forces collectve defence operaton, such as the if need be. This is the underlying principle of protecton of connectons between Europe and NATO’s reinforcement strategy. North America, depends on manoeuvrability on the North Atlantc. Although a structure focused on these issues did not exist for a number of years, it has been decided to restore it, under US 8. Reinforcement leadership. The other positve change concerns Strategy logistcs: Germany has decided to create a staf focused on rear operatons, the importance of In order for the reinforcement strategy to be which cannot be overestmated in the eyes of realistc, it has to meet a number of preconditons. Estonia, which is dependent on the rapid arrival This secton lists the fve most important. of follow-on forces.

First, NATO must have enough forces capable of Positve developments have also taken place rapid response, both in low- and high-intensity in the region’s military leadership. For years, confict situatons. This frst and foremost Estonia has pointed out the need to form a requires money, which is why the mater of division-level staf focused on the defence increasing NATO states’ defence expenditure of the Baltc states. In June 2018, Denmark, should be seen as fair burden-sharing rather Estonia and decided to create such a staf, than an issue involving real combat readiness. and various other allies will also contribute. A A number of important decisions have been divisional staf responsible for the territory of made in recent years, including at the last NATO Latvia and Estonia helps to bridge a gap that summit, to create additonal military response previously existed between the local brigades capability: it has been decided to expand the and NATO at corps level. already existng NATO Response Force, as well as its rapid-response component – the Very Third, NATO must signifcantly strengthen its High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) – and operatonal planning capability. Here it is worth place at NATO’s disposal 30 heavy or regular providing a short explanaton of planning army batalions, 30 fghter squadrons and 30 terminology. In Estonia, defence planning warships ready to deploy within 30 days of usually means an actvity that aims to identfy being alerted. capabilites that may need development in the future, and operatonal planning looks at how Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine The topic of rapid-response forces is also to use existng capabilites in confict. connected to the issue of the US military presence in Europe. In this area, recent developments Operatonal planning is less about a defence have been positve: the US military presence is plan that eventually needs to be completed, on the increase, and US funding for partcipatng and more about a constant process; it is also in Europe’s defence has grown consistently and important that planning should cover even the considerably in recent years. most difcult challenges. No plan can stand up to the complexity of a possible real situaton, Second, NATO needs a working leadership but through constant and realistc planning structure that must be able to lead a highly it is possible to learn how to act in complex complex extensive military operaton if situatons; it is a way to discover one’s strengths necessary. Consequently, the NATO command and weaknesses, systematcally work through structure was once again amended this year, various possible courses of acton, and atribute as has been done before, in order to reverse actual substance to collectve defence. the cuts made in previous years. Collectve defence in Estonia cannot be There are two recent positve developments separated from collectve defence in Latvia concerning NATO’s military command capability and Lithuania – strategically they form a single that stand above the rest. First, the part of region. The collectve defence of the Baltc the NATO command structure responsible region is also inseparable from a wider regional for maritme issues, especially the critcally context: forces partcipatng in Estonia’s defence

Challenges of Real National Defence 17 must get to it and receive support from other Union’s atenton to issues of areas of the Alliance. It is also natural that, among others. Now it remains to keep an eye in case of a confict that triggers a collectve on them, so that the promises made are kept. defence operaton in Estonia or anywhere else in the NATO area, other areas of the Alliance are directly or indirectly connected to it. Operatonal Conclusion planning in collectve defence must also take the regional aspect into account. Finally, I would like to touch on a claim that has bothered me for a long tme. It is said that, as a Planning is also what connects in one compre- small state, Estonia should not have a say in the hensive entty the forces already in the area, development of its security – that it is decided follow-on forces arriving as part of the by others somewhere else. This is incorrect. reinforcement strategy, leadership structure, We ourselves are primarily responsible for our and all peacetme actvites, such as training. security, and this applies to both independent and collectve defence capabilites. A successful Fourth, we must consider training exercises, both security policy requires knowledge and desktop strategic decision-making ones and experience, as well as confdence and courage. those carried out with actual troops. There have been positve developments in both areas in recent years, but not We ourselves are primarily responsible for our enough. Estonia’s collectve defence security, and this applies to both independent has aspects that need much more and collectve defence capabilites thorough training with real troops. A beter systemic approach to training is required; exercises are useful if they test actual The later may be especially important, since plans and teach lessons that will be taken into we are ofen the ones who must take the frst account in planning. step and guide security developments in a favourable directon before others even realise Fifh, in order to quickly reinforce various a certain acton is necessary. NATO areas with follow-on forces, the internatonal movement of armed forces in Europe needs to be smoother. This is referred to as military mobility and can be divided into two important components: regulatons and Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine physical infrastructure. Concerning regulatons, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the United States Army Europe, pointed out that the rapid movement of troops in Europe is impossible, mostly because of all the paperwork involved in crossing borders. Countries have diferent formalites, as well as rules concerning the transport of military vehicles by road, etc. All of this can slow down movement. There is also plenty of room for improvement in physical infrastructure to support the rapid movement of troops – taxpayer funding of roads, bridges and railways should at least partally take defence requirements into account.

The EU can make a big contributon to help military mobility: NATO ofen comes up short in the regulaton and development of civil infrastructure. During Estonia’s presidency of the Council of the EU, it managed to draw the

Challenges of Real National Defence 18 Eestivälisteenistuse tugevdamine

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