Democracy in US Security Strategy

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Democracy in US Security Strategy Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & From Promotion to Support CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1800 K Street | Washington, DC 20006 project director and Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 principal author E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Alexander T.J. Lennon contributing authors Larry Diamond Francis Fukuyama Michael McFaul researcher Matthew J. Owens March 2009 ISBN 978-0-89206-567-7 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Ë|xHSKITCy065677zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy From Promotion to Support project director and principal author Alexander T.J. Lennon contributing authors Larry Diamond Francis Fukuyama Michael McFaul researcher Matthew J. Owens March 2009 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak- ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this publica- tion should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo: © Paul A. Souders/CORBIS © 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lennon, Alexander T.J., 1969– Democracy in U.S. security strategy : from promotion to support / Alexander T.J. Lennon. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-89206-567-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Democracy—Government policy—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—1989– 3. National security—United States. I. Title. JZ1480.L46 2009 355’.033573—dc22 2009005492 The CSIS Press Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 775-3119 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 contents Executive Summary v Introduction 1. What Now for U.S. Democracy Promotion? 1 Alexander T.J. Lennon White Paper 2. Views on Democracy Promotion from the Strategic Community 9 Alexander T.J. Lennon Alternative Strategies 3. Supporting Democracy: Refashioning U.S. Global Strategy 29 Larry Diamond 4. Reconceptualizing Democracies and Empowering Them to Deliver 55 Francis Fukuyama 5. Engaging Autocrats (and Democrats) to Facilitate Democratic Transitions 75 Michael McFaul Conclusion 6. Democracy Support 97 Alexander T.J. Lennon Appendix A: List of Persons Interviewed 101 Appendix B: About the Advisory Committee 103 Select Bibliography 106 Key Presidential Speeches on Democracy 109 About the Project Director 133 | iii executive summary Democracy promotion in some form has been central to U.S. foreign policy since the country’s in- ception, yet recent setbacks require reevaluating: What role, if any, should democracy have in U.S. security strategy and public diplomacy today? Extensive interviews with former national security advisers, senior diplomats and policymakers, strategic thinkers, and democracy experts, along with in-depth explorations of alternative strategies by Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, and Michael McFaul, all enhanced by an elite, bipartisan advisory committee, have found the following: The consolidation and spread of democracy remain a strategic U.S. interest. Others may cite values, but members of the strategic community unequivocally maintain that the consolidation and spread of democracy remain a U.S. strategic interest for multiple reasons, including an endur- ing belief in the “democratic peace theory”; that democracies make better decisions and partners for the United States; and that a role in spreading democracy can help the United States be, and be perceived as, a benevolent global power. “Democracy” should be rehabilitated, not jettisoned. The new administration should affirm that democracies are not defined by elections, but are slow, complex, and indigenous processes, con- tinuously struggling with self-governance, including the United States itself today. More than Iraq, Egypt has shaped the U.S. strategic community’s views. The principal recent U.S. strategic mistake is viewed as the loss of credibility from the gap between U.S. rhetoric and public action in places like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, not launching a democracy crusade into Iraq, which was initially a quest to eliminate WMD. Charges of hypocrisy are inevitable. The United States will face charges of hypocrisy not just because it must balance other strategic interests, but also because its strategy should vary with countries’ needs and desires; U.S. partners; the amount of U.S. influence; and the manner (e.g. public or private) to influence others most effectively. Support, do not promote, democracy. Promoting has become synonymous with imposing democracy. U.S. strategy should be patient, humble, cooperative, and pragmatic, and not always active and public. Working side-by-side with other nongovernmental, national, and multilateral actors, the United States should pursue a “democracy support” strategy, invoking these pillars: ■ be a model democracy, including in resolving issues like Guantanamo and torture; ■ rebuild credibility by pragmatically and explicitly acknowledging that U.S. strategies, tailored for different countries and regions, as well as U.S. interests will vary; ■ enhance political assistance to strengthen good governance by shifting from determining what countries need to responding to their initiatives, while sustainably scaling it to countries’ size; ■ use economic assistance to reduce corruption, absolute poverty, and help consolidate nascent indigenous efforts, delivering on the promise of democracy and bringing “freedom from want”; ■ engage autocratic regimes—both friendly and adversarial—and their societies, including democratic forces, through diplomatic and other means to facilitate democratic transitions. | v what now for u.s. 1 democracy promotion? Alexander T.J. Lennon Although many others have dedicated their careers to studying or fostering democracy, I have not. I am a security policy analyst and strategist. So why run a project on the role of democracy in U.S. security strategy? While interacting with officials and experts from other countries, I have not only had opportunities to learn about their politics, priorities, and perceptions, but am often asked for my assessments to help explain the United States. As the situation in Iraq deteriorated and par- ticularly after Hamas won 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories, more interlocutors—both abroad and in the United States—began to assert that democracy promotion would inevitably fade from U.S. foreign policy along with the Bush administration. But a closer look at the United States’ foreign policy history and its own political identity revealed deeper roots for democracy prior to the Bush administration. What role would it perform in the future? The spread of democracy has not traditionally been pursued by the United States simply for altruistic reasons or as a blind ideological commitment; it is a strategy that has sought to enhance U.S. interests. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his most recent book, Second Chance, recalled French stra- tegic thinker Raymond Aron’s counsel that “the strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea.”1 Without such a supportable idea, countries would not know the ends to which power will be used, balancing against the United States will be inevitable, and U.S. power will in- exorably decline. Historically, the United States has pursued democracy promotion as that idea. Given its place in U.S. foreign policy, but also the setbacks in recent years, the United States is more likely to revisit, and possibly reframe, rather than dismiss the place of democracy promo- tion in U.S. strategy. To help shape and understand the potential changes in U.S. security strategy, questions remained: Given the experiences of recent years, is democracy promotion sustainable? Should it guide U.S. security strategy, be adjusted, or even be replaced? How, if at all, should it shape the U.S. national security strategy itself and public diplomacy by officials with global re- sponsibilities, including the president? Democracy in U.S. History “Democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to U.S. political identity and sense of national purpose,” concluded Georgetown Universi- 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (New York: Basic Books, 2007), p. 180. | 1 ty’s Jonathan Monten in his recent historical review.2 America’s founders were unanimous in their belief that the consent of the governed was the only legitimate basis for political authority and that popular sovereignty was therefore the best form of government. Novus Ordo Seclorum, or New Or- der of the Ages, is written on the back of the Great Seal of the United States, proclaiming the inten- tion of the founders to change the nature of government itself. Thomas Jefferson himself hopefully predicted that the entire Western Hemisphere would eventually be a confederation of democratic republics and that the United States would be the leader in bringing this change about.3 Although the desire to promote democracy in the rest of the world has been a basic principle of U.S.
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