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1 the Expression of Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands Across The Expression of Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands across Facebook Posts Agneta Fischer1, Charlotte Brands2, David Abadi1 1 Department of Psychology – University of Amsterdam 2 Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR) – University of Amsterdam Corresponding author: Agneta Fischer E-mail address: [email protected] Funding Note This research was funded by the H2020 project Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe (DEMOS) under H2020-EU.3.6.1.1. and H2020-EU.3.6.1.2. (Grant agreement ID: 822590). 1 Abstract When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be ‘endemic' across political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones. In total, 51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before and 71 in the period after the 2019 Dutch elections (N = 122). This study tackles the use of the founding elements of populist communication strategies: references to the people, references to the elites, and references to the others. For a populist leader, Wilders’ Facebook posts do not contain many references to the people. Instead, he focuses on the elites (e.g., the EU) and on the others (e.g., Muslims or asylum seekers). The clearest difference between the pre- and post-election period seems to be that Wilders gradually changes his populist communication strategies from a focus on the elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more references to religion and blaming the others. He also refers more to people within the country (asylum seekers and immigrants) in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election period (23,5%). His posts show clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture of a battle between the Netherlands and the EU (the elites), Muslims or asylum seekers (the others). 2 1. Introduction The Netherlands has seen a rise of populist parties in the last decades, both on the right wing (Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV, Forum voor Democratie FvD) and left wing (Socialistische Partij SP) spectrum. The core element of the populist ideology that has been mentioned as a defining feature is the combination of an advocative position toward the people and conflictive one toward the elites (Wirth, Esser, Wettstein, Engesser, Wirz, Schulz & Müller, 2016; Wirz, 2018). In the words of Mudde (2009, p. 23): populism is “... a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”. Hence, according to Mudde (2009) and others (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014), populists view the people as sovereign, homogenous, and virtuous. Another often mentioned element is that the elites are viewed as evil, whereas the people are considered good. This is referred to as a Manichean outlook, in the sense that the people are morally superior to the elites. A fourth element that has recently often been discussed is nativism. Nativism focusses on the idea that one believes to have more rights to be treated fairly, and to receive priority treatments when living in the country where one was born. In other words, natives should have more rights than non-natives (e.g., asylum seekers, immigrants), because their ancestors built the country (see also Hochschild, 2018). The non-natives are treated as others in these views. The dream of a White Europe is a clear example of nativism within Right Wing populism. Thus, these aspects suggest that there are antagonistic relations between the people and the elites, but also between the people and the others. Most recently, Kešić and Duyvendak (2019) outline how right-wing discourses and issues of belonging and collective identity across Europe can be better comprehended through the logic of nativism, which is 3 categorized, in the illustrative case of the Netherlands, into three subtypes: secularist, racial and populist nativism. 2. The PVV and FvD In the Netherlands, the PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid; Party for Freedom) is the oldest right- wing populist party, founded in 2006, with Geert Wilders as the leader and also the only member, as there is no possibility to become a PVV member. Hence, supporters do not have a say in the contents of the political program nor in the election of officers. Before the foundation of PVV, Geert Wilders was a member of the right-wing party VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), which has been part of the country’s government for many years since World War 2. When Wilders left the VVD in 2005, he founded his own party, the PVV, which has witnessed a steady rise until recently. He received 15.5% of the votes in the 2010 elections, which was the peak of his popularity, and his party eventually took part in the negotiations for a new government. They ended up as supporter of the center-right minority government, although they were not officially part of the coalition (‘gedoogconstructie’). The coalition clashed in 2012 when Wilders suddenly announced that he would leave the negotiation table, and new elections followed. In the 2012 elections, Wilders lost nine seats and went from 24 to 19 seats. Many supporters seem to have realized that Wilders has a big mouth towards the government but is not capable to enforce or change anything. Klein and Muis (2018) furthermore argue that although Wilders receives considerable support from the electorate and his anti-Islam statements are often mentioned by the traditional media and during political debates, “all established parties ignore or criticize the PVV” (p. 557). After the events that led to the fall of the coalition in 2012, this sentiment became even stronger. Since then, many parties declared that they did not want to be part of a government coalition that also includes the PVV. In the last elections of 2019, the Netherlands has seen the rise of a new right-wing populist party, 4 FvD (Forum voor Democratie; Forum for Democracy), led by Thierry Baudet. This party has many young, male supporters and has received a large part of its votes from PVV voters. The PVV thus seems to be losing ground. 3. Populist Ideologies in the Netherlands Both Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet display anti-Islam attitudes and Muslims are portrayed as ‘the others’ in statements of both. For Wilders this is his primary asset. His statements in the Dutch Parliament and on social media, are mostly about Muslims, and his plea is to ban Muslim fundamentalism from the Netherlands and Europe. He does not present a nuanced view about Muslims but argues that there are many extremists and terrorists among Muslims who want to take over the Netherlands, turning it into a Muslim state by applying the Sharia. He describes ordinary Muslims as terrorists or Jihad supporters, and he specifically targets young male Moroccans, who are known to have a higher crime rate than young males from other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Baudet also focuses on other political issues, (e.g. climate change) and seems to have a broader populist discourse. Regarding the EU, the PVV and FvD hold slightly differences stances. Wilders has always been clear about the EU: he seeks a ‘Nexit’, meaning the Netherlands should leave the EU to take back control over immigration issues. Whereas Baudet also expressed a preference for a Nexit, his party does not: instead, the FvD wants a referendum about the Euro and Europe’s open borders, and to stop the expansion of the EU. Although they state that they are against the EU and are in favor of a referendum, they are far more careful when speaking about leaving the EU than Wilders. Party members of FvD disagree about their stance on Nexit: while party leader Baudet expressed a desire to leave the EU, other party members expressed that FvD is not necessarily in favor of leaving. Baudet responded by telling the media that he does not recognize himself or his party in these statements, and that he is against the EU, against the internal market, against the Euro and against open borders 5 (Dietvorst, 2019). Such disagreements are not expressed within the PVV, but this may also result from the fact that Wilders is the PVV and seems to be fully in charge of the party’s viewpoints. Baudet hardly actively uses Facebook and only published 3 posts during and 3 after the elections in 2019. Therefore, we will focus on the Facebook posts of Wilders in this report. What do his Facebook posts entail? The majority of his posts are about Muslims, or incidents including Muslims, specifically Moroccans (‘Moroccan terrorists’ as he refers to them). In 2014, Wilders spoke at a political meeting and asked his supporters whether they wanted more or fewer Moroccans in The Hague. He then yelled: ‘What do we want? More or fewer Moroccans?’ and the audience bellowed ‘Fewer’, ‘fewer’, ‘fewer’ for minutes. On the basis of this incident, he was prosecuted by The Hague court, for eliciting hate and discrimination of a whole group. His process still continues till today. His obsession with Islam and Moroccans is clearly reflected in his Facebook posts. Many of his Facebook posts merely contain more than one or two words, such as ‘stop Islam’, or ‘Burka stop’. The latter refers to a much-discussed law that was proposed by Wilders and installed in 2019, which forbids wearing a burka in Dutch public places.
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