#268 "The Future of Ukrainian-Russian Relations" Conference Roundtable Transcript

This roundtable was part of a conference entitled "Ukrainian National Security" held on May 8-9, 1997. The conference was sponsored by the Kennan Institute, the Harriman Institute, the RAND Corporation, and the Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University Institute of International Relations.

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©September 1997 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars transcribed by Jodi Koehn

PARTICIPANTS

Ian Brzezinski Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator William Roth, U.S. Senate

Speakers

Sherman Garnett Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Oleksandr Pavliuk Associate Professor, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Alexander Rahr Head of the Russian CIS Unit, German Society for Foreign Affairs, Bonn (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswatige Politik)

Roman Solchanyk Senior Analyst, RAND Corporation

Igor Torbakov Fellow, Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Roundtable: The Future of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Ian Brzezinski: We will commence the newly independent state-whose last session of this conference on identity is still very much in a phase of "Ukrainian National Security." My consolidation. It is a relationship that is name is Ian Brzezinski and I am the very interactive. We have heard from legislative assistant to Senator Bill Roth c:hers and from the members of this of the U.S. Senate. I have had the honor panel :hat the future of Ukraine's of being asked to chair this very independence will very much shape the distinguished panel of experts on future of Russia's role in world affairs European security, experts who have a and ·;rice versa. strong interest and have played important roles in Ukrainian security Let me introduce our speakers. On affairs. Over the last day and a half you my far right we have Dr. Sherman all have looked at various dimensions of Garnett, Senior Associate from the Ukrainian security-the political, Carnegie Endowment for International economic, and military dimensions. Peace where he specializes on the foreign and security policies of Russia, The panel we have today is going to Ukraine, and the other Newly look at one aspect of Ukraine's Independent States. He is widely relationships with the rest of the world published with articles appearing in in which each of these dimensions are Foreign Policy, The Washington Quarterly, particularly acute-that is Ukraine's and other leading journals, and has just bilateral relationship with Russia. They published a book on Ukraine entitled are acute because in each case you can Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine and the New look at the dimension as being a Political Geography of Central and Eastern significant challenge to Ukraine's Europe. To his left, we have Oleksandr security. Just to reiterate what you have Pavliuk, who is an Associate Professor probably already heard over the last at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv. day: in the economic field you have a He is an old friend of the Kennan relationship that is one of perhaps Institute and was here as a Regional dependence, particularly in the energy Exchange Scholar three years ago. He sector; in the political you have a has written extensively on Ukraine's relationship in which there are security policies. We have to my right stresses-Ukraine neighbors on a nation Igor Torbakov, who is a fellow at the that still has difficulty recognizing its Institute of Russian History at the independence and refuses to recognize Russian Academy of Sciences in Ukraine's borders, at least on a bilateral Moscow. He has attained numerous and basis; you have a security dimension fairly prestigious scholarships. He was that is very acute, with the stationing of an Eastern Research Visitor at the foreign forces on Ukrainian territory RFE/RL Research Institute in Munich, and the ongoing difficulties over the and two years ago he was a Regional negotiation of the future of the Black Sea Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Fleet. Then there is the broader aspect of Institute. To my left we have Alexander having two nations whose own Rahr, who is the Head of the Russian identities are evolving and whose CIS Unit at the German Society for evolutions are deeply intertwined. We Foreign Affairs. I know of his work have Russia, whose geographic space is through his time at RFE / RL, where he far different from what it was in was a Senior Research Analyst. His previous history, and who is trying to work has provided him a fair amount of adjust to that reality; and we have study both in the United States and in Ukraine-which in many ways is a Russia in addition, of course, to his

1 horne, Germany. He has written quite than a few weeks afterwards, but they extensively on Russian-Ukrainian understood the need to avoid a security relations. To my far left, we breakdown. This pragmatism at the core have Roman Solchanyk, whom I have has been more important than the sort known for a number of years through of nutty and irreconcilable chorus on the my work in Kyiv and his travels out outskirts. Nationalists in both countries there. I have turned many times to his at this point are less critical of the work as an important source for fre relationship than this pragmatic core. policy activities we have in our office in So, the second theme that defines the U.S. Senate. Roman is a senior Russian-Ukrainian relations is analyst at the RAND Corporation and is muddling through. You really have an now working on a book on Ukrainian­ intricate muddling through. The two Russian relations. sides do not just "luck" through things. I have asked our speakers to keep That brings me to my third point, their remarks fairly brief-no more '.:..1.&.:....._ the main obstacle in this relationship. ten minutes-and then we will move to Some call it psychological, but I would an open discussion. We will start off call it a crisis of expectations. The main withSherm. obstacle in my view is that the Ukrainian side believes in the need to Sherman Garnett: I just want to make normalize this relationship, to make it six points and I will try to do so within like any other country. It will not the time constraints our chairman has become less important in Europe, but suggested. If you drew up a list of the they would like to make it a settled relationships in Europe that were at relationship in Europe. They are once the core relationships for the future certainly too weak to impose this on of the continent, and you drew up a list Russia. The Russians want something of the most unsettled relationships-not better from their point of view-what necessarily in crisis or unstable, but Ryurikov called the "fraternal Slavic unsettled-the Ukrainian-Russian compromise." They want an intimate relationship would be high on both lists. relationship, something better than a It might be the only one that is that high normal relationship. The psychology on both lists. This conference has here is very compatible with muddling certainly talked about Ukraine's through. In other words, from the importance, location, and size, Russian side, they do not want to let the especially after NATO expansion which Black Sea crisis get out of hand. But if makes it a front-line state with NATO. It they settle this thing and sign this treaty, is the most important and unsettled it will obstruct the movement back to relationship. some more intimate relationship than normal that will inevitably come two The second point is that the years, four years, or seven years later. I relationship has not broken down. It is think that is the main issue, because not, as many predicted, a relationship of !hey all play out, if you look at the Black conflict, although it is conflictual at Sea fleet, the VAT, the border issue, times. Someone on an earlier panel anything. I think it is less sinister, less made the point this morning about it irreconcilable in its nature than the being governed by a "perverse extremes on both sides suggest, but stability." I agree with that. I think that there is a really core obstacle here, a there has been an amazing pragmatism crisis or a differentiation of expectation. when it counted, there have been summits in which both sides have Now here is where I begin to conspired to make progress that they diverge from the panel this morning, knew would not actually hold for more and this is my fourth point. The long

2 term moderate trends suggest that one internally and to make its claim upon country is going to be big and powerful Europe-at a time when it is so vital that and one is going to be at best just a Europe recognize it-less credible. I medium power. There is simply going have not joined the group of pessimists. to be a difference in capabilities and I do not think we are talking about the potentially of intentions over time. That existence of Ukraine. I do not even could be exacerbated by the current believe everything I read about situation in which Russia, despite corruption. But I do think that there is a having many of the same problems that con::adiction between Ukraine's current Ukraine has, also has a dynamism that I foreign policies and its domestic and think is absent from Ukrainian political internal situation. Ukraine has said that and economic life right now. So it is not it wants to be a part of the European that Russia has less corruption than Union, that it wants to be close to Ukraine. In my view, Russia has more NATO, and has even hinted about going on around the corruption. You can joining NATO. They are reaching out to see that the difference that will exist by Europe. Europe certainly has not nature between the two countries is reached back to them. I think it is hugely exacerbated by what Russia is :;..'Il.portant that U.S. policy push Europe doing right and what Ukraine is doing towards Ukraine. But at exactly the time wrong. I am a big fan of at least the we should be doing this, we look to Ukrainian view of this relationship­ Ukraine itself and see this inherent bat it should be regulated and contradiction between their ambitions in normal-because I do not want to see a foreign policy and their domestic and crisis of the Black Sea Fleet or of Crimea internal situation. I think the danger that really was not maneuvered by here is that Kuchma assumes-although Moscow but would become a bilateral I have never heard him articulate this in issue. I would rather that crisis, if it a policy-that the situation of "perverse should come about, take place within stability" is a permanent thing. I have the context of settled relationships, tried to present an argument in this brief regulated treaties, and international time that it may not be. It may not be recognition of them. That is, if you think both because things in Russia could there is still a dark side to come in this change or the balance of powers could relationship, even accidentally, it is change, and also because the two better if these treaties are here. countries could be potentially drawn in as a result of some problem such as My fifth point is that Ukraine's Crimea. Again, while this is supposed to view-and what I would argue the be on Russian-Ukrainian relations, it West's view ought to be-of the seems to me the central paradox to that Ukrainian-Russian relationship is relationship is probably in Ukraine itself bolstered if it becomes as strong as at this point. Ukraine needs a linkage p ossible internally and if it has friends. between its political and economic In other words, the West can play a role reform and the claim that I think both in normalizing Russian-Ukrainian Ukraine and the United States should be relations somewhat comparable to pressing in Europe: that Ukraine and the the way it played a role in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship matter denuclearization of Ukraine and the deeply in the long run. w ay the IMF played a role in the settlement of Ukraine's debt. That is an The current situation that one sees in objective need, I think. Ukraine may justify a hands-off position on the part of Europe. But the basic My last point would be that I think geo-p olitical realities which I began this Ukraine right now is doing everything talk with- its location, its size, simply possible both to make itself weaker its potential effect on Europe-make it a 3 kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish far failed to elaborate a clear concept of policy not to embrace Ukraine right its Ukrainian policy: now and if we think it is going wrong not to take a stick to it. That would be It may look very strange, but despite the paradox that I see at the heart of the the centuries of mutual history, both Ukrainian-Russian relationship. co~~es experience a very strong defiat of knowledge and information Ian Brzezinski: Thank you Sherm. Dr. about each other. Today, Ukrainians do Pavliuk? not know much of what is going on in Russia, although they know more than Russians know about what is going on Oleksandr Pavliuk: Speaking about the current status of Ukrainian-Russian in Ukraine. Ukrainians still read some Russian newspapers and have access to relations, my first point is that in spite of Russian television. The Russian the experience the two countries have accumulated since they became population does not have this independent, they still have not information at all. As a result, there are developed a mature relationship. Today mutual rnisperceptions, suspicions, and we can say that Ukraine and Russia stereotypes. Some of the most continue to be involved in a complex widespread stereotypes in Russia are, process of negotiations to establish the forexample, thatmostUkrainians basic principles and legal norms of would like to renew this or that kind of bilateral relations. Despite the fact that union with Russia, and that if not for the Ukraine signed more than one hundred Ukrainian leadership (which is bilateral agreements with Russia-more nationalistic and has somehow cheated than with any other country in the the population), it would be much easier world-basic agreements like the to reintegrate. My colleague Hryhoriy political treaty on Friendship and Nemyria spoke yesterday and gave a Cooperation and the agreement on the number of figures about the changes in delimitation and demarcation of borders perception of the population, at least in have yet to be signed. These are the Ukraine, about Ukrainian-Russian basic agreements which should shape relations and their identity. the whole political context for bilateral Several serious problems still persist agreements. in Ukrainian-Russian relations. A lot has My second point is that both been said about those problems and I do countries still lack a coherent strategy of not want be repetitious. However, I their bilateral relations. Speaking about would like to say that in my opinion Ukraine, after taking a rather Ukrainian-Russian relations experienced propagandistic anti-Russian stand in the first systemic crisis last year. There 1992-93 and harboring ideas of a was a serious deterioration of political strategic partnership with Russia and relations; there were certain economic the Eurasian space in 1994 and the tensions- ! would even call them beginning of 1995, official Kyiv seems to wars-regarding Ukrainian exports to have come to the conclusion that its Russia and new taxes; and there were relations with Russia should be, in many examples of actual psychological Kuchrna's words, "equal, mutually warfare when both countries published beneficial, and respective relations of materials presenting the other country two European states based on the norms in a rather negative light. All this leads of international law." However, aside me to the conclusion that Ukrainian­ from this general approach, Kyiv finds it Russian relations still remain difficult to come up with a coherent contradictory and unstable. Today the Russia strategy. This is not in the least term "perverse stability" was used. I due to the fact that Russia itself has so agree with this term. I would also use

4 the term "a stability of instability." If we This dependence on Russia and the look at the last five years of Ukrainian­ size factor in Ukrainian-Russian Russian relations, they were rmcertain, relations leads to the fact that Ukraine is but they were stably rmcertain. There mu0 more interested in finding quick were no major changes for the better or solutions to the remaining problems in the worse. There were certain periods of its relations with Russia, while Russia is tension and then periods of more or less not in a hurry to finally settle all the normalization. But in general they have issues that we have discussed here. So remained uncertain. far Ukrainian-Russian relations have been defined mainly by the position of In estimating today's Ukrainian­ Russian relations, I would also like to Russia, given the size factor and the level of dependence of one cormtry on challenge the assertion of the one-sidedness of Ukraine's economic the other. Ukraine's policy has been dependence on Russia that was mostly reactive rather than proactive. sometimes presented during our Only in the last year has Ukraine tried to conference. I would point rather to the be proactive in its relations with Russia. remaining significant mutual It has tried on certain occasions to use interdependence and complementarity the domestic situation in Russia (first of of Russian and Ukrainian economic all connected with the presidential systems. In this regard, I cannot elections) to take the initiative in its completely agree with Professor relations with Russia. For the most part Smolansky, who gave a very interesting this has failed. presentation on Ukraine's fuel and However, despite its largely reactive energy dependence on Russia. Russia Russian policy, Kyiv can still do much also depends on economic cooperation more to strengthen its position vis-a-vis with Ukraine, especially if we take into Moscow and to improve bilateral accormt the fact that Ukraine is the world's largest consumer and transport relations. First of all, Kyiv itself still has route for Russian gas and oil, offering to clearly decide to what extent it can Europe's lowest tariff for this rapproche with Russia, in what areas it transportation. Ukraine annually can-I do not want to use the word consumes 50-55 billion cubic meters of integrate-move closer, and in what Russian gas, and each year up to 200 areas any kind of rapprochement is billion cubic meters of gas and about 10 completely rmacceptable for Kyiv. There million tons of oil are piped through is no clarity in this approach, at least in Ukrainian territory. On the whole, my opinion. Given Russia's size, it Ukraine accormts for more t.~an 50 seems to me that Ukraine could be percent of Russia's trade with the CIS much more active in establishing cormtries. The question here is why relations with Russian regions Ukraine is largely losing from its (especially with those where Ukraine "neighbomess" with Russia. For has specific economic interests), with example, why can the Baltic cormtries Russian media, and even creating benefit from their geographic proximity friends or a lobbying group in the to Russia? Why, despite having the same Russian Parliament. So far, Ukraine has energy dependence on Russia, can the done nothing in this regard. Also, it Baltics profit from trade with Russia and seems to me that what Ukraine needs is from exporting Russian minerals to the to create a special governmental West while Ukraine is a loser in this structure which will coordinate all the game? This is, in my opinion, a serious official relations of Ukraine and various question which should be addressed. Of Ukrainian ministries and regions with course, it is clear that Ukraine is still Russia. There is no positive coordination more dependent on Russia. of Ukraine's Russian policy. 5 Now for a few words about the transition process and on the success of future of Ukrainian-Russian relations as its integration into Europe. If Ukraine I understand it. First of all, given the fact succeeds in becoming a legitimate part that transformation in both countries is of Central Europe and in strengthening far from being completed and that the its relationship with the European process of transformation is very Union and with NATO, it will be more complex for both countries, it is confident and will be perceived by practically impossible to predict all Russia as a more equal partner. Then possible scenarios for the future. Some relations have a good chance of being unexpected developments can still take normalized. place in Ukrainian-Russian relations. In the short run, Ukrainian-Russian I want to say a few words about the relations will remain uncertain and in nature of the Ukrainian-NATO this sense unstable, corresponding to agreement which was discussed here their defined status of "perverse yesterday. There were a few titles used: stability." Russia still wants to be a great "special partnership" or "distinctive power and wants to assert its great partnership." In my understanding, it power status. Ukraine is definitely should be neither special nor distinctive. perceived as a key in asserting this In the long run, the role of this status and Russian pressure on Ukraine agreement and its importance for will continue. The fact that Ukraine is Ukraine will depend a lot on whether it still too weak to withstand that pressure will forever fix special status for Ukraine will continue to contribute to the in Europe or whether it will become one development of Ukrainian-Russian more major step towards Ukraine's relations. In the long run, I believe there gradual integration into Europe. If it is are two major scenarios that are the former, this will definitely lead to a possible. The first scenario is that weakening of Ukraine's position with Ukrainian-Russian relations will remind Russia. In the latter case, this agreement us more or less of American-Canadian will really contribute to Ukraine's relations. They will develop into stable stability, the stability of all of Europe, relations of two sovereign and more or and the stability of Ukrainian-Russian less equal partners. Under the second, relations. Thank you. less preferable scenario, Ukraine will Ian Brzezinski: Thank you. Dr. remain overdependent on Russia and Torbakov? will continue to be a subject of Russian pressure. Igor Torbakov: Thank you. I seem to be the only representative of the Today, Ukrainian-Russian relations Moscow academia here, so I will try to are asymmetrical. This asymmetry in present a Russian angle-naturally in a itself has the potential for conflict and good neighborly way--and will talk tension between Ukraine and Russia. In about the perceptions and stereotypes of this regard, two events could help in Ukrainians that Russians have been normalizing Ukrainian-Russian shaped over the past 200--300 years. I relations: first, if Ukraine becomes will talk about things that may seem strongereconornically;andsecond-­ immaterial, but I do believe that these and this is very important--if Ukraine things powerfully affect the current becomes part of some larger decision-making process in Moscow. international entity. Then the country will start feeling more confident and Historical sources testify that at the will become a more equal partner in its time of the first contacts between the relations with Russia. To make this two peoples in the beginning of the 17th possible, a lot will depend on Ukraine's Century, Muscovites viewed Ukrainians ability to progress with its internal not as close, kindred, and intelligible 6 Slavic brothers, but rather as aliens and nobility, accepted its culture-naturally strangers. AB one Russian observer, Ivan the Russian one-and itself started Pereverzev (a resident of my native actively participating in its further Kharkiv) noted at the end of the 18th development. century, as a result of the separation from Northern Rus, Southern Rus-that This has, however, led to another is Ukraine-had been forced to very important tum in the evolution of transform its ancestors' tongue, "to the stereotype of Ukrainians. Since change into foreign dress, to work out practically the entire Ukrainian new forms of housekeeping, to change representative class became Russian in its mores and character." In a word, terms of language and culture, the Little "this fateful separation transformed its Russian language and more important, inhabitants in such a way that there the people who spoke it, came to be emerged a foreign nation." True, since viewed as something distorted, ugly, the 14th to mid-17th Century, Russians and ludicrous. They became the target and Ukrainians belonged to different of snobbish jibes and arrogant mockery. political and cultural worlds. After the Following the example of contemporary "reunification," this extremely Polish writers, the little Russian important historical fact inevitably vernacular came to be used only in resulted in mutual mistrust, suspicion, comedies, parody dialogues and scenes, and misunderstanding. The difference scabbarous satirical songs, etc. As can be in interpreting the nature of the political seen in the treaties and poetics penned alliance concluded in 1654 has led to the by Mitrofan Dovgalevsky, even a emergence of an important component theoretical basis for such literary part of a stereotype of Ukrainians, practice appeared. namely an unreliable partner or a traitor. The great Russian historian of the 19th During the first half of the 19th Century, Sergei Solovyov, wrote that the Century, the image of Ukraine and word cherkashenin-that is Ukrainian­ Ukrainians in the perception of Russians was synonymous with treason long has undergone some modification. before 1709. IvanMazepa's so-called Despite the centralizing efforts of the betrayal has just become a final chord in imperial government, a number of the shaping of the stereotype. ethnographic differences between Great During the entire 18th Century, the Russia and Little Russia persisted and Russian imperial government was more arrested the attention of observers. or less successfully struggling with such Travelling in Ukraine in 1803, Pavel historical relics as lxal rites and Surnarokov sees, for instance, "different privileges. The regions with certain faces, different manners, different dress, internal administrative differences had different ways," and hears "a different to be brought to a common denominator. language." "Does here run the As Empress Catherine the Great had boundary of the empire? Am I entering picturesquely put it, they needed "to be a foreign land?" he asks. In 1830, Nikolai russified," "lest they look like wolves in Polevoi was informing his readers that the forest." Provincialization of in case they would like to travel to the Ukrainian life as a result of the south of Moscow beyond the Desna administrative practices of the central River, they would find themselves government on the one hand, and of the "among people completely different irresistible appeal of high imperial from us pure Russians. The language, culture on the other, were slowly but dress, faces, appearance, way of life, surely making themselves felt. The houses, opinions, beliefs look absolutely Cossack starshina (the 18th Century different." "Moreover," he said, "they Ukrainian elite) merged with Russian still look at us with hostility."

7 In the first half of the 19th Century, formation of stereotypes is concerned, it however, Russians were neither afraid is interesting to look at three famous of nor even irritated by such an attitude. disputes: first between Mikhail From their point of view, this was Maksimovich and Mikhail Pogodin; simply the reaction of uneducated second between Mykola Kostomarov plebeians. The Ukrainian nobility, while and Mikhail Katkov; and third between preserving a certain ethnographic Bohdan Kistyakovsky and Peter Struve. interest in native antiquities, remained Thus to Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov, an politically totally loyal to the Russian influential journalist in the 1860s, an crown and in its majority did not attempt to distinguish Russians and express signs of a special-distinct from Ukrainians represented "a scandalous Great Russians'-national consciousness. and preposterous sophism." Like In general, Ukraine was perceived by Vissarion Belinsky, he maintained that the enlightened Russian public as a "Ukraine has never had a distinctive certain ideal Rousseauistic world, an history, has never been a separate state. idyllic land of plenty. "Little Russia is The Ukrainian people are a purely another Italy!" emotionally exclaimed Russian people, a primeval Russian Prince Shalikov. This seems to be an people, an essential part of the Russian early corroboration of llya Prizel's thesis people, without which the Russian which he set forth yesterday. people cannot go on being what they are." From Katkov's point of view, there The situation changed by the end of could be "no rivalry between the the 1840s. The development of events southern and the northern part of one both inside and outside the Russian and the same nationality, just as there empire (suffice it to mention the could be no rivalry between the two European Spring of Nations in 1848 and hands, between the two eyes of one and the new stage of Ukrainian national the same and living organism." It is movement connected with the noteworthy, though, that the Brotherhood of Cyrill and Methodius) representatives of the Russian could not fail to put the authorities on intelligentsia who were polemicizing guard. These events also affected the with the Ukrainian intellectuals had, as attitude of the Russian intellectual class the journal Ukrainskaya Zhizn put it in towards the subtly emerged "Ukrainian 1912, "an extremely vague idea of question" and revived the dormant old Ukrainian national rebirth, its history stereotypes and prejudices. Within this and current state, the aspirations and context, it is easier to understand, for needs of Ukrainian people and even example, the Ukrainophobia of the Ukrainian literature." The political Russian literary critic Belinsky who sympathies of several true experts and compared Ukrainian history with a genuine Russian Ukrainophiles like grotesque style in art. It is no wonder Academicians Pypin, Shakhmatov, and that Belinsky is considered to be the Korsh also had their limits. Having founding father not only of Russian learned of the First Universal of the liberalism but also of liberal nationalism, Ukrainian Central Rada, Alexei an intellectual trend popular today with Shakhmatov irritatingly exclaimed, the majority of current Russian "Non possemus!" that is, "We will not politicians. allow!"

The second half of the 19th Century The dramatic events of the and the beginning of the 20th Century Ukrainian vyzvolni zmahannya and p assed in the Russian Empire under attempts at building an independent signs of administrative and intellectual Ukrainian state had further aggravated struggle with the growing Ukrainian relations between Russians and national movement. As far as the Ukrainians. For the two Great Russian

8 political camps, both Reds and Whites which one of the peoples considered its alike, an independent Ukraine was national state. For the Russians-at least unacceptable. As the future head of the from the end of the 18th Century to the Ukrainian Soviet government, Grigorii present day-it is psychologically very Pyatakov stated with a Bolshevik's difficult to view Ukrainians as bluntness, "all talk of independent full-blooded "aliens." Cultural and Ukraine is out of the question because linguistic kinship on the one hand, and this is a nationalist invention." One may the local existence within the common assume that this point of view was body politic on the other, had led to a readily shared by General Anton situation where Russians always saw in Denikin as well. The rapid growth of Ukrainians not so much a genuine Ukrainophobia in the course of the "stranger" as a "distorted self." In the hostilities as of 1917-21 was artistically circumstances of an overwhelming reflected, by the way, in Volodymyr domination of Russian culture and Vynnychenko's play Between the Two artificial marginalization of Ukrainian Forces. culture similar phenomena were perceived not as "strange," but rather as Although the Bolsheviks had won a parody of "one's own." In politically the civil war, they had to pursue a more neutral situations, such a parody or less flexible policy of ukrainizatsiya in prompts one to laugh, but when the whose framework they tried somehow "quasi-strange" entity tries to prove its to harmonize Moscow's centralizing sovereignty and independence the first efforts with the still strong aspirations natural reaction of a psychologically for independence on the part of the unprepared person is a perplexed borderland republics. Nevertheless, this irritation and anger. It is exactly these inconsistent policy has resulted in an emotions that seem always to have intensive nationalist rebirth in Ukraine taken the upper hand in Moscow when and the forming of a sizeable cultural it has to deal with Kyiv. class there. But at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s this policy How long will such a situation last? w as abruptly interrupted and both the A lot depends on the evolution of ultra-revolutionary and the new Ukrainian society itself. So far, one can Ukrainian elite were mercilessly observe a dramatic contradiction destroyed. The next, and probably between the Ukrainian elite's words and the most destructive wave of deeds. Almost from the first days of provincialization of Ukrainian life and independence, Ukraine's authorities culture began, which lasted until the tried to distance themselves from very end of the 1980s. During this last Moscow and announced a policy period, the stereotype of Ukrainian has ending their country's transformation finally shaped in the consciousness of an into a modem European state. These overwhelming majority of Russians intentions were not, however, supported which has now a direct influence on by either national consensus--which is Russia's current Ukrainian policy. demonstrated by the results of numerous opinion polls-or a single To sum things up, something truly political will of the elite. Some analysts "strange" can either be acceptable or correctly point out that Ukraine has unacceptable, but its very strangeness rather radically civilized its foreign and distinctiveness compel one to notice policy, but at the same time remained an it and regard its claims to independence outsider in carrying out internal seriously What we are dealing with reforms. This prevents Ukraine from here, however, is two peoples who have moving beyond formal diplomatic lived for quite a long time within the successes to strengthen its position in framework of a single state, a state the international community So,

9 Ukrame is distancing itself from the Ukrame in the presidential elections of Moscow-led Eurasian integration 1999 and in Russia in the year 2000. process, and is incapable of realizing the Imagine, there will be no improvement European alternative. Thus, it finds itself in the economics of both countries. It is in a geopolitically undefined situation. realistic and possible, then, that in Kyiv Representatives of the elite proclaim and Moscow there will be a change of Ukrame is a Central European country power. In Russia, a nationalistic leader whereas in fact, both politically and could still be elected as president. In economically she still remains a Ukrame, a pro-Russian, communist­ typically post-Soviet Eurasian nation. oriented politican may emerge in the This, of course, provides Moscow with eastern parts of the country who would additional trump cards. It makes it divert Ukrainian politics closer towards easier for Russia's political class to Russia and away from the West. That is ignore historical and cultural differences a negative scenario from the Western between Ukrainians and Russians and point of view. It would mean that the strengthen already existing stereotypes pace of both countries' integration to of Ukrame and Ukrainians. As long as Europe would slow down. Conflicts Ukrame retains its uncertam and may emerge between these two precarious status, Moscow-relying on economically suffering countries. In my persisting Eurasian similarities-will opinion, neither Russia nor Ukrame continue to exert economic and political could survive outside this globalization influence upon Kyiv. Thank you. process and should seek to realize the first scenario (together and not one by Ian Brzezinski: Thank you Igor. We one). now have Alexander Rahr. What seems clear is-and here I Alexander Rahr: Thank you Mr. completely agree with what has been Chairman. I start with two possible said by my predecessors-we do not scenarios in Russian-Ukrainian foresee any real rapprochement between relations-one positive, one negative. the Russian and Ukrainian elite at that time. My personal opinion is that the The positive one, which I hope will competition and mistrust between the materialize, would happen if Russia and Moscow and Kyiv elites will continue Ukrame succeed with economic and for at least one if not two generations. democratic reform, with transition to a That is easy to explam. Moscow civilized world. Of course this would suspects Kyiv of having a secret agenda happen with Western assistance, which with the West--of trying to break up the will strengthen Western influence over CIS and isolate Russia from Europe. Russian-Ukrainian affairs, politics, and Kyiv suspects that Moscow wants to economics and move both countries rebuild the empire, drive Ukraine into closer to the West. Russia and Ukrame, its orbit, and not let Ukrame join the according to this positive scenario, could European structures. It may be that after join the globalization processes and the foreseeable Russian-Belarusian European integration, maybe in 15-20 union, which I think will materialize by years. Both countries may become the year 2000, the conflict and the members in the World Trade mistrust between Russian and Organization and in the European Ukrainian elites will deepen. Union-probably even Russia in twenty years-and eventually both in NATO or What should our reaction in the what will remam of NATO. West be to developments in Russian­ Ukrainian relations? I think the West There is a negative scenario as well. I should engage more strongly in conflict think we will face a moment of truth in prevention. Many things have already 10 been done, very positively, very build up alternative energy supplies and effectively, and other steps are being thus escape Russia's dominance. At the conducted now. A good move, from my same time, we should also deal carefully. point of view, is the buildup of a special We should not prevent, from my point military arrangement between NATO of view, a closer Russian-Ukrainian and Russia which is accompanied economic integration if both countries simultaneously by similar arrangements want that, because European markets between NATO and Ukraine. I think this will remain closed to Russia and trilateral approach of the West is the key Ukraine for a couple of years. Speaking yo stabilization of Russian-Ukrainian from a European perspective, I think it is relations-not doing anything special in the interest of the European Union to with Russia by doing the same with try to establish trade relations with Ukraine. We see this not only in the Russia and Ukraine as long as they do emerging relations between NATO­ not meet the conditions to become Russia and NATO-Ukraine, but also in members of the European Union. the partnership which Russia and Politically, of course, Ukraine should be Ukraine are conducting now with the oriented toward the European Union, European Union. toward the West. ?artnership for Peace activities are Also, recently there has been a lot of also a very important step to stabilize pressure by the West on Ukraine to sign relations with Russia-Ukraine and the Friendship and Cooperation treaties insure peace on the European continent. with Romania and Poland. We welcome But from my point of view, we have to that Ukraine and Russia succeeded in alter the agenda a little bit. So far, NATO signing the Cooperation treaty. What is has done a lot to strengthen the also clear at this stage is that the West Partnership for Peace activities with cannot defend Ukraine militarily from Ukraine--for example, maneuvers Russia. That means- and Sherman has around the Black Sea will be conducted said it quite clearly-that we therefore this August. I think that we should also have to convince Ukraine that it should direct our attention towards Russia. We establish, first of all, a good relationship should convince Russia that it is in with Moscow in order to guarantee its Moscow's interest to participate in and sovereignty and economic well-being on to strengthen Partnership for Peace the European continent. K yiv cannot activities with the West, not at the rely on premature Western promises expense of Russia but for peace and the which the West really cannot uphold. strengthening of European security on That may also lead to wrong the continent. conclusions in Kyiv that the more anti-Russian Kyiv's policy becomes, the In the long run, after the first wave faster it will be integrated into the West. of expansion of NATO, until NATO has I think it is exactly the opposite. There is been expanded a second or third time, a feeling in the European Union that if these Partnership for Peace there will be trouble between Russia and arrangements could provide both Ukraine, the Europeans will shrink Ukraine and Russia with a status very away from integrating Ukraine into the close to NATO membership. Then, West. On the other hand, if there is no through economic pressure from the trouble, then integration will go llv1F and the World Bank, the West smoothly. should try to relieve Ukrainian dependence on Russia. If possible--and Sherman has also said that the this w as also mentioned yesterday United States should push the European during the economic session-we Union closer to Ukraine, or Ukraine should try to find ways for Ukraine to closer to the European Union. I would like to debate this in a couple of Union. There is no question about that. statements. I will also say a few words A European Union action plan on about German views of Ukraine. In Ukraine was adopted in December 1996. 1991-92 the Ukrainian elite laid many It is a very ambitious plan, but it shows hopes on Germany. There were very that the European Union is eager to help high expectations that Germany-in Ukraine. Chemobyl remains a particular after the reunification­ stumbling block on the path to this would give strong assistance to Ukraine cooperation. Although they are to strengthen its sovereignty and probably hardly seen in the United integration into the Western world. They States, environmental issues are very also believed that Germany would need high on the agenda of the European Ukraine as a military partner and as a Union and Ukraine. The second western ally against Moscow. This stumbling block is criminality, also felt expectation did not materialize. This is in Europe-drug trafficking, mafia probably because, first of all, Germany activities, racketeering--coming not does not regard itself as a big economic only from Russia, but from the entire power yet. Moreover, in its foreign and CIS territory. European states, especially economic policy Germany is very much Germany, feel threatened by this oriented towards the European Union, criminality and have to find a common toward creating and strengthening the means to address that challenge. Third, new European Union first and only then failure to establish a legal basis in the looking towards the East. That means economic system prevents German that Ukraine has probably overestimated investments from reaching Ukrainian Germany's and Europe's capacity. markets.

This brings me to the relations of I think I will stop here with some Ukraine with the European Union. food for thought. Ukraine could be disappointed with the European Union and Germany's Ian Brzezinski: Thank you Alexander. approach. But at the same time, it may Our last speaker is Roman. also be that some European states are disappointed with Ukraine's relations with Europe as well. If Ukraine says that Roman Solchanyk: Thank you Ian. Let it wants to join the West, it means that it me begin by making some excuses, wants close cooperation with the United which lately I find myself doing all the States. That is important for Kyiv. time. Part one of the excuse: As Dr. Ukraine has not yet developed a real Pavliuk mentioned earlier, all of us who sense of European identity. It has not have been here for the p ast two days joined the debate on the creation of a have heard about Ukrainian-Russian common European foreign and security relations in one way or another. It seems policy without the United States. In to be injecting itself into all kinds of Germany, of course, the question is discussions about Ukraine. On the one whether Ukraine will contribute more to hand, that is to be expected. On the the European unification or to the other hand, I think it makes it very strengthening of the European difficult when you have a special panel transatlantic alliance. Will Ukraine be a that deals with Ukrainian-Russian very close ally of the United States in relations. We are talking about Europe or will Ukraine in a couple of essentially the same kinds of problems, years join the family of European perhaps in different kinds of ways, that nations? That is a question which has people mentioned earlier. So here we not yet been answered. But efforts are are, people's patience is wearing thin being made and should be made to and we are at the end of the line. That is move Ukraine closer to the European a sort of general problem. 12 The second part of my excuse is can probably be negotiated. I think very personal. Within, I think, the last under the conditions of abnormality, three to four months I have been in you have a pretty difficult problem Washington about three or four times. I resolving normal issues. If you begin recognize quite a number of faces here with that kind of perspective, then it who have already heard my sermon becomes difficult to deal with things before. So this puts me in a position that once certain assumptions are made my professor used to call avtoplagiat, sort between two states. of self-plagiarism-trying to find ways of saying the same thing in different Obviously, relations between ways. I told this story to Professor Ukraine and Russia may be moving in Bilinsky and Professor Smolansky. It is the direction of normality, but it seems not the first time this is happening to to me that there is a fair amount of me. I remember talking to my professor evidence that this will probably take a once saying "I had some problems in long time. This is because of what trying to formulate these things. It Sherm referred to as psychological seems that I am repeating myself. I layers, From Dmitrii Ryurikov's concept cannot come up with any new ideas." of special relations, and so on, all of He said, "Well, you are not the only one these are codewords for really an who has this problem. There are very abnormal situation. Again, I am not few people who really have anything saying anything new here, although I original to say. There were some people w ould like to think that because I was who had new ideas all the time, but they writing about some of these things back all died several hundred years ago." So, in Munich five, six, maybe seven years this is where I am and I sincerely ago, I am happy to see that other people apologize to the familiar faces who have are also looking at it this way There is a probably heard parts of this in some new publication that Chatham House different way in December, again in put out very recently on Ukraine by a February, and then again three weeks Norwegian author called Tor Bukkvoll. ago atCSIS. He devotes about 75 percent of his treatment of Ukrainian security In any case, after all my excuses, I problems to Ukrainian-Russian am going to make some very simple relations, and he begins precisely with statements. Number one, during the this problem of abnormality So maybe p ast 5-51/2 years, it seems to me one in spite of my excuses today, maybe I h as every right to say that relations did do something a bit original back in between Ukraine and Russia since 1988-89. December 1991 have been largely strained, largely conflictual. They In any case, the problem, I think, is remain fundamentally unstable, and really quite fundamental. That does not most important, I think they remain mean we should not look at how to abnormal. The term "abnormal" needs resolve the Black Sea Fleet, how to deal to be dealt with a little. It is obviously with assets and debts, or how to deal very important to talk about specific with energy dependency, but my problems, whether it is the Black Sea argument has been that the relationship fleet, the former Soviet Union's assets is historically shaped and molded. By and debts, what is going to be the status that very fact, because it is a product of of Sevastopol, or energy dependency history, it is not something that is going and pipelines. These are the kinds of to be negotiated away between Mr. things with which most countries have Lazarenko and Mr. Chernomyrdin or problems in one form or another. But their successors. I think from a rustorical those problems, it seems to me, are perspective, what Igor told us basically either resolved or not resolved, or they contributes to what I am saying.

13 Let me put the abnormality this way: approach Russia in their negotiations on What makes the Ukrainian-Russian the basis of some sort of laws. "Why do relationship unique? Let us think of it in we need laws when we are so close?" the following terms: whether we refer to it as neo-imperialism-I do not like to So the second logical thing, I think, use the terms neo-imperialism or is not something you can put your expansionism, since these are all loaded finger on, it is not empirical evidence, terms-what makes the Ukrainians and but it is there. What this leads to in the Belarusians different (I think we concrete terms is that-and if I had to, I tend to forget about the Belarusians) is could produce public opinion that from the Russian standpoint, polls-certainly as far as the political Ukrainians and Belarusians are different and cultural elites in Russia are than other former Soviet nationalities. concerned, they face a difficult problem Russians may have designs on Armenia, with coming to terms with the fact that or on northern Kazakhstan or this place called Ukraine really exists. Kazakhstan as a whole. They may have They understand that it is there--there security interests in Transdniester, or is even a Ukrainian Embassy in specific views about how to handle Moscow. I am sure that really was quite Abkhazia, but this is all power politics. something for the person who is What makes Ukraine and Russia walking to the subway to go to work different is while Russians have little everyday to see a blue and yellow flag problem agreeing with the fact that yes, in Moscow. In real terms, how can this Armenians are Armenians, Georgians state really be? It is anti-historical. It is are Georgians, Latvians are Latvians, not zakonomerno, if you want to put it that is not the status of Ukrainians and that way. So that is problem number Belarusians. I cannot put it any more one. simply. Armenians are Armenians, there is no problem with that. Mr. Ryurikov or The other half of the problem has Mr. Yeltsin or Mr. Chemomyrdin will not been mentioned here as much. I call not tell you that"Armenians are part the Ukrainian-Russian relationship a of our soul," which is how Mr. two way street. That is, Ukraine is not Chernomyrdin talks about Ukraine. "It just the consumer of this relationship. is difficult, we love them so much, we The nature of the relationship not only love how they sing and dance. They are defines and tells us things about Russia, part of our soul. What would we be but its outcome--let us call it the without these people?" These are some normalization of the relationship (and of the things that Igor was talking about. this may be a kind of loaded term as They do not talk about Georgians like well)-willlead to the normalization of that. "Georgians may be lazy, they may Russia itself. We can find any number of be this, they may be that. Central Asians, phrases for this: the normalization of they drink too much tea and do not Russia, the successful solution to its want to work." Their essential identity identity problem. Basically Ukraine is clear. This is not the case with impacts on Russia not in empirical Ukrainians and Belarusians. That is my terms (although this is the case as well, point of departure. That is what makes as a consumer of oil and gas or as a the situation abnormal.; that explains supplier of sugar), but in how Russians what Mr. Ryurikov means by "special actually perceive themselves. This is relationship." Why should Mr. Ryurikov admittedly quite a crucial problem if want a special relationship with you are not quite sure who you are and Ukraine? Why can they not have a where Russia is. I remember years ago normal relationship with Ukraine? Mr. during the perestroika period when Ivan Ryurikov is genuinely perplexed and Drach, who was a major political figure confused about why Ukrainians in Rukh, was talking about Ukrainian- 14 Russian relations. I do not know if this is contemporary Ukraine as a whole a real story or not, but he told a story have ever been and are not now a about a Russian tourist from Tambov nation in the contemporary Western comes to Kyiv for the first time and sees understanding of that term." 1 all the sights-St. Sophia's, and this and This is 1997, March, I want to repeat. that. He turns to the tour guide and What he means is that in spite of the says, "Excuse me, could you please tell United States' policy in trying to drive a me, when did the Ukrainians steal all wedge between the forever united this from us?" It is the same as what Russian and Ukrainian peoples, the facts Igor, in one of the recent articles he show that Ukraine and Ukrainians are a wrote in a K yiv newspaper, remarks fiction, perhaps even a conspiracy. about many Russians who look at Ukraine and do not really see Ukrainians, but rather a funny, distorted Ian Brzezinski: Thank you very much. image of Russians. These Ukrainians are We have had some, I think, very really Russians, they just do not know it colorful, very substantive presentations yet. So, the second part is this sort of on why we have a "perverse" :Jr two way street. "abnormal" relationship between Ukraine and Russia. I would like to start I do not want to bore you with long out with a very basic question. We have quotations, that is not really necessary. talked about the history of the Sort of by accident right before I left relationship, we have talked about its California I made a photocopy of the current status, and Alexander talked journal SShA, which is published by a about steps that the West shoU:.d be very reputable institution, namely the taking to add stability to the relationship. Institute for the USA and Canada. It has I would be interested in the panelists' an article here in the March issue about insight into how exactly NATO certain American stereotypes with enlargement is likely to affect that regard to Ukraine. It is a criticism of an relationship. article that was co-authored by one of our panelists here, Dr. Pavliuk, together Particularly, what is most likely to with John Mroz in Foreign Affairs. To occur at the Madrid Summit in July make a long story short, let me just read when the alliance will extend invitations you one quick quote. Not only does this to some central European states of remind one of the Soviet Union, but I which Ukraine will not be a part? Is it think it emphasizes the degree to which going to make it more difficult for things have not changed. This is 1997, Ukrainians or is it something that is not 1907: going to somehow enhance Ukraine's relationship vis-a-vis Russia? "So, the conclusion presents itself, that in spite of the American Sherman Garnett: I think my colleague stereotypes that have held on since set it up best by saying the test of this is Cold War times neither ethnic going to be whether it perpetuates a Ukrainians as such nor the sense of distinctiveness about Ukraine multinational population of or whether it is a step towards Europe. I

1 " TaKHM o6pa3oM, no.n:yqaercsr, 'ITO BonpeKH ycrosrBJ:.u:eM}'csr co BpeMeH xoJio,n;Holi Boffin,r aMepm<:aHCKOM crepeonmy no)J.JIHHHoe np~JILHOe C03,Il;rurn:e YKPaHHCKOH Ha_wrn c n mrnJieHHeM MHOrO"'lliCJieHHOH Hau;HOHaJihHOI1: mrreJIJIIiTeHUHH H 3.JIHTbie C03,Il;aHe ycro~oe XOTSf H oprafftlqeHHOH YKPaHHCKOH r ocy,Il;apCTBeHHOCTH HaqaJIOCh KaK pa3 B paMKax <>." S. M . Samuilov , "0 nekotorykh amerikansk ikh stereotipakh v otnoshenii Ukrainy" SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, (March 1997), p . 90.

15 think we are going to have a number of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship and issues to deal with. I will just list a the very ambiguous Ukrainian-U.S. couple of them and we can talk about security relationship has some them in discussion. instabilities to it that I do not like very much. I think the hole there has to be There is a need for Ukraine to nestle filled by Europe. It has to be filled by a itself in Europe in total and not just in willing Europe and it has to be filled by the security area. In fact, I think there is a Ukraine that wants to be European. a danger of a NATO-Ukrainian But NATO enlargement is to me, just the partnership being seen by others who first step. Whether it is a wise thing for do not want to do very much on Ukraine or not depends on how we all economics or politics (whether in use it afterwards. Ukraine, the United States, or in Europe) as an excuse: "Here it is. We have Oleksandr Pavliuk: I would like to already done something in NATO. We expand a little bit on the issue of the role do not need to do anything else." But of Ukraine's integration into Europe. I NATO does not solve Ukraine's security want to emphasize that, as of today, it is problem, nor will it. clear that Ukraine is not ready to be a full participant in European integration The other thing is it perpetuates a economically, politically, or security relationship between the United psychologically. This is clear. Nobody States and Ukraine that is not well says today that Ukraine should be defined. I gather if you took a poll of admitted to the European Union and to people about what we committed to in NATO. The problem is, however, that in defense of Ukraine, there would be a fact there exists a certain conceptual rather wide degree of answers. And in dividing line, which pre-supposes that fact, it is a classic sort of ambiguous Europe could be united and integrated relationship where some of us are trying up to a certain border in the east, and to suggest there is more to it than there some countries (Ukraine is among in fact is. Or, maybe there is more to it them) will never join this new integrated than many of us think and we will wake Europe. Consequently, Ukraine may up one day and discover "Holy moly, find itself in a situation where it will not we have to do this and not this." I am be encouraged to do much in terms of not sure that is good or bad. I am just internal reforms. Today Ukraine is in a saying that the key to it is really how far situation where society is not structured; Europe extends. This is my point that where there is corruption; where very Sasha took on earlier. I think Europe often interests of various clans dominate needs to extend quite far and it cannot the political and economic decisions in just be NATO. The European Union the country; and where, due to the needs to catch up. If I took the subtext of forthcoming parliamentary and what Sasha said- that Ukraine has to presidential elections, both the president become more European and less and parliament are hesitant to take any dependent on the U.S.-I think the radical steps in terms of economic difference in international relations on transformation so as not to undermine our side as opposed to that part of the their popularity At this particular world is that I am quite happy with that. moment the only force which I I do not see Ukraine becoming a personally see that can push the European state as a zero sum thing and Ukrainian leadership toward further that we lose influence there. The key in internal reforms is Western pressure on the long run is for them to be healthy, the one hand, and, on the other, the wealthy, and wise, so this is not a realization that if Ukraine fulfills certain problem for me. The permanent conditions, it can be a legitimate part of extension of both the unsettled nature of the larger integrated Europe. Europe 16 should say "It is up to you. If you do challenge for Europe in the future. I this, we perceive you as a potential full think this priority agenda is now participant in the European integration changing, and we in the West are process, but you have to fulfill certain understanding more and more that the conditions." If this is made clear, it stabilization of Central Eastern Europe would be to the benefit of everybody in is important, but equally important is Europe and Ukraine and to the benefit finding a solution that would of Ukrainian-Russian relations. incorporate Russia and Ukraine in a unilateral agreement (about which I Ian Brzezinski: Before I pass the spoke in my short presentation) in the microphone on, the focus of my European security system. I think it is question was "What is the likely impact very important to increase Partnership on the relationship?" as opposed to for Peace activities, as I said, parallel "What would we like it to be?" Are with Ukraine and Russia. And similarly there any responses we should be important is to give a concrete anticipating- perhaps on the part of perspective to both countries that they Russia-to NATO enlargement? will be part of a common European Alexander? security system, not now, but in ten, fifteen, or twenty years. Alexander Rahr: Well I think that the Of course it will also depend on the problems for us will only start after the Ukrainian elite. There is a split in the first wave of expansion. If Poland, Ukrainian elite. On the one hand there is Hungary, and the Czech Republic will Horbulyn, Tarasiuk, and Khryshchenko, become members of NATO, of course who w ant to join NATO in the next the pressure on the West will increase three to four years. On the other, there is from those countries which will not be the faction of Udovenko and Kuchma part of the first wave. One of the biggest who do not want to join at the present challenges for future European security time. So it will have to be seen how far issues will be Ukrainian pressure, the political elite of Ukraine itself will pressure from K yiv and Moscow on sort out this difference and define a NATO to do something in the new course towards NATO. situation.

It is clear that Russia has no military Roman Solchanyk: If Ian is demanding means to threaten the West, Ukraine, or a direct response to a pretty direct even the Baltic states in the next 4-5 question, I think I can say something. I years. But the question which we have see two things that are quite possible in to ask ourselves is "Do we want to terms of the consequences of NATO cooperate with Russia or not?" I am not expansion. One is on the negative side sure what the West really wants. There of the balance sheet and one is are a lot of forces in Europe who are hypothetically positive. On the negative saying "Let the Russians be out of side-and again, this is not anything Europe. They are not a threat anymore, particularly profound, except that not a challenge. Let them sort out their maybe the way that I perceive it is differences and then in ten years, we somehow different-it is not just a will start talking again." I do not think question of Russia possibly exercising that this will stabilize the European some sort of levers with regard to situation. The West has so far put only Ukraine as a result of NATO expansion. one priority on its agenda, namely the stabilization of the East European I think that people have forgotten­ continent. It is not looking so much or maybe never even realized-that in towards the problem of Russia and two weeks' time the Tashkent Collective Ukraine, which is, of course, a big Security Treaty expires. It was a 17 five-year treaty, signed on May 15, 1992. meetings of foreign ministers or defense In the meantime, Uzbekistan has passed ministers. It is another thing to say a law declaring non-bloc status. I am "Aufwiedersehen, good bye, we have waiting to see whether Uzbekistan will made our choice." Whether they can violate its own legislation and sign on to implement it or not is something that the treaty in Tashkent. Why do I bring Sherm would be very good at up the Tashkent treaty? The usual questioning. But I am talking about argument is that since Ukraine is trying fundamental things. "We have said to integrate with the West, of course good bye to you. Figure out your own Russia will try to strengthen up some identity problems. Do your peacekeeping kind of security structure-Russian in Ossetia and Chechnya. Leave us politicians have said this. Lots of things alone." So that is a fundamental problem. can be said about that, but we do not It is a question of identity have the time. First of all, there are many people who quite rightly wonder On the positive side-and this is whether the Tashkent Treaty is actually a highly speculative--I see a positive real organization to begin with. And development not necessarily with second, if one follows trends in the CIS, NATO expansion, but with the charters one can see that there is an increasingly or treaties that are in the process of rapid away-from-Russia movement, being negotiated right now. It seems to even in places like Kazakhstan, which me that if Ukrainians and Russians cannot really afford to do that. Look at cannot-or have thus far proven unable the policies; at the recent visits of to-successfully resolve their problems Shevardnadze and Aliev in February and March to Ukraine; at the idea of on a bilateral basis or within the a joint Ukrainian-Georgian-Azeri framework of the CIS, special peacekeeping battalion; at developments relationships with NATO may create a in Central Asia themselves, especially certain spielraum totally different from Uzbekistan, and even Kazakhstan and the post-Soviet space where Ukraine even in little Kirghizia. I think if I were and Russia might be able to resolve in Moscow, I would be saying the same some problems. This would not thing the chairman of the Defense necessarily be a trilateral or formal Committee of the State Duma, General arrangement such as Sherm would like Lev Rokhlin is saying: "Russia does not to see, like the formal trilateral know how to make friends or it knows agreement where the January 1994 how to lose friends." denuclearization occurred. Clearly that is highly optimistic because--as Sherm Why that long introduction? First of himself will tell you-then Russia and all, it is not just a question of using the United States had overriding leverage against Ukraine. I think that interests to have a trilateral organization. what NATO expansion and what the As I asked Ms. Davis [Lynn E. Davis, stated policy of Ukraine to integrate into Under Secretary of State for Arms Western structures (including security structures) means is that now Ukraine is Control and International Security not only refusing, as it has from the very Affairs] yesterday, it takes three to tango start, to integrate into the CIS. Now in this case. If Russia does not want to Ukraine is stating "We are rejecting dance and the United States is not all Russia. We are leaving you-if we were that happy about it, then it will fall ever actually with you from our apart. But the NATO atmosphere in standpoint. We did not want to integrate Brussels creates (hypothetically) a new into your structures because we knew spielplatz for Ukraine and Russia with they were run by you." It is one thing to the presence of a third partner without I refuse to integrate into or take part in trila teralism. 18 Igor Torbakov: Just a couple of words. I U.S.-Ukrainian relations. I would like completely agree with Oleksandr you to elaborate a little bit on that. Pavliuk in that it is not the enlargement itself that matters but how far NATO Sherman Garnett: I think they are will go to the east. Because, it seems to ambiguous on two levels. One is, it is a me, the Moscow political class has classic ambiguous security relationship. somehow reconciled itself to the idea I think it is fair to say that we have gone that its "outer empire"-Poland, the the farthest of any of our allies in Czech Republic, Hungary, etc.-has understanding the importance of gone for good. But its "inner empire", Ukraine in the coming European that is the post-Soviet space, is an structure, the importance of its failure or absolutely different story. Russia's its stumbling, and the importance of the official position is that no former Russian-Ukrainian relationship. We republic of the USSR should ever have defined with Ukraine a set of become a member of the Alliance. The assurances backed by a process which is Kremlin reacts in an extremely nervous not at all the same as a treaty relationship. way to the "Atlantic aspirations" of the So when you look around and you say, Baltic countries, who view themselves "Is Ukraine Kuwait? If something as the frontrunners of the second wave happens do we have a fundamental of enlargement. But even the potential interest there?" Or is Ukraine some possibility of Ukraine's membership in other country where we stroll in and NATO-however distant it might talk about brotherhood and friendship, be-is a sheer nightmare for Russian and then stroll out if the weather is bad? politicians. Such a pos~ib~ty wo~d That is a real problem for me-and I do ruin all plans of Eurasian mtegration, not think the answer is to make it more political or otherwise, which are being explicit. This is why the other part of the worked out in Moscow. ambiguity is that our policy requires us One of the senior Russian historians, to beat up on our allies or gently Yurii Polyakov, has recently stated that persuade them so that we come to some the Ukrainian factor has a paramount kind of consensus on Ukraine. Therefore importance, because "without Ukraine it is particularly unfortunate r~ght now all integrationist attempts will be . that at the time we should be m Europe illusory." Speculating in his programmatic saying "You Europeans are all article on centripetal and centrifugal completely crazy about Ukraine" (and I trends in Russian history, he asserted do not mean to suggest that all Europe that the question of what trends are is the same) "You Europeans are slower stronger would be resolved between than we are. We are smart on this one," Konotop and Bryansk, where the they can point to a number of things Russo-Ukrainian border runs. That is that are going on in Ukraine now that why I think that after the Madrid suggest that we are not so smart. summit Moscow will go out of its way, The fundamental ambiguity for me using a stick-and-carrot policy, to bully is that we are creating certain obligations, and cajole Ukraine back into its Eurasian yet on another level, these obligations fold. are not clear, and the enthusiasm for them over time could be strained if Ian Brzezinski: I have a ton of questions Ukraine does not put its domestic house for the panel, but let us open it up to the in order. If they fail on reform that does audience. not mean Ukraine is less important. The problem is that Ukraine is simply going Question: This is a question for to be a major front-line state for NATO. Sherman. Your last thought was about It is going to be a major determinant in the fundamental ambiguity in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship and 19 of stability in that part of the world, so aggressive designs. So, again, it comes we are stuck The only way I see of down to the geopolitical problem, to getting out of this ambiguity is to try to where the border between the Western push our allies ahead, push Ukraine, world, the European world, and the and (as Sasha said) help to normalize Eurasian world runs. the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. Alexander Rahr: I think a remarkable One can understand by looking at change has taken place in the Kremlin in the really knotty problems in Western the past couple of months, following Europe that do not exist anymore that it Yeltsin's reelection. We see that the is possible to transform the situation. I priorities in Russia's foreign policy are think it is too early to give up. Wi11. this already changing. In the three years pessimism on corruption and everything, before 1996 (1993-1996) the Russian elite I think it is wrong to conclude, "Okay, wanted to reestablish superpower let's shut the door." Right now, we have status. That was the primary goal, and to be very honest about the ambiguities, everything else was subordinated to that the problems, and the lack of a finished goal. There was also the appointment of solution to this. And I think in this Primakov, whose aim was to see Russia context Ukraine and the region of again as a great power state. I think this NATO expansion becomes more has remarkably changed. We have a important, not less. new government now in Russia that has set other priorities, namely not to Question: Well, this is sort of a become a super power at any cost, but simplistic question. There has been so to join the world globalization process. much hype about NATO expansion that We see Chubais, Berezovsky, even when it actually happens we are a little General Lebed talking about the need to bit on the other side of a mountain. join the globalization process and not to Granted, there are a lot of other states rebuild the empire. I think this is a that want to join, but let us assume that change that has not been noticed in the the Czech Republic, Hungary, and West. It is very encouraging for our Poland do join NATO. Let us assume future relations with Russia and I hope that they become more integrated in that after the signing of the agreement in economic, political, and security Paris we will see a Russia with which arrangements in the West and that these we will become more cooperative. additions have demonstrated as serving absolutely no threat to Russia. Do w e Ian Brzezinski: Next? Dr. Bilinsky. begin to see a different attitude taking place in Moscow concerning NATO Question: This is a question directed to expansion? Could this lead then to, of Dr. Torbakov but also Dr. Solchanyk, or course, the integration of other anybody w ho w ould like to answ er it. countries? There was a remarkable policy paper on "Will the Soviet Union be Resurrected?" Igor Torbakov: Well, I can just repeat of 26 April1996. One of the factors listed that even if-as you said-Russia will see as facilitating a possible reintegration of that nothing threatens it on that part, it a greater Russia is the ethnic and will reconcile itself to expansion and will cultural-historical identity of Russia, idly look at how NATO might proceed Belarus, and Ukraine. First of all, wh at going eastward. Because, I remember just do you think about the idea and h ow recently, Mr. Chernomyrdin was on his weighty is that Council of Karaganov? visit to the U.S. (if I am not mistaken) Thank you. when he said privately that the Russian elite does not perceive NATO as a threat Igor Torbakov: Well, my answer and does not believe N ATO has any will be rather brief because I think other 20 people will talk about this. I am not a I think they are true. In fact, if he political scientist, I am a historian. I do becomes the true founder of a European not know much about the Karaganov Ukraine he probably will be the next Council, but I do believe it is a fairly president. The scenario that I see most influential think tank, because from time likely right now-and for which I to time it issues certain memos and w ould blame everyone in Ukraine-is papers which are then used in the that the next two years are going to be decision making process. Moreover, we eaten up in politics among a group of can see parts of these documents people in the center that ought to be included in some important working together. I can only conclude governmental and strategic documents. that they must be under the assumption As for this particular issue, it that there is no fundamental danger for strengthens my point. Despite the Ukraine right now from Russia or from current shift in foreign policy priorities, anywhere else. So despite the fact that about which Sasha Rahr was speaking, I they say that after NATO enlargement agree that something now is changing_ R•.. : ssia could do this, that, or the other, but this is a principled issue. I do not there is really a lot of complacency. If think that this change pertains to they w ere really afraid that the day after Ukraine. Of course, it is not that some NATO Russia will turn off the gas or kind of raw force will be implemented invade, they would not be behaving this to integrate Ukraine and to incorporate way. it illto the body of a new empire. But some mechanisms of "soft empire" I have been a very big fan of tactics can be used. Kuchma, but I think the regime has lost its momentum. What I hear now is "in Q uestion: My first question is for Sherm 1999 we will regain it." I do not think Garnett. You pointed at the gap between, they can wait until1999. And I do not if I understood you correctly, Ukrainian want to be misunderstood; I am not foreign policy issues-leaving Russia saying that Ukraine is about to fall into aside--and its economic development, the Black Sea or lose its independence. and then went on to say that maybe Let me compare it to this: recently there Kuchma assumes that this trend for has emerged in Europe-especially stability will continue. I am wondering among the Christian Democrats-a very if it is that he assumes that this stability different view of Turkey. Or, at least a will continue or that he cannot do much view of Turkey has come out in public more about it. What can he do? How discussion that Turkey could be a can he accelerate the process in the member of Europe, but that it had to do economic sphere? My second question the following twenty-three hard things: goes back to what Ian said. Is anybody no torture, etc. In a way it was not anticipating what Russia will do or how European but it could be European. it will respond to NATO expansion? Recently you heard Christian Democrats What about economic pressure, what saying that Turkey cannot be European about a media campaign- is this because its people are Muslim. Now realistic? Here we get back to Sherm's that is something that is unlikely to argument about the gap between change, unless the Mormons are more objectives and means in Russia. effective. Ukraine is in the same boat, and I would argue that Russia is too in a Sherman Garnett: I think Kuchma is sense. And this is why it is important for at a crossroads as a politician. He either U.S. and European policy to say this is decides that he wants to be the next wrong. The question is, fundamentally president or he wants to be remembered is Ukraine capable of being in Europe at as the true founder of a European some point? Can it demonstrate that Ukraine. Those may be harsh words, but quickly-not that it is fully European 21 but that it is reasonable to think about it the Kremlin that was completely against in those terms? Or is it like the Christian this reunification. That is a remarkable Democratic view of Turkey; is it just moment, that even the reunification never going to happen? I do not believe with the so-called weaker Belarus could in historical determinism or in being not materialize. simply enshackled by history or psychology. I think it is up to people of Second, I think that Roman is responsibility right now. completely right-neither the Tashkent pact nor the CIS will exist in a couple of My reading of the constitution is months. NATO General Secretary that Kuchma's power is pretty Solana's trip through Central Asia and extensive. If it is not, then he ought to Transcaucasia has shown that the admit it. He ought to admit that there is leaders or the elites of these countries do a kind of fecklessness to the system. I not regard Russia as a military partner compare him to Yeltsin in only half of it. anymore. They all seek NATO He has figured out the Yeltsin political assistance. The Central Asians want to strategy of finding a prime minister to rebuild their armies with the help of blame, but he has not figured out the NATO, with the help of Americans and Yeltsin political strategy that every once Germans. Uzbek officers are now in a while you have to move--you have coming to Germany to study in military to do something, you have to decree schools there. There is a big process something, you have to force something. going on. The only ones who do not Whether Lazarenko is the world's most understand that the CIS is breaking corrupt politician or not, he either has to apart and that the members are make Lazarenko his prime minister or diverting away from Russia are the fire him. Why does he not threaten the people in Moscow. parliament with its dissolution in some practical way? Why does he not push Third, Russia was trying to escape for reform? Either they decided that it is this situation by trying to build an not that important-that they can exist alliance with China that is also failing. in this state for a long time and that he The Chinese do not want to be the has too many things to do when he younger brother of Moscow. At the last wakes up in the day-or he has lost Russian-Chinese summit, the Central momentum. Asian leaders joined the table in order to mediate between these two countries. To me, we are at a defining point in Nothing can be done. Russia is too weak Ukraine. I do not mean in the next three even to negotiate an alliance with China, weeks. I mean that if they wait until and the Chinese do not know why they 1999 (just like the Christian Democratic should build such an alliance with view of Turkey) the view will be Russia against the West. So even at that entrenched in Europe that Ukraine is point Russia's policy in Asia seems to not Poland and cannot be part of fail. Europe. And that would change forever the geopolitical possibilities. So I think Our hope is that Yeltsin will stay that this is an extremely serious moment alive until the year 2000. While he is in Ukrainian history. there I think there is a certain stability in Moscow. And we will face then an elite Alexander Rahr: I will answer your that is more or less Western-oriented, an second question on the Russian threat. elite which would like to cooperate with Very shortly, three points why ~ussia is the West (under certain conditions of not threatening anyone anymore. First, course), which is more interested in they could not even reunite with joining the world economy than starting Belarus. There is a very strong faction in wars with its neighbors. 22 Ian Brzezinski: One of those factors political behavior and the decision certainly is not worth betting making process. So that is a priority. on-Yeltsin's health. Any other questions? Sherman Garnett: Could I just say that-and every time I say this, I get Question: There is one issue which you disinvited from homes in Moscow-! do did not touch upon, and that is that in a not think we should give up on Russia sense Ukraine is very much a European yet. The homes I am disinvited from in country in that its intelligentsia tries to Moscow are precisely those of the be very theoretical instead of being people who cannot adjust. When I look practical. Part of the problems that at the foreign policy of Russia, it seems Ukraine is having is precisely that the to me that they are facing an immense middle parties do not cooperate with choice. But I think the forces that are each other. They do not cooperate with gathering to make the choice ultimately each other because they have to go in favor of some form of recognizable through litkrit before they start and civilized cooperation are actually cooperating with each other. I think that increasing, not decreasing. But still the one of the issues where you people foreign and security policy area in could be successful is by focusing on the Russia, when you compare it to the need for political activity aimed at a political or economic area, is the most focused understanding of the problem unreformed. The people that Sasha rather than these long sausage-type rightly points to as the brightest spots in dispositions of what democracy is. I Russian policy right now very rarely get think that is an issue that should be involved in foreign policy. They get addressed at a conference like this. involved in Belarus because there is money. But when they are forced to Ian Brzezinski: Comments about the come out and speak, you have a lot of theoretical and the practical sound like stupid things that Chubais and the budget negotiations on the Hill. Nemtsov say on all sorts of issues. Does anyone want to take a hit at that? In other words, there are not Question: This question is primarily for Chubais' or Nemtsovs yet in the foreign Professor Torbakov. I agree with policy community. To the extent that Professor Solchanyk that Russians seem there are new interests working in the to be pretty good at producing trends; foreign policy community in Russia, and I agreed with what someone said right now they are economic and yesterday which was that it is the regional and only affect individual Russians, not the Americans, who are issues. They do not affect the strategic driving the wedge in Russian-Ukrainian question. It is hard for me to believe that relations. It would seem to me that in Gasprom and Lukoil and all these order to remove this wedge and regain people are simply doing the bidding of these "trends," bringing all the CIS Primakov. I think Prirnakov is running countries back closer to Moscow, the to get ahead of a train. We have not most effective policy would really be to finished seeing the transformation of build relations on an equal basis. The this Russian elite. The thing that makes question then is: why does this line of it hard for us to see this is that they keep reasoning seem to be rejected? Is it just publishing these articles. I do not know because a psychological aspect is how many times I have recently quoted discussed ? from this Migranyan/ Zatulin thing about the end of history and the Igor Torbakov: My very brief answer undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty. will be that I do believe that Those people still exist and their rhetoric psycho~ogical problems underlie the becomes important for Yeltsin. That is 23 what in the end makes me think we are about it." I get the same thing at RAND not quite over the hump. But there are from my colleagues, "Roman, why are other forces going on in Russia. you always bringing up these tasteless quotations from Russian politicians? One thing I think is really tough is They do not mean anything. It is that in modernizing international rhetoric, they could not do it even if they relations and pushing Europe to the wanted to. Let us look at Nemtsov, at East, the most nimble institution we Chubais." Okay, but I am sorry. Zatulin have right now, for a lot of reasons, is is there. If you read the Zatulin and NATO. I think that it is the toughest Migranyan article, rather program, in institution for Russians to immediately Nezavisimaya gazeta-I wish we had the embrace. It is a fact that I am actually in full text of it, maybe Sherm's agent favor of NATO expansion, but I know in vliyaniya can secure that for us and find Moscow it is just not easy, and for a lot out what the full text is. If you read that of reasons. text it brings you back to Struve in 1910. It brings you back to Fedotov in the Roman Solchanyk: If you wowd allow 1930s. The bottom line is very simple. me to take what Sherm said one step The existence of a Ukraine in any shape further and maybe somehow be even or form other than as part of Russia more rigid. What Sasha said about a is-to quote or paraphrase Mr. fundamental change happening, I wish Solzhenitsyn-"a mortal threat to the it to be so. I suspect that what he had in existence of Russia itself." Finished. That mind was the appointment of Chubais is all that is. and Nemtsov in February. But I think the distance between February and May I must give Migranyan and Zatulin is a little too early to phrase it just the a compliment for figuring out how to way you phrased it, that "this is it, destabilize and how to destroy Ukraine. konets, it is finished, it is all different I never would have figured it out now." It has only been three months. myself. Before it was always the CIA Sherm's point-who certainly knows that was doing this, but now they really better than I do-is that these young have a different way. What they suggest people like Nemtsov and Chubais are (if you have not read the program) is interested, primarily, in domestic that all pro-Russian forces in Ukraine reform. This does not mean they cannot completely boycott the upcoming have an impact on foreign affairs. parliamentary and presidential elections. This will bring Chornovil to I did want to bring up that power-namely a pro-Western sort of programatical article by Zatulin because person-and therefore will cause a when I have these discussions with my revolt of the Russian elites in Ukraine. colleagues at RAND, I point to these sort Bring the Ukrainian nationalists to of outlandish statements by 39-year old power and then the Russians will really members of Yabloko who are deputy realize the danger. Zatulin has been able chairmen of the Duma and who say that to convince your normal Russian and they love the Ukrainian language, but Ukrainian that the situation is bad, one really Ukraine should be reduced to the does not get paid, etc., but he has not status of Bashkir-Tatariya. Where does convinced your statistically average somebody who was born in 1957 get Russian that his identity is threatened by ideas like that? When you ask his boss the existence of Ukraine. So how do you Yavlinsky "Who is this guy Mikhail do that? You boycott the elections. You Yuriev? Where did you find him? What bring all these Chomovils to power and is wrong with this guy?" He says, "He is all these other people who have strange a businessman. He does not understand ideas about Ukraine and therefore anything about politics. Don't worry Ukraine will collapse because then

24 Russians will realize, "Chomovil is in grudgingly push this country to p ower, konets, we are finished." And confront reality. then Russia will have achieved its aim of destroying Ukraine. Very original. Roman Solchanyk: There was a Polish-Soviet war in 1920 that might Sherman Garnett: I think that makes have changed the mentality. my point, however, that one should not spend more than thirty-five seconds on Sherman Garnett: There is a Ukrainian Migranyan and Zatulin. I really think state right now. Every day everybody they do a tremendous disservice to gets up and realizes it. It could even be a Russia and I will not get invitations to non-functioning state. It is not a Migranyan's house anymore either. I nationalist state. It has accomplished think that scenario is relatively foolish. some things, it needs to accomplish others. But I think this over time is a real Roman Solchanyk: My point, Sherman, mental block. It is a physical reality. It is not whether it is foolish or not, but makes people like Migranyan more and that it is there. That is a reflection of more bizarre as the days pass because history. they have to account for a reality that somehow cannot exist within their Sherman Garnett: Let me make one mental world and, as Galileo said, "yet point on mentality because I think the it moves." That is where we are. Russians and Ukrainians are fond of this. I used to write in my journals every Ian Brzezinski: Okay. On that note, time they talked about mentalitet and unfortunately we have already gone ten especially genetic pessimism connected minutes longer than our session was with the elite. Both of those themes seem scheduled for and I think that is a to be really popular. I just do not come reflection of how successful our from that tradition. The thing I would panelists have been. They have given us say is that I think Igor could give a very fantastic overviews of the genetic, fascinating presentation on Russian historic, the cultural dimensions of historical opinions of Poles. Same stuff, Russian-Ukrainian relations, insights of not quite, but some of it. There are real where they might be heading, and some problems in Russian-Polish relations steps that the West can take to ensure it and in the mentality of the Russians is a stable relationship. I think we owe toward Poles, but it is not the same. And them a round of applause for their it suggests that over time you can effort. Thank you for participating.

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