The Relief of Chitral Chap

T H E REL I EF OF C H I T RA L

BY O U N G H U S BA CAPTAI N G . J . X N D ’ "U EEN S OWN CORPS OF GU I DES “ “ A UTH OR OF EIGHTEEN H UND RED M I L ES ON A BURM ESE TAT FRAYS " “ ’ " AN D FORAYS TH E UEE S COM M I SS IO ETc ETC ; " N N , . , .

AN D K Y U N H T N FR N E . O G U S BAN D E CAP AI A , C . I . . I ND IAN STAFF CO RPS ( L ATE POL I T I CAL OFFI CE R I N CH ITRAL )

WITH MAP A ND I LLUSTRATIONS

1 01mm

M A C M I L L A N A N D C O .

AN D N EW YORK

1 895

' The R zg/z t qf Tra ns la tion a nd R eprod uction is R eserved I CH A R D L AY A N D So N s L m rrE D R C , ,

L ON DON A N D B U N G AY .

’

be r 1 8 . Fz rst E dition Octo , 95

tobe r 1 8 . R eprin ted Oc , 95 PREFA C E

TH I S book of is the joint production two brothers ,

for who are constantly being mistaken one another, who happened to be present together in the same campaign and to both act as correspondents of the

Times in that campaign . The chapters on Sir Robert Low ’s advance are by Captain George

Youn husband g , who was present throughout the

’ O perations on General Low s Staff. The remaining

Youn husband chapters are by Captain Frank g , who from his two years ’ residence in Chitral was better acquainted with the country through which Colonel

o Kelly marched his tro ps , and with the place in f which the de ence was made . This record of the Chitral campaign is based on the ofﬁcial despatches published in the Gazette of I ndia and in the Blue Book on Chitral affairs lately

of presented to the Houses Parliament, and the management of the Times have kindly allowed that use Should be made of the letters which the

Times authors wrote to the .

5 1 3 1 6 6 vi PREFACE

The illustrations are from photographs taken by

of of Sergeant Mayo , the Photographic Section the

Bengal Sappers and Miners , which accompanied

’ General Low s column ; and from sketches very kindly furnis hed by Surgeon -Captain Browning i Sm th and Lieutenant Beynon , who served with

’ Colonel Kelly s Column . C O NTENTS

CHAPTER I TH E CAUSES OF TH E WAR

CHAPTER I I CAPTAIN ROSS AN D LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

CHAPTER 11 1 GENERAL L ow ’s ADVANCE

CHAPTER IV ACTIONS AT TH E M ALAKAND AN D PANJ KORA

CHAPTER V TH E RELIEF O F CHITRAL

CHAPTER VI TH E DEFENCE OF CHITRAL

C HAPTER VI I

’ COLONEL KELLY S M A R CH

CHAPTER VII I THE PRESENT SITUATION LI ST O F I LLUSTRATI O NS

nt COLONEL KELLY AND HIS OFFICERS Fro .

M AP X 1 8 To ace . OF CHITRAL E PEDITION, 95 f p I TH E WESTM INSTER AB BEY OF CHITRAL I I

B ...... LIEUT. E M GURDON, D S O DIAGRAM M ATIC SKETCH OF THE KOR AGH DEFILE TH E L OWAR AI PASS TH E L OWAR AI PASS IN M AY TH E MALAKAND PASS MOUNTAIN B ATTERY IN ACTION CONSTRUCTING A SUSPENSION B RIDGE OVER THE PANJ KORA RIVER D I R FORT M D I R HEAD"UARTER CA P, I R Low AN EATTAI S R . AND STAFF ON THE J PASS M CHITRAL FORT, FRO THE SOUTH W S C . B . MAJ OR TO N HEND, .

LIEUT. H . K . HARLEY, D . S . O . GU N W H SKETCH OF SOUTH ( ) TO ER, C ITRAL FORT N ATIVE LEVY SEPOY 32N D PIONEERS RECONNAISSANCE SKETCH OF THE CH OKAL WAT P S A 1 8 O ITION , 9TH PRIL, 95 SS M ’S P S N S RECONNAI ANCE SKETCH OF ENE Y O ITION, I A GOL

M . D C . B CAPTAIN J . AIRD M 1 TH S I K H s W M CO PANY OF THE 4 , HICH FOR ED PART OF THE GARRISON OF CHITR AL DURING THE SIEGE HOUSE OCCUPIED BY SHER A FZU L D URING THE SIEGE OF CHITRAL FORT

TH E RELI EF O F C H ITRAL

C H APTE R I

THE CAUSES OF TH E WAR

I N of of the middle March the present year , people in England were suddenly made aware that grave trouble had arisen upon the northern frontier of I ndia ; that the representative of the British -Government was besieged in the heart of a

of f mountainous country, hundreds miles rom the nearest support ; and that operations on a large scale were contemplated by the Government ofI ndia

ff his . to e ect release , and restore British prestige Some account of how this trouble arose is required

of f of to enable readers this brie narrative , the brilliant exploits by which the honour of the

w as f British name saved , and British o ﬁcers were f rescued rom an untimely end , to understand the reasons for and the results of this successful

campaign . I ndia is bounded on the north by successive

of of ranges mountains great height, and among

of u these mountains is the State Chitral , a co ntry

B THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

somewhat larger than Wales , and supporting a

of population or rough , hardy hill f men . Both the capital and the state itsel are c r alled Chitral , and the p incipal place , where is the f of of ort Chitral , is situated at a distance about forty-seven miles from the main water-shed of the

of du range the Hin Kush , which divides the waters ﬂowing down to I ndia from those which take their

Central way into the Oxus , and on to Turkestan and f s . o A ia Chitral is an important state , because its s ituation at the extremity of the country over which

of d the Government I n ia exerts its inﬂuence , and for s of some years pa t , it had been the object the

of of d a policy the Government I n i , to control the e ff of f xternal a airs Chitral , in a direction riendly to o ur interests ; to sec ure an effective guardianship o ver its northern pas s es ; and to keep watch over

s what goes on beyond those passe . With these

O w as bjects in view , Major Biddulph sent to the c u 1 8 o ntry in 7 7 , and the ﬁrst attempt to enter into relations with the Ruler or Mehtar of the country

was made . No very deﬁnite arrangement was come

but 1 88 to at this time , in 5 , when war between

E l d uff Russia and ngan was imminent , Lord D erin , d espatched the pres ent Sir William Lockhart at the head of an important mission to enter into more deﬁnite and complete relations with the

f e of Mehtar, and to report upon the de enc s

the country . Colonel Lockhart spent more than a year in Chitral and the neighbouring state s THE CAU SES OF THE WAR o n as as s of the north , well on the South ide t he du u n f H in K sh ra ge , and rom that time to this t he relations of the Government of I ndia with the Rulers of Chitral have been of a Close and intimate nature . At this time Chitral was governed by old

A - ul- u s u man M lk , a trong, ast te ruler, who , by the f of u s orce his character , by intrig ing, murdering tho e o f n his s his rivals whom he could e snare with wile , a nd n s by ﬁghting the remai der, had con olidated a n of f umber small states , incessantly at war are with

o ne of s . another , into the Chitral the pre ent year

his n Under ﬁrm rule , the cou try was held together , a nd , so long as he lived , no one dared to rise against

his . him , or dispute authority But he had seventeen s s s ofM ohamme on , and those who knew the cu toms d an f his in countries oresaw that , on death , these must

‘ f f u for allibly commence a ratricidal str ggle the throne .

of u 1 8 2 -ul- At the end Aug st 9 , old Aman Mulk d - s for ied , and the long expected cramble the

n f Mehtarship immediately comme ced . O the seven

of teen sons , there were two who by reason the

of rank their mother , were regarded as having the

s s trongest claims to the Mehtar hip . These two youths had been invited down to I ndia on a visit to t he f Viceroy some years be ore , and they were in receipt of small subsidies from the Government of

d -ul- of I n ia. Nizam Mulk was the name the elder,

w as Afz ul-ul- a nd the younger named Mulk . At the ’ t of Old M ehtar s s on ime the death , the second h appened to be in Chitral , while his elder brother

B 2 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP.

1 60 was away in Yasin , miles distant , carrying out

- his d uties as Governor of that out lying province . Afz ul-ul-Mulk immediately seized the arms and f f treasure in the ort, attached a large ollowing to

f for of himsel , he was decidedly the more popular the two brothers , and then proceeded to murder all

of of those his other brothers , who , in spite their lower birth , might certainly be expected to make a

f r f o . o bid the throne He killed a number these, and then s e t off with an army to ﬁght his elder

- - Afz l ul . u brother, Nizam Mulk , in Yasin was a bold

N z m w as n for and daring leader, while i a never oted

’ of his courage , and had none his brother s personal

w a f popularity . He s there ore only able to make a very f of eeble show resistance , and he then ﬂed to Gilgit,

- of of to the head quarters the political agent , and the troops stationed there for the protection of this part of d f f the I n ian rontier, to seek re uge under British

Afz ul-ul- is authority . Mulk returned to h capital elated and triumphant. He was recognised by all

as of and the his people the Mehtar the country ,

of d Government I n ia, in accordance with their prin ciple of recognising as ruler the man whom the peo

ple themselves chose , proceeded to congratulate him f T upon his accession to the throne o Chitral . he anticipated troubles seemed to have come to an end

of few in the space a very weeks , and there appeared ’ n Afz ul-ul-M ulk s to be obody now to oppose rule . The British Government saw Seated on the throne of this important state a man for whom British TH E CAU SES OF THE WAR ofﬁcers who had met him had considerable admir

n d atio , and a man who , having visited I n ia, and become acquainted with our real strength and t e s ources , and who was believed to be loyally attached to the alliance with the British Government, was likely to prove an almost model ruler for the country. Everything then seemed to have settled down satis ‘ factorily ; but Afz ul-ul- Vlulk had only just received

of of d a the recognition the Government I n i , he had not been two months on the throne, when absolutely

f of without warning, and suddenly as the all a thunder b in of olt, appeared one upon the scene who , the space

f Afz l a o . u single night, upset all these dreams peace ul-Mulk had by one means and another ridded himself ofthose ofhis brothers who were likely to cause him f . e trouble He was reasonably sa e as r gards brothers , w h but there as an uncle wh o ad been overlooked . This w as Afz ul f Sher , who many years be ore had struggled for the throne with the old Mehtar , but who had f f long since been driven rom the country , and orced ' f to live in exile in A ghan territory. This prince

f of f suddenly appeared be ore the walls the Chitral ort. He had successfully intrigued with a number ofmen in Afz ul-ul- Chitral who were inimical to Mulk , and s o secured an entrance to the country. The fort of Chitral is situated only forty-seven miles distant from

Afz ul the pass into Badakhshan , over which Sher a dvanced , and he had ridden rapidly in with a hun

of a few f dred or more horsemen , collected ollowers o n of v u the way, killed the Governor the valle thro gh THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

of d which he passed , and in the dead night appeare f f be ore the walls of Chitral itself. Success or ailure

u u I f now t rned upon the action ofa few ho rs . he could f gain an entrance to the ort, and hold it, he would Secure the throne for himself; but if he were held at

for to bay even that one night , he could only expect be swamped in the morn ing by the undoubtedly

n f f A z l- l- Afz ul w as stro g ollowing o f u u Mulk . Sher

f f u making a bold and daring move , and ortune avo red

Afz ul-ul- f his audacity . Mulk , hearing rom the inside of the fort the clamouring at the gate as Sher Afz ul

s s appeared, ru hed out to a certain what was the f w . so as matter I n doing he exposed himsel , shot

s . one down , and died almo t immediately And now ,

n n s ki g bei g dead , the Chitrali , with that versatility of so of temperament characteristic them , immediately proceeded to recognise as their ruler the man w ho

is had killed him . I n no other country the principle , s o of s of dear to the heart the Briti h Government ,

de acto f u n recognising the f ruler , more ully acted po

w as than in Chitral . There now no attempt to turn

of u no one the invader out the co ntry, and waited

in son of u to call from Gilgit the eldest their old r ler. The Chitralis simply recognised as their chief the man who w as the last to say he i ntended to rule

Afz ul w as them . Sher to be their Mehtar . They believed all the promises s o utterly incapable of

f and Afz ul ulﬁlment which he made to them , Sher ,

s having now eized the riﬂes , ammunition , and treasure which had before been taken possession of TH E CAU SES OF THE WAR

Afz ul-ul- of by Mulk, assumed the reins government , f and by promising houses , lands , and air wives to

for fs every one who asked them , and by liberal gi t of m f u of oney, speedily made himsel the pop lar idol

f w as . the people . But his lease o power a short one

-ul- While these events were occurring, Nizam Mulk,

s son of n the elde t the old Mehtar, had bee living f quietly at Gilgit , enjoying a daily allowance rom the

n his r British Government . He had see younge

and s brother succeed to the throne , recogni ed as

of d and f Mehtar by the Government I n ia, his ortunes for in the time seemed at their lowest ebb , but these

u off s turb lent countries , where the Wheel ortune turn so n rapidly, no claima t to a throne need despair , however remote his Chances ofsucceeding may seem f -ul- f or . o the time And now Nizam Mulk , hearing

ofhis u the death younger brother, at once plucked p courage to make an attempt to gain the throne of

u s Chitral . He wrote to Colonel D rand , the Briti h

for agent at Gilgit, asking him his support , and

u d saying that, Should he become Mehtar, he wo l

s f s agree to Briti h o ﬁcers being tationed in Chitral ,

i of and and to the establ shment a telegraph line , would carry out all the Wishes of Government . Nizam also signiﬁed his intention of moving against Sher Afz ul ; and having come to Gilgit of his own

as r accord , and being there our guest and not unde f him detention , Colonel Durand was unable to re use permission to leave Gilgit, and accordingly allowed

s 2 0 2 him to go , while he de patched 5 riﬂes , guns , THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

1 00 of and levies , into the province Yasin, in order

of to strengthen his own position , in the event its

e Afz ul b coming necessary to treat with Sher , and to preserve order in the western part of the Gilgit district and in Yasin .

-ul- f Nizam Mulk on crossing the rontier, was joined by a large number of men from the upper

of valleys Chitral , with whom he had been brought

as a up youth , and who were always much attached

f of to him A orce men , which Sher

Afz ul sent to oppose him , also went over to him , and

occu he immediately marched on Mastuj , which he f f pied without di ﬁculty. Drasan ell into his hands o n I s t of Afz ul the December, and Sher , seeing the game was up, ﬂed as rapidly as he had appeared , f back into A ghan territory ; where he remained , till at the commencement of the present year he again appeared upon the scene to set the whole of

in f Chitral once more a erment . Nizam-ul- M ulk felt that his success had been very largely due to the countenance which had been given him his by the British authorities , and first act on ascending the throne was to ask that a British f o ficer might be sent to remain by his side . The G overnment ofI ndia directed that a mission under the C of - harge Surgeon Major Robertson , and which f c onsisted o Lieutenant The Honourable C . G . ’ f Bruce, Lieutenant J . H . Gordon , and mysel , with fifty men of the 1 sth Sikhs should be deputed to proceed to Chitral to congratulate the new Mehtar

1 0 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

f s o . ho pitality We had long conversations together , w e dined with him and he with us , and we played polo together and when on the 1 1 th ofOctober we

f s rode away rom Chitral , no one would have suppo ed

’ fe w it possible that in a months time the country ,

u of which then seemed so quiet, sho ld be the scene the bloody conﬂict which raged there in the ﬁrst

s s -ul- w as month ofthe pre ent year . Nizam Mulk by n o in means a pattern ruler, but, though deﬁcient

u of co rage , and unpopular with many his people on

of in s account his avaricious habits , was many respect

u of the a good r ler, and he was certainly a ﬁrm ally

n . d British Gover ment He had been to I n ia, had

s f ff adver mixed with Briti h o ﬁcers , and had su ered

s sity . At the ame time he had no wild ambitions to

s of lead him astray. His ruling pa sion was love sport ; and as long as he had the support of the Government of I ndia to guard him from outs ide f troubles , he elt that he could indulge his inclina

’ s The tions in that respect to his heart content .

s s w as result, both to ourselve and to the Chitrali ,

sf f f certainly sati actory . The Chitralis were ree rom any gross oppression or misgovernment , they could

f in - s enjoy li e their easy going way as they would wi h ,

u h and they co ld be ruled by their own ruler. At t e f same time , we had never to ear that the Mehtar would not be guided by us in any matter relating ff to his external a airs .

n f of ofthe Whe , there ore , on the ﬁrst day January present year Nizam -ul- Mulk was Shot dead While out

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR I I

s ofhis f- hawking, by the direction hal brother, Amir ul- s of Mulk , a characterles youth about nineteen , every one who knew the country felt that a grave misfortune had occurred . At a stroke this miserable boy was

’ able to sweep away the good res ults of two years careful thought on the part of the Government and of Of sf fu their local ﬁcers , and to tran orm a peace l state into the scene of a desperate struggle . The

u s s fa yo th who had hattered the promi ing bric , which

s et u w as s on of had Slowly been p, a the old Mehtar

ofhis f and -ul- u by one our legitimate wives , Nizam M lk would have liked to have murdered him , knowing that if he did n ot do s o he ran the ris k of himself

n Bu bei g murdered by the youth . t knowing how averse the Britis h authorities were to these murders he had refrained from carryi ng out what he knew

u u of f- f to be a pr dent meas re sel de ence , and he had now suffered for his leniency and his loyalty to the

s s hi wi he of s allies .

of s f At the time thi un ortunate occurrence ,

u few Lieutenant B . Gurdon , who had s cceeded me a

f of weeks be ore in the political charge Chitral , was on a visit to the capital with an escort of eight Sikhs : the remainder of his escort of 1 00 men

s -ﬁve s n - s being posted at Ma tuj , Sixty mile orth ea t

-ul- s of Chitral . Amir Mulk immediately ent a depu tation to him asking to be recognis ed as Mehtar ; and it is s igniﬁcant of the pres tige and authority

which we then enjoyed , that a reckless youth , in

of his the very excitement impetuous action , should 1 2 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL CHAP . have come cringing in to a young British ofﬁcer with only eight native soldiers at his back , asking f or his countenance and support . Lieutenant Gurdon told him that he could merely refer the matter to the Government of I ndia and await their but orders . This Lieutenant Gurdon now did , it may be imagined that his pos ition at this time was one of considerable anxiety which required all the tact and coolness which he now proved himself to

for f possess . He had at once Sent a rein orce

of f f s u ment ﬁ ty Sikhs rom his escort at Ma t j , and these reached him on the 8th ; and that they

so were able to do , and were not hindered or

S molested on the way, is another ign that at that time there w as no deﬁned spirit of hostility to the

British .

of 1 00 I n anticipation trouble , however, men were

f 2 00 sent to rein orce Mastuj , men were marched to

Ghiz r of n , and in the middle Ja uary Surgeon

s Major Robert on , the British agent at Gilgit,

for u started Chitral to report on the sit ation . Mr.

of Robertson arrived in Chitral at the end January , ff f and a orded timely relie to Mr . Gurdon , who , in

of the meantime had , in the words the despatch of of d the Government I n ia on the subject, acted with admirable coolness and judgment, occupying

for f if a house in an excellent position de ence ,

s of necessary, and quietly laying in supplies in ca e

. f of trouble Meanwhile Umra Khan , chie the

andul n J State , immediately borderi g Chitral on the '

P ho o A . E sme Collzn s I V . B ri /1 1072 t g , g

I E UT E N A N T B . E . M . UR DON D . S O . L G ,

p 1 4 TH E RELIEF OF CH ITRAL a .

’ the time of N izam s murder w as preparing for an expedition elsewhere , and , had he been in direct communication with Amir-ul- M ulk as to the precis e

of u time the murder, it is q estionable whether he would have chosen the season of the year when the high pass between his own and Chitral territory w as blocked with snow . However , seeing that the murder had occurred , and knowing that all the leading men in Chitral had previously been made

and away with , that the country had now no leaders , mus t ofneces s ity be s plit up into a number of op

’ f a s posing actions , he , without moment s he itation ,

n s of seized the opportu ity, and in pite the heavy

s f snow on the pas , eet in height . which f separated him rom Chitral , marched with men into that country .

The Chitralis at ﬁrs t opposed this Pathan force . They had always looked upon the Pathans as their

n hereditary enemies , and had on ma y previous occa

s s s d n s s ion re i te i va ions by them . Had they now had any leader to keep them together, and to encourage

s them , the Chitralis would have been able to repul e

the invaders . .Could the British have s upported

t s as u hem in their resi tance , Lieutenant G rdon did

few of s s s with a men in one the preliminary kirmi he ,

s they would have gained heart , and , with the pirit which they are capable of showing when once they f u are airly aroused, wo ld have beaten back Umra

’ -ul- -be Khan s men ; but Amir Mulk , their would

w of s as . leader , incapable exerci ing authority He THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 1 5 had not been recognised by the British ofﬁcers as

w as f Mehtar, and it doubt ul whether he ever would be ; and his hope lay therefore more with Umra f Khan than with the British , and the British o ﬁcers were unable to support the Chitralis in a quarrel of their own with this neighbouring chief without the d r irect inst uctions oftheir Government. The resist

a of f nce the Chitralis there ore collapsed , Umra

s u Khan cceeded in capturing Kila Drosh , the prin c i al f on s u f of p ort the o thern rontier Chitral , and this

s as f he immediately commenced to trengthen , so to orm “ ofit a ﬁrm pied -a-terre on Chitral territory ; and

u as ff s f now , j st a air had taken this un avourable turn , just when the Chitralis were divided and

s its leaderle s , when their country had an invader in midst , once more appears upon the scene that evil spirit of Chitral and persevering aspirant for its

n Afz ul thro e , Sher , the prince who a little more than f two years be ore had killed one Mehtar, ruled the o c for and then s ountry a month , been ou ted by the f f elder brother, and who now , a ter a urther sojourn

of s f two year in A ghan territory , in a conﬁnement which the Amir ofCabul had mos t solemnly declared

of d u so to the Government In ia wo ld be permanent , that he might never again be allowed to disturb the

of f peace Chitral , was now allowed to escape rom Afghan territory— and men do not escape from the hands ofthe Amir ofCabul without the knowledge ofthat ruler— and joined Umra Khan at Drosh in

f u the latter halfo Febr ary . 1 6 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

f Mr. Robertson did not receive reliable in orma tion ofhis arrival in Chitral territory until the 2 4th of u com Febr ary, when he at once entered into muni i n cat o O n 2 th of . with him . the 7 February, Mr Robertson received from Sher Afz ul a demand that

Afz ul he should go back to Mastuj at once . Sher promised to be friends with the Government on the

M ehtars of same terms as previous Chitral , that f is to say, that he was to receive subsidies rom the f Government, but that no British o ﬁcer should reside in the country . But his promise w as coupled with

if his the threat that terms were not accepted ,

Umra Khan would at once advance . The two f princes had , in act, made an alliance , the basis of which was really hostility to the British Govern ment. They were to induce or force the British f f f o ﬁcers rom Chitral territory, and a ter that had ff been e ected, they could then decide who should rule the country, one thing only being certain , that whoever should be the nominal Mehtar, Umra

Khan would be the ruler practically. Mr. Robert son replied to Sher Afz ul that the Maharajah of

of Kashmir was the Suzerain Chitral , and that neither Umra Khan nor any one else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission of the Government ; he added that Sher Afz ul was

of d wanting in respect to the Government I n ia, that he was informing the Government of Sher ’ Afz ul s demands , and would communicate their u if instr ctions to him , and that in the meantime THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 1 7 he of s attempted any overt acts hostility, he mu t t ake the consequences on his own head .

of s till At the end February, the Chitralis were h n s oldi g a position a dozen mile below Chitral , and Umra Khan was rapidly completing his pre parations for the defence of Kila Drosh against a n f s attack rom the Chitrali , which he believed

to be imminent . A few Chitralis of the lower class

Afz ul had gone over to Sher , but the principal

of of men , though suspected being partisans Sher

z ul f Af . , did not openly de ect They suddenly, how

ever, changed their minds and went over in a body to Sher Afz ul ; in that versatile and im

s o of d pulsive way characteristic them , they turne c of ompletely round , and, in place joining the British a nd opposing Umra Khan , they now, thinking that

w as Umra Khan the stronger, bei ng the nearer

be power, and that the British were the weaker, c f ause the more distant, joined the Pathan chie and c ame surging on in a wave towards the fort of

h . of C itral , which Mr Robertson , with the escort 00 u 4 men , which he had bro ght with him , had now

~ A i ~ l~ M ulk o . m r u ccupied had been deposed . and w as of f s now under the custody the British o ﬁcer , a nd f o Mr. Robertson had ormally rec gnised Shuja ul- n Mulk, an intelligent, trustworthy little boy, ine o r of ten years old, as provisional Mehtar Chitral ,

i of of d pend ng the orders the Government I n ia.

O n rd of the 3 March , the combined Chitrali and P f e f athan orces appear d be ore Chitral , an action took 1 8 A P THE RELIEF OF CH ITR L CHA . place in which one British ofﬁcer was mortally w ounded . and u , another severely wo nded , in which a General and a Major and twenty-one non -com missioned ofﬁcers and sepoys of the Kashmi r

- f . I n antry were killed , and twenty eight wounded The British force was then shut up within the walls of f f of the ort, and no urther news them reached the

of f r Government I ndia o many weeks to come . I nformation of the serious turn which affairs had taken in Chitral w as received by the Government

th of on the 7 March , and they immediately decided

r n that prelimina y arra gements should be undertaken , in order to be prepared if necessary to operate f against Umra Khan rom the direction ofPeshawur. I t was believed that the garrison in the Chitral fort could resist an attack from Umra Khan and Sher

’ Afz ul s f am orces , and hold out as long as their mun ition and supplies lasted but as communications

u off were all interr pted , and as retreat was cut , it appeared imperative that no effort Should be spared

ff f of if in to e ect their relie by the end April , the vestment was not otherwise removed before that

O n 1 of h date. the 4th Marc , in order that Umra Khan might have distinct notice of the decision

of d to which the Government I n ia had thus come, a ﬁnal letter of warning was sent to him recounting the various warnings given to him against inte rfer

in ff g with Chitral a airs , mentioning his various acts f o aggression , directing him to at once quit Chitral

if the I s territory, and telling him that by t of April THE CAU SES OF THE WAR 1 9 h of d e had not withdrawn , the Government I n ia

o would compel him to do so . The letter went on t say that the Government were making fresh pre parations to send forward their forces for that

f to purpose, and that he would only have himsel

for f blame any evil results that might all upon him . At the same time a proclamation in the following terms was issued

To all t/ze people ofSwat and tﬁe people in B ajour w/zo do not m side with U ra K fzan.

B n wn ou and an e e s ns n e ned a e it k o to y , y oth r p r o co c r , th t n the iefof andul in s i e of his f n Umra Kha , Ch J , p t o te repeated es offiends the B s G ve n en and e a d ss assuranc r hip to riti h o r m t, r g r le offrequent warn ings to refrai n from interfering with the affairs w is a e ed s a e unde he suz of Chitral , hich prot ct t t r t erainty of has f en e ed the C a va e and a a ed the K ashmir, orcibly t r hitr l ll y, tt ck

Chitrali people . The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full

nin ha un ess he e es f C a b the 1 st of A i war g t t, l r tir rom hitr l y pr l ,

n n w the th da of S awa 1 1 2 H . e wi us correspo di g ith s y h l 3 , th y ll e

el do so. I n o d e a out s u se force to comp him to r r to c rry thi p rpo , they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawur border a force of n t ve me all es s an e and ar sufﬁcient stre gh to o rco r i t c , to m ch this ’ a K an s er wa d h a force through Umr h t ritory to r C itr l . The sole object ofthe Government ofI ndia is to put an end to s n and even an fu u e un awfu a ess n on the pre e t, pr t y t r , l l ggr io C r and as s n as s e has een a a n h hitral ter itory ; oo thi obj ct b tt i ed, t e n force will be withdraw . The Government of India have no i ntention of permanently ’ occupying any territory through which Umra Khan s misconduct f e e ass of in e fe in wi th in may now orc th m to p , or t r r g th e de pendence ofthe tribes ; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the C 2 20 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP .

s Su s n ans s w be a d for and all e s ns troop . pplie a d tr port ill p i , p r o are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect u sec rity.

Orders were also now issued for the mobilisation of the I st Division ofthe Field Army under Major

General Sir Robert Low .

of f While preparations were in progress this orce , news reached the Government of I ndia ofthe disas ter to a detachment oftroops under Captain Ross on f their way to Chitral , when Captain Ross had himsel been killed , his Lieutenant Jones been wounded , and ﬁfty-six men killed out ofa total ofseventy-one another detachment under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler was also known to be surrounded ; and ﬁnally communication with the supporti ng post of

Mastuj was severed . This intelligence materially

u w as altered the sit ation again . I t now known to the Government ofI ndia that before they had taken

s the action de cribed above , Umra Khan and Sher Afz ul had actually waged war upon British I ndian and Kashmir troops . The necessity for relieving the little garrison in

e Chitral was more imminent than had been suppos d , while the reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw from Chitral had now disappeared . Colonel Kelly, commanding

2 nd f the 3 Pioneers , the senior military o ﬁcer in the

of Gilgit district , was placed in command the opera tions in the Gilgit district . His orders permitted him to make such dispositions and movements as he

C HAPTE R I I

CAPTAIN ROSS AN D L IEUTEN AN T EDWARDES

ON I of . the st March , while Mr Robertson with his escort was in Chitral and active hostilities had not f yet commenced , a native o ﬁcer had started from Mastuj with forty men and s ixty boxes of

for for a ammunition Chitral . He had proceeded c of ouple marches and had reached Buni , when he found the road broken and rumours reached him that he was to be attacked . He accordingly wrote f to Lieutenant Moberly, the special duty o ﬁcer with the Kashmir troops in Mastuj telling him of

of ff or s the state a airs and asking f instruction . Rumours had by n ow reached Mastuj that Sher Afz ul had entered Chitral territory and that large

of numbers the Chitralis had joined him . But he was said to have frien dly intentions towards the British and all the local head men reported to Lieutenant Moberly that no organised attack upon

of a party troops was at all likely. Still there was

f of evidently a eeling unrest abroad , and as a detach ment of the 1 4th Sikhs under Captain Ross and H 11 A A N AN D N AN 2 C . C PT I ROSS LIEUTE T EDWARDES 3

es Lieutenant Jones were now at Laspur, two march o n of s u the Gilgit side Ma t j , on their way up , Lie utenant Moberly wrote to ask Captain Ross to c ome on into Mastuj in a s i ngle march instead oftwo.

T on of his Captain Ross did , and the evening the 4 th of March he started from Mastuj with ﬁfty men

f u . to rein orce the S badar, who was blocked at Buni O n the same day a detachment of twenty Sappers d a n R . E . u . . Miners under Lie tenant J S Fowler, , a ccompanied by Lieutenant S . M . Edwardes also

u arrived in Mast j . The party were on their way

to s Chitral with engineering tores, and without

h f f n alting at Mastuj they le t on the ollowing morni g,

n of March sth , with the i tention overtaking the Subadar at Buni and with the combined party

c ontinuing the march to Chitral . That evening Captain Ros s retu rned to Mastuj reporting that

e s verything was quiet at Buni , and that Lieutenant Edwardes and Fowler were to leave Buni o n the

r O n oth fo Chitral with the ammunition escort . the e vening of March 6th Lieutenant Moberly received

.a note from Lieutenant Edwardes dated noon ofthe

s f Kora h fe w ame day rom g , a small hamlet a miles

n below Buni , sayi g that he heard he was to be

a s s u ttacked near Reshun , the ﬁr t tage beyond B ni . Upon hearing of this Captain Ross at once moved

f u f rom Mast j , and also wrote to the o ﬁcer com

m Ghiz r s anding at , the nearest po t on the Gilgit s of u ide the Shandur Pass , asking him to send p a s many men as he could poss ibly spare to reinforce 24 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

’ s of a Ma tuj . The strength Captain Ross s p rty was

2 British ofﬁcers 8 Hospital followers 1 Native ofﬁcer 2 Cooks 6 H avildars (sergeants) 2 Water-carriers 3 Naiks (corporal s) 1 Lascar 2 B uglers 1 Sweeper 8 2 Sepoys 2 Dhobis 1 Hospital-Assistant

’ Nine days rations and 1 40 rounds of ammunition per man were carried .

of th Leaving Mastuj on the morning March 7 ,

Captain Ross reached Buni , eighteen miles distant,

P M . f at 1 1 . . the same day Here he le t one native

f - the o ﬁcer with thirty three rank and ﬁle , while with

s rest he and his subaltern , Lieutenant Jone , started for R r eshun , the place , about thirteen miles lowe

’ down the valley, in which Lieutenant Edwardes ’ party were detained . Captain Ross s men took with

’ 1 P M them three days cooked rations , and at about . .

ofK ora h t the party reached the small hamlet g , abou

f w as hal way to Reshun , and a short halt made here . What occurred after that may best be told in

’ ow n Lieutenant Jones s words .

About half-a mile after leaving K oragh [he says] the road The s 011 h enters a narrow deﬁle . hill t e left bank consist

f a su ess n of a e s ne S s w e us s u o cc io l rg to hoot , ith pr cipito p rs in between ; the road at the entrance to the deﬁle for about one hundred yards runs q uite close to the river ; after that

s a n a na w a dan s e f a s i it lie lo g rro m i , om thirty or orty y rd n h and is on the of the e an w is e e a widt , top riv r b k , hich h r

1 1 CAPTAI N R oss AN D LIE U TE N AN T EDWARDES 2 5

cliff this continues for about half a mile ; then at the R eshun end as end s a s ee s u W e the ad an ed a ea ed it c t p p r. h n v c p rty r ch a u a f wa u s s u was ed on f a san a w bo t h l y pthi p r, it ﬁr rom g r hich is a ss the r ad and at the sa e m n a ea on all th cro o , m time e pp red e un a n s and d es and s nes w e ed d wn all th mo t i top ri g , to er roll o e

s s. a a n R ss who was w the ad an ed ua d re hoot C pt i o , ith v c g r , called the point of the advanced guard and fell back on the mai n

d w w I was. All our s d ed e ads and bo y, ith hich coolie ropp th ir lo e as h a a n R ss afe d s n as t e s s was ed . bolt oo fir t hot fir C pt i o , t r ’ n at the ene s s n de ded fa l a u n looki g my po itio , ci to l b ck po K ora h as w u d a e een use ess t on R es un g , it o l h v b l o go to h , ea n an n in su a s n n u W l vi g e emy ch po itio behi d s. ith this object in view Captai n R OSS ordered me back with ten men to seiz e the K ora h n i B e d of the de e e h s e e en . the e g fil , to cov r r tir m t y tim that I had reached withi n about one hundred yard s of the sangar at s end I had n two se s ef w me unw unded an thi o ly poy l t ith o , d. it was eref e ss e for m e an fu I s n th or impo ibl e to proce d y rther. e t a an n n R r n a a n R s i b ck d i formed Captai oss acco di gly. C pt i o s n the ean e ha u ed two aves in the r e an and he m tim d occ pi c iv r b k,

de ed me e a w I did . a a n R ss or r to com b ck to him, hich C pt i o then i nformed me that it was his i ntention to wait till the moon r W se and a he w u d en tr and f e his wa out. e o , th t o l th y orc y

s a ed in th a a u 8 P . M . and en we s a ed t y e c ves till bo t , th t rt to try and f ur wa ut K ora h orce o y o to g . When Captain Ross had got about halfway across the stone S unde the san ars at the Kora h end he de ded e re hoot r g g ci to r ti , as e e was su a en of s n d wn the s a th r ch torr t rock comi g o hoot, th t h e thought that his party would be ann ihilated if he attempted to o on T e eu n we a a n h a en ned a v g . h r po g i retired to t e c ves m tio bo e. Afe ea n e e Ca a n R ss u a he w u d and t r r chi gh r , pt i o tho ght th t o l try et the of the un a n a e us and we s a ed u the g to top mo t i bov , t rt p s u n ares W h s e wa u w n e a ve the a es. e ad ot e p r t bo c v g om y p, h our ad was e e a ed a e e and we u d et ro compl t ly b rr by pr cipic , co l g no fu e as we had no na ve of the un u de us and rth r, ti co try to g i , h h t e und was e e e an e us. ne of t e se s fa n gro xtr m ly d g ro O poy , lli g

e e was ed . Afe n a u in va n for a a Ca a n h r , kill t r looki g bo t i p th , pt i R ss a a n de ded e e the aves and we ea ed em o g i ci to r tir to c , r ch th

a u A. H . As eve one was now ed out a a n R ss bo t 3 ry tir , C pt i o 2 6 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP. d e e a n h n We e a ned in the cided to r m i here for t e prese t. r m i i not c aves all the da of the th . Th ne eanw i e d d y 9 e e my, m h l , es us fu e an in a f w s s n the ave and as we mol t rth r th ﬁr g e hot i to c , , had u u reas w s e e e u d not d o us u b ilt pb t ork th r , th y co l m ch d ama Du n h h n se f a eed ge. ri g t e 9t Captain Ross a d my l both gr that the only thing remaining for us to do was to cut our way out ba K ora h at all s s and we de d d a e the a e ck to g co t , ci e to m k tt mpt

a u 2 A. M . On the I oth w en we u a the ene bo t , h tho ght th t my w u d eas ex e we s a ed a d n and we a a ed o l l t p ct it, t rt ccor i gly, tt ck their sangars and drove them out of them ; they retired a short d istance upthe hill and kept upa bri sk fire from behind rocks. There was al so a heavy fire kept on us from the sangars on the ri an f h A ar n fs s were ed ght b k o t e river. l ge umber o epoy kill , or s o seve e w unded as not to ve the S nes r ly o be able to mo , by to d wn the S w ran n the and Ca a n R ss o hoot hich right i to river, pt i o se fwas in f n I and se en een him l killed ro t ofone ofthe sangars. v t rank and file reached the maidan on the K oragh sid e ofthe defile in safe and w en I o r I n r -f ed the men ty, h g t the e halted a d e orm , and s a ed e e s e ten nu es ee n u a eav fire on t y th r om mi t , k pi g p h y the san a s on an s of the r e in de e an e g r both b k iv r, or r to h lp y mor f h m e e two o t e en who u . n co ld get through While halti g th r , ’ d es of the ene s w a e us but bo i my s ordsmen attempted to ch rg , we e e ed v e s and s n eav As the ene now r ch ck by oll y lo i g h ily. my S wed s ns ofa a n u n our n f ea I ns de ed a ho ig g i c tti g li e o retr t , co i r th t it was e e e es e a as tw f a were tim to r tir , p ci lly o more o my p rty k ed and one a w unded w e I had een wa n e e . ill , mort lly o , hil b iti gh r

O fthe e a n n feen I se fand n n se s we e w unded . r m i i gﬁ t , my l i e poy r o We e ed s w Bun w I was e e we a e a u 6 A . M . r tir lo ly to i , h r rriv d bo t t q uite impossible to bring any wounded men who were unable to _ w a w us and was e ua ss e n e ﬂes &c . lk ith , it q lly impo ibl to bri gth ir ri , T e ef e a er a n n u e a u f of ese fe l n the h r or c t i mb r, bo t orty th , l i to ’ ands f th n r h o e e emy . I estimate the enemy s numbe s at about

and n a e us a e st eav . I s en f thi k th t th y m t h v lo h ily “ p t rom t he l oth the 1 th M a at B uni av n c e a use to 7 rch , h i g O cupi d ho t e e and ut n a s a of h r p it i to t te defence.

On the 1 7th he w as relieved by Lieutenant

Moberly, as will be subsequently told.

2 8 THE RELIEF OF CH IT RAL CHAP. level ofthe river passes for halfa mile or SO over a

un plain , and then enters a narrow deﬁle with the fordable river on one hand and inaccessible cliffs on the other. f The British o ﬁcers were unaware , though the

of siege Chitral had commenced three days ago , that the Chitralis had risen in arms against the British , but they saw sufﬁcient evidence of a hostile spirit to induce them to take every precaution on entering

- this deﬁle . All the hill Sides were carefully ex amined s with telescope , and , as some sangars were

s ob erved, Lieutenant Fowler was sent to scale the heights on the left bank so as from there to be able to look down into the sangars on the opposite bank .

Meanwhile , Lieutenant Edwardes remained with the

of rest the party close outside the deﬁle . Lieutenant Fowler with some difﬁculty found a way up the hill s w as ide , and engaged in examining the opposite

ffs f cli , when suddenly a Shot came rom them , and about two hundred men rushed out from a village where they had been concealed and began swarmi ng into the sangars . Lieutenant Fowler kept up a

as w as heavy ﬁre on them , he well above the sangars , and did considerable execution . But the enemy had now begun climbing the hill s ides behind him s o as to cut him offfrom Lieutenant

w as f Edwardes , and he orced to retire . H is position

for indeed was now a very precarious one , the t n Chitralishad succeeded in get i g above him , and were

s his hurling down stone upon party, besides ﬁring 11 CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIE UTE NAN T EDWARDES 29

upon them . Lieutenant Fowler himselfwas wounded

of of in the back the shoulder, the corporal the party was also shot , and two other men wounded .

Scrambling and jumping down he succeeded , how ever, in bringing his party with the wounded men down the hill -Side again and on to the plain where Lieutenant Edwardes with the main body was covering his retreat . The Chitralis with Lieutenant Edwardes had been trying to induce him to enter the deﬁle, in which case he would without doubt

’ have suffered as Captain Ross s ill-fated party had d one . But Edwardes had prudently waited till

- Fowler could report the hill sides clear, and then , ﬁnding that instead of their being clear the enemy

saw were now swarming on to them , he that his o w as s s nly plan to retire to Re hun ; and thi , when

Lieutenant Fowler had rejoined him , he accordingly did . But they were nearly two miles from the village they had an open plain to cross and the spur nearly a thousand feet high to climb . One British ofﬁcer and several men were wounded , and the enemy

- were gaining ground along the hill sides . Disaster

of seemed imminent , but by holding the crest the spur, and by ﬁring steadily on the enemy to keep

s w as ff them at a di tance , the retirement e ected without serious loss , and the sangar near the village of of Reshun , where the rest the party had been f f le t, was reached be ore the enemy could cut them off. 0 CH A P 3 THE RELIEF OF ITR L CHA . There is one little incident in this retirement

c for the which should be re orded and remembered , principle it illustrates is the secret of our rule in

I ndia. I t has been said that Lieutenant Fowler w as wounded . Now awaiting him in the plain at the foot of the hill side up which he had been climbing was his pony . A steep hill a thousand feet in height had to be ascended on the way back t to Reshun , and it might have been supposed tha Fowler would have mounted his pony and ridde n up it . But there were also some sepoys wounded ; and these in Fowler ’s opinion had to be looked

n after before himself. So he mounted a sepoy o

f. be his pony, and walked himsel I t is not to f wondered at , there ore , that when the native soldiers se e their ofﬁcers ready to make such sacri

fice s for f w them , they should be willing to ollo them anywhere , and stand by them to the last , as indeed these very soldiers were now called upon to do . For now the first blood was drawn the people rose excitedly and surrounded the little British party in the f quarters they were occupying. The British o ficers found it impossible to hold the original sangar on the

ff for f the cli by the river, it was exposed to ﬁre rom

- opposite bank, and had no head cover. They there fore decided upon occupying some houses by the polo ground , and curiously enough the very spot where f Mr. George Curzon and mysel had camped

ﬁve s without a single man as escort, only month 1 1 CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIE U TE N AN T EDWARDES 3 1

. of ﬁre previously I n this batch houses , cover and

of wood could be obtained , and a certain amount

s Th upplies also . e only drawback in occupying them w as that they were more than a hundred yards from

w as e the river, and consequently there considerabl

of f risk their water supply being cut off. The o ﬁcers

the hoped, however, to be able to keep the road to

river open by their ﬁre .

R f s I mmediately upon returning to eshun , the o ﬁcer

s e t f the to work to make the position de ensible , and following account of their brave resistance against overpowering numbers ofthe enemy is compiled from the report they subsequently submitted to Govern

cons r ment . The ﬁrst work to be done was the t uc tion ofsangars on the roofs ofthe houses (the houses

ﬂat- f of being roo ed) , the loopholing the walls , blocking

of up entrances , and knocking out passages com munication for h . The materials available making t e sangars were the mud bricks of which the houses

f of r were built, roo timbers and other pieces timbe

s &c t lying about, and boxes , grain bin , . An at ack w as f e ully expected that same night , and every possibl

f S et precaution had to be taken be ore darkness in . Before dusk the ammunition and the wounded had to be transported from a sangar near the river to the

s for s house . Some Kashmir sepoy volunteered thi

of work , and though they had to run the gauntlet a heavy ﬁre in crossing the space of a hundred yards which separated the sangar from the end of the

n out garde wall round the house , they carried it 2 TH E A an » 3 RELIEF OF CH ITR L c .

m n a . without losing a Single Already dead tired, t hese men behaved splendidly, say the British of ficers in their report. The enemy had been firing all day upon the party while they were at work , but at sunset their fire s lackened and they went off to eat the evening m for of eal , this was the month the Ramzan when Mohammedans have to fast all day and eat nothing between sunrise and sunset . Every man on the d f w as e ending side now posted in his place , and told

for f s to strengthen his cover himsel . And o the ﬁrst f night ell on the little party, now at bay , in the heart ’ o f r off an enemy s count y, with their retreat cut , and

deﬁles of of impossible on either side them . Out

- the sixty two men , they had already lost one corporal

tw o killed, men mortally and eight others less severely w of f ounded , and one the two British o ﬁcers

w as . also wounded The men had had . hard work f the whole day long, they had had no ood and little

for water, and now at night they could take no rest , f the enemy commenced ﬁring again , and the de enders had to expect a rush from the houses and garden

’ walls close by at any moment. The defenders

w as position indeed surrounded by these houses ,

s walls , and tree , which gave ample cover to the enemy and the demolition ofthese w as undoubtedly a matter of the ﬁrst importance. But beyond those

w as immediately round the house , there more cover ’ o - ccupied by the enemy s sharp shooters, and the British ofﬁcers considered that it would have been 1 1 CAPTA I N R OSS AN D LIE U TEN AN T EDWAR DES 33 too risky to have taken men from their places

s o to demolish these , and expose them where they

e might have been cut off at any moment . Ther w as f for a di ﬁculty, too , about burning the houses , large quantities of kindling wood would have been

for f e required the purpose , and rom whichever sid f the de enders should burn ﬁres , the enemy would

a f ttack rom the other, and thus have them between

themselves and the light .

s All night long the garrison remained at their post , and when day dawned on the morning of the 8 th f f they were all utterly exhaus ted . But the ear o f immediate attack being over, hal the men were

f s l Was brought down rom their po ts , and a mea cooked from the ﬂour which had been found in the

s of now house . Water, which had course to be

f r carefully husbanded , was also served out ; and a te f al the men had re reshed themselves , they were

lowed to s leep in turns . During the day the enemy kept up a continuous ﬁre from sangars which they

s had thrown up on the hillside . At twilight the remainder of the baggage w as brought in from the

of re s angar , and the garrison then had to think

plenishi ng the water supply. Two large earthen

o n e nt w are vessel s were lashed pol s , and Lieutena Fowler with the volunteers and a bhisti (water

f r . carrier) se t out o the river The men carried

- w ater bottles and the bhis ti his mussuck (skin) .

n w e met the Fortunately no e emy re with, and

e tw o . ﬁll party w re able to make trips, and so D H A A . _ 34 THE RELIEF OF C ITR L CH P

up all the storage ve ssels at the disposal of the garrison .

f rs That night, as on the previous one , the de ende stood to their posts expecting an assault at any moment but the night passed by quietly until just

b f of 1h e ore dawn on the morning the 9 , when the

w as i s moon had gone down and night at t darkest .

u The enemy then charged down thro gh the houses , a nd n got behind the garden wall in large umbers . Lieutenant Edwardes and his party at once opened

ﬁre at about twenty yards range , while the enemy were shouting and urging each other on to the a w as f - ssault. There a tremendous din o tom toms a s they were beaten furiously to encourage the

a of ssailants , but none the men could approach to within twenty yards Of the deadly ﬁre poured out

f s of by the de ender , and as the dim light early d awn grew clearer , it became evident to the gar rison that the enemy had no stomach for further

a ssault . Some Pathans among the assailants were s till seen urging on the Chitralis and hurling abuse f a t A . M . the de enders , but at about 9 they all retired, a nd contented themselves for the rest of the day

- with beating tom toms and howling in the village . During the attack the native soldiers of the defence

s f of howed the utmost steadiness , but our them were

killed and Six others wounded . On account of the d arkness, it was impossible to estimate the number

l s s o f the enemy or their os e . But there must h s and ave been several hundred , a very large por

6 A H 3 THE RELI E F OF CH ITR L C AP,

OC the river . But the enemy had now built and ’ cu ied ff p sangars along the cli at the river s edge , and the work of getting dow n to the river w as one

of extreme risk . Lieutenant Fowler succeeded in

’ getting to within ten yards of the ﬁrst sangar and withi n ﬁve yards of the sentry without being ob

be “ served. About twenty men could seen sitting round a ﬁre in the interior with their riﬂes lying by

w as their sides . A volley poured into these men , and then Lieutenant Fowler charged down on the

f few top o them . A men only succeeded in escaping

a down the cliff to the river bed . Me nwhile the

n e emy in a second sangar , roused by the ﬁring, lined

the walls and began ﬁring to their front. But Fowler e had got round th m behind a wall on their ﬂank ,

now and he charged right up the wall , poured a

o . second volley into these men over the ﬁres , als

s ix of knocked over about them , then bayoneted

f w s a e . o more , while the remainder ﬂed And

f n t s success ul had Fowler been in surprisi g these par ie ,

not man of w as The that a single his scratched .

w a r y down to the water was now open , but Fowle now heard heavy ﬁring and the Pathan cry ofattack

of S n d in the direction the post. O havi g collecte

his e men , he retired at once to rejoin Lieut nant

’ s Edwardes . The enemy attack w as repulsed by

’ this latter ofﬁcer before Fowler s return but the attempt to obtain water had to be abandoned for

' the night . O n the following day nothing of importance ‘ 11 CAPTAI N ROSS AN D LIE UTE N AN T EDWARDES 37 o f in ccurred , and that night the de enders succeeded reaching the river and bringing back water , the s upply of which was still further reple n is hed by c l ollecting the rain in waterproof sheets . A wel

s of f k was unk to a depth twelve eet , but as roc w as then struck , the attempt to procure water in that m n an er had to be abandoned . On the morning of the 1 3th a white flag was s n n n s how by the e emy , and a Patha houted out “ Cease firing I The defenders also hoi s ted a white h .fl a n g, and se t out Jemadar Lal Khan to parley wit t he Pathan while every man s tood to his post .

A f re ter some talk , the J emadar returned with the

’ I sa Afz ul s - n port that Mohamed , Sher right ha d

man f f , had just arrived rom Chitral with a ollowing t o stop the ﬁghting and speak with the British

s O fﬁcers . Lieutenant Edwarde sent word in reply

’ ’ t hat if Mohamed I sa would come to the defenders

s f of s ide o a gap in the wall the polo ground , ituated O nly sixty yards from the wall of the houses held

b s f n n f m y the Briti h o ﬁcers , and e tirely u der ﬁre ro

t he f s o f f o de ender , one the British o ﬁcers would g

I sa o ut and meet him . Mohamed agreed to do this

h e n n n came to the gap, and Lieute a t Edwardes the

n r went out to talk with him , while Lieutena t Fowle remained i nside the post with his men standing ready

to arms in case of treachery.

n I sa When Lieute ant Edwardes met Mohamed , t hat prince i nformed him that he had jus t arrived

f Afz ul R s n rom Chitral , where Sher and Dr. obert o 38 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP were corresponding with a view to the former being

I sa all recognised as Mehtar. Mohamed said that

s s ﬁghting had cea ed , and that he was most anxiou

n n f r to be friends with the I ndian Gover me t. A te some talk betwee n the British ofﬁcer and the Chitral

of s prince , the conditions an armi tice were arranged , and it w as stipulated that the British force should

n e remai within their walls , that no ﬁring should tak place , that no Chitralis were to approach the walls ,

' ' that water-carriers w e re to be allowed to go down to

and the river, that supplies were to be provided by

n s s the Chitralis . Lieutena t Edwarde al o wrote a

R n h . t e letter to Dr obertso in Chitral , and to

O f n n h ﬁcer commanding at Mastuj , stati g in E glis

and in that an armistice had been arranged , adding

s French what his losses had been , and expres ing very great doubt of his being able to beat off any

fu s u . n s n rther a sa lt Havi g arranged the e conditio s,

n n s Lieute a t Edwardes returned to the po t .

s n f and The bhisti were se t down to etch water, supplies were brought to the fort wall by the f C s . n n hitrali The ight ollowi g passed in quiet ,

a w as R n but vigil nce not relaxed . ai fell heavily dur

n and of ing the ight , a quantity water was collected

a f s I n af in w terproo sheet . the ternoon o f the

1 of a fu a s for 4th M rch a rther p rley was a ked ,

on a a of a I sa n and the rriv l Moh med , accompa ied now by another Chitrali prince named Yadgar

f a of n n Beg , at the ormer pl ce meeti g, Lieutena t

a n nf him e Edwardes ag in we t out to co er with , whil I I CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIE UTE NAN T EDWARDES 39

u f Lie tenant Fowler remained , as be ore , inside the f ortiﬁed post . Yadgar Beg conﬁrmed to Lieutenant Edwardes the story previously told by Mohamed

I sa f of s , and both the princes were ull protestation f of riendship. Yadgar Beg said he had a large f n f ollowi g who desired to be riends , and not

s of m f n enemie , the British The sa e a ternoo the bhistis were again sent to bring in water and havi ng to go for some distance through the f village , they reported that the houses were ull

- of . w Pathans They were not, ho ever, ill treated

w a I sa in any y , and Mohamed sent in a sheep f and other supplies to the British o ﬁcers . Lieu f tenant Edwardes sent another letter to in orm Dr . Robertson of the presumed strengthening of the

and n s enemy , to let him k ow that the ration would f 1 o i. e. s not last beyond the 7th March , three day hence . So far the relations between the British ofﬁcers and the Chitralis had been conducted upon an ap

are ntl f f n of s p y riendly ooti g, the aim the Chitrali

s n of s being to lull the Briti h into a se se ecurity .

af of f 1 On the ternoon the ollowing day , the sth of act of March , occurred that treachery by which

f s r the two o ﬁcer were captured , and the greate number of their men lost their lives . I n the after

‘ in e noon , Mohamed I sa sent word that now peac was restored , he and his men wished to amuse

to o themselves , and he asked permission play pol on the ground immediately outside the post which 40 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

the British party were occupying. I t seemed to the British ofﬁcers that there could be no harm

for n in granting this permission , no man ridi g

o n nd the polo ground could escape their ﬁre , a

’ they therefore decided to grant M ohamed I sa s

ask request . The Chitrali prince then sent to

f as s o that both o ﬁcers would come and look on ,

u s H far he had only seen Lie tenant Edwarde . e a lso offered to lend the ofﬁcers ponies on which f to play polo . The British o ﬁcers considered

t as so far hat they had trusted the Chitralis , they might trust them further ; so when Mohamed I sa

a nd n his men arrived upon the polo grou d ,

both Lieutenant Fowler and Edwardes , having previously ordered their men to their posts which

c ommanded the entire polo ground , went out to

meet the Chitralis . A bedstead was placed in the

of gap in the wall the polo ground , on the spot

f n where the ormer meetings had take place , and Mohamed I sa sat next to the ofﬁcers until the

sh me n were ready to begin the game . The Briti f o f s . ﬁcer were asked to play polo , but re used

I sa m Mohamed , however , joined in the ga e , while

s at n Yadgar Beg with Edwardes a d Fowler. A

f s third arrival rom Chitral , speaking to the Briti h

o f of and ﬁcers , conﬁrmed the story Mohamed Isa

Yadgar Beg, that peace between the British and

t he Chitralis had been made . The polo ground at Reshun is about ﬁfty yards b road and one hundred and twenty yards long, and 1 1 CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIE UTE NANT EDWARDES 4 1

‘ f s h s t e . slopes away rom the po t occupied by Briti h , the further side of the groun d not being covered by the of n a s ﬁre the British garrison . Lieutena t Edw rde as I sa ked Mohamed to order the men , who num

u and f and bered abo t one hundred ﬁ ty, who were

s w ords t f . o armed with riﬂes and , go to the urther

of side the ground . The ofﬁcers had some tea made

f r f and brought out o the Chitralis to drink . A ter

I sa if me n the polo was over, Mohamed asked the

of might dance , as is the custom the country at the

s f c o . f s onclu ion a game The British o ﬁcers con ented , a nd the dance began . Then under the excuse that

f of f s there was a wet place in ront the o ﬁcer , the bedstead on which they were Seated was moved to

of of the right , bringing it under cover the end the

s f u wall and the polo ground . The ofﬁcer o nd it d f s a i ﬁcult to object to this , as it eemed th t any a ttempt at treachery could be unattended by heavy

s A S n loss to the Chitrali . the da ce proceeded , more men began to collect and to press forward in a ring

n f s rou d the dancers , and the o ﬁcers ob erved that a n umber had come over to the wall s ide of the polo

f s s ground . At a pause in the dance the o ﬁcer tood

and up and said that they were tired , would now go

s I sa back to their po t. On this Mohamed himself s f s of uddenly seized the British o ﬁcers , and a ru h d men was made upon them , and they were dragge f u nder cover o the wall . A volley was immediately ﬁred by the Briti sh garrison but the Chitralis kept u and o f nder the wall , none them seemed to have 2 4 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

r been hit . Firing then became general fo a short

n n s time , till it gradually died down i to si gle hots ﬁred

n s at i terval . The ofﬁcers in the meantime had their

f and s : s eet hand bound , and were dragged by the leg

l - r f r a ong the gound away rom the gap . All thei

n e tc off butto s , badges , were violently torn and

’ s r e and s and s n s their pocket iﬂ d , Fowler s boot tocki g

.I s were taken off. n about halfan hour the ofﬁcer saw the enemy carry off some of their dead and

un m n a d e . wo ed , and c me out laden with loot They

al so saw, at least one K ashmir sepoy bei ng driven

l w . s a ong ith a load With their arm still bound , the ofﬁcers were taken off to the house in which

I sa r e te a Mohamed lived , where they we e s a d in

h t n of verandah . W a happe ed to the garrison the

s n a m s bu po t they .could ot t the ti e a certain ; t they

s me t of me n in and ubsequently twelve their Chitral ,

a s it appears that the Chitr lis ru hed the place , killed

u s of and s few off n mber the men , carried the e as

n s priso er .

I n a n n f n f rem rki g upo the de e ce , the British o ﬁcers say they had freque ntly cons idered the ques tion of destroyi ng a portion of the ammunition in thei r charge Thi s ammunition had now fallen into the

s of n and w as hand the e emy, a great advantage to

n f if them . I t would have bee well , there ore , the British ofﬁcers could have managed to have destroyed it ; but they say that in the hurry ofimprovisi ng the

f n o n of n de e ce the ﬁrst night the siege , they had bee compelled to build the ammunition boxes up into a

4 4 THE RELI EF OF CH ITRA L CHAP. s me n of f ergeant and ten Umra Khan , who , a ter i quarrell ng with the Chitralis , insisted upon taking them on as their prisoners . On the l gth ofMarch the t w o f o ﬁcers reached Chitral , and were met there by a

’ c olonel and about a hundred men of Umra Khan s a of rmy. They were led into the presence Majid

’ f- t Khan , Umra Khan s representative and hal bro her, a nd now his successor in the rule of the J andul f State . The two o ﬁcers were received civilly , and the J anduli prince expressed regret at the course

of and of rac events , the treachery which had been p

r f s f tised on the B itish o ﬁcers . H e as ured them o

and f s the good treatment, a ter a hort interview ofﬁcers were marched with an escort offorty men to

s Afz ul f ee o . Sher , the claimant to the throne Chitral The es cort accompanied the Britis h ofﬁcers into the

f Afz ul n sur room in which they ound Sher sitti g,

a s s t rounded by trong e cort, and wi h a loaded riﬂe

. s f in his lap H e received the Briti h o ﬁcers civilly, a nd gave them tea and cakes . He also talked to them at great length of the negotiations which had

taken place between him and Dr . Robertson . He further expressed sorrow at the treachery which had

u been used to them , and said that he wo ld see to

f for u far their com ort, and arrange s pplies as as

s f u pos ible , though supplies were di ﬁc lt to obtain , as f everything had been taken into the ort . Both Sher

Afz ul of and Majid Khan , at the earnest request

ch Lieutenant Edwardes , promised to make strict sear

f r all of o men their party who might still be alive . 1 1 CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIE U TE NAN T EDWARDES 45

The two ofﬁcers were permitted to communicate w s f ith the British garrison be ieged in the ort, but were not allowed to visit them . I t was the object of f the besiegers to let the de enders know , without d s f oubt , the di aster which had be allen the British de tachment s as far the , in order to depre s as possible spirit ofthe defence .

O n of 2 oth s the evening March , Lieutenant E dwardes and Fowler saw the native clerk of the political agent , who had been allowed to come out from the fort for the purpose of communicating with

f s on the o ﬁcers , but all conver ation had to be carried

of in the presence the Pathans and Chitralis . No

s ffi e talk in Engli h was permitted , and the o cers wer

ask u for C only allowed to in H ind stani lothing .

n f . plates , k ives , orks , etc On the 2 l st of March the ofﬁcers received from their beleaguered comrades in the fort some Clothing and n a a ecessaries , and they ag in saw the politic l

’ agent s native clerk in the presence of Sher Afz ul

n a s x a d M jid Khan and other . These princes e plained to the British ofﬁcers their view of the

S I tuation w as t , which tha they did not wish to ﬁght the British if they would retire to Gilgit or Pesha q ‘ and ask , they asked Lieutenant Edwardes to one of the ofﬁcers in the fort to come up and meet

L i u n them . A letter was accordingly written to e te

ant f if Gurdon inside the ort , telling him that he me t them under the walls of the fort they would f f B ut give him some use ul i n ormation . no reply AP 4 6 THE R ELIEF OF C H ITRA L CH .

e e fr m r was r c ived o Lieutenant Gu don , and there is no doubt that the only object of the besiegers w as to capture the other ofﬁcers of the garrison in as treacherous a way as they had seized Lieutenants

Fowler and Edwardes . On the 2 4th of March the two captured British o fﬁcers were sent towards Drosh to meet Umra

f [ f w Khan, the Pathan chie . Here on the ollo ing day they had a long i nterview with this important

t l U mra K han . ruler. they found to be of a tall and

strai htfo rw ard command manly appearance , with a g , in of a c g manner speaking, and with great inﬂuen e o : ver his men On these , and on all other occasions , he treated his captives with c iv ility and considera

n ' tion . He now gave them a choice of re tur ing to

of to his t f Chitral , or going with him na ive country o

andul S n o r s J , ome seve eight marches to the outh . A S the chief would not allow the sepoys to go

s O f to with the Briti h ﬁcers Chitral , they decided u pon accepting the alternative of accompanying

andul for Umra Khan to J , and started that place o n the following day. Umra Khan had give n orders that everything t hat could be Obtained should be given to them before

f but his f t himsel , ollowers did not carry out hese

‘ f s ff f f o orders , and the o ﬁcers u ered much rom bad o d and bad quarters on the way. From the Chitral fort they had obtained a bag of sugar and a pound of tea , which they considered great luxuries , and they cooked food with the assistance of the sepoys l I CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIEUTE NAN T EDWARDES 47

' ' ' w ho from Chitral onw ards w ere accompanyingthem .

f a n The o ﬁcers were never in y way threatened , but t he y knew that they were always liable to be killed by some fanatic who might have ' a bloo d feud

a n s . n gai st the Briti h A stro g guard , armed with

s and loaded riﬂe , accompanied them , however , never for a moment allowed them to go more than a fe w f w as o yards rom them , and this d ubtless as

for n n s much their protectio as to preve t their e cape . T he guard always had in it some me n who had s of erved in our I ndian army, and although many t rufﬁan - hem were extremely like in appearance , and

s s s probably were thorough coundrel , yet hey mo tly

t f s f n a reated the o ﬁcers in an ea y and rie dly m nner, a nd were always willing to share with them the s ns n o n canty ratio they obtai ed the march . The O fﬁcers o n the w ay occupied the ordi nary co un try

s s and and f f hou e , which were very dark dirty, ull o

ns s of smoke and i ect . The guard ten me n or more always slept and lived in the same room as the

f and as of had s o ﬁcers , most them colds and cough ,

n s s n r th and were i ce santly pitti g on the ﬂoo , e

prisoners had little quiet . The sepoy prisoners w ere given the same food as w as s erved out to ’ Umra Khan s men . But this ration on the march w as a very small one . The three H i ndu prisoners were made to learn the

cut but t Kalin , and their hair was ; hey were not M made to publicly declare themselves ussulmans , and t f hey never really changed their aith. No attempt 48 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP. w as ever made to ind uce the ofﬁcers to become

f a f dis Mohammedans , nor was any anatic l eeling played by the people whom they met . The men

’ ofﬁcers of would eat the bread , and gave them some

a f theirs . The P thans would o ten ask the ofﬁcers how n they managed to exist without wi e , and while in Chitral the ofﬁcers were offered the contents of all the medicine bottles taken in the hospital outside the

as . fort as a substitute . This delicate attention w

however declined . The prisoners were naturallyan object of great

c s se e curiosity to the people , and rowd gathered to

s l the them . These people pecial y delighted to see

s f f r ofﬁcer eat with kni e and ork, and laughed at thei

r s o n attempts to eat with thei ﬁngers . Thi curiosity

t o f f how he part the populace the British o ﬁcers , f ever , ound to be somewhat annoying, and the guard

' so on discovering that they did not like vi sitors at

m - off h f eal times , kept them w ile the o ﬁcers were

eating ; but at other. times the prisoners received the

sat ns s public , and to be i pected whilst conver ing with

u the people thro gh interpreters . Umra Khan him

f as Sa his s sel , has been id , always treated captive

h t in wit civili y , and was much interested talking with

an d as t them , long as he was with hem and had

n r leisure se t fo them every day. He twice took

0t a d m them hawking, and ske the to walk alongside hi f ‘ w m. The o ﬁcers were not allo ed to communicate f with any one , except through the chie , nor were they

r allowed any w iting materials , but they had obtained

P 50 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHA .

f s him , and , giving them ood and sweetmeat , asked them how they liked his country . For a long time he sat there with the officers at his side gazing over f his native valley stretched out at his eet, and then proceeding down the hillside he w as met by crowds ofmen on horseback and on foot as he marched into f f Barwa. Here the o ficers remained about a ort night but on April 1 5 1 the Mussulman sepoys were told that they could consider themselves at liberty, and the guard over them was removed . A native f f o ficer accordingly le t and proceeded to Peshawur, where he brought the news of the disaster to his

of party. News now began to come in the ﬁghting ’ f between General Low s orce and the Pathan tribes , and great excitement prevailed . Numbers of men began clearing out , taking all their goods with them to hide on the hill sides . I t is a remarkable point

as f that the panic increased , the o ﬁcers received

of our greater attention , and at the approach f troops they were supplied with two owls , ﬂour, rice ,

1 2 butter and milk daily. On the th ofApril both of f ’ the o ﬁcers were taken to Munda, Umra Khan s strongest fort . There they met a native political ofﬁcer who had been sent by the British authorities to treat with Umra Khan . A long conversation took place between Umra Khan and the native

of ofﬁcial , the upshot which was that Lieutenant Edwardes w as made the bearer oftwo letters to the

British General , and released . Umra Khan ex

plained to him his views at great length , and under 11 CAPTA I N ROSS AN D LIEU TENAN T EDWAR DES 5 1

f a an escort he le t at midnight, taking circuitous

of rufﬁans route to avoid a collection in the valley,

1 0 A . M . of arrived at at Sadoo, the headquarters the British forces now advancing to the relief of

Chitral . Umra Khan hoped by delivering up the British ofﬁcers to stave offthe punishment which the

f now u British orces were at hand to inﬂict pon him , and it was with this object that he had released

Lieutenant Edwardes . But General L ow did not

f r stay his advance o a moment. He pushed steadily ’ on towards Umra Khan s stronghold at Munda, and on April the 1 6th Umra Khan played his second a c rd, and released Lieutenant Fowler, though still without the effect of staying the advance of the

British . Both ofﬁcers had now unexpectedly obtained their release . They had suffered the greatest

of hardships , and lived in daily peril their lives, but they spoke with something like enthusiasm of the good treatment they had received at Umra Khan ’s hands . I t was sometimes no easy matter for that Chiefto keep offthose who had wished to injure the British ofﬁcers and on one occasion after Lieutenant f Edwardes had le t, Fowler had had an anxious time owing to the presence ofmany fanatics from outside f in gaining an entrance into the ort. There had nearly been a pitched ﬁght between Umra Khan ’s

rufﬁans few d f men and these wild , and a ays a ter wards when we both stood together in Umra ’ f Khan s ort, Lieutenant Fowler, standing in the

E 2 1 1 5 2 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CH . doorway ofthe house he had occupied as a prisoner o f nly three days be ore , had shown me the spot where these fanatics came clamouring round his guard, and trying to obtain access to him . But Umra Khan succeeded in protecting him through

n his out. He gave back to Lieutena t Edwardes o w n sword which had been seized at Reshun , and which Umra Khan had received as a present from Chitral ; and he promised to obtain Lieutenant

’

s if f . Fowler s al o, it could be ound We both c sa f s of onsider, y the British o ﬁcers , at the clo e

us their report, that Umra Khan treated very well indeed, and that he never intended to be the direct " cause ofinjury to us under any circumstance . So ended the wonderful adventures of the tw o

British subalterns . At the time when they were holding out at Reshun , and making their last stand in a mere village house against overwhelming

of numbers the enemy ; again , when they were

f foe treacherously captured by a deceit ul and lastly, when they were in the hands of men in the fever

of heat rebellion against the British , no one would have supposed that they could ever have escaped alive . But they had survived every peril , and were now once more in safety among their fellow country men .

’ The account of General Low s advance to the

f f n w relie o Chitral will o be given . C HAPT E R I I I

’ GEN ERAL L ow s ADV AN CE

S I N CE Lord Roberts made his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar the I ndian Army has perhaps

s o taken part in no campaign rapid, brilliant, and successful as the operations which resulted in the

f of relie the sorely pressed garrison ofChitral . N 0 element w as wanting to call forth the keenest in s tincts of the soldier, or to arouse the anxious interest of those who watched with breathless sus pense the keen struggle , as the columns pushed f orward over high mountain passes , girth deep in w sno , across rivers broad and deep, swollen with

and rain melting snow , and ﬁercely opposed by the desperate bravery of mountai n warriors born and f bred to the sword . When there ore within three short w eeks the welcome newswas ﬂashed down the

w as wire that Chitral relieved, and that the British Agent and his escort had been snatched from a

f w as of horrible ate , there perhaps hardly a corner the British Empire which did not feel proud of the hardy leaders and brave men who had so signally H P 54 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL C A .

of upheld the proud standard British resource , pluck , and endurance .

The general plan of operations w as this . The

I n of s be st Divisio all arm , some strong, longing to the I st Army Corps w as to mobilis e at f Peshawur, and moving rom a southerly position as rapidly as possible , was to pass through Swat and

f of . Dir, alling on the rear Umra Khan At the same time a small column some 400 strong was to move from Chilas and taking the wide circuit through Gilgit and Mastuj was to endeavour to force its

- way to Chitral from a north easterly direction . Before the opening of the campaign our know ledge of that portion of the theatre of operations which lies between the Peshawur Valley and Chitral territory was limited almos t entirely to such informa f tion as had been collated from the reports o natives . This information though defective in accuracy of detail yet described with sufﬁcient exactness the f main physical di ﬁculties to be overcome . Speaking

ofw ar w as generally, the theatre crossed transversely

of by ranges high mountains and rapid rivers , each f f f in itsel a ormidable obstacle , culminating in the lo ty range through which a pass feet high alone gave access to Chitral . Of the country which lies f between Chilas and Chitral , by the route ollowed ’ w e by Colonel Kelly s column , had accurate know f ledge , the route having been requently traversed by troops and an accurate survey made . The stu

e ndous f p task placed be ore Colonel Kelly, moving 1 11 GE N ERAL L OW’S ADVAN CE 5 5 a t s of f bef thi time year , could there ore airly gauged beforehand . With the fuller knowledge we now possess it is possible to give more in detail the physical features o f the country through which the Relief column

n from Peshawur passed . Skirti g the broad open plain in which Peshawur is situated is a range of mountai ns varying from feet to feet in height and known locally and collectively as the " for border hills , , generally speaking, the British

n border runs along the foot of this ra ge. Beyond the border range lies the richly cultivated Swat

vaf in f Valley , y g in width rom two miles to three

t of - miles , and having an ex ent some thirty six miles

n s le gthways . Down thi valley ﬂows the Swat

R s of iver, a considerable stream at all time the year, f but a ter the snows begin to melt , and the summer

rains burst , a large and rapid river. Some estimate of the size of the river may be gained by noting

that at the point ﬁrst bridged by our troops , it is about f f hal a mile wide rom bank to bank , being split up into seven channels each requiring a s eparate f bridge . The north side o the Swat Valley is formed by the Laram range of mountains varying f f f rom eet to eet in height . Beyond the Laram range we come to the southern extremity of

n of n of the Pri cipality Dir, dow the main valley which ﬂows the formidable and treacherous Panjkora

is f River. This river which one day ordable may

' the f n n n f next be ound a roari g torre t , ma y eet deep 56 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP indeed on one occasion it rose fourteen feet within a

few . a hours , with little or no warning The Panjkor

its Valley throughout length is narrow, with steep

’ rocky spurs constantly running down to the water s

of edge , and except in the depth winter when the

is w as t water at its lowest , not suitable , withou

for of s . extensive road making, the passage troop

s of and Lying to the ea t the Panjkora Valley ,

f w e d separated rom it by high ranges , ﬁnd the broa

f of andul B a aur the open ertile valleys J and j , former of these being the original home and limited

of f e territory the chie Umra Khan , against whos

w as n power the British expedition mai ly directed. Skirting the north end of the Jandul Valley comes

anbatai f f the J range , varying rom eet to f eet in height , crossing which we drop into a series ofnarrow rocky valleys which betoken the approaches to some great mountain range . Such are the Baraul

for and Upper Dir Valleys , with no room cultivation

s . of a on any cale , and barely capable supporting

and miserably poor backward race . Running trans versely across the north corner of Dir territory w e

of s f come to the mighty range mountain , rom

f f L ow arai eet to eet in height, over which the Pass alone gives military access to the Chitral f w Valley. The Chitral Valley is itsel very narro i and rocky much on a par w th the Panjkora Valley,

f for the and was, till a track was cut, very di ﬁcult f passage o troops .

' Brieﬂy it may be s tated that four high ranges » of

111 GEN ERAL LO 'W’S ADVAN CE 57

mountains , and three considerable rivers , besides

s mountain torrent , had to be crossed by the Southern

of f column the Relie Force . The country through w hich the small Northern column under Colonel Kelly had to pass was still

as more rough and rugged . Moreover he w practic ally isolated and had to depend entirely on his own resources for those necessities which are requisite for pushing an armed force through a difﬁcult country f under the most un avourable climatic conditions . The highest pass which w as crossed by this column

w as f of over eet, the account the passage of which w ill appear when the heroic struggle of

this column is dealt with in detail .

of Speaking generally then , the theatre war may

as of be described a mass mountains , amidst which d win deep and rapid torrents , whilst here and there may be found small ope n valleys with sufﬁcient

n supplies only to mai tain the inhabitants .

As e f of mention d be ore , incidentally, the plan operations for the Relief of Chitral consisted of a

f and combined movement rom north south , the Southern column being a strong force capable of holding its own against any combination that might

of arise, whilst the Northern column consisted a

f of w mere hand ul men lightly equipped , hose errand

as the it was to arrive as soon possible , and by moral effect oftheir arrival more than by actual force of arms to prolong the siege sufﬁciently for the

of f f arrival the main relie orce . The Southern 5 8 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP . force was based on Nowshera (near Peshawur) whilst the northern column w as based on Gilgit.

’ The enemy s main base of operations w as Jan dul of of , the home the ruling spirit in the camp the w besiegers of Chitral . Hence Umra Khan dre the

of pick his men , his treasure lay here , and such arms and ammunition as he possessed were drawn from I f andul here . we look at J on the map and e xamine its relative position to Chitral and Peshawur w e shall at once s ee that a decisive blow struck from the direction ofPeshawur must inevitably jeopardise ’ of Umra Khan s base operations , with the probable result that he would be compelled to leave Chitral f and retreat hastily to de end his own country. The Peshawur column in fact by the nature of its march

must take him directly in rear, and he must either abandon his own country to the i nvader in the hope

o f f ﬁrst striking a decisive blow at Chitral , a terwards

s turning on his tracks to meet Sir Robert Low , or el e he mus t perforce abandon the siege and concentrate his forces to meet the British before they could gain

f r of a ooting in his territo y . The relative position

the belligerents being thus , it is apparent that the ﬁrst objective ofthe main column of the relief force

w as and l v n J u . But though at ﬁrst sight the ad a

of tage position lay with the British , yet one import ant item entered into the problem which made the

of . balance even , and that was the consideration time It was calculated that the Chitral garrison was only

of f provisioned up to the end April , and there ore to 111 GE N ERAL LOW’S ADVAN CE 59 effect its relief a decisive blow must be struck f be ore that date . Such a possibility Umra Khan and his lieutenant Sher Afz ul were inclined to dis c w ountenance . An organised army moves slo ly,

f s w a immense physical di ﬁcultie stood in its y , and the inveterate animosity of tribesmen could f w in allibly be counted upon . I n a matter hich depended upon days and even hours here lay a

on of distinct advantage the side the besiegers . Orders were issued for the mobilisation at Pesha w ur of the I st Division of the I st Army Corps o n l th f w f March g , the base being a ter ards shi ted

to N ow shera as more convenient . This being the ﬁrst occasion on which a serious mobilisation ofany

of part the army had been attempted, the experiment was watched with much interest by military critics . I t must be remembered that to mobilise a force on the I ndian frontier is a far more complicated and d ifﬁcult problem than to mobilise a force at Metz or

Strasburg. I n Europe many railways lead to import a nt of points concentration , the distances are com

arativel p y Short, and countries which are likely to become the theatre of war are intersected by n umerous railw ays as well as roads suitable for heavy

wheeled trafﬁc . Large towns and ﬂourishing vil

f of lages are to be ound at the end every march , and the country invaded is capable of supplying to a very great extent the wants of the invaders in the matter ofcommissariat and transport . Far differently s ituated is a force on the I ndian frontier destined to 60 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP penetrate into the inhospitable mountains which frow n along its whole length from the Bay of

n a Bengal to the deserts of B eluchista . For such f of orce, nearly all the grain , and much even the hay, has to be carried up to the most advanced f troops rom the base in I ndia, and carried not along macadamised roads in capacious carts , but by moun tain paths where pack transport is alone possible . There is a popular error that the impedimenta of an I ndian Division is enormous indeed , it has been gravely stated by a serious military critic that it is no uncommon thing for regiments in I ndia to take Of their mess tables on service with them . course

of its only ignorance the country and ways , with a hazy recollection of Chillianw allah and the mess

of 2 th for table the 4 Foot, could be responsible such

off an erroneous statement. As a matter act during this campaign the allowance per man for everything w as 1 lb s f s . 0 . 0 lbs , and per o ﬁcer 4 , and no tent

w n were allo ed . Whe we consider that an ordinary ’ lb s . soldier s blanket weighs 4 or 5 , an allowance

f 1 o 0 lbs . need not be called extravagant in a w country here snow and ice, heavy rain , and the

ﬁery heat ofthe sun had in turns to be encountered. Yet marching thus light pack animals had to f be collected to feed and maintain the orce . I t will be apparent then that the problem ofmobilisation on the I ndian frontier is very materially complicated by the conditions that exist. Not only the troops and their stores have to be concentrated , but also many 111 GE N ERAL LOW S ADVAN CE 6 1

s of f for thou ands pack animals , and the ood the

f for as cam entire orce , man and beast, as long the

ai n pg lasts . Add to this that units had in some

the of cases to come in immense distances , that line w rail ay was a single one , and that the detraining station w as a small roadside station without plat f or for orms conveniences disembarking troops ,

w e of animals , and stores , and have a compendium d ifﬁculties which would try severely the most per fectly organised scheme of mobilisation . I t must be a source of gratiﬁcation to the military authorities that the scheme and the railway stood

the severe test applied to them . On April I st the

n f Divisio , ully equipped and provisioned , made the f f ﬁrst march ofthe campaign . The orce consisted o

f off three I n antry Brigades , each our regiments , two o fwhich were British and two native the Divisional

of tw o of f troops consisted regiments cavalry , our 1 of of batteries Mountain Artillery, one regiment 1 of Pioneers , and three companies Sappers and

of f Miners . I n addition , three regiments in antry

ff of were told o as lines communication troops . The command ofthe force w as given to Lieutenant

General Sir Robert Low , with Brigadier B C . . R General Bindon Blood, , oyal Engineers , as

his chiefstaffofﬁcer. The three brigades were com - B manded . . C . . by Brigadier Generals A A Kinloch , ,

rﬁ ld . . . Wate e H G . , and W F Gatacre , w hilst the lines of communication were entrusted to

1 Af n a terwards i cre sed . H 111 62 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL C .

- V . B . . C . C . Brigadier General A G Hammond , . , ,

. D C . A to the "ueen . The column under Colonel Kelly will be dealt with separately in a later chapter.

6 4 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

an s d especially so the Shahkot Pa s . Sir Robert Low therefore decided to merely threaten the

s Shahkot and Mora Passes , whil t his real attack

w as made on the Malakand Pas s . With this plan in V iew the I st Brigade bivouacked at L undkw ar in

f of and ull sight , directly threatening, the Shahkot s ; s w as Pas whilst a trong . cavalry reconnaissance made towards the Mora Pass to stir up dust and ’ to dis tract the enemy s attention from the true poin t

of . attack The passes are , roughly speaking, about

s e w as f ev n miles apart , and as soon as it ound that the enemy w as irrevocably committed to defend all

s to co those pa ses , Sir Robert Low issued orders n

c on f f entrate his le t, and with his whole orce stormed

n s the Malaka d Pa s .

a o rd r The b ttle t ok place on April 3 , on the ve y ’ day that Colonel Kelly s column crossed the ShandUr

far . 2 nd Pass away to the north, the Brigade under

B a - Waterﬁeld a n b rigdier General le di g, supported y

I U - n the st Brigade nder Brigadier General Ki loch , whilst the 3rd Brigade under B rigadier-General

’ n Gatacre was held i reserve . The enemy s position

e e n of the xt nded alo g the crest pass , holding the

n s of heights on either ﬂa k , whil t a series breastworks

of built stone , each commanding the one below , were

pushed down the main spurs . The position w as of

the extraordinary strength , and one which in hands

‘ of an organised enemy would have taken a week to ’ n s capture . The e emy numbers were afterwards found to be about about half of whom were

I v ACTION S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PANJKORA 65

a armed, whilst the rem inder were occupied in carry

Off f and ing the killed and wounded , etching water, bowling down huge rocks on the assaulting columns . The extent of the position may be put down at one f and a hal miles . The regiments chieﬂy engaged ’ were the King s Own Scottish Borderers , the Gordon th of H ighlanders, the Guides , and the 4 Sikhs , all

2 nd f the Brigade ; and the Bed ordshire Regiment,

6oth 1 th s the Riﬂes , the sth Sikhs, and the 37 Dogra

I s composing the t Brigade . Three mountain bat te rie s massed under Major Dacres Cunningham also

e took a conspicuous part in the ﬁght, whilst thre Maxim guns also did their share towards defeating

the enemy.

of w as f . The plan attack as ollows The Guides ,

th the supported later by the 4 Sikhs , were to scale precipitous height on the extreme right of the ’ tw o enemy s position , then turning inwards the

n the regime ts were to sweep along the crest, taking enemy in ﬂank whilst the frontal attack was pushed d home . I t was calculated that the Guides woul

w as take three hours to reach the crest , but so stern

the the resistance , and so jagged and perpendicular

n ﬁve asce t , that it took these practised mountaineers hours before they had captured the last sangar and

s w as crowned the height . Meanwhile as the day drawing on it was considered inadvisable to delay

f for now longer the rontal attack, the enemy had been under a most searching and accurate shell ﬁre from three batteries for the space of upwards of three F THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

s hours and were naturally much haken by it , whilst the action ofthe Guides had made itself well felt on his right ﬂank ; orders were therefore given for the

’ King s Ow n Scottish Borderers and the Gordon

H ighlanders to advance to the attack , each being

directed up a separate spur. I t was a ﬁne and stirring sight to s e e the splendid dash with which the two Scotch regiments took the

hill . From valley to cres t at this point the height varies from to feet and the slope looks f or the mos t part almost perpendicular . I t was this very steepness which partly accounted for the comparatively small loss suffered from the enemy ’s ﬁre and the showers of huge boulders which were hurled upon the assailants ; but the chief reason for this happy immunity was the wonderfully spirited manner in which the men rushed breastwork after

n breastwork, and arrived just beneath the ﬁ al ridge before the enemy had time to realise that the assaulting columns were at their very feet . When the whole of the 2 nd Brigade had thus got well under way orders were given for the I st

s 6oth f Brigade to upport them , the Riﬂes , ollowed

1 n re - by the sth Sikhs , being se t up a entrant, which intervened between the King’s Own Scottish f Borderers and the Guides , whilst the Bed ordshire th Regiment and 37 Dogras , heading on up the

’ valley passed across the front of the enemy s

of position , and, circling round the rear the Gordon ’ f H ighlanders , attacked the enemy s extreme le t,

68 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP. searching and splendidly-directed shell ﬁre from

a d to three batteries , n yet were still ﬁrm enough stand up to a bayonet charge at the end of it. Their loss was computed by themselves at 5 00

of killed, and the general average battles would make their wounded probably reach a total of

of f or, say, a total loss rom to The

British loss w as under seventy killed and wounded. Several curious cases ofthe vitality ofthe wounded

f . of was urnished by both sides A man the Guides ,

of to hit in the region the stomach , climbed down

f o f to the oot the pass , and walked ﬁve miles back

One the Field Hospital , supported by a comrade . of the enemy on the other hand, with no less than

to six bullets through him , walked all the way

off f d Chakdara, nine miles , and was a terwards treate d by our surgeons , and , strange to say , made a rapi

can recovery . There is no doubt that Asiatics stand wounds inﬂicted by Sword or bullet inﬁnitely

an better than Europeans c . Wounds that would

for kill a European , or at any rate lay him up ff months , a ect these hardy and abstemious moun

taineers . in a very much less severe manner I magine , for of instance , having the whole lock an exploded ’ un as g blown into one s shoulder, and going about if nothing in particular had happened ' Yet such ’ a lock was cut out of a man s shoulder months after

of s the occurrence by one our surgeons . Marvellou

of cases recovery , without number, might be told, but perhaps the case of quite a young boy is as lV ACTION S AT THE MA LAKA N D AN D PAN JKORA 69

typical as any. Like boys in any other part of the

w as world, hearing that a ﬁght going to take place

to . hard by, he naturally determined go and look on Whilst he w as thoroughly enjoying himself in all

of n the excitement the ﬁght , and probably throwi g stones vigorously, a stray bullet hit him in the arm , pass ing through it in several places and splintering it badly. When the pass was taken he w as found

n w as lying wounded , and his wou d examined . The

off doctors decided that he must have his arm cut , or mortiﬁcation se t would certainly in , and they gave the boy the choice between death or the am ’ f f o . putation his arm He chose the ormer, but in a fe w of n days instead bei g dead he was better, and in a fe w days more w as out and about again .

s Concealed among t the rocks , boulders , and

s s f f bu he , the enemy ormed a most di ﬁcult mark to

hit ; whilst the same causes , combined with the

of f steepness the ground , saved our troops rom r severer loss . The admi able control under which o ur infantry ﬁre w as kept may be gauged by the fact that the average expenditure ofammunition w as

under seven rounds per man throughout the day . Of the enemy ’s bravery it is difﬁcult to speak too

s highly, and individual cases were conspicuou . One

leader, carrying a large red and white banner , called o n his men to charge the Scottish Borderers when

they were half w ay up the hill . The charge was f f made , but all his ollowers gradually ell , till the f leader alone was le t . Nothing daunted he held 0 7 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL CHAP.

on f steadily , now and again alling, heavily hit, but

’ up and on again without a moment s delay , till at last

w as he shot dead close to the line . More desperate n f . o e courage than this is di ﬁcult to imagine Again ,

’ of the enemy s drummers , not content with taking

f s of m his air hare risks , persisted in ounting on to

f of the roo a hut, where he showed up clear and

t s k conspicuous agains the y line , and thence cheered o n his comrades . Every now and again a bullet would ﬁnd him out, and he would drop to dress his wounds, and then again mounting recommenced

r beating his d um . At last a bullet got him through f the heart, and he ell headlong a hundred yards down

ff r the cli , and there lay stark dead , but with his d um

s e round his neck, and his arms ready rai ed to strik it. No doubt the great Mahomed will ﬁnd a place f r o him in the ranks of the Mussulman Paradise .

f of On the night a ter the battle , the crest the pass

w as I held by the st Brigade , with two regiments

as far as s 2 nd pushed down Khar, whil t the Brigade

of bivouacked at the south entrance the pass . On the following morning commenced the stupendous task of pushing over the pass the ammunition baggage

of and supplies the advanced brigades . The only available path was a single track very steep and

much encumbered with boulders , which had been hastily improved by working parties of Sappers and f n s . s Pio eer Up this , rom dawn to du k , toiled batch

f of e nd of a ter batch laden mules , and yet at the the

day small progress had been made . At this highly IV ACTIO N S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PAN JKORA 7 1

opportune moment it was discovered that the old

off 6oth Buddhist road , hit by the Riﬂes during the

assault, led down by a good gradient to the plains . E very , available man was immediately employed in

of improving this relic a civilisation years old , with the result that in another twenty-four hours the

f r brigades were ready to move . Had it not been o

of this Buddhist road , the very existence which appeared to have been forgotten by the present

inhabitants, it would have taken many days to get

the division across the Malakand Pass .

I st Whilst the work on the pass was going on , the

Brigade moved down into the Swat Valley, and was

of ﬁercely assailed by several thousand the enemy,

s who , ﬁnding the Shahkot and Mora Passe turned ,

came streaming westward , determined on a ﬁght. These large bodies of men appeared on the spurs

of I st which ﬂanked the advance the Brigade , and it became necessary to hold them in Check till the brigade with its baggage could get clear into the f f open valley. This duty was success ully per ormed th by the 37 Dogras, who crowned a neighbouring

as as r spur, well by the Mountain Artille y, which

’ kept the enemy s crest well swept . Towards evening, f however, the enemy, mistaking the de ensive attitude of our troops , who were merely covering the advance of the remainder, were reported to be boldly issuing into the plain to the number of making as ifto sweep round the foot of the spur where it meets the plain , with a view to charging on to the head and 7 2 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP.

of ﬂank the advancing column . Receiving warning of this movement, orders were immediately given for the mere handful of cavalry which had been able s o far to struggle over the pass to trot round

for of f the spur, and to watch a chance alling on the f e nemy in the open . This small body consisted o ﬁfty sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Captain

s w ho f Adam , , on reconnoitring round the spur , ound

n the e emy in the open , but , like all mountaineers , h n f uggi g the oothills . Seeing his chance , Captain

Adams, with great promptness and boldness , charged ,

n doi g great execution , and driving the whole mass w o fthe enemy headlong into the hills . Not only as ff ff the charge brilliant and e ective , but the moral e ect w as enormous . The enemy had not the remotest n the otion that any cavalry had crossed pass , and like all nations unaccustomed to horses , they had f e xaggerated notions o the power of cavalry .

W f s aw w f hen , there ore , they their orst ears more f ’ than realised, and ﬁ ty sabres without a moment s hesitation charging a couple ofthousand foot soldiers and of completely altering the aspect the ﬁght, the ascendency of the cavalry arm w as es tablished for

n the campaign . Eve Fowler and Edwardes , in their

far-off so captivity, heard nothing reiterated much f as this dread o cavalry . The immediate result w as that the enemy began to melt away even from the

n of hill tops , and by next mor ing not a vestige

them was to be seen . Our losses on this day were

S e light, including s ven or eight in the cavalry , whilst I v ACTIO N S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PANJKORA 7 3

ff 2 0 the enemy su ered severely, at least 5 being killed.

th 6th of On the 5 and April , reconnaissances under f ff f the Chie Sta O ﬁcer, General Blood , were pushed upthe valley to search for fords across the Swat

and River, to keep in touch with the enemy, who c b n s ould e see in con iderable force beyond Thana .

n of f Suitable poi ts passage having been ound, the duty offorcing the passage w as entrusted to General

W a rﬁ l h 2 n te e d and t e d Brigade . The enemy now left Thana and crossing the river were reinforced by a body of riﬂe me n sent down by Umra Khan

f his under the command o brother . I n all about men were posted in a naturally strong position f f to oppose the passage o the British orce . On the

’ ’ enemy s bank small rocky hills at the water s edge , c ompletely commanded the perfectly level and open s n f w outhern ba k, rom hich the attack had to be d f elivered . Naturally a rontal attack would have

’ W aterﬁeld s been very costly, but General smart tactical instinct showed him the w ay to gain his e nd

n with but slight loss . Engagi g the enemy heavily at long ranges with his artillery and the main body o f his f and I n antry , he sent the Guides Cavalry 1 l th Bengal Lancers up the river with orders to c - f f ross by a little known ord , and to all briskly on

of the ﬂank and rear the enemy. To support the c 1 f avalry he sent the 5 th Sikh I n antry . The e ffect was instantaneous the defenders ofthe passage

saw s f the moment they the dread Lancer , hal 7 4 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

n f n swimmi g, hal wadi g, across the river, a mile or

s n n and so up tream , tha they bega to lose heart ; what at ﬁrst was a retirement gradually degenerated

’ into a ﬂight, headed by Umra Khan s brother and

f s s the body o hor emen e corting him . But the

Lancers and Guides were not to be denied , and f foe f alling on the demoralised , le t the green crops

’ strewn with their dead . The enemy s total loss was

00 of f about 4 killed , whom about one hundred ell to the cavalry. Holding the north bank with two f battalions , ords were rapidly marked out, and the

f n in antry, aided by inﬂated Ski s , and the skilled

of for s watermen the country impressed the ervice , struggled across with only two or three casualties f n for rom drowni g. The work was an anxious one , armpit deep in the rushi ng torrent a man washed off

f r his legs was lost o ever . During the cavalry pursuit one of the squadrons ofthe 1 1 th Bengal Lancers narrowly missed captur

’ in g Umra Khan s brother, which at the time would

n c u have bee a great o p. For it must be remembered

f s n that two British o ﬁcer , Lieute ants Edwardes and

’ s n Fowler, were all thi time priso ers in Umra Khan s

his . hands , and entirely at mercy I t may be said

w as that the halter round their necks , and every blow

f s our orce struck served but to tighten the knot . With Umra Khan ’s brother in our hands the situ ation would have been reciprocated , and we could then have afforded to treat on equal terms for an exchange . During this same pursuit a curious inci

76 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP .

f Ra fort built by Umra Khan . The ort is called ’ of mora, and lay east Chakdara, being Umra Khan s f advanced ort, with which he practically domin ated the entire Swat Valley. This was captured f a ter a short resistance , and sentenced to be blown up by the Sappers . But sentence was one thing,

n and executio another . A heavy charge was placed

f of of at the oot one the towers , the train lighted ,

s f off and the spectators tood a ar , expecting to see the whole structure lifted sky high . There was a very

for loud report indeed , but that was all , the tower f f stood per ectly unmoved . On urther examination it was found that the base ofeach tower w as perfectly solid masonry from the foun dation to ﬁfteen feet

n of above grou d line , whilst the walls above were f immense thickness . All the orts built by Umra

n of is f - Kha were the same pattern , that , our cornered ,

of with one these strong towers at each corner, and with high walls of great thickn ess and carefully

f n f loopholed ormi g the our sides . Our artillery

n f could make no impressio on these orts . The sites chosen in the open valleys are very good but in the narrow valleys they are perforce much com manded n by the neighbouri g precipitous hills . On

’ n s f the Swat River, the e emy position, with the ort of Ramora on one ﬂank, rocky hills well prepared for f on of r de ence the other, the village Chakda a in the centre, with much swampy ground restricting the advance of an enemy even after the passage of

few -deﬁned the river to a well paths , combined to I V ACTIO N S AT TH E MALA KAN D AN D PANJKORA 7 7 make the position if scientiﬁcally held a remarkably

strong one . The river is now spanned by three bridges— a ﬁne

suspension bridge , a pontoon bridge and a trestle

and pier bridge, the latter two being liable to be

washed away in ﬂood time . Directly the passage of the Swat River had been effected the Sappers were set to work to construct

the trestle and pier bridge, whilst strong recon naissances were sent forward to keep in touch with

f K at ola r the enemy. These ound the g Pass ove

the Laram Range unoccupied , and the cavalry push

ing on descended on to the Panjkora River, some f twenty miles ahead . Here was ound the most formidable obstacle which the force had yet e n th f countered . On April 9 , the river was ordable

for s f for f hor es and, with di ﬁculty, also in antry ; on

1 1 th f for the , it was barely ordable horses, and not at all for I nfantry ; but from that time onwards I t f im became a mighty torrent totally un ordable ,

for practicable also cavalry swimming, though the I ndian trooper and his horse are like ducks in the

f to water. I t became necessary there ore build a

bridge . The only materials immediately at hand were the

of of heavy logs wood , parts great trees which are

f for annually ﬂoated down rom these parts to I ndia, sale. With these, and using telegraph wire to f anchor the piers , a rough ootbridge was with great

f o di ﬁculty and danger constructed , and ﬂoated int 8 7 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

f s . o 1 2 position On the night April th , the Guide

n were pushed across , and strongly e trenched , so as

n to cover the bridge head . The ight passed quietly, but towards morning a freshet came down beari ng great logs and washed the bridge away, leaving the

far n Guides on the side . The positio was un

for n doubtedly an awkward one , cavalry reco naissances had reported that the enemy in some strength , calculated at by the local people , lay

n n n of o ly about seve miles westward , and the ews the bridge breaking would immediately be reported ﬁ h by their outlooks. However it never does in g t ing these people to hesitate or appear to be in the least discomposed , happen what may. Colonel

Batt e n y , who was commandi g the Guides on this f occasion , there ore adhered to the orders received overnight, when the bridge was intact . These orders

’ were to turn the enemy s sharpshooters out of the positions from which they had been annoying our. working parties , and to burn such villages near at hand as had been furnishing armed parties to ﬁre across the river by night and day . The bold offensive thus taken by the Guides undoubtedly had ff a good e ect . They started early in the morning and making a wide Sweep drove out all parties of

n the enemy concealed amo gst the rocks, and burnt such villages as were actively hostile . All this was

for f easy work troops highly skilled in hill war are, though the Climbing was very stiff; but the really stern trial came when the hour arrived to retire to

80 H A THE RELIEF OF C ITR L CHAP.

strongly as it retired . The second column sweeping down the valley prepared to assail the Gu ides in

cut off r flank and rear, hoping to completely thei f — retreat. Foot by oot to the spectators it seemed almost inch by inch— the different companies retired alternately down the ridges they occupied , fiercely assailed on all hands yet coolly firing volley after volley, relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one strong position only to take up another a fe w

of the yards back, the splendidly directed ﬁre De rajat Mountain Battery doing invaluable service so good indeed was the ﬁre discipline of the troops engaged under these trying Circumstances that not

of a shot was ﬁred except by word command . Mean

of while two companies the regiment, which had f been le t to hold the bridge head , moved out to

' ’ of check the advance the enemy s second column , which , making a detour, was moving with determina

of f tion into the ﬂank and rear the retreating orce .

of 2 nd of The whole the Brigade , a battery

r un artille y, and a Maxim g , were now ordered out and placed in a strong pos ition on the east bank of the Panjkora (the Guides being on the west bank) , whence in the later stages of the retirement thei r

f the ﬁre could be o material assistance . Owing to

r of ve y broken nature the mountain sides, and the

ff our excellent cover a orded to skilled skirmishers , loss was exceedingly small till the foot of the hill

s w as reached . Here the regiment had to cros

of h several hundred yards level ground , on whic I V ACTIO N S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PANJKORA 8 1

t he n green barley was standing waist high , and the andul f t cross the J River, here about three ee o deep, to make its way thr ugh more ﬁelds to the

e . f bridg head U nhappily, just as the regiment le t f the last spur, the commanding o ﬁcer, Lieutenant

Batt e Colonel F . D . y was mortally wounded , dying,

as of he would perhaps most wish to, at the head

f of r of di his regiment, a ter a quarter a centu y s h d tinguis e service with it. I t was in crossing this open ground that the e xtraordinary bravery of the enemy became more

- brilliantly evident. Standard bearers with reckless gallantry could be s een rushing to certain de

s u f of th tr ction, alling perhaps within ten yards e

of . invincible line the Guides Nay, sometimes

of f men , devoid all ear, and having used up

the of f r whole their ammunition , rushed o ward

lar w ith . e at s g rocks and hurled these the soldier ,

c ourting instant death . They were like hounds

on their prey. Nothing could damp their ardour

o r f of assaultS f check the ury their . Even a ter

andul the Guides had crossed the J stream , and the enemy were under a severe ﬂank ﬁre from the Gordon Highlanders and the King’s Own

s Scottish Borderers , they da hed into the stream, where each one stood out as clear as a bull ’s

eye on a target, and attempted to close again .

not But a man got across , so steady and well d of irected was the ﬂank ﬁre the British regiments .

G 82 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

The ﬁght was now practically over for the day ;

ﬁre slackened all round, and the entrenched posi

tion was rapidly occupied, and strengthened where

who necessary. During the day the enemy, numbered lost from 5 00 to 600 men ; the ’ a t Guides total loss was only bout twenty , a resul due to the skilful manner in which the retirement

ff to aff was e ected, as well as the ﬁne cover orded

by the broken ground on the mountain side.

I t was now evening, and preparations had to be

for made to meet a night attack , the enemy, several

u Close round be tho sand strong, were still hidden l w f hind the o hills . As a rein orcement a couple of companies of the 4th Sikhs and some spare

f a f o ﬁcers were sent cross in ra ts , with a Maxim

the gun ; whilst near bank , which commanded ’ the bridge head entrenchment at 800 yards

r range , was occupied by a mountain batte y, and

of 2 nd the troops the Brigade . The position

of n was . the the e emy being such as it , night was

of . for r one some anxiety, a determined ush might

be expected at any moment. Such an attack

n of was pla ned and on the eve being executed,

when the unexpected , and as it seemed to the

e of nemy, magical , appearance a star shell com

le tel f foe p y dum ounded the hitherto dauntless , th and e attack was not delivered . From the information of s pies it appeared afterwards that

chosen warriors , sword in hand, lay con

IV ACTION S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PAN JKORA 83

cealed in the standing corn just outside the

for picquets , merely awaiting the signal assault, when this happy contrivance of civilisation staved

off t a ﬁght, which could only have been at ended f with enormous loss on both sides . Be ore the

w off f s us enemy ﬁnally dre however, the orce

‘ tained a serious loss in the death of Captain f h e o t e . s Peebles , in charg Maxim gun Thi

’ ofﬁcer s services had proved invaluable from his

of o of intimate knowledge the w rking the Maxim,

h o a gun whic in inexpert hands is apt, like ther f of h o . The pieces mec anism , to get out order ’ working of Captain Peebles s gun had been the admiration of the whole force throughout the

n campaig .

’ f now tha n I t had become su ﬁciently apparent , t o

“ ﬂoating bridge could hope to stand the current in f the Panjkora River, and it was there ore decided to throw across a suspension bridge at a point some

w . u s what lo er down C riously enough at thi point , where the rocky hills shut in the river t ill it is like

1 00 f f a mill race only eet or so across , were ound

o b ' m K bridging materials c llected y U ra han , who had evidently ordered a cantilever bridge to b e built

a r . e here The work was ntrusted to M jo Aylmer , V R . E s . C . . , , who had had much experience in thi

branch of his art up in the Gilgit direction . The available materials were telegraph w ire and beams f f e . rom dismantl d houses With these, within orty

G 2 8 H RA 4 THE RELIEF OF C IT L CHAP .

eight hours , Major Aylmer constructed a suspension

of 1 00 f of bridge eet span , capable bearing even

i . loaded camels , cavalry , and mounta n artillery During the construction a very prompt and plucky ’ act on Major Aylmer s part saved the life of a so] dier. About a mile up stream , where the ﬁrst

ﬂoating bridge had been constructed, a ﬂying bridge and rafts were still working Ibackw ards and for wards, to supply the Guides with their wants on the

o . of f ther bank One these ra ts , on which were two men of the Devonshire Regiment Maxim Gun De tachment , got accidentally overturned , and the boat men and oars were washed away . The two soldiers managed to climb on to the raft and were carried down stream at a great pace . General Gatacre , seeing the accident, immediately galloped down to

S of the ite the new bridge to give warning, in the

of hopes saving the men . Meanwhile one man had made an attempt to jump on shore , and had been s a the wept way and drowned, and survivor on the f ra t came ﬂying down the torrent . With the greatest presence of mind and pluck Major Aylmer imme diately slipped down a slack wire that was across the

as river, and just managed to grab the soldier he f shot past . The raft was immediately a ter dashed

r to pieces on the rocks below. With conside able difﬁculty the soldier and his preserver were hauled

w as f on shore, and it then ound that the Major was badly bruised and cut by the wire. The Royal

86 THE R ELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP. arm to strike , unhampered by the thought that his action might sound the death -knell ofthe two young f in ofﬁcers . I n meeting Major Deane hal way these diplomatic overtures Umra Khan displayed an enlightened and civilised advancement which is far n ahead ofhis surroundings . Without demandi g any ’ uia ro oo n for g p g , he , whe they were asked , returned n in m the priso ers all honour, having treated the

thoroughly well throughout. Whilst the Sappers are busy building their bridge over the Panjkora this would be a not altogether unfavourable moment to epitomise the campaign in so far as it had conduced to the relief of the

r ff beleaguered garrison up to this date . Eve y e ort f f had ailed to get news rom the besieged, nor had it been found possible by any device— for many were — tried to throw news ofthe . coming succour into the

f far ort . But so great results had been gained ;

-in-C f o the commander hie , the soul and body f the

f ofhis siege , Umra Khan himsel , with one thousand

- picked men , mostly armed with breech loaders , had

been compelled to abandon the siege, and to hasten

back southwards and to organise . resistance to and

raise the tribes against our a dvance . On this same

1 f of date , April 3th , Colonel Kelly and his hand ul men

were at Mastuj , having accomplished his celebrated

f H is passage o the Shandur Pass . advance so far had

been but slightly opposed. From reliableinformation it w as supposed that the garrison of Chitral had

2 2 n supplies to last them only up to April d. A I V ACTION S AT THE MALAKAN D AN D PANJKORA 87

f f week there ore only remained, and be ore the Southern force lay Umra Khan with men and tw o of mighty ranges mountains, whilst the Northern f orce , under Colonel Kelly, though within sixty miles of f f c Chitral , had be ore it a narrow and di ﬁ ult route, at any point in which the enemy might be found s trongly posted . C H APT E R V

TH E R EL IEF OF CH ITRAL

TR ULY on this thirteenth day of April the outlook was not a bright one but here came in one ofthose ﬂashes of genius which go to win campaigns and undoubtedly helped to win this one . I t occurred to those responsible for the conduct ofthe campaign that though it was impossible to convey a large force to f Chitral in the given time , yet it was quite easible to

of f push through a small number men who , alling on

of Afz ul f the rear Sher , the general le t by Umra

of f Khan in charge the Siege , might orm a welcome

w s diversion . At ﬁrst it a contemplated sending a

f of f f mixed orce regulars and levies , but a ter care ul deliberation it was decided that regulars would

of ff impede the rate march , and that the e ect being chieﬂy a moral one could be almost as surely gained

f for by levies alone . The plan there ore was the

f s main orce to cros the Panjkora, and to ﬁght a

our decisive battle with Umra Khan , whilst ally the

of des Khan Dir, covered by this movement, was patched up the left bank of the Panjkora River

H v E EF H RAL 8 C AP. THE R LI OF C IT 9

L ow arai 0 f with orders to cross the Pass , 5 eet

high , to descend into the Chitral Valley, and to give out far and wide that he was merely the advanced

of f guard the orce , which had conquered Swat and f in Bajour, and had heavily de eated the hitherto

n vincible general Umra Kha . I n pursuance of this plan the Khan of Dir w as ordered to move forward with men and to cross

L ow a the rai Pass, and immediately the bridge over

was the Panjkora River completed, General Blood moved rapidly forward in charge of a cavalry reconnaissance towards Umra Khan ’s stronghold at

s of s Munda. Advancing with a quadron the Guide

andul Cavalry, General Blood moved up the J River till the large and important village of M iankila was

in sight . Here a peasant was met who entered

f n n reely i to conversation . The Ge eral asked him “ w as where Umra Khan . He said Over there in " f of that ort, pointing to Munda , just over the brow “ a rise in the ground . Will you take him a note "" and bring an answer asked the General . Cer " “ f tainly, said the peasant, I will be back in hal an " hour . So calling into his assistance the linguistic

n of of proﬁcie cy Captain N ixon , the I ntelligence

Department, a polite and cordial note was written to

Umra Khan , asking him to come out into the open f and have a talk with the General , in all good ellow “ " ship, and without prejudice . The answer came

f w as f ff back be ore long, and to the ollowing e ect f A ter greetings , I should greatly like to meet 90 THE REL IEF OF CH I TRAL CHAP.

a your excellency, and to have a quiet t lk with you , whereby the whole affair might be easily settled . But unfortunately I am surrounded by about

’ of Ghaz is , and the scoundrels won t hear my going o u t to see . You too I notice are accompanied by those cutthroats of yours . Assuredly no quiet con versation can take place under these circumstances . Now I would propose that you send away your c utthroats and I will send away mine , and then you and I can have our conference alone in the " ﬁeld. This was all very nice and friendly ; but meanwhile dense columns of the enemy began to

f M eankila issue rom and Munda, and moving with

of astonishing rapidity, occupied both banks the f river, which is here easily ordable everywhere , and began to press on the cavalry. The reconnoitring

of party moved back quietly, till the head the f in antry column became visible , hastening up . This w as rd nf nera the 3 I antry Brigade under Ge l Gatacre, accompanied by the 1 1 th Bengal Lancers and the

D ra a e t . j . Mountain Battery

O The battery pened ﬁre at once , and the cavalry moved up the river bed , here very broad and open , whilst the infantry advanced to the attack up the f right bank o the stream . But from the ﬁrst moment, though Umra Khan was present in person , it was quite evident that the enemy did not mean " f business . The severe lessons of ormer battles had begun to tell upon them , and their resistance w as f- r only hal hearted. The 3 d Brigade pushed

’ 92 THE RE L IEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

f their proﬁts rom all , merchants or agriculturists , and the money thus accumulated he changed into gold at f n if a rate o excha ge ﬁxed by himself. Thus the

f Rs 2 o . 0 real value a Russian gold coin was , by royal

for of edict, and the beneﬁt the royal purchaser, it R s . 1 8 . became Gold is very scarce in Asia, but a

n of certai number Russian coins ﬁlter across , and

gold ornaments are to be found here and there . All

these Umra Khan assiduously collected , so that at the time of his ﬂight he probably had a goodly

treasure . f One evening be ore the British advance began , after attending evening prayers on the praying plat

f of f orm in the clump chenars below Munda ort ,

his f Umra Khan , turning to ollowers , said I have

‘ f the just received a letter rom Gholam Hyder,

-in - f f f Commander Chie o the A ghan army . H is pro posal is that I shall invade the Peshawur Valley by

of way the Malakand with men , and that he will co-operate through the Khyber Pass with

sa men . What y you , my brave warriors Where

n upo the whole assembly arose with a mighty shout , To Peshawur I " travestying a somewhat more

cr 1 8 celebrated y which was heard in Europe in 70.

su Whether ch a letter had been received or not , and w if n hether, it had been , it was anything more tha

of h one t ose neighbourly acts by which , in the East , f one riend lures another to certain destruction , it is

not necessary here to discuss . The anecdote is merely told as showing the immense conﬁdence THE REL I EF OF CH ITRAL 93

f Umra Khan had in his own powers , and the aith his f f . o ollowers had in his skill Years conquest, and

of unche uered years q success , had led the petty border Chieftain into halfthinking that he could with

w as a stand the power of a mighty empire . It thousand pities that this chieftook up the attitude he

did. I fhe had chosen to be the friend ofthe British he might now be despotic ruler of all the country

which lies between Chitral and the Peshawur Valley , with the ﬁrm alliance of the British Government at

his back.

When the cavalry, riding on rapidly, captured the

f of of abandoned ort Munda, every trace a rapid

ﬂight was apparent . Books and grain were strewn

about, dismounted cannon lay at the gate , everything

- was topsy turvey and turned inside out, and the sole f occupant was a poor, de ormed idiot. Amongst the papers found lying about were some of considerable 1 mullet/z . f interest One was rom a certain who ,

f f of be ore the battle, wrote rom the summit the Mala

inﬁ el . d s kand Pass H e said We see the , the sons

of . pigs , encamped down in the plains below us There

few of are very them , and we shall easily send them f all to Hell . On our side we have twelve or ﬁ teen f thousand Ghazis, and the place is well ortiﬁed with

- sangars. To morrow or next day I shall have the honour ofinforming your Excellency that the inﬁdels

is have been extirpated and so on . I t highly probable that the worthy mullet/z spent the next few

1 A i ft n ofthe s n - a s n f u f l es e e o s a o o d. pr t, o porti gp r o typ Jo h TH H 94 E RELI EF OF CH I TRAL C AP .

w a o r days in breaking the record towards Upper S t ,

a a else, perchance , his bones now lie on the Mal k nd . Another literary curiosity found in Mund a fo rt was a letter from a Scotch ﬁrm in Bombay o ffe ring to provide Umra Khan with every luxury in the

of f m u s way arms and ammunition , rom Maxi g n

R R s . S . 00 at 3, 7 each , down to revolvers at 34

i n s of a piece . Luckily the benevolent ntentio this patriotic ﬁrm had been frustrated by the

of t m astute intervention Major Deane , at tha ti e

r Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur. The ﬁ m in

f f s e f question has ound it expedient to trans er it l ,

s and the beneﬁts to humanity which it provide , to w Cairo . Many other letters too lay about sho ing how wide was the inﬂuence of the departed chief;

ff of r s w o ers help , spontaneous and othe wise, ho ed that the total resources at his command were not

f o much under men , all armed in some ashi n

of - or another, with a good sprinkling breech loading

of riﬂes , late the property Her Majesty the "ueen of England . It w as on the I 7th day of April that Umra Khan made his last stand and disappeared permanently f f rom the theatre o operations . On the very same day the garrison of Chitral made the splendid

of 1 sortie led by Lieutenant Harley the 4th Sikhs , a full account of which will appear in a future

o of 1 8th of chapter, and n the night the April the

Afz ul his siege was raised , and Sher and whole f orce ﬂed to the hills . Here the general with

THE REL I EFOF C H ITRA L 95 of his men, were cleverly captured and brought in

The prisoners to Dir. history of our recent wars does not furnish an example of a more signal and sweeping success. I n the space of exactly one month from the day on which the mobilisation of

f f ‘ t he o the relie orce was ordered, main object f

of the campaign was obtained, the whole the enemy’s numerous and ubiquitous forces were

f of i de eated and dispersed, and every one the m

f w as r portant chie s a p isoner in our hands, or in that of our ally the Amir. Setting aside the superiority in armament and organisation which were undoubtedly on our side— though in passing it may be noted that the Soudan and the Cape furnish instances where both ‘ availed not against determined savages it may be well to examine the chief causes which

s led to this signal uccess . The result may be described brieﬂy as due to three main causes To the rapid and successful mobilisation of the Relief Force ; to the crushing defeat of the enemy in

‘ t andul Swa , on the Panjkora, and in the J Valley ; and to the hardy and determined advance ofColonel

’ Kelly s small column from the north . Nor must we forget the stout resistance of the garrison placed perforce in an almost untenable position against

m the overwhel ing odds, which thoroughly damped ardour oft he besiegers and paved the way for the effective result obtained by the approach of the

f - of w ar relief columns . I t was in act the game - d played on sound principles , and with a ﬁne all roun 96 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

combination which commanded success . How nice this calculation had to be will be appreciated by the

ar s o far milit y tudent, when he c nsiders how diver gent were the bases from which the two columns f had to start, and what immense physical di ﬁculties had to be overcome by each . I t does not require much imagination to show that Umra Khan , acting, as he was, on interior lines as against exterior lines, if f might, less skil ully assailed, have ﬁrst thrown his

’ f e n whole orce on Colonel Kelly s weak column ,

in deﬁles tangled almost impossible ; next, with troops elated with victory, to have swamped the

of small garrison Chitral , already hard pressed and

of f Short ood , and then , with a dozen tribes at his

of M ahomedan back, stirred up to the highest pitch f anaticism , to have turned and assailed the main f column under Sir Robert Low . The ﬁnal result o the campaign must undoubtedly have gone against

Umra Khan , but he would have had some signal successes to Show in return . I t happened to be one

’ of the writer s duties to escort Sher Afz ul to I ndia as of f a prisoner war, and rom conversation held with him it appeared that such in fact had been in the main the plan ofcampaign which Umra Khan f had contemplated, and he was rustrated only by the superior combination and strategic Skill which di

o rected the march fthe relieving columns.

All need for any hurry was now over. Colonel

2 h Kelly reached Chitral unopposed on April ot . I was the ﬁrst to shake hands with the brave

8 9 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP. V

f s and his strapping I ndian war comrade , aced the e many hardships with the cheerful alacrity of me n ready and accustomed to overcome unusual difﬁ culties f s n , and to ace tremendous odd by la d and

s ea.

s I t is seldom , too , that a Briti h campaign does not produce its men of mark and those who have done heroic deeds , nor is this one an exception to

for s of the rule , the name Sir Robert Low , General

Wate rﬁeld Bindon Blood , and General stand high

of sf n in the historic roll succes ul ge erals , whilst

’ Colonel Kelly s brilliant feat of arms has made him f or of amous f ever. But perhaps the deed all others which appeals most to the soldier’s heart was the desperate and successful sortie from Chitral made by the brave and gallant Harley and his Sikhs on

f 1 8 1 o . the 7th day April , 9 5 SI R R . L ow A N D STA FF O N T H E J A N EATA I PA ss .

1 00 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

of f H os strength and intentions the Chitrali orce . tilities between the British and the Chitralis had not

f ad yet commenced , and with a large armed orce vancing towards the fort it was necessary for the British garrison to take every precaution against

being caught unawares by them . Two hundred f Kashmir I n antry under Captains Campbell , Towns

c hend , and Baird , and a companied by the British

- u Agent, Surgeon Major Robertson , Lie tenant Gur - f don , and Surgeon Captain Whitchurch , there ore set out from the fort to reconnoitre the Chitrali disposi

. of tions There is no regular town Chitral , but

f of round the ort , which is merely the residence the

M e htars , there are scattered over the valley a num of ber little hamlets and detached houses , dotted over the cultivated lands which stretch for a distance of about three miles down the valley. These culti vated f lands are on some gently sloping ground , rom

and f a mile to a mile a hal in width , which runs

f - down rom the high, steep hill sides on the right bank to the river. Leaving ﬁfty men in the sem i a quarter of a mile f f a rom the ort, and detaching a section under Capt in

Baird , and which Lieutenant Gurdon accompanied ,

- to ascend the hill sides on the right, Captains Camp bell and Townshend advanced for a mile and a half down the valley , towards a house in which it was

Afz ul stated that Sher had established himself. On arrival at the house it was found that Sher Afz ul w as

not in it, and Captain Townshend then advanced

’ s f till urther down the valley, while Captain Baird s THE DEFENCE OF CH ITRA L ﬂanking party was strengthened by an additional

- twenty ﬁve men . Captain Townshend could see a number of men moving about among the trees and houses of a hamlet 5 00 yards beyond the house which it had been supposed Sher Afz ul was occupy ’ ing and on the hill-sides which Baird s party were ascending there were some hundreds ofthe Chitralis .

On these hill slopes ﬁring now commenced , and Captain Townshend concluding that the men he could see in the front moving about in the hamlet

O . were the enemy , pened ﬁre with a section volley

The ﬁre was immediately returned by the enemy, d - who , being arme with Martini Henry and Snider e riﬂes made , says Captain Townsh nd , most excellent

e shooting. Among the nemy were several hundred

’ o f men Umra Khan s , drilled and trained by pen s ione rs f rom our own I ndian Army ; and there were ,

of indeed, many these pensioners themselves in the f orce which was now advancing upon Chitral . Captain Townshend kept his men under cover as

for much as possible , and , taking advantage the purpose of the boulders and low walls which sur

u 2 ro nd the ﬁelds, advanced to within 00 yards or so o f the hamlet. There was now no more cover in

f of his ront, many his men were hit, and he could s e e the hamlet towards which he was advancing

' now crow ded w ith men who were keeping up a well s u f stained ﬁre rom the walls and loopholes . To a dvance with the hundred men he had with him , and not of these veteran troops our own army, but untried Kashmir troops armed with worn -out Snider THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

s u of riﬂes , again t s perior numbers a better armed and more experienced force posted behind walls was an impossibility, and Captain Townshend decided therefore to hold his ground until Captain Baird

- should move along the hill slopes to the westward, and so turn the hamlet, and when Baird had done this Townshend would then advance to attack it in f ront .

s But time went on , and Town hend could see no

of signs Baird advancing on his flank. On the other hand small parties of the enemy began to overlap him on both flanks and to e nfilade him with their

ﬁre . His position was now becoming untenable ; it

f- was hal past Six and would Soon be dark , so decisive action of some sort— either an advance or a retire — ment must be carried out at once . At this juncture

the Captain Campbell arrived, and directed that

e f haml t should be stormed . The order to rein orce

of was given , but the support men in rear did not come up, though the order was continually repeated . Captain Campbell then went back to himself bring

u up the s pport, while Captain Townshend ﬁxed C bayonets preparatory to a harge , and kept up a

e h avy independent ﬁre . The support all this time was lying behind some low walls I 5 0 yards to the rear. Captain Campbell succeeded in bringing on f f about a dozen men rom among them , and then ell shot through the knee just as he w as rejoining the

of m advance party . Colonel Jagat Singh, the Kash ir

00 tr ps , then went back to try and get more men on ,

he but could only bring on one or two . So Captain

1 04 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP . s o f r terrible a ﬁre , and the raw Kashmir in ant y could

r no longer stand before it. I nsensibly they sh ank down under the ﬁre , then crouched down behind s s tones , till Captain Townshend ﬁnding it impos ible to carry the charge home in spite of all his e n deavours to get the men on , abandoned the attempt , and ordered his men back behind the wall from which they had started .

Events had now taken a very serious turn . The Britis h ofﬁcers were nearly tw o miles distant from the fort with a handful ofdisheartened troops in the f of u of ace vastly superior n mbers an elated enemy , w ho were now commencing to overlap them on all

s . f now side The retirement to the ort commenced , and Captain Campbell , even though he was very s everely wounded in the knee , mounted a pony and helped to keep the troops in order and steady during ff the trying retirement . This retirement was e ected

off by alternate parties, the men dribbling to the rear by word ofcommand while the remainder kept up a heavy ﬁre to keep off the enemy . Captain Towns hend always remained with the last party in order to

n prevent any pa ic or disorder arising, and in this w ay the party reached a house about a mile from the

f . f ort, where Mr Robertson was ound rallying men w ho f had retired be ore , and here a short stand was made , while Mr. Robertson , at great risk and exposed to a heavy ﬁre from the enemy now lining the garden

r f walls and houses on eve y side , rode back to the ort

’ to bring out ﬁfty of Lieutenant Harley s Sikhs to

n cover the retireme t . v1 TH E DEFEN CE OF CH ITRAL 1 05

w as I t now quite dark , and the enemy were ﬁring ’ f f into Captain Townshend s troops rom ront, ﬂank ,

f r . and rear, rom eve y hamlet and wall The Chit ralis and Pathans were wild with excitement at the unexpected success oftheir ﬁrst encounter with the

of British , and , carried away in the whirl enthusiasm , even women hurled down stones upon the re tir

ing troops . Groping their way, and unable at a

f f foe Short distance to distinguish riend rom , Cap tain Townshend brought his men along between walls ﬂashing out ﬁre in the darkness till he reached

semi f f f s the near the ort, where he ound ﬁ ty Sikh under Lieutenant Harley come out to cover his

un retreat . Steady as on parade , and calm and

s moved amid t all the excitement around them , Harley and his veterans headed back the storm

s while the Ka hmir troops retired to the fort . Then he and his men slowly retired within the walls also

C in while the enemy losed thickly around , and the vestment which was to last forty-seven long days and weary nights commenced . B ut when the ofﬁcers arrived within the walls it f f w was ound that two o their number ere missing .

Neither Dr. Whitchurch nor Captain Baird had yet arrived . I t was known that Baird had been de s eratel p y wounded , and deep anxiety regarding the f of f ate him and Whitchurch was elt, when at

’ about eight o clock Whitchurch w as seen from the

su walls staggering along towards the gateway, p f porting and hal carrying Baird along. At the

of i f me n beginning the act on Baird , with about ﬁ ty , 1 06 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRA L CHAP .

had been s ent away on the right to w ork round the ’

. f of w enemy s ﬂank With his hand ul men , and ith

s Lieutenant Gurdon by his ide , he ascended the steep rocky mountain slopes which overlook the

of valley. I t is a generally accepted principle war fare that an attacking party should be divided into

an advance party and a support , and this principle

a was now acted upon ; but Capt in Baird , with his

s characteristic zeal , would not remain with the upport,

but s f determined on leading the advance him el , and f Lieutenant Gurdon , who , though as Political O ﬁcer was not present in the reconnaissance in a strictly

a milit ry capacity, was as anxious as Baird to be in

f tw o f ront, so the British o ﬁcers agreed to go on

h now together with t e advance . But the enemy were in hundreds on the mountain side ﬁring and hurling

down stones upon the little straggling party , who f pain ully worked their way upward . Captain Baird

was mortally wounded in the stomach , many other

of his men were also hit , and the party had to be

o drawn ff. Lieutenant Gurdon could not remain

f for long to look a ter his wounded comrade , he had to Collect the men and conduct their retirement upon the main body. But news was given to Dr.

of f Whitchurch the mis ortune to poor Baird , and a

w as f small escort le t to help him home , as no general retirement had yet taken place . All that he

f r C . o ould do Dr Whitchurch did Baird but now , as C darkness was losing in , it was seen that our troops were retiring— that the enemy were swarming round f on all sides , and that even the retreat to the ort

1 08 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

w ho action to Government , and men have them selves gained the Victoria Cross have said that never has it been more gallantly earned than on

- this occasion by Surgeon Captain Whitchurch .

’ The total losses in this day s engagement were twenty - three men killed and thirty-three wounded

of 2 00 of 1 0 out , whom only 5 were actually engaged and it was with this newly- raised Kashmir regiment

depressed by these severe losses , and with their own hearts saddened by the death on the following morning of their brave comrade that the British ofﬁcers commenced the defence of the Chitral fort against an enemy correspondingly elated at their

s uccess .

’ The Chitral fort is eighty yards square w ith walls

- ﬁve twenty feet high and about eight feet thick . At each corner there is a tower s ome twenty feet higher

n f than the wall , and outside the orth ace on the edge

ofthe river is a ﬁfth tower to guard the waterway. On the eas t face a garden runs out for a distance

of 1 0 f of o - 4 yards , and orty yards the s uth east tower

s - is a ummer house . On the north and west faces

were stables and other outhous es .

f of The ort is built rude masonry kept together,

not of by cement or mortar any description , but by cradle - work of beams of wood placed longitudinally

and transversely s o as to keep the masonry together. Without this framework of wood the walls would

s fall to piece . The fort is situated on the right bank of the

s f f f Chitral river, ome orty or ﬁ ty yards rom the

1 1 0 THE RELIEF OF CHITRA L CHAP .

On the 4th March the enemy commenced offen sive action against the British in earnest by ﬁring the i f . whole day long into the ort On this day, Capta n

Townshend , who, now that Captain Campbell was wounded and unable to leave his bed, commanded

f for the ort, commenced taking measures its proper

f w as f de ence . I t a most un ortunate circumstance ff he that a airs had come to a head so quickly, that was unable to carry out any demolitions ofthe out

&c. f . houses , , which surrounded the ort His ﬁrst

w as care, however, to do what he could towards carrying out this necessary operation even though

u of w as m ch the work had to be done under ﬁre , it necessary to knock down all the garden walls and

so houses he could , as to prevent the enemy occupy

ff as ing them and e ecting a lodgment, they thus f f would be close up to the very walls o the ort .

As it was, the besiegers succeeded in occupying the

- - of f summer house at the south east angle the ort, which w as only forty yards distant from the corner

‘ I OW CI .

The fort is also surrounded by numbers oftrees of t ff grea height, which not only a orded cover to the enemy, but up which it might have been possible for f them to climb, and rom their higher branches

ﬁre into the very interior of the fort . Captain Townshend had also to take efﬁcient measures for for protecting the way down to the river, as there w as no serviceable well inside the fort it was necessary to obtain every drop of water required by Pho o V a n der We de R n S r t y , ege t t eet. M OR C . . F W N A V . O NS HE D C. B . J T ,

1 1 2 THE RELIEF OF CHITRA L CHAP . for as the remainder, screens to serve protection f rom sight were provided . These ﬁrst measures occupied the attention of the British ofﬁcers for the few days following the commencement of the

Siege . On the night of the 7th March the enemy made

- be a determined attack on the water way . The siegers were well versed in every art ofthe attack on

f as for e such orts Chitral , among the numbers wer

’ of andulis several hundreds Umra Khan s J , whose entire lives are occupied in besieging and defending

f of Similar orts to that Chitral . They well knew therefore the importance of cutting off the garrison f its rom water supply, and this is always the ﬁrst

of measure which they attempt. Under cover darkness therefore they commenced a heavy and well sustained ﬁre from the trees on the north -west f of f of ff t ront the ort, and sent a party men to e ec

n an entra ce to the water tower. This they actually

of m succeeded in doing, and a small number the carrying faggots ofwood placed these in the interior of of the tower, and set ﬁre to them with the object

u burning down the entire struct re . The garrison , t however, were well on the alert, the men always slep

r one . on their alarm posts , and eve y was quickly in his

- place . A well controlled ﬁre was then commenced on the attacking party . Captain Townshend had given instructions that no independent ﬁring was to be allowed at night, and only section volleys were ’ w as off and employed . The enemy s attack driven , VI THE DEFE N CE OF CH ITRAL 1 1 3 water-carriers having been sent out to the water

tower, the ﬁre there was quickly put out.

of of s At the end the ﬁrst week the iege , owing to the admirable arrangements for the protection of

but the men , there had only been five casualties , there were now only eighty rifles of the 1 4th Sikhs and 200 rifles of the Kashmir I nfantry fit

for u n duty. These latter, too , were m ch shake by their severe losses in the reconnaissance of the 4th

March . They were a new regiment, and that action w as the ﬁrst occasion on which they had been under

ﬁre , and they had then lost their general and major , and ﬁfty -Six killed and wounded out of the total of

w as 2 5 0 actually engaged . I t hardly to be wondered

f s at , there ore , that these men Should be depre sed at

f s the prospects be ore them . The iege w as likely to

be f u to a long one, only hal rations co ld be served

the men , and Captain Townshend saw clearly that under the circumstances he must husband the re

u of so rces and energy his men , and watch them and

as encourage them much as possible . The following arrangements besides those already

e . f w as detailed , wer now made First a ort police established to watch the Chitralis in the fort and

prevent them communicating with the besiegers . Amongst these Chitralis were many w ho were any i th ng but loyal to the British , and who , above

r f eve ything, desired not to be ound on the losing h t f side w hen t e crisis came . They had here ore to be carefully watched to see that they did not attempt 1 1 4 T H E RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP.

communication with their friends outside the fort.

for w as Secondly , a system extinguishing ﬁres

- organised . The water carriers were ordered to s i mus sucks s leep with the r (skin ) ﬁlled with water, and ammunition boxes and any vessel s which could be found were also ﬁlled with water and placed

ready to hand . Patrols were sent round day and

f recau n ight to watch accidents rom ﬁre . These p tions were especially necessary on account of the

of - f large amount wood work inside the ort, and because the walls and towers were built almost as f of as o . r much wood stone Thirdly , what sanita y

s . arrangement were possible were made Fourthly , ’ f ofﬁce rs - t ollowers , servants , and other non comba ants

for were organised into parties carrying water, put

ting out ﬁre , carrying out demolitions , building up f for of cover rom ﬁre , and every other kind work

for which they could be employed , and So save the

f f r . o regular soldiers Fi thly , hand mills grinding

ff r o fo . were made and men told this work Lastly, Captain Townshend ins tilled into the minds of all f the men that a relieving orce would soon come , and then they would be able to sally out and drive

back the enemy . The work ofthe defence practically devolved upon f — three o ﬁcers only Captain Townshend , Lieutenant

u — u - Gurdon , and Lie tenant Harley S rgeon Major Robertson was engaged in his political duties under ﬂags oftruce and s o forth in treating and correspond d ing with the enemy, Captain Campbell was wounde ,

1 1 6 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL CHAP . their native ofﬁcer had been engaged in the ﬁerce

’ battle at M c N e il s Zareba in the Soudan campaign

s but the Ka hmir troops were young and untried , they were now placed in a position which required

of w as for all the finest qualities a soldier, and it these especially that it w as necessary that the British officers should be able to inspire confidence and hope .

Captain Townshend still continued , whenever opportunity occurred , and he had time to spare . the work of demolishing the outer walls beyond f f the main wall o the ort . He used the Punyalis for

s this , and they did it , he say , marvellously quickly . They crept along on their stomachs outside the

of walls , and with beams wood pushed down the f light outer walls which ran out round the ort. The enemy ﬁred incessantly upon them while the work

w as r . being ca ried out , but nobody was hit Thirty rounds a day were also ﬁred at the house in which

Afz ul Sher lived , in order to cause him annoyance ,

see and let him that the garrison were awake .

w as n w as When an attack made at ight, and there

of no firing, the average amount ammunition ex pende d during the first two or three weeks ofthe Siege w as between forty and fifty rounds of Martini

of r Henry, and twenty or thirty rounds Snide

a ammu nition daily. To guard gainst attack by

h for nig t, arrangements had to be made lighting up the ground immediately outside the walls of the

f t . of C of or At ﬁrst, light balls made up hips v1 THE DEFE N CE OF CH ITRA L 1 117

us wood and resino pine , and soaked in kerosene oil ,

were lighted and thrown ov er the walls . But there were not sufﬁcient materials to carry on this method nightly ; and the defe nders adopted the better plan o f f f building out plat orms rom the walls , and light

ing ﬁres on these , which would keep the ground in the vicinity of the fort lighted up for the entire

n ight . On the night ofthe 1 3th— 1 4th ofMarch the enemy m f w ade an attack on the east ace , outside hich is a f d garden with a number o large trees . They soun ed

and the advance on a bugle , and with much shouting b of - eating tom toms , and keeping up a straggling ﬁre

' t hey advanced to the attack . The garrison received t hem with a brisk ﬁre , and though men had been heard by the defenders shouti ng to them repeatedly

- to come and attack the water way, they gradually s ff lunk o in the dark back to their own lines . Find ing the enemy still had an inte n tion of attacking the

- a n f water way, Capt i Townshend urther strengthened t he w a u y to the river , loopholing and occ pying the s 1 of tables just by the gate . On the 5 th March a

f Afz ul letter was received rom Sher , in which the would -be Mehtar said that a party of tro ops escort ing an ammunition convoy had been s urrounded and

‘ d f R s u f a a s e eated at e h n and urther , th t Briti h

O f f ﬁcer, who had come down rom Mastuj had also

n been taken prisoner, and that he had writte a letter

. n Afz ul if to Dr Robertso , which Sher would deliver the British agent would send some one to receive it . 1 1 8 A THE RELIEF OF CH ITR L CHAP.

w as of This the news the disaster to Captain Ross ,

’ ’ and e Li utenants Edwardes and Fowler s parties .

the f f But o ﬁcers in Chitral re used to believe it . On

f u the ollowing day , however, a letter written by Lie tenant Edwardes from Reshun on the 1 3th of March

w as of the received , and in it he gave the news

his of his attack upon party, and being shut up in

f 1 of the post which he had ortiﬁed . On the 9th

’ i l March Abdul Maj d Khan , Umra Khan s ieu

andulis had tenant , who , with three hundred J ,

Afz ul r been with Sher during the siege , sent a lette t to Dr . Robertson saying that he much regretted tha although he had sent off messengers to Reshun to sa y that peace had been made , a ﬁght had taken f place , and that two British o ﬁcers and nine Moham

n medan sepoys had been taken priso ers , and would

f O n the arrive in Chitral on the ollowing day.

2 oth of u and March , Lie tenants Edwardes

Fowler reached Chitral , and on the same day f d a native , clerk rom the garrison was allowe

to to come and see them , that he might be able assure the defenders that there w as no mistake about the disasters having occurred . The news of this unfortunate occurrence much depressed the

s garri on . They knew that it would not only greatly

r elate the Chitralis , but would also give into thei hands a large quantity ofammunition and engineering

u s n stores which might be sed again t them . Captai

s his ff s Town hend, however, in no way relaxed e ort

n u ssfu f in co ducting a s cce l de ence , and even during

1 20 THE RELI EF OF C H ITRAL CHAP. there were rounds of Snider ammunition in

f 1 ff of f hand or 2 6 e ective men the Kashmir I n antry ,

2 6 2 for . r that is to say, rounds per rifle these The e were now fit for duty 343 rifles in all . By th ese the following guards and pickets had to be furnished

M aingate 1 0 Parapet 4 0 ( 1 0 on each parapet) Water picket 2 0 tower 2 5 Stable picket 2 0 Water-gate guard 1 0 Guard over Amir-ul-M ulk 6 Chitralis at night 4 on ammunition 6 garden gate 6 four towers 2 4

Total I 7 1

Thus only 1 7 2 riﬂes were available with which to make a sortie The s trength of the guards had been reduced to the lowest number compatible with

f out of 1 2 -ﬁv e sa ety, and 7 , at least thirty would be

for an n required inlyi g picket . The garrison now had supplies to the amount of pounds of

s of grain , which would la t the number persons in

f -f 1 of the ort seventy our days , or up to the 3th June ,

f n at the rate o 5 40 pou ds a day. Some allowance for n wastage would ecessarily have to be made . There were now only left thirty-six pounds of the

u s u clariﬁed butter which native soldiers req ire o m ch .

for for That was kept the sick and wounded , and VI THE DEFE N CE OF CH ITRAL 1 2 1

f lights at guards in the ort, and even then would only f last another twelve days , a ter which it was known that the already heavy sick-lis t would be greatly

as s as out increased oon the clariﬁed butter gave ,

for f and the men were all the time on hal rations ,

were getting little else . Stenches in the stables, too,

s in which were ituated the latrines , were terrible , and a picket of twenty- ﬁv e men had to be placed

- n as . there every ight , it lay on the water way There

w as f the still a little rum le t, and some tea, and

of f s Sikhs were given one dram rum every our day , and the Kashmir I nfantry were given a tea ration

every third day .

I s t of ne On the 3 March , the e my made a new

s s of angar on the oppo ite bank the river, at a dis tance of only 1 7 5 yards from the place where the

n f The garriso had to take the water rom the river. enemy here s howed the greatest skill in the con

and f n of s struction de e ce their sangar , making regular zigzag approaches after the manner of our

n u own engineers , excavating tre ches , and building p

- f f s s o . breast works a cines , tones , and earth The defenders replied by placing screens of ten ts to

n so conceal the men goi g down to the water, that the enemy should not be able to se e whe n

’ any one w as on the w ay to the river s edge . More beams were also put outside the water

f o f gate , to protect the doorway rom the ﬁre f the riﬂe me n on the opposite bank o the river . But the enemy were not only advancing their 1 2 2 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP . trenches towards the water-w ay from the opposite

of now bank the river, they also commenced the construction ofa covered w ay to the water from their l w n n - f n of f o er sa gar on the orth west ro t the ort , l c ose down to the river. This sangar w as only

’ about eighty yards from the defenders covered w ay to the water . Captain Townshend now commenced fu for rther protection men going to the water, by n th sinki g a trench in the stables . On the 5 and

6th of April , the enemy showed great activity on

- of f t the south east corner the or , occupying the - f summer house only orty yards distant, and they also constructed a large fascine sangar in front of the f n of o . mai gate, at a distance only rty yards The garrison commenced loopholing the lower story of

of a s this tower to command the east end the st ble , and more loopholes were also made in the stable buildings at the west end . From their proximity, the enemy were able to cause great annoyance to

w as f the besiegers , and it with great di ﬁculty that the defenders were able to keep a proper watch h f o . t o ver their proceedings On the 7 April , at

M f n n u A . . o abo t 5 , a large number the e emy ope ed a heavy matchlock ﬁre from the trees in front of the

w as on north tower , and an attack made the covered w ay to the water. The defenders were instantly on

and n the alert, steady volleys were ﬁred upo the enemy by the Sikhs , which caused them to decamp towards the bazaar. But while this ﬁring w as taking place on the

1 24 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP.

o f - u making a water spout, which they p shed out

of through a hole in the corner the tower, and then f pouring in water rom the inside , allowed it to pour d f own on the ﬂames below . I n this way , a ter

for w as working about ﬁve hours, the ﬁre got under, but water w as kept pouring down inside the walls

all day long, and holes were picked inside the tower

t o s thoroughly damp it out . To guard against thi happening again Captai n Townshend made more s trict arrangements for watching the ground under the s s wall , and the better di ciplined Sikhs were put as sentries in place of the men of the Kashmir

f r I n ant y. The Machicoulis galleries were gradually im

proved and loopholed inside , in a way that all the ground immediately under the tower could be well

and a s n s of watched , e try alway lay in each these

s a s s of gallerie . C ptain Town hend al o had heaps e u arth collected , and sent pon the parapets , and

s s and u s ve sel amm nition boxe ﬁlled with water,

in placed every story in each of the towers . The waterproof Sheets of the 1 4th Sikhs were also

s for u of a utili ed the p rpose holding w ter, and all t he servants and followers were formed into a ﬁre

- picket under Surgeon Captain Whitchurch . H eaps o fstone s were al so placed at the top of the towers for the s entries to throw down from time to time in f f . o 8th o the dark On the evening the April , some red -hot embers and a bundle of faggots were

o s w as b erved quite close to the tower, and it evident VI TH E DEFE N CE OF CH ITRA L 1 2 5 that the enemy had succeeded in rushing up and placing these there while the Sentries were being relieved . Captain Townshend accordingly arranged that the sentries should be relieved at a different

f so time rom day to day, that the enemy should be

unaware when the relief w as taking place . On that

re day, Captain Townshend demolished some

n f mai ing walls le t outside the main gate , and he also built a stone loopholed tambour in front of

the main gate . This would hold ten men , and from it it was possible to ﬂank the whole of the

f s west ront with its two tower . And the Machicoulis gallery in the gun tower

f - was still urther improved , and good loop holes w were made in the lower story . A hole as also dug inside the tower in the ﬂoor to the depth of

a f f - bout our eet, and then a shutter like loophole w as made which commanded the ground at the

f of f of oot the south ace the tower. Sentries were

n placed in all ofthese . Fourteen men were ow per

mane ntl fﬁ y in this gun tower, and an o cer also

of n w lived in it . The number men in hospital o

1 1 1 f 6 were Sikhs , 9 Kashmir I n antry , and others ,

- and there were 49 out patients besides , making the

a u o 8 tot l n mber fsick 5 .

of I oth- I 1 of On the night the th April , the

aftack - enemy made an upon the water way . They

t and came rushing in wi h a tremendous din , yelling, - f beating tom toms , but the de enders immediately

an - s spr g to their stations, and ﬁred section volley 1 26 H THE RELIEF OF C ITRAL CHAP.

f . rom the parapets These volleys caused them , as

a aa on other att cks , to retreat towards the baz r, and with a loss ofonly one man wounded on the part of

f of m w as the de enders , this last assault the ene y f beaten . On the ollowing day it was noticed that the enemy began playing tom -toms and Pathan

- pipes, in the summer house at night, and shouting a s of buse at interval . At this time large parties the e n nemy were seen movi g away towards Mastuj , and the garrison began speculating upon the approach of f a force from Gilgit to their relie . The enemy were

off indeed moving to oppose Colonel Kelly, who had now crossed the Shandur Pass , and reached Mastuj o n his way to Chitral .

of 1 6 of On the evening the th April , it having s f - truck the de enders that the tom toming, which was s o - constantly kept up in the summer house , was

n of of inte ded to drown the sound the picking a mine , s entries in the gun tower were warned to be on the

a . lert, and to listen intently I t was thought quite possible that the enemy might have the intention of digging a mine from the summer-house in towards the tower, and right under it, so as to be able to ff a f blow it up, and e ect an entr nce to the ort . At midnight one ofthe sentries in the lower story ofthe

of gun tower, reported that he heard the noise pick f ing. Captain Townshend himsel went up, but

Bu 1 1 A M t . . could hear nothing. about on the morn

f 1 f re ing o the 7 th , the native o ﬁcer in the gun tower ported to him that he could hear the noise ofpicking

P ho o L a a D bli . t f y ette, u n

H . I E UTE N A N T . A R L EY D . O . S . L K H , v1 T HE DEFE N CE OF C H ITRAL 1 2 7

quite distinctly . Captain Townshend accordingly

mis again went up , and there could now be no

a take that mine was being made , and that it had

f f Of f reached to within twelve eet o the walls the ort.

Dr. Robertson came up and listened too ; and both ofﬁcers agreed that the only thing to be done was to

- for rush the summer house , and destroy the mine ,

w as - and there no time to construct a counter mine , ’ f the enemy s plan must be rustrated at once . Lieutenant Harley was accordingly told off to c of f of ommand a party orty Sikhs , and sixty the

f and w as f Kashmir I n antry, he given the ollowing instructions H e w as not to ﬁre a shot in rushing

s to the as ault , but to use the bayonet only. He w as f u of for , however, to take orty ro nds ammunition the purpose ofﬁring upon the enemy after he had c - a aptured the summer house . He was to t ke w ith

1 1 0 of him three powder bags with pounds powder, a nd f f of - orty eet powder hose, and picks and spades . He w as to go straight for a gap in the wall of the

his house with whole party without any support.

u w as Having r shed the place , he to hold it with

of part his men , while with the remainder he was to destroy the mine by pulling down the upright and

if in if wooden supports , any . or by blowing it he saw I ﬁt. f possible he was to take a prisoner or

tWO .

Captai n Townshend summoned the native ofﬁcers going with Lieutenant Harley, and explained to them

O of the bject the sortie , that they might be able to 1 2 8 A THE RELIEF OF CH ITR L CHAP. make it thoroughly clear to their non -commissioned fﬁ f o cers and men . All o ﬁcers carried matches, and

f w as off n one o ﬁcer told to bri g up the rear, and see f ’ that no man hung back . At our O clock in the

f of 1 a ofthe f a ternoon the 7th April , the g te east ace of f r w as n a the o t quietly ope ed , and Lieuten nt

Of a man Harley rushed out at the head his p rty . A w as of n shot on either side him , eve in the short space of eighty yards which they had to cover

f w of - us be ore reaching the alls the summer ho e .

B ut the enemy had been taken by surprise , and were only able to get off a few hurried shots before

his me n Lieutenant Harley and were up to the walls ,

. of is over them , and into their midst At the time th unexpected assault there were about thirty Pathans

the in the house , and they bolted down garden wall ,

far e nd f f and stopped at the , threw out ascines rom

e f oft u a b hind it, and rom under cover hese , po red

' heavy ﬁre into the house . Lieutenant Harley told off

c n of a ertai number his men to reply to these , and

h n r af of th t e Sought fo the main sh t e mine . This w as f O s - the ound utside the ummer house , behind

-ﬁve garden wall , and thirty Chitralis were bayoneted in as the mouth of the mine they came out . While Harley w as employed in c learing the mine and

r- now holding the summe house , the enemy,

on a e thoroughly the lert , began moving in larg numbers down to the river-bank and along behind the w a - garden ll towards the water way, with the

of u - intention making a co nter attack upon it .

VI THE DEFE N CE OF CH ITRA L 1 29 Captain Townshend having considerable anxiety that an attack made now while a hundred ofhis men were

u f . outside might be s ccess ul , lined the parapets and kept an incessant steady ﬁre upon the assailants , while he sent three successive messengers to

Lieutenant Harley to hurry up in his work, and warning him that the enemy were gathering round the garden with the intention of either cutting f o f . him , or striking at the waterway I n about an

’ hour s time Lieutenant Harley cleared the mine of the men inside it , and taking down the powder bags placed them in the mine . These were ex

loded p , and the work being completed , Lieutenant f Harley rushed back to the ort again , the enemy from the end of the garden keeping up a furious

fu . sillade as they retired The party lost, altogether,

8 1 i. e. 2 1 men killed and 3 wounded , killed and

1 wounded out ofa total of 00 men . But the work

e had been accomplished , the mine had been succ ss

fu u now lly blown p, until it lay exposed as a trench running up to the fort to a distance of only ten feet f rom it , and the besiegers had been Shown that now ,

f f -Six of f a ter orty days the siege , the de enders still had pluck and spirits enough left in them to assume

a vigorous offensive . Yet the defenders were not to be carried away by

n their success , or led into slackening their precautio s

n in any way, and they immediately bega to run a

n subterranean gallery rou d the tower, to ensure that if the enemy again attempted mining, they must run

K 1 30 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP.

n . now f i to this But relie was close at hand , and the labours and anxieties of the garrison were soon t o

c . of 1 8th of ease On the night the April , a man w as heard outside the walls shouting to those inside that he had important news to tell. With great pre c f autions he was let into the ort , and he was then fﬁ recognised as a man known to the o cers . He told

Afz ul anduli f them that Sher and the J chie s , with all their men , had fled in the night , and that a British f f w w Th orce rom Gilgit as only t o marches distant . e o ffi f for the cers at first re used to believe this story, f news seemed all too good to be true , and they eared that the enemy were merely trying to entrap them i f s nto leaving the ort or lackening their watching, a nd n so catching them at a disadvantage . But as o

S of e igns the enemy could be observed , patrols wer s out the n as the ent , and , . it became apparent that e off f nemy had really drawn , the amished British

Ofﬁ f cers, in the ﬁrst place , showed their satis action at their release by sitting down to eat a good square

far meal . They had so been only able to eat s of -ﬂe sh paringly even their horse , but now, as the w as siege over, they could eat as they wished .

Then they tried to sleep , but being so excited they found it impossible to do so ; so they got “ " up and ate again , calling their ﬁrst meal supper, “ and f the second meal early break ast . At day light the next morning, patrols were sent out at s f f ome distance rom the ort , and the whole place

w as f follow i then ound to be deserted , and on the

1 2 TH E R v1 3 ELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

w ho f f u H e r ell in the discharge o their d ty . Majesty the "ueen w as pleased to express he r gracious approbation of the successful efforts of the

in troops, and H is Excellency the Viceroy Council

u - ta n tendered to S rgeon Major Robertson , Cap i f Townshend , and to the Whole garrison , his heart elt congratulations on their gallant defence of the posi

n w as l tio entrusted to them , while it an especia

the pleasure , H is Excellency said, to recognise devoted aid given by the loyal troops of H is f Highness the Maharajah o Kashmir.

’ All ranks in the garrison were granted six months

f of pay, Which reward also ell to the heirs those

killed, in addition to the pensions to which they

- might be entitled . Surgeon Major Robertson w as created a Knight Commander of the Order of the Star ofI ndia ; Captain Townshend was made a Com

of of and a panion the Order the Bath , promoted to Brevet majority ; Captain Campbell w as given the

of rv Decoration the Distinguished Se ice Order, and promoted to a Brevet majority ; and Lieutenant Gurdon and Lieutenant Harley were both also given the Decoration of the Distinguished Service Order ;

- ta n u and, lastly, Surgeon Cap i Whitch rch was awarded

of that most coveted all rewards , the Victoria Cross . We now turn to the account of the brilliant

’ march of Colonel Kelly s troops to the relief o f their comrades in Chitral . C HAPTE R VI I

’ COLON EL K EL L Y s MARCH

I N the beginning of March alarming reports of

t he of ff s state a air in Chitral began to reach Gilgit, t he headquarters of the British Political Agent and t he force of some men stationed on this

f for s rontier its supervi ion and protection . The w hole of Lower Chitral was rumoured to be up in

a the s w rms against Briti h , and communication ith

f w ho Mr. Robertson and the o ﬁcers had two months previously marched from Gilgit to Chitral was now

u o O f e ntirely c t ff. The ﬂame rebellion seemed to

s f for be spreading, and the grave t anxiety was elt the safety ofthe detachments oftroops at the various posts on the road and of the several pa rties which

were marching towards Chitral . M r. Robertson was

t he British Agent, deputed by the Government of I ndia fo r the conduct of political affairs on this

f w as now rontier ; but he shut up in Chitral , and the c ontrol ofour relations with the various states round

G now n ilgit and Chitral , at this critical ju cture ,

d . . evolved upon Captain W H Stewart , and it may 1 34 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

‘ well be imagined that his task in keeping the variou s

f the peoples on this rontier quiet and orderly, with

of w as catching inﬂuence the troubles in Chitral , no

m e easy one . These excitable and i pressionabl people ofthe Hindu Kush spring to arms under little provocation When once the spirit of ﬁghting is l abroad . News of what w as occurring in Chitra and would rapidly reach them , and in every house

of. s hamlet little else would be spoken Unles , f f m there ore , the British o ﬁcers in contact with the

be could steady them by their influence , there would a great risk that thoughtlessly, and rashly, they might rise against us as the Chitralis had done . I t hung in a balance w hether they would go with u s f t or against us , and it is satis actory to find tha British influence w as still so secure even in state s d like Hunza and Nagar, which had been subdue

s only three years previously, that when in this crisi Captain Stewart inquired through the political ofﬁce r in Hunza and Nagar ifany more men w ere willing to enlist temporarily as levies in addition to the ninety men already furnished and now stationed in Ghiz r

f of s on the way to Chitral , the chie s these two state

s f of showed the utmo t eeling loyalty, and imme diately responded by arriving in Gilgit w ith some 900 men ofall ranks ready to serve Government in

’ w a u f s any y req ired. Each man brought a ortnight

the supply in order to avoid giving trouble , and most enthusiastic spirit was displayed by all . A

of certain number these men were sent on to Chitral ,

v11 COLO N EL KELLY’S MARCH 1 3;

While others were employed in guarding passes near

as s w ho Gilgit, and will be een later on , these men three s hort years before were ﬁghting despe rately

us of against , now stood by us in the time need and rendered to Colonel Kelly in his march to Chitral s uch service as he repeatedly acknowledged in the

of terms the highest praise . Colonel Kelly w as the ofﬁcer in command of the

f of troops on the Gilgit rontier. He was the colonel the 2 nd few 3 Pioneers , a regiment which had a months previously arrived upon this frontier partly for the purpose of constructing roads and fortiﬁed

f of posts , and partly to give a backbone to the orce Kas hmir troops who composed the principal part of the garrison . The total strength of men on this frontier w as made up of the regiment of Pioneers of the

of 2 00 of 1 s regular army I ndia ; men the 4th Sikh , also of the I ndian army ; and three battalions of

f of 600 Kashmir I n antry men each , and a battery f f o Kashmir Mountain Artillery . This orce in the beginning of March was distributed in the following manner : At Chitral Fort 1 00 of the

1 00 f u 4th Sikhs and 3 Kashmir I n antry ; at Mast j ,

1 00 s 1 0 f r Ghiz r Sikh and 5 Kashmir I n ant y ; at ,

1 00 f 1 0 r Kashmir I n antry ; at Gupis , 4 Kashmi I nfantry ; at Gilgit a Kashmir regiment com

l n pe te . On the Hunza and on the line betwee 200 f Hunza and Gilgit , Kashmir In antry , and in

800 w as Chilas 400. A Pioneer regiment strong 1 36 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL GI I AP

c 'at i e and lo ated Bunj , and on the line b tween there

Chilas . When it became apparent how critical the state of aff W of a saw it airs ere, the Government I ndi that w as necessary to move up as many troops as could be spared from Gilgit to afford some relief to the Chitral garrison till the large force under General

L OW w as f , which to march rom the Peshawur d c w as irection, ould reach Chitral ; but it not

f f for possible to send any large orce rom Gilgit, in the neighbourhood of that place there are several

had r r small states who but ve y recently given t ouble ,

now e be and would hav to watched , however much loyalty they might show. Hunza had only been

the of 1 8 1 subdued at end 9 , and Chilas had been brought under submission a year later. There was

of of no sign disturbance in either these states , and Hunza especially seemed quiet and contented ; but it and the neighbouring s tate of Nagar had to be w h guarded , and in Chilas , which is in contact it

f of anatical and turbulent tribes the I ndus valley,

of r there is always constant risk insurrection . Unde

as how these circumstances , and it was not known

of m ac t Yasin and the states to the south it ight ,

s of with Chitral in a tate rebellion close by , it would have been unwise to send away from the Gilgit district any larger force than the 400 Pioneers and two guns which it was now decided Colonel Kelly should take with him to march towards Chitral in order to aid the garrison to prolong their

1 38 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL C H A P .

of b e obstructive , his task reaching Chitral would

for o f an almost hopeless one , both in the matter supplies and oftransport he mus t necessarily large ly depend upon the people of the country through which he passed . ’ On March 2 3rd and 2 4th Colonel Kelly s force se t

f u out rom Gilgit , the news having just previo sly

’ reached them of the annihilation of Captain Ross s party . The ﬁrst detachment which Colonel Kelly himself accompanied w as composed of 2 00 men of the 2 nd s B orrodaile 3 Pioneer under Captain , with

Cobbe an d Lieutenants Bethune (Adjt . ) and , Surgeon -Captain Browning Smith ; and the secon d detachment of 200 Pioneers under Lieutenants Pete r

n sen and Cooke . Two guns ofthe Kashmir Mountai

Battery also accompanied the latter detachment . I t was with this little force that Colonel Kelly started on his venturesome journey to succour the

s Chitral garrison , to restore Briti h prestige , to steady f f m the rontier, to keep those who were wavering ro

s t ﬂooding over to the oppo ite side , and to give hear to those who still trus ted and looked to the British .

for And it may be well here to explain , the beneﬁt of w ho those not acquainted with our I ndian army , the men were whom Colonel Kelly w as now taking

of with him on this march . The Pioneer regiment,

of s which he was taking a wing, is composed Sikh

is from the Punjab . The regiment organised and equipped for the special purpose of making roads and doing light pioneer work in advance of the E SEPOY 32 N D PION F RS .

1 0 H H 4 THE RELIEF OF C ITRAL C AP.

Ghiz r f l is a is eet above sea leve , and s mall village occupied by a hardy and somewha t i f ndependent set o people . Here it was tha t

’ Colonel Kelly s chief difﬁculties were likely to

c f ommence . H e had bee n able to get so a r Th without encoun tering any serious Obstacle . e

of n t an d people Yasin had show no hostili y, Ghiz r had been reached without mishap ; bu t

Ghiz r the d here at snow lay deep on groun , ’ a nd at the time of Colonel Kelly s arrival snow f d Th had allen steadily for ﬁve ays previously. e S handur Pass (two marches ahead) had to be c fﬁ n rossed, and the British o cers had to bear in mi d

if if r that the pass could not be crossed , or any so t

of d f re isaster be ell them on the opposite side , the was the almos t certainty that the loyalty of the people of Yasin in their rear would not s tand the t of f the Yas inis est urther trial , and that , believing that the Chitralis in rebellion on the western side of t he to pass must be in the ascendant , would begin t rim their sails to join them so as to save their ow n

n ecks . On the 3 I s t ofMarch both detachments ofColonel

’ f Ghiz r of Kelly s orce had reached , and in spite the h eavy snowfall and of the unpromising look of m atters , it was decided to push on the next day

for s f f r towards Chitral , the Briti h o ﬁcers in the o t

now for f u w there had been shut up o r eeks , and it w as urgently necessary to press forward as rapidly a s possible to their aid . v11 COLO N EL KELLY’S MARCH 1 4 1

I f Ghiz r On April st, Colonel Kelly le t With the

f f . whole orce , but di ﬁculties commenced at once

h A. M . The start, which was to ave been made at 7 , did not take place for three hours later on account ofthe coolies required for the carriage ofthe supplies

in crossing the pass having absconded . For some f hours the orce plodded resolutely through the snow,

2 P M as but at about . . it became apparent that, eager they were to push on to the reliefof their comrades m in Chitral , it would be i possible to do so with

a w as s the means t their disposal . What mo t necessary was to take on the guns ; for the mere rumour that Colonel Kelly was bringing guns with him had been sufﬁcient to produce the strongest ff moral e ect upon the Chitralis, unaccustomed as they f were to these weapons . The Chitralis might ormerly

of have dreaded the regular troops the I ndian Army, but they had already annihilated two detachments of these troops , and were now engaged in besieging

’ others , and Colonel Kelly s Pioneers alone might not have been able to produce that strong moral effect which w as so necessary ; but if guns could be brought over, the Chitralis would certainly be terri

ﬁed at these , and Colonel Kelly was above every thing anxious that the two guns he had brought f rom Gilgit should accompany him over the pass .

H ere, however, just at the critical time , there seemed no possibility of his being able to carry out his object . The gun carriages and the ammunition

&c . boxes, , are carried on mules , and now , on this 1 42 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CH A P m f Ghiz r f u n d arch rom towards the pass , it was o t hat these mules could scarcely move through th e snow ; they were ﬂoundering about with the sn o w ’ f me up to their bellies, and in the a ternoon it beca apparent that it w as no longer possible to take the m

. f m l s s . any urther, uch ess to bring them over the pa

of ff 1 5 1 n e l This was the state a airs on April , as Colo Kelly was marching out from the last village toward s

f t o the pass . Colonel Kelly had now, there ore , decide whether the enterprise s hould be abandoned fo r the present and a more favourable season

a h of his f be waited , or w ether a part orce should sent to cross the pass while the remainder returned

to hiz r quarters at G . He elected the latter arrange

and 2 00 of r ment , while the guns and the Pionee s ,

0 s Ghiz r with 5 Nagar levie , returned with him to ,

2 00 of B orrodaile the Pioneers , with Captain , Lieu

Cobbe u - tenant , and S rgeon Captain Browning

S 0 e mith , and 4 Kashmir Sapp rs and Miners under R E 0 Lieutenant Oldham , . . , with 5 Hunza levies ,

r Tee ru emained at , a small hamlet about seven miles i beyond Gh z r in the direction ofthe pass .

2 nd f On April snow ell the whole day , and Cap

t B orrodaile ain , with the detachment which was

t o make the ﬁrst attempt to cross the pass , had

T ru f on t o remain patiently at ee . I n the a terno

R m hiz r A . f G Lieutenant Stewart , . , arrived ro again

w to ith the two guns . I t was impossible carry these

on but to guns over mules , the Pioneers , unwilling

l t to eave them behind , had themselves volun eered

1 44 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP.

ll a s . all , those behind would have to drop their load

&c. This was accordingly done , ammunition boxes , d were stacked in the snow, and the troops marche

f of on to Langar, the camping spot at the oot the pass . Here at Langar there was only one small hut in which the more exhausted men were placed, and the remainder being without tents had to re

f r me n main in the open o the whole night . The with Captain Borrodaile were Sikhs from the plains of for of the Punjab, brought up generations in one C the hottest limates in the world , and they were now

f of called upon , a ter the severe struggles this and

s n previous day , to spend a night on the snow at early f - m eet above sea level , and with the thermo eter somewhere about zero (Fahrenheit) . Sleep for most ofthem was out ofthe ques tion the men as fa r as possible gathered round small ﬁres which had been made up from the brushwood to be obtained n ear

a the camping spot, and we rily awaited the dawn and f ﬁnal struggle O the coming day . On the following morning Captain Borrodaile set offfor the pass but as it had now become clear to him that if his men were to attempt to carry over

in the guns as well as their own kit, they would e vitabl d y break down altogether, he decide to leave

and Lieutenants Stewart and Gough behind , directed these two Ofﬁcers to employ that day in bringing the remaining loads into camp and storing them there till either Captain B orrodaile could send back assist a f e of aid nce rom the opposit side the pass, or until ’ V I I COLON EL KELLY S MARCH 1 45

’ hiz r B rr d il s could come from G . Captain o o a e men found the task ofcrossing the pass just heart-break ing ; every fe w steps they would sink in through the

Of snow , although some sort a track had been beaten out by the levies going on in front; At times they w f a ould all in almost up to their rmpits , so that they

had to be pulled out by their comrades . This was

f fu ear lly trying to men loaded as they were , to men too w ho had passed an almost sleepless night and

for s of started this , the crisi the enterprise , thoroughly

exhaus ted . By the time the party had reached the middle of f the pass men were alling out in twos and threes , sitting down in the snow as if they were on the poi nt of giving up the struggle . The heavy loads

which they had to carry, riﬂes , ammunition , haver

sa &c. cks , greatcoats , , were weighing them down

and utterly exhausting them . The snow was from three to ﬁve feet deep and quite eighteen inches of w as f f it so t and resh , at the same time the sun was pouring down upon the men, and adding to their discomfort by the glare which it produced

f f of s now . and rom the white sur ace the , , although all the men were provided with blue spectacles ,

of - many cases snow blindness occurred . The absence of ff water too caused the men additional su ering . f ff f Little relie was a orded them rom sucking snow , “ f and many were a raid to do that, thinking that there f must be some bad inﬂuence rom it . So exhausted were the men that it seemed at one time to . the 1 46 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

British Ofﬁcers that it would be necessary to spend

the another night on snow, but at about the advance guard came to the end of the ﬂat part of of w as the top the pass, and the descent at last commenced . News w as at once passed along the f line and resh spirit came into the men . They pulled

for ff themselves together a ﬁnal e ort , and when a

f r a little u ther on some w ter was obtained , they began to step out quite briskly. A critical time had now been reached ; the party were descending the western side of the pass into the part of the country which had for a month now been up in

O a pen arms against the British . I t was known th t

w as a f of there a vill ge at the oot the pass , and it ’ was quite possible that Captain Borrodaile s ex hansted troops might ﬁnd resistance offered them

o s here at the very culminating point f their trouble . Captain Borrodaile had therefore to send on his few levies to scout and discover if the enemy were

f of at f o f in any orce in the village Laspur, the oot f ff o e . the pass , and to report on the state a airs ther

for the Fortunately no opposition was met with , Chitralis had scarcely expected that the troops

n would be able to cross the pass in its then conditio , and at about nearly twelve hours after the

f s w as ﬁrst start had been made rom Langar, La pur reached . I n this straggling village a few inhabitants were

s found, who immediately came in to pay their respect ,

200 e e as, men in their midst, even though they w r

1 48 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP.

the Shandur Pass. They were now in the presence of an enemy elated with success , and behind them

a off . this terrible pass , pr ctically cutting their retreat The village of Laspur had to a certain extent been

r s su prised , though two spies stationed on the pa s ’ B orrodaile s had been observed by Captain party , but a c onsiderable number of Chitralis was know n

on to be in the valley lower down , and an attack l Captain B orrodai e might be made at any moment . ’ Colonel Kelly s instructions to Captain B orrodaile

f his were to entrench himsel on arrival , return

on coolies , and endeavour to open up communicati

of w with the garrison Mastuj , two marches belo h w o . Laspur, were besieged by the Chitralis On the evening of April sth a short recon

e s naissance was made below the camp , as the levi had brought back information that a small body o f the enemy had been seen . On April 6th a reconnaissance in force was made

B orrodaile dis by Captain to Gasht, twelve miles tant the two guns and one hundred and twenty o f the pioneers taking part in the movement. Gasht w as reached without opposition, and the villages on the f route were ound almost deserted, but Captain ’ Borrodaile s troops were able to seize some thirty inhabitants and twelve ponies to serve for transport

B orrodaile purposes . Captain returned to Laspur f n l the same night, and he then ou d Co onel Kelly

his ff-ofﬁce r with Lieutenant Beynon , sta , and about f ﬁ ty levies had crossed the pass and arrived in Laspur. VII CO LON EL KEL LY’S MARC H 1 49

On the 7th the troops rested and prepared for an

advance on the following day . 8 f On the th the orce reached Gasht unopposed , and a small reconnaissance in the evening showed that the enemy were occupying a strong position

Chokalw at fe w across the valley at a place called , a

s miles below. Thi position Colonel Kelly decided

Chokalw at to attack the next morning. The position

of of is one great natural strength , and that order

which is generally described as impregnable . Any one looking at it would say that here a hundred men f could keep a whole army at bay. On each side o the valley mountains tower up thousands of feet in

rugged precipices . A river ﬂows along the valley

bottom , and the only road down the valley leads either

of - along the bottom a stone shoot , down which the enemy stationed at the top could hurl rocks to prevent any force passing beneath or else over the river and

— ffs of by a zig zag path up some cli , the edges which the

s enemy had lined with sangars or stone breastwork . At accessible points on the mountain sides the enemy if had also constructed these breastworks , and the Chitralis were determined to Offer Colonel Kelly at

s u all a re olute opposition , he might have been bro ght

to a standstill here at his ﬁrst contact with the enemy , and his main object of affording speedy relief to the

f I n garrison in Chitral would be rustrated . the

of 1 8 1 Hunza campaign 9 , our troops had been kept at bay for nearly a fortn ight in just such another

fe w of h a d position . The Hunza men were t em rme THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

of with riﬂes , while the Chitralis had numbers breech

s f loader , and it was not di ﬁcult to imagine that a

ff ff a check might here be o ered to the relie orce , and check , anything else indeed but complete success , would have involved the British in most serious u trouble , and might have ca sed the people all along

of the lengthy line communications to Show hostility.

of th A M l O n . . the morning April 9 , at , Colone

of I n Kelly advanced to the attack this pos ition . the early morning Lieutenant Beynon with the Hunza levies were sent to ascend the high hills on

f of as of the le t bank the river, so to turn the right

’ P n the enemy s pos ition and attack in rear . The u yalis were sent up the hills on the right bank to turn

u me n - o t the above the stone shoots on that side .

’ The enemy s position consisted of a line ofsangars blocking the roads from the river up to the alluvial fan on which they were placed . The right Of the

’ enemy s position was protected by a snow glacie r which descended into the river bed , and also by san gars which were built as far up as the snow line on the hill side . The road down the valley led on to

fan the alluvial , the ascent to which was short and — it t steep was covered wi h boulders , and intersected with nullahs . The road led across this fan and then

f of s along the oot the steep , haly slopes and shoots within 5 00 yards ofthe line of sangars crowning the o of Of pposite side the river bank , and totally devoid an of for y sort or description cover some two miles . I t could also be swept by avalanches ofstones se t in

VII CO LON EL KEL LY’S MARCH 1 5 1 motion by a few men placed on the heights for that purpose . The force with which Colonel Kelly advanced to the attack of this position consisted of 1 90 men of

2 n d s , u of the 3, Pioneer two g ns the Kashmir Moun 0 tain Battery, 4 Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and

— in n 0 2 80 . co 5 levies all , men Colonel Kelly s ide red that any delay to wait for the second detach

ofhis ment troops , who were on their way over the

o or Shandur Pass , would only give the enemy an pp tunit for for y collecting in greater strength , and

f i of improving the ort ﬁcation their position , and he f decided there ore to attack at once , and advanced in the following order — A half company of 3 2 nd

s f Pioneer ormed the advance guard , and these were f the f ollowed by orty Kashmir Sappers and Miners,

f of 2 nd a hal company the 3 Pioneers , the two guns

of which were carried bycoolies, and the other company

z ud the 3 Pioneers completed the main body. The

of baggage , under escort the rear guard , remained f at Gasht till ordered orward to the action . The advance w as made up to the river where the bridge

sufﬁ had been broken by the enemy , but was now cie ntly repaired by the Sappers and Miners for the f of f . passage the in antry The guns orded the river, and the force ascended to the fan facing the right

’ ’ sangar of the enemy s position . Colonel Kelly s plan was for the advance guard to leave the road and form up on the highest part of the fan facing

see S A sangar ( sketch), which was to be ilenced 1 5 2 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

u d by volley ﬁring and the g ns. He also propose

the s r to adopt ame course with regard to B sanga , when an opportunity should offer for the infantry to descend into the river bed and ascend the left bank to enﬁlade the enemy in the remaining san

w as e gars, which it exp cted would be vacated ’ as soon as Lieut enant B eynon s ﬂank attack with u of the levies had developed. The advance g ard the Pioneers formed up at about 800 yards from

f . the position , while the main body ollowed in rear The Pioneers then advanced to the attack— one

of n section C company extended, another sectio of the same company in support ; two sections of

C company and the whole ofA company in reserve . The guns then took up a position on the right and

f 8 2 d As opened on A sangar at a range o 5 yar s . the action progressed the s upporting section of C company advanced and reinforced the remaining

f of hal C company, which also advanced , and

f for u r leaving su ﬁcient space the g ns , took up thei pos ition in the ﬁring line on the extreme right .

800 s the Volley firing was first opened at yard , but firing line advanced 1 5 0 to 2 00 yards as the action At m progressed . a later stage one section ofA co pany w as pushed up to fill a gap on the right ofthe

f few guns in action in the centre o the line . A well -directed volleys and accurately-aimed shells s oon caused the enemy to vacate A sangar in twos

w as . e and threes, till it ﬁnally emptied Meanwhil Lieutenant Beynon with his levies had found his way

I S4 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRA L CHAP .

f in and Snider riﬂes . Several dead were ound the

and of t e sangars , the loss the enemy was estima d to f have been rom ﬁfty to sixty men . After a Short halt the troops continued the adv a nce by the left bank ofthe river till within three mile s of

f . r Mastuj , where the river was orded Here , d awn

of an r up on the crest an alluvial f above the iver,

of w ho were seen the British garrison Mastuj , had

f for w ho been shut up in the ort eighteen days , but ’ of o had, on hearing the ﬁring Colonel Kelly s tr ops , and seeing the enemy gradually vacating their posi f w tion round the ort, now come out to join hands ith f the relieving orce .

’ f a At 5 pm. Colonel Kelly s orce reached M stuj

f f n had itsel , and so in a single day a success ul actio

f of re been ought, the beleaguered garrison Mastuj lie ve d n of , and another march made in the directio m Chitral . Lieutenant Moberly, who was in com and

Of his at Mastuj , was now able to relate the story adventures since his investment by the Chitralis . In a previous chapter the story of the disasters to the parties under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes has been told . These detachments had in the begin

of f for ning March set out rom Mastuj Chitral , but

of of a no news what had happened to them , or wh t w as occurring in Chitral reached Lieutenant Moberly.

s H e had sent messengers down to Buni three time ,

l oth but each time they were cut Off. On March

- s Captain Bretherton , the Deputy Assistant Commi

- for f h sary General the Gilgit orce , arrived in Mastuj wit VII C O LON EL KE L LY’S MARCH 1 5 5

of 1 00 f Ghiz r a detachment Kashmir Sepoys rom , and so brought up the Mastuj garrison to a total strength

Ghiz r of 1 70 men . Sixty more men arrived from on

1 1 6 the 3th , and on the th Lieutenant Moberly , who had been trying for some days to Obtain coolies to enable him to march down to Buni to ascertain the ’ f of set f ate Captain Ross s party, out rom Mastuj

1 0 f with 5 Kashmir I n antry . No coolies had been

oshtin obtained, and each man had to carry his p

1 2 0 of (sheepskin coat) , two blankets , rounds ammu ’ niti n o . , and three days cooked rations Sanoghar, a h village eight miles below Mastuj , was reached t at

n day, but no lo ger march could be made, as a bridge

f Pun ali over the river had to be repaired . Fi ty y

levies had joined Lieutenant Moberly, and on the

next morning he left for Buni . This he reached at m f 5 p , and ound there Lieutenant Jones and the ’ of a seventeen survivors Captain Ross s p rty, and thirty-three men who had been left in Buni by h Captain Ross before his march to K orag . Lieu tenant Jones had been unable to proceed towards

for f of f Mastuj ear attack on the di ﬁcult road there , and had remained on in B uni trying to communicate

u n f with Lie te ant Moberly, and hoping that relie f might be sent him . This relie Lieutenant Moberly

s for at no small ri k , there are many points on the eighteen miles of road between Mastuj and Buni

Off now where his retreat might have been cut , had gallantly brought . But Buni was no place in which to stay longer than was absolutely necessary . I t is 1 6 A 5 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CH P .

f and an open village there is no de ensible post in it , above everything there were not supplies sufﬁcient to

last any length oftime . The enemy were already in

few o strength at Drasan , a miles distant on the opp

a of site b nk the river, and Lieutenant Moberly heard that they intended to cut off his retreat that very

] w a night at the Nisa Go , a strong position on the y

between Buni and Mastuj . Lieutenant Moberly heard also that the enemy were collecting on the

e road between Mastuj and Gilgit , and that no mor

four ow n had H o troops yet started from Gilgit . e had therefore no choice left but to return to Mastuj

S f r immediately . O a ter emaining there only two

hours he se t out at 7 pm. on the 1 7 th on his return journey . A party had been previously despatched to seize the bridge over the river and the difﬁcult

of ff s piece cli along which the road passe , and the Punyali levies had been sent forward to if possible prevent the enemy from occupying the N isa Gol

suc position. These precautionary measures were ce ssfully carried out ; the enemy did nothing more f than ollow the party along the path , and Lieutenant Moberly after marching steadily all night halted for

fe w a hours at dawn , and proceeded on to Mastuj ,

f 1 A M on which he reached in sa ety about 0 . . the

1 81h fu - , having thus by a bold , and care lly planned

’ march rescued Lieutenant Jones s party from prob ’ ably the same fate that bofel Lieutenant Edw arde s s

of for party . He did this , too , just in the nick time ,

few u f he f only a ho rs a ter had le t Buni , the enemy

1 8 T C 5 HE RELI EF OF CH ITRA L HAP.

a a th t time I was the political agent there , and little incident which occurred while the earthquake w as taking place is worth recording as an instan c e of

Of e n a the steadiness the native troops . Lieut nt

Ofﬁ of r of Gordon , the cer in command the esco t

f Of the f Sikhs , and mysel were seated in a room ort

w e f when suddenly elt the whole place shaking. But earthquakes are common in Chitral and w e h did not at ﬁrst move , till we heard stones cras ing down outside and the whole room tossing about like w a cabin on board ship . Then e dashed out of the

w e door to the courtyard , and as did so passed a

w ho sentry, quietly proceeded to present arms in

as if w as a salute nothing happening. The mount ins round were in a cloud of dust from the avalan ches of rock set rolling down their sides by the earth quake and the rickety walls of the fort tumbling on all sides ; but all this did not disturb the

f of and Sikh sentry rom his sense discipline , he

w s saluted as he a accustomed to do . This fort is situated on the edge of a sloping plain running down from the hillside which at one point approach to within about 400 yards ofthe fort. The enemy occupied a row of houses some 300

f f and yards rom the ort ; these they loopholed , from the walls commenced ﬁring upon the fort.

Of 800 They also built sangars at a distance yards, but the garrison succeeded in silencing the ﬁre from these by aiming volleys into them ; and on one occasion Punyali levies were sent out at night to VII COLON EL KELLY’S MARCH I S9 whitewash the loopholes of sangars out of which

so the enemy had been driven during the day, that it would be possible for the garrison to aim correctly i at them f the enemy attempted to reoccupy them . The enemy did subsequently come back to the sangars , but only to be driven out again by the

n carefully aimed ﬁre from the garriso . On another occasion the Chitralis had built a sangar on the hillside and from it wounded two f ponies in the inside of the ort. The enemy were armed with Martini - Henry and Snider riﬂes and

w as could ﬁre from long ranges into the fort . I t necessary therefore to dislodge them from the

Pun ali s sangar, and the y levies were ent early one morning before it had been occupied for the day

f w s by the enemy to destroy it. Some days a ter ard 00 f a sangar was built about 3 yards below the ort, but Lieutenant Moberly moved out with a party of

r eighty sepoys and ushed it. The enemy only ﬁred

fe w f a shots , and then retired into some houses rom which they harassed the return of the party. The

f Of sangar, which was ound to be strongly built

f . ascines and stones , was destroyed All this time the Chitralis had been trying to induce Lieutenant Moberly to come out under the

of f promise a sa e conduct to Gilgit, and he was

Afz ul assured that Sher , the pretender to the throne f o . Chitral , had no wish to ﬁght the British Had Lieutenant Moberly listened to these insinuating advances he would undoubtedly have been captured 1 60 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

as soon as he came outside , and he acted wisely

for f w as to wait the relie which , though he not aware

of . th of it , was now near at hand On the 9 April large numbers Of the enemy were Observed to be

n off me n movi g , Lieutenant Moberly took out his

f w as to ollow them up, and then it that he met

’ Colonel Kelly s force marching in to the relief of

w as the garrison . The siege now at an end ; the

s f s table were turned , and relieving and relieved orce

now marched down to succour Chitral . From the 1 0th to the 1 2 th ofApril Colonel Kelly halted in Mastuj to allow of arrangements for sup plies and transport for the further march to Chitral

of to be made , and to await the arrival a second de tachme nt ofthe troops catching up from the Shandur

1 1 of Pass . On the th April this detachment arrived accompanied by Surgeon-Captain L uard with the i Field Hospital , which was now establ shed at Mas tuj and on the same day a reconnaissance was

of made by the levies in the direction Chitral , as the e nemy were reported to be holding a strong position

1 2 f a few miles below Mastuj . On the th o April a further reconnaissance w as made by Lieutenant

ff f and of Beynon , the sta o ﬁcer, an accurate sketch

’ the enemy s position brought back by him , which enabled Colonel Kelly to settle the course of his

n actio . This sketch is reproduced on the opposite

a C of o p ge , and it gives a very lear idea the p sition which the enemy had now occupied , and which was

01 known as the Nisa G . I t is generally considered to

VII COLO N EL KELLY’S MARCH 1 6 1 be of impregnable , and the late Mehtar Chitral had ,

s f standing on the very spot , him el explained to me

f w as of its natural strength , and a ﬁrmed that it one the strongest positions in his country . I n Chitral all the positions in the mountain valleys are well known and are regularly occupied in each successive

s G0] invasion which occurs , and this position , Ni a , is the one which has been selected from time imme

f of morial by the Chitralis in the de ence their valley . The valley of the Chitral river at the N is a Gol position is about a mile wide , and is bounded on e for ither hand by steep rocky mountains , rising several thousand feet above the river. On the left bank especially the mountain sides are very pre

i i ous c t . p , and up against these the Chitral river runs

rs as if On ﬁrst looking down the valley it appea , in b a w as etween the mount ins , there nothing but a s r i f - mooth plain unn ng down rom the right hand side, a nd it is not till one is actually on it that it is dis covered that the seemingly open plain is cleft by a mi l/a}; 200 00 f between and 3 eet deep, and with absolutely perpendicular sides . This mi l/a}; is the

G01 s it of Nisa , and only one path lead across , that the road to Chitral , and this path the enemy had

- n ow cut away. There had been a small goat track a s mi llet/i cross thi at another point , but the enemy

n had now entirely obliterated it. Sa gars had also been erected at the head of these paths and along

el the right bank of the m lem. These sangars were s unk into the ground and head-cover w as provided 1 62 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CHAP .

s f of by a covering oftimber and stone . On the le t their pos ition they had sangars on the spur of the

n hill in a general li e with the sangars on the plain , and on the hill parties of men were stationed to f throw down stones . On the right o their posi

in tion across the Chitral river, and slightly

Of of advance the general line , they had another line sangars on a spur stretching away high up into the

- snow line . Such w as the position which Colonel Kelly had now to attack , and here the Chitralis had collected to the number ofabout men under their chief

n leader, Mohamed I sa, to make their pri cipal stand , so as to prevent Colonel Kelly joining hands with the British garrison in Chitral .

f of Colonel Kelly, rein orced by the garrison

now 8 2 r Mastuj , had with him 3 Pioneers unde

B orrodaile tw o t Captain , guns under Lieutenan

1 00 f Stewart , Kashmir I n antry under Lieutenant

r Moberly, 34 Kashmir Sappers and Miners unde

R E 1 00 Lieutenant Oldham , , and Hunza and f Punyal levies . With this orce he advanced m H 1 . is from Mastuj at 7 a . on the 3th April plan was to send on an advance guard, which ,

’ on gaining the plain which the enemy s position

its w a the bisected, would make y well up to right where the ground favoured an advance

00 of under cover to within 5 yards the ravine , whose further bank was occupied by the enemy . This advance guard w as ordered to direct

A 1 64 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CH P.

’ distance of 2 7 5 yards from the e nemy s main sangar. The infantry having deployed A and C companies kept the enemy engage d directly in front along the

m n l ne ofsa a s a as ai i ng r , the latter comp ny occ ionally directing its ﬁre half right agai nst the sangars o n

The of com the hills in that ﬂank. ﬁre E and G panics w as almost entirely directed against th e hill sangars— occasional volleys being directed o n small parties Of the enemy occupying hill tops

fom 8 s a r 00 to 900 yard distance . The gener l average distance at which ﬁring w as ope ned to

f n w as f 2 s the ro t rom 5 0 to 300 yards. As soon a the guns had silenced the ﬁre from the sangars on

s s s l s the hill ide to the right, they hel ed at range from 8 7 5 yards to yards the sangars along

f he the edge of the ravine . The existence o t goat-path across the ravine already referred to was now reported to Colonel Kelly by his staff ofﬁcer n l Lieutenant Beyno , and Co onel Kelly accordingly directed that an attempt should be made to make it practicable so that the force migh t

cross by it . Some ladders had been brought with the force for the special purpose of crossing the

r and r t avine , the Kashmi Sappers under Lieutenan Moberly were now sent forward with Lieutenant

r Beynon to car y out the work. The scaling ladders were lowered down the sides ofthe ravine by means ’ of f f ropes , and a ter hal an hour s work a track was made by which the bo ttom Of the mi l/a}: could be reached and an ascent by the goat-track on the ’ VII CO LON EL KELLY S MARCH 1 65

further side assured . The troops then descended

mi l/alt of into the , and eventually a party about f ﬁ teen succeeded in climbing the opposite bank , which they reached almost simultaneously with the levies , who had now worked their way round by the ’ f s a s right, turned the enemy s le t and reached the ang r of on the hill side. The appearance these bodies

’ the f e r on enemy s le t caused a gen al ﬂight, and they

of the streamed out their sangars in a long line , with guns ﬁring at ranges from 9 5 0 to yards and

of f f under volleys riﬂe ﬁre rom the in antry. Colonel Kelly then ordered a general advance across the

nit /Zak r . a by the road leading to Chit al A comp ny,

o n as s o as it could be mustered, was sent in pursuit,

’ the but enemy s ﬂight was extremely rapid , and they succeeded in effecting a retreat towards Drasan and

the of over the hill sides on right bank the river. Colonel Kelly in reporting this action says that he cannot speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during the course of the

s action , which la ted two hours , and during which they were subjected to a very heavy and trying fire f rom the front and left bank . The fire discipline he also says was excellent, and contributed materially f ’ to keeping down the fire rom the enemy s sangars . The enemy ’s casualties were estimated at some h sixty killed and one undred wounded . Amongst ’ f of h me n the enemy were some orty Umra K an s ,

’ and the ﬁre which Colonel Kelly s force had to face w as f n - n entirely rom Marti i Henri and S ider riﬂes . 1 66 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRA L CHAP .

This second success w as even greater than the

’ s of not ﬁr t. All the principal men the country em

f f of l ployed be ore the ort Chitra , were present in the action, and the utmost reliance was placed in the f strength of the position. I t w as there ore a serious blow to the Chitralis when they found that the principal position on the road to Chitral had been

u s mmarily captured. Colonel Kelly halted that night opposite the village of o on f 1 th San ghar, and the ollowing day , the 4

ar r s n t th April , m ched to D a a to ascer ain the streng of o the enemy and his whereab uts , as it was reported

t h m I s The tha Mo a ed a had ﬂed in that direction .

be road had been broken , and a long detour had to m s ft. ade up the spur ome high above the road ,

t f s necessi ating a march o ome twenty miles .

f s w as f The ort at Dra an ound to be unoccupied ,

of r u d and in it were large quantities g ain , which wo l have be en very acceptable to Colonel Kelly had t he been able to carry it away, but no transpor was available for the purpose as no men could be f captured rom the neighbouring villages . The usual road to Chitral runs down the op posite side of the valley to that on which Drasan

w as f is situated . I t by this road on the le t bank of the river that Captain Ross and Lieutenants

Edwardes and Fowler had advanced, and along it the parties under them had been annihilated. The ’ enemy had intended to have arrested Colonel Kelly s

’ progress at or near the spot where Captain Ross s

1 68 THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL CHAP

’ —Colonel Kelly had turned the enemy s last posi tion ; it w as on this day that Lieutenant H arley

w as s made his brilliant sortie, and it on thi day Umra Khan w as making his last futile effort against ’ r f - a of the Gene al Low s orce . The high water m rk r e f now e ebellion had b en reached, and rom the tid

r began to turn apidly. On the 1 81h Colonel Kelly made a Short march

M oroi 1 th K o haz i to and on the 9 arrived at g , only f t one march rom Chitral . H ere he received his ﬁrs

fr s and d letter om the beleaguered garri on , obtaine the welcome news that the siege had just been raised and that the enemy had ﬁnally ﬂed . I n the afternoon of April 2oth the force marched into Chitral and joined hands with their comrades , w ho had for forty-seven days been invested within f the ort .

f u c a This amo s march, which, arried out by handful of British ofﬁcers with not a single British s f oldier by them , but with native troops rom the

of - r plains I ndia, over a snow clad ange and through the heart of a mountainous country in the ﬂush of f success ul rebellion , will ever be remembered as a

of n ow unique exploit the I ndian Army, was at an

s of of f w as end . The new the success the little orce

soon spread throughout the empire. Everywhere

r the the highest admi ation was excited, and critics in great armies of the Continent joined with ours elves in the praises of the high military qualities which its accomplishment showed that our Ofﬁcers and me n ’ v11 COLO N EL KELLY S MARCH 1 69

possessed . Her Majesty the "ueen immediately telegraphed to I ndia her gracious approbation of

-in this remarkable exploit, and the Commander

f his Chie in India, Sir George White , expressed

of warm appreciation the manner in which , in the f of r f ace extraordina y di ﬁculties, the advance and

of f of operations the orce were conducted , and the indomitable energy displayed by Colonel Kelly and the ofﬁcers and troops under his command in over

- in- f coming them . The Commander Chie considered the arrangements made for the crossing of the

s Shandur Pass , the perseverance and skill di played

fﬁ Of by the o cers , and the excellent behaviour the

of and troops worthy the highest praise , while commending all wished to record the important part taken by Captain B orradaile and his detach

w ho . ment, were the ﬁrst over the pass

A week after Colonel Kelly had reached Chitral " f Major Roddy Owen and mysel , riding on ahead

’ of the advanced parties of General Low s force arrived in Chitral . I t was a bright sunny day , the

r f n of count y was clothed in all the ul ess spring, the f young corn waving in the ﬁeld , the blossoms orming on the trees and all nature smiling as we rode through the forty miles of country which separated Chitral from the advance guard which General Gat

us L ow ar acre had j t led over the ai Pass . But the

of looks the people were in striking contrast. Worn , trembling and utterly cowed the Chitralis shrank 1 70 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP . from even the British ofﬁcers riding without an e w as scort through the country . I t pitiable to see

. few f them Men , whom a months be ore I had seen gay as few but Chitralis in their contented moments f can be , were now moving about with careworn aces thin and exhausted . The people of Chitral had

n flamed up into rebellion , and were now lying bur t out f like the charred remains o a firework . When I asked them why they had been so foolish as to “ fight us , they wrung their hands and said , Why were " we We hate these Pathans ; they have plundered

off our houses and carried our women , but they were

ou far strong and close while y were away, and we

rf never knew you were so powe ul as you are . We did not want to ﬁght you , but we were led away .

w as r fe w I t only ve y people , however, that we

for met as we rode through the villages , most had

’ Gatacre s ﬂed to the hills , believing that General

L ow arai brigade , now just over the Pass , was to advance upon them and exact a terrible retribution

r by massacring them fo the s pace of three days .

of 2 th of Late in the evening the 7 April , we rode into Chitral , and had the honour to be the first to congratulate the famous garrison and the officers of Colonel Kelly ’s force upon their splendid achieve f f ments . We ound the o ficers just sitting down to dinner in the very house in which I had lived for many months , and in which Mr . Curzon and I on the previous October had entertained the late Mehtar

w as f-a- at dinner. This house situated hal mile

Pho o B assa n o Old B ond S t r t , eet.

A I N . M CD . B I R CA PT J A D . VII COLON EL KELLY’S MARCH 1 7 1 f f w e f rom the ort, and here ound Sir George Robert son f in and the other o ﬁcers , recovered somewhat

’ deed from what Colonel Kelly s ofﬁcers had found

but n them , still looki g pale and worn , thin , and with the set anxious look which had not yet left their faces . They were cheery indeed they brought out a long treasured bottle of brandy from the reserve for hospital purposes , and they produced a Christmas

- plum pudding which had only that day arrived , and insisted upon our sharing these luxuries with them but even now they hardly realised that the struggle w as of f yet over, and one or other them would rom time to time go round the sentries posted everywhere round the house . One of the ﬁrst subjects on which they spoke to f us was about poor Baird . Few o ﬁcers have ever attached their comrades more sincerely to them than

f of did this brave o ﬁcer, and he was one the best S and keenest oldiers in the service . He was noted for for of his tact and the amiability his character, and he studied his profession with the spirit ofan enthusiast. His coolness was as remarkable as his ff zeal , and su ering though he was and knowing that f he must die , he remained cheer ul and collected to the last . He said that he would not have wished to die any other death than the soldier ’s death which he was now to meet he had done his duty and led

re his men as a soldier should do , and he never

retted f f w g his ate . He gave a e last messages to those at home and then with a smile on his face 1 7 2 THE RELIEF OF C H ITRAL CH AP .

of f n r and , thinking his pro essio to the ve y end , wished his comrades success in their plans and bade

- them good bye.

of th and w as H e died on the morning March 4 , buried in the dead of night outside the main ga te of f d the ort while the enemy were ﬁring all roun . A

tw o r little over months later, when the advance b igade of e n r the Relieving Force arrived in Chitral , G e al

f e Gatacre read a uneral service over his grav , and

E . R. w ho w Major Aylmer, , had served together ith Baird in the Hunza Campaign three years before

o and won his Victoria Cross there , erected a t mb stone to his memory and with his ow n hands carved o an inscription upon it . H is c mrades and fellow co untrymen will know then that far away though he now lies his grave has not been neglected , but will ever

for who f f be cared by the soldiers ollow a ter him . After poor Baird I think the subject on which the ofﬁcers of the garrison spoke most feelingly w as the devotion and noble spirit ofdiscipline and deter mination shown by the Sikhs . There were but a hundred of them in a garrison of nearly four f hundred, but the o ﬁcers said that without them

for they could never have held out, and that but these Sikhs not one of them would have been there now . These Sikh soldiers only grew more enthusiastic as the siege became closer and times seemed harder. With calm self-reliance they stood proudly at bay

n nd like a rock with the waves beati g against it. A so great was the sense ofdiscipline which their s tern

VI I COLON EL KELLY’S MARCH 1 7 3

old native Ofﬁcer Gurmurkh Singh instilled into

them , that when during an attack the sick struggled out of hospital to join in the ﬁght he would not

excuse even their impulsive bravery, but told them

’ s that a oldier s ﬁrst duty was to obey , that they had

been ordered to hospital and there they must stay . I t w as the discipline ingrained into these men that

saved the garrison . As long as a Sikh was on

sentry , while Sikhs were holding a threatened point , f Captain Townshend had nothing to ear. The enemy would never catch a Sikh off his guard and could never force their way through a post of

s Sikhs while one remained alive . They aved the f f garrison , and the o ﬁcers grate ully acknowledged

their service .

s of w as s on The kill the enemy , too , a ubject

f s which the o ﬁcer specially dwelt . The Chitralis had not previously been considered ofmuch account

as a ﬁghting race ; but even they, once their blood f was up, ought hard and well , and their Pathan allies were as skilful and brave as troops of a regularly

’ trained army . These men of Umra Khan s were

born warriors ; unlike the Chitralis, who by nature f pre er polo and sport and dancing to ﬁghting, the Pathans from their childhood upwards think of little

e f lse than war are . They are for ever raiding upon

’ one another, attacking each other s villages , and besieging and defending the forts scattered over their country nearly as thickly as public-houses in

England . They therefore showed every ingenuity 1 74 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP .

s f r of in the iege o Chit al . To make the most their ammunition they never ﬁred a shot without clearly

the making out an object to aim at , and usually with riﬂe resting on a stone so as to enable them to aim correctly . The skill which they displayed in the construction oftrenches and breastworks to approach the walls ; the sagacity they showed in repeatedly attacking thewaterway and in setting ﬁre to the towers and walls of the fort ; and the courage and deter mination they showed in their attempts to carry out

of these objects , excited the highest admiration the besieged . No less remarkable was their well -directed effort to undermine the walls and at the close ofthe siege

f f f w as to the de enders ound a huge pent roo , which have been borne along and placed against the wall s of f as the ort so to cover the assailants , and huge

s of r scaling ladder , capable car ying three men f . o abreast , had also been constructed With the aid these contrivances the enemy had hoped , when the f mine had been success ully blown up , to have made one last desperate assault upon the devoted garrison

f f calcu be ore the relieving orce could arrive . They lated that the defenders must be getting very short

for of . s supplies, Mr Robertson in his negotiation with them had always been careful to lead them into f this belie . They thought , too , that the native

s troops mu t be low at heart , and ready to throw up

. f the sponge at any day They considered , there ore , that if one great effort could be made they would be

v1 1 COLO N EL KELLY’S MARC H 1 7 5

r able to ﬁrst c ush the Chitral garrison , and then

annihilate Colonel Kelly, who they knew had with him only a handful Of men with no supplies and no

of transport to speak , and who was now in the

of of middle the worst deﬁle the country . But the carefully-planned and brilliantly-executed sortie under Harley had effectually frustrated this last supreme

’ ff of f e e ort the besiegers, and Colonel Kelly s orc

f and r had , by their skil ul tactics brave y in action ,

’ s thwarted the enemy most cherished plans . Just on the brink of a disaster the British forces came

’ out triumphant ; and once again in our fair island s

r w as f sto y it shown that British o ﬁcers , even though they had not a single British soldier by them , and had only to trust to their own stout hearts and strong u right arms , and to the inﬂuence they co ld exercise

of f of over men subject races, and to the eeling f loyalty they could evoke rom them , had been able to uphold the honour of the race ; and the story of the defence and relief of Chitral will be handed down to posterity as one of the most brilliant

of chapters in the annals I ndian military history. C H APT E R V I I I

TH E PRESEN T SITUATION

I N their proclamation to the tribes on their w ay

f of to Chitral , be ore the commencement the cam

ai n of t pg , the Government India had declared tha their sole object was to put an end to the present, f f and to prevent any uture, unlaw ul aggression upon Chitral territory ; and now that Umra Khan had

f his r Afz ul been driven rom count y, and that Sher f had been captured , the British o ﬁcers relieved, and our prestige restored , the Government had then to decide what should be our future relations with the ruler of Chitral and with the tribes on the w ay to

Tw o Chitral . alternatives only were placed before the Government ; they must either maintain thei r position in Chitral , or change their policy and aban d on the attempt to keep any effective control over

ff of the external a airs that state . The history Of Chitral had demonstrated that the state had not for the last twenty years been able to stand alone , a nd the condition of Chitral since its invasion by f o . Umra Khan , and the investment Mr Robertson

f Afz ul n of in the ort by Sher , had bee one anarchy .

1 78 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP.

w as therefore considered possible to come to arrange

m s r ent with the inte vening tribes , which , backed by

a f S of f su ﬁcient, but not an extravagant, how orce, w ould be adequate to keep open the route by which

troops and supplies could be sent up to Chitral . Along

t the his route a considerable trade is carried on , and country through which it pas ses furnishes supplies to an amount which would render it unnecessary to import any large quantity from I ndia for the u se of

I f f e the troops in Chitral . riendly relations wer

e a st blished with the tribes , it might be expected that

o e cultivation would increase , and the surplus pr duc

’ nd e be more a more available . General Low s forc during their occupation ofthe country had constru cted

u a good road by the Panjkora Valley, so that by sing

it, it would only be necessary on the way to Chitral f . O to pass through two States , Dir and Swat

w as f these two States , the ﬁrst necessarily riendly

for n of to the British Government, the positio the Khan of Dir had depended entirely u pon the support given him by the British Govern

of ment, and in regard to the second , many f f the chie s had , even be ore the war, petitioned the Government of I ndia to take them under f f their protection , as they eared attack rom their f power ul neighbour Umra Khan , and now since the war they had shown themselves to be quite f riendly . They had been egged on into opposing the British advance by Umra Khan for his own pur

f s poses , and by their anatical mullas , who alway VIII THE PRESE N T SITUATION 1 79

dread the encroachme nt ofa foreign power will lessen

their inﬂue nce . But the Swatis are not really a war like race they are more cultivators and traders than

s for oldiers . By working the British during the

o of ccupation , they had earned large sums money, and as they had always been treated with justice and

c Of f onsideration by the British ﬁcers , they pre erred ,

and asked , that the British troops should remain in

of their country. The Government I ndia proposed , f there ore, under these circumstances , to leave a gar

of f of rison two native in antry regiments , two guns a r of as mounted batte y, and one company sappers , a garrison in Chitral . The headquarters of this f orce would be placed at Kila Drosh , a place about 1 30 miles distant from our settled frontier in the

of -f f plains the Punjab , and twenty our miles rom f Chitral itself. At Chitral a hal battalion would be

s . tationed in a strong position To support this , it w as proposed for the ﬁrst year or two to keep a

of brigade two native regiments , one mounted bat te r of y, and one company sappers on the Malakand

few l f Pass , just a mi es over the Punjab rontier, and commanding the chief entrance into these countries and one battalion was to be stationed to guard the bridge over the Swat River. Between the Swat

of 1 River and Kila Drosh , a distance roughly 00

— b 2 miles , a road was to be held by levies y about 5 0 f 00 f rom Swat , and about 5 rom Dir. These propo s als ofthe Government ofI ndia were sanctioned by the Secretary ofState on August 9th. 1 80 THE RE L IEF OF CH ITRAL CHAP .

The much controverted question of the rete ntion

n of e or abandonme t Chitral having thus been s ttled , it would be wearisome to reiterate the various argu ments for and against its occupation . High military authorities say that it would be wiser to leave the whole country alone ; to let an invader come there if of n an he will, but not to think ourselves throwi g army into those mountain fastnesses to oppose him .

re Other authorities , including the past and p sent

-in- f l e Commander Chie in I ndia, and practical y very military ofﬁcer of position now serving in I ndia w ho a of has studied the subject, think th t the retention Chitral is necessary for the proper defence o f our

- ' North west Frontier. But setting aside the purely

of military aspect the question , about which such diametrically opposite opinions were expresse d by

and r h military men on the spot milita y men at ome , the point which appears to have had very great weight with the Government in bringing them to the decision now arrived at is the questio n of t w pres ige . The Government considered that a ith d raw al from Chitral would involve a serious los s of prestige, and they recognised that in dealing with

Asiatic peoples prestige cannot be lightly disregarded . We had for some years made it the object of our

ff of to policy to control the external a airs Chitral , guard its northern passes and to watch what went on beyond them; This was known to be our object both to the people themselves and to the surround

r ing countries , and whether it would have been wise

1 82 THE RELIEF OF CH ITRA L CHAP.

be relied on . H itherto they had not been able

to trust in this . They were attacked by a neigh bouring state ; they asked us for ass istance and it

w as saw f not given them . They there ore little N W purpose to be gained from siding with us. O

can be they know better, and lieve in our strength and in our intention to steadily carry through the policy w e had for years deﬁnitely adopted and w ith this impression thoroughly stamped upon their min ds there can be little risk of such trouble as we ha ve

few had this year ever again occurring. The rest less spirits w ho have hitherto gambled with the

people , and used them as pawns in the political game for t their own purposes , will no doub dislike the Change to a time of rest and improvement from a period ofincessant strife and warfare in which though t C hey might go under, they at any rate had a hance ofcoming out the winner. Yet the people on the

of of whole will be glad the chance quiet, and we have every reason to believe that just as in the

of case Hunza , the neighbouring state to Chitral , f which our years ago had like Chitral to be subdued ,

1 8 2 f but which both in 9 , not a year a ter the campaign f there , and again this year by urnishing those hardy mountain levies which so materially assisted Colonel Kelly to accomplish his arduous march and turn the enemy from their mountain position had so loyally come to our aid when the call upon them w as made , so also now in Chitral the people once and for all recognising that we are a power Who VIII THE PRESE N T S ITUATION 1 83

of z can and will exercise the proper duties a su erain , and yet that we have no wis h to tamper with their

us customs or set aside their ruler, will join instead of opposing us, and will with the Hunza men be turned from an element ofweakness to a source of f strength upon our rontier, and help us and not obstruct us in the defence of our great I ndian

Empire.

TH E EN D .

D D SONS LI M I D L ON DON AN D B UNGAY. R I CHAR CL AY A N , TE ,

A dz/ airfa res mM as h amz/c m

B tw o H s ita Nurse s R O SE B L ENN ERH A SSE y o p l ,

nd L U Y L a S EEMAN r . s 6 C d . w n 8y o . . C o 3

n e . I TI M ES . The book is w ritten in direct un conventio al languag " w w e are n n ed be w e rea and w e en e . ill , co vi c , id ly d , id ly joy d all a be ead not on] S PECTATOR . Their book is emphatic y book to r for its ow n sa e for the en e a n en t w h aff s and for its easau k , t rt i m ich it ord , pl and un e end n er but a so us is one w a es one h n pr t i g m it , l beca e it hich m k t i re of uman a o S ea w e of e se es wa mo highly h n ture as a w hole . T p k ll th m lv ’ e den the e ast t n in the au s nds w ho n ee s u us] vi tly v ry l hi g thor mi , , i d d , t dio a d an refe en e t e f n rt e ess is a t a s u voi y r c to h ir ee li ngs ; eve h l , it book h t ho l " ma e En - k glishme n proud ofthe ir fellow countryw omen . ’ S T. AM ES The a en u e s and a s s of hes 7 S GAZ ETTE . dv t r h rd hip t h tw o brave ladies are extremely fasci nating reading ; for eve ry p age bears t ’ — ress of e a and n w e e i ere the ave e s ea fa n th imp v r city , o h r s th tr ll r gr t ili g atte mpt at ﬁ ne w riting at the expense of truth W e have given on] a s a sa e of the an d n ss of the for w w e m ll mpl ec otal rich e book , hich m se a n run at the a s t w in due u se a e a ac pro i lo g libr rie . I ill co r t k high pl among the most readable w orks of travel and adve nture w hich the curren ev a of n e e t in Af r iv l i t r s rica has produced . W v m n an ORL D . The is e e en ea n fu of e e book xc ll t r di g , ll mo t n en e ea n w u s a the u a e ene and w ell i cid t , r v li g , itho t di pl y, cool co r g , rgy , trained devotedness of the companion s in an arduous campaign agains sickne ss and s ufferi ng in the un know n coun try w hich has s o fascinate e a e are e e u n th m th t th y lik ly to r t r thither . ha S TAR . An e c n Add the un ue u s an e s t x iti g book . to iq circ m t c in spired it the humorous vie w take n by the siste rs ofthe ir o w n mi sfortunes and the e n o f ee fu i s m a e va es its a e s and the esu t v i ch r l opt mi th t p r d p g , r l i a a u memor ble addition to the literature of merciful advent re . AFRI CAN REV I EW Adven tures in M ashonaland is dec idedly b ea book to e r d .

DAI L Y T L G e of the is w e w t E E RAPH . Every pag book ll or n re adi g .

A L W e nd un w en a ou P L M AL L GAZETTE . e r comme yo g om b out Af a as nu ses to ea a ea n and nw a es th to go to ric r r d , m rk , l r , i rdly dig t " e e en es ofN u ses B enne s d n xp ri c r l rhas ett an Sleema .

HAL L R I t is e fu s u s e an d et th WHI TE EV I E W d light lly di c r iv , y w riters never stray into the dangerous path s of elaborate scen e -paintm a s n T e a e a a e e and e f e tas or prolix mor li i g . h y h v t l to t ll , p r orm th ir s ea and in a man ne w sh u a e Adven tures i imply, cl rly , r hich o ld m k onala the ofthe sea n M as/z nd book so . A n e n W e M ORNI N G P OS T. thoroughly i ter sti g book ritt and na e in a simple u ff cted style .

AM BRI D G E REV I E W. A f es v va ous . C r h, i ci book

M AC MI LLAN CO L on don ' ' R emz ms cm ces of th e Grea t

' M u fz ﬂ 1 8 - y , 5 7 5 9

n u n R f S and a u of L u k I cl di gthe elie , iege , C pt re ; c

now an d am a n s in R ohilcun d an d u e . , the C pig O d

B W IL L IA M FORB ES-MI TCHEL L at S r a t rd y , l e e ge n g3

S a H r . r w 8vc . s . 6d utherl nd ighl ande s C o n 3 .

ATHEN/ E UM We could m ultiply largely the number ofinteresting e a s f s a ra e but w e ave ven en u s w xtr ct rom thi tt ctiv book , h gi o gh to ho that

’ the Sergean t s vol ume is w orthy ofthe reputation ofthe old 93rd .

TI M ES H is narrative is vivid an d full of strange and romantic incidents .

I w u a m t s CADEM Y. t be eas u e es f b t A o ld y to q ot p g ro hi book, u w e have said enough to show that truth may sometimes be not only stranger " t an n but a s not ess n e es n ea . h ﬁctio , l o l i t r ti gto r d

h S PEGTATOR . N 0 one w o w ants to be amused an d to be made to " fee u of our a s u fa ea l pro d rmy ho ld il to r d it .

DAI L Y CHR ONI CL E M uch as has been w ritten of the story of

n n M u n w e a e n ot f e h ad a eal n a a ve f the I dia ti y , h v be or r ly good rr ti rom the

n of ew of the an s an d a e te one h an s w e are n ot e poi t vi r k , b t r t thi lik ly " to get .

I t is n f su a PAL L M AL L GAZ ETTE . o ly rom ch book as this that the civili an can know anythi ngw orth know i ng of w hat may be styled

e h s of a ua w a fa e f the n of e w of he an th minor i tory ct l r r rom poi t vi t r ks . The most lurid effort of the ﬁ ctionist pales be fore the bare grim truths w hich this Scottish ex-sergeant describes w ith an u nstrained vigour of

a re li sm .

E His w a ea all e o NATI ONA L OBSER V R . book ill pp l to lov rs f w adventure and manly orth .

' W u e h M AN CHES TER G UARDI AN . itho t exc ption t e best battle " w e ave e book h ver read .

N C L on d n A C I LLA O . o M M , ‘ ’ rea z Froz en L a n a ( B o"

M a ia Z eme/s ér/a Tu n dra}

A N arrative ofa Winter Journey across the Arctic undras and a s ur a n the Samo ads. T , ojo n mo g y

FR EDER ICK GEO R GE A C KSON a er of J , Le d

the ac s -H ar sw rt P r h J k on m o h ol a Expedition . Wi t

ust at s and M a s E f i I ll r ion p . dited rom h s journals b RTH R M N F O E I OR E . 8vo. I 3 n y A U T 5 . et

TI M ES To those w ho have any taste for Arctic literature this book ’ " ‘ fM r o . F de Ge e a e s n s w e s n u a fas na n . r rick org J ck o ill prov i g l rly ci ti g . j

’ ADM I RAL TY AND HORS E GUARDS GAZ ETTE Enriched as the w is s e a s an d n u e us us a ns s an s out as a ork by om m p m ro ill tr tio , it t d va ua e n u n A resear and eads one an ate w i l bl co trib tio to rctic ch , l to ticip th hopeful intere st the result of the still more extended exploration of the a t u hor . — GL OB E. M r. a s n w as a e e t nf rma n e a a J ck o bl to coll c i o tio g ogr phic l , z oo n d n — w a a a a w be w e ed s en s uden s . logic l , bot ic l hich ill lcom by ci tiﬁc t t ’

M r. a s n s ate a has een a ran e w t us n es and a end ces J ck o m ri l b r g d , i h copio ot pp i ,

M r. Ar u M onteﬁore w se e s na s a e in the w is in se f by th r , ho p r o l h r ork it l

nte es n and a e . The w is u s M ess s . M a an i r ti g bl book, hich p bli hed by r cmill , " n a ns a nu e ofad a e us s co t i mb r mir bl ill tration .

DAI L Y CHR ONI CL E. Apart from its act ual addition s to geogra ’ " hical n e n m i a n w M r. a s s u er ere s on e e s n e . p k o l dg , J ck o vol v y i t ti g

n of t e n f DAI L Y N EWS . O e h most interesti g and valuable books o a el u tr v p blished for many a year . ’ M r a son s na v SATURDA Y REV I E W. . J ck Spirited rrati e of sub Arctic travel w ill have n o ordinary fascination for all w ho admire z ealous a e n ure and a e The s e dv t ppr ciate manly endurance . tory los s n othing " in a a n e n w t eme and es ttr ctio by b i gtold i h extr simplicity mod ty .

’

AM AZE E. An n e es n ns a men of S T. f ES S G TT i t r ti g i t l t Arctic " literature .

L I R Un ue e en in t ese a s of u nou TE AR Y WOR LD . iq v h d y m ltitudi s " e s of i n r cord trave l n outla di sh parts .

va ua WES TM I N S TER GAZETTE. A l ble contribution to the

literature oftravel .

N Th i ot n B L ACK A D WHI TE. e w ork s n o ly purposeful b throughout ut admirably w ritten .

MAC MI LLAN 8: CO L ondon

‘ RETURN 7 0 imc ircul ation desk ofany

Unﬁérs ity of Caiiiornia Library

orto the

NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FAOlLITY l 4 Richmond Fie ld Station B dg. 00. Univers ity ofCal ifornia Richmond CA 94804-4698 ,

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTEH 7 DAYS 2-month loans may be re newed by call ing (4 15 ) 642-6233 - 1 yearl oans may be re charged by bringing books to NRLF Re newal s and recharge s may be made 4 days priorto due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW