INSIDE | Syrian Chemicals Destroyed on U.S. Ship

Volume 44 Number 7 Arms Control SEPTEMBER 2014 THE SOURCE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITYTODAY

IN THIS ISSUE

IAEA Custody of Nuclear Japanese Plutonium Stocks: Strengthening Confidence and Transparency Verification By Fred McGoldrick

The IAEA’s State-Level In Iran Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences By Laura Rockwood

Book Review Posture Matters, but Stability Matters More By Douglas B. Shaw

IN THE NEWS  Russia Breaches INF Treaty, U.S. Says U.S., EU Sanction Russia’s Arms Sector Iran, P5+1 Extend Nuclear Talks By Tariq Rauf and Robert Kelley White House Reviewing Nuclear Budget

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Features

8 Nuclear Verification in Iran By Tariq Rauf and Robert Kelley To build international confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, Iran and six world powers could agree to make the Natanz and Fordow centrifuge enrichment plants a model of monitoring and verification for such plants all over the world. Also, the IAEA should appoint a group of outside experts to review contentious issues connected with Iran’s alleged weaponization activities.

18 IAEA Custody of Japanese Plutonium Stocks: Strengthening Confidence and 3 Focus Transparency By Fred McGoldrick Bridging the Uranium- Enrichment Gap A modest but valuable step in addressing Japan’s plutonium problem would be for Tokyo to place its excess plutonium By Daryl G. Kimball under the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That would ease some of the international concerns about its 4 In Brief program and bolster the global nonproliferation regime.

5 News Briefs 25 The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences Senators Push Nonproliferation Budget By Laura Rockwood

Creedon Takes Office at NNSA The IAEA’s state-level concept was intended to be the next logical step in the evolution of safeguards, but it appears to China Conducts ASAT Test, U.S. Says have inadvertently provided a vehicle for a rearguard attack on long-standing measures for strengthened safeguards. IAEA U.S.-UK Nuclear Pact Revised member states should fend off this attack and reaffirm their commitment to effective safeguards. 7 Reports of Note

18 ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 45 Book Review: Posture Matters, but Stability Matters More In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Vipin Narang argues that more-aggressive nuclear postures provide a better deterrent, but re- viewer Douglas B. Shaw cautions policymakers against using this advice to justify changes in nuclear posture.

Cover photo: At Iran’s Natanz uranium-enrichment plant, an inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency disconnects the connections between the twin cascades for 20 percent enrichment on January 20. Photo credit: Kazem Ghane/AFP/Getty Images 1 36 Arms Control TODAY Volume 44, Number 7 September 2014 A Publication of the Arms Control Association

1313 L Street, NW, Suite 130 Washington, DC 20005 Phone: 202-463-8270 Fax: 202-463-8273 E-mail [email protected] News The United States and Website the Americas www.armscontrol.org Europe and the 39 White House PUBLISHER and Executive Director Former Soviet Union Reviewing Nuclear Daryl G. Kimball 31 Russia Breaches INF Budget Editor NONPROLIFERATION Treaty, U.S. Says Daniel Horner Analyst The White House is overseeing Kelsey Davenport an interagency review of mul- CONTRIBUTING EDITOR The State Department has Jefferson Morley PROGRAM ASSOCIATE accused Russia of testing a tibillion-dollar plans to rebuild Timothy Farnsworth ASSISTANT Editor new medium-range, ground- the U.S. nuclear arsenal, while Jackie Barrientes Finance Officer a bipartisan congressional Merle Newkirk launched cruise missile in Senior Fellow violation of the 1987 Inter- commission has found the ad- Greg Thielmann Kroc Fellow Jonah Aboni mediate-Range Nuclear Forces ministration’s modernization Research Director Treaty. Moscow denies the plans “unaffordable.” Tom Z. Collina INTERN Brianna Starosciak charge. 40 Vietnam Pact Nears BOARD OF DIRECTORS 33 U.S., EU Sanction End of Hill Review John Steinbruner Christine Wing Russia’s Arms Sector The congressional review Chairman Treasurer Responding to Russian inter- period for a U.S.-Vietnamese Avis Bohlen Jack Mendelsohn Matthew Bunn Janne Nolan vention in Ukraine, Western civilian nuclear agreement is J. Bryan Hehir Hazel R. O’Leary governments barred new arms almost finished, and action John Isaacs Nathan Pyles transfers to Moscow. Ongoing seems unlikely. Some congres- Catherine Kelleher Rachel Stohl Michael Klare Jeremiah Sullivan U.S. and French deals worth sional sources say broader Kenneth N. Luongo Paul Walker billions have stirred contro- issues raised by the pact could versy, but are not banned. resurface. The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding The Middle East and 41 State Dept. Targets and support for effective arms control policies. Africa ‘Generation Prague’ Through its media and public education programs and its magazine Arms Control Today, ACA 35 Syrian Chemicals For the past five years, the provides policymakers, journalists, educators, Destroyed on U.S. State Department has hosted and the interested public with authoritative information and analyses on arms control, Ship an annual conference on proliferation, and global security issues. arms control and disarma- The destruction of Syria’s most ment to heighten interest in Arms Control Today (ISSN 0196-125X) is published monthly, dangerous chemical weapons the issue among students and except for two bimonthly issues appearing in January/February and materials was completed Aug. July/August. Membership in the Arms Control Association includes young professionals. a one-year subscription to Arms Control Today at the following rates: 18 aboard a U.S. ship in the $35 student, $70 individual, $100 international. Non-member sub- Mediterranean Sea. scription rates are: $65 individual, $85 institutional, with international Asia and Australia rates of $95 individual and $105 institutional. Digital-only subscrip- tions are also available. Please contact the Arms Control Association 36 Iran, P5+1 Extend 44 Congress Questions for more details. Letters to the Editor are welcome and can be sent via e-mail or postal mail. Letters should be under 600 words and may Nuclear Talks Policy on N. Korea be edited for space. Interpretations, opinions, or conclusions in Arms Control Today should be understood to be solely those of the authors Iran and six world powers At a July 30 hearing, members and should not be attributed to the association, its board of directors, agreed to a four-month ex- of Congress questioned the officers, or other staff members, or to organizations and individuals that support the Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today tension for negotiations on a Obama administration’s pol- encourages reprint of its articles, but permission must be granted by comprehensive deal address- icy toward negotiations with the editor. Advertising inquiries may be made to act@armscontrol. org. Postmaster: Send address changes to Arms Control Today, 1313 ing Iran’s nuclear program. North Korea over its nuclear ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY L Street, NW, Suite 130, Washington, D.C. 20005. Periodicals post- program. age paid at Washington D.C., Suburban, MD and Merrifield, VA. © 2 September 2014, Arms Control Association. By Daryl G. Kimball FOCUS Executive Director Bridging the Uranium-Enrichment Gap long-sought, comprehensive deal between Iran and Negotiators can square the circle in a number of ways. The the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United International Crisis Group and the Arms Control Association re- AKingdom, and the United States) to ensure Iran’s nuclear cently outlined a formula that would increase the time Iran would program is exclusively peaceful is within reach. Both sides have require to produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb been negotiating seriously, but some big gaps must still be bridged and still would provide Iran with more than sufficient capacity before the Nov. 24 deadline. for its civilian nuclear program over a period of 11 to 16 years. Key To succeed, both sides must seek creative trade-offs, particularly elements of the proposal include: on the toughest issue: Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity. In previous rounds of talks, the two sides reached a basic under- • Reducing Iran’s current enrichment capacity by half for a standing on several key issues, including strengthening Interna- period of three to five years. Combined with a reduction in tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to guard against the size of Iran’s enriched-uranium stocks, this would increase a secret weapons program and modifying the Arak heavy-water the time it would take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade reactor project to drastically cut its plutonium output. enriched-uranium gas to 12 months or more. Iran’s operating The two sides also agreed that Iran need not enrich uranium to enrichment capacity could return to current levels by 2021 levels above 5 percent fissionable uranium-235 and for the duration of any agreement, but only if and that the Fordow enrichment plant would [B]oth sides must Iran can demonstrate that it has discontinued any be limited to a research role, but they could not experiments with possible military dimensions. seek creative bridge their differences regarding the overall scale of Iran’s enrichment program. trade-offs. • Limiting Iran’s working stockpile of low-en- Today, Iran has about 18,000 IR-1 first-gener- riched uranium hexafluoride gas to less than 200 ation centrifuge machines at two sites, of which about 10,200 are kilograms and converting any excess into an oxide powder, operational. Iran has also installed 1,008 more-advanced IR-2M which is more proliferation resistant, for removal to a third centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. country, conversion into fuel for the Arak reactor or a light- Theoretically, Iran’s operating IR-1 machines could allow Teh- water reactor, or some combination of those options. Iran ran to use natural uranium to produce a quantity of weapons- would be barred from building a reconversion line that could grade uranium gas sufficient for one nuclear bomb (25 kilograms) reverse the process. in about two to three months if such an effort were not detected and slowed or halted first. Even so, if Iran tried to build a militar- • Removing and storing under IAEA seal most of Iran’s IR-1 ily significant nuclear arsenal, it would take considerably more centrifuges and replacing some with a smaller number of than a year. IR2-M centrifuges. Research on machines that are even more For the next several years, Iran’s practical needs for enrichment advanced would be limited over the course of any agreement. are limited. Iran already has enough fuel for its Tehran Research This would allow Iranian scientists to make the desired shift Reactor, which produces medical isotopes, for several years. If the to more cost-effective machines, but still constrain Iran’s over- Arak reactor is modified to use 3.5 percent-enriched uranium fuel, all enrichment capacity. it might require no more than 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges to provide

for its fuel requirements. • Providing strong guarantees to Iran to help meet its future ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 Iran’s light-water reactor at Bushehr, which has a power- energy needs, including predelivery of fuel for operation of generation capacity of about 1,000 megawatts electric, uses fuel the Bushehr reactor beyond 2021. By that time, the IAEA and supplied by Russia under a 10-year deal that could be extended Iran could begin a technical assistance project on reactor fuel past its 2021 end date. Russia is obliged to supply fuel unless Iran fabrication. chooses not to renew the contract. But Iran’s leaders are under heavy political pressure to reduce the country’s reliance on foreign Such an agreement may not deliver everything each side wants, energy suppliers and to maintain a uranium-enrichment program but it would deliver what each side needs. The P5+1 would put that could be expanded if and when the country’s nuclear energy in place significant, verifiable, long-term constraints on Iran’s needs grow. capacity to build nuclear weapons and be able to detect and deter By the close of the last round of talks in July, Iran was still push- any such effort before Tehran could do so. Iran would be able to ing for an industrial-scale enrichment capacity. The P5+1 was ease the burden of nuclear-related sanctions and pursue a realistic insisting on a drastic reduction of Iran’s enrichment capacity—to civilian nuclear program. It is a win-win formula that both sides about 1,500 IR-1 centrifuges—for an extended period. should embrace. ACT 3 September 2014

The By Numbers

InBRIEF Iranian Stockpile of 20 Percent- Enriched Uranium Hexafluoride Gas Under the Joint Plan Notable Quotable of Action in 2014 “When I compare this with the situation of looking for WMD [weapons of mass destruction] in Iraq, my 209 kilograms comparison is that in Iraq, we spent a trillion dollars, on Jan. 20 lost more than 4,000 American lives, many Iraqi lives, and destroyed zero tons of WMD. In Syria, we’ve spent less than 1 percent of that amount, a couple hundred 54 kilograms on April 17 million dollars; we have not lost any American lives; and we will succeed by the end of the summer in destroying well over a thousand tons of WMD. That’s a 0 kilograms pretty damn good cost-benefit calculus for what’s been on July 20 accomplished.”

—Thomas Countryman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, Washington, July 10, 2014

The Joint Plan of Action, an agreement between Iran and six world powers, was concluded last November. Its six-month term began in January. The term has been extended by four months.

Fifteen Years Ago in ACT Illuminating Global Interests: The UN and Arms Control I think a demonstration of the political will of the nuclear-weapon states toward making deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals—either through a statement or through actual negotiations—would greatly help to allay the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Source: International Atomic Energy —Jayantha Dhanapala (interview), September/October 1999 Agency ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY

4 News Briefs Senators Push Nonproliferation Budget

wenty-six senators sent a letter to the Obama administra- Ttion requesting increased funding for nuclear nonprolifera- tion programs in the fiscal year 2016 budget for the Energy Department. The signatories of the Aug. 13 letter, led by Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), urged Shaun Donovan, director of the Office ofM anagement and Budget, to “seek increased funding for vital nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs.” The letter noted that the administration “proposed cuts to Energy of Department U.S. these programs over the last several years.” The Obama administration’s budget for fiscal year 2015 would cut the Energy Department’s nonproliferation programs by $399 million from the fiscal year 2014 appropriation. Fiscal year 2014 ends Sept. 30. It is “not the time to pull back on nonproliferation,” the letter said, noting that recent terrorist actions serve as a reminder Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz (left) swears in Madelyn of the importance of “ensuing that terrorist groups and rogue Creedon as principal deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration on August 7. states” do not obtain nuclear weapons and materials. The Senate Appropriations energy and water subcommittee, She most recently served as assistant secretary of defense chaired by Feinstein, increased funding for nonproliferation for global strategic affairs, overseeing U.S. nuclear forces and activities to nearly $2.0 billion, $423 million above the presi- missile defense policy. dent’s request for fiscal year 2015. The subcommittee released The administration is still seeking confirmation of other its bill and draft report July 24, but no further action has been senior officials for positions dealing with nuclear weapons taken on the bill. policy, including Adam Scheinman, currently senior adviser to The increases include an additional $136 million for the the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and $50 million for Nonproliferation, to be special representative of the president the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation for nuclear nonproliferation; Frank Rose, deputy assistant program. secretary of state for space and defense policy, to be assistant The letter said the GTRI played an important role in eliminat- secretary for arms control, verification, and compliance; and ing nuclear materials from 13 countries since 2009 and that Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, the top nuclear proliferation and “significant work remains” to secure nuclear material at “hun- defense policy official on the National Security Council (NSC), dreds of sites spread across 30 countries.” to be deputy secretary of energy. The senators urged the administration to work with the Sen- On July 28, the Senate confirmed BrianM cKeon, who had ate to “ensure that critical nuclear material security” programs served as NSC staff director, as the principal deputy undersec- have the necessary resources. The letter urged the administra- retary of defense for policy. The Senate had held up McKeon’s tion, in next year’s budget request, to build on the funding lev- nomination over concerns that he had withheld information els that the appropriations subcommittee approved for fiscal from Congress regarding Russia’s alleged violation of the year 2015. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. (See , April In addition to Feinstein and Merkley, the signers of the letter ACT 2014.)— included 20 Democrats, Republican Sens. Lamar Alexander TOM Z. COLLINA (Tenn.) and Lindsey Graham (S.C.), and independents Bernie ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 Sanders (Vt.) and Angus King (Maine).—KELSEY DAVENPORT China Conducts ASAT Test, U.S. Says

hina conducted “a non-destructive test of a missile de- Creedon Takes Office at NNSA Csigned to destroy satellites” on July 23, according to the U.S. State Department. adelyn Creedon was sworn in on Aug. 7 by Energy Sec- The U.S. comment appeared to differ from the Chinese Mretary Ernest Moniz as the principal deputy administra- statement on the test. According to Xinhua, China’s official tor for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a news agency, the Chinese defense ministry called the test a semiautonomous part of the Energy Department. “land-based anti-missile technology experiment,” suggesting Creedon, who was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, will that it was a test of a missile defense system rather than of an assist NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz in the management anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. and operation of the NNSA, according to an NNSA statement. During his Aug. 13 remarks at the U.S. Strategic Command President Barack Obama nominated her last November. (See Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Neb., Frank Rose, U.S. dep- ACT, December 2013.) 5 uty assistant secretary of state for space and defense policy, said the United States “has high confidence in its assessment” that China was testing an ASAT weapon. Neither China nor the United States provided additional de- tails to support its characterization of the test. China said the test took place within its territory and successfully reached the anticipated goal. The U.S. statement called on China to “re- frain from destabilizing actions” that threaten the security and sustainability of space. Also in its statement, the State Department said that, in the test, China had used the same missile system as in a 2007 test in which China shot down one of its own weather satellites. That event, which created thousands of pieces of debris that continue to present a danger in space, used an SC-19 missile. (See ACT, March 2007.) China has claimed that subsequent tests of its SC-19 mis- sile in 2010 and January 2013 were part of an effort to develop and understand missile-interceptor technology, not to develop ASAT capabilities, but the two technologies are very similar. U.K. Royal Navy Royal U.K. (See ACT, March 2013.) In an Aug. 12 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Brian Weeden, a technical adviser to the Secure World Foundation, said the July 23 U.S. statement marked the first time since the 2007 test that the State Department had publicly declared that China The UK ballistic missile submarine HMS Vanguard departs conducted an ASAT test. The United States has never publicly from Faslane naval base in Scotland on September 24, 2012. acknowledged the 2010 test or two tests in 2005 and 2006, Weeden said. Information related to those tests was made A July 24 White House statement said the changes would public after the website WikiLeaks published a 2010 State De- “ensure consistency with current United States and United partment cable about the 2010 test. Kingdom policies and practice regarding nuclear threat re- Weeden, a former U.S. Air Force space analyst, pointed out duction, naval nuclear propulsion, and personnel security.” the lack of specific details from Washington and Beijing about Because portions of the new agreement are secret, Obama the July 2014 test, saying that, after the 2010 and January 2013 sent classified and unclassified versions of the agreement to tests, both countries mentioned another missile that had been Congress, according to the statement. launched as a target. The lack of information about the target As the UK debates the long-range future of its submarine- for the recent test makes it unclear whether this was actually based Trident nuclear forces, the renewed agreement autho- another test of the SC-19 missile tested in 2007, 2010, and 2013 rizes U.S. support through 2024. A 1958 mutual defense pact or possibly a test of a new ASAT system—believed to be in de- between the two countries allows transfer of “classified infor- velopment and capable of reaching geostationary orbit, about mation concerning atomic weapons; nuclear technology and 36,000 kilometers above the earth—that might have been controlled nuclear information; material and equipment for the tested in May 2013. (See ACT, April 2014.) development of defense plans; training of personnel; evalu- The State Department’s description of the recent test as ation of potential enemy capability; development of delivery nondestructive, combined with the lack of details from Beijing systems; and the research, development, and design of mili- about the test, could point to the testing of this new ASAT tary reactors,” according to the White House.—JEFFERSON weapon in geostationary orbit, Weeden said. “It would be dis- MORLEY tinct enough from a missile defense profile to allow the US to confidently characterize it as an ASAT test,” said Weeden. As the second test of a new system, it would be consistent with the pattern that China followed for the SC-19, carrying out two nondestructive tests in 2005 and 2006 before conducting an On the Calendar actual intercept in 2007, he said.—TIMOTHY FARNSWORTH Sept. 15-19 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting, Vienna U.S.-UK Nuclear Pact Revised Sept. 22-26 IAEA General Conference, Vienna Sept. 26 International Day for the Total Elimination he United States and the United Kingdom revised and of Nuclear Weapons extended their long-standing nuclear forces cooperation T Sept. 29 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Vienna agreement in July, with President Barack Obama declaring that Oct. 2 First Committee of the UN General “continu[ing] to assist the United Kingdom in maintaining a Assembly in session, New York ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY credible nuclear deterrent” is in the U.S. national interest. 6 Reports of Note Innovating Verification: New Tools and New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2014

This report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative highlights verifica- tion as a key mechanism for building confidence in the disar- mament and nuclear nonproliferation effort. “[V]erification can serve as the brake or the engine for arms control, and much capacity and participation are needed now and in the future for long term success,” NTI Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Sam Nunn says in his foreword. The NTI assembled Help Create A expert groups in three areas—baseline declarations, societal verification, and enhancement of global capacity—and devotes a volume to each of them. The report’s overview highlights More Peaceful some common themes. For example, the report urges the in- ternational community “to build and sustain a global cadre of and Secure World verification experts” and to develop a new framework for sen- sitive information so that cooperation can take place without For the Next Generation… compromising security. It argues that collaborative work on verification should begin now. According to the report, one role or more than four decades, the Arms of verification is to meet policymakers’ demands, but it also Control Association has been working to can help stimulate demand: “Showing what is verifiable can F strengthen the resolve of policymakers to seek new commit- provide the authoritative information and ments or inspire new thinking on what is possible.”—JONAH sound policy solutions to guard against the use ABONI of and to eliminate the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation For our generation and for generations M icah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, Council on Foreign to come, that work must go on in the years Relations, June 2014 ahead. Please consider making an investment in In this report, Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps of the Council the future by including a bequest to the Arms on Foreign Relations address the prospect of armed drone proliferation and its implications for U.S. policymakers and Control Association and Arms Control Today. interests. Zenko and Kreps contend that although the con- You can do so by including ACA as a sequences of drone proliferation are years away, the failure beneficiary of your will, living trust, retirement to establish “rules of the road” now will have “grave conse- plan, or insurance policy. quences” for U.S. efforts to prevent armed conflict, promote human rights, and strengthen international law and norms. The authors say the unique qualities of drones—their ability GET STARTED TODAY! For more to hover over a target and strike time-sensitive targets with- information about bequests and out risk to the pilot—make militarized disputes more likely beneficiary designations to ACA, please by lowering the threshold for the use of force and increasing ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 the risk of miscalculation. Zenko and Kreps question whether contact: the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is adequate to curb the proliferation of armed drones because its guide- Gift Planning lines are nonbinding and its membership does not include Arms Control Association all countries that produce drones or aspire to do so. Another 1313 L Street NW, Ste. 130 concern, Zenko and Kreps say, is that small-payload drones that do not qualify for restrictive Category I handling under Washington, DC 20005 the MTCR guidelines could still prove destabilizing. The authors recommend that the U.S. government adopt seven Call: (202) 463-8270 or requirements for approving the export of armed drones and Email: [email protected] that it increase transparency in the use of armed drones, par- ticularly in the criteria for targeting U.S. citizens and foreign nationals.—JEFFERSON MORLEY Arms Control Association 7 By Tariq Rauf and Robert Kelley

Nuclear Verification in Iran

or nearly a year, negotiations on Iran’s enriched uranium and accepted daily IAEA inspector access at its uranium- nuclear program have been underway enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow and monthly access at the under- between Iran and the EU3+3 (China, construction Arak heavy-water reactor, F among other measures.3 France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, In July, the sides agreed to extend the arrangement until November 24, 1 and the United States). The two sides in the exactly one year since it was finalized, to provide additional time to conclude the negotiations, which the European Union has comprehensive agreement. This article provides a brief review of facilitated, are seeking a “mutually-agreed long- the Iran nuclear issue as it has developed since 2002, covers the ongoing IAEA term comprehensive solution that would ensure verification, addresses the allegations of nuclear weaponization activities, and Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively concludes with some recommendations peaceful.”2 on the way forward in reaching a long- term solution.

In November 2013, the sides agreed to to the Joint Plan of Action, Iran has Background an arrangement known as the Joint Plan halted the production of uranium Concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities of Action, under which Iran has taken enriched to 20 percent uranium-235 and came to a head in August 2002 when substantial steps to address proliferation down-blended half its entire stock of an exile group using information concerns about its nuclear activities. In that material to below 5 percent U-235 supplied by unidentified states revealed particular, under International Atomic while converting the rest to uranium enrichment activities in Iran that had not Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards oxide, which cannot be immediately been declared to the IAEA as required by supplemented by additional IAEA used for enrichment. In addition, Iran Iran’s safeguards agreement. Subsequent monitoring and verification pursuant has capped the production of 5 percent- investigation by the IAEA led to Iran

Tariq Rauf heads the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). From 2002 to 2011, he was head of verification and security policy coordination, reporting to the director-general, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Robert Kelley, an associated senior research fellow at SIPRI, worked on documenting nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Libya, and South Africa for the IAEA and was a director of the IAEA Iraq Action Team. He previously worked at

ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States. He also was director of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Remote Sensing Laboratory. 8 U.S. Department of State of Department U.S.

EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, the head of the six-country group negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program, speaks at the UN Office at Geneva on November 24, 2013, after the two sides reached an interim agreement. With Ashton are, from left, UK Foreign Minister William Hague, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. submitting an updated declaration to Treaty] Safeguards Agreement…constitute suspended from 2003 to 2006 as a the IAEA. On the basis of this updated non-compliance in the context of Article “voluntary and non-legally binding” declaration, the IAEA reported that Iran XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.”6 This confidence-building measure under an had developed a nearly complete front referred to the previously undeclared agreement with France, Germany, and end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including part of Iran’s nuclear program, namely the UK. In response, the IAEA board uranium mining and milling; facilities enrichment and reprocessing activities decided to report to the Security Council for uranium conversion, uranium and the import and use of nuclear that Iran was required to “implement enrichment, separation of plutonium material, which Iran had concealed from transparency measures, as requested by from targets, fuel fabrication, and heavy- the IAEA. The resolution also concluded the Director General…which extend water production; a light-water reactor; “that the history of concealment of beyond the formal requirements of the a large heavy-water research reactor; and Iran’s nuclear activities referred to Safeguards Agreement and Additional associated research and development in the Director General’s report, the Protocol, and include such access to facilities.4 nature of these activities, issues brought individuals, documentation relating ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 IAEA Director-General Mohamed to light in the course of the Agency’s to procurement, dual use equipment, ElBaradei concluded that Iran had verification of declarations made by Iran certain military-owned workshops and failed in a number of instances over since September 2002 and the resulting research and development as the Agency an extended period of time to meet its absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear may request in support of its ongoing obligations under its comprehensive, programme is exclusively for peaceful investigations.”7 or full-scope, safeguards agreement.5 purposes have given rise to questions Over the next 28 months, in particular ElBaradei called on Iran to take the that are within the competence of the after agreement on the work plan required corrective measures. [UN] Security Council, as the organ between the IAEA and Iran in August In September 2005, the IAEA Board of bearing the main responsibility for the 2007, the IAEA was able to clarify past Governors adopted a resolution in which maintenance of international peace and enrichment activities and to put in place it concluded that “Iran’s many failures security.” the safeguards approach for the Natanz and breaches of its obligations to comply In February 2006, Iran resumed enrichment plants. In late May 2008, with its NPT [nuclear Nonproliferation enrichment activities, which it had ElBaradei reported that the plants had 9 been operating as declared.8 more than 1,000 pages of information IAEA entered into force on May 15, Unresolved questions remained on this issue by certain Western states, 1974.18 As an NPT party that is a non- regarding allegations that there were but they have prohibited the IAEA from nuclear-weapon state, Iran has accepted “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s giving Iran copies of the bulk of such the obligation to use nuclear energy nuclear program and that the IAEA had information, citing the need to protect exclusively for peaceful purposes and to not detected the actual use of nuclear sources and methods. The number of allow verification of nuclear material in material in this regard.9 The allegations pages is misleading in that a significant all nuclear activities “for the exclusive were based on information provided by fraction is computer printouts of purpose of verifying that such material

A novel idea could be to make the Natanz and Fordow facilities into examples of state-of-the- art monitoring and verification of centrifuge enrichment plants and implement a combination of overlapping verification measures that later could be implemented in all such plants under safeguards.

several states. repetitive calculations of little practical is not diverted to nuclear weapons or The IAEA has limited means interest. In May 2008, ElBaradei reported other nuclear explosive devices.”19 The to determine the veracity of such that although the IAEA “had been shown underlying premise is that, without information independently because, in the documents…it was not in possession access to weapons-usable nuclear many instances, the states concerned of the documents and was therefore material, there can be no weapons. do not give the agency access to the unfortunately unable to make them For its part, the IAEA has the origins of the information, the original available to Iran.”12 Iran consistently corresponding right and obligation to documentation, or the sources of the has maintained that this information is verify not only that Iran’s declarations of documentation. There were several “baseless,”13 “fabricated,”14 or “forged” or nuclear material subject to safeguards are notable instances regarding Iraq in based on publicly available information15 “correct,” accurately describing the types which the IAEA was given fabricated on the location and activities of certain and quantities of the declared nuclear or false information. Nevertheless, the nuclear and military facilities. material holdings, but also that they are IAEA critically assesses all information The IAEA has continued to verify the “complete” and include all material that provided to it, in part by corroboration nondiversion of declared nuclear material should have been declared pursuant to its with information available to the agency in Iran,16 but the director-general cannot comprehensive safeguards agreement. from other sources and from the agency’s conclude that all nuclear material and The secretariat has defined three own findings. To the extent possible, the activities are in peaceful uses. This is safeguards objectives20 that are common IAEA shares such information with the the same conclusion he must draw for to all states with comprehensive state concerned with a view to obtaining all states that do not have an additional safeguards agreements. The IAEA seeks clarification. This process is based strictly protocol. to detect undeclared nuclear material on the rights and obligations of the IAEA The Joint Plan of Action addresses and activities, undeclared production or Secretariat enshrined in the safeguards civilian nuclear activities in Iran that processing of nuclear material at facilities agreement (and additional protocol, for could be used to produce highly enriched and at “locations outside facilities,”21 and states that have adopted one) with the uranium or separated plutonium, diversion of declared nuclear material at state and in certain cases in pursuance of which are the nuclear materials needed facilities and locations outside facilities. a request of the Security Council.10 for a nuclear weapon. The plan does To meet these objectives, the IAEA ElBaradei noted that the constraints not address the questions of possible determines an optimized combination placed by some member states on the weaponization. Those questions must be of safeguards measures based on a sharing of information with Iran were addressed directly between the IAEA and comprehensive state evaluation that takes making it more difficult for the IAEA to Iran.17 state-specific factors into consideration at conduct detailed discussions with Iran all stages of safeguards implementation on the possible military dimensions Safeguards Implementation (fig. 1). Presently, in accordance of its nuclear program.11 In the case of Iran is an original party to the NPT; with these objectives, the IAEA is ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Iran, the IAEA has been provided with its safeguards agreement with the implementing safeguards at 18 nuclear 10 Figure 1: State-Level Objectives of IAEA Safeguards Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are to be applied to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of a state for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In order to apply effective safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements, the IAEA identifies and conducts safeguards activities to address generic state-level safeguards objectives that are common to all states with those agreements, such as Iran.

Safeguards Objective Focus Activities Objective A Evaluation of state declarations and all safeguards- Detection of undeclared nuclear State as a whole relevant information available to the IAEA; verification material and activities activities in the field Objective B Declared facilities and Evaluation of state declarations and verification Detection of undeclared production locations outside facilities activities at declared facilities and LOFs or processing of nuclear material (LOFs)* Objective C Evaluation of state accounting reports and verification Detection of diversion of declared activities at declared nuclear facilities and LOFs to Declared facilities and LOFs nuclear material verify inventories and flows of declared nuclear material Features Common to the Three Objectives Follow-up activities defined and carried out to ascertain Questions on discrepancies, anomalies, and inconsistencies whether the identified discrepancies, anomalies, and that were identified during evaluation, analysis, and verification inconsistencies indicate the possible presence of activities and that require follow-up undeclared nuclear material or activities or the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities *This category includes locations such as hospitals and small laboratories where the amount of nuclear material in compounds or solutions is less than one kilogram. Source: IAEA, “The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2013: Report by the Director General,” GOV/2014/27, April 23, 2014. facilities and nine locations outside file to the UN Security Council. reported that there are no reprocessing facilities in Iran (fig. 2). Of the nuclear facilities, the ones of activities being carried out at the To restore international confidence immediate proliferation concern are the facilities to which it has access in Iran.23 in the peaceful nature of all Iranian enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow The U.S. Department of State goes further nuclear activities, Tehran would have to and the Arak heavy-water reactor. Iran is to note that Iran did not construct a take a number of steps in addition to full constructing the indigenously designed facility capable of reprocessing.24 implementation of its comprehensive Arak reactor to produce medical isotopes. safeguards agreement. Tehran would That reactor is intended eventually Verification of Enrichment have to revert to full implementation to replace the aging Tehran Research The technical objective of IAEA of modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary Reactor, originally supplied by the safeguards is the timely detection of arrangements to its comprehensive United States under President Dwight diversion of significant quantities of safeguards agreement, under which Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace plan. nuclear material from peaceful activities a country must provide early design All reactors can be used to produce and deterrence of such diversion by the information on modifications to existing plutonium, but certain heavy-water risk of early detection.25 nuclear facilities or construction of reactors are considered to be especially The enhanced monitoring and ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 new ones. Under the old requirement, useful for producing weapons-usable verification measures under the Joint countries had to provide such information plutonium.22 Plutonium obtained from Plan of Action implemented at Natanz 180 days prior to the introduction of the reprocessing of fuel or targets from and Fordow, along with routine nuclear material into the facility. a research reactor or a production safeguards involving weekly or biweekly In addition, Iran would have to revert reactor can be more easily optimized inspections, are completely adequate to the implementation of the additional for weapons use than plutonium for verification of the peaceful nature protocol to its safeguards agreement. from a power reactor. Many countries of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran and the Iran signed the protocol in December are concerned about the plutonium- EU3+3 should cover the added costs to 2003 and provisionally implemented production potential of the Arak reactor. the IAEA for monitoring and verification, it until March 2006. The Majlis, Iran’s Any plutonium produced in the fuel which go beyond normal safeguards. parliament, rejected ratification in irradiated in the Arak reactor would need For centrifuge enrichment plants response to the IAEA board decision in to be reprocessed to separate plutonium, such as Natanz and Fordow, the main February 2006 to report the Iran nuclear and thus far, the IAEA has consistently safeguards concerns are production 11 of a significant quantity of uranium enriched uranium in Iran. or HEU and are even more effectively enriched to a level higher than declared, IAEA inspectors have a greater level safeguarded than at present. in particular highly enriched uranium of access to enrichment plants in Iran (HEU); diversion of a significant quantity than they do at similar plants in Brazil Heavy-Water Reactors of declared uranium; and production of and Japan and those operated by Urenco As noted above, the IAEA has been low-enriched uranium (LEU) in excess of in Germany, the Netherlands, and the reporting for several years that it can declared quantities. The early detection UK. A novel idea could be to make confirm that there are no ongoing of undeclared HEU production is of the the Natanz and Fordow facilities into reprocessing-related activities with greatest importance, as HEU is a direct- examples of state-of-the-art monitoring respect to the Tehran Research Reactor use material for a weapon. and verification of centrifuge enrichment and the other facilities to which it has To achieve its safeguards objectives, plants and implement a combination of access in Iran. Iran has declared that the IAEA successfully utilizes a number overlapping verification measures that the Arak reactor will be used for the of verification and monitoring measures later could be implemented in all such production of radioisotopes for medical at centrifuge enrichment plants in plants under safeguards. These additional uses, like the Tehran reactor. That Iran, as well as elsewhere, to provide measures could include continuous reactor, which originally burned HEU a high level of confidence in and online enrichment monitors, tamper- enriched to 93 percent U-235 supplied knowledge of a country’s enrichment indicating devices, and centrifuge and by the United States, has been converted activities. These measures include plant cylinder tracking. to run on LEU. The Arak reactor is to design verification, nuclear material Under the latter measures, in be fueled by natural uranium although accountancy, material balance areas, addition to centrifuges, cylinders of Iran has indicated the reactor could be sampling, containment and surveillance enriched uranium hexafluoride and converted to use LEU fuel to reduce its (seals, cameras, and monitors), depleted uranium hexafluoride can be plutonium-production potential.26 physical inventory verification, individually tracked using bar codes and The most effective way to monitor routine inspections, limited frequency radio-frequency identification devices the Arak reactor and verify its actual unannounced access, and short-notice to maintain continuity of knowledge for plutonium content in irradiated random inspections. The combination verification and security purposes. Such nuclear fuel is to have a full and correct of these measures with those under tracking can ensure that only declared declaration by Iran of the initial supply the Joint Plan of Action, such as daily centrifuges and cylinders are introduced of fuel and targets in the reactor core. access by IAEA inspectors to Natanz and for use in the cascades and autoclaves Knowledge of irradiation time and Fordow, a ban on production of uranium at the Natanz and Fordow plants and an accurate mass balance for the core with an enrichment level above 5 percent that the IAEA can ensure continuity of material balance area will allow the IAEA U-235, and continuing full IAEA access knowledge there. In this way, the IAEA to determine the quantity of plutonium to the cascade halls of the enrichment could further ensure that the enrichment being produced in spent fuel and targets facilities, can provide assurance against plants in Iran are not misused to divert and the isotopic composition of the diversion or undeclared production of material or to produce undeclared LEU plutonium. As the concentration of the isotope plutonium-239 drops, the suitability for weapons use drops as well. The IAEA and Iran are working on devising an effective and efficient safeguards approach for the Arak reactor. If Iran modified the reactor to burn 3 percent-enriched LEU rather than natural uranium, the plutonium content would be significantly reduced.27 Frequent IAEA inspector access, short-notice random inspections, and unattended instrumentation such as surveillance cameras and reactor power monitors could ensure that the reactor is operated

jid Saeedi/Getty Images Saeedi/Getty jid M to produce medical isotopes, which is a a legitimate need of Iran. In addition, novel technologies could be explored, such as anti-neutrino monitoring to detect and monitor the plutonium content in the reactor’s core.

ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Iran’s uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, seen in this April 2007 photo, plays a Allegations of Military Activities central role in the negotiations between Iran and the six-country group. In addition to the talks between Iran and 12 the EU3+3, negotiations between Iran and the IAEA over a possible weapons Figure 2: Declared Nuclear Facilities in Iran program have continued over the years. Iran has declared a complete nuclear fuel cycle to the International Atomic The focus of the EU3+3 negotiations Energy Agency, encompassing uranium mines, research and power reac- has been the fear that the ultimate goal tors, and facilities for milling, conversion, enrichment, reprocessing, heavy- water production, fuel fabrication, and nuclear waste storage. The facilities of Iran’s declared nuclear program is of immediate concern are the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow and development of a nuclear weapon, a the research reactor at Arak. That reactor, which is under construction, uses charge Iran vigorously denies. Discussions heavy water as a moderator. with the IAEA over the program’s possible military dimensions have become Thrane Fordow unusually acrimonious and a major • Tehran Research Reactor • Fordow Fuel-Enrichment Plant stumbling block to making progress. • Molybdenum, Iodine, and Xenon The IAEA director-general has provided Radioisotope Production Facility Arak a report to the Board of Governors • Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Labo- • Iran Nuclear Research (IR-40) Reactor every three months since 2003 on ratories implementation of safeguards in Iran. Karaj In his November 2011 report, Director- Isfahan • Karaj Waste Storage Facility General Yukiya Amano added an annex • Miniature Neutron Source Reactor describing all of the information the IAEA • Light-Water Subcritical Reactor Bushehr had suggesting that there is a clandestine • Heavy-Water Zero Power Reactor • Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant military dimension to Iran’s nuclear • Uranium-Conversion Facility program.28 • Fuel Manufacturing Plant Darkhovin The issue of discovering possible • Fuel-Plate Fabrication Plant • Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant weapons activities is much more difficult • Enriched Uranium Oxide Powder to resolve than the normal safeguards Plant Shiraz issues described above. The information • Fars Research Reactor on this issue comes from a number of Natanz sources that provide information and • Fuel Enrichment Plant Locations Outside hearsay that the IAEA cannot verify. Much • Pilot Fuel-Enrichment Plant Facilities of the information is old and exaggerated, • Nine (all situated within hospitals) and the most recent items are among those that are not from verifiable Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agree- sources. The annex gives great weight to ment and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: experiments with high explosives and Report by the Director General,” GOV/2014/28, May 23, 2014. detonators suitable for a nuclear weapon in the 2002-2004 time frame. In 2007 the or more countries that the IAEA claims information has been in the public United States concluded that Iran had have provided the weaponization domain since at least the 1950s.33 Yet, had weapons ambitions but gave them up information has to include all countries Iran, which voluntarily showed this in the fall of 2003.29 that provided information on the document to the IAEA, is accused of The technologies under discussion are finances and travel of the supply network pursuing a weapons program because complex and are outside the experience of headed by Pakistani metallurgist Abdul it received the document from Khan. most IAEA safeguards staff and all upper Qadeer Khan, but this does not directly Experts in material processing should management. For example, according concern alleged weaponization studies. examine this information to see if to the annex, the IAEA “recognizes that Rather than being highly consistent, the there is anything new and explain why there exist non-nuclear applications, information seems to be thinly sourced Iran’s possession of the document is of ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 albeit few, for detonators like [exploding when limited to weaponization, the proliferation significance. bridge wire devices].” In fact, there is a subject of the annex, rather than foreign large civilian and non-nuclear market for assistance with centrifuges. In addition, Adding Expertise to the IAEA such devices.30 multiple countries held identical sets of In 1991 the UN Security Council gave The IAEA claims that its weaponization documents. the IAEA the task of forming a special information is “highly consistent” Iran is accused of receiving, although unit, the Iraq Action Team, to investigate because it comes from 10 or more not requesting, a document on uranium nuclear activities in Iraq that had come to countries.31 An examination of the metallurgy from the Khan network light as a result of the Persian Gulf War. claims in the annex, much of which describing processes for converting The IAEA had been inspecting nuclear was leaked to the press even before the uranium compounds into metal and activities in Iraq for many years and had IAEA report was published,32 shows the production of uranium metal not detected undeclared activities to that the majority comes from two or hemispheres, such as might be used produce nuclear materials. three countries. A postulated list of 10 in the core of a nuclear weapon. This The IAEA mandate, as interpreted at 13 the time by the secretariat, did not require in the area of gas centrifuges, the classified channels. it to look for undeclared activities. In fact, investigation was managed by experts The IAEA Department of Safeguards IAEA member states discouraged such from Urenco. They were assisted in their used a similar approach in South Africa an initiative, citing the obligations in analysis by experts from U.S. national for a weapons assessment. Because South the text of the standard comprehensive laboratories, the UK Ministry of Defence, Africa had actually built nuclear weapons, safeguards agreement that safeguards France’s atomic energy commission, and it was important to restrict access to will be applied for the exclusive purpose elsewhere. South Africa’s design documentation

The IAEA board should...appoint a qualified group of external experts to review contentious issues and information [related to Iran’s alleged weaponization activities].

of verifying that nuclear material is not The outside experts came armed to avoid making the IAEA a conduit for diverted to nuclear weapons or other with technical knowledge, a detailed proliferation-sensitive information. nuclear explosive devices.34 understanding of the gas centrifuge In the area of alleged Iranian The failure in Iraq led to a new process, detailed prior knowledge of Iraq’s weaponization, the IAEA needs to initiative by the Board of Governors centrifuge procurement activities gained replicate its experience in Iraq by to interpret the IAEA mandate under from intelligence, and a team-building recruiting an unbiased team of specialized comprehensive safeguards agreements as attitude. They carried out dozens of experts to analyze data. The IAEA has giving the agency the authority to look inspections of equipment and facilities made a major issue of alleged high- for undeclared nuclear materials and and put together a very coherent picture explosive experiments by Iran that could activities and to show more curiosity of Iraq’s centrifuge program. In the significantly improve and miniaturize a and initiative in its safeguards activities. process, they sensitized IAEA personnel nuclear weapon. Unfortunately, the IAEA This realignment of safeguards, called to proliferation indicators of centrifuge shared the information on this improved Programme 93+2, resulted in the technology so that they would know nuclear weapons concept with Iran. The promulgation of the Model Additional when to ask for help in the future. Iranians said they did not understand it.35 Protocol in May 1997. The process for analyzing the extensive An international team of weapons experts The situation in 1991, however, led Iraqi electromagnetic separation program would have recognized that giving Iran to the IAEA’s total lack of preparation to was similar. The solutions came almost details of better designs is not in the best investigate Iraq’s nuclear activities in the entirely from the U.S. nuclear laboratories interests of nonproliferation. postwar environment. To ensure a new because the technology, which was old approach, a new unit that was established and considered to be obsolete until The Parchin Controversy under UN Security Council auspices Iraq revived it, originated in the United The IAEA has reported that weaponization had two components. First, IAEA career States. U.S. experts from the Savannah experiments were carried out at a site safeguards staff worked to re-establish River Laboratory built an environmental called Marivan in the far west of Iran.36 knowledge of nuclear materials that had radioactive material sampling network Instead of visiting Marivan, the IAEA has previously been safeguarded in Iraq. for the IAEA. They designed the network, demanded access to a defense facility at Second, as new materials were discovered provided assistance in taking samples, Parchin. There are hundreds of buildings in large quantities, the materials and analyzed the samples. at Parchin involved in all aspects of Iran’s verification teams produced excellent new In the area of nuclear weapons analysis, conventional military programs. The accountability records and brought those the work was done entirely by outside IAEA has visited Parchin twice, inspecting materials under safeguards. experts. Due to the sensitivity of weapons a total of 10 buildings of its choice. The In all of the inspections in other design information, the outsiders only IAEA sampled the site for radioactive areas, such as gas centrifuges and summarized their findings to the IAEA contamination and found none. electromagnetic separation, high and UN Security Council. The results Radioactive contamination is only explosives, detonators, hydrodynamic were examined cooperatively, however, one small indicator of a nuclear weapons testing, weaponization, procurement, by experts from the nuclear-weapon program. Equally important in a weapons and machine tools, the analysis and states. Their summary assessment of Iraq’s development complex are the many verification were done by specialist nuclear weapon design was adequate other indicators, such as explosive outsiders recruited to work in or with for the Iraq Action Team to inform the testing, initiator development, ultra-fast the Iraq Action Team, of which one of Security Council that the task had been diagnostics, and metallurgy. The IAEA ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY the authors was a director. For example, completed; the details remained in does not normally hire staff with skills in 14 these areas. report.39 In the report, the IAEA says Breakout concerns a case in which a Clearly, privileged information about it has acquired commercial satellite state makes a sudden and unexpected alleged weaponization and enrichment images “that are consistent with this move that gives it a strategic advantage. activities in Iran has been leaked or information.”40 Experienced intelligence An example is the sudden resumption otherwise made available to sources analysts would not be satisfied with of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union outside the IAEA.37 In many cases, the vague phrasing of this kind. They would in 1961, which caught the United States leaks are selectively designed to support not be satisfied with settling on one completely off guard. In Iran, it would be weaponization theories. Because of the scenario to the exclusion of all others the discovery of a mature and clandestine many leaks, Iran is not interested in for an undistinguished rectangular parallel nuclear materials production and letting the IAEA continue to inspect building, as the annex does repeatedly. weaponization program. the Parchin site. This has produced an A team of experts that should review the The Joint Plan of Action is concerned impasse of massive proportions, with the weaponization data needs to tighten up with prolonging Iran’s projected IAEA fishing for information about items language to reflect what is known, not capability threshold, but the definition such as high explosives and exploding what is said to be. of the capability that constitutes the bridge wire detonators, areas outside IAEA The IAEA is not subject to independent threshold varies from observer to expertise. external review and does not have to observer. Accumulating sufficient fissile Iran has been accused of carrying out respond to challenges to its technical material for a weapons program in a unspecified weaponization experiments in conclusions. The IAEA board should slow, steady process in a way that is a large chamber in a building at Parchin. correct this flaw and appoint a qualified being monitored and reported by IAEA Extensive earth moving, paving, and road group of external experts to review inspections is not breakout. Applying that building for a kilometer on the northeast contentious issues and information. In term in such a situation is a misuse of this side of the alleged containment building academia and intelligence, peer review well-defined concept in arms control. began shortly after the IAEA first publicly and “red-teaming” are essential tools to The IAEA is the world’s eyes and ears indicated interest in the building. As avoid groupthink. in Iran. All that is known about Iran’s a result of this activity, Amano said in declared nuclear materials programs a November 2012 report to the board The Question of Breakout qualitatively and quantitatively comes that when the IAEA “gains access to the One objective of the Joint Plan of Action from IAEA safeguards and inspections. location, its ability to conduct effective is to improve the quality and timeliness If this vital source of real-time, verified verification will have been seriously of IAEA activities in the verification information on the main issue of undermined,” a reference to sanitizing of declared nuclear materials. It does nuclear material is compromised or the site to remove putative traces of not relate to undeclared materials or sidetracked because of confrontations uranium.38 activities. Some observers are mistakenly over weaponization issues, it will be a There are many flaws in this analysis, using the term “breakout” as the metric significant and irreversible loss. which could be better addressed by for constraining a hypothetical Iranian Resolution of the outstanding experts in construction, environmental nuclear weapons program. This is questions about possible Iranian sampling, satellite imagery analysis, incorrect. weaponization requires a broad and civil engineering. At the same time, Iran should be encouraged not to create uncertainty by conducting earth- moving activities nearby until the issue is resolved. Similarly, information that a 19-meter- long cylinder devised to contain alleged high-explosive experiments involving

uranium and weighing more than 100 ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 tons was still being designed in the year 2000 but was fabricated and installed at the Parchin facility in the same year is implausible. Mechanical engineers and experts in explosive containment chambers are needed to correct such a

faulty assessment. Team Action IAEA In the weaponization annex, exaggeration, innuendo, and careful choices of words make the data look much more significant than they are. The chamber “was said to have been Members of the team carrying out nuclear inspections in Iraq after the 1991 Persian put in place in 2000,” according to the Gulf War examine the remains of a reactor at Tuwaitha. 15 set of skills. If a very small team of With the declarations and access a long-term comprehensive agreement accountancy experts, unfamiliar with provided to the IAEA, the whole world that address all the concerns of both conventional arms, construction sites, knows the precise number and types sides. For its part, Iran would continue and common practices in nuclear of centrifuges in operation, as well as to limit its nuclear program to reduce its weapons studies is allowed to analyze the quantities and enrichment levels proliferation potential, continue with the data, the team may envision nuclear of enriched uranium produced by Iran stringent IAEA safeguards, and cooperate activities because that is all it knows. at those facilities. None of this is in proactively with the IAEA in resolving This led to the disaster of U.S. claims question; the question is the purported open questions. The EU3+3 would refrain that aluminum tubes destined for Iraq use of these capabilities. from threats of use of force and remove in 2002 were for centrifuges when they Only the IAEA is positioned to legally all multilateral and national sanctions actually were for rockets, and it can and definitively reach a conclusion against Iran. There is no rational happen again. about the exclusively peaceful nature of alternative. Iran should be encouraged to end Iran’s nuclear program, much as it has its ban on accepting inspectors from done in the cases of Japan, South Korea, ENDNOTES France, the UK, and the United States and Taiwan. States may have defectors, 1. The six-country group is also known as the and other countries, now that the EU3+3 other intelligence sources, analysts, and P5+1. negotiations have been ongoing for aerial and satellite imagery, but it is only some 10 months. By forcing the IAEA IAEA safeguards inspectors that have 2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to rely on inspectors with little or no access to states’ declarations, operating “Communication Dated 27 November 2013 nuclear weapons experience, Iran is records, sampling results, facilities, and Received From the EU High Representative obstructing IAEA efforts in a way that personnel. A satellite image may be Concerning the Text of the Joint Plan of works against Iran’s interest in reaching a worth a thousand words, but it cannot Action,” INFCIRC/855, November 27, 2013. comprehensive agreement and resolution show what is inside a building or facility. 3. IAEA Board of Governors, “Status of Iran’s of the open questions. That is where IAEA safeguards are Nuclear Program in Relation to the Joint Plan In November 2013, the IAEA and invaluable. of Action,” GOV/INF/2014/16, July 20, 2014. Iran agreed on a work plan to cooperate Under the legal authority available further with respect to verification to the IAEA from Iran’s comprehensive 4. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation activities to resolve all present and safeguards agreement and the IAEA of the NPT Safeguards Agremement in the past issues and to proceed with such Statute, the IAEA is positioned, if Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75, activities step by step.41 A dedicated Iran it receives Iran’s full and proactive November 10, 2003. Verification Team should be established cooperation, to sort out the questions 5. Ibid.; IAEA Board of Governors, at the IAEA. The team should comprise related to alleged military activities. As “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards experienced specialists from the five noted above, the IAEA would need to Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” nuclear-weapon states and Iran to work supplement its safeguards personnel with GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003. with the IAEA safeguards team to assess nuclear weapons experts. and resolve questions relating to alleged A long-term comprehensive agreement 6. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation weaponization activities. The IAEA and between Iran and the EU3+3 would be of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Iran then would consider the findings for a good basis for facilitating a technical Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/77, possible finalization. resolution of the open issues between the September 24, 2005. IAEA and Iran regarding possible military 7. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation Conclusions dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program. of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the With the implementation of the full If Iran does its part in safeguards Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/14, suite of IAEA safeguards measures, and verification implementation, it February 4, 2006. supplemented by additional monitoring eventually should be no different from and verification measures under the Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, or 8. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA should the Netherlands, with an enrichment of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant be able to continue to provide credible capability fully accountable under IAEA Provisions of Security Council Resolutions assurances regarding the peaceful nature safeguards and in accordance with the 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) of Iran’s uranium-enrichment and heavy- NPT. in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report water activities. The IAEA has stated In 2003 and 2005, Iran and the EU3+3 by the Director General,” GOV/2008/15, that it has not detected any diversion of missed opportunities for resolving May 26, 2008 (hereinafter May 2008 declared nuclear material in Iran, nor the issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear IAEA implementation report). See IAEA, has it found any indications of nuclear program through negotiations. In “Communication Dated 27 August 2007 From material being used in connection with fall 2013, negotiations resumed after the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic alleged activities concerning possible eight lost years of recriminations and of Iran to the Agency Concerning the Text of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear posturing. Now, both sides appear to the ‘Understandings of the Islamic Republic program. Safeguards continue to be have come to the logical conclusion that of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY implemented at Natanz and Fordow. the only credible course is negotiation of of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues,’” 16 INFCIRC/711, August 27, 2007; IAEA Board Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 28. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT INFCIRC/140, April 22, 1970, pp. 2-3 (Article of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions III). Provisions of Security Council Resolutions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the 20. See IAEA Board of Governors, “Safeguards and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic Director General,” GOV/2011/65, November Implementation Report for 2013.” of Iran: Report by the Director General,” 8, 2011 (hereinafter November 2011 IAEA GOV/2007/58, November 15, 2007; IAEA Board 21. For a full explanation of “locations outside implementation report). of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT facilities,” see IAEA, “Non-Proliferation of Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: 29. “Key Judgments From a National of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) Overview of Safeguards Requirements for Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activity,” The New York Times, December 4, of Iran: Report by the Director General,” Activities,” September 2011, http://www. 2007. GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008 (hereinafter iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/ 30. For example, see Teledyne RISI Inc., February 2008 IAEA implementation report). safeguards0806.pdf. “Selecting the Right EBW Detonator,” 9. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation n.d., http://www.teledynerisi.com/ 22. See World Nuclear Association, of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant products/0products_1ebw_page10.asp. “Plutonium,” August 2014, http://www.world- Provisions of Security Council Resolutions nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Fuel- 31. November 2011 IAEA implementation 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and Recycling/Plutonium/. report. 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Report by the Director General,” GOV/2008/59, 23. For example, see IAEA Board of Governors, 32. See Julian Borger, “IAEA Secret Report: Iran November 19, 2008. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Worked on Nuclear Warhead,” The Guardian, Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security 10. IAEA Division of Public Information, September 18, 2009; George Jahn, “IAEA: Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic “IAEA Safeguards Reporting Process,” August Leaked Iranian Graph on Nuclear Weapons Is of Iran: Report by the Director General,” 28, 2009, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ Flawed, but Supports Suspicions That Tehran’s GOV/2014/28, May 23, 2014; IAEA Board mediaadvisory/2009/ma200918.html. Vying for a Bomb,” Associated Press, December of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT 1, 2012. 11. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant of Iran: Report by the Director General,” 33. For example, see A.B. McIntosh and T.J. Provisions of Security Council Resolutions GOV/2006/53, August 31, 2006. Heal, eds., Materials for Nuclear Engineers (New 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and York: Interscience Publishers, 1960). 24. Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Department of State, “Summary of 34. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Report by the Director General,” GOV/2009/55, Understandings Related to the Implementation Agreements Between the Agency and States August 28, 2009. and Extension of the Joint Plan of Action,” Required in Connection With the Treaty on 12. May 2008 IAEA implementation report. July 22, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” ps/2014/07/229658.htm. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972, paras. 13. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the 25. A significant quantity is used in 1-2. establishing the quantity component of IAEA Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director 35. November 2011 IAEA implementation General,” GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006. inspection goals. The IAEA defines a significant report. quantity as the approximate amount of 14. February 2008 IAEA implementation nuclear material for which the possibility of 36. Ibid. report. manufacturing a nuclear explosive device 37. Borger, “IAEA Secret Report”; Jahn, “IAEA: 15. May 2008 IAEA implementation report. cannot be excluded: 8 kilograms of plutonium, Leaked Iranian Graph.” 8 kilograms of uranium-233, and 25 kilograms 16. IAEA Board of Governors, “The Safeguards of highly enriched uranium (U-235). IAEA, 38. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 Implementation Report for 2013: Report by “IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition,” of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant the Director General,” GOV/2014/27, April 23, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3 Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 2014. (2002). in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the 17. IAEA Office of Public Information and Director General,” GOV/2012/55, November 26. See Ali Ahmad et al., “A Win-Win Solution Communication, “Joint Statement by Iran and for Iran’s Arak Reactor,” Arms Control Today, 16, 2012. IAEA,” 2014/11, May 21, 2014. April 2014. 39. November 2011 IAEA implementation 18. IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement Between 27. See R.S. Kemp, “Two Methods for report. Iran and the Agency for the Application of Converting Iran’s IR-40 Reactor to Use Safeguards in Connection With the Treaty on 40. Ibid. Low-Enriched-Uranium Fuel to Improve the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Proliferation Resistance After Startup,” March 41. IAEA Division of Public Information, December 13, 1974, INFCIRC/214. 2014, http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/ “IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework 19. Ibid., arts. 1 and 2; IAEA, “Treaty on the Kemp-Arak.pdf. for Cooperation,” 2013/21, November 11, 2013. 17 By Fred McGoldrick

IAEA Custody of Japanese Plutonium Stocks: Strengthening Confidence and Transparency

ven before the 2011 Fukushima nuclear reprocessing plant, and the use of MOX fuel in Japanese reactors. The plan disaster shut down all 48 Japanese stated that the Japanese government “remains committed to the policy of nuclear reactors, Japan’s plan to reprocess not possessing reserves of plutonium E of which use is undetermined on the its spent nuclear fuel and use the recovered premise of peaceful use of plutonium. In order to achieve this policy effectively, plutonium and uranium as mixed-oxide (MOX) the government will conduct an appropriate management and utilization fuel in its nuclear power plants suffered from of plutonium while paying due consideration to an appropriate balance significant delays. between separation and utilization of plutonium.”2 The Federation of Electric The country now has a stockpile of regime and increases the risks of nuclear Power Companies of Japan (FEPC) some 44 metric tons of plutonium, with theft. Reducing or eliminating this announced that Japanese utilities would more than nine metric tons in Japan and stockpile will be daunting and take many clarify a plutonium-utilization plan about 35 metric tons in Europe that must years to accomplish, but Japan could before plutonium would be recovered eventually be returned to Japan.1 With alleviate international apprehensions and at the Rokkasho plant.3 Yet, it will be formidable challenges precluding any strengthen the global nonproliferation challenging to run the plant and reduce quick or easy route for using or disposing regime by placing its excess plutonium or at least not increase Japan’s plutonium of this material, Japan has a major under the custody of the International stockpiles. plutonium problem on its hands. Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Nuclear Regulation Authority This problem not only has produced (NRA) has been reviewing 18 reactors a national test for managing Japan’s Obstacles to the Abe Policy to determine whether they meet the plutonium, but also has intensified On April 11, Japanese Prime Minister new post-Fukushima safety regulations. apprehensions by neighboring states Shinzo Abe announced the latest Basic On July 15, the NRA declared that two about Japan’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Energy Plan, which calls for the restart reactors meet the new safety standards, Nonproliferation analysts have expressed of nuclear power plants that satisfy and the local community has appeared concerns that such a stockpile sets a poor rigorous post-Fukushima regulatory to favor a restart. According to estimates example for the global nonproliferation standards, the start-up of the Rokkasho in the Japanese media, the entire process

Fred McGoldrick served for many years as a senior official with the U.S. Department of State and Department of Energy and with the U.S. mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) dealing with nonproliferation and civilian nuclear cooperation issues. He

ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY participated in the talks on an international plutonium-storage regime at the IAEA in the early 1980s and in the negotiations on the IAEA’s “Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium.” He is presently a consultant on nonproliferation and civilian nuclear cooperation issues. 18 Kimimasa Kimimasa M a yama/AFP/Getty Images yama/AFP/Getty

Work on the construction of an ice wall at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant proceeds on July 9. The ice wall is designed to stop radiation-contaminated water from flowing to the sea from reactors at the Fukushima site, which were damaged in an accident triggered by a tsunami on March 11, 2011.

should conclude around October.4 Even political hurdles needed for restart.10 In capacity to consume existing plutonium if the NRA determines that reactors meet addition, the reactor restarts are facing stockpiles or prevent an increase in these the new safety standards, however, the significant implementation costs ranging stocks. Japanese utility operators have agreed to from $700 million to $1 billion per unit. consult with local jurisdictions before A March estimate put the cost at $12.3 An International Problem they make a final decision on resuming billion.11 Japan’s plutonium stockpile is not operation of any reactor. Nevertheless, the The Japanese plan to burn the merely a national political and program- federal government has been clear that it plutonium as fuel is further complicated management problem. Countries in East alone has the final say on whether nuclear by the government’s decision to halt Asia have long expressed concerns that power plants operate.5 Recent polls reveal the Monju prototype fast-neutron Japan’s reprocessing and recycle policy has that opponents of restarting the nuclear breeder reactor project, which was to made Japan a plutonium superpower and program outnumber supporters by about play a central role in utilizing Japanese put Tokyo in a position to develop nuclear two to one.6 plutonium.12 Finally, Japan Nuclear Fuel weapons very quickly, should it decide to Some local governments support Limited (JNFL)—a private company do so. nuclear power because it brings jobs involved in producing nuclear fuel, In answering what was an obviously and government subsidies to their reprocessing and storing spent fuel, staged question last January about press

communities. Other localities are strongly and disposing of nuclear waste—plans reports that Japan would return several ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 opposed.7 Thus, any plans to restart to start up the Rokkasho plant this hundred kilograms of weapons-grade reactors could be undermined by local October. Further delay is still possible, nuclear material to the United States,13 opposition. One city has sought a court however, because the NRA review of the a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign injunction to prevent a nuclear plant from plant’s compatibility with the new safety Ministry, Hua Chunying, made several being built.8 Adding to the uncertainty regulations has been delayed and it is sharply critical points about Japan’s was a ruling in May by a Japanese court still uncertain when the plant will be plutonium policy. against restarting reactors 3 and 4 at the completed. Ohi nuclear plant in Fukui prefecture.9 In light of all these uncertainties and Japan’s large stockpile of nuclear A Reuters analysis concluded that obstacles, trying to balance plutonium materials including weapons-grade only one-third of the 48 idled reactors supply and demand will be a very tricky materials on its territory is an issue are likely to pass Japan’s new, more and complicated task, particularly if the concerning nuclear material security, stringent safety standards and meet the Rokkasho plant begins operations and if proliferation risks and big supply- seismological, economic, logistical, and restarted reactors do not have sufficient demand imbalance.…. Only when 19 there is such a balance, there can particular, actions that may aggregate very material, like separated plutonium, be no hidden dangers that may risk the imbalance.16 that we’re trying to keep away from peaceful use of nuclear energy.… terrorists.”21 The communiqué of the We also urge Japan to take concrete Japan voluntarily agreed to manage its March 2014 nuclear security summit in steps to tell the international civilian plutonium responsibly, including The Hague also encouraged countries to community how it is going to redress taking into account “the importance of minimize their stocks of highly enriched

Japan’s plutonium stockpile is not merely a national political and program-management problem.

the big supply-demand imbalance of balancing supply and demand, including uranium and “to keep their stockpile of nuclear materials on its territory as demand for reasonable working stocks for separated plutonium to the minimum required by the IAEA.14 nuclear operations, as soon as practical.”17 level, both as consistent with national The Japanese explained that the failure requirements.”22 Hua also said that the IAEA “requires to report the 640 kilograms was due to all parties to maintain a best possible their erroneous belief the plutonium was An Alternative Path balance of supply and demand of nuclear exempt from reporting.18 Nevertheless, it Opposition to the closed fuel cycle— materials as contained in the Guidelines is subject to IAEA safeguards and therefore which involves reprocessing of spent fuel for the Management of Plutonium.” Under known to the agency. and recycling of the plutonium into fresh those guidelines, states are to increase Beijing’s criticisms appear to reflect fuel—has also been virtually universal transparency of their plutonium stocks growing tensions with Tokyo. Relations in the nonproliferation and arms control by publishing annual statements of their between the two countries have worsened community, which criticizes reprocessing holdings of unirradiated plutonium and since China’s declaration of an air defense as an uneconomical approach posing periodic statements explaining their identification zone over the East China significant risks of proliferation and national nuclear power strategies.15 Japan Sea in 2013 and its related long-standing nuclear theft. In a recent article, two and eight other states agreed to follow the dispute with Japan over Beijing’s claims to critics urged Japan to adopt an approach, guidelines, which are voluntary. islands in that sea. known as the once-through fuel cycle, According to press reports, the The Chinese statement elicited in which spent fuel is not reprocessed Japanese government failed to include responses from IAEA Director-General but stored and eventually disposed of. 640 kilograms of plutonium in its annual Yukiya Amano and Joseph Macmanus, the More specifically, the article included the statement to the IAEA in 2012 and 2013. U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, expressing following steps: In response, Hua said, “It is Japan who confidence in the peaceful nature of should answer the question of whether Japan’s nuclear program and its proper • negotiating with the prefectural it is an unintentional omission or a handling of its plutonium.19 Nevertheless, and local governments that host deliberate concealment. Japan is not when the previous Japanese government nuclear power plants for on-site dry- only required but also obligated to report suggested in 2012 that it intended to cask storage of spent fuel; faithfully its storage and usage of nuclear phase out Japan’s nuclear power program materials to the IAEA.” She added, but continue to reprocess spent fuel, • renegotiating the deal with Aomori U.S. officials reportedly raised strong prefecture and the village of Rokkasho The Japanese side has long been objections. According to news accounts, concerning the construction and holding a large amount of sensitive the officials said such a policy would operation of the reprocessing plant nuclear materials that far exceeds its lead to an increase in stocks of Japanese and the MOX fuel fabrication facility; actual needs, which is a matter of plutonium and set a bad nonproliferation grave concern for the international example. They called on Tokyo to • having the central government community. We hope that the keep the amount of its plutonium to a take responsibility for final disposal Japanese side can give an earnest minimum, the reports said.20 of spent fuel away from the nuclear response to the concern of the The U.S. government has long utilities and the operator of the international community, take opposed the accumulation of weapons- Rokkasho plant; and concrete actions as soon as possible to usable materials, a policy reiterated by address the supply-demand imbalance President Barack Obama when he said • disposing directly of Japan’s 44 of sensitive nuclear materials at in March 2012, “We simply can’t go tons of already separated plutonium ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY an early date and refrain from, in on accumulating huge amounts of the instead of using it in MOX fuel in 20 Japan’s nuclear power plants.23 with the IAEA. It is not plausible that material is used for peaceful purposes Japan would seek nuclear weapons as long under continuing IAEA safeguards. A once-though fuel-cycle strategy as Tokyo has confidence in the security Although this provision has been in would avoid an increase in Japanese guarantee that the United States provides the statute since the agency’s inception stockpiles. Yet, any attempt to adopt in its 1960 treaty with Japan. in 1957, it never has been implemented. all or even some aspects of this There is no sign U.S.-Japanese ties An IAEA experts group on international strategy would be a bumpy, grueling, are going to weaken. They are likely plutonium storage held several meetings and protracted ride. It would require to be cemented in the coming years from 1978 until 1982, but failed to reach convincing local communities to keep as U.S. policy rebalances to Asia and agreement on an IAEA storage regime. spent fuel at reactor sites; renegotiating as Chinese-Japanese relations become It may be time for Japan to consider agreements with Aomori prefecture, more contentious. Nevertheless, given concluding an agreement with the IAEA which supports reprocessing and MOX the rising tensions in East Asia and the for a custodial regime for its excess fuel fabrication; changing the law portrayal of Japan’s plutonium policy by plutonium. The details of such an governing the national Reprocessing some as a strategy to develop a nuclear agreement would have to be negotiated Fund, which bars repayment of loans weapons capability, Tokyo needs to take between Japan and the IAEA, and the for the construction of the Rokkasho steps to reassure the region and the agreement would have to be approved by plant unless the JNFL, whose majority global community of its peaceful nuclear the agency’s Board of Governors. It should shareholder is the FEPC, commits to intentions. have the following broad characteristics: operating the reprocessing plant, taking One step that Japan could take to responsibility for final disposal of spent demonstrate its commitment to use • Japan would determine the amount fuel away from itself and the nuclear its plutonium for exclusively civilian of plutonium to be placed under utilities; and directly disposing of purposes would be to place its excess IAEA custody, but there would be a plutonium. Because industry, politicians, plutonium under the custody of the presumption that material not being and local communities would fiercely IAEA. Article XII of the agency’s used or not designated for use within resist these steps, implementing them statute provides that the IAEA has a specified period of time would be is not likely to be any easier or quicker the right “to require deposit with the excess and be deposited with the than putting the Abe administration’s Agency of any excess of any fissionable agency. program into effect. materials recovered or produced as a Thus, although Japan should make by-product over what is needed for • Japan and the IAEA would agree every effort to reduce its plutonium [peaceful purposes]…in order to prevent on the location of storage sites, stockpile and will sooner or later find stockpiling of these materials.” The presumably co-located with Japanese a path—or, more likely, paths—toward statute also provides that, “[a]t the reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication this objective, its plutonium stocks are request of the member or members facilities. unlikely to go away anytime soon, no concerned special fissionable materials matter what policy or combination of so deposited with the Agency shall be • The agency would retain custody policies Tokyo pursues. returned promptly to the member or of the excess plutonium until the members concerned,” provided that the Japanese government requests The Custodial Regime In the meantime, how should Japan deal with concerns that it is accumulating its stockpile as part of a “bomb in the basement” strategy or as a warning to China and North Korea that it is capable of developing nuclear weapons?

The charges that Japan is seeking ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 nuclear weapons are not credible. It has become a cliché that the Japanese, as the only victims of nuclear weapons use, have a widespread and deeply felt opposition to nuclear weapons. Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1956 restricts AFP/Getty Images AFP/Getty research, development, and utilization of nuclear power to peaceful uses. Japan is a strong supporter of all elements of the global nonproliferation regime, is a party in compliance with the nuclear Employees of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited applaud as they begin tests using Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and has uranium at the Rokkasho spent fuel reprocessing plant on December 21, 2004. The a comprehensive safeguards agreement plant has not yet begun commercial operation. 21 its release for a specified peaceful n the destination and end assurances and conditions required by use, for example, in a MOX fuel use: fabrication into MOX fuel the NPT or by the suppliers of the nuclear fabrication plant, a nuclear power assemblies and prompt irradiation material or equipment from which the plant, a vitrification facility, or a direct in a designated reactor, use in plutonium had been produced. If the disposal site. some research application, or IAEA custodial regime were extended to immobilization and disposal. Japanese plutonium located in the United • Japan could not remove the Kingdom or France, the same conditions materials from IAEA custody until An IAEA-Japanese custodial agreement would apply. In other words, the relevant

The IAEA custodial regime would go beyond classical safeguards because it would afford the agency the legal authority to bar Japan from removing the material from its custody unless it met certain conditions for release.

it submitted to the IAEA a request would need to provide that the release of French or UK entities or authorities would for release of a specified quantity the plutonium from agency custody would have responsibilities for management, accompanied by an end-use be only for a declared, specific, immediate, operation, safety, and physical protection certificate. The certificate of use would and peaceful use and that the timing of Japanese plutonium under IAEA custody contain the following assurances and of release and the quantity and form of on their territories. information: the material would be consistent with the declared end use and thus not result Benefits of IAEA Custody n an assurance that the material in stockpiling. The decision to release The proposed IAEA custodial regime would be used for exclusively plutonium from custody should not be would offer several benefits over and peaceful, nonexplosive purposes; subject to debate by the IAEA board, as above the agency’s traditional safeguards release would be a routine matter based on system and other elements of the global n an assurance that the the provision of a certificate of use. nonproliferation regime. plutonium would be subject to IAEA custody of the plutonium would Elimination of national stockpiling. It continuing IAEA safeguards in not change most of the basic physical would remove excess plutonium from the accordance with the provisions arrangements; operational, safety, and sole control of Japan by placing it under of the IAEA-Japanese safeguards physical protection responsibilities; or the legal custody of an international agreement or, if the material were nonproliferation conditions under which organization. to be exported to another country, Japanese plutonium is now stored. The Strengthened barriers to diversion. The that it would be subject to the plutonium would not be moved to a purpose of traditional IAEA safeguards safeguards agreement between the separate IAEA facility, but would remain is to detect the diversion of a significant IAEA and that country; in storage under IAEA custody at sites quantity24 of nuclear material and to such as Rokkasho or other locations where deter such diversion by the threat of early n an assurance that the material plutonium is normally stored. The title to detection. The IAEA custodial regime would remain under effective the plutonium would remain with Japan; would go beyond classical safeguards physical protection in accordance ownership would not be transferred to because it would afford the agency with accepted international the IAEA. Japanese companies owning the legal authority to bar Japan from standards; plutonium-storage facilities would retain removing the material from its custody responsibility for their management and unless it met certain conditions for n a description of the quantity operation. release. Unauthorized removal of the and composition of the material to In addition, safety and physical plutonium would require seizing the be released from custody; protection would remain the responsibility material in defiance of the international of Japanese authorities. The IAEA would custodial authorities. n the approximate date of apply safeguards at sites where Japanese The establishment of IAEA legal custody delivery; plutonium is under IAEA custody as over the material pending specified part of the agency’s normal safeguards peaceful use would thus erect a significant n the timetable foreseen for responsibilities. The plutonium would new legal barrier to diversion. There could ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY utilization; and remain subject to all nonproliferation also be a physical barrier to removal, 22 such as a two-key system that would nuclear security summit. The signers encompass Japanese plutonium stocks require action by an IAEA official and a pledged to “meet the intent” of various located in France and the UK. Expanding Japanese official for release of material IAEA recommendations on physical the undertaking in this way clearly would from IAEA custody. In such a case, the protection and nuclear security guidelines be desirable from a nonproliferation operator should have the right to remove and “to embed the objectives of the point of view. Japan should explore material from IAEA custody in emergency nuclear security fundamentals and the the willingness of the French and UK circumstances such as a fire. Any IAEA recommendations in national rules governments to negotiate appropriate emergency entry would have to involve and regulations and to host peer reviews custodial arrangements with the IAEA an immediate notice to the IAEA. to ensure effective implementation.”25 and Japan for Japanese plutonium on Increased transparency. The IAEA would Japan has recently deposited its their territories. verify that the location, form, and instrument of acceptance of the 2005 Even if London or Paris proves composition of material that it allowed amendment to the Convention on the unwilling to put Japanese plutonium to be released would be consistent with Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on its territory under IAEA custody, the declared use. Provided it does not with the IAEA. An IAEA-Japanese custodial Tokyo should move ahead with placing compromise security and proprietary agreement should require that the plutonium on Japanese territory under requirements, the IAEA should publish physical protection and safety measures such a custodial regime. information on the quantity, form, for plutonium meet international and locations of the plutonium under standards while under the agency’s A Model for Others its custody and on any of the material custody and during transport and use. The If the custodial regime works well in released from its custody, including the IAEA should verify that these standards Japan, it might serve as a model for other specific peaceful uses or disposition of such are being met. states with large plutonium stocks to material in Japanese facilities. (Plutonium Minimal cost. The proposed custodial place their excess civilian plutonium holdings published under the IAEA regime should not be particularly under IAEA custody. plutonium management guidelines are self- burdensome or costly to Japan or the Like Japan, some NPT nuclear- reported and are given on a countrywide IAEA. Because Japan is already a party to weapon states have substantial stocks of basis.) After release of the plutonium the NPT, its plutonium is already under unirradiated civilian plutonium with no from IAEA custody, the agency would IAEA safeguards. The incremental costs of short-term or easy path for its disposition. apply safeguards to verify the ongoing administering a custodial regime should Although it would take a radical change peaceful, nonexplosive use of the material be relatively small. Although they could in mind-set for the nuclear-weapon states and confirm that it is being used for the be covered by the agency’s budget, it to place their excess civilian plutonium particular application specified by Japan. would be prudent for Japan to pay for the under IAEA custody, it would be a Increased assurance of effective physical additional expenses. meaningful step toward fulfilling their protection and safety. Japanese physical disarmament commitments under Article protection measures have come under Plutonium in Japan and Europe VI of the NPT.26 considerable criticism. In reaction to Unirradiated plutonium in Japan should NPT nuclear-weapon states may the September 11 attacks in the United be the prime candidate for submission withdraw material from their voluntary States, Japan has improved security at its to IAEA custody. That should include safeguards agreements for national facilities, but still has much more to do. plutonium that has been fabricated into security reasons. If their excess civilian Japan was one of 35 countries that signed MOX fuel elements or assemblies but has plutonium were under an IAEA custodial the initiative on strengthening nuclear no scheduled, near-term use. regime, it could be released from its security implementation at the March The IAEA custodial regime also could custody only for peaceful, nonexplosive purposes and could not be returned to military use. Such a step would help respond to the recommendations

of the 2010 NPT Review Conference ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 for increased transparency of nuclear materials in nuclear-weapon states.27 Kazuhiro Nogi/AFP/Getty Images Nogi/AFP/Getty Kazuhiro An IAEA custodial regime for Japanese plutonium stocks is admittedly a modest step. It would not help Japan shrink its plutonium stocks. Tokyo must move as expeditiously as possible to fulfill its promises to reduce its plutonium stocks, and an IAEA custody regime should not be used as a justification for continued stockpiling. Such a regime, however, A vessel carrying plutonium-uranium fuel for Japan’s Takahama nuclear plant arrives on June 27, 2013. The cargo of mixed-oxide fuel was the first such fuel to might alleviate international concerns arrive in Japan since the Fukushima accident. and regional tensions over this issue until 23 an option or options for reducing and 11. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power communique_final.pdf. eliminating Japanese plutonium stocks in Japan,” April 2014, http://www.world- 23. Masafumi Takubo and Frank von Hippel, can be implemented. In addition, it could nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries- “Ending Reprocessing in Japan: An Alternative establish a good nonproliferation model G-N/Japan/. Approach to Managing Japan’s Spent Fuel and for others countries with excess civilian 12. The government plans to convert the Separated Plutonium,” November 2013, http:// plutonium stocks. facility into a center for research on reducing fissilematerials.org/library/rr12.pdf. the volume of nuclear waste and improving ENDNOTES 24. The IAEA considers eight kilograms of technologies related to nonproliferation. plutonium to be a significant quantity. For 1. In its latest declaration to the International 13. The agreement to transfer the material was highly enriched uranium, the amount is 25 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Japan announced in March at the nuclear security kilograms. Atomic Energy Commission reported that summit in The Hague. as of December 31, 2012, Japan held 44,241 25. In addition, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo kilograms of separated unirradiated plutonium, 14. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abe pledged at the March nuclear security of which 9,295 kilograms was stored in Japan “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua summit to strengthen security measures for and 34,946 kilograms was stored in France and Chunying’s Regular Press Conference Japanese nuclear materials and facilities and the United Kingdom. IAEA, “Communication on February 17, 2014,” http://www. indicated that Japan would invite a visit by Received From Japan Concerning Its Policies fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ the IAEA International Physical Protection Regarding the Management of Plutonium,” s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1129283.shtml. Advisory Service by the spring of 2015. INFCIRC/549/Add.1/15, October 3, 2012. 15. IAEA, “Communication Received From 26. Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation 2. Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Certain Member States Concerning Their Treaty (NPT) states, “Each of the Parties to the Industry, “Strategic Energy Plan,” April 2014, p. Policies Regarding the Management of Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 54, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/. Plutonium,” INFCIRC/549, March 16, 1998 good faith on effective measures relating to (hereinafter INFCIRC/549). cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 3. Federation of Electric Companies of Japan, date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a “About plutonium utilization which is produced 16. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty on general and complete disarmament in Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant” (in Japanese), “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua under strict and effective international March 26, 2013, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/ Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June control.” iinkai/teirei/siryo2013/siryo11/siryo2-2.pdf. 9, 2014,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1163678.shtml. 4. Anna Fifield, “Japan Gives Green Light 27. The final document from the 2010 NPT to Restart Pair of Nuclear Reactors,” The 17. INFCIRC/549. Review Conference contains an action plan that Washington Post, July 15, 2014; “Safety Approval includes the following items: 18. The material was located at an idle reactor for First Japanese Reactor Restarts,” World in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Action 16: The nuclear-weapon States Nuclear News, July 16, 2014, http://www.world- Nevertheless, the plutonium was unirradiated, are encouraged to commit to declare, as nuclear-news.org/RS-Safety-approval-for-first- and Japan should have reported it to the appropriate, to the International Atomic Japanese-reactor-restarts-1607141.html. IAEA as it agreed to do under the plutonium Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material 5. “Safety Approval for First Japanese Reactor guidelines. “Japan Fails to Include 640 kg of designated by each of them as no longer Restarts.” Unused Plutonium in Report to IAEA,” Kyodo required for military purposes and to News, June 7, 2014. place such material as soon as practicable 6. Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, and Kentaro under IAEA or other relevant international Hamada, “Japan May Only Be Able to Restart 19. Frederik Dahl, “Japan’s Plutonium Stocks verification and arrangements for the One-Third of Its Nuclear Reactors,” Reuters, No Reason for Concern - IAEA Chief,” Reuters, disposition of such material for peaceful April 1, 2014. March 3, 2014; Frederik Dahl, “U.S. Says ‘Not purposes, to ensure that such material at All Concerned’ About Japan’s Plutonium,” 7. Ibid. See also Diane Barnes, “Japan’s remains permanently outside military Reuters, March 5, 2014. Plutonium Plan Hits New, Local Obstacles,” programmes. Global Security Newswire, April 10, 2014. 20. “U.S. Urges Japan on Plutonium Fears,” Action 17: In the context of action 16, Power Engineering, October 4, 2012. 8. “Japan City Launches Legal Bid to Halt all States are encouraged to support the Reactor Build,” Nuclear Power Daily, July 3, 2014, 21. Office of the Press Secretary, The White development of appropriate legally binding http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/ House, “Remarks by President Obama verification arrangements, within the Japan_city_launches_legal_bid_to_halt_ at Hankuk University, March 26, 2012,” context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible reactor_build_999.html. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- removal of fissile material designated by office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama- each nuclear-weapon State as no longer 9. “Japan Court Rules Against Nuclear Restart in hankuk-university. required for military purposes. Rare Win for Activists,” Reuters, May 21, 2014. 22. “The Hague Nuclear Security Summit 2010 Review Conference of the Parties 10. Saito, Sheldrick, and Hamada, “Japan May Communiqué,” March 25, 2014, https://www. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Only Be Able to Restart One-Third of Its Nuclear nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/ Nuclear Weapons, “Final Document,” NPT/ ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Reactors.” the_hague_nuclear_security_summit_ CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), June 18, 2010. 24 By Laura Rockwood

The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law Of Unintended Consequences

n September 2013, the International Atomic the possible unintended consequences of those deliberations if the recent Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors challenges to that authority are allowed to prevail. reviewed a report by Director-General I The State‑Level Concept Yukiya Amano on efforts to further strengthen The state-level concept has its roots in efforts by the IAEA and its member states the effectiveness of safeguards and increase their to strengthen safeguards in the aftermath of the discovery in 1991 of a clandestine 1 efficiency. The report described an approach to nuclear weapons program in Iraq. This discovery triggered a reassessment of the the implementation of safeguards that had come then-conventional, ill-founded belief that the IAEA’s legal authority under to be known as the “state-level concept.” comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to the nuclear Nonproliferation Rather than being received as absence of undeclared nuclear material Treaty (NPT) was limited to verifying intended—as a blueprint for the and activities in a state with such an nuclear material and facilities declared by next logical step in the evolution agreement. the state. of safeguards—the paper and, more The IAEA board and General For the first 20 years of the specifically, the concept it described Conference will have another implementation of comprehensive triggered a decidedly vitriolic response. opportunity to address this issue when safeguards agreements, IAEA safeguards

Some member states have used they convene again this month to activities were, as a practical rather ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 this opportunity to call into question discuss the state-level concept. The than legal matter, focused primarily important measures to strengthen purpose of this article is to assist the on verifying declared nuclear material safeguards that have been in place since parties involved in those deliberations at declared facilities. Safeguards were the early 1990s. Most disconcerting in understanding the legal basis for IAEA implemented and evaluated on a have been challenges to IAEA authority authority to verify the correctness and facility‑by‑facility basis, rather than by under comprehensive safeguards completeness of state declarations under examination of the state as a whole. As a agreements to verify the nondiversion comprehensive safeguards agreements consequence of this approach, although of declared nuclear material and the and, in doing so, to call attention to the agency routinely sought to verify

Laura Rockwood joined the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment as a senior research fellow in February. In November 2013, she retired as section head for nonproliferation and policymaking in the Office of Legal Affairs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where she had worked since 1985. While at the IAEA, she was responsible for all legal aspects of the negotiation, interpretation, and implementation of IAEA safeguards. 25 Dean Calma/IAEA Dean

Yukiya Amano, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, attends an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on September 9, 2013. During the meeting, the board reviewed a report from Amano on efforts to improve safeguards.

that there was no undeclared production embarked on an ambitious program, measures was that they would not only of nuclear material at declared facilities, known as Programme 93+2, to develop improve safeguards effectiveness, but also in particular at research reactors, it did a comprehensive set of measures permit the IAEA to introduce efficiencies not seek to verify that there was no for strengthening safeguards. These in safeguards implementation. If the undeclared nuclear material elsewhere in measures, which were presented to the IAEA was able to conclude that a state’s the state. board in 1995,2 comprised two parts. The declarations under its comprehensive The flaw in that facility-level approach first part consisted of measures that could safeguards agreement were correct and became evident with the discovery of be implemented under the existing legal complete, commonly referred to as “the Iraq’s undeclared nuclear activities in authority of comprehensive safeguards broader conclusion,” it could consider 1991. agreements. The most significant of reducing its in‑field inspection effort Between 1991 and 1993, the IAEA these measures was a profound change on those parts of the nuclear fuel cycle board and General Conference made in the IAEA’s evaluation of information that were less proliferation sensitive. a number of decisions reaffirming the available to it about a state. Instead of For example, if the agency was able to agency’s right and obligation to ensure assessing the results of its verification assure itself that there was no undeclared that, in a state with a comprehensive activities separately for each individual reprocessing in a state, it could reduce safeguards agreement, no nuclear facility in a state, the IAEA would the frequency of inspections at a power material, whether declared or undeclared, visualize the state’s nuclear program in a reactor using low-enriched uranium from is diverted to nuclear weapons or other coherent and connected way by looking four times a year to one. nuclear explosive devices. In other at the state as a whole. In 2002 the conceptual framework words, the objective of IAEA inspections The second part consisted of for this process, known as integrated under such agreements is verification measures that the secretariat proposed safeguards, was presented to the board. of not just the nondiversion of declared be implemented on the basis of a new The board took note of it, and the nuclear material (the correctness of legal instrument. These measures were secretariat proceeded to implement it.4 state declarations), but also the absence eventually transformed into the Model Within this framework, the IAEA took of undeclared nuclear material and Additional Protocol, which the board into account state-specific characteristics activities (the completeness of state approved in May 1997.3 and features and all other safeguards- declarations). As described in the secretariat’s reports relevant information available to it about At the end of 1993, the IAEA on Programme 93+2, an important the state concerned and, in consultation ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Secretariat, at the request of the board, consequence of these strengthening with the state, developed a customized 26 “state‑level integrated safeguards challenged the state-level concept.7 the State-level concept for safeguards.” approach.” Although limited to states for Although some of its concerns were In response to that request, Amano which the IAEA had reached the broader shared by other states, the challenges issued an 11-page report in August conclusion, integrated safeguards became were particularly surprising because, 2013 entitled “The Conceptualization the first wide-scale implementation of as a nuclear-weapon state, Russia does and Development of Safeguards safeguards at the level of the state rather not have a comprehensive safeguards Implementation at the State Level.”9 than the facility. agreement in force and because it had In that document, the secretariat The term “state-level concept” was previously supported all of the early provided background information on

Although many board members expressed support for [IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano’s] report, the state-level concept was far from an unqualified success.

first used with reference to this process efforts to strengthen safeguards. the evolution of safeguards. The report in a board document in the director- Among the issues raised by these states described the secretariat’s development general’s 2005 report on safeguards during the 2012 General Conference of state‑level approaches under the state- implementation during 2004.5 As the were the prospect that application of the level concept and their implementation report noted, the state-level concept was state-level concept could result in the in states with comprehensive safeguards already being implemented for states IAEA making political and subjective agreements. with integrated safeguards, and it would judgments about states; the need for As in the case of the 2002 report to eventually be extended to all other further definition of specific elements the board on integrated safeguards, states with comprehensive safeguards of the concept, such as what constituted the board was asked at its September agreements. The report also said that safeguards-relevant information and 2013 meeting only to take note of the the next step would be the evolution safeguards objectives; and the authority director-general’s report, rather than of safeguards to take full advantage of of the secretariat to implement the to approve it. Although many board the information available to the IAEA concept without approval of the board members expressed support for the in order to better focus safeguards or General Conference. Clearly, further report, the state-level concept was far activities in all comprehensive safeguards clarifications and information by the from an unqualified success. The board agreements, given the environment of secretariat were necessary for states to ultimately took note of the report and increasing verification demands and a fully understand the state-level concept. of Amano’s statement that he would static safeguards budget. A remarkable aspect of the discussion produce, in consultation with member So entered into the lexicon of during the General Conference was the states, a supplementary document on the safeguards the state-level concept, simply tone of suspicion and distrust directed at state‑level concept for consideration by another way of referring to the agency’s the secretariat, triggered by a perceived the board before the General Conference practice, well established by then, lack of transparency on the part of the met in September 2014. of evaluating all safeguards-relevant secretariat and reportedly exacerbated During the General Conference that information about a state as a whole and, by external political factors unrelated to took place immediately after that board where possible, tailoring safeguards to fit strengthening safeguards. This mistrust meeting, member states considered

the state concerned. spawned further suspicions about the the matter again. The overall tone ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 In 2010 the Department of Safeguards real intentions behind the state‑level of the critical comments seemed to presented the results of its long-term concept, as reflected in suggestions reflect skepticism and an unwillingness strategic plan for 2012-2023,6 in which that states were being asked to agree to to acknowledge any merit in the it stated that, in its efforts to focus its measures not covered by their safeguards secretariat’s responses. Nevertheless, activities and resources where they agreements and in implications that the General Conference took note of mattered most in terms of achieving decisions about state-level approaches the report and the director-general’s safeguards objectives, it would further were being taken by the secretariat intention to produce the supplementary develop the state-level concept and “behind closed doors.”8 document.10 extend its application to all states. Against that backdrop, the General There were no serious challenges to Conference in its 2012 safeguards Challenges to IAEA Authority the implementation of that concept resolution requested the director- In developing the state-level concept, until 2012 when, for reasons that were general to report to the board on “the the secretariat understood that it was not entirely apparent, Russia actively conceptualization and development of doing what it had been tasked with 27 doing: continuously looking for ways member states, in resolutions adopted by Finally, in late February 1993, to improve the effectiveness and the board13 and the General Conference,14 Blix submitted a report to the board efficiency of safeguards implementation. requested the director-general to verify informing it of an anomaly the In resolutions dating from 2006, the the “correctness and completeness of secretariat had discovered in North General Conference had urged the the inventory of South Africa’s nuclear Korea. The anomaly had given rise secretariat to continue to do so through installations and material” under to doubts about the completeness of the use of state‑level approaches. its newly approved comprehensive the country’s initial report of nuclear Debates on the state-level concept safeguards agreement. material under its comprehensive provided an opportunity for states to Special inspections. In February 1992, safeguards agreement. Based on the express genuine concerns. Unfortunately, the board, acting through a chairman’s director-general’s report and a detailed they also provided a platform for summary, reaffirmed the IAEA’s right secretariat briefing, the board adopted a some states to call into question the under comprehensive safeguards resolution in which it stressed that it was most fundamental principle in the agreements to ensure that all nuclear “essential to verify the correctness and implementation of the comprehensive material in all peaceful nuclear activities assess the completeness” of North Korea’s safeguards agreements: that the right is under safeguards.15 initial report and decided that the access and obligation of the IAEA to verify the Romania. In June 1992, the board, to additional information and locations correctness and completeness of state again acting through a chairman’s requested by the director-general was declarations derives from the agreements summary, took note of Director-General “essential and urgent in order to resolve themselves. Hans Blix’s report on noncompliance differences and to ensure verification All comprehensive safeguards by the former regime in Romania with of compliance” by North Korea with its agreements are based on INFCIRC/153, certain provisions of its comprehensive comprehensive safeguards agreement.18 an IAEA document negotiated in 1970- safeguards agreement, brought to It is simply disingenuous to contend, as 1971 by a board committee open to all the IAEA’s attention by the successor a few states have recently, that the above member states of the agency.11 A plain Romanian government, and requested examples of decisions by the board and reading of INFCIRC/153 makes clear that that the director-general report the the General Conference are not germane a comprehensive safeguards agreement noncompliance to the UN Security to the issue of IAEA authority under 16 requires the IAEA to provide assurances Council “for information purposes.” comprehensive safeguards agreements that all declared nuclear material of a Strengthening safeguards. The General either because they were related to the state is under safeguards and that the Conference in September 1992 adopted implementation of safeguards in specific state has declared and placed under a resolution in which it noted the states or because the acceptance of a safeguards all nuclear material that is “decisions taken by the Board over the chairman’s summary does not constitute 19 required to be declared. Paragraph 2 of preceding 12 months to strengthen a formal decision. The safeguards INFCIRC/153 provides that the IAEA “has the safeguards system” and called on agreements of South Africa and North the right and the obligation to ensure member states to cooperate with the Korea are substantively identical, 17 that safeguards will be applied…on all IAEA in implementing those decisions. as are all comprehensive safeguards source or special fissionable material.” The drafters of INFCIRC/153 agreed on this formulation after due consideration and explicit rejection of a proposal by one member state that “safeguarding and inspection…shall be concerned solely with the material reported upon by the state concerned.”12 Well before Programme 93+2 was initiated or the Model Additional Protocol even contemplated, the board made a number of decisions confirming that the IAEA had not just the right but the obligation to verify that all nuclear material required to be safeguarded under a comprehensive safeguards IAEA of Courtesy agreement was under safeguards and that, in fulfilling that obligation, the agency had the right to use all relevant information available to it about the state IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei (left) and Hans Blix, head of the UN concerned. These decisions addressed a Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which carried out inspections range of countries and issues. ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY for nonconventional weapons in Iraq, speak to each other at UN headquarters in South Africa. In September 1991, IAEA Baghdad on February 9, 2003. Blix was ElBaradei’s predecessor at the IAEA. 28 agreements. Furthermore, the board Programme 93+2, Blix acknowledged the state-level concept, but the risk of has made decisions on many occasions that “[n]o safeguards system, no matter dramatic damage to effective safeguards through the mechanism of a chairman’s how extensive the measures, can provide implementation. There is a further risk summary of its deliberations, including absolute assurance that there has been that the damage could creep into the decisions with respect to the most no diversion of nuclear material or NPT review process. sensitive of issues, noncompliance. This that there are no undeclared nuclear The confluence of external political was the case for Iraq as well as Romania.20 activities in a State.”21 The IAEA made circumstances with IAEA efforts to It is particularly difficult to understand that point again in 2003 in its reports further strengthen safeguards may

IAEA safeguards are not based on confidence; they are designed to create confidence. The degree of confidence created is directly dependent on the scope and reliability of the verification process.

how any state, let alone states that on Iraq to the UN Security Council, in have inadvertently created those participated in deliberations by the which it acknowledged that proving a risks by providing an opportunity for board or General Conference between negative was not possible even with the reinterpreting and thereby eroding 1991 and 1993, can argue that the IAEA’s authority granted under Security Council IAEA verification authority under obligation under a comprehensive resolutions.22 comprehensive safeguards agreements. safeguards agreement to verify Yet, the IAEA could look for The most immediate practical impact completeness derives exclusively from an indications of undeclared activities. In of acceding to such a reinterpretation additional protocol. The push by member the case of Iraq, having sought such would be to permit a state that has only states for the IAEA to provide assurances indications and not found any, the a comprehensive safeguards agreement of the absence of undeclared nuclear agency could conclude with a high and no additional protocol, such as Iran, material and activities under such degree of confidence that Iraq had not to prevent the IAEA from investigating agreements—and, indeed, the board and resumed its nuclear weapons program. As indications of undeclared nuclear General Conference decisions confirming it turned out, the IAEA was right. material and activities in that state. If that IAEA authority to do so—predated even Some critics have articulated a reinterpretation is not addressed directly the contemplation of new legal authority. somewhat more nuanced argument. and rejected explicitly, safeguards could Some states question the need for an Although the IAEA has the right to follow be forced to revert to a pre-1991 approach additional protocol if the IAEA already up on indications of undeclared nuclear to verification that focused primarily on has the right to verify completeness material and activities, it does not have declared nuclear material, which resulted of a state’s declarations under a the right to look for such indications. in the IAEA’s failure to detect Iraq’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. Again, the argument is disingenuous. If undeclared nuclear program. The answer is straightforward: the one does not look for something, one Others can speculate on the IAEA’s right and obligation to verify is not likely to find it. Would critics of underlying motivations of the vocal correctness and completeness derive completeness efforts conclude that the critics of the state-level concept. The from the comprehensive safeguards IAEA should not even try to determine more pressing concern is that the debate agreement, but in such an agreement, whether such indications exist? Blix on the state-level concept might have there are limited tools for doing so, such addressed that point in 1995 by invoking unintentionally provided a vehicle ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 as special inspections. An additional a person “looking for a lost key near a for a rearguard attack on the hard- protocol secures for the IAEA broader lighted street lamp who, when asked won progress made 20 years ago in access to information and locations whether he was sure he had lost the key strengthening safeguards. If so, this on a more routine, predictable, and there, said ‘No, but it’s easier to look would be a dramatic and unfortunate reliable basis. This permits the IAEA to here.’”23 example of the law of unintended detect indications of undeclared nuclear consequences. material and activities earlier and more Managing the Consequences Are IAEA member states going effectively than it otherwise would. IAEA safeguards are not based on to dismantle what was achieved in Another challenge to IAEA authority to confidence; they are designed to create strengthening safeguards—what the verify the absence of undeclared nuclear confidence. The degree of confidence secretariat achieved at the request of the material and activities in a state has been created is directly dependent on the member states? that proving a negative is impossible. scope and reliability of the verification The biggest challenges to effective In one of his reports to the board on process. The real issue at stake here is not safeguards and their further evolution 29 are not technical. They are a lack Term Strategic Plan (2012-2023): Summary,” Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of knowledge about the history of n.d., https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/ of Korea for the Application of Safeguards safeguards and a misrepresentation of documents/LongTerm_Strategic_Plan_ in Connection With the Treaty on the Non- the history that capitalizes on that lack (20122023)-Summary.pdf. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” GOV/2636, of knowledge. It is possible to correct February 26, 1993. The draft resolution was 7. Mark Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA the former and to limit the impact adopted without a vote. The director-general’s Safeguards,” Carnegie Endowment for of the latter through education and report and the official records of the board’s International Peace, November 20, 2012, communication by raising the level of discussion, which was held in closed session, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/20/ knowledge about safeguards and the have not been publicly released by the IAEA. plan-for-iaea-safeguards; Mark Hibbs, history of their evolution. It is incumbent “Russia’s Safeguards Problem,” Arms Control 19. IAEA, “Committee of the Whole: Record of on all parties to understand what has Wonk, December 3, 2012, http://hibbs. the Seventh Meeting,” GC(57)/COM.5/OR.7, already been achieved in strengthening armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1196/russias- March 2014, paras. 25-160. safeguards so that it is not necessary to safeguards-problem. reinvent those achievements. 20. In July and September 1991, the board During the agency’s September 8. IAEA, “Committee of the Whole: Record of found that Iraq’s failure to declare nuclear deliberations on the state-level concept, the Fourth Meeting,” GC(56)/COM.5/OR.4, material and facilities in connection with member states should make a renewed December 2012. its clandestine uranium-enrichment and and explicit commitment to effective plutonium-separation programs constituted 9. IAEA, “Conceptualization and Development IAEA safeguards and reaffirm the IAEA’s noncompliance with its comprehensive of Safeguards Implementation at the State right and obligation to verify not just safeguards agreement and requested the Level.” the correctness but the completeness of director-general to report the matter to the UN state declarations under comprehensive 10. IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness Security Council. The first decision was taken safeguards agreements. and Improving the Efficiency of Agency by a resolution, and the second decision was Safeguards,” GC(57)/RES/13, September 2013, made through the mechanism of consensus ENDNOTES para. 21. adoption of a chairman’s summary of the board’s deliberations. IAEA, “Iraq’s Non- 1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 11. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Compliance With Its Safeguards Obligations,” “The Conceptualization and Development Agreements Between the Agency and States GC(XXXV)/978, September 16, 1991; IAEA, of Safeguards Implementation at the State Required in Connection With the Treaty on “Iraq’s Non-Compliance With Its Safeguards Level,” GOV/2013/38, August 12, 2013, para. the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Obligations,” GC(XXXV)/978/Add.1, 12; Yukiya Amano, “Introductory Statement INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972. September 16, 1991. to the Board of Governors,” September 9, 12. The state was South Africa. International 2013, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ 21. IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness Energy Associates Ltd., “Review of the and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards statements/2013/amsp2013n17.html. Negotiating History of the IAEA Safeguards System,” annex 1, para. 15. 2. IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Document INFCIRC/153,” July 30, 1984, 22. “It is important to emphasize that there Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards: pp. 33‑44, http://cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/ is always some degree of uncertainty in the Report by the Director General to the General INFCIRC153Ch1-3.pdf. verification process, and the Agency cannot Conference,” GC(39)/17, August 22, 1995, 13. IAEA, “Safeguards: Draft Resolution provide absolute guarantees regarding the annexes 1 and 4. Submitted by Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and absence of small-scale nuclear activities, 3. IAEA, “Model Protocol Additional to Tunisia on Behalf of the Africa Group,” such as simulations on personal computers the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the GOV/2547/Rev.1, September 11, 1991. or lab work by a few scientists (or indeed, International Atomic Energy Agency for the direct acquisition by a state of weapons- 14. IAEA, “South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities,” Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 usable nuclear material).… Nevertheless, an GC(XXXV)/RES/567, September 1991. The (Corrected), September 1997. intrusive inspection system [such as the one draft resolution, submitted by Zaire on behalf that the IAEA was implementing in Iraq] can 4. See IAEA, “Background on IAEA Board of the African Group, was adopted without a minimize the risk of prohibited activities going of Governors’ Approval of Framework for vote. undetected, and deter, through the risk of early Integrated Safeguards,” November 17, 2010, 15. IAEA, “Record of GOV/OR Meeting 776,” detection, the revival of a nuclear weapons http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2002/ GOV/OR.776, February 25, 1992, paras, 48, 83, programme.” UN Security Council, “Letter sgarticle_02.shtml. “Taking note” is a neutral and 84. Dated 19 March 2003 From the Secretary- term, an acknowledgment that information General Addressed to the President of the was conveyed rather than an indication of 16. IAEA, “Record of GOV/OR Meeting 783,” Security Council,” S/2003/342, 20 March 2003 approval or disapproval. GOV/OR.783, June 17, 1992, paras. 90‑93. (containing the IAEA work program in Iraq 5. IAEA, “Conceptualization and Development 17. IAEA, “Strengthening of the Safeguards pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1284). of Safeguards Implementation at the State System,” GC(XXXVI)/RES/586, October 1992. 23. IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness Level.” 18. IAEA Board of Governors, “Report on the and Improving the Efficiency of Agency ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6. IAEA Department of Safeguards, “Long Implementation of the Agreement Between the Safeguards,” annex 3, para. 49. 30 EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION SOVIET FORMER THE AND EUROPE InThe 31 Europe and the 39 The United States Former Soviet Union and the Americas

35 The Middle East and 44 Asia and Australia NEWS Africa Septemeber 2014

Russia Breaches INF Treaty, U.S. Says

fter months of speculation, the U.S. State Department the Obama administration was “asking Russia to return to announced in July that it had found Russia to be in compliance with the treaty in a verifiable manner.” Aviolation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Gottemoeller said that the two countries previously “have (INF) Treaty over Moscow’s testing of a new medium-range, been down the road of needless, costly, and destabilizing arms ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). The accusation comes races.” She added, “We know where that road leads and we are at a time of heightened U.S.-Russian tensions over Moscow’s fortunate that our past leaders had the wisdom and strength to support for separatist forces in Ukraine. turn us in a new direction.” “We have been attempting to address this very serious The INF Treaty, signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet matter with Russia for some time, as the United States is wholly leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, marked the first time the two committed to the continued viability of the INF Treaty,” Rose superpowers agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and utilize Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and extensive on-site inspections for verification. The treaty, which international security, said Aug. 14. In remarks to a symposium is still in force, eliminated almost 2,700 intermediate-range at U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, she said ballistic and cruise missiles, most of them Russia’s. ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 U.S. Department of Defense of Department U.S.

A Soviet inspector examines a ground-launched cruise missile in 1988 prior to its destruction under the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 31 U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir the cruise missile as early as 2008, and the administration Putin spoke by telephone about the INF Treaty on Aug. 1, concluded that it was a compliance concern by the end of 2011, according to the White House. although officials do not believe the missile has been deployed. According to a July 28 New York Times report, Obama sent Gottemoeller first raised the issue with Russian officials in May Putin a letter that day in which Obama asked for a high-level 2013, according to the Times. dialogue with Moscow to discuss ways to preserve the treaty and Unconfirmed reports have focused on Russia’s R-500 Iskander-K bring Russia back into compliance. short-range cruise missile as the missile that precipitated the U.S. In an interview in early August, a diplomatic source familiar allegation. That system uses a road-mobile launcher, similar to with the treaty controversy said senior Russian and U.S. officials the Iskander-M, which is a short-range, nuclear-capable ballistic are expected to meet in September to discuss the issue. missile. Russia reportedly is deploying the Iskander-M near Luga, south of St. Petersburg, near Russia’s borders with NATO member U.S. Allegation Unspecified countries in response to U.S. missile defense plans. (See ACT, The Obama administration alleges that Russia is violating its January/February 2014.) It is not clear if the range of the R-500 INF Treaty obligation “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” a exceeds the lower limit of the INF Treaty. GLCM with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers or “to possess In the August interview, the diplomatic source said that or produce launchers of such missiles,” as a State Department according to the United States, the R-500 is not the focus of the report sent to Congress in July summarized it. allegation. That appears to be consistent with other available At a meeting in early July, the Principals Committee, which information on the allegation and the history of the R-500. includes the national security adviser, the defense secretary, According to the Times report, the GLCM considered to be a EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state, violation was first tested in 2008 and has not been deployed. and the CIA director, “unanimously agreed” that the cruise The R-500 reportedly was first tested in May 2007 and deployed missile flight test was a “serious violation,” theTimes said. A in 2013. senior administration official toldArms Control Today on July 29 At an April 29 congressional hearing, Rep. Brad Sherman that the intelligence community has “high confidence” in the (D-Calif.) offered an alternative explanation of the nature of the assessment. alleged violation and the platform involved. He said that Russia The State Department report, which surveys compliance claims to have tested a new intermediate-range missile for use with arms control agreements by the United States and at sea, which is allowed under the INF Treaty if the missile is other countries, did not specify the type of cruise missile in tested from a test launcher, but that Moscow used “what appears question or say how many tests have been conducted or when to be an operational, usable ground-based launcher,” which is they occurred. The senior administration official said that not allowed. Sherman said that “it appears as if [the Russians] the testing took place at the Kapustin Yar test site in western were developing a ground-based capacity for this intermediate[- Russia. According to the Times story, Russia began testing range] missile.” (See ACT, June 2014.) khail Klimentyev/AFP/Getty Images Klimentyev/AFP/Getty khail M i

ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, speak at a reception at the Kremlin on June 26, 2013. 32 Russia Denies Charges maintain its capability to launch intermediate-range cruise Russia denies that it is breaching the INF treaty. The Russian missiles or if the United States intends to modify the launcher to Foreign Ministry said in a July 28 statement that the allegations eliminate this capability. are “as baseless as all of Washington’s claims that have lately been reaching Moscow. Absolutely no proof has been provided.” Hill Response The United States has accused Moscow of providing military In response to the State Department’s charge against Russia, support to rebel forces in eastern Ukraine, including the surface- Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) said in a July 31 press release that to-air missile that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July. Russia’s action “cannot go unanswered.” Along with Sens. Jim “We have many complaints to make to the United States with Risch (R-Idaho) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Rubio introduced regard to the [INF] Treaty,” the statement continued. “These legislation that would, among other things, initiate U.S. include missile defense target missiles having characteristics research and development on missiles banned by the INF Treaty. similar to those of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles and Such work is allowed under the pact. the production by the Americans of armed drones which clearly Congress does not appear to be pressuring the administration fall under the [category of] land-based cruise missiles” in the to withdraw from the INF Treaty to protest Russia’s actions, in INF Treaty, the ministry said. part because there is an apparent political consensus that the Russia’s top general, Valery Gerasimov, told Gen. Martin best outcome for the United States would be for Moscow to Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on July come back into compliance. “I do not believe the appropriate 31 that Moscow was committed to adhering to the INF Treaty, remedy in this case is for the United States to withdraw from the Reuters reported. treaty,” Stephen Rademaker, an official in the George W. Bush According to the diplomatic source, Gerasimov expressed administration, told the House Armed Services Committee on concern about U.S. plans to field the Mark-41 (MK-41) missile July 17. “Rather, since Russia so clearly wants out, we should launcher in Romania and Poland as part of the European Phased make sure that they alone pay the political and diplomatic price Adaptive Approach, the Obama administration’s policy for of terminating the treaty.” missile defense in Europe. According to an Aug. 1 statement by Last summer, Sergey Ivanov, the Kremlin chief of staff, the Russian Foreign Ministry, the sea-based MK-41 “can be used publicly questioned the value of the treaty, saying Russia has to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles, but [its] ground- more potential threats on its borders than the United States launched version will be a gross violation of the INF Treaty.” does. “The Americans have no need for this class of weapon[;] The MK-41 is currently used on U.S. Navy ships to launch they didn’t need it before and they don’t need it now,” Ivanov missile defense interceptors, such as the Standard Missile-3, but said, according to RIA Novosti. “They could theoretically only it is also used to launch the Tomahawk intermediate-range cruise attack Mexico and Canada with them, because their effective missile. As a sea-based missile, the Tomahawk does not run afoul radius doesn’t extend to Europe.” of the INF Treaty. But once the MK-41 is based on land, as the Russia has indicated that another answer to its concerns United States plans to do next year, it would, in Russia’s view, might to be to expand the membership of the treaty. In 2007, conflict with the INF Treaty’s prohibition on possessing a ground- Russia and the United States issued a statement at the UN based launcher for intermediate-range cruise missiles. General Assembly reaffirming their “support” for the treaty The United States has not responded publicly to the Russian and calling on all other states to join them in renouncing the allegations. It is not clear if the land-based MK-41 would missiles banned by the treaty.—TOM Z. COLLINA U.S., EU Sanction Russia’s Arms Sector

n response to Russian intervention in Ukraine, the Obama Iadministration and the European ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 Union have imposed sanctions on khail Klimentyev/AFP/Getty Images Klimentyev/AFP/Getty khail M

Russia’s weapons and defense sector. i In an announcement on July 29, the EU banned new EU-Russian military equipment transactions for one year while the Obama administration blacklisted eight Russian defense firms, two separatist groups, and a Ukrainian oil facility. The European Commission, the executive body of the EU, called the Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during an awards ceremony in the Kremlin measures “a strong warning [that] illegal on July 31, days after the United States and European Union imposed additional annexation of territory and deliberate sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. 33 destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe.” The U.S. What Sanctioned Commerce Department cited “Russia’s Russian Firms Make continued policy of destabilization in eastern Ukraine and ongoing occupation • Joint Stock Company (JSC) Concern Almaz-Antey is Russia’s largest of Crimea and Sevastopol” as reasons to defense contractor and the 12th largest in the world, with revenues of $8 block transactions with the 11 entities billion in 2013. “engaged in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy • Kalashnikov Concern makes the durable Kalashnikov assault rifle, one of interests of the United States.” the world’s most popular weapons. Kalishnikov Concern has exported al- Any U.S. firm seeking a license to do most 10,000 rifles to the United States in the first six months of 2014. business with these organizations will face a presumption of denial, according • KBPO (Konstruktorskoe Byuro Priborostroeniya Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe to the Commerce Department. The Obshchestvo) manufactures high-precision weapons, anti-tank missiles, U.S. sanctions, first authorized by an and anti-aircraft systems, including the vehicle-mounted Buk missile sys- executive order issued in March by tem that Western defense analysts say destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 President Barack Obama, also block in July, killing 298 people. these entities from transferring any EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION assets, receiving payments, or processing • The State Scientific Production Enterprise Bazalt builds aircraft, ground, withdrawals in the United States. and marine munitions. The sanctioned Russian firms include Concern Almaz-Antey, Russia’s leading • JSC Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies focuses on electronic war- defense contractor; KBPO, which fare. manufacturers the anti-aircraft system believed to have destroyed a Malaysia • JSC Concern Sozvezdie focuses on electronic warfare. Airlines plane in July; and Kalashnikov Concern, which manufactures the assault • JSC Military-Industrial Corporation NPO Mashinostroyenia builds ad- rifle of the same name. Kalashnikov vanced space and rocketry equipment. exported at least 10,000 rifles to the United States in 2013, according to the Wisconsin • Uralvagonzavod produces combat vehicles, tanks, and ordnance. Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which monitors the global arms trade. Source: Defense News, U.S. Commerce Department, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Russia Responds It is not clear what the impact of the sanctions will be. European arms exports to Russia are relatively small, totaling In addition to the EU sanctions, summer at the port of Saint-Nazaire, in around $400 million in 2013, according the German government canceled an northwestern France, learning how to to the EU. But exports of dual-use ongoing deal involving Rheinmetall, a operate the vessel. goods to Russia last year were worth an German defense firm supplying parts for The U.S. House of Representatives estimated $26 billion. European firms a Russian military training facility. The approved a defense appropriations bill supplied lasers and advanced electronics deal has been suspended, and no more in May with an amendment by Rep. and materials, which Russia may find deliveries will occur, according to the Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) barring the difficult to replace, according to sources German embassy in Washington. “We Defense Department from contracting quoted by The Wall Street Journal. wanted to go beyond the EU sanctions,” or subcontracting for helicopters or On Aug. 6, Izvestia cited sources in a spokesman said in Aug. 11 phone other weapons with Rosoboronexport. Russia’s Federal Space Agency as saying interview. The Senate is expected to take up its aerospace and military-industrial Despite criticism from other European similar legislation in September. enterprises will purchase electronic countries, France is going ahead with Republican Sens. John Cornyn (Texas) components totaling several billion a $1.6 billion deal to sell two Mistral and Dan Coats (Ind.) have called for the dollars from China. The sources said amphibious warships to the Russian cancellation of all Pentagon contracts China Aerospace Science and Industry defense firm Rosoboronexport. DCNS, a with Rosoboronexport. The Pentagon Corp. had offered “a direct alternative to, French naval defense company, signed has paid the company more than $1 or slight modifications of the elements the deal in June 2011. The company billion for a fleet of Russian-made Mi-17 [Russia] will no longer be able to acquire says it will deliver the first carrier to helicopters, which the United States is because of the sanctions introduced by Russia in October. According to news providing to Afghan security forces.— ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY the United States,” according to Izvestia. reports, 400 Russian sailors trained this JEFFERSON MORLEY 34 Syrian Chemicals Destroyed on U.S. Ship AFRICA AND EAST MIDDLE THE

he destruction of the most dangerous of Syria’s chemical The OPCW Executive Council and the UN Security Council weapons materials was completed Aug. 18 aboard a U.S. subsequently endorsed the plan. Tship in the Mediterranean Sea, President Barack Obama Parties to the CWC are responsible for destroying chemical announced in a statement that day. weapons components that they possess, but the plan allowed The MV Cape Ray neutralized about 600 metric tons of Syrian for the possibility of destruction outside Syria, in part because chemicals using two mobile units of the Field Deployable of the civil war that has been taking place in Syria since early Hydrolysis System, a technology developed by the Defense 2011. Several countries were seen as candidates for hosting Department. About 20 metric tons was weapons-usable sulfur destruction facilities, but all of them declined, making mustard, and the rest was a sarin precursor known as DF, shipboard destruction an attractive option, particularly for the according to figures from the Defense Department and the most dangerous chemicals. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In an Aug. 19 statement congratulating the United States, The announcement of the milestone in the ongoing effort OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü reported that to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons program came a few days “OPCW inspectors aboard the ship verified that no chemicals before the one-year anniversary of a chemical attack on the of any kind escaped into the sea or otherwise impacted the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, the catalyst for the sequence of environment.” events that led to Syrian chemical weapons materials being Some of the lower-priority chemicals, as well as the effluent destroyed on a U.S. ship. from the Cape Ray operation, are being processed in land In response to that attack, which the United States, other facilities in Europe and the United States. governments, and most independent analysts attributed to Of the 1,300 metric tons of chemical weapons material that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Obama Syria declared when it joined the CWC, approximately 90 administration appeared poised to launch punitive military percent was removed from the country for destruction. About strikes against Syria. But Secretary of State John Kerry and 130 metric tons of isopropanol were destroyed in Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov negotiated a deal under The removal of the material proceeded sporadically, and which Syria, which has close ties to Russia, agreed to join the Syria fell months behind the timetable set by the OPCW and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and destroy its chemical the United Nations. Syria and Russia blamed the civil war and arsenal under an expedited schedule. (See ACT, October 2013.) the resulting dangers to overland transport. Other countries ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 U.S. Department of Defense of Department U.S.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel makes a telephone from his office at the Pentagon on August 18 to congratulate the crew of the U.S. ship MV Cape Ray on finishing its job of neutralizing Syrian chemical weapons materials. 35 assigned much of the blame to the Syrian government; Robert The hydrolysis units operated 24 hours a day for six days a Mikulak, the U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, said Syria was week, with one day set aside for activities such as maintenance “drag[ging] its feet.” (See ACT, March 2014.) and testing, the official said, adding that there were no “major The chemicals had to be gathered from across the country to problems or delays.” the port of Latakia, where an international convoy picked them In an Aug. 18 press release, the Pentagon said Defense up for delivery to the Cape Ray and other destruction locations. Secretary Chuck Hagel had called the ship to congratulate the An OPCW-UN mission oversaw the operation. crew on its work.

Beating the Schedule Production Facilities As Obama and Üzümcü noted in their statements, the chemical Several weeks before the Cape Ray completed its task, the OPCW destruction on the Cape Ray was completed ahead of schedule. announced an agreement on a long-running, contentious issue, The estimates varied somewhat, but generally had projected that the destruction of Syria’s 12 remaining chemical weapons the task would require about two months. production facilities. In a July 24 statement following an In an Aug. 26 e-mail to Arms Control Today, a Defense Executive Council meeting earlier that day, the OPCW said

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA Department official said the original estimates were 45 to 90 that seven hangars would be “razed to the ground” and five days, with the range later narrowing to 45 to 60 days once underground structures, which are part of a system of tunnels, officials had a better idea of the quantities theCape Ray would would be “sealed permanently to make them inaccessible.” be handling. The Pentagon maintained 60 days as the publicly Syria had previously insisted on converting the facilities to announced figure to avoid “external pressure to meet an other uses rather than destroying them. (See ACT, July/August ‘artificial’ deadline,” the official said. 2014, Web Extra.) The CWC allows countries to do so, with the The 60-day figure built in some time for delays the official approval of their fellow parties to the treaty. said, noting that the Cape Ray operation marked the first time The council’s decision document and an addendum from chemical weapons neutralization was carried out at sea. Üzümcü, which were not publicly released but were obtained by Arms Control Today, provide some details on the upcoming steps for the production facilities. The addendum describes a “fill and plug” process that would essentially destroy the parts of the underground structures that were directly related to chemical weapons production. Sensors will be installed “to monitor the integrity of the interior plug.” The OPCW Technical Secretariat will have the right to inspect the closed portions for five years after the filling and plugging operation is completed, the addendum says. No “toxic chemical activities” are allowed in the parts of the structures that remain usable. According to the decision document, the destruction of the hangars is to start within 60 days of July 24, and destruction of the underground facilities within 90 days. In his Aug. 18 statement, Obama said, “Going forward, we will watch closely to see that Syria fulfills its commitment to destroy its remaining declared chemical weapons production

U.S. Navy U.S. facilities.” He also cited “serious questions” about “omissions and discrepancies in Syria’s declaration to the OPCW” and “continued allegations of use,” apparently a reference to A helicopter approaches the Cape Ray to drop off cargo in the allegations of weapons use of chlorine in Syria earlier this year. Mediterranean Sea on August 4. The OPCW is investigating those allegations.—DANIEL HORNER

Iran, P5+1 Extend Nuclear Talks

ran and six-country group known The negotiators originally aimed to December 2013.) as the P5+1 agreed in July to extend conclude a comprehensive agreement In a joint statement announcing the Inegotiations over Iran’s nuclear by July 20, which marked the end of the extension in Vienna on July 19, Iranian program through Nov. 24, a step implementation of a six-month interim Foreign Minister and lead nuclear officials said they hope will give the agreement. But the interim accord, which negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif and parties enough time to find solutions the parties reached last Nov. 24, allows Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy to the remaining gaps and reach a for the initial six-month time period to chief and lead negotiator for the P5+1 ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY comprehensive nuclear agreement. be extended if all parties agree. (See ACT, (China, France, Germany, Russia, the 36 Jim Bourg/AFP/Getty Images Bourg/AFP/Getty Jim

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (left) meets with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (right) in Vienna on July 13 during multilateral talks on Iran’s nuclear program.

United Kingdom, and the United States), about 10,200 operating first-generation and converting the other half to powder said they had made “tangible progress” in centrifuges, and want to build up a form for fuel assemblies. Kerry said that some areas but that “significant gaps on program that will allow them to provide implementation of the interim agreement core issues” will require “more time and enriched-uranium fuel for domestic was a “clear success” and rolled back effort” to reach an agreement. nuclear power reactors Tehran says it parts of Iran’s nuclear program for the The statement did not give an exact plans to build. Iran currently has one first time in a decade. date for the resumption of negotiations, nuclear power reactor, Bushehr, and has a The stockpile of 20 percent-enriched but said that the parties would reconvene contract with Russia for the reactor’s fuel uranium in gas form was a particular “in the coming weeks in different through 2021. concern to the P5+1 because uranium formats.” The P5+1 wants to cut Iran’s current enriched to this level is more easily On Aug. 7, U.S. officials, led by Wendy capacity and maintain strict limits on enriched further to weapons grade. Sherman, the lead U.S. negotiator and uranium enrichment for a number of The P5+1 committed to allow Iran undersecretary of state for political affairs, years. to transfer $2.8 billion of its funds met with Iranian officials in Geneva to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who locked up in overseas accounts back discuss the nuclear negotiations. joined negotiators July 13-15 in Vienna, into the country over the course of the A European diplomat familiar with the said in a statement after the extension four-month extension. U.S. sanctions talks told Arms Control Today in an Aug. announcement that, despite the gaps, have prohibited foreign banks from 14 e-mail that negotiators would likely there is a “path forward.” transferring payments for Iranian exports

meet before the UN General Assembly Both sides committed to continue such as oil to Iranian banks. (See ACT, ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 convenes Sept. 16. A ministerial-level implementation of the measures from July/August 2012.) meeting during the General Assembly is the six-month interim agreement and probable, he said. agreed to take several additional steps IAEA-Iran Cooperation He said both sides “remained before Nov. 24. For example, Iran Meanwhile, Yukiya Amano, director- entrenched” on the issue of Iran’s agreed to convert 25 kilograms of 20 general of the International Atomic uranium-enrichment program. A percent-enriched uranium powder into Energy Agency (IAEA), visited Tehran on comprehensive agreement is unlikely fuel assemblies for its Tehran Research Aug. 17 to discuss how to “strengthen unless both sides are willing to move Reactor. cooperation and dialogue” between the away from “extreme positions” on what During the term of the interim agency and Iran, according to an Aug. 15 uranium-enrichment capacity Iran needs agreement, Iran neutralized its stockpile IAEA press release. in the years to come, he said. of 20 percent-enriched uranium During his one-day visit, Amano met Iranian officials have opposed any gas by diluting half to reactor-grade with President Hassan Rouhani, Zarif, cuts to the current capacity, which is enrichment levels of less than 5 percent and Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the 37 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. 2013.) The IAEA laid out its concerns, weapons development. In comments to the press during his including allegations of activities with visit, Amano said he discussed with possible relevance for developing nuclear Detonators Iranian officials how to “move ahead weapons, in detail in its November Under one provision of the November with existing practical measures.” 2011 report to the agency’s Board of framework agreement, Iran provided He was referring to a May 21 joint Governors. (See ACT, December 2011.) the IAEA with information by May on announcement in which Tehran pledged As one of the May actions, Tehran was its past work on exploding bridge wire to provide the agency with information to provide the IAEA with information detonators, which is one of the activities in five areas of concern to the IAEA by addressing allegations that Iran relevant to developing nuclear weapons. Aug. 25. (See ACT, June 2014.) Amano conducted experiments with certain Iran maintained in its communications said implementation of these measures kinds of high explosives that could be to the agency that the detonators were had begun and he expected further relevant to nuclear weapons. Iran also developed for use in the oil and gas progress to be made over the next week. said it would provide information on industry. (See ACT, June 2014.) These actions are part of a November studies “in Iran in relation to neutron Amano said the IAEA “followed up” THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA agreement, the Framework for transport and associated modelling and on issues related to the information Iran Cooperation, in which Iran and the calculations and their alleged application provided on the exploding bridge wire IAEA committed to “resolve all present to compressed materials,” another area detonators during his visit. Salehi told and past issues.” (See ACT, December with direct connections to nuclear reporters on Aug. 17 that Iran “responded to all of the questions” Amano asked about the detonators and said he hoped Amano would “wrap up” this topic. Salehi said future steps would be easier if the topic were closed. Amano, however, said that to assess Iran’s need for the detonators, the agency will need to consider “all past outstanding issues” and assess them as an entire system. Amano said he and Iranian officials also discussed new measures that Iran is to take “in the near future” to address the agency’s unresolved concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, who was in Tehran during Amano’s visit, said on Aug. 18 that Iran is trying to resolve its problems with the agency while protecting Iran’s “principles, interests, and national security.” He said he hoped this cooperation would continue but that some IAEA requests are “irrational” and unacceptable to Iran. Iran has provided the IAEA with information to address 13 areas of concern since the November agreement. After the August talks, Amano said he was glad to hear “from the highest levels [of the Iranian government] a firm commitment to implementation” of the

Conleth Brady/IAEA Conleth November agreement. Amano said that the IAEA remains committed to “resolve all past and present issues.”—KELSEY DAVENPORT

Kelsey Davenport’s reporting from Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (left), and Vienna was supported by a grant from the ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano participate in a press conference in Tehran on August 17. Heinrich Böll Foundation North America. 38 THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAS THE STATES AND UNITED THE White House Reviewing Nuclear Budget

aced with increasing pressure to reduce military spending, weapons, and the U.S. military leadership has determined the White House is overseeing an interagency review of it can reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to Fmultibillion-dollar plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear 1,000-1,100, or about one-third lower than the levels set by the arsenal, an Obama administration spokesman said in August. 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Russia showed little This review will inform the administration’s fiscal year 2016 interest in further arms reductions, even before U.S.-Russian budget request to Congress, Ned Price of the National Security relations worsened over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Council (NSC) said in an Aug. 22 e-mail to Arms Control Today. actions to support rebels in Ukraine. The NSC staff is leading the review, Price said. At the same time, the administration’s nuclear modernization The budget request is to be submitted to Congress early next plans have started to run into trouble as the 2011 Budget year. Control Act’s limits on defense spending have begun to bite. For Meanwhile, a bipartisan, independent report commissioned example, the defense budget still needs to be cut by $115 billion by Congress and the Defense Department and released July 31 for fiscal years 2016-2019 to meet the act’s requirements. calls the administration’s plans to rebuild the nuclear arsenal As a result, the administration has had to delay producing “unaffordable” and a threat to “needed improvements in the Navy’s new submarines by two years, delay certifying the conventional forces.” new bombers to carry nuclear weapons, delay developing a new The report, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future” nuclear-armed ALCM by three years, delay rebuilding nuclear by the National Defense Panel, which focuses primarily on warheads, and cancel plans to build a new warhead production broader defense issues, finds that current plans to modernize all facility in New Mexico. three legs of the nuclear triad—land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers—would have a “substantial cost” of $600 billion Questions on New Cruise Missile to $1 trillion over 30 years. Although the panel supports Seeking to cut spending, Congress has begun to scrutinize retaining the triad, it states that “the merits of some aspects of this expensive recapitalization can be debated.” The panel, co-chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and retired Gen. John P. Abizaid, former commander of U.S. Central Command, says that the U.S. nuclear arsenal “could be reduced” if future arms control agreements required that. Either way, the United States will have to stop the “neglect” that has existed since the end of the Cold War and make some “reasonable decisions” about modernization of delivery systems and life extension of nuclear warheads, the report says. The administration and Congress should “urgently and jointly” conduct a nuclear review to “examine the intellectual underpinnings of our strategic deterrence policy” and to “find cost-efficient ways to modernize the force,” the report says.

Big Plans, Smaller Budgets Military spending is slowing at the same time as the departments of Defense and Energy are making long-term decisions about how many new missiles, submarines, bombers, and nuclear warheads the United States will build over the next ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 50 years. The Navy wants to buy 12 new, nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines with a total production cost of about $100 billion. The Air Force is seeking up to 100 new, nuclear-armed strategic bombers that are expected to cost at least $55 billion, as well as a new fleet of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The Energy Department’s semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security

Administration (NNSA) is pursuing a $60 billion plan to Navy U.S. upgrade five nuclear warhead types, including the B61 gravity bomb. (See ACT, May 2014.) In June 2013, President Barack Obama announced he would Sailors moor the ballistic missile submarine USS Maine at pursue a new agreement with Russia to reduce strategic nuclear Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington state on June 17. 39 administration budget requests for nuclear weapons more when the Air Force cannot identify sufficient funding in its closely. Last year, the Senate Appropriations energy and water budget planning documents to design and procure a cruise subcommittee reduced the administration’s funding request for missile to deliver a refurbished warhead.” the B61 bomb life extension program by half, only to have the To shore up support for the weapon, Frank Kendall, chairman budget restored by a last-minute political compromise. (See ACT, of the joint Pentagon-NNSA Nuclear Weapons Council, wrote a March 2014.) June 24 letter to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairwoman This year, that panel and the House and Senate Appropriations Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) stating that a bomber force armed defense subcommittees all cut the administration’s request for with nuclear cruise missiles provides the president with the new ALCM. “uniquely flexible options in an extreme crisis, particularly the In its June 17 report accompanying the bill, the Senate ability to signal intent and control escalation.” Appropriations energy and water subcommittee said it is No date has been set for a vote in the full Senate on the “reluctant to provide funding for a new cruise missile warhead defense and energy appropriations bills.—TOM Z. COLLINA

Vietnam Pact Nears End of Hill Review

U.S.-Vietnamese agreement for

THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS civilian nuclear cooperation is Aon the verge of clearing its main hurdle in the United States, as Congress seems unlikely to complete the action it would need to take to block or revise the pact in the little remaining time left to do so. Legislation that would have altered the duration of the Vietnam pact and some other agreements passed the Senate, and when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had marked up State of Department U.S. the legislation, it considered but did not approve amendments that would have made changes that are more far-reaching. In interviews since then, congressional staffers indicated that although the Senate bill is very unlikely to become Secretary of State John Kerry (left) and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Bình law during the current Congress, its Minh initial the U.S.-Vietnamese nuclear cooperation agreement on October 10, key provision and the amendments 2013, in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, the site of the Association of Southeast considered by the committee could Asian Nations summit. resurface in some form. That is because they set standards for nuclear only two of the 90 days when Congress would require most new agreements to cooperation agreements rather than returns in early September, according to be reviewed by Congress every 30 years. specifically changing the Vietnam congressional sources. House action on The Vietnam agreement has an initial accord, the staffers said. the legislation within that time is seen as duration of 30 years “and shall continue Under current law, nuclear cooperation extremely unlikely. in force thereafter for additional periods agreements that meet nine basic The agreement with Vietnam is of five years each.” Either party can nonproliferation requirements can enter the first in what could be a series of terminate the agreement at the end of into force without a congressional vote agreements with countries that are those periods. of approval if they lie before Congress for considering launching nuclear power 90 days of so-called continuous session programs. For nonproliferation advocates Changes Contemplated without Congress blocking them. Most in Congress and elsewhere, a key issue When the Foreign Relations Committee agreements, including the one with is how hard the United States should marked up legislation July 22, it Vietnam, are in this category. press these countries to forgo uranium considered amendments by Sens. Bob The 90-day clock for the Vietnam pact enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, Corker (R-Tenn.) and Edward Markey began when President Barack Obama activities that are considered sensitive (D-Mass.) that would have made broader submitted the agreement to Congress because they can be used to produce changes in U.S. law. on May 8 and ran until Congress nuclear explosive material. Corker’s amendment would have ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY adjourned for its August recess, leaving The legislation approved by the Senate added a 10th item to the nonproliferation 40 list, a “guaranty” that the country would Congress has “other powers,” namely the preconditions to U.S. nuclear cooperation not “engage in activities related to the ability to establish in law the standards with potential partners, especially enrichment or reprocessing of material.” that agreements must meet, he said. nontraditional preconditions that At the markup, Corker noted that potential partners refuse to accept and adding the language does not mean Seeking Clarity other supplier nations do not require,” that countries necessarily would be Late last year, the Obama administration a description that would apply to the required to forgo enrichment and completed a three-year internal review of proposals to press countries to renounce reprocessing. But if they did not agree its policy on civilian nuclear cooperation. enrichment and reprocessing activities. to that condition, the agreement would A senior administration official last Lipman, the institute’s executive require congressional approval, a much December described the policy as director for policy development and higher political hurdle than lying before “principled...but also pragmatic and supplier programs, said enrichment- and Congress for 90 days without being practical.” (See ACT, January/February reprocessing-related provisions in U.S. disapproved. 2014.) The administration did not issue nuclear cooperation agreements should Markey’s amendment would bar the documents that typically accompany “reflect the unique circumstances of each funding for U.S. nuclear cooperation such a policy announcement, leading bilateral relationship.” with countries that take certain actions, to questions in Congress and elsewhere But he said that the nuclear industry including pursuing development of about the specifics of the policy. “has no quarrel” with a 30-year limit enrichment and reprocessing programs At a Jan. 30 Foreign Relations on the duration of civilian nuclear unless such programs are authorized Committee hearing, Menendez and agreements. The most important by the country’s nuclear cooperation Corker pressed administration witnesses issue with regard to the term of the agreement with the United States. to provide a clear explanation of the agreements is that renewal negotiations Markey’s amendment failed by a vote U.S. policy on nuclear cooperation, begin early enough to avoid situations in of 11-5; Corker’s lost on a voice vote. particularly with regard to restricting which “an agreement is ready run out” Committee Chairman Robert Menendez enrichment and reprocessing. and the renewal agreement has not been (D-N.J.) told Corker and Markey that he Menendez said he wanted to know completed. “The term to us is, to some supported their “aspirations” but not what criteria the administration would degree, immaterial,” he said. the amendments. He said he would be be using to determine whether to push Congress is in the midst of a wave of willing to work with the two lawmakers a country to refrain from enrichment new and renewed nuclear cooperation to come up with language that was more and reprocessing activities. Corker said agreements. Renewal agreements with likely to win support in the Senate. there was a “great inconsistency across Taiwan and the International Atomic Menendez is the author of the language agreements.” Energy Agency recently entered into requiring the 30-year review, which was In the Aug. 6 interview, the staffer said force. Earlier this year, the United States incorporated into a resolution of approval the absence of clearly articulated criteria and South Korea agreed to a two-year for the Vietnam agreement. means that Congress has no baseline extension while they sought to resolve In an Aug. 6 interview, a senior Senate for judging if the administration “got issues preventing a longer-term agreement. staffer said the resolution had been as much as [it] could” in negotiating The United States also is in various crafted to recognize the different roles nonproliferation conditions with other stages of negotiations with a number of of Congress and the administration. countries. “We don’t enjoy that,” he said. other countries, including China, Jordan, Negotiating agreements is the At a July 10 hearing before the and Saudi Arabia. China’s agreement responsibility of the executive branch, House Foreign Affairs Committee, expires next year; the ones with Jordan and it is “not our job to change the Daniel Lipman of the Nuclear Energy and Saudi Arabia would be new ones.— agreement that is negotiated,” he said. Institute argued against “inflexible DANIEL HORNER

State Dept. Targets ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 Profile ‘Generation Prague’

ince 2010, the State Department has hosted an annual refer to the conferences and the next generation of professionals conference on arms control and disarmament to support working in arms control. The term is an allusion to Obama’s SPresident Barack Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear speech outlining nuclear policy in Prague on April 5, 2009. weapons, with students and young professionals in the field as its The State Department created the Generation Prague concept in principal target audience. 2010 to provide a “forum and framework for collaboration” with In interviews, participants in the conferences praised the young professionals, students, and foreign governments that were meetings while suggesting ways to strengthen the effort. energized by the Prague speech, Erin Harbaugh, outreach officer The State Department uses the term “Generation Prague” to for the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and 41 U.S. Department of State of Department U.S. THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS

Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, addresses the Generation Prague conference in Washington on July 10.

Nonproliferation, told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 25 e-mail. that youth “view the value of nuclear weapons differently” Now in its fifth year, Generation Prague is an event for because the weapons do not have the same deterrent value today “educating and empowering the next generation,” Alexandra Bell, as they did during the Cold War. director for strategic outreach in the Office of the Undersecretary One of the young professionals he mentioned was Kingston for Arms Control and International Security, said in the same Reif, who participated in a 2011 panel and is now the director of e-mail. nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non- Young people view nuclear weapons “through a completely Proliferation. different lens” in comparison to other generations because many Reif said in an Aug. 20 e-mail that he was motivated to were born after the Cold War, Bell said. The conferences give participate because nuclear threat reduction is the responsibility emerging leaders an opportunity to discuss nuclear policies that not only of previous generations, “but our generation and future will fit in a more interconnected world, she said. generations as well.” Although the conferences bring in high-level officials such as Making Disarmament ‘Relatable’ Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and Participants at the conference said they benefited from the international security, and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, Bell experience. For Brenna Gautam, a senior at the University of said the State Department has also worked to bring in experts Notre Dame who attended the conference while working as an from the “policy trenches” to ensure that the “audience gets an intern in Washington, the gathering presented “a more relatable idea of how policy is working from top to bottom.” image of the issue of disarmament and arms control.” Gautam, Shane Mason said he appreciated the opportunity to meet a co-founder of her university’s Global Zero chapter, said in an experts who have been in the field for five to 10 years and support Aug. 20 e-mail that this is important because she feels that nuclear high-level officials. Mason, a research associate at the Stimson disarmament is “not a very personal issue” for her generation. Center, said in an Aug. 20 e-mail that these experts provide Erin Corcoran, a recent college graduate with an interest in “practical insights” about finding jobs and developing the the field, said in an Aug. 21 e-mail that, for young professionals necessary skills for the field. to continue making progress in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, it is important to learn about the gravity of the threat Increasing Participation posed by these weapons from “predecessors who lived and worked Mason said that barriers to careers, particularly at the State through the Cold War.” Department, “seem pretty insurmountable at times.” Although Officials also say they benefit from the conferences. An Energy he acknowledged that budget constraints make hiring difficult, Department official said in a July 28 interview that the students Mason said that young people will not stay in the field if they and young professionals at Generation Prague have “challenged cannot find jobs. ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY and broadened his thinking.” He said experts need to be reminded Bell said a “key driver” for reaching out to young people is 42 demographics, as many experts who “built the arms control and nonproliferation regimes” are reaching retirement age. The State Department “wants to recruit their replacements” and is looking for new ways to hire the next generation of leaders, she said. U.S. Department of State of Department U.S. Despite the difficulties finding jobs, the number of young people involved in nuclear issues at the global level apparently is growing. Meena Singelee, who has tracked participation by young experts attending conferences that are part of the review process for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said the numbers have “gradually increased” since 2010, due in part to “renewed momentum” on disarmament issues and “new priorities” in areas The audience at the July 10 Generation Prague conference such as nuclear security. listens to a presentation. Singelee, executive director of the International Network Emerging Nuclear Specialists, said there remains a “lack of opportunities to “directly engage” with some of the experts. significant participation by young experts from developing Reif suggested that the State Department work with universities countries,” she said. on events that bring officials to campuses to “demonstrate that The State Department is looking to expand Generation nuclear weapons are not just a problem of the past.” Prague to reach international audiences. Bell noted that the Gautam agreed and suggested that the State Department work State Department has paired with international partners such as with pre-existing clubs on college campuses that are dedicated the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to arms control issues. She said a stronger online presence could representatives from countries including Kazakhstan and Ukraine. be helpful in reaching out to students who cannot attend events Harbaugh said that the State Department sees Generation such as the annual conference in Washington. Streaming the Prague as “one part of a larger push to engage global youth” and conference live would be a good step, she said. welcomes collaborators. Harbaugh said that the State Department wants to partner with universities and nongovernmental organizations to “offer more Moving Forward opportunities through the year, in and out of Washington.” Several participants agreed that the conferences could accomplish She said plans are already underway for next year’s conference more. Corcoran said that small-group discussions at future and that organizers hope to make it more “interactive.”—KELSEY conferences might be useful so that there would be more DAVENPORT

Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship Providing Opportunities for Tomorrow’s Leaders in Peace and Security The Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship invites recent college and grad school graduates to apply for six to nine month fellowships in Washington, DC, focusing Candidates must have an excellent academic record and a strong interest on arms control, peace, and international security issues. Founded in 1987 to in issues of peace and security. The develop and train the next generation of leaders on a range of peace and security program is open to all U.S. citizens and issues, the program has awarded 154 fellowships. non-U.S. citizens living in the U.S. eligible for employment. Benefits include a salary, Scoville Fellows work with one of more than two dozen participating public-interest health insurance, and travel to Washington, ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 organizations. They may undertake a variety of activities, including research, DC. The next application deadline is writing, public eduction and advocacy on a range of security issues, including October 1, 2014, for the spring 2015 nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, non-proliferation, missile defense, fellowship. For complete details, visit weapons trade, environmental and energy security, and peacekeeping, that www.scoville.org or call (202) 446-1565. support the goals of their host organization, and may attend coalition meetings, policy briefings and Congressional hearings. Fellows are supervised by senior level staff and often have the opportunity to publish articles, blogs, or reports. The program also arranges meetings for the fellows with policy experts. Many former Scoville Fellows have gone on to pursue graduate degrees in international relations and taken prominent positions in the field of peace and security with public interest organizations, the Federal Government, academia and media.

43 Congress Questions Policy on N. Korea

embers of Congress questioned for North Korea policy at the working with countries in the region, the Obama administration’s State Department, defended the including China, to push North Korea Mpolicy toward negotiations administration’s approach at the to take steps toward denuclearization in with North Korea over its nuclear program hearing, saying that because North order to resume negotiations. Washington at a July 30 hearing and expressed Korea “increasingly rejects meaningful is also unilaterally tightening sanctions concern about Pyongyang’s growing negotiations,” the United States is looking that “increase the cost” of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. for meaningful actions by North Korea illicit activities, he said. ASIA AND AUSTRALIA Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), before restarting talks. Davies said North Korea committed to chairman of the House Foreign Affairs these actions could include steps by denuclearization in a 2005 joint Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, North Korea such as freezing its nuclear statement with the other members of said the administration’s “so-called program and inviting inspectors from the the six-party talks, but more recently, strategic patience policy is crumbling to International Atomic Energy Agency back Pyongyang has said that it wants pieces” and that North Korea’s nuclear into the country. negotiations on its nuclear program to weapons program “continues unfettered.” Davies said it might take continued resume without any preconditions. (See As described by U.S. officials, the diplomatic overtures combined with “the ACT, November 2013.) strategic patience policy seeks to hobble patient application of increasing amounts Those talks began in 2003 with the North Korean nuclear and missile of pressure” to make North Korea realize goal of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear programs through U.S. and international its current path is “leading [it] nowhere.” program. The multilateral negotiations efforts to prevent the import and export Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) said that were held intermittently until North of proliferation-sensitive materials and “both carrots and sticks” are necessary Korea announced in April 2009 that it restart negotiations after Pyongyang to change North Korea’s behavior. He would no longer participate. demonstrates its commitment to said the United States should discuss a Washington has also negotiated dismantling its nuclear weapons program. nonaggression pact with North Korea bilaterally with North Korea in the past. For more than a decade, North Korea has and work with China to stem the Pyongyang is believed to possess the had intermittent talks with the United “enormous subsidies” that Beijing sends nuclear material for approximately four States and its four negotiating partners— to Pyongyang. to eight nuclear weapons and is working China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea— Davies said that negotiations with to increase its stockpile of weapons-usable in the so-called six-party talks. North Korea are a “multilateral task” nuclear material. (See ACT, January/ Glyn Davies, special representative and the United States is making progress February 2014.)—KELSEY DAVENPORT Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images Somodevilla/Getty Chip

ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Glyn Davies, the State Department’s special representative for North Korea policy, testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on July 30. 44 Reviewed by Douglas B. Shaw BOOK REVIEW: Posture Matters, but Stability Matters More

ipin Narang’s new book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International V Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Conflict, is an important step forward Regional Powers and International Conflict in understanding the emerging global landscape of nuclear weapons policies that By Vipin Narang could point in a dangerous direction. The Princeton University Press, 2014, 360 pp. book fills a gaping hole in the literature on nuclear weapons by offering a plausible explanation for why new nuclear states choose the nuclear postures that they do. nuclear postures deliver unique deterrence Narang applies rigorous analytical It also demolishes the common benefits below the threshold of nuclear methodologies to the topic of nuclear assumption that possession of a nuclear weapons use, a finding that should be posture—the forces, doctrines, plans, and weapon provides deterrence. Narang considered within the context of the rules for the use of nuclear weapons. He deploys sophisticated quantitative inherent risk of such postures. confronts problems in the literature such methods to demonstrate that the ability Narang’s choice of topic is noteworthy as a “Cold War hangover” of overemphasis to deter conventional attack varies with for a couple of reasons. First, his work on the experience of the superpowers with the nuclear postures that states select. delivers new concepts and insights nuclear deterrence and an “existential In so doing, Narang’s argument could that may prove immediately useful to bias” characterized by “focusing almost encourage states to consider more- policymakers. This is unusual because exclusively on a state’s acquisition or aggressive nuclear postures. policy relevance is strangely unnecessary test of its first nuclear weapon.” He Narang, an associate professor of for success in political science. Second, the contends that his findings “fundamentally political science at the Massachusetts topic of nuclear weapons policy has grown challenge the assumption that the mere Institute of Technology (MIT) and unpopular in the academy. Narang reports possession of nuclear weapons provides a member of the school’s Security that “almost everyone…was telling me the substantial deterrence benefits.” Studies Program, improves scholarly subject was dead.” He proceeds to offer three “mutually understanding of 21st-century nuclear Narang goes against the grain in exclusive and empirically exhaustive” strategy in several additional ways. both respects and identifies a troubling, categories of nuclear postures into which He has chosen an important, policy- important issue: “[t]he effect of nuclear he sorts the practices of non-superpower relevant topic for academic research; weapons on deterring conflict remains nuclear-armed states. These are “a challenged entrenched biases; categorized fundamentally unclear.” Given the catalytic strategy that attempts to catalyze

emerging nuclear postures; rigorously prospective effect of deterrence failure superpower intervention on the state’s ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 observed the reasons that states choose on international conflict, the dangers behalf; an assured retaliation strategy that their nuclear postures and the effect of of inadvertent or unauthorized use threatens certain nuclear retaliation in these posture choices on international of nuclear weapons, the destructive the event a state suffers a nuclear attack; conflict; described the specific nuclear potential of nuclear weapons, and the and an asymmetric escalation strategy that postures of several states; and, one security, economic, and human costs of threatens the first use of nuclear weapons hopes, provided the spark for a wider maintaining nuclear arsenals, this is a against conventional attack” (italics scholarly consideration of nuclear policy. public policy consideration of the first in original). This useful contribution He concludes that aggressive, first-use order. provides an intuitive and descriptive

Douglas B. Shaw is associate dean for planning, research, and external relations at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he also is an assistant professor of international affairs. During the Clinton administration, he served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Energy. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Georgetown University. 45 Fred Dufour/AFP/Getty Images Dufour/AFP/Getty Fred

A French Mirage 2000N, a fighter-bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons, prepares to take off from the military base at Cazaux in western France on June 21.

shorthand for discussing these postures military enjoys wide freedom of action in explanation for nuclear posture is and their relative merits. questions of defense policy. structural realism, relying on the Narang’s “posture optimization theory” Narang theorizes that assertive civil- distribution of power in the international describes the conditions driving states military arrangements favor a nuclear system. Technological determinism, in to select among the three postures he posture of assured retaliation while which a state’s capabilities determine defines. According to Narang’s theory, delegative civil-military arrangements its nuclear posture, is Narang’s second four sequenced variables about a state leave a state’s choice of nuclear posture alternative. In describing it, he misses with nuclear weapons allow an observer open to the question of resource an important opportunity to recall the to predict the state’s nuclear posture. If constraint. If such a state has the money, crippling blow that his MIT security the state perceives “the availability of a it may choose asymmetric escalation; studies faculty predecessor, the late reliable third-party patron” to guarantee otherwise, Narang predicts, it will choose Stephen Meyer, dealt to this idea its security from aggression, it will select assured retaliation. Narang assumes an in his 1986 book, The Dynamics of a catalytic nuclear posture to reinforce asymmetric escalation posture to be more Nuclear Proliferation,1 and the persistent that positive security assurance. If expensive than an assured retaliation nonproliferation puzzle of states that no powerful patron is available and a posture. This assumption is intuitively have the technical capability to acquire state faces a “conventionally-superior attractive because historical experience nuclear weapons but have not done so. proximate offensive threat,” Narang’s suggests that changing to an asymmetric Finally, Narang evaluates strategic culture, theory predicts that the state will adopt escalation posture requires more and finding it to be an intervening variable—a an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture. more-diverse nuclear forces. Yet, by not factor that exerts influence through If the state has neither a powerful patron quantifying this difference in expense another factor—by influencing nuclear nor a threatening neighbor with superior or exploring the possible advantages posture “through a state’s civil-military conventional forces, then Narang expects of more-expensive variants of assured relations.” He finds that the observed its nuclear posture to depend on its “civil- retaliation, Narang leaves a door open to nuclear postures of states in his case military arrangements.” He distinguishes additional research. studies are more reliably aligned with his between two types of these arrangements: Narang demonstrates the superior posture optimization theory than with “assertive,” in which civilian political explanatory power of his theory any of the three alternatives and that authorities exercise tight control over the against three alternatives across six his theory offers additional insight into ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY military, and “delegative,” in which the empirical cases. Narang’s first alternative when states may choose to change their 46 nuclear postures. On this basis, Narang them by adopting asymmetric escalation limbo” to reap coercive bargaining argues that posture optimization theory postures, upsetting existing dyads advantages against friends and enemies will predict future posture decisions of and perhaps more-complex deterrent alike.2 Arrangements for nuclear sharing regional nuclear powers. relationships. He wisely observes that within an alliance, reliance on a nuclear Rich with careful observation and “this posture undoubtedly carries with umbrella without seeking an independent historical context, the six case studies it other significant risks, such as severe nuclear weapons capability, or augment the importance of this book for command-and-control pressures and membership in nuclear-weapon-free-zone

Narang deploys sophisticated quantitative methods to demonstrate that the ability to deter conventional attack varies with the nuclear postures that states select.

any reader interested in nuclear policy. an attendant increase in the risk of agreements might widen the potential These chapters concentrate and explain inadvertent nuclear use.” variation of “nuclear posture” further. the findings of a voluminous secondary Acknowledgment of this danger begs for If Narang’s theory or some adaptation literature on each case, making the more research to understand, in Narang’s of it also drives the defense posture book a useful and convenient primer terms, when states should “trade off some decisions of countries that are nuclear on contemporary nuclear strategy, even ‘deterrent power’ for arsenal security.” Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) non- for readers who might not have great The prospect of deterring conventional or nuclear-weapon states, it could illuminate interest in the book’s discussion of terrorist attack will be attractive to many, nonproliferation behavior within NATO Narang’s research methods. For those possibly leading some nuclear states to and by other close U.S. allies. This would readers, however, the methodologically undervalue security against the prospect be of great interest to policymakers driven exclusion of the United Kingdom of inadvertency. Overturning widely held and might enable improvements in and North Korea from the list of cases assumptions may itself be dangerous, extended deterrence policy for nuclear explored is frustrating. even if the assumptions are false, in an nonproliferation. Specifically, if a Historical perspective on U.S. nuclear area such as nuclear posture, in which superpower guarantor is always preferred posture during the Cold War would also the consequences of miscalculation and to an independent nuclear weapons be interesting to explore in parallel. miscommunication are as catastrophic capability, what should the United States Nonetheless, the six case-study chapters— as misapprehension. On the other do to manage the risk of proliferation? Pakistan, India, China, France, Israel, hand, significant new findings such as Variation of the “resource constraint” and South Africa—constitute a thought- Narang’s may prove more beneficial for variable should be explored further. provoking vehicle to explore the drivers international security in the context Narang indicates that it is relative to a and characteristics of nuclear posture as a of practitioners’ perspectives on best prospective adversary. For example, it globalizing phenomenon. practices in promoting crisis stability, is low in India’s case because “anything Narang argues that the states he studies confidence, and effective negative control Pakistan can afford, India can surely also “enjoy” a “reduction in armed conflict of nuclear weapons. afford.” This is an insufficiently clear at every level of intensity, compared to Additional research extending Narang’s criterion for reliably observing variation both non-nuclear states and states that theoretical approach to states that have in resource constraint for three reasons. adopt other nuclear postures” only when not yet acquired nuclear weapons could First, states sometimes assign a very high ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 they exhibit an asymmetric escalation reveal further insights. For example, priority to nuclear weapons capabilities, nuclear posture. This finding is important Narang describes Japan as a “standby as in Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali and troubling. In claiming to overturn nuclear state,” raising the question of Bhutto’s 1965 pledge that Pakistan would a widely held assumption that the mere why this is not another possible value of “eat grass” to match an Indian nuclear existence of nuclear weapons provides his “nuclear posture” variable. Could the capability. Similarly, Narang says, France deterrence, Narang’s work seems to threat of future proliferation be sufficient was “forced to adopt an asymmetric raise the prospect that this discovery to catalyze greater resolve in a patron escalation posture before it was fully will prompt more states to adopt more- to defend a near-nuclear state? Tristan capable of doing so.” aggressive nuclear postures. This might Volpe, a Ph.D. candidate at The George Second, multiple adversaries may be be dangerous. The unique benefits of Washington University, observes that implicated in a state’s nuclear strategy. asymmetric escalation postures may not states with the latent capacity to produce For example, China is relevant to the persist if these benefits are more widely nuclear weapons often wait in a restrained Indian case, but with greater resources understood and additional states seek yet costly preweapon stage of “nuclear than Pakistan. That fact could alter the 47 way that resources affect Indian posture which policymakers do not consider this policy implications that should be choices. risk in selecting a posture, which seems explored. Can U.S. policy choices Third, when Narang observes that dangerous. encourage a posture change back from resource constraint makes a state Political constraint imposed by other asymmetric escalation to assured cautious to avoid an arms race that states seems to matter to Narang’s retaliation, catalytic, or any latent “could bankrupt the state or render it narrative explanations, but it is not nuclear posture? How should the United vulnerable,” it seems that a security included in his theory. Narang’s posture States respond to the nuclear postures dilemma, in which actions by one state to optimization theory and alternative of additional states that newly acquire increase its security decrease the security explanations for sources of nuclear nuclear weapons? How will those states of others, may be doing more work to posture do not include references to respond in turn? Could widening explain that state’s restraint than budget political pressure by other states, but he multilateral participation in direct pressure. Variation in resource constraint refers to such pressure repeatedly to communication links and nuclear risk is already suppressed in Narang’s study by explain posture decisions. For example, reduction enhance crisis stability? Perhaps including only states that possess nuclear India somehow sidestepped the first node most importantly, would an asymmetric weapons, which Narang observes are not in the decision tree of the posture escalation posture deliver additional cheap. If resource constraint does not optimization theory because relying on a national security benefits to a state such prevent proliferation, why should one superpower patron “risked undermining as India against conventional or terrorist expect it to prevent aggressive postures India’s position in the nonaligned attack? If so, this finding would be very rather than, for example, allowing these movement.” In turn, “[f]ear of important and potentially dangerous if postures with subpar negative controls international backlash prevented it supported policy arguments for more- against unauthorized use? Narang does [Pakistan] from fully operationalizing an aggressive nuclear postures. Such findings not demonstrate the existence of states asymmetric escalation posture by testing should be explored, but also combined rich enough to build a bomb but too poor nuclear weapons” until India “midwifed” with input from nuclear policy and to choose a strategy for its employment. this change with its own testing in 1998. military practitioners whose backgrounds Instead, he finds that “the asymmetric Further qualitative research to explore the may have exposed them to practical escalation nuclear posture is both the role of political constraint could help to dangers of nuclear first use that are curse of the severely threatened and the refine Narang’s theory in testable ways. difficult to capture in a study with no data luxury of the rich and stable,” as France Narang claims that Chinese and South on inadvertency. was forced to adopt this posture to face a African policy choices were influenced by Narang adds importantly to the vastly superior Soviet Union but free to consideration of political costs while this scholarly understanding of nuclear retain it after the Soviet collapse because mechanism remains unacknowledged in posture in a way that can inform policy. its domestic civil-military relations his theory. Moreover, he seems to cast the He studies an important topic, shatters support a delegative command structure. NPT as a global background condition false assumptions, provides insightful Narang repeatedly notes the inherent affecting all states equally, robbing it of and useful new conceptual categories, risk of the asymmetric escalation posture, potential explanatory power. Political offers apparently powerful theoretical but his theory seems to explain a world in science has not yet explained the small explanations of important behaviors, number of states that have acquired provides a valuable set of case studies, nuclear weapons, and in this vacuum of and opens doors for additional scholarly scholarly explanation, it is imprudent research. At the same time, Narang’s to disregard the insight of many findings should be scrutinized carefully practitioners that the NPT is an important and his policy advice assessed from factor in preventing proliferation. additional perspectives before it is used Additional research could clarify the to justify changes in nuclear posture. The role of perception in Narang’s theories. many avenues for additional research it He provides a useful primer on theoretical suggests and worrisome possibilities it perspectives, but treats deterrence at a surfaces testify to the analytic strength length too great never to mention that it and policy ambition of this important takes place in the mind of the adversary. book. The main reason that the requirements of nuclear deterrence are unknown is ENDNOTES AFP/Getty Images AFP/Getty that they vary with the adversary to be 1. Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear deterred. His theory relies on objective Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago facts to predict posture, but some of these Press, 1986). facts, such as resource constraint and the availability of a more powerful patron, 2. Tristan Volpe, “Proliferation Blackmail: The Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, shown in a 1976 photo, said in 1965 that are subject to the perceptions of decision- Coercive Threat Advantages of Nuclear Latency” makers. (Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2014 ARMS CONTROL TODAY his country would “eat grass” to match India’s nuclear capability. The book has numerous additional University, forthcoming). 48 Your Assignment Stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Learn how from the experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Jessica Bufford MANPTS ‘12 and the Monterey Institute’s Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program.

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