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Moldova - Key Challenges and Political Developments Burkhardt, Fabian

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Concluding with optimism, Adelheid Wölfl and closed the discussion. Hansjörg Brey thanked the panellists and

International Workshop at the European Academy in Moldova – Key Challenges and Political Developments

Organizers: Southeast Europe Association (SOG), funded by the German Federal Foreign Office via the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

Berlin, 13 / 14 December 2019 Report by Fabian Burkhardt, Berlin

Introduction agreement for cooperation, electing This report gives an overview of discussion in as new Prime Minister of the Republic of Mol- the realm of the Southeast Europe Association’s dova. Sandu is a former Minister of Education Workshop on current political developments and World Bank adviser. Hopes were high that and challenges in Moldova on the 13th and 14th under the new government the country could December 2019 in Berlin. The workshop gath- return to the reform path that had been ne- ered 50 politicians and experts from Moldova, glected in recent years. However, after the fall as well as experts from Germany and other EU of the government on 12 November 2019 follow- countries to discuss the key challenges Moldo- ing a no-confidence vote in parliament, the sit- va faced in 2019 and to give an outlook on what uation seems once again unclear and snap lies ahead in 2020. elections likely.

Besides, taking stock of the country’s turbulent In order to shed light on the recent develop- political year 2019, the panels addressed more ments and a turbulent year in Moldova, the specific issues such as reforms, the economy, workshop aimed to take stock of domestic poli- migration, energy as well as foreign policy with tics in 2019 and the prospects for 2020, the a specific focus on the two main external actors state of institutional reforms and the country’s Russia and the EU. Discussions benefited from agenda, Moldova’s economic situation, as well two background papers which have been pub- as its international politics. In order to under- lished in the SOG’s online paper series. As the stand the latest developments and to draw workshop took place under the Chatham House conclusions for the future, also the develop- Rule, discussions are summarized without nam- ments witnessed during the last decade were ing speakers. considered. In 2009, Moldova was already in a similar situation, with the change of govern- Background ment from the Party of Communists to the ‘Alli- After years of polarization between self-de- ance for European Integration’ coalition. Despite clared ‘pro-Russian’ and ‘pro-EU’ camps, the fo- of high hopes for change, domestic politics cus of Moldovan politics seemed lately to be were soon characterized by an infinite struggle shifting from geopolitics to domestic reforms. for power among domestic elites. When it The parliamentary elections on 24 February comes to reforms, the formal adoption of poli- 2019 had split the votes between the Socialist cies to fight corruption, to increase the inde- Party of President Dodon (31.15 %), the reformist pendence of the judiciary, and to strengthen in- and grassroots ACUM platform (26.87 %), and the stitutions was rarely followed-up by proper im- until then ruling Democratic Party (23.62 %), and plementation. Thus, the question was what les- thus gave no single party an outright majority. sons should be drawn from past experience After months of deadlock, in June 2019 the So- and for international actors dealing with Mol- cialists and ACUM surprisingly reached an dova. 148 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte

Panel 1: Domestic Politics in 2019 elections. Among electoral malpractice, the The speakers of the panel unanimously agreed speakers mentioned the use of administrative that for Moldova, 2019 was a year of turbulence. resources and vote buying. The parliamentary elections in February ended in a constitutional crisis. The deadlock was ter- Of special concern was the lack of impartiality minated in June when a coalition government of media as well as fake news and the spread was formed by the Party of Socialists of the Re- of disinformation on social media. Due to polit- public of Moldova (PSRM, Socialists) and the ical connections of media owners, in particular ACUM electoral bloc. But the coalition govern- TV, national and regional media are used ment headed by Prime Minister Maia Sandu against political opponents. While many TV sta- (ACUM) lasted only until November when it was tions used to be controlled by Vladimir Plahot- brought down by a parliamentary no-confi- niuc, some speakers wondered how the Social- dence vote and was replaced by a new govern- ists managed to increase the number of televi- ment headed by former Minister of Finance Ion sion outlets affiliated with their party in a short Chicu. period of time. Another concern was the in- creasing presence of Russian state television on The various epithets used to describe these two the Moldovan media market. Another feature of governments are already indicative: While the electoral malpractice is the increasing amount Sandu government was described as an “im- of unaccountable money funneled into election possible” or “unnatural” coalition, or even an campaigns. This is both due to loopholes in leg- “unholy alliance”, the “technocratic” Chicu gov- islation as well as non-compliance by a wide- ernment which features a significant number of spread disregard of existing legislation. former advisers of President was described as a “tacit coalition” between the So- The emergence of the Sandu coalition govern- cialists and the Democratic Party of Moldova ment and diverging goals within the coalition: (PDM, Democrats). While the ouster of the long- The main reasons for the creation of the “un- time grey cardinal behind the PDM, Vladimir natural” or “impossible” coalition between the Plahotniuc, was generally seen as a boon for previously opposed political forces PSRM and the political development of Moldova, concerns ACUM was the common goal to get rid of were raised about the potential emergence of a Vladimir Plahotniuc. The parties shared the in- new “strongman” – President Igor Dodon – terest of dismantling elements of the previous whose major goal is thought to be his reelec- regime, namely the strong control over political tion at the upcoming presidential elections institutions and monopolies over the economy. slated for the end of 2020. Rather than continu- A symbol of the pledge to work together was ing the reform agenda of the previous Sandu the Temporary Provisional Agreement that was government, the intention of the Chicu govern- signed by the parties. In the initial stage, a few ment was primarily to support president Dodon common objectives could be identified: First, in in achieving electoral victory in the next presi- the short-term to conduct a justice reform and dential elections. the depoliticization of state institutions. Sec- ond, to organize snap elections freely, based on Causes for the political turmoil: The main the new proportional electoral system. And thrust of arguments focused on Moldova as a third, there was to be a division of labor in ex- captured state with profound problems with ternal policy: The Sandu government and ACUM good governance and the rule of law. As one were committed to restore good relations with speaker put it: Moldova is not divided by geo- the EU while Igor Dodon and the Socialists were politics or competing narratives about the past, to restore good relations with Russia. but by kleptocracy. Features of this weak state include an oversize role of oligarchs in politics The overall performance of the Sandu govern- and monopolies in the economy, as well as a ment was aptly summarized in the phrase: “one politicized judicial system and civil service. government, two parallel agendas.” The most These general issues with the rule of law have frequent metaphor most speakers appeared to significant effects on political campaigns and agree with was: “ACUM danced ballet while the Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 149

Socialists were boxing.” The hardly hidden aim government was committed to restore good re- of this “boxing” approach of the Socialists was lations with the EU, Dodon and the Socialists to take up as many key positions in the “force intended to restore good relations with Russia. institutions” and the judiciary as possible. Meanwhile, the Sandu government was “danc- While some palpable reform progress helped to ing ballet” and pursuing its overarching goal to unlock money from the IMF, EU, and the EBRD, conduct uncompromising reforms. The key pil- the early collapse of the coalition prompted the lars of ACUM’s reform agenda can be subsumed speakers to search for reasons. They identified under four “Ds”: deoligarchization, democratiza- two proximate stumbling blocks that triggered tion, demonopolization of the economy, and the end of the coalition in November. The first depoliticization of institutions with a distinct was the issue of the general prosecutor. While focus on justice reform. ACUM pressed for the selection of an entirely independent official, such a choice beyond the One panelist described deoligarchization as dif- control of political forces was argued to be too ficult to embrace in legal terms, but with two much of a danger for president Dodon and the distinct components: First, unilateral power of Socialists, hence their fierce resistance. The an individual, or a group of persons over the in- second proximate reasons were the local elec- stitutions of state law enforcement bodies tions on November 4 which resulted in a back- should be limited. And second, there should be lash for ACUM. Especially in the capital city clear limits for financing political parties and Chișinău, where the Socialist Ion Ceban defeat- media from offshore organizations. Different ed Andrei Nastase of the ACUM bloc. understandings of deoligarchization not only created rifts between the two coalition part- The Chicu government: Loyal to president Do- ners, but even within ACUM, as some ACUM bloc don with low prospects for conducting reforms. members did not want to follow through on a Despite rhetorical commitment by the new draft bill on deoffshorization. Beyond differenc- Chicu government to continue the reform agen- es in interpretation, deoligarchization created da of the previous government, both the com- another dilemma between speed and legality. If position of the government consisting mainly of the reforms were to have any lasting effect at Dodon confidants while being formally all, they would have to be implemented swiftly. non-partisan, technocratic, as well as concrete But the coalition was bound by law when it actions appear to demonstrate that there was comes to changing the heads of many institu- little hope for reforms. Some speakers even at- tions. Some were virtually irremovable, like the tested a “reoligarchization” of politics since heads of regulatory agencies. Moldova wound up with a new “strongman” who runs the state like a “limited company”. This dilemma created incentives to accumulate Since the reelection of Igor Dodon at the 2020 sweeping powers, even for a benign purpose of presidential elections was the undeclared main conducting reforms. President Dodon and the goal of the government, participants expect a Socialists were described by speakers as unin- rise in “social populism” by increasing the terested in reforms. Their main goal was to spending on social policy to win over the hearts amass power over state institutions and pack and minds of the population. organizations with loyal officials. Early on in the coalition, president Dodon received more com- Depending on the degree of this social spend- petences over the intelligence services and the ing, the effect on the state budget and there- Security Council. In contrast to the govern- fore on the relationship with the IMF and the ment’s reform agenda, the Socialists were de- EU might be “disastrous” for what was begun by scribed by speakers as politicizing the process the previous government. With regard to foreign of appointments and circumventing contests policy, a balanced approach between Russia when appointing heads of the customs office, and the EU was expected. In practice, this might tax office, and board members of state compa- turn into a “game of smoke and mirrors” to play nies. In terms of foreign relations, there was one side against the other in order to receive as some sort of division of labor: While the Sandu much foreign aid from both external actors on 150 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte beneficial terms for Moldova with as little con- Transnistria can be reintegrated into Moldova, ditionality attached as possible. Moreover, the potentially by creating a special status. government is actively looking for new donors with China and Turkey as likely candidates for Panel 2: Moldova’s Reform Agenda investments. The general context of reforms is a democratic backlash. The backsliding is reflected in inter- Forecast 2020: There was a shared expectation national rankings in which Moldova today does that 2020 is likely to remain as “hot” and “tur- worse than in previous years. In Transparency bulent” as 2019 because of the focal point of International’s Corruption Perception Index, the presidential elections expected to be held Moldova ranks 120th out of 180 countries while by the end of 2020 (between October and De- five years ago it was ranked 102. In the Rule of cember). There were little doubts that president Law Index of the World Justice Project, Moldova Dodon was willing to use all means available to ranks 83rd out of 126, in the Criminal Justice seek reelection. But no agreement could be subindex it is on rank 97 out of 126 countries. As reached on what exact strategy would be pur- one panelist framed it, Moldova “hit the jack- sued to achieve reelection. If at all, political ac- pot” when it comes to challenges governments tion or even a political crisis should be expect- face. There are four such simultaneous struc- ed in spring (between March and June) 2020. tural challenges that have been inhibiting Mol- Mainly because time is needed after the winter dova’s development: First, an identity crisis di- break, but also due to provisions in the Consti- vides the country between the two concepts of tution: According to Article 85.4, the parliament an ethnic and a civic nation. Hence any cannot be disbanded later than six months be- state-building and reform effort would need to fore the end of the term of the president. The be preceeded by nation-building. Second, due presidential mandate ends in December 2020. to geopolitical cleavages Moldova often was a In order to hold elections simultaneously, one playground due to geographic constraints. Par- would need to disband the parliament in mid- ticularly the Russian influence was not condu- June. cive to meaningful reforms. Third, emigration contributes to decreasing human capital which Most speakers agreed that snap elections were creates a huge pressure on the public sector generally possible, but not very likely at this since the brightest people tend to prefer the point. A look at the political history of Moldova private sector due to more competitive salaries. shows that snap elections occur rarely (1994, Fourth, endemic corruption and clientelism 1999, and 2010). Beside the constitution, snap function as a sort of replacement for the lack- elections would depend on Dodon’s and the ing welfare state, and political institutions are Socialists’ electoral rating, on the government’s mainly used for rent-seeking. support by the Democrats in the parliament, but also on the performance of the ACUM bloc One other panelist enumerated four additional, and their internal stability to create a counter- political factors that generally impede any re- weight to the ruling coalition. With regard to the formist endeavor: The first necessary condition electoral rules, some even assumed that presi- is strong parliamentary support, but often there dent Dodon might go as far as to initiate a con- is no clear coalition. Second, a long-term per- stitutional amendment to return to an indirect spective of at least four years is crucial but election of the president by the parliament in- rarely achieved due to frequent government stead of a direct vote by the population. Russia turnovers. Third, reforms are regularly done in a might also be interested in snap elections to quick way without evidence by data and expert create a more solid pro-Russian majority of analysis. Fourth, alternative resources for moni- leftist forces to bolster their agenda in Transn- toring the results of reform agendas besides istria. Generally, the expectation prevailed that those provided by the government are mostly the real level of influence and activity from absent. will become even higher, while patriot- ic slogans might play a prominent role during Particularly the overarching issue of time hori- the electoral campaign in the debate on how zons was highlighted by speakers across policy Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 151 fields: The most pressing problems such as mi- from politicians and extracting rents from over- gration would require long-term strategies seeing businesses, the Prosecutor General across party lines, but short-termism and an wields enormous power over the system. But absence of a vision for the future were typical since the use of the Prosecutor General is a po- characteristics of many policy domains. Moldo- tent weapon of those wielding power against va thus oscillates between two equilibria that political opponents, the incentives to turn the both provide negative incentives for reforms: office into an institution serving public interest Short-term governments that tend to engage in are believed to be low. Regarding the Constitu- irresponsible policies due to electoral concerns, tional Court, the members of which had re- and political forces that attempt to establish signed during the 2019 constitutional crises, wholesale control over politics and the econo- one panelist argued that the contest of ap- my by means of authoritarian and oligarchic pointing new judges had been flawed. One pan- practices. Currently, according to several speak- elist stated “a complete shift of philosophy” ers, Moldova faces the danger of the “installa- with the justice reform of the Chicu govern- tion of a new authoritarian regime” that would ment. Instead of an external evaluation of judg- not only do away with the feeble democratic es and prosecutors, there would be an internal pluralism achieved in 2019, but would also di- evaluation process. In other words, corrupt minish the chances of thorough reforms. judges will evaluate fellow corrupt judges.

Public administration: A reform of the public Migration: The core thesis of one panelist on administration system is widely seen as the emigration was that it is one of the key chal- cornerstone and basic requirement of any fu- lenges Moldova faces. This is because it leaves ture progress of Moldova since no economic a deep imprint on other spheres such as the la- progress can be achieved without sweeping bor market, education and health. The numbers change. Moldova’s system of public administra- provided speak a clear language: In the last five tion was characterized as dysfunctional and not years, the number of students in schools has accountable. One crucial aspect is its size which decreased by five percent from 350,000 pupils makes the bureaucracy both costly and ineffi- to 344,000 pupils. The number of schools was cient. The example of local public administra- reduced from 1,370 to 1,240. At universities, in tion and territorial reform demonstrates that the last six years the number of students has any endeavor of cutting the civil service for rea- decreased by 37 percent. The number of teach- sons of efficiency would prove to be politically ers in primary and secondary schools shrank by costly. As a priority, speakers identified the jus- more than ten percent in the last five years tice system, particularly the prosecutor general, from 30,000 to 27,000. And the number of doc- courts, and customs. One point of critique was tors per 1,000 residents is twice lower in Mol- that the current Government Program does not dova than the average of EU. say much about the strategic priorities of Mol- dova in the realm of public administration re- This trend poses at least two serious challeng- form. It does have a lot of actions such as the es: First, any policy targeted only at migration aim to create a modern public procurement would fail to address the entire phenomenon. system in line with EU standards, a task that Second, migration is such a complex issue that needs to be accomplished by December 2020. urgent measures would need to be taken in the next 5 – 7 years across party lines. The flow of Judiciary: The reform of the justice system is remittances has dropped by 8.5 percent in the crucial for at least two reasons. First, it was one last years from 24 percent to 16 percent as of the main priorities of the Sandu government share of the Moldovan GDP. The visa free regime and a major bone of contention within the coa- with the EU was described as “one of the main lition. And second, support by external donors achievements of the Eastern Partnership” as is tied to reform progress in the justice sector, more than 2.1 million Moldovans have already among others. The Prosecutor General’s Office benefited from it. Nonetheless, there is evi- was described as more powerful than the Presi- dence that an increasing number of Moldovans dent due to the Soviet heritage. By taking calls goes to the EU with biometric passports to seek 152 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte work even though this is illegal, or to seek asy- Panel 3: Economy, Migration, and lum with the help of organized criminal net- Energy Supply works. The third panel was dedicated to three consid- erably diverse policy domains. But one charac- Foreign policy and foreign trade: In the realm teristic that unites these is the challenge of of foreign policy, the main question was what limited resources that Moldova faces. As one kind of repercussions a potential free trade panelist quipped, Moldova is often said to be agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union an emerging country or economy, but it is diffi- would have on Moldova. Even though the So- cult to actually find something emerging there. cialists speak publicly about a balanced foreign policy with regard to European and Eurasian in- Economy: Despite its limited resources and tegration, one panelist argued that the concept many dependencies, Moldova can also boast a of balanced foreign policy always “was a euphe- number of success stories. One of these are the mism for turning to the east”, and that the “bal- introduction of Free Entrepreneurial Zones. anced foreign policy is now rather unbalanced”. They helped to create jobs and helped to kick- One concern was that increased economic and start the automotive industry in Moldova which financial ties to Russia might create additional now has around 70,000 employees with Ger- liabilities. man, Japanese, and American producers. One problem that frequently occurs is a lack of co- Role of the civil society in reforms: At an ab- ordination and long-term planning when mutu- stract level, one panelist saw the potential con- ally exclusive industries are settled on adjacent tribution of civil society to reforms, first, in territories. Another success is an IT park which monitoring activities and writing reports for provides software companies with the opportu- transparency reasons. And second in supporting nity to register as virtual residents and pay only reforms with expertise and analyses. There was seven percent from sales with no other taxes agreement among the speakers that the Chicu and payments. As thousands of software com- government showed little effort to engage with panies registered, the ICT industry in Moldova civil society. has demonstrated good growth. According to one speaker, the downside has been so far that Role of the EU: The EU was portrayed as being mainly IT services companies preferred to regis- conducive to reforms mainly through the in- ter under this special fiscal regime, but only few strument of conditionality. The Moldovan gov- proper software companies. ernment was arguably engaged in reforms once it was “forced” to do so by international agree- The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area ments it signed. The Association Agreement and (DCFTA) with the EU was unanimously lauded as particularly the visa-free regime were charac- Moldova’s biggest success story. The impact on terized as the main motivation for reforms in the country was much larger than on the other Moldova. This inevitably creates a reform co- Eastern Partnership countries and nundrum: At the moment, there was no other with which the EU concluded an analo- comparable “carrot” that would work as an gous agreement. According to a comparative equal motivation to implement reforms. Simple study by Berlin Economics, there was a 60 per- budget support was deemed an insufficient in- cent increase in the export of goods from Mol- centive. The main challenge for the Eastern dova to the EU from USD one billion in 2013 to Partnership and Association Agreement agenda 1.6 billion in 2018. Excluding the price effect would therefore be to come up with new incen- with constant prices, the effect increases to 73 tives to motivate the Moldovan government and percent. The share of the EU in Moldovan ex- citizens equally. Georgia and Ukraine are gener- ports increased from 56 percent in 2013 to 74 ally considered to be positive examples to be percent in 2018. emulated by Moldova. In terms of the commodity composition, the DCFTA did not have a strong effect. In other words, Moldova still exports more of the same. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 153

FDI increased from USD 2.1 billion in 2013 to 2.5 tions of the DCFTA with the EU were positively billion in 2018. But as the FDI from other coun- contrasted with the Commonwealth of Inde- tries also increased, the share did not change pendent States (CIS) Free Trade Area since the much. The reason why the DCFTA failed to have latter includes lists of agreed exporters which a significant effect on FDI is that business cli- are risky in terms of corruption since compa- mate is much more important for FDI than for nies often are at the mercy of bureaucrats to be trade. Since 3/4 of Moldovan exports now go to on that list. the EU, the panelist concluded that it would not be wise for any Moldovan government to ques- During the panel, the speakers identified a tion the DCFTA. This development is even more number of key challenges that inhibit Moldova’s striking if one considers that still in 2011, economic development. First, businesses face around 2/3 of exported goods went to Russia. huge problems in finding qualified labor force due to a massive lack in human capital. Among As another panelist remarked, this turnaround others, this is due to the fact that Moldovan cit- was not so much about switching from one izens demonstrate a high labor mobility while market to another, but about changing mentali- the Moldovan state lacks behind in integrating ty and profile of Moldovan producers. Since the itself into the global economy. A second major EU was understood to be about clear rules and hindrance is the business environment, and regulations, Moldovan producers became used namely the over-regulation of the economy. to norm and regulatory compliance such as Moldova considerably lags in international product safety standards. But the DCFTA raised comparison. Even though Moldova is ranked a few questions that would need to be tackled 48th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business by policy makers: First, tariff-rate quotas for ba- ranking, in the indicator of construction per- sic agricultural products are used up very mits, Moldova is ranked 156th. quickly, therefore they should be increased. Second, in the view of one speaker, Transnistria Migration: Migration was described as also enjoys a lot of benefits from the DCFTA and “cross-cutting issue with many angles” ranging the Association Agreement (AA) – by exporting from the economy to demography and security, steel, caviar, or textile – without contributing to due to an enormous outflow of about one mil- the Moldovan budget which de facto amounts lion Moldovans since 1991. In 2018, there was a to a discrimination of local Moldovan produc- negative migration balance of 48,600 (more ers. leaving than coming back). By the year 2050, the population is projected to decrease by 20 Another Transnistria-related issue is the ques- percent. With regard to the countries of desti- tion of border control: While Moldova erected a nation, there is an approximate split of 50 to 50 system of laboratories and inspection points to percent between Russia and the EU (mainly Po- comply with EU food safety regulations, the (in- land and Italy). Ukraine, the US and Israel are ternal) border with Transnistria is porous, and also important destinations. According to sur- illicit imports (for example of meat from Odes- veys, more than 40 percent of the diaspora are sa, Ukraine) poses risks for food security. Third, highly educated and therefore constitute a sig- concerns were raised that companies unequally nificant brain drain for the country. benefit from the DCFTA, particularly to the ad- vantage of big companies and monopolists, and Remittances received as percent of GDP peaked the disadvantage of small and medium-sized in 2006 according to World Bank figures, since enterprises (SME). This question is not easy to then there has been a steady decrease. For the assess due to the lack of statistical data on economy this might be interpreted as a positive companies, here Moldovan authorities should sign since “reliance on remittances is a fool’s improve the quality of data collection. Fourth, a errand”, according to the panelist. In Moldova, related critique stated was that the structure of household consumption accounts for over 80 products still was reliant on traditional prod- percent of GDP, a very high figure in interna- ucts with low added value. In general, the tional comparison. Part of this consumption transparent and predictable rules and regula- stems from remittances. This means that there 154 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte is a smaller margin for the GDP containing in- build a gas pipeline from to Moldova vestment into the economy. The high rate of re- to decrease its dependence from Russia. Sever- mittances is ultimately a dependency, it lowers al other avenues are also promising for diversi- the possibilities for a diversification of the fication: These are Black Sea shelf gas, reverse economy, and ultimately leads to a lower flows from Slovakia, and renewable energy standard of living. (Moldova committed itself to the EU to have 20 percent of renewables in its energy mix by This outward migration trend leaves a deep im- 2025). Moldova also has commitments to imple- print on Moldova’s demography: There are rela- ment the Third Energy Package in order to un- tively more elderly people, and working age bundle the national gas monopolists. One groups are shrinking fast (by 10 to 15 %). One speaker argued that the Socialists were unlikely solution, according to one speaker might be the to follow through to reduce these vulnerabili- creation of centers for the retraining of the la- ties since this would go against the interests of bor force. The negative migration trends are re- the Kremlin. Another speaker pointed out that flected in international rankings: In the Human Moldova did little to liberalize the energy mar- Capital Index of the World Bank, Moldova is in ket during its presidency of the Energy Commu- the same league as Albania and Bosnia and nity. Herzegovina. The World Economic Forum Com- petitiveness Index demonstrates that Moldova Panel 4: Moldova Between Russia and the EU has very low scores on talent retention. To tack- The idea that Moldova is a country that oscil- le these issues, the Moldovan government lates between East and West is well-estab- drafted a Diaspora plan 2025, convened a com- lished. Therefore, the short-lived Sandu govern- mittee on diaspora, and operates a bureau for ment was not just an exceptional case in recent relations with the diaspora. Moldovan history, but for the Eastern partner- ship countries, if not for the whole post-Soviet Promising actions that could be taken are space as a whole. Due to a rare “coincidence of schemes like 1+1, a financing facility that match- interests”, the EU and Russia pulled the same es funds coming from the diaspora into SMEs strings for a short period of time. As one pan- and rural development, and the support of lo- elist put it, “geopolitics temporarily disap- cal credit unions and therefore being able to peared”. The Sandu government was seen as a profit from financial services. And agreements crucial test case by some whether Russia could could be concluded on social rights so that potentially be seen as reliable partner in the people from the diaspora can actually come post-Soviet space. One of the main concerns of home and reap the benefits of work in terms of the Chicu government appeared to be that Mol- pensions. One possibility for the EU would be dova is still an object in the hands of the big- to ponder investments in “Partnerships for gest players on the international scene rather Skills” programs, for instance in the education than a subject with own agency in international system of Moldova, as many EU countries which relations. are on the receiving end profit tremendously from migrant labor. Even though there is a man- Metaphors used to describe Moldova’s role re- ifest “migration crisis” in Moldova, relatively lit- volved around the images of a “bridge” con- tle has been done by the EU to mitigate the necting East and West in a neutral way, and “ex- outflow. clusive love” demanded either by Russia or the EU that would exclude a mutually beneficial re- Energy: Moldova’s dependencies in the sphere lationship. Russia currently appears to allow of energy are as much an issue of energy secu- Moldova to flirt with the EU, but since it is heav- rity as they are of economic development. In ily invested in President Dodon, this tolerant terms of energy, Moldova is entirely dependent stance might abruptly end after the 2020 presi- on Russia. This is not only the case for gas, but dential elections, and they might try to push for also for electricity which is bought from a Rus- a quick solution of the Transnistria issue on sian power plant in Transnistria. According to Russian terms by pulling off a “Kozak memo- the panelist, Moldova’s priority should be to randum 2.0”. Such an advance would have a Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 155 significant impact ranging from the “Macron ini- dissolution of the . This nostalgia tiative” to the Minsk agreements on Ukraine. is related that the EU bears responsibility for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that it is Moldova-EU: A structural change in the rela- because of the EU that Moldovan exporters tions to the EU without a fully-fledged Europe- cannot export to Russia and blame the EU for anization. In the longer term, the relations of the DCFTA, and not Russia for retaliating against Moldova with the European Union have under- it. 5) Russian propaganda which amplifies the gone a qualitative, structural change. For in- successes of Russia and the failures of the EU stance, trade has seen a complete reversal in 6) corruption and rent-seeking behavior among the last decades. While in 1997, exports to the those who rhetorically pretend to be pro-Euro- CIS accounted for 69 percent (about 50 % to pean. Russia), in 2018 Moldovan exports to Russia ac- counted for a mere 15 percent of Moldovan ex- Foreign policy orientation of President Dodon ports while 69 percent went to the EU. Moreo- and the Chicu government: “A European Moldo- ver, the EU gave around €1.3 billion in grants va with Russia?” The Sandu government was a and other financial support, and the EIB provid- unique case since it was the “most representa- ed €175 million in preferential credits. But there tive coalition” in Moldova’s post-Soviet history is more to this structural change than trade and as it did not pit “pro-European” against financial support: Since October 2005, the EU “pro-Russian” forces, as in previous electoral operates a delegation in Chișinău, the time it cycles. Yet with the collapse of the Sandu gov- joined the mediation process of the Transnistria ernment, this short-lived “success story” also conflict as an observer in the 5+2 format. With ended abruptly. As in previous panels in which the accession of Romania, Moldova became a the Chicu government’s foreign policy was de- direct neighbor to the EU in 2007. scribed as an attempt to balance Russia and the EU in order “to get the best out of the two Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing worlds”, one speaker characterized the ap- war in Donbas also had a profound impact on proach with the slogan “Let’s build a European Moldova since its Eastern neighbor Ukraine cut Moldova together with Putin”, a revival of a many ties with Russia and reoriented itself to- campaign slogan that won the Communist lead- wards the EU. Most importantly, there are the er 66 seats in the 2009 parlia- AA, the DCFTA, the visa liberalization, and signif- mentary elections. The ideal type thinking be- icant cross-border cooperation. In Moldova it- hind this approach was to seek closer coopera- self, a new post-Soviet generation of politicians tion with and additional loans from both Russia emerged that was educated in Moldova and and the EU without alienating either one of many of which went for degrees to Romania. them. Due to this non-Soviet socialization, the nation- al elite is much less Russia-centric than before. The speakers debated potentially hidden inten- Despite this trend, the palpable structural tions, practical implications and possible con- change has not led to a fully-fledged European- tradictions of this approach. First, several ization, or “Westernization”, of Moldovan poli- speakers questioned the actual intention and tics and, as one panelist put it, “rupture with pointed to its evolution over time. One panelist the Russian world”. warned that “everything is a game and is not what it looks like”. “Geopolitics,” the speaker Among the many reasons that slow down the continued, “is always about money. About process of Europeanization were: 1) The loss of someone else’s money.” Being “pro-Russian”, or human capital due to emigration 2) the divide “pro-European” was just another rent-seeking between cities and rural areas contributing to a strategy to extract favorable loans from abroad. “cultural and intellectual isolation” of rural Second, it was president Dodon who was pull- Moldova 3) a low penetration of “Western lan- ing the strings in terms of foreign policy. In the guages” as compared to the Baltics and Georgia description of one panelist, Dodon “proved to 4) a nostalgia for Soviet stability: More than 65 be a very shrewd, cunning and efficient political percent of Moldovans aged over 50 regret the operator in Moldovan realities”. In this respect, 156 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte it is crucial to track the evolution of Dodon’s was willing to negotiate the next memorandum rhetoric on foreign policy. On the AA with the much tougher than the Filip government. One EU, Dodon’s rhetoric has changed from sup- speaker voiced concerns that the announce- porting his party’s decision to cancel the AA in ment of this potential loan – at this point it is early 2017, to renegotiating the AA, and finally in unclear whether Moscow will actually follow mid-2018 to continue the implementation of through – was made bypassing the public and the AA. A similar switch occurred with regard to competent political institutions while the con- publicly stating that the NATO office in Moldova ditions still remain in the dark: “When you bor- should be closed down, to remaining silent row from authoritarians, there are always about it. Finally, Dodon publicly explained his strings attached.” But as one panelist explained, earlier statement about “Russian Crimea” that Moldova finds itself “at the crossroads”: To it actually meant “Crimea de facto belongs to boost economic development with investments Russia, and de jure to Ukraine”. in infrastructure and the energy sector, it was indispensable to find USD one to 1.5 billion in Russian policy on Moldova between punitive the next two or three years rapidly, and cheaper measures and a loan: According to one pan- – implying also with less conditionality – than elist, Russia has made it repeatedly clear that it on the international financial markets. considers the post-Soviet space a zone of its privileged interest. Frozen conflicts (read: Trans- Eurasian integration and the EU: Moldova’s ob- nistria) remain an effective tool in inhibiting server status in the Eurasian Economic Union the drift of the former Soviet Republics to the (EAEU) raised many questions since there are West. From this point of view, Russia’s goal was apparently some more procedures to be com- achieved in Moldova. There are no troops on pleted to formalize the status. The main criti- Moldovan territory other than Russian troops, cism raised was that neither the Filip nor the which, according to the official reading of the Sandu governments, and the parliament, nei- Moldovan government, are deployed, and am- ther saw nor ratified a document on this status. munition is stockpiled, illegally in Transnistria. The observer status was understood to be a pet In the words of one speaker, Russia also “weap- project of president Dodon. But the main inter- onized trade” against Moldova by enacting four est of Moldova, as one speaker noted, was to be successive embargo waves in 2006, 2010, 2013, informed and follow the developments within and 2014. There was little doubt that Moscow the EAEU, without commitments and further en- used these economic sanctions to gain political gagement. Moldova continues to be a ful- leverage over Moldova and retaliate for closer ly-fledged member of the CIS community, main- relations with the EU. Evidently, Russia’s calcu- ly through the CIS Free Trade Area (CISFTA). The lation is that the costs of reversing Moldova’s aim of this membership in the CIS community trade balance from being Russia-centric to was mainly economic, and only partly about EU-centric are less than the gain from prevent- political cooperation, and not at all about mili- ing Moldova from a closer political, and eventu- tary cooperation. ally, security-related integration with the EU and NATO. With regard to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EAEU, the Chicu government believes Another instrument in the Russian toolbox of that this was in the interest of Moldova, just as retaining influence over Moldova is a loan the any other FTA negotiated with around forty oth- size and the conditions of which remain unclear er countries such as China or Turkey. But at this to date. Shortly after the new PM Chicu came point, such an FTA with the EAEU remains “in into office in November 2019, he traveled to theoretical distance” as even consultations with Moscow and announced a potential USD 500 the secretary of the Union on a start of negotia- million loan slated for investment projects. tions have not begun. Since the PRSM’s elector- Chicu explicitly linked it to unacceptable condi- al party program envisioned a dismantling of tions imposed by the IMF. The current three- the AA and DCFTA, and a full membership with year IMF program expires in March 2020, and the EAEU, it is no wonder that Dodon’s flirta- the Chicu government has made it clear that it tions with Moscow raised many eyebrows, par- Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 157 ticularly also because Moscow insisted on an Neutrality of Moldova, its meaning and implica- either/or logic with regard to the EAEU and the tions were heavily debated among the speakers. EU. Nonetheless, the implementation of the AA Since neutrality was a “fetish” for president Do- remains of the highest priority for the Chicu don, the question arose whether he was intrin- government, as well as the commitment to use sically motivated or whether neutrality – which the DCFTA to its full advantage as it is seen as de facto limits Moldova’s sovereignty – was im- an important tool to overcome the blockade on posed. Russia on its part made it clear to Mol- the Eastern flank. In the view of president Do- dova that a withdrawal of troops and ammuni- don, a potential renegotiation does not mean tion could only take place if Russia was sure no to scrap the whole agreement, but to tackle a one else moved in instead. That is, Russia “couple of articles” to achieve further protec- framed its position in the words of an ultima- tion of Moldovan producers, mainly in agricul- tum. But even if Moldova achieved this interna- ture and animal breeding. tionally recognized neutral status, serious doubts would remain about Russia’s commit- The future of reintegration of Transnistria and ment to such a document. the status of Moldova’s neutrality: The speak- ers generally complained that there was neither The main argument was that Russia did not ful- a vision nor a discussion by the political camps fill its obligations to withdraw its troops from and a widespread disinterest on the side of the Moldovan and Georgian territories as decided population with regard to the reintegration of upon on the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit, and Transnistria. Dodon’s presidential administra- that Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial sover- tion drew up a so-called “Big Package” – a doc- eignty by annexing Crimea and waging war in ument that is supposed to propose a start of a Donbas despite international guarantees in the dialogue on this delicate issue. The “ideology” Budapest Memorandum. Some speakers also of the Big Package can be summarized in three suspected that neither the EU nor the US would points: First, in the view of the drafters, the set- agree to such a deal of neutrality, mostly be- tlement is neither an issue of the EU, Russia, cause this would limit Moldova’s state sover- nor the US. Moldova itself should first draft a eignty considerably, and because this would vision, find a national consensus, and then smack of a division of the European continent present it to the big international players. in spheres of influence. But even if the big in- Moreover, no time must be lost, the process ternational players agreed, this would be detri- should be started “soon”. mental to Moldovan national interests by turn- ing Moldova into a “grey zone” and an “in-be- Second, Moldova is portrayed as having the tween-state”. choice between exactly two options only: 1) Ei- ther Moldova will pay the price of becoming an Panel 5: The Way Ahead – Outlook to 2020 internationally recognized neutral country as a In terms of the regime quality of Moldova’s po- necessary precondition for the withdrawal of litical system, there was a broad agreement Russian troops. 2) Or Russian troops will remain about a trend towards limited pluralism and forever in the best scenario. In the worst sce- authoritarianism as president Dodon and the nario, Moldova would face a secessionist war Socialist party strive to gain control over insti- like Georgia did with South Ossetia and Abkhaz- tutions. But even though it is obvious that Do- ia, and Ukraine with Crimea and Donbas. In oth- don has been creating a power vertical, it re- er words, reintegration will need to be bought mains to be seen in how far he is willing to use with an internationally recognized neutral sta- the powers he amassed, and how far he will be tus equaling a rejection of EU and NATO mem- able to use them. So far, he has not faced too bership. Third, the drafters see the Package ex- much political pressure yet. Moreover, one pan- plicitly as a potential model solution for elist even assumed that authoritarian tenden- Ukraine. Any movement towards the realization cies might fade in 2020 as pluralism remains of the Big Package could have wide-ranging im- solid, and the urge to proceed with deoligarchi- plications for the Minsk Agreements, too. zation is strong among many political forces. Dodon also appears to be interested in attract- 158 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte ing voters from the political center. Among oth- the 25 percent look more like a “PR gag” to most ers, this also depends on other parties than the observers. Socialists: One panelist asked whether ACUM can be more than an anti-Dodon front, and Freedom of media: Media are generally under whether the Democrats will remain coherent or pressure in Moldova. Access to information is will split. often restricted, especially for investigative journalists. The concentration of media is gen- 2020 as an electoral year: 2020 is expected to erally high, which also leads to a monopoliza- be highly politicized since “everything goes tion of the advertising market. The legislation around these presidential elections”. Since Do- of media regulation features considerable gaps. don’s key aim is to achieve reelection, most Political interference of politicians into editorial speakers assume that the government’s unde- policies of media they own or control are com- clared main policy goal is to support reelection mon. Disinformation and fake news are increas- as a “PR team”, other goals are suspected to be ingly problematic, especially during electoral subordinated to reelection. This means that campaigns. The hope that after the decline of everything the government promises to the the media empire of Vladimir Plahotniuc, media public will have a short time horizon to demon- pluralism and content would improve did not strate some palpable success to the electorate. materialize: The Socialist party was quick to es- Deliverables could include small pension rises tablish and strengthen a media empire of its and other social gifts the size of which will de- own. One of the reasons lies in the Audiovisual termine the degree of populism, and therefore Council, a monitoring body whose task is to also the effect on budget stability. On the other oversee broadcasting media, which is heavily hand, it is expected that Dodon also would dependent on political circumstances. want to “play safe” without shaking up the po- litical scene too much. Following this logic, one While the situation in terms of access to public speaker argued that early parliamentary elec- institutions improved and the Action plan of tions in the first half of 2020 appeared rather the Sandu government was promising, the time unlikely at this point. The central political risk was too short to implement reforms in the me- therefore will be what happens after the presi- dia sphere. The Action Plan of the Chicu govern- dential elections. ment includes two fairly general provisions on media and includes proposals to review the Reforms and the economy: The Chicu govern- media legislation framework, and some regula- ment is expected to simulate rather than to tory amendments to the advertising law, or on conduct reforms. This is because the Dodon the limitation of offshore funding of media. presidency cannot go against kleptocratic ele- ments of the system because they may serve to Since 2020 is an election year, a panelist sur- protect his political power, and because they mised that partisanship and bias will be a are needed as “administrative resources” to prominent feature of media reporting. Politi- conduct elections. The country has huge prob- cians strive to use journalists as their PR per- lems with the absorption of EBRD and other sonnel and would like to see them promote donor money. One evidence for the unwilling- their ideology. Therefore, political control over ness to reform is that several bills on anti-mon- the Audiovisual Council and the Competition ey-laundering and other justice-sector-related Council responsible for monopolies in advertis- initiatives are stuck in parliament and are likely ing will remain crucial. Moreover, the Socialist to be either withdrawn or considerably amend- party is expected to take control over the public ed. According to one speaker, deoligarchization broadcasters. Legislation such as the private will remain widely popular among the popula- data protection law is likely to be used by pub- tion, and might bring considerable advantage if lic servants to restrict access to information for used in electoral campaigns. In terms of eco- investigative journalists. Some speakers also nomic growth, the government promised 25 expect Russian state broadcasters and online percent in the next three years. For 2020, the media to play a crucial role during the elec- projection is only at 3.4, or 3.5 percent. Hence tions. One of the core problems identified by a Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 – 02 | 2020 Berichte 159 speaker was that the media community itself new AA agenda and the revised Eastern Part- was only marginally interested in media free- nership will be crucial and shape EU-Moldovan dom as such, a factor unlikely to change in relations for the next 5 – 10 years. One speaker 2020. remarked that the metaphor “boxer vs. balleri- na” mentioned so frequently during the confer- International factors: Since in 2020, a new EU ence was originally about Russia and the EU, Commission and Parliament are in place, the and not so much about the Socialists and main questions will be what kind of strategy ACUM. Consequently, as Moldova is at the the EU will pursue regarding Moldova, given the crossroads, if Russia continues to invest money domestic political turbulence. Among the two into media propaganda and cash into political options are that the EU will reinvigorate its sup- projects, and the EU into sessions on democra- port for Moldova, or that there will be a Moldo- cy and human rights, the outcome in the near va fatigue in the European capitals, the latter future might just be the same as with the San- appears to be more likely. In this respect, the du government.

4. Deutsch-Bulgarischer Geschichtstag Zwischen Freiheit und Flucht: 30 Jahre Fall des „Eisernen Vorhangs“ und die Gegenwart der deutsch-bulgarischen Beziehungen

Veranstalter: Deutsch-Bulgarischer Geschichtsverein „Pamet“ e.V. / Bulgar(i)en in Hannover e.V. / Volkshochschule Hannover / Alfred Toepfer Stiftung F.V.S. / Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft e.V. / u.a., gefördert im Rahmen des Förderprogramms „30 Jahre friedliche Revolution“ der Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung

Hannover, 17. November 2019 Bericht von Gudrun Steinacker, Wien

Am 17. November 2019 veranstaltete der 2015 in „Der Eiserne Vorhang – Fluchten über Bulga­ Münster gegründete Deutsch-Bulgarische Ge- rien“ ein. schichtsverein „Pamet“ e.V. unter seinem Vorsit- zenden Dr. Christoph Lorke den 4. Deutsch-Bul- Dass die Aufarbeitung der kommunistischen garischen Geschichtstag in Hannover in Ko- Vergangenheit in Bulgarien immer noch ein operation mit vielen anderen Institutionen – heikles Unterfangen ist, erläuterte sehr ein- unter anderem dem Verein Bulgar(i)en in Han- dringlich der Journalist Hristo Hristov in seinem nover e.V., vertreten durch Gergana Naumann. Vortrag „Umdenken in der Aufarbeitung der Zeit Beide haben sich vor allem die allseitige Infor- des kommunistischen Totalitarismus in Bulgari- mation über die Geschichte und das Leben in en“. Hristov forscht seit Jahren über diese Bulgarien zum Ziel gesetzt, Information über schwierige Phase der bulgarischen Geschichte die Zeit des autoritären Regimes und Kommu- und publiziert darüber in verschiedenen Medi- nismus, deren Folgen im Land sowie über die en und auf seiner Website. Dies ist in Bulgarien deutsch-bulgarischen Beziehungen. Die Veran- auch dreißig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall nicht staltung in der VHS-Hannover stand unter willkommen. Hristov sieht sich und seine Fami- dem Thema „Zwischen Freiheit und Flucht: lie vielen Anfeindungen und sogar konkreten 30 Jahre Fall des ‚Eisernen Vorhangs’ und die Bedrohungen ausgesetzt. Bulgarien stehe im Gegenwart der deutsch-bulgarischen Bezie- Vergleich zu Staaten wie Deutschland, Polen, hungen“. Eine Poster-Ausstellung im Vorraum Tschechien, selbst Ungarn und Rumänien mit des Veranstaltungsraums führte das Thema seiner völlig unzureichenden juristischen Auf­