Military and Development in Bangladesh Alan Lindquist On the other hand, there were other 'races' who did not possess the required martial spirit. The Bengalis Origins were decidedly placed in the latter category. The The origins of the Bangladesh army lie more than 200 contempt for the Bengali population shown by the years back in the mercantile period of British Pakistan army at the time of the crackdown in 1971 expansion when representatives of its commercial can in part be traced to these theories of racial capital arrived in India to trade and plunder. The superiority. first of the native armed forces commanded by foreigners were the armies organised by government- The Indian army was effectively insulated from the sponsored companies, such as the British East India growing nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s Company. Without these forces, this foreign capital against which it was often used, although during could not have penetrated to the extent that it did, World War II this insulation began to break down. nor have been as financially successful. Thus, even in With the partition of British India into independent this early period, the army played an important role India and Pakistan virtually all the Muslim officers in development, albeit the development of Britain and soldiers trained by Britain joined the armed and the underdevelopment of India. forces of the Islamic State of Pakistan. These two vivisected halves of the original Indian army fought When the British government took over direct rule, their first skirmishes in 1948 over the control of the East India Company's army became the Indian Kashmir. army. This was ultimately developed into the largest and most effective colonial army in the world. With Post-Independence: the Pakistan army it, Britain extended its control over India and other Thisconservativeand'anti-national'military areas, suppressed local uprisings, and contained the establishment inherited from the Empire became the growing nationalist movement in the 20th century. armed protector of the post-colonial State. The Itwas evenabletousetheIndianarmy experience of the nationalist struggle left a good deal extensively against the challenge of other imperial of resentment against military institutions. But in powers in World Wars land II. The British governing Pakistan there was almost no thought of tampering class, with the confidence and skill developed over with the traditional military structure. centuries, accomplished thisdifficulttask only through careful recruitment, training and organi- Pakistan was officially an Islamic State and its rulers sation of Indian soldiers. had little of the socialist, secular, and 'non-aligned' character of the Congress Party government in India. At the beginning, recruitment naturally came from The US began providing itwith military and the areasfirst conquered by Britain: Bombay, economic assistance in 1951, and when Pakistan Madras, and especially Bengal. But after the entire joined Dulles' two anti-Communist alliances, SEATO Bengal army revolted against the British in the and CENTO, that aid increased. By 1969 Pakistan famous Mutiny of 1857, the 82 Bengal regiments had received up to $2,000 mn. in American military were disbanded and further recruitment from this assistance and $3,000 mn. in economic aid. A large area was banned until1910. Subsequently, the US military mission trained, equipped, and advised British developed the myth of the martial races which the armed forces. The army expanded rapidly, more survives to this day in India and Pakistan, if in a than tripling its manpower between 1947 and 1971, somewhat attenuated form. According to this myth, and acquired sophisticated weaponry from the United there existed in India certain ethnic, regional or caste States. A US government report stated in 1962: groups that were vigorous, courageous and warlike, "From a political viewpoint, US military aid has and which ought to be recruited into the army. Most strengthened Pakistan's armed services, the greatest recruitment for Britain's Indian army after 1857 was stabilizing force in the country ..." (quoted in done inIndia'snorth-westregions, from the Feroze Ahmed 1962: 429). Punjabis, Dogras, Jats and the Gurkhas from Nepal. The British protected these groups and encouraged US military assistance converted the Pakistan army them toregard themselvesassuperior.Itis into the dominant political force and chief defender significant that education and political consciousness of the propertied classesin the country. The tended to be less widespread in these areas than in increased strength and confidence of the army was Bengal or Madras. demonstrated in its seizure of power in the 1958 coup 10 d'etat. The coup was led by Sandhurst-trained disarm the Bengali units of the armed forces.' But this General Ayub Khan, who later admitted consulting proved to be more difficult than expected and resulted US officials, including the director of the CIA, Allen in their rôvolt and armed resistance. Bengali units in Dulles, before taking power. the armed forces had been moved by the nationalist sentiment that swept the eastern wing of Pakistan. Army rule only exacerbatèd the conflict between East These regular forces in the army and police formed and West Pakistan. It prevented the former from the initial core of the resistance, but had no training using its larger population in parliamentary elections or experience in guerrilla warfare. They did not yet to obtain policies favourable to its own interests. It know how to mobilise the overwhelming support of also meant greater economic exploitation of the the Bengali population and offset the greater number East. The military consumed as much as 60 per cent of trained West Pakistani soldiers and their superior of Pakistan's budget. Foreign exchange derived firepower. In the two or three weeks after the mainly from jute exports from the East was drawn Pakistani crackdown began Bengali troops tried to upon to purchase foreign weapons especially after engage them in different parts of the country by the 1965 war with India when most US military conventional tactics. These 'set-piece' battles proved assistance was cut off. Yet most military troop to be costly mistakes, resulting in the defeat of all deployment was in the West and the East gained organised Bengali resistance by the end of April little from military spending and the jobs it created. 1971. The remnants of the Bengali units crossed the border into India with their officers. The Pakistan army continued the British pattern of The secondphaseof resistancetoPakistani recruiting mainly among the 'martial races' of the repression took three main forms. The first, which Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province. Bengalis may be termed the 'official' resistance, came directly made up less than 10 per cent of an army estimated in out of the post-colonial army tradition. It was made 1971 at 350,000 although they constituted 56 per cent up of the regular Bengali units guided by a of the national population. And only two out of the conventional approach to military matters. This top 50 officers in post-Independence Pakistan were group is best represented by Majors Saflullah and Bengalis. Khaled Musharraf, who became top-level sector commanders, and above all by Colonel M. A. G. The growing economic disparity between East and Osmany, a retired East Pakistani military officer who West, the former's lack of a voice in its own affairs, was appointed Commander of the resistance forces the geographical absurdity of the country to begin by the Awami League government in exile. Their with, and the great cultural differences between the approach was to organise all the trained Bengali two regions combined to produce an increasingly military personnel into conventional units which potent nationalist brew in the East. Accumulated would operate from bases in India. And their grievances burst forth in large-scale student and political goal was to bring an Awami League workers riots during 1968-69, leading to the fall of government to power in Bangladeshs soon as the Ayub regime. A new military administration possible by whatever means including direct Indian callingitself an interim government promised intervention. nation wide elections. These were held in December 1970 and fought on the issue of provincial autonomy. The Indian government had decided by the middle of The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman April 1971, that it was in its own national interest to won an overwhelming victory in East Bengal with a aid the resistance in East Pakistan. India had fought large enough majority to dominate the new National two inconclusive wars with Pakistan since Indepen- Assembly and make Mujib the next Prime Minister dence and saw this as the opportunity of the century of Pakistan. West Pakistani interests saw their to cut its enemy to size and assert itself as the domination threatened, and the military regime of dominant power in the region. The Indian Congress Yahya Khan postponed the convening of the Party government also desired to bring to power an Assembly. The Awami League respondedby 1 The Bengali armtd forces in East Pakistan at the time were organising a mass campaign of unarmed resistance. six battalions of the East Bengal Regiment (EBR), number- ing about 6,000 men, plus 13-14,000 lightly-armed troopa The West Pakistani military rulers answered this of the border security force, the East Pakistan Riffes (EPR). political challenge with one of the most brutal In addition there were some 45,000 police in the province, not all armed, who mostly went over to the resistance, as military onslaughts seen in South Asia. well aothers in home-guard type militias. General Osmany, the retired East Pakistani army officer who took command of the Bangladesh liberation forces during the war was later to say that the 'Bengali personnel in the army might well have stayed neutral, had thePakistani authorities confined War of Independence their crackdown to seleed Bengali politicians.