DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Influence in Japan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Influence in Japan JULY 2020 China’s Influence in Japan Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular AUTHOR Devin Stewart A Report of the CSIS SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM JULY 2020 China’s Influence in Japan Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular AUTHOR Devin Stewart A Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Program About CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact. CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public. CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world. CSIS is ranked the number one think tank in the United States as well as the defense and national security center of excellence for 2016-2018 by the University of Pennsylvania’s “Global Go To Think Tank Index.” CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular | II Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Ayano Tsunoda, Erika Bulach, Gray Gaertner, Ken Silverman, and Perry Landesberg for their research assistance on this report. This publication was made possible by the Global Engagement Center at the U.S. Department of State, through the Information Access Fund (IAF) administered by the DT Institute. The opinions, conclusions, or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the view of the U.S. government or the IAF. Devin Stewart | III Contents Introduction 1 1 | China’s Tactics to Influence Japan 3 2 | Resilience and Vulnerabilities: Traits Unique to Japan 19 3 | Responses: Lessons from Japan’s Experience 33 4 | Conclusions: Japan as a Negative Case of CCP Influence 45 About the Author 47 China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular | IV Introduction Starting in 2018, the uncertainty generated from the U.S.-China trade war had compelled two longtime rivals and the world’s second and third largest economies, China and Japan, to temporarily put aside their differences. To that end, they pursued a pragmatic “tactical détente” or “new start” in the relationship, emphasizing shared interests in trade, tourism, and diplomacy. Tokyo’s business-friendly associations and officials also pushed in this direction domestically. The result has been a nuanced hedging strategy toward Beijing that aims to derive economic benefit from the Chinese economy while protecting the nation from malign influence. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s scheduled spring 2020 state visit to Japan (later postponed due to Covid-19) was a potential litmus test for producing a “fifth political document” defining the improving relationship. In line with China’s global propaganda aims, Beijing had aimed to use that document to further legitimize its global leadership and ambitious economic projects.1 Under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embarked on a global influence campaign, including the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to fortify the CCP’s image more than disrupt global politics and place China among the world’s “great powers.” What can we make of China’s influence activities in Japan, a historic geopolitical rival? This inductive project sought to understand how different democracies handled foreign influence activities. It does so by looking at the “demand” side or consumption of foreign influence rather than the “supply” side or production of foreign influence (as many other studies do). Additionally, a distinction should be made between the CCP, China as a country, and the Chinese nation. While the CCP claims to represent the Chinese people, the two entities should not be conflated. In this study, however, in order to examine the “demand” side of influence, the three terms are less sharply distinct, reflecting attitudes in Japan toward China in general. Japan’s resilience toward the CCP’s influence is wrapped in its comprehensive relationship with China. The consensus of about 40 experts interviewed over a two-year period (2018-2019) for this project stated confidently—and even pridefully—that China’s influence in Japan remains limited compared with other democracies. “Influence,” as understood by experts in Japan, constitutes efforts by the Chinese government or government affiliated entities 1. Nagai Oki, “Beijing readies new political document for China-Japan ties,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 12, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Beijing-readies-new-political-document-for-China-Japan-ties. Devin Stewart | 1 to shape Japanese views and actions in the CCP’s favor.2 This finding is consistent with recent reports by the Hoover Institution, Hudson Institute, Jamestown Foundation, and others.3 But this paper does something different. It attempts to answer why CCP influence is limited in Japan. This report will explore underlying factors, Japanese responses, and possible lessons for other countries wrestling with similar issues. Unlike other wealthy democracies, Japan has generally resisted influence activities from China, its massive neighbor, due to liberal democratic virtues as well as deficits. They include strict campaign finance rules, regulations favoring domestic industry at the expense of foreigners, a homogenous population, a politically apathetic public, political stability, relative historic isolation from foreign influence, an “oligopolistic” media landscape, and popular suspicion toward China. Anyone who travels to Japan knows that Chinese political influence in Japan is like air: it is everywhere yet nowhere in particular.4 As Koichi Nakano of Sophia University told us, “This is a hard topic because China’s influence is more subtle here compared to other places. China’s influence has been in Japan forever, so it’s not visible or not new. It’s not in your face . maybe it’s because China saw Japan as a steppingstone for development and now no longer needs it.” Chinese cultural influence in Japan is ubiquitous; it pervades the language, art, cuisine, literature, architecture, music, law, and philosophy. After two millennia of intense China-Japan relations (documentation of the bilateral relationship dates back to the year 57AD), including wars, invasions, and rivalries, Japanese society is accustomed to living side-by-side with China yet not necessarily together, and the country has proved to be relatively impenetrable to Chinese political warfare.5 Moreover, China risks pushback from the Japanese public over its influence activities. The global reaction to China’s role in the Covid-19 crisis, attempted cover-up, and propaganda campaign to take credit and avoid blame suggests that such a backlash may increasingly become a global norm as global awareness of CCP meddling increases. 2. A close concept is “political warfare,” which American diplomat George Kennan defined in 1948 as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.” From “269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum,” U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian, May 4, 1948, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269. 3. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Washington, DC: Hoover Institution, November 29, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-amer- ican-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance; Eric Ressler, “Information Warfare: the Communist Party of China’s Influence Operations in the United States and Japan,” Hudson Institute, August 29, 2018, https://www.carnegie- council.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/information-warfare-communist-party-of-china-influence-opera- tions-in-us-and-japan; and Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan Publication: China Brief,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 19, no. 12, June 26, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/a-prelimi- nary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-japan/. 4. The author suggested
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1 Contents Introduction I STRATEGIC VISIONS for EAST ASIA Toward
    Contents Introduction I STRATEGIC VISIONS FOR EAST ASIA Toward Greater U.S.-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue and Coordination Mike Green Arc of Freedom and Prosperity Heigo Sato India’s Strategic Vision Suba Chandran II THE RISE OF CHINA Dealing with a Rising Power: India-China Relations and the Reconstruction of Strategic Partnerships Alka Acharya The Prospect of China Up to 2020: A View from Japan Yasuhiro Matsuda The United States and a Rising China Derek Mitchell III NONPROLIFERATION Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime in the Era of Nuclear Renaissance: A Common Agenda for Japan, the United States, and India Nobumasa Akiyama Global Nonproliferation Dynamics: An Indian Perspective Lawrence Prabhakar Nonproliferation Players and their Policies Jon Wolfstal IV ENERGY SECURITY Trends in Energy Security Mikkal Herberg 1 Japan ’s Energy Security Policy Manabu Miyagawa India’s Energy Security Chietigj Bajpaee V ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE A U.S. Perspective of Economic Convergence in East Asia Krishen Mehta New Open Regionalism? Current Trends and Perspectives in the Asia-Pacific Fukunari Kimura VI SOUTHEAST ASIA U.S. Perspectives on Southeast Asia: Opportunities for a Rethink Ben Dolven Southeast Asia: A New Regional Order Nobuto Yamamoto India’s Role in Southeast Asia: The Logic and Limits of Cooperation with the United States and Japan Sadanand Dhume VII COUNTER-TERRORISM Japan’s Counterterrorism Policy Naofumi Miyasaka Counterterrorism Cooperation with the United States and Japan: An Indian Perspective Manjeet Singh Pardesi VIII MARITIME
    [Show full text]
  • Visit to the Philippines
    Volume 14 | Issue 5 | Number 3 | Article ID 4864 | Mar 01, 2016 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Political Agenda Behind the Japanese Emperor and Empress’ “Irei” Visit to the Philippines Kihara Satoru, Satoko Oka Norimatsu Emperor Akihito and empress Michiko of Japan dead as gods," cannot be easily translated into visited the Philippines from January 26 to 30, Anglophone culture. The word "irei" has a 2016. It was the first visit to the country by a connotation beyond "comforting the spirit" of Japanese emperor since the end of the Asia- the dead, which embeds in the word the Pacific War. The pair's first visit was in 1962 possibility of the "comforted spirit being when they were crown prince and princess. elevated to a higher spirituality" to the level of "deities/gods," which can even become "objects The primary purpose of the visit was to "mark of spiritual worship."3 the 60th anniversary of the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations" in light of the Shintani's argument immediately suggests that "friendship and goodwill between the two we consider its Shintoist, particularly Imperial nations."1 With Akihito and Michiko's "strong Japan's state-sanctioned Shintoist significance wishes," at least as it was reported so widely in when the word "irei" is used to describe the the Japanese media,2 two days out of the five- Japanese emperor and empress' trips to day itinerary were dedicated to "irei 慰霊," that remember the war dead. This is particularly the is, to mourn those who perished under Imperial case given the ongoing international Japan's occupation of the country fromcontroversy over Yasukuni Shrine, which December 1941 to August 1945.
    [Show full text]
  • JAPAN: the Silence Defeated Suga, As Eyes Turn Now to Kono
    Asia | September 3, 2021 JAPAN: The silence defeated Suga, as eyes turn now to Kono ● Strategic silence from Abe and Aso undermined Yoshihide Suga, but the prime minister’s own gambits hastened his departure. ● Taro Kono is set to enter the race as the favorite, and Kishida may now be joined by Ishiba and other candidates. ● The LDP’s prospects for the general election will now improve, as will the likelihood of another stimulus package The dominos all fell quickly at the end. Perhaps the chief factor in Yoshihide Suga’s decision to step down from his positions as party president and prime minister was the ongoing silence of two of the kingmakers, his boss of eight years and former PM Shinzo Abe, and his current deputy PM and Finance Minister Taro Aso. Their lack of public support created the space for doubts to fester in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) circles about whether the factionally-unaligned premier would secure the votes to repeat his unlikely victory of 12 months ago. Suga also hastened his own departure with two consequential gambits this week – first floating the idea of a snap September election that resulted in blowback from jittery party colleagues, then presenting several prominent names with a back-me-or-I’ll-sack-myself ultimatum with his plan to reshuffle top posts only weeks before the party vote. Environment Minister Junichiro Koizumi and others ultimately seem to have concluded that Suga’s offers of promotion were akin to being given front-row deck chairs on the Titanic. The leadership race opens The incumbent’s withdrawal leaves the field open in the party leadership race.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism in Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy
    The London School of Economics and Political Science Nationalism in Japan’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: A Consideration of the Cases of China, North Korea, and India Maiko Kuroki A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, February 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of <88,7630> words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Josh Collins and Greg Demmons. 2 of 3 Abstract Under the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the deterioration of the Japan-China relationship and growing tension between Japan and North Korea were often interpreted as being caused by the rise of nationalism. This thesis aims to explore this question by looking at Japan’s foreign policy in the region and uncovering how political actors manipulated the concept of nationalism in foreign policy discourse.
    [Show full text]
  • Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021 the President's News
    Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021 The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan April 16, 2021 President Biden. Well, good afternoon. The Prime Minister has brought the sun out, so he can do about anything. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for being here. It's been my pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Suga to the White House. This is our first in-person meeting here, the first head of state that I've asked in my administration to come to the White House. Yoshi, thank you for making the long trip to Washington. We've already met several times virtually on—at a G–7 meeting and a Quad leader summit, but I greatly appreciate the chance to spend time with you in person and to make our—exchange our ideas face to face. There's no substitute for face-to-face discussions. We are still talking—taking COVID precautions, being careful. But our commitment to meet in person is indicative of the importance and the value we both place on this relationship between Japan and the United States, this partnership. We had a very productive discussion today. When nations as close as ours get together, we always look for operations and opportunities to do more, and today was no exception. So, Yoshi, you'll probably be seeing a lot more of me in the future. And today Prime Minister Suga and I affirmed our ironclad support for U.S.-Japanese alliance and for our shared security. We committed to working together to take on the challenges from China and on issues like the East China Sea, the South China Sea, as well as North Korea, to ensure a future of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • Japan's Way Forward: the Prospects for Political Leadership and The
    From Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan, 2015 Japan’s Way Forward: 8 The Prospects for Political Leadership and the International Implications James GANNON and Ryo SAHASHI he success that Shinzo Abe had after his 2012 election in breaking Japan’s pattern of one-year premierships offered hope to some that a new era of effective political leadership was at hand for Tthe country. However, it appears that any respite from Japan’s “leadership deficit” will be temporary. As the authors of this volume argue, there are bound to be exceptions to the parade of short-lived prime ministers who struggle to advance their agendas—strong premiers such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, Junichiro Koizumi, and Abe are likely to emerge from time to time—but without further changes to the political system, powerful institutional factors will continue to make it difficult for prime ministers to exercise political leadership in a sustained and effective manner. Of course, Japan has never been renowned for having charismatic, strong political leaders. However, the challenges associated with political leadership are particularly worrying now because over the past quarter century, societal shifts, political reform, and voter expectations have elevated the profile of Japan’s prime minister, making the individual holding that post and the performance of that person increasingly conse- quential. Furthermore, in recent decades, the rise of summit diplomacy James Gannon is the executive director of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE/USA), and Ryo Sahashi is an associate professor at Kanagawa University. 181 182 LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP and advances in communications technology have expanded the diplo- matic role of heads of government.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2015
    THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2015 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer October 15, 1910 – September 1, 1990 Yearbook Class of 2015 From Left to Right: Sung Hui “Sophie” Yang, Jeffrey Bond, Ju Hyung Kim, Luoxi Dao, Ji Won Kwon, Malcolm Whitehead, Michael Wakcher, Professor William Brooks, Evan Sankey, Benjamin Garton, Ian Hamilton, Michael Kotler, Waichiro Katsuda, Yiwei “Jenny” Pan TABLE OF CONTENTS The Year at the Reischauer Center 1 Reischauer Center Events, 2014-2015 7 Introduction 10 William L. Brooks For U.S.-Japan Relations, the JET Program Is a Hidden National Treasure 46 Malcolm Whitehead U.S.-Japan Cultural Exchange in a New Era of Public Diplomacy 73 Michael Wakcher New U.S.-Japan Partnership in Disaster Management and Japan’s Role 95 Waichiro Katsuda India and the US-Japan Alliance 113 Evan Sankey Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Central Asia Strategy: Is it Effective? 129 Ian Hamilton Trilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia 157 Ju Hyong Kim Japan’s Trade Agreement Strategies: Three Case Studies 172 Ji Won Kwon Changing Trade Patterns among the U.S., Japan and China: Does Politics Trump Market Forces? 205 Jenny Iwei Pan Impact of “Abenomics” on Mergers and Acquisition Trends in Japan 222 Luoxi Dao Japan’s Long Road to Corporate Governance Reform 240 Ben Garton Building Japan’s Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 258 Jeff Bond Class Research Trip to Tokyo, March 2014: Photo Album 281 1 THE YEAR AT THE REISCHAUER CENTER The 2014-2015 academic year, during which the Reischauer Center celebrated its thirtieth anniversary, was a historic one--for the Center, SAIS, and for trans-Pacific relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Unleashing the Power of Women
    ADVERTISEMENT Unleashing the Power of Women Expanding opportunities for women in the workplace and throughout society is a central plank in the Abe government’s growth strategy for Japan. In that spirit, the Japanese government and three other spon- sors convened the World Assembly for Women in Tokyo (WAW! Tokyo 2014) from September 12 to 14. Participating as speakers and as workgroup participants were about 100 public- and private-sector luminaries from around the world. Highlighting the event was a high- level roundtable on September 13. SPONSORS: Government of Japan Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) Nikkei Inc. Japan Institute of International Affairs SUPPORTER: Japan Center for Economic Research Pictured above Left, from top: Barbara Judge, Chairperson, UK Pension Protection Fund; Miki Tsusaka, Senior Partner and Managing Director, Boston Consulting Group; Zainab Hawa Bangura, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.Center, from top: Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan; Helen Clark, Administrator, United Nations Development Program. Right: Haruko Arimura, Minister in Charge of Women’s Empowerment, Japan ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT HIGH-LEVEL HIGH-LEVEL ROUNDTABLE ROUNDTABLE organizations, entrepreneurship, infra- fellow at the Cambridge [University] structure, human security, peace and Central Asia Forum and a former vice prosperity, and self-determination. The minister for foreign affairs. She called workgroups convened for 90 minutes in attention to the far-reaching implica- the morning and again for an hour after tions of the proposals that the partici- lunch to hammer out policy proposals. pants would prepare. Coordinating the group focused on “Please enjoy substantive discussions women in the economy was Hiroko Ota, in the small workshop format,” encour- a professor at Japan’s National Graduate aged Yamanaka in the expectation of Institute for Policy Studies and a former heart-to-heart talks.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia–Japan Relations: New Stage of Development
    S SUMMER SCHOOLS EXPERT COMMENTARIES S GUEST LECTURES CENARIOS T S S TABLE NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS C I S NALYSIS AND FORECASTING FOREIGN POLICY ISCUSSIONS A T D C REFERENCE BOOKS DIALOGUE ETWORK SCIENCE WORKING PAPERS DUCATION N PROJE OUND E REPORTS NALYSIS AND FORECASTING URITY R A S ATION C C PROJE E ORGANIZATION OMPETITIONS C NTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY CONFERENCES DU I E S S S FOREIGN POLICY TALENT POOL CS S EDUCATION POOL POLITI EPORTS OUND TABLES ION R R ENARIO GLOBAL POLITICS ETWORK C NTERNATIONAL I N IVIL OCIETY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS S C S LOBAL RELATION G TALENT SS EFERENCE BOOKS NTERNATIONAL Y R I RUSSIANY RUSSIAN Y S C S ORGANIZATIONS DUCATION C E E INTERNATIONAL U SECURITY C RELATION SUMMER C AFFAIRS COUNCIL POLI SCHOOLS IALOGUE IETY D TING ONAL OUND I R GUEST LECTURES C SC O S TABLES I TY IGRATION EPORTS I R S A V ARTNERSHIP OREIGN P I NTERNATIONAL IBRARY OADMAPS XPERT R F E I S ONFEREN IPLOMA D M C L URITY GLOBAL NTERNAT MIGRATION COMMENTARIES IVIL C I ACT S ILATERAL NTHOLOGIE C POOL D SCIENCE C REPORTS I BOOK E ISCUSSIONS INTERNSHIPS B A D IPLOMA E WEBSITE PARTNERSHIP INTERNSHIPS S S Y C TALENT C DIALOGUE GLOBAL NTHOLOGIESGLOBAL Y A C S D POLI FORE SCIENCE CONFERENCES POLI Y S C ITE EFEREN S S NALYSISSCIENCE IGRATION A IBRARY OADMAP EB ENARIO OREIGN R IPLOMA C F R L M OREIGN D S W NALY AND FORECASTING F S DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A AND S NETWORK INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS E CLUB MEETINGS DIALOGUE DIPLOMACY PROJECTS HOOL S S C IALOGUE S T D C URITY UMMER ITE E S HIP C S OMMENTARIE TURE IVIL OCIETY C S C S EBSITE
    [Show full text]
  • Japan at a Political and Strategic Crossroads
    Policy Brief DecJune 25,2020 1, 2018 Valérie Niquet is senior Japan at a Political and Strategic fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Crossroads: head of the Asia program Complex Strategic Choices and a at Foundation for Strategic Balancing Act? Research. She writes extensively on Asia-Pacific Valérie Niquet strategic affairs and security. Her latest book, La puissance Introduction chinoise en 100 questions, Tallandier, has been published On August 28, Shinzo Abe, the longest-serving prime minister in 2017. You can follow her on in Japan (2,822 days) stepped down and was replaced by Yoshihide twitter @V.Niquet Suga, Abe’s former Chief Cabinet Secretary. Having long focused on internal politics and the intricacies of Japanese bureaucracy, Prime Minister Suga is now facing the task of navigating an increasingly tense and uncertain strategic situation, with stakes going far beyond Japan’s borders and immediate environment in the context of the unresolved COVID-19 pandemic.1 The challenges that Prime Minister Suga is facing are manifold and diverse; some can be considered long-term or permanent. Others are relatively new or continued trends with new effects on the strategic balance of power and threats to the region and beyond. Permanencies North Korean missile threat In terms of threats, though mentioned with less frequency in recent months, North Korea remains the most immediate and vital threat for Japan. Contrary to expectations after the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore in 2018, North Korea has never put a stop to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Since ending a one-year moratorium in May 2019, North Korea has carried out 35 tests as of April 2020, all successful but one.
    [Show full text]
  • Programme for Web Announcement-E
    Building ASEAN Identity on a Transnational Dimension Programme (TBC) 7 March (Thursday) 09:30 – 10:20 Opening Session Opening Remarks: Prof. Shotaro Yachi, Special Advisor to the Cabinet (TBC) Dr. David Malone, Rector of the United Nations University (TBC) Representative from ASEAN (TBC) Keynote speech: Professor Yasushi Kikuchi, Visiting Professor, UNU-ISP, Professor Emeritus, Waseda University 10:20 – 11:30 Session I: Moderator: Vesselin Popovski, Senior Academic Programme Officer (UNU-ISP) Perspectives from Vietnam Madam Ton Nu Thi Ninh, President, Tri Viet Institute for International Studies and Exchange, Ton Duc Thang University Perspectives from Thailand Dr. Ketkanda Jaturongkachoke, the School of Language and Communication, National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) Perspectives from Singapore Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission in Kuala Lumpur Discussion 11:30 – 11:50 Coffee Break 11:50 – 13:00 Session II: Moderator: Madoka Futamura, Academic Programme Officer (UNU-ISP) Perspectives from Philippines Dr. Wilfrido Villacorta, Professor Emeritus, De La Salle University, Former Ambassador to ASEAN Perspectives from Myanmar Ms. Moe Thuzar, Lead Researcher, ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Perspectives from Malaysia Dr. Rahmat Mohamad, Secretary General, Asian African Legal Consultative Organization Discussion 1 13:00 – 14:30 LUNCH TIME 14:30 – 15:55 Session III: Moderator: Dr. Yuichi Sekiya (University of Tokyo) Perspectives from Laos Dr. Soukanh Chithpanya, Associate Professor,
    [Show full text]
  • The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan
    Washington International Law Journal Volume 28 Number 2 4-1-2019 The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan Mayu Terada Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons Recommended Citation Mayu Terada, The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan, 28 Wash. L. Rev. 431 (2019). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol28/iss2/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Compilation © 2019 Washington International Law Journal Association THE CHANGING NATURE OF BUREAUCRACY AND GOVERNING STRUCTURE IN JAPAN Mayu Terada* Abstract: This paper analyzes and criticizes changes in the relationship between politics and the bureaucracy, in Japan up to the present from the viewpoint of administrative organizations and related public law system. Drastic changes in the legal system, or legal reform, may sometimes undermine the true intention of the policy and its implementation. Thus, bringing political leadership in administrative decision-making bodies cannot be easily concluded as better or worse than the complete separation of administration and government. To analyze this matter in
    [Show full text]