Northern Ireland and the Divided World The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective

Edited by JOHN MCGARRY

1 CONTENTS

List of Figures xi List of Tables xii List of Abbreviations xiii List of Contributors xv

1. Introduction: The Comparable Northern Ireland John McGarry 1

Part I. General and Theoretical Perspectives 2. Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation? Rupert Taylor 36 3. Comparative Political Science and the British–Irish Agreement Brendan O’Leary 53 4. The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear, Consociational, and Risky Donald L. Horowitz 89 5. Northern Ireland, Civic Nationalism, and the Good Friday Agreement John McGarry 109 6. Unsung Heroes? The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in the Northern Ireland Conflict Feargal Cochrane 137

Part II. Comparative Case-Studies 7. From Conflict to Agreement in Northern Ireland: Lessons from Europe Antony Alcock 159 8. Northern Ireland and the Basque Country Michael Keating 181 x Contents 9. Making the Transition from Hegemonic Regime to Power-Sharing: Northern Ireland and Canada in Historical Perspective S. J. R. Noel 209 10. Northern Ireland and Island Status Adrian Guelke 228 11. Taking the Gun out of Politics: Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland and Lebanon Kirsten E. Schulze 253 12. Northern Ireland and South Africa: ‘Hope and History at a Crossroads’ Padraig O’Malley 276 13. The Tenability of Partition as a Mode of Conflict Regulation: Comparing Ireland with Palestine–Land of Israel Sammy Smooha 309

Index 337 1

Introduction: The Comparable Northern Ireland

JOHN MCGARRY

Northern Ireland is truly a place apart (editorial, Belfast Telegraph, 5 April 2000) For 30 years the politicians . . . of Northern Ireland have insisted their conflict cannot be compared to others (Kevin Cullen, journalist, Irish Times, 13 May 2000) ‘Ulster’, the world’s best laager! (sign in David Trimble’s Westminster office) We tried to answer, spoke of Arab, Jew, of Turk and Greek in Cyprus, Pakistan and India, but no sense flickered through that offered reason to a modern man why Europeans, Christians, working-class should thresh and struggle in that old morass (John Hewitt, Ulster poet)1 Say it once, Say it loud, I’m Black an’ I’m proud . . . The Irish are the niggers of Europe, lads. (Roddy Doyle, The Commitments)2 For many people, like the editorialists of the Belfast Telegraph or the audi- ence of John Hewitt’s poem, Northern Ireland is a place apart, its conflict the result of some unique pathology. This view was particularly dominant from the outbreak of the troubles until the early 1990s, although it is still subscribed to. Northern Ireland has been seen, variously, as a ‘sui generis, untypical and even anachronistic phenomenon’,3 a ‘peculiarly local conflict’,4 an ‘outlandish exception to all the rules’,5 or as possessing a ‘peculiar intractability’.6 However, many people, not just John Hewitt and Roddy Doyle, reject the idea that Northern Ireland is incomparable. Political partisans, contrary to 2 John McGarry Kevin Cullen’s insight, have been drawing parallels between Northern Ireland and other divided societies since at least the nineteenth century. Some of the best academic work on the Northern Ireland conflict, written by leading scholars from both outside and inside Northern Ireland, is com- parative in focus.7 The scope for comparative analysis has increased in recent years. As a result of better international communications, it has become easier for those inside and outside Northern Ireland to compare its conflict with others. With outside governments, particularly the United States, and non- governmental organizations playing an increasingly prominent role in Northern Ireland, there are more incentives for the region’s partisans to seek to influence external opinion through the drawing of appropriate parallels. There also appear to be more conflicts with which Northern Ireland can be compared: the end of the cold war has been followed by a series of confrontations in south-eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and has made it possible to focus more on other ongoing violent intra-state conflicts, in Spain, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus, as well as the non- violent dispute between Quebec and the rest of Canada. It has also ushered in peace processes in South Africa and Israel–Palestine that have been the focus of global attention. Finally, the process of European integration led some scholars to examine the possibilities it offers for different national minorities, including those in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and South Tyrol. This collection was assembled in part to allow leading comparativists to discuss Northern Ireland in light of these broad developments. Northern Ireland is compared with a significant number of the cases mentioned, including the Åland Island, Cyprus, and South Tyrol (Alcock); the Basque Country (Keating); Canada (Noel); Cyprus, Corsica, East Timor, Puerto Rico, and Sri Lanka (Guelke); Lebanon (Schulze); South Africa (O’Malley); and Israel–Palestine (Smooha). The collection is also a response to the Good Friday Agreement, the landmark settlement reached in April 1998. Contributors were asked to use comparative analysis to evaluate the Agreement and to assess whether it represents the optimal way forward. The judgements are rich and var- ied. Several of the contributions are written from a pro-Agreement per- spective. These include chapters written from a unionist perspective (Alcock), a loyalist perspective (Schulze), and a position that has been associated with that of moderate nationalists (McGarry, O’Leary). Other chapters are critical of the Agreement, including one that appears close to the position of republican rejectionists (Taylor) and another that reflects Introduction 3 concerns held by the Alliance Party (Horowitz). The various contribu- tions offer a wealth of prescriptive suggestions, including advice on how to design institutions for a bi-national society (McGarry, O’Leary); strengthen the Agreement to prevent breakdown (O’Leary); address the vexed question of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons (Schulze); ensure that negotiations between rival groups succeed (O’Malley); build a multi-ethnic executive coalition that will last (Horowitz, Noel); and construct an integrated society from the grass roots up (Taylor). While a number of academics have examined Northern Ireland comparatively in monographs and journal articles, this is the first collection of essays on the subject. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the use of compara- tive analysis in Northern Ireland. The first section discusses the ways in which nationalist and unionist partisans have drawn links between Northern Ireland and other divided societies since before the conflict began in the late 1960s. The second section examines comparative analysis by academics over this same period. The chapter ends with a brief sum- mary of the various contributions to the collection, and situates these in relation to the existing literature.

Partisans and Parallels8

Partisans everywhere draw parallels with other conflicts. Particular paral- lels are selected because they are considered appropriate: the partisans see the two cases as essentially similar. However, comparisons may also be used for their instrumental value. As the parallels invariably portray the group making them in a positive light and depict rivals negatively, they can help to rally one’s domestic constituency and attract sympathy from outsiders.9 Preferred parallels change, depending on circumstances: a comparison with a particular conflict may be dropped if the conflict ends or loses its international salience. There is also some evidence that an ethnic group’s choice of comparison may have real political consequences. If outsiders, including external governments and non-governmental organizations, accept the validity of a parallel between two conflicts, it may lead them to adopt the same approach towards one that they have taken towards the other. If actors in one conflict come to identify sufficiently with the actors in another, the latter’s behaviour may influence the former’s. There is evid- ence of both effects in Northern Ireland. 4 John McGarry During the 1960s Northern Ireland’s nationalists, particularly moderates, identified their plight with that of American blacks struggling for civil rights.10 This had the advantage of identifying Northern Ireland’s unionist regime with the white racist regimes of Alabama, Mississippi, and other parts of the Deep South. The parallel embarrassed Britain on the world stage and encouraged pressure from the United States for the reform of Northern Ireland. Like the US campaign, the appeal for civil rights in Northern Ireland was aimed at metropolitan citizens. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, which began to challenge the unionist regime in 1964, was based on its American counterpart, although it was also inspired by the UK- based National Council for Civil Liberties. Catholics used the same slogans, ‘One man, one vote’ and ‘The world is watching’, and the same song, ‘We shall overcome’, as their American counterparts. More importantly, they employed the same tactics: civil disobedience and peaceful protest marches. It was thought that these tactics would have the same effect in Northern Ireland as they had in the United States, that is, that they would appeal to moderates in the dominant group and expose the intransigence of local chauvinists to liberal metropolitans. This was what happened. Nationalists have been less inclined to portray their situation as similar to that of American blacks in recent years. This is because the American case, which featured a minority peacefully demanding civil rights, became less appropriate as the struggle of Northern Ireland’s Catholics developed into a violent campaign for national rights. It is also because the American civil rights campaign lost its salience, partly because its core demands were met. However, nationalists continue to compare themselves to American blacks when it suits them. Nationalists who want to stop Orange parades through their neighbourhoods frequently refer to the Orange Order as akin to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and to the idea of it marching through a nationalist community as equivalent to the Klan parading through a black area in the United States.11 During congressional hearings into police reform in Northern Ireland in April 1999, at which I was a witness, a nationalist woman giving evidence claimed that Northern Ireland reminded her of Alabama in the 1950s.12 The parallel resonated with sev- eral of the black congressmen in attendance, and they accordingly con- demned the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). If a report in the Guardian is to be believed, President Clinton also accepts that the two cases are sim- ilar. He apparently rebuffed a request from Tony Blair to put pressure on Irish republicans to make concessions on police reform because he believed that bowing to unionist demands on the RUC ‘would be like leaving Alabama and Georgia under all-white cops’.13 Introduction 5 By the 1980s the favourite comparison of nationalists and republicans was between their struggle and that of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.14 Ironically, at the beginning of the century Irish republicans identified with Boers, who, like them, were engaged in a militant campaign against British imperialism.15 This comparison lost its appropriateness after the apartheid regime came to power in 1948, and after the salient conflict in South Africa became between whites and blacks rather than between Afrikaners and Britain. The comparison with the anti-apartheid movement was pressed into service as early as the 1970s. Michael Farrell, a leader of the civil rights movement, pointed out in an important book published in 1976 that the South African prime minister had offered, when introducing a new Coercion Bill in the South African Parliament in 1963, to ‘exchange all the legislation of that sort for one clause of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act’.16 However, it was not until the 1980s that the comparison became widespread. The emerging violent anti-state protests in South Africa; the even more violent response from Pretoria; the armed, even if relatively low- key, campaign of the African National Congress (ANC)’s paramilitary wing Umkhonto we Sizwe; and the greater international profile of the conflict against apartheid, all helped to make South Africa a more compelling par- allel for nationalists than the American civil rights movement. Republicans constantly refer to the similarity between their struggle and that of the ANC, as can be seen from Belfast wall murals celebrating ANC–IRA solidarity, and from their speeches and books.17 The analogy has been given the blessing, to the consternation of the British government, of Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders.18 It is also accepted by consti- tutional nationalists. In a book published two years before the Good Friday Agreement was reached, the Social Democratic and Labour Party leader, John Hume, claimed that what Northern Ireland needed was a unionist version of F. W. de Klerk, the white South African leader who negotiated an end to apartheid with Nelson Mandela.19 Two years after the Agreement was signed, Hume allegedly continued to see unionists as possessing an ‘Afrikaner mindset’.20 Equating unionists with the defenders of apartheid is intended to suggest that it is for unionists, as defenders of the status quo, to make con- cessions. However, it is also meant to convey a nationalist interpretation of the conflict, and of the prescription that is necessary to end it. It infers that unionists, like whites, not only defend the status quo, but are also a minor- ity, who should seek agreement with the nationalist majority in the island of Ireland. Just as South Africa’s majority was denied its right to self- determination by the apartheid regime, Ireland’s majority has been 6 John McGarry similarly deprived by the British state. The attempt to carve Northern Ireland out of Ireland is seen as analogous to attempts by whites to carve out a white-dominated South Africa through the creation of black ‘home- lands’.21 Just as the context for the solution to South Africa’s conflict was the reintegration of these territories into South Africa, so the context for a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland is an end to the partition of Ireland (the hardline nationalist version) or a process which leads to this (the moderate and currently dominant version). Towards the end of the 1960s and early 1970s some radical republican groups drew parallels between Northern Ireland and Vietnam, and this had echoes on the British Left. It was never a dominant comparison, however, perhaps because there was concern that repetition of it would alienate Irish American support. Republicans have also compared Ireland and Israel–Palestine. In the first half of the century republicans sympathized with Zionists, who, like them, were being blocked from self-determination by British authorities. However, after Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, and particularly after the outbreak in 1987 of the infada, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli control, nationalists began to draw parallels between themselves and Palestinians. The parallel, however, has not been as popular as that with black South Africans.22 There are two obvious reasons: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s greater proclivity for using indiscriminate terror made them a less attractive par- allel; and Israeli Jews have been considered less of a pariah people than South African whites, at least in a West that continues to harbour guilt about the Holocaust. Israeli Jews may indeed be a pariah people in certain Arab societies, but Irish republicans are not primarily interested in influencing them. More generally, Northern Ireland has been seen by its nationalist popula- tion, and in particular by republicans, as a colony, like those in pre-1960s Africa and Asia. This has helped to underline the republican position that Ireland, unlike Scotland and Wales, had never been a candidate for integra- tion into the British nation. It has further suggested that the conflict is unfinished business left over from the imperial era, and that the appropriate prescription is a British withdrawal. Labelling Ireland (later Northern Ireland) as a colony entitled to national self-determination has the additional advantage of calling international law in aid. Colonies are entitled in inter- national law to the right of self-determination, but integral parts of states are not. Designating Northern Ireland as Britain’s colony is also consistent with the nationalist argument that the conflict is externally imposed, and masks over internal divisions between unionists and nationalists. Introduction 7 The international community largely accepts the colonial analogy, which helps to explain why nationalists and republicans have received more external support than unionists.23 Many Americans, Europeans, and people from developing countries have a rather simplistic view of the conflict as taking place between Irish people and imperialist Britain. Even more damaging for the unionist cause, there is considerable evidence that people in Britain accept the colonial analogy. The public in Britain do not consider Northern Ireland an integral part of the United Kingdom. London has exclusion clauses in the Prevention of Terrorism Act that allow people from Northern Ireland to be denied entry to Britain. The main British political parties do not contest elections in Northern Ireland. Regular comments by British political elites suggest that many of them think of Northern Ireland in a colonial context. Reginald Maudling, when commenting on the failure of Stormont, said that it showed the West- minster constitution was not ‘easily exportable’. In 1969 Jim Callaghan, the British home secretary who introduced troops into Northern Ireland, com- pared it with Cyprus, suggesting that it was much easier to get involved in these conflicts than to get out of them. In the mid-1990s Home Secretary Douglas Hurd sounded a similar note to European Union foreign minis- ters: they should avoid military intervention in Bosnia lest they end up with a protracted commitment like the British government’s in Northern Ireland.24 London’s decision, in the Joint Declaration for Peace in 1993, and in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, to grant the right of self- determination to the people of Ireland (north and south) and to allow a united Ireland as soon as a majority in Northern Ireland assents, is further evidence that the British government sees Northern Ireland as a colony. States have granted such rights to colonies, but seldom, if ever, to integral parts of their territory.25 Nationalists have also argued that they are ‘republicans’, that is, ‘civic’ nationalists committed to an inclusive vision of the nation in which Protestants and Catholics are treated equally.26 This argument treats Irish nationalism, at least implicitly, as similar to French or American national- ism, both of which are predominantly civic in character. Unionists, by contrast, are identified as ethnic chauvinists, or, as locals might put it, ‘sec- tarian’ bigots.27 The message is that they are more like militant Serbs than Americans. This civic–ethnic distinction pervades the other analogies favoured by nationalists. It may be another reason why republicans prefer identification with the ANC, a civic nationalist movement, over the PLO, which is more clearly ethnic nationalist. It is consistent with the colonial analogy, as colonial movements were generally multi-ethnic and inclusive 8 John McGarry national liberation movements. It is implicit in the common description of unionists as analogous to South African whites, the KKK, or European fas- cist organizations. In each of these cases the consistent nationalist message is that they are on the right side of enlightenment values while unionists cling to old prejudices.

Unionist Analogies A key theme running through nationalist comparisons is the depiction of Northern Ireland as a colony and of British rule as illegitimate. Unionists reject such arguments. Before political correctness became fashionable, Brian Faulkner famously explained that Northern Ireland was not a ‘coconut colony’.28 Unionists have consistently rejected the idea that Ireland was a colony before 1921. It was, rather, an integral part of the United Kingdom governed by the same legislative procedures as the rest of the state. What happened in 1921 was not decolonization but secession from the United Kingdom by ethnocentric nationalists. One academic who is sympathetic to unionism, Hugh Roberts, has devoted an entire book to rejecting the argument that Northern Ireland is similar to the French colony of Algeria and that the appropriate prescription is an end to metro- politan rule.29 However, since 1972, and especially after 1985, many unionists have come to see Northern Ireland as an ‘internal colony’ whose inhabitants are treated as second-class citizens.30 They are referring here to the British gov- ernment’s use of special ‘Order in Council’ procedures to limit debate on legislation pertaining to Northern Ireland and to its decision in 1985 to allow a ‘foreign’ government, the Irish Republic, a say over the affairs of Northern Ireland. Unionists have also criticized the major British parties, those with the only chance of winning office, for refusing to organize in Northern Ireland.31 The use of the term ‘internal colony’ is deliberate, because the solution for this condition is integration, whereas ‘decoloniza- tion’ is the remedy for a colony. While nationalists identify with the internationally recognized right of colonies to self-determination, unionists rest their case on an even older international principle: the right of states to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The conflict, from this perspective, is a result of irredentism and external aggression from the Irish Republic, and parallels are chosen to make this point. During the Gulf crisis in the early 1990s former Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader James Molyneaux compared Northern Ireland with Kuwait, casting the former Irish prime minister Charles Introduction 9 Haughey in the role of Saddam Hussein. His colleague Chris McGimpsey likened Northern Ireland with the Sudetenland, with Irish nationalists as Nazi aggressors and the unionists as doughty liberal Czechs. McGimpsey claimed that ‘the South’s demand for the destruction of Northern Ireland—Eire’s claim to Lebensraum—is equivalent to Hitler’s claim over Czechoslovakia’.32 In his contribution to this volume (Chapter 7) Antony Alcock, a member of the UUP, provides another version of this argument. He explains that unionists traditionally refused to accommodate nationalists only because the latter rejected the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and because the Irish Republic, in Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution, expressed an irredentist claim to Northern Ireland. He draws on a number of cases from continental Europe to show that unionist behaviour was not deviant. Alcock claims that the accommodation of the Swedish minority in the Åland Islands and the Austrian minority in South Tyrol was greatly facilitated when Sweden and Austria dropped their claims to these respective areas. In Cyprus, Slovakia, and other parts of eastern Europe, on the other hand, continuing uncertainty over territorial integrity has prevented majority-minority settlements. This account helps to explain, from a pro-Agreement unionist perspec- tive, why unionists signed the Good Friday Agreement. It was because the Republic agreed to remove its constitutional claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland; because nationalists accepted that a united Ireland required the consent of a majority within Northern Ireland; and because the 1998 Agreement replaced the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which gave the Irish Republic a role in policy-making in Northern Ireland. Alcock also offers an explanation of why many unionists are ambivalent about the Agreement or opposed to it. This is because Irish irredentism remains a potent political force. It is also because the Irish government, while it no longer has the right to be consulted in areas of jurisdiction that have been devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, continues, under the Agreement, to be able to ‘put forward views and proposals’ on ‘non- devolved Northern Ireland matters’.33 Their concern with the territorial integrity of states has led unionists to be sceptical of ‘internationalizing’ conflicts. Their opposition to inter- national intervention led some of them to denounce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s intervention in Kosovo (or, as they would have it, Yugoslavia) in 1999. During the parliamentary debate on NATO’s bombing campaign, the UUP’s deputy leader, John Taylor, stated that he condemned it ‘without hesitation’. In a defence of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, he argued that it was as wrong to recognize Kosovo as it had been 10 John McGarry to recognize Croatia, Bosnia, and the other states of the former Yugoslavia.34 A member of the Democratic Unionist Party, Ian Paisley Jr., complained that the Kosovo Liberation Army, like the IRA, had got its way ‘by internationalising the crisis in the Balkans, and just like their Irish counterpart in the IRA, they are looking for a way of seizing power in this region of the Balkans’ in the name of a ‘mystical-romantic nationalism’.35 While the younger Paisley relied on secular arguments, other Protestants did not. According to a ‘Professor’ Arthur Noble, writing on the elder Paisley’s web site, internationalization should be resisted because it is orchestrated by the Vatican. What links the bombing of Serbia and the Good Friday Agreement, in this view, is that both were directed by Rome. The Vatican, apparently, is planning a papal ‘super-state’ in Europe, and has ordered its vassals in Washington and London to subdue the Serbs and Ulster’s Protestants, the two groups who ‘refused to bow the knee’ to Rome.36 Given the support among unionists for an integrated United Kingdom, it is hardly surprising that their favourite parallel is with Scotland and Wales. Integrationist unionists have long argued that Northern Ireland should be treated in the same way as these other parts of the United Kingdom. They have criticized the British government’s practice of passing legislation for Northern Ireland in ways that are different from Scottish and Welsh legislation, and the tendency of the major British parties to organize in Scotland and Wales but not in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland’s dis- tinctiveness, including the fact that it has a large Irish nationalist popula- tion, can be managed, it is claimed, within the United Kingdom, which also has sizeable Scottish and Welsh national communities. As Britain would not allow a foreign government a say in Scottish or Welsh policy, unionists argue that it should not allow a ‘foreign’ government a say over Northern Ireland policy. Prior to the Labour government’s decision in 1997 to devolve power to a Scottish parliament and a Welsh assembly, unionist integrationists used the fact that Scotland and Wales had no such institu- tions to argue against devolution for Northern Ireland. Since devolution anti-Agreement unionists have expressed a preference for the Welsh over the Scottish model, as the powers Wales received are relatively insubstantial and, therefore, more compatible with integrationism. Some unionists go beyond the Scotland and Wales analogy to compare Northern Ireland with parts of England. Margaret Thatcher once famously asserted that Northern Ireland is ‘as British as Finchley’, her sub- urban London constituency, although her autobiography suggest her views on Northern Ireland were more traditionally British than this statement Introduction 11 suggests. A Marxist integrationist clique, the British and Irish Communist Organization, once supported its case for integration by arguing that ‘parts of Ulster’ are physically similar to parts of England and could ‘be placed in Worcestershire without arousing comment’.37 Just as nationalists occasionally deviate from the rule of comparing their conflict with national liberation struggles, as when they identify with American blacks, unionists also stray from a consistent defence of the ter- ritorial integrity of states. Rather than defending the territorial unity of Cyprus and opposing outside interference in Cypriot affairs, two leading unionist politicians, John Taylor and Ken Maginnis, support the partition of Cyprus by Turkish forces and are sympathetic to the claims of Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island.38 Steven King, an adviser to the UUP leader, David Trimble, has argued the merits of partition not only in Ireland and Cyprus, but also in India and the former Yugoslavia. King claims that partition can maintain peace between warring enemies and that ‘people who cannot hang together are better hanging apart’. His solution to the recent Kosovo conflict is the creation of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Albania, and an end to the illusion that one can have multi-ethnic states in this region.39 This support for partition represents a divergence from the traditional unionist position that it was Irish nationalists who were partitionists, not unionists. The support for homogeneous states is also inconsistent with civic unionist support for the United Kingdom as a mul- ticultural and multinational state. Unionists have been less adroit, or less concerned, than republicans about selecting politically correct analogies. In the 1960s they expressed sympathy with the white regime in Rhodesia, which they saw as, like them, under siege by a larger group and without friends. Ulster loyalists made contact with the South African apartheid regime during the 1980s, and currently enjoy links with fascist groups in Great Britain.40 As we have just seen, some unionists are happy to associate themselves with the Serbs. However, mainstream unionists have become increasingly disenchanted with such comparisons, probably because of the propaganda pitfalls asso- ciated with them. Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 unionist politi- cians and intellectuals have increasingly presented their position in modern inclusive language.41 They claim that unionists want a modern and tolerant multi-ethnic state capable of accommodating all its citizens, including Irish Catholics and nationalists. It is Irish nationalists who are said to seek a homogeneous nation-state on the Eastern European model. To the nationalist accusation that they are like the KKK, the Loyal Orders respond by framing their demand to march through nationalist areas in the 12 John McGarry liberal language of rights of assembly. One of these Orders, the Apprentice Boys, claims it wants the ‘right’ to march while nationalists want to impose ‘apartheid’ on Northern Ireland by keeping Orangemen and nationalists separate.42 Launching his bid for the UUP leadership in March 2000, unionist right-winger Martin Smyth suggested that it was Sinn Féin which was fascist, and claimed that the European Union was being hypocritical in opposing the inclusion of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in the Austrian gov- ernment while permitting Sinn Féin’s participation in Northern Ireland’s government.43 When told by a reporter that John Hume had called for a unionist de Klerk, David Trimble responded that the analogy was incor- rect: it was a nationalist de Klerk that was necessary. Trimble was making the point that if one took Northern Ireland, or the United Kingdom, as one’s point of reference, it was nationalists who were in a minority, but his response also had the advantage of associating nationalists with an erst- while pariah people.

Do Parallels Matter? One should be careful about exaggerating the effect of parallels. Developments in divided societies, whether of a violent or peaceful kind, are usually influenced by a myriad of exogenous and endogenous factors. However, there is evidence that a parrallel, once accepted, can influence subsequent developments. In the 1960s the norm spread by the US civil rights movement that second-class citizenship was unacceptable helped to motivate Catholics, after decades of passivity, to challenge the Stormont regime. The event that is thought by many to have started the troubles, the Belfast to Derry march of January 1969, was modelled consciously on the Selma–Montgomery march undertaken by the American civil rights move- ment in 1965. The use of tactics of civil disobedience had roughly the same effect in Northern Ireland as in the American South: it exposed the illiber- alism of the local governors, split the dominant group, and provoked met- ropolitan intervention. If the Guardian report referred to on page four is accurate, the analogy between Northern Ireland’s Catholics and America’s blacks continues to influence US policy on Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland-South Africa Parallel was used explicitly by Irish Americans to shape US policy towards Northern Ireland. The MacBride principles, adopted in the 1980s to promote regulation of US investment in Northern Ireland, were modelled on the Sullivan principles established to govern trade between the United States and apartheid South Africa. This American pressure helped to secure anti-discrimination reforms in Introduction 13 Northern Ireland, including the Fair Employment Act of 1989. By the 1990s the ANC’s decision to suspend its armed struggle, and, to a lesser extent, the PLO’s decision to embrace the Oslo process, made it easier for the IRA to explore peace. According to Guelke, the ANC’s decision to abandon its armed struggle was one of the factors that led the IRA to declare a ceasefire in 1994.44 Others, including O’Malley in this collection, argue that the abil- ity of South Africans to settle their conflict exercised a positive influence on Northern Ireland nationalists (and unionists) as they negotiated the Good Friday Agreement. A number of journalists attributed the IRA’s decisions in May 2000 to allow two international inspectors to examine some of its arms dumps to pressure from the ANC, particularly from one of Mandela’s lead- ing lieutenants, Mac Maharaj. It was noted by anti-Agreement unionists and others that an important aspect of the IRA’s offer was that one of the two inspectors be the former ANC secretary-general, Cyril Ramaphosa.45 A reporter from the Boston Globe claimed, albeit without offering a shred of evidence, that ‘there is little doubt that [the IRA offer] would not have been issued if not for the influence of Maharaj and Ramaphosa, and if Ramaphosa had not been chosen by the British and Irish governments as one of their arms inspectors’.46 Unionists also appear to have been affected by their choice of paral- lels. After years in which they argued that Northern Ireland should be treated the same as Scotland and Wales, their case for integration was dealt a serious blow when the Blair government devolved power to Edinburgh and Cardiff in 1997.47 This created space for UUP moderates to support proposals for devolution in the Good Friday Agreement. The fact that the arrangements for Scotland and Wales were asymmetrical, reflecting the particular circumstances of each case, made it easier to accept, or at least more difficult to argue against, peculiar institutions for Northern Ireland, including a power-sharing executive and a North–South Ministerial Council and all-island ‘implementation bod- ies’.48 Supporters of reform sought to take advantage of these parallels, pointing out that a new oath to be sworn by police constables from 1998, and proposed changes to the prosecution system, were based on Scottish precedents. It is not only Northern Ireland partisans who are influenced by the analogies they use. Keating points out in this volume that Basque national- ists have looked to Northern Ireland rather than vice versa.49 According to him, the Basques followed the Northern Ireland peace process closely, and it was not a coincidence that ETA called a ceasefire shortly after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. 14 John McGarry

Academics and Comparative Analysis

Comparisons are not a preserve of partisans, of course. Northern Ireland has also been a focus of study for several intellectuals who have used com- parative analysis. The most prominent of these approaches are based on classical pluralist theory, consociational theory, integrationist theory, link- age theory, and settler colonial theory. My intention here is to offer a brief summary of these approaches rather than a lengthy analysis and critique. Those interested in the latter should see the discussion by Brendan O’Leary and me in Explaining Northern Ireland, particularly chapter 8.50

Classical Pluralist Theory Classical pluralist theory dominated political science during the 1950s and 1960s.51 Sometimes referred to as ‘cross-pressures’ theory, it explained instability as resulting from the absence of a balanced distribution of conflicting interests. Conflict flowed, in this view, when social divisions, whether linguistic, racial, religious, or otherwise, reinforced rather than cross-cut each other, when, for instance, memberships in different volun- tary associations were cumulative rather than overlapping.52 Given its dominance in the 1960s, it is not surprising that it shaped some of the early prominent attempts to explain the conflict in Northern Ireland. In one of the first major works on Northern Ireland, Richard Rose argued that Northern Ireland’s reinforcing pressures accounted for its surplus of republican ‘rebels’ and loyalist ‘ultras’. It had, according to Rose, insufficient cross-pressures to generate enough allegiant or passive citizens, and it consequently lacked the consensus required for legitimate democra- tic government.53 Edmund Aunger, a French Canadian political scientist, also employed cross-pressures theory in a comparative study of Northern Ireland and the Canadian province of New Brunswick. According to Aunger, New Brunswick was stable, despite its English–French ethnic cleavage, because the language division was cross-cut by others based on religion and class. Northern Ireland was unstable, by contrast, because its various social divi- sions were reinforcing.54 In a comparative study of Belfast and Glasgow which used survey evidence, Ian Budge and Cornelius O’Leary made the ‘discovery’ that there was much lower cross-cutting between party and reli- gion in Belfast than between party and any social characteristic in Glasgow.55 In their view, the fact that political parties in Belfast were sub- Introduction 15 ject to fewer cross-pressures than their Glasgow counterparts helped to explain why Belfast’s politics were unstable while Glasgow’s were not.

Consociational Theory Consociational theory was developed by Arend Lijphart in reaction to what was seen as a sociological bias in pluralist theory.56 According to Lijphart, social divisions by themselves did not necessarily condemn regimes to instability. Otherwise, he argued, how could one account for stability in states like Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, or the Netherlands—none of which, in his view, possessed cross-cutting social cleavages? While Lijphart accepted that certain social and political conditions were more conducive to consociational democracy than others, he claimed that the only essential conditions were the presence of strong political elites who were willing to accommodate each other and who could win their followers’ support for the resulting bargain. While the design of consociational institutions could vary, they included four basic features: (1) a grand coalition, an executive inclusive of all the state’s main subcultures; (2) proportional representation for the state’s subcultures in public institutions, including the legislature and bureaucracy; (3) group autonomy, allowing subcultures to be self-gov- erning where possible; (4) minority vetoes, at least when vital interests were affected. Consociational theory was first applied to Northern Ireland by Lijphart himself in 1975, although consociational thinking was implicit in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. Lijphart was pessimistic about the prospects for consociational democracy, claiming that it was ‘unwork- able’.57 The key problem in his view was the absence of support for it among Protestants.58 However, he added that Northern Ireland also lacked a number of conducive conditions: rather than being divided into a num- ber of groups none of which could govern by itself, Northern Ireland had a (Protestant) majority that was ‘capable of exercising hegemonic power’; Protestants were normatively attracted to the Westminster majoritarian tradition and rejected continental power-sharing norms; there was no overarching national consensus.59 By the mid-1990s Lijphart was more confident about the prospects for consociationalism, and claimed that it was the only ‘viable option’ for Northern Ireland.60 Rather than being ‘unworkable’, he now argued that it was wrong to conclude that power-sharing ‘cannot be successful’. His new optimism was due to his observation that the British government now appeared committed to power-sharing and that none of Northern 16 John McGarry Ireland’s political parties was seriously proposing ‘a return to majoritari- anism’.61 Consociational theory has also been applied to Northern Ireland by Brendan O’Leary and me.62 While broadly supportive of Lijphart’s claim that a Northern Ireland government should be constructed on consocia- tional principles, we have been critical of some of his arguments. One problem with traditional consociational research is its tendency to treat political systems as closed entities. This has led to a focus on endogenous factors when explaining conflict, and a stress on internal institutions, mod- elled on the traditional ‘Westphalian’ state, when proposing prescriptions. This focus limits the explanatory and prescriptive power of consociational theory when applied to conflicts like Northern Ireland’s, which have been influenced by exogenous as well as endogenous factors, and where satisfac- tory prescriptions require institutions that transcend state frontiers. In our view, an important reason why unionists refused to share power with nationalists was not because they were committed normatively to the Westminster model of government but because, as British nationalists, they preferred the default of direct rule from Westminster to the risk of power-sharing with Irish nationalists. Direct rule also helped to block what Lijphart calls a ‘self-denying prophecy’, a decision by elites to share power because the alternative is chaos and deepening violence. London paid the costs of the conflict, and the British army helped to prevent it reaching Bosnian levels of violence. Even if unionists had embraced consociational- ism, this would not have sufficed for nationalists, who also demand insti- tutions linking Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic. Agreement was reached in 1998 on a consociational government and North–South institu- tions in part because London made it clear to unionists that the default to a settlement was no longer unalloyed direct rule from Westminster but, instead, deepening Anglo-Irish cooperation in the governance of Northern Ireland. Unionist flexibility was facilitated by an IRA decision to declare a ceasefire and by the Irish government’s preparedness to drop formal irre- dentist claims in return for a settlement.63

Integrationist Theory The classical pluralist accounts described earlier are explanatory in nature. However, there is a branch of pluralist theory that has an important normative and prescriptive dimension. This branch can be described as integrationist, as it seeks to transform divided societies into integrated ones. Integrationists, like pluralists, attribute conflict to the salience of Introduction 17 divisive identities, such as those based on ethnicity or race, and the absence of cross-cutting identities, such as those based on class. However, integra- tionists believe that cross-cutting identities can be constructed, if the cor- rect policies are followed. Such policies include combating the divisive appeals of self-interested ethnic elites through the mobilization of organ- izations in civil society that promote transcendent identities; integration in schools, workplaces, and residential neighbourhoods; an end to discrimi- nation; and the removal of economic inequality through economic growth and/or distribution. Integrationism was advocated in one of the earliest books on Northern Ireland politics, written in 1961,64 and it has been a theme of a number of works since then.65 One complication, however, is that integrationists in Northern Ireland are themselves divided: there are some who support an integrated Ireland and some who support an integrated United Kingdom.66 Others are post-nationalists who back the process of European integration in the belief that it will contribute to cross-cutting divisions by creating new functional allegiances across state boundaries and a new European identity that both communities in Northern Ireland can embrace.67 Integrationists are extremely sceptical of consociational theory and have launched a vigorous critique of it.68 Consociationalists are accused of exag- gerating the depth and resilience of social divisions, and of downplaying the capacity of humans to develop new identities. From the integrationist perspective, consociational institutions often worsen matters by strength- ening the position of those sectional elites who are responsible for division in the first place. Because consociational institutions are thought to entrench and deepen division, they are seen not simply as undesirable, but also as unstable and ultimately unworkable. The integrationist critique of consociationalism is popular among acad- emics specializing in the Northern Ireland conflict. Several of them oppose the British government’s long-standing commitment to consociational institutions, and criticize the central part these play in the Good Friday Agreement. Anderson and Goodman claim that the consociational model at the heart of the Agreement has ‘very serious defects’, over-emphasizes ‘the primacy and the permanency of ethnic divisions’, and ‘actively excludes other perhaps more fruitful social categories, other bases of political mobilisation such as gender and class which cross-cut ethnic divi- sions’.69 Wilford condemns consociational theory as conveying a ‘rather bleak view of humanity’ and as threatening to cast divisions in ‘marble’.70 He endorses an alternative strategy of promoting ‘pluralistic rather than 18 John McGarry monolithic thinking’ through ending discrimination in the workplace and educational integration.71 Dixon criticizes consociationalism as ‘elitist’ and ‘segregationist’ and recommends mass participation and social integration as a more appropriate way forward.72 In a well-cited article that rejects consociational prescriptions for Northern Ireland and South Africa, Rupert Taylor condemns Lijphart’s ‘uncritical acceptance of the primacy and permanency of ethnicity’, argues that divisions in the two cases are constructed by self-interested elites, and calls for ‘economic growth and the removal of discrimination’ as an alternative strategy for conflict resolu- tion.73 To these academic critiques can be added partisan attacks from both nationalists and unionists: Irish republican Kevin Rooney claims that the Agreement’s consociational institutions have ‘put an end to the prospects for overcoming [Ireland’s] divisions and institutionalise[d] the differences between Catholics an Protestants’; the leading unionist Robert McCartney criticizes the same institutions as ‘dysfunctional’, ‘undemocratic’, and ‘impermanent’.74 Their alternatives, of course, are diametrically opposing.

Linkage Theory One problem with much political science work on ethnic conflict is that it puts an exaggerated stress on endogenous factors. As John Whyte has pointed out, this stress is an important feature of the general academic lit- erature on Northern Ireland.75 There is an important body of work, how- ever, that has been undertaken at the interface between comparative politics and international relations and that emphasizes the role of exogenous factors in the Northern Ireland conflict. This can usefully be described as ‘linkage’ theory because it focuses on the linkages between exogenous pressures and internal political developments in Northern Ireland. Linkage theories are a rather mixed bag. They range from some of the worst ‘scholarship’ on the Northern Ireland conflict to some of the best. In the former category are works that attribute much of the conflict to fund- ing for paramilitary groups from rogue states and diasporas,76 as well as partisan accounts that attribute the conflict exclusively to ‘perfidious Albion’ or to the Irish Republic’s irredentism’77 In the latter category are a number of books that, while acknowledging the importance of internal factors, take the position that the conflict cannot be explained without ref- erence to the actions of both the British and Irish states. An influential short book by the lawyers Tom Hadden and Kevin Boyle, published in Introduction 19 1985, falls into this category.78 So does a more substantive volume by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, published in 1996.79 In our various works on Northern Ireland Brendan O’Leary and I have also emphasized that the conflict cannot be explained adequately without recourse to British and Irish nation- and state-building failures. Adrian Guelke has gone beyond the role of Britain and Ireland. In a book published in 1988 he argued that the violence and constitutional stalemate in Northern Ireland was crucially shaped by the international norm of self- determination.80 In his view, the international perspective that Northern Ireland is illegitimate, a legacy of colonialism, is an important factor underlying unionist insecurity and republican aggressiveness. Guelke has also done important work on linkages between South Africa’s conflict and Northern Ireland’s, and has claimed that events in the former influenced developments in the latter. The most ambitious example of linkage theory is Frank Wright’s Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis.81 For Wright, Northern Ireland is best understood as an ‘ethnic frontier’, a site of contested sovereignty between the British and Irish national communities. In an ethnic frontier, conflict is crucially affected by the actions of external powers beyond the frontier. If one external power intervenes to side with an internal protago- nist, then the other will also seek external help, compelling a dramatic escalation in conflict. Wright holds an unstable regional environment responsible for the ferocity of past and present conflicts in the Balkans, Cyprus, and Lebanon.82 The relative stability of Belgium and Switzerland, by contrast, flows from a tradition of non-interference and restraint by larger neighbours who have avoided intervention on behalf of their co- ethnics. When ethnic communities in a frontier zone are locked in conflict, the best that can be hoped for, according to Wright, is that interested exter- nal powers will cooperate with each other to contain the conflict rather than siding purely with their co-nationals. Northern Ireland’s most benign feature, in Wright’s view, was that the British and Irish governments, par- ticularly since 1985, enjoyed amicable and cooperative relations. His pre- scription was that this cooperation should be consolidated into full-blown British and Irish joint authority over the region. The British and Irish states remain unquestionably the most influential exogenous actors in the Northern Ireland conflict. In recent years, however, academics have also pointed to the impact of Europe and the United States. In a number of accounts, which overlap with the integrationist accounts discussed earlier, European integration is seen as promoting multiple or post-national identities in place of the old nationalist–unionist polarities.83 20 John McGarry Intellectuals who are sympathetic to Irish nationalism put forward a vari- ant of this: European integration will erode the identity of unionists in a way that will promote a united Ireland.84 One unionist writer has argued that European integration is having a negative impact: it is facilitating Anglo-Irish cooperation over Northern Ireland and, by eroding traditional notions of state sovereignty, weakening the Union.85 Other, more impar- tial, observers agree that European integration is diluting state sovereignty, but see this as a useful development that creates the space for imaginative institutional arrangements suited to the needs of nationally divided soci- eties like Northern Ireland.86 A number of scholars have focused on the role of the United States, which is generally thought to have grown in importance after the Clinton adminis- tration assumed power in 1992.87 Even before this, the US government was credited with persuading London to embrace a policy of power-sharing devolution in 1979 and to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.88 Irish American pressure groups are said to have played an important role in per- suading London to implement far-reaching employment equity legislation in 1989.89 Clinton’s administration, it has been argued, played a crucial part in the IRA’s decision to declare a ceasefire in 1994,90 and Clinton’s delegate George Mitchell is widely seen as having contributed to the successful out- come of the inter-party negotiations that produced the Good Friday Agreement. While the United States is usually seen by unionists as biased against them, one commentator notes that Clinton had a good relationship with UUP leader David Trimble and that the president’s last-minute assur- ances helped convince Trimble to sign the Good Friday Agreement.91

Settler Colonial Theory A final prominent comparative approach to the Northern Ireland conflict is based on settler colonial theory. As O’Leary and I have argued, settler societies are normally extreme examples of plural societies, and the fact that Ireland, and later Northern Ireland, was a site of settler colonialism helps to explain the intensity of divisions there.92 The legacy of the settle- ment of Ireland contributed to the prevalence of segregation, endogamy, and segmented labour markets. The initial act of dispossession bequeathed a legacy of inequality that continues to poison inter-group relations. The parallels between the establishment of a hegemonic control system by the dominant settler group in Ireland, and later Northern Ireland, and domi- nant settler control systems in South Africa, Algeria, and Rhodesia help to explain the focus of several works by comparativists.93 Introduction 21 Three of these works are especially noteworthy. Ian Lustick has com- pared French state-building failures in Algeria with British state-building failures in Ireland. In both cases, he claims, the large-scale introduction of settlers into the two regions fundamentally disrupted a prerequisite for successful state-building: the elicitation of loyalties from the newly acquired area. At several crucial junctures, such as the Treaty of Limerick in 1691 and the Act of Union in 1801, Protestant settlers intervened to obstruct conciliatory gestures by the state towards natives.94 This helps to explain why, when Catholic mass mobilization occurred in the late nine- teenth century it took off in a separatist direction. Don Akenson’s historical research emphasizes the important fact that Ulster’s Protestant settlers were religiously inspired, like the Afrikaners who settled southern Africa and the Jews who settled Palestine. All three groups, Akenson argues, saw themselves as ‘chosen peoples’ who had a bib- lical covenant with God. This helped to explain Ulster Protestants’ sense of superiority to Catholics, their willingness to discriminate, their endorse- ment of endogamy, their cohesiveness, their intransigence, their rejection of ecumenism, and their attachment to their soil, which they saw as a promised land. Akenson is careful to note that, while religion was crucial for Protestants, it is now a much less important influence. Ronald Weitzer, who compares Northern Ireland with Zimbabwe, is concerned with the coercive dimensions of state power in divided societies with histories of settler rule. He shows that dominant settler groups can maintain control over sometimes much larger native populations through the construction of a highly sectarian security apparatus. With obvious rel- evance to contemporary Northern Ireland and contemporary Zimbabwe, Weitzer claims that substantive democratization—after a transition— requires a radical overhaul of inherited security structures.95 Weitzer argues that Zimbabwe at independence lacked a democratic polit- ical culture and a strong civil society. It had a regime that wanted to retain the repressive character of the security apparatus inherited from Rhodesia for use against its new (Ndebele) enemies. The result was that the transition from white minority rule to majority rule, while it increased democracy, did not create a liberal democracy. The new (British) regime that took over Northern Ireland in 1972 was much more willing than its Harare counter- part to transform the police into a professional and impartial agency. However, it was impeded, on the one hand, by opposition to reform from a strong Protestant civil society and, on the other, by a Catholic minority that was strong enough to resist strengthened security measures. The result was that the British engaged in limited reforms that did not go far enough. 22 John McGarry It is worth noting that these accounts are different from the partisan nationalist portrayal of Ireland as a colony. In the latter Ireland is seen as exploited by outsiders—British imperialists. The existence of profound internal divisions in the colony are downplayed. Settlers, to the extent that they are acknowledged, are portrayed as the dupes of metropolitan forces without their own interests or identity. There is an inference, although often delivered sotto voce, that those who are descended from settlers have less legitimacy than natives, and even, in the view of extremists, that they should be repatriated. The above accounts, by contrast, emphasize that Northern Ireland has important endogenous divisions based on the historic distinction between settlers and natives. Britain is not the only obstacle to a resolution of the conflict: the different identities and interests of settlers and natives are also factors. Following from this, none of these authors, unlike partisan nationalists, thinks the conflict can be resolved simply by Britain’s withdrawal.96 These differences are sometimes overlooked by unionist sympathizers who (incorrectly) regard any portrayal of Protestants as settlers as a nationalist argument and as implying a demand that they be discriminated against or repatriated.97

The Chapters

This collection builds on the rich legacy of comparative work on Northern Ireland. It assesses Post-Agreement Northern Ireland from a comparative perspective. The first set of chapters is general and theoretical, and is focused on consociational and/or integrationist theory. Rupert Taylor (Chapter 2) delivers a sustained critique of the consociational institutions in the Agreement from an integrationist perspective. He argues that a stable peace requires the rejection of the approach taken in the Agreement and, instead, the construction of a common society through integrated schools, residences, and workplaces, and through the organization of groups in civil society that are dedicated to eroding ethno-national divisions. He favours a ‘non-sectarian democratic society . . . in a united “New Ireland”’. Brendan O’Leary (Chapter 3), by contrast, defends the Agreement’s consociational institutions. He notes that the Agreement also contains fed- eral and confederal institutions covering all of Ireland and linking Ireland with Britain, and argues that both the internal and external dimensions were necessary parts of a durable settlement given the identities and aspi- rations of nationalists and unionists. O’Leary’s chapter is wide-ranging in scope, stressing, in contrast to the positions taken by Arend Lijphart and Introduction 23 Donald Horowitz, the advantages of the particular proportional electoral system used in Northern Ireland, and pointing to the dangers that Britain’s tradition of parliamentary sovereignty poses to stable agreements between Britain and Ireland. He argues that Northern Ireland could and should have become a federacy as well as having consociational governance. Like Taylor, but for different reasons, Donald Horowitz (Chapter 4) is critical of the consociational aspects of the Agreement. He views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes the extremes, particularly Sinn Féin. He regards a number of com- mitments in the Agreement as maximalist, and believes this will rebound, when the commitments are not delivered, to the advantage of militants. Horowitz prefers, for Northern Ireland and elsewhere, what he calls an ‘incentives’ approach. The likeliest and most stable coalition resulting from this is one that includes moderates and excludes militants. In my chapter (Chapter 5) I take issue with the integrationist or ‘nation- building’ approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. The problem with this is that there are two national communities in Northern Ireland, and no sign that either of them is prepared to accept the other’s identity or state. What is needed, therefore, are political institutions, like those in the Agreement, that cater to the bi-national nature of Northern Ireland’s society. Feargal Cochrane (Chapter 6) addresses the integrationist complaint that academics focus too much on political elites and not enough on civil society. He explores the role that a large number of peace and conflict res- olution organizations have played in Northern Ireland. An important con- clusion, which is at odds with integrationist thinking, is that many of these organizations are as divided as political elites along national lines, and are committed to a solution that accommodates both communities rather than to one that transcends them. In the case-study section of the collection, Northern Ireland is compared with conflicts occurring throughout Europe, Africa, North America, the Middle East, and other parts of Asia. Antony Alcock (Chapter 7) compares Northern Ireland with a number of European conflict zones. His chapter, as discussed earlier, is an example of how unionist intellectuals use the comparative method. It can also be seen as an example of linkage theory: Alcock argues that unionists were able to accept the all-Ireland institutions in the Good Friday Agreement in the context of similar developments in other parts of the European Union. Michael Keating (Chapter 8) compares Northern Ireland with western Europe’s other hotspot, the Basque Country. Like Alcock he links both regions with the process of European integration. His view is that, as this promotes a move away from the 24 John McGarry traditional notion of single identities and sovereign nation-states towards the idea of multiple identities and shared sovereignty, it offers a potential way out of both conflicts. It may appear inappropriate to compare Northern Ireland with prosper- ous and non-violent Canada. As Sid Noel (Chapter 9) shows, however, Canada’s relative tranquillity was not inevitable but owes much to the development of consociational practices by its English and French Canadian elites. Noel notes that if consociationalism is to work in Northern Ireland, its elites must also embrace a consociational bargain, a desire to compromise. He sees limited evidence of this, and is sceptical of the Agreement’s prospects. Noel’s chapter is a useful reminder that it is pos- sible to support consociationalism normatively, while recognizing that it remains a difficult system to operate, particularly in sites of profound polarization. Guelke, who compares Northern Ireland with Cyprus, Puerto Rico, Corsica, East Timor, and Sri Lanka, puts forward a version of linkage theory (Chapter 10). In his view, the fact that Northern Ireland is a parti- tioned part of an island helps to explain why the international community tends to favour a united Ireland. This is because there is an international norm that islands, as natural units, should be under one jurisdiction. International support for the Agreement can be explained, in Guelke’s view, by its inclusion of all-island political institutions. Any attempt to weaken these will result in reduced international support. One of the major obstacles to the consolidation of the Agreement is the issue of paramilitary weapons. This is tackled by Kirsten Schulze (Chapter 11), who argues that Northern Ireland has a lot to learn from how the Lebanese handled this problem. Schulze sees the inclusion of all groups, including militants, as the key to a peaceful transition. This perspective, shared by O’Leary and me, is directly at odds with Horowitz’s, which is that the inclusion of militants is destabilizing and should be resisted. In a chap- ter that compares Northern Ireland and South Africa (Chapter 12), Padraig O’Malley squarely rejects the claim of Irish republican militants that their position is analogous to South Africa’s ANC. He also claims that those who negotiated South Africa’s settlement influenced their Northern Ireland counterparts. This is another example of linkage between Northern Ireland and the outside world. The collection ends with a comparison between Ireland and Palestine –Land of Israel by Sammy Smooha (Chapter 13). Smooha’s chapter exam- ines the political consequences of different settlement patterns in the two cases. It is an example of the use of settler colonial theory to explain conflict Introduction 25 and conflict resolution. Smooha argues that Jews have settled Palestine–Land of Israel in sufficient strength to establish a strong inde- pendent state in part of the area (pre-1967 Israel), although their attempt to incorporate the rest (the West Bank and Gaza) by settlement has failed. As a result, partition has become the most feasible way to resolve the Jewish–Palestinian conflict. In Ireland, by contrast, the position of British settlers (Protestants) is said to be much weaker than their Jewish counter- parts. The Protestants are weak demographically, lack international legiti- macy, are not supported by Britain, and are faced with a confident Irish nationalism. As a consequence, Smooha argues that the historical trend points to Britain’s withdrawal and an end to the partition of Ireland as the most likely form of conflict resolution.

NOTES

1. J. Hewitt, cited in T. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London: Verso, 1981), 224. 2. R. Doyle, The Commitments (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 9, cited in B. Dooley, The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland and Black America (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 6. 3. R. Pearson, cited in R. Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland (London: Routledge, 1997), 76. Pearson thought that the tendency to see Northern Ireland as pecu- liar would change as a result of the end of the cold war and the outbreak of sev- eral conflicts in eastern Europe. 4. J. Darby, cited in J. Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 196. 5. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, 222. Nairn noted, to his credit, that Northern Ireland was becoming less peculiar. 6. The Report of the Alliance Commission on Northern Ireland, cited in Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 199. 7. A. Guelke, Northern Ireland: The International Perspective (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1988); A. Lijphart, Review Article, ‘The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and Solutions’, British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 83–106; I. Lustick, State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985); R. Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); F. Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987). 8. I will be exploring this topic more fully in a future journal article. 9. The use of parallels by partisans is not limited to Northern Ireland. It is a 26 John McGarry widespread practice. Quebec nationalists, for example, described themselves in the early 1970s as ‘the White Niggers of America’. See P. Vallières, White Niggers of America (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971). The comparison identified them with progressive movements for civil rights in the United States and decolonization in Africa and Asia, and it identified Canada’s English minority as akin to Deep South racists and imperialists. In case the point was missed, Quebec’s Anglophones were labelled as ‘Westmount Rhodesians’, after a part of Montreal dominated by wealthy members of their community. 10. For a readable account of the ways in which Northern Ireland’s Catholics and America’s blacks have compared their plights, see Dooley, The Fight for Civil Rights. 11. American blacks appear to accept the analogy. US Congressman Donald Payne, one of the most influential black politicians in Congress, told the Sunday Times recently that ‘there are many parallels between the situation of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the situation the black community faced in the United States’. He confirmed that he would be present at Drumcree in July 2000 to observe the Orange Order’s attempt to march through the Catholic Garvaghy Road area. The Sunday Times suggested that Martin Luther King’s daughter Bernice would also be there. ‘King Daughter may Observe Drumcree’, Sunday Times, 18 June 2000. 12. The Need for New and Acceptable Policing in Northern Ireland, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, 22 Apr. 1999, serial no. 106–16 (Washington, DC: 1999), 11 and 13. 13. ‘Clinton Refuses to Back Blair’s Deal for RUC’, Guardian, 25 May 2000. The words in quotation marks were spoken by a senior administration official closely involved with the Northern Ireland peace talks. They reflect this official’s view of the president’s position. 14. Much of what I have to say about the analogy between South Africa and Northern Ireland is derived from reading Adrian Guelke’s excellent work on the subject. See A. Guelke, ‘The Political Impasse in South Africa and Northern Ireland: A Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics (Jan. 1991), 143–62; ‘The Peace Process in South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland: A Farewell to Arms?’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 5 (1994), 93–106; ‘The Influence of the South African Transition on the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 3/2 (1996), 132–48; ‘Comparatively Peaceful: The Role of Analogy in Northern Ireland’s Peace Process’, MS, 1998. 15. Guelke, ‘Comparatively Peaceful’, 3. 16. M. Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 1976), 93–4. 17. Guelke, ‘The Political Impasse’, 147. Introduction 27 18. ‘Mandela’s IRA Remarks Criticised’, Irish Times, 21 Oct. 1992. 19. John Hume, A New Ireland: Politics, Peace and Reconciliation (Boulder, Colo.: Roberts Rinehart, 1996), 117. 20. ‘Hume Likens Unionists to Afrikaners’, Irish Times, 19 June 2000. According to Ruth Dudley-Edwards, Hume was misquoted (Sunday Independent, 25 June 2000). 21. In the same paragraph in Hume’s book where he refers to the need for a unionist de Klerk, he puts forward the conventional nationalist position that partition is at the root of Northern Ireland’s problems: ‘There are parallels between the South African situation and our own. If the solution to the prob- lem in South Africa had been to draw a line on the map, create a small white state, with two whites to every black person, and to make the rest of South Africa independent would there ever have been the possibility of peace? Would not the whites have been forced to discriminate totally against the black minority in order to ensure that it never became a majority? This is pre- cisely what happened in Ireland, and we are still living with the consequences.’ 22. Guelke, ‘The Influence of the South African Transition’, 140. 23. Guelke, Northern Ireland. 24. The comments from Maudling, Callaghan, and Hurd are cited in J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 312–13. 25. The constitutions of various communist states, including that of the USSR, included the right of republics to secede. However, these were ‘sham’ rights and were not meant to be taken seriously. The Canadian Constitution now includes provision for a province to leave. The federal government is required to negotiate with the government of Quebec, or any province, that wins a ‘clear majority’ in a referendum that has a ‘clear question’ on secession. If the two parties negotiate in good faith, and the negotiations fail, the province is entitled to seek international recognition as an independent state. An important aspect of Canada’s provision for secession is that it is judge-made, that is, it was inserted into the constitu- tion by the courts, not politicians. This is an ironic example of Canadian judges invoking American-style judicial activism to reach a very un- American decision. 26. See Ch. 5 of this volume. 27. Nationalists often refer to bigoted Protestants as ‘black’ and the Protestant- dominated RUC as ‘black bastards’. Nationalist politicians must have some difficulty explaining this to their allies in the US civil rights movement and the South African government. 28. B. Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), 157. 29. H. Roberts, Northern Ireland and the Algerian Analogy: A Suitable Case for Gaullism? (Belfast: Athol Books, 1986). 28 John McGarry 30. Queen’s University Belfast Ulster Unionist Association, pamphlet (Belfast: Ulster Unionist Association, 1989). 31. See H. Roberts, ‘Sound Stupidity: The British Party System and the Northern Ireland Question’, in J. McGarry and B. O’Leary (eds.), The Future of Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 32. McGimpsey was referring to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution; Irish Times, 29–30 Oct. 1990. An Irish nationalist could respond that the two cases—the Sudetenland and Northern Ireland—are similar in that both flout the norm of self-determination. Large numbers of Irish and Germans were left on the wrong side of new borders because they were the weaker parties in peace negotiations. 33. Unionists also remain concerned, as is well known, about issues relating to policing reform, prisoner release, and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. 34. ‘If the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia and the other states of the former Yugoslavia was wrong—if we were bounced into it—why is that now the basis on which we foresee a settlement being made? Recognition was wrong then and it is still wrong today.’ Cited in D. Conversi, ‘Moral Relativisim and Equidistance—British Attitudes to the War in the Former Yugoslavia’, in T. Cushman and S. Meštrović (eds.), This Time we Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 257. I am grateful to Daniele Conversi for drawing this to my attention. 35. I. Paisley Jr., ‘Kosovo and Ulster—The Alarming Parallel’, Belfast Telegraph, 28 Apr. 1999. 36. A. Noble, ‘Popery, NATO and the Yugoslav War: Our Analysis Vindicated!’, located at http://www.ianpaisley.org/article.asp?ArtKey=nato 37. British and Irish Communist Organization, Against Ulster Nationalism (Belfast: Athol Books, 1977). 38. See Ch. 10 of this volume. 39. S. King, ‘Partition Back in Vogue’, Belfast Telegraph, 13 May 1999. 40. Guelke, ‘The Influence of the South African Transition’, 143–4; ‘English Fascists to Join Loyalists at Drumcree’, Observer,2 July 2000. 41. See Ch. 5 of this volume. 42. ‘Marching Orders: Ulster “Apartheid” Criticised’, Guardian, 25 Apr. 2000. 43. ‘Smyth Urges Support Ensure Electoral Gains’, Irish Times, 25 Mar. 2000. Unionists and their sympathizers commonly describe republicans as ‘fascists’. Take this recent statement from Ruth Dudley-Edwards: ‘I’ve hated the fascist strain in Irish republicanism since my Dublin childhood. My paternal grand- mother lived and breathed hatred of Britain and worship of its enemies: until her death in 1956 she had a photograph of Hitler at the end of her bed. She even wrote “Sinn Féin” on the ballot-paper if it had no candidate standing’; ‘Trimble on the Wire’, Belfast Telegraph, 19 May 2000. 44. Guelke, ‘The Influence of the South African Transition’, 145. Introduction 29 45. ‘You are Fools to Believe IRA, Robinson Tells MPs’, Belfast Telegraph, 17 May 2000. 46. Kevin Cullen, ‘Boston, South Africa Figure in Irish Road to Peace’, Boston Globe, 17 May 2000. 47. One effect of this was that integrationist opponents of the Agreement, such as Robert McCartney MP, shifted their arguments against the Agreement to the fact that it allowed Sinn Féin into government before the IRA had decommis- sioned its weapons rather than because it provided for power-sharing devolu- tion. 48. Traditionally support for decentralization has been much higher in Scotland than in Wales. As a consequence, while Scotland received a Parliament with law-making powers and the (limited) ability to raise taxes, Wales received an Assembly with power to pass only secondary legislation (administrative regu- lations) and no money-raising powers. 49. Ch. 8 of this volume. 50. McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland. For a sample of recent work that examines Northern Ireland from a comparative perspective, see the collection of essays edited by M. Cox, A. Guelke and F. Stephen, ‘A Farewell to Arms?’ From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 51. According to Eric Nordlinger, the cross-pressures account of political stabil- ity was ‘probably the explanatory hypothesis most widely accepted among American political scientists’; Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 93. 52. S. M. Lipset, Political Man (London: Hutchinson, 1960). 53. R. Rose, Governing without Consensus (London: Faber & Faber, 1971). 54. E. Aunger, In Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1981). 55. I. Budge and C. O’Leary, Belfast: Approach to Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1973). 56. A. Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, 21 (1969), 207–25. 57. Lijphart, Review Article, ‘The Northern Ireland Problem’, 105. 58. Ibid., 99. 59. Ibid., 100. 60. A. Lijphart, ‘The Framework Document on Northern Ireland and the Theory of Power-Sharing’, Government and Opposition, 31/3 (1996), 268. 61. Ibid. 274. 62. J. McGarry, ‘A Consociational Settlement for Northern Ireland?’, Plural Societies, 20 (1990), 1–21; B. O’Leary, ‘The 1998 British–Irish Agreement: Consociation Plus’, Scottish Affairs, 26 (1999), 1–22; B. O’Leary, ‘The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland’, in R. Rhodes (ed.), The International Library of Politics and Comparative Government: United Kingdom (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); B. O’Leary and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (London: Athlone Press, 30 John McGarry 1996); B. O’Leary, ‘Afterword: What is Framed in the Framework Documents?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18 (1995), 862–72. 63. For more details, see J. McGarry, ‘Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa’, Political Studies, 46/5 (Dec. 1998), 865–70. 64. D. Barritt and C. Carter, The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). 65. For example, see D. Smith and G. Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); C. Irwin, Education and the Development of Social Integration in Divided Societies (Belfast: Queen’s University, 1991); E. Gallagher and C. Worrall, Christians in Ulster, 1968–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 66. For an Irish nationalist account, see G. FitzGerald, Towards a New Ireland (London: Charles Knight, 1972). For a unionist account, see A. Aughey, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1989). 67. Elizabeth Meehan is one such Europeanist. She argued in her inaugural lec- ture at Queen’s University in Belfast in 1992 that European integration was having the desired effect: ‘a new kind of citizenship is emerging [in Europe] that is neither nationalist nor cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights and duties exercised, through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions’. Cited, approvingly, in Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland, 84. 68. For a general discussion of this critique, see A. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1985), 106–8. 69. J. Anderson and J. Goodman, ‘Nationalisms and Transnationalism: Failures and Emancipation’, in J. Anderson and J. Goodman (eds.), Dis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles, Hopes (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 21–2. 70. R. Wilford, ‘Inverting Consociationalism? Policy, Pluralism and the Post- Modern’, in B. Hadfield (ed.), Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), 31. 71. Ibid. 41. 72. P. Dixon, ‘The Politics of Antagonism: Explaining McGarry and O’Leary’, Irish Political Studies, 11 (1996), 137–8. Also see his ‘Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Glass Half Full or Half Empty?’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 3/3 (Autumn 1997), 20–36. 73. R. Taylor, ‘A Consociational Path to Peace in Northern Ireland and South Africa’, in A. Guelke (ed.), News Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994). Both Taylor and Dixon like the South African constitution that was adopted after 1999, that is, after it had been stripped of a number of consociational features that were part of a transitional Introduction 31 constitution in operation between 1994 and 1999. See Dixon, ‘Consocia- tionalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, 32–3. The problem with the current constitution, however, is that it seems to have produced a one- party system for the foreseeable future. It is difficult to see how this, which bears some comparison with the Stormont regime, would suit Northern Ireland. 74. K. Rooney, ‘Institutionalising Division’, Fortnight (June 1998), 21–2; R. McCartney, ‘Devolution is a Sham’, Observer, 20 Feb. 2000. For a similar unionist perspective, see D. Kennedy, ‘Evidence is Growing that Agreement did not Work’, Irish Times, 16 Feb. 2000. 75. See Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 194–205. 76. See J. Holland, The American Connection: US Guns, Money and Influence in Northern Ireland (Swords: Poolbeg Press, 1987); C. Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981). 77. These partisan accounts are dissected in McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, pt. I, chs. 1–4. 78. K. Boyle and T. Hadden, Ireland: A Positive Proposal (London: Harmonds- worth, 1985). 79. J. Ruane and J. Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 80. Guelke, Northern Ireland. 81. Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis. 82. Ibid., 276–7, 282–3, and 285. 83. See n. 67 above. Kevin Boyle has expressed a belief that the ‘Europeanization of both islands . . . will force a reassessment of all relationships on these islands and in particular of the two principal influences on the present tragedy of Northern Ireland, “Britishness” as an historical integrating force and the reac- tive tradition of Irish separatism’, K. Boyle, ‘Northern Ireland: Allegiances and Identities’, in B. Crick (ed.), National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 69, 78. Boyle and his colleague Tom Hadden have since tempered their Euro-enthusiasm. See K. Boyle and T. Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994). Richard Kearney and Robin Wilson argue that European integration will allow Northern Ireland’s citizens to evolve beyond nationalism and unionism. They envisage Europe developing into a federation of regions, including Northern Ireland, which will foster allegiances ‘both more universal and more particular than the traditional nation-states’, ‘Northern Ireland’s Future as a European Region’, reproduced in Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland, 79. Cathal McCall claims that European integration has the potential to erode unionism and nationalism in Northern Ireland, particularly in the absence of sectarian violence, ‘Postmodern Europe and the Resources of Communal Identities in Northern Ireland’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 406. 32 John McGarry Rupert Taylor writes in Ch. 2 of this volume that ‘increasing European inte- gration has led to the erosion of absolutist conceptions of national sovereignty [and there] has been an erosion of ethno-nationalism on both sides, a fading of Orange and Green, in favour of a commonality around the need for gen- uine structures of democracy and justice’. Also see J. Goodman, Nationalism and Transnationalism: The National Conflict in Ireland and European Union Integration (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997). 84. FitzGerald, Towards a New Ireland, 111–12. A Cambridge economist, Bob Rowthorn, argues that closer economic cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic in the context of the European Union will lead unionists to shift their loyalties from London to Dublin. B. Rowthorn, ‘Foreword’, in R. Munck, The Irish Economy (London: Pluto Press, 1993). In Ch. 13 of this volume Sammy Smooha claims that the option of a united Ireland ‘will be less and less resisted’ by unionists ‘as Ireland, a member of the prospering European Union, [comes to] enjoy economic growth, expand its welfare services, and secularizes’. 85. D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland Question’, in B. Barton and P. Roche (eds.), The Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), 177. Kennedy, a unionist who is hostile to Dublin’s growing role in Northern Ireland, argues that Anglo-Irish coopera- tion would have been almost impossible outside the European Union: ‘the experience of working together in the institutions of the Community, partic- ularly at Council of Minister and senior diplomat and official level, was slowly transforming the relationship . . . The patron–client pattern was dissolved; in the new circumstances British ministers and diplomats could see their Irish counterparts as clever partners in Europe. Without this transformation it is almost impossible to see how Dublin–London relations could have been transformed as they were between the mid-seventies and the mid-eighties.’ 86. ‘Anglo-Irish Relations: Entente Cordiale’, The Economist, 28 Nov. 1998; J. McGarry, ‘Globalization, European Integration, and the Northern Ireland Conflict’, in M. Keating and J. McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Michael Keating makes a similar argument in his contribution to this volume, Ch. 8. 87. A. Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968–1995 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995); ‘From the Beltway to Belfast: The Clinton Administration, Sinn Féin, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, New Hibernia Review, 1/3 (1997), 23–39; ‘The Billy Boys Meet Slick Willy: The Ulster Unionist Party and the American Dimension to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1993–1998’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 11 (Autumn 2000), 121–137; A. Guelke, ‘The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, International Affairs, 72/3 (1996), 521–36; ‘Northern Ireland: International and North/South Issues’, in W. Crotty and Introduction 33 D. Schmitt (eds.), Ireland and the Politics of Change (London: Longman, 1998); R. MacGinty, ‘American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, Journal of Conflict Studies (1997), 31–50; J. O’Grady, ‘An Irish Policy Born in the USA’, Foreign Affairs (May–June 1996), 2–7. 88. Wilson, ‘From the Beltway’, 23; MacGinty, ‘American Influences’, 33; Guelke, ‘The United States’, 531–2. Also see Guelke, Northern Ireland, 147. 89. Guelke, ‘The United States’, 528. 90. Ibid., 534; MacGinty, ‘American Influences’, 34; O’Grady, ‘An Irish Policy’, 5; Wilson, ‘From the Beltway’, 32. 91. Wilson, ‘The Billy Boys’. 92. McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, 333. 93. D. Akenson, God’s Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Clayton, ‘Religion, Ethnicity and Colonialism as Explanations of the Northern Ireland Conflict’, in D. Miller (ed.), Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism ((New York: Longman, 1998), 40–54; I. Lustick, State-Building Failure in British Ireland; M. MacDonald, Children of Wrath: Political Violence in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Polity Press, 1986); D. Miller, ‘Colonialism and Academic Representation of the Troubles’, in Miller (ed.), Rethinking Northern Ireland, 3–39; B. Schutz and D. Scott, Natives and Settlers: A Comparative Analysis of the Politics of Opposition and Mobilisation in Northern Ireland and Rhodesia (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1974); R. Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 94. William of Orange’s original Treaty of Limerick, which was conciliatory towards Irish Catholics, was converted, at the insistence of settlers, into the penal system. Pitt’s proposal to link the Union of 1801 with Catholic emanci- pation was also blocked by Protestant settlers, with help from King George III. 95. Weitzer, Transforming Settler States, 1. I have been told by reputable sources that two academic works importantly influenced the Patten Commission, which delivered its report on policing reform in Northern Ireland in September 1999. One was Policing Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999), by Brendan O’Leary and me, and the other was a book by Weitzer, Policing under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police–Community Relations in Northern Ireland (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995). 96. While arguing for the usefulness of comparing Algeria and Ireland against unionist accounts which deny any similarities, Ian Lustick does not accept the arguments of ‘troops out’ advocates that the Algerian analogy means the British should withdraw from Northern Ireland. 97. P. Dixon, ‘The Politics of Antagonism’, 133.

INDEX

Act of Union (1801) 21, 112, 214 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 9, 11, 16, Adams, Gerry 79, 118, 264–7 passim, 271, 20, 54, 59, 62, 65, 113, 116, 119, 292, 296 163–4, 171, 266 affinity 248, 279 challenge to 162 affirmative action 325 ‘negotiated away’ 60 Africa 6 reapplying the logic of 126 see also North Africa; Rhodesia; South Anglo-Irish gentry class 190 Africa Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) 160 Afrikaners 5, 21, 277, 281 annexation 246–7 harshness of the regime 282 Antall, Josef 166 lower classes 279 anti-sectarian programmes 43 agriculture 61, 62, 169, 170 anti-Semitism 312 common policies 168 apartheid 11, 12, 109, 148, 232, 278, 281 Ahern, Bertie 266, 271, 292, 301 condemned by UN 282 Akenson, Don 21 dismantling of 280 Alabama 4 equating unionists with the defenders of Åland Islands 2, 9, 164 5 Alava 186, 198 grand, foundation stones of 291 Albania 11 Apprentice Boys 12 Alcock, Antony 9 aquaculture 61 Alderdice, John, Lord 300 Arabs 6, 312, 313, 315 Algeria 111, 201, 243, 257 Arana, Sabino 183, 185, 188, 195 dominant settler control systems 20 Arge Adria/Arge-Alp 168, 169 French state-building failures 21 Argentina 160, 229 alienation 144, 248 armed forces, see British army Alliance Party 3, 71, 74, 96, 115, 118, 121, armed groups 255 125, 163, 170, 189, 198, 258–9, 327 armed struggle 125, 270, 283 see also Alderdice Armenia 256 American revolution 213 arms dumps/inspectors 13 Amnesty International 249 Arniston Indaba 284–9 ANC (African National Congress) 5, 278, Asia 6 279, 281, 289, 292, 298, 299, 302 ‘aspiration’ thesis 162 criteria for a just war 283 aspirations 186, 294, 295 decision to suspend armed struggle 13 national 280 movements aligned to 41 As-Safir (newspaper) 256 South African government and 287, 288 assassinations 195 republicans prefer identification with 7 assimilation 183, 188, 246, 256, 322 unbanned 291, 293 second- and third-generation immi- see also Maharaj; Mandela; Phosa; grants 189 Ramaphosa no possibility of 185 Ancient Order of Hibernians 184 Assyrians 233 Anderson, J. 17 Athens 236 Anglicans 182 Aughey, Arthur 113 Anglicization 213, 309 Aunger, Edmund 14 338 Index

Australia 231, 248, 320 blood lines 185 civic nationalism 109 Bloody Sunday (1972) 197 Austria 9, 164–5, 167, 168, 169 Bonapartists 243 Freedom Party 12 Bophuthatswana 232 stability 15 Borneo 228 Austrian State Treaty (1955) 165 Bosnia 7, 10, 16, 94 AV (alternative vote) 71–2, 73, 75 Muslims 117 Boundary Agreement (1925) 161 Baden-Württemberg 168 Bourbon dynasty 182 balance of power 42, 279, 310 bourgeoisie 185–6 Baldwin, Robert 216–17, 218 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 238 Balfour Declaration (1917) 313 Boyle, Kevin 18–19 Balkans 10, 19 Boyne, Battle of (1690) 210, 265 Bangladesh 229, 230, 310–11 Breen, R. 187 n. Bantustans 281 brinkmanship 271 Basque Country/Basques 2, 109, 117, British and Irish Communist Organization 181–208 11 nationalists 13 British army/troops 195, 202, 319, 324 Bavaria 168 should be withdrawn 262 behavioural model 150 British Isles 230–1 Beijing 161 see also United Kingdom Beirut 257 British Lions 231 Belfast 14–15, 42, 149, 160 British-Irish Agreement, see Good Friday active and militant labour movement Agreement 184 British-Irish Council 60–3 passim, 76, 204, Derry march (Jan. 1969) 12 231, 250, 266 intermarriage 101 Brooke-Mayhew talks (1991–2) 97, 98 Maryfield 163 Brunei 228 Queen’s University 43, 73 Brussels 168 Shankill Road 45, 138, 144, 151 Budge, Ian 14 vigilante groups 142 Bulgaria 238 vision-setting partnerships 44–5 bureaucracy 15 wall murals 5 business 46, 61, 154 West, enclosed Catholic community 198 by-elections 74–5 working-class communities 187 Byzantium 233 Belfast Agreement, see Good Friday Agreement Callaghan, Jim 7 Belgium 15, 19, 310 Campaign for Equal Citizenship 113 Bello, Bishop 247 Campaign for Labour Representation in Bew, Paul 119 Northern Ireland 113 bigots 7, 149 Campbell, Gregory 300 Bilbao 198 Canada 109, 209–27 bills of rights 55, 122 see also Quebec; Ontario blacks 277, 279, 280 Canaries regionalists 204 American 4, 11, 12 Canary Wharf bombing (1996) 260 disenfranchised 281 Carlism 182–3 enormous suffering 282 Castile/Castilian language 181, 189 homelands 6 Catalonia/Catalans 117, 182, 200 puppet states 291 bombs 195 Blair, Tony 4, 13, 80, 266, 268, 271, 292, bourgeoisie 185–6 328 nationalists 193, 204 Trimble and 285–6 Catholic Association of Ireland 184 Index 339

Catholic Defence Society 184 centralized states 64 Catholics 11, 94, 111, 197, 277 Channel Islands 231 churches 323 Chastelain, General John de 170, 265 Civil Service employment 325 chauvinism ethnic 114, 117, 126, 248 clear shift in favour of 327 Chile 229 concessions to separate nationalism not China 161, 229 necessary to win over 114 Chinese Malays 91 consociational democracy 328 ‘chosen peoples’ 21 defenders of 138 Christians 254, 255, 256, 257, 258 discrimination against 202, 321 see also Catholics; Protestants economic development within churches 154, 184, 197 communities 142 Civic Forum 55, 153 educational system 325 civil disobedience 4, 12 expropriation of lands of 212 civil rights 5, 12, 324 French 213, 214, 215, 218 lack of 45 fulcrum for relationships with ‘state’ minority peacefully demanding 4 140 Civil Service 56, 176, 325 hegemonic control of 212 civil society organizations 117 identified as Irish 191 civil war 152, 160, 196, 267, 319 inclusion of 91, 113 bloody 311 machinery of control imposed on 323 ethnic 229 mass mobilization 21 to prevent a measure of home rule 200 middle-class 198, 324, 325 civilianization 253, 258, 269 motivation for 12 class 14, 185, 194 no attempt by UUP to reach out to 113 differences 279 parades designed to intimidate 210 cleavages 14, 15 political right 322 clergy 213 population rise 42, 118, 119 Clerides, Glafcos 238 Protestants and 7, 18, 21, 43, 55, 97, Clinton, Bill 4, 20 101, 124, 184, 187, 209, 210, 215, 281, coalitions 218, 219 283, 324 attempts to form 325 right to express their Irishness 284 Catholic-Protestant 220 RUC recruitment 202 consociational 70 SDLP and 102 French-English 218 security force harassment of 325 grand 15, 77, 121 seen as citizens of Britain 322 informal 155 slogans 4 inter-class Protestant 184 stereotyped 322 left-wing 249 subordination 282 minimum winning 104 voting patterns 189 multi-ethnic 94, 100, 105 welfare state and 186 multi-ethnic executive 3 working-class 141 populist Protestant 186 younger voters 103 voluntary 121, 125 Caucasus confrontations 2 ‘coercive consociation’ 59 Cavan 112 Cold War 247 ceasefires 199, 201, 204, 268 collaboration 44, 243 IRA 13, 16, 20, 72, 120, 198, 260, 270, colonialism 229, 248 297–8, 327 legacy of 19 loyalist 120, 258, 262 settler 20–2 republican 258 Committee of the Regions 168 Celtic fringes 211, 319 Committee on the Administration of Celtic heroes 183 Justice 145 340 Index common interests 169, 287, 328 constitutional change 67, 219 Commonwealth status 240–1, 242, 243 constitutional politics/parties 125, 126, communism 41, 281 259, 261 collapse of 166, 229 constitutionality 174 communitarian loyalties 184 contact hypothesis 150 community issues 148 Corrymeela Community 43 activism 140, 144, 152 Corsica 2, 243–6 development projects 151 co-sovereignty 58 initiatives 142 Council of Europe 167, 168 see also cross-community activity Council of Ireland (1974) 60, 61, 97, 98–9, Community Relations Council 43 112, 169 Comoros Islands 232 Council of the British Isles 231 complaints commission 325 Craig, Sir James 113 compromise 92–3, 97, 100, 101, 104, 112, Credit Union 139 217 criminal justice system 145 attempts by political elites to reach 149 criminality 261 bi-national 110, 118–20 ‘criminalization’ 202 broad agreement on the outlines of 290 Croatia/Croats 10, 117, 168 coerced 289 Cromwell, Oliver 212 encouraging 288–9 Cronin, Jeremy 41 inherent risk of 288 cross-border activity 62, 170 not necessary 125 cooperation 155, 167, 169, 174–6 territorial 315 institutions 60, 117, 260 tough and sometimes unpalatable 295 national parks 168, 169 concessions 102, 103 networks with alliances 46 conciliation 92–5, 213 political institutions 120 Confederation of British Industry 44 cross-community activity 149 confederations 60, 64, 311 ‘agreement’ 56 confidence-building 267–72, 288 consent 62, 66, 68, 78, 79, 80, 81 confidentiality 285 contact and communication 150 conflict resolution 44, 115, 117, 125 organizations 146 alternative strategy for 18 cross-country contacts 43 attempts to construct framework for ‘cross-pressures’ theory 14–15 248 Crusaders 233 hindered 262–3 Cullen, Kevin 1, 2 inter-community 149 cultural issues 148, 202, 210 key to 148 custom 182 see also P-CROs Cyprus 7, 9, 165–6, 173, 229, 232–9, 248 conquest 211, 212, 233 Constitution (1960) 89, 174 consensus 287, 288, 299 instability 19 Conservative and Unionist Party 200 partition 11, 311 consociationalism 37–52, 89–108, 151, violent intra-state conflicts 2 125, 202, 215–20, 325–30 see also EOKA complex settlement 235 Czech Republic 238, 311 criticized as ‘elitist’ and ‘segregationist’ Czechoslovakia 9, 311 18 distinctive 54–69 Darby, John 43 institutions 121–7 Dayton Accord 94 opposition to 154, 155 De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement 165 paradox’ 124 De Hoop Indaba 276 principles 115 death squads 195 theory 15–16, 17 decentralization 126, 246 Index 341 decolonization 194, 241 undermining the appeal of 115 decommissioning of arms 3, 59, 121, 170, within a decentralized unitary state 63 263, 266, 267, 302 Dhimmi 313 achievable 253 d’Hondt procedure 54, 71, 77, 78–9, 80, actual 80 104, 124, 173, 264, 265 all paramilitary groups 265 Diaspora 320 associating with surrender 256 Jewish 312, 313 completion of 79 Palestinian 312, 316 crisis over 62 Dicey, A. V. 66, 67, 68, 201 deadlines for 67, 255 dictatorship 321 debate on 258–60, 272 Dili 247 demand for 264 direct rule 16, 37, 119, 167 demilitarization within the context of effective permanence of 139 262 introduction of 138, 139, 140, 143, 282, early release of prisoners a start to 269 324 Good Friday Agreement’s language on disarmament 259, 261, 263, 267, 269 285 agencies of violence 262 highly politicized issue 261 militias 254–8, 270 in parallel with negotiations 270–1 paramilitary organisations 260 IRA 102, 277 disenfranchisement 268 made possible 268 dispossession 214, 277 not optional 272 dissidents/dissent 111, 125, 184, 271 parallel 286 District Council Community Relations politicization of 261–2 Programme 44 prolonged impasse over 296–7 divide and rule policy 111 republican position on 81 Dixon, P. 18 UUP 265 Doherty, Pat 266 De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement (1946) 164 Dominican Republic 228–9 de Klerk, F. W. 5, 12, 299 Donaldson, Jeffrey 300 Democratic Dialogue 44, 45 Donegal 112 Democratic Left 115, 121, 125 ‘double protection model’ 58 demographic factors 198, 310, 316 Dove House Resource Centre 149 demonstrations 196 Downing Street Declaration (1993) 152, 200 Denktash, Rauf 237, 238 Doyle, Roddy 1 Depeille, Henri 244 Droop quota 69 deprivation 141, 149 Drumcree 265, 302 Deputy First Minister 75–6, 77, 79 dual premiership 75–81 Derry 12, 42, 138, 144 Dublin 160 Dove House Resource Centre 145 DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) 54, ‘Free’ 142 102, 104, 113, 160, 260, 284 vision-setting partnerships 44–5 Assembly abandoned by 298 Waterside area 145 accusations 120 de Valéra, Éamon 160, 161 commitment to destroy Good Friday devolution 56, 96, 167, 202, 265, 266 Agreement 299 agreement on 119 decommissioning 258, 261 ‘all round’ 120 right-wing Protestant sects 281 key for 263 Sinn Féin and 173 political vacuum that proceeded 124 see also Campbell; Paisley power-sharing 20, 120 Durham, John G. L., Lord 216 proposals for 13 referendums 230 Early Release Scheme 260, 262, 269 transition from support for 113 East Timor 2, 246–8 342 Index

Easter Rising (1916) 264 pictures of prisoners 198 Eastern Europe 9, 11, 166 Spanish government talks with 201 collapse of communism 229 state must negotiate directly with 205 ethnic tensions 165 targets of attacks 202 integral and exclusionary nationalisms ethnic cleansing 114, 281, 310, 311 312 ethnic democracy 316, 321–4 EC (European Community) 165, 167, 170 defunct 325 see also EU ethnic groups 92, 99, 100, 311, 318 Ecevit, Bulent 236 separated 168–9, 310 economic boycott 161 ethnic issues 17, 19, 104, 185, 210, 215 economic growth/development 17, 18, deep cleavages of 210 110, 142 see also headings above prefixed ‘ethnic’ Economic Policy Unit 76 ethnicity 41, 183, 239, 294 ecumenism 21, 43 ethnocentricity 115, 122 education 61, 143, 150, 322, 324 ethno-nationalism 37, 38, 71, 149 see also schools divided territories 73 Egypt/Egyptians 233, 314 erosion of 45 Eire 9 extent to which people subscribe to 39 Elazar, Daniel 56, 57 opposing, clash of 115 elections 163, 268, 298, 327 rivals 77, 116 fraud and other irregularities 245 undermined 46 non-racial 276, 293 EU (European Union) 7, 12, 151, 320, seemingly endless procession of 139 329 turnout in 117 Council of Ministers 61, 234, 254, 256 electoral systems 69–75 decisions made in relation to Cyprus electricity 169 238 Elizabeth I, Queen of England 212 international matters 76 Empey, Sir Reg 297 policies 56, 62 employment opportunities 257 politics 42 endogamy 20, 21, 22 programmes 44, 61, 62, 175 England 195, 231 Europe 159–80 Ulster Protestants who study in 96 central 183 Enniskillen Together 144 Christian democracy 186 enosis 166, 233, 236, 239 fascist organizations 8 environment 61, 168 impact on Northern Ireland 19 EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion integration 2 Agoniston) 233–4, 236 irredentism 164–72 Equality Commission 123 Jewish predicament 312 Equality Unit 76 south-eastern, confrontations in 2 Erignac, Claude 245 see also Eastern Europe Ertzainza 202 European Convention on Human Rights Ervine, David 301 and Freedoms 55, 122, 174 Estonia 238 Euskal Herritarrok, see Basque Country ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) 190, 194, Evans, Geoffrey 73 197 exclusion 184, 212, 259, 321, 323, 327 activists in France 195 institutions designed to prevent 326 armed activity after transition to perceptions of 269 democracy 192 social 144 ceasefires 13, 199, 204 Executive Committee of Ministers 76–7 military strategy 196 executive powers 78, 170 must ‘represent’ the unrealized people extra-bloc voting 124 194 extremism 119 Index 343

Fair Employment Acts (1976/1989) 13, Constitution (1949) 161 143 gerrymandering 71, 73, 216 Fair Employment Commission 143–4 terminated 325 FAIT (Families Against Intimidation and Gibraltar 161, 172 Terror) 145, 149 Glasgow 14–15 Farrell, Michael 5 God 152 Farren, Sean 300 Good Friday Agreement (1998) 2, 7, 110, fascism 11, 12, 243 118, 170, 200, 209, 239, 287, 326–7 nationalists attracted to 243 agreed 253 Faulkner, Brian 8, 96, 98, 99, 102 all-Ireland dimension 228 federacy 56–7, 63–5, 68, 167 Balir’s letter accompanying 271 Ferre, Luis A. 241 comparative political science and 53–88 Fianna Fáil 64, 126, 163 considerable interest in Sri Lanka 249 fiefdoms 72 consociational institutions and 17, 38, Fiji 90, 94, 95 89–108, 121–7 Finland 164 elections accepted as necessary by all First Minister 75–6, 77, 79 parties to 268 first-preference votes 99 implementation of 152–3, 263 First World War 233 important element in 231 fisheries 170 integration 328 Fitt, Gerry 96 IRA not a party to 292 FitzGerald, Garret 163 legitimacy to 250 flags 121, 211, 241 provision for right of people of tricolour 111 Northern Ireland 204 food safety 61 referendum on 154, 276–7 Foraker Act (1900) 240 room for a different interpretation of forced labour 212 letter and spirit of 270 Ford, Gerald 242 South Africa and 13 Framework Documents (1995) 97, 170, 175 success of 243, 246 France 168, 191, 229, 232, 238 terms 269–70 boundaries guaranteed by 165 unionism and nationalism transcended civic nationalism 109 in substance through 155 falling on deaf Catholic ears 119 unionist opponents of 114 Corsica annexed by 243 Vatican and 10 ETA activists 195 why unionists signed 9 franchise 282 see also Clinton; Mitchell; Trimble FRANCIA (Front d’Action Nouvelle Good Hope, Cape of 277 Contre l’Indépendance et Goodman, J. 17 l’Autonomie) 244 Government of Ireland Act (1920) 67, Franco, Gen. Francisco 186 160, 171–2, 327 Free Presbyterian Church 281 Gove, Michael 299 French Canadians 211, 216, 217–18 Gow, Ian 163 ‘frontier’ democracy 217 Graubünden 168 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Gaelic Athletic Association 117 Great Depression (1930s) 240 Gaelic revivalism 184 Greater Serbia 11 Gaza Strip 6, 309, 312, 314, 316 Greece 166, 233, 234 Geneva 237 military junta 236, 237, 239 Genoa 243 Greek Cypriots 89, 166, 232, 234, 235, 237 genocide 310 disastrous consequences for 239 Georgia 4 Green stereotypes 42, 43, 115 Germany 167, 168, 229, 233, 238 Greysteel (Rising Sun bar) 151 344 Index

Griffith, Arthur 228 single-issue groups 145, 149 group cultures 90 strong protection for 235 Guadeloupe 229 violations of 249, 280 Guardian 4, 12 Human Rights Commission 55 Guelke, Adrian 13, 19 Hume, John 5, 12, 97, 118, 203 Guernsey 63 Hungarian minorities 166 Guerra, Alfonso 200 Hungary 166, 238 guerrillas 196, 257, 263 hunger strikes 198 Guipuzcoa 189, 198 Hurd, Douglas 7 Gulf crisis (1990s) 8 Ibo people 311 Habibie, B. J. 247 Iceland 232 Hadden, Tom 18–19 identity, see national identity Haider, Jörg 12 ideologies 234 Haiti 228 left-wing 246 hardline conduct 70 paternalism 185 leaders 79 rival 150, 151 nationalist 163 IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) 292, 293 parties 71, 72, 194 immigrants 183, 185, 201, 204, 215 republican/separatist 192 Jewish 312 hardship 145 tendency to integrate 189 Hare, Thomas 71 working-class 204 harmonization 169, 170 imperialism 5, 7, 22 hatreds 110, 111 inclusiveness 110–16, 117 Haughey, Charles 8–9, 163 inclusivity 72, 78, 263, 267, 269 health 61 in the early phase of peace process hegemony 15, 20, 209–27, 279, 324 268 Heisenberg principle 286 paramount 255 Helsinki Final Act (1975) 162, 166 incomers 185, 189 Herri Batasuna, see Basque Country independence 159, 160, 232, 234, 242, Hewitt, John 1, 276 243–4, 319 Hillsborough Declaration (1999) 263–4 Basque 193 Hincks, Francis 217, 218 choice between autonomy and 248 hiring practices 143 desire for 191 Hisbollah 255, 257 islands 229 Hispaniola 228 opponents of 247 Hitler, Adolf 9 support for 192, 241 Holocaust 6, 109 uprising for 315 Home Rule 160, 200, 202–3, 217, 220 India 11, 229, 311 civil war to prevent a measure of 200 Indian Malays 91 opposition to 111, 112–13, 184 Indonesia 2, 228, 229, 247, 248 suspension (1972) 325 Timor divided between Portugal and homelands 232, 280, 281, 291 246 homogeneous states 11 industrialization 183, 185 Hopkinson, Henry 233 industries 143, 159 Horowitz, Donald 54, 71, 73, 122, 126 inequality 17, 45–6, 109, 115 hostility 166, 169, 243 legacy of 20 House of Commons 66, 219 injustices 144, 282, 324 House of Lords 66, 174, 213 inland waterways 61 housing 115, 141, 161, 189, 325 inter-ethnic vote transfers 99 human rights 44, 146, 170, 247 intermarriage 43, 101 NGOs in the field of 247 ‘internal colony’ term 8 Index 345

International Commission on talks taking place with gun at the head of Decommissioning 80, 265, 260, 264, unionist negotiators 258 266, 271 targeting of RUC 283 internationalization 4, 10, 245 unionist victory over 261 intifada 6, 315 unjust means in pursuit of its unjust war intimidation 101, 141, 196, 261 283 civilian population 147 weakened and weary 204 mass demonstrations of 196 see also Adams; McGuinness; Provisional IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force) 249 IRA IRA (Irish Republican Army) 10, 102, 112, Iran 255 151, 170, 269 Iraq 311 absence of contact between any party Ireland Act (1920) 326 other than Sinn Féin 302 Irian Jaya 248 ANC solidarity 5 Irish America 118 atrocious action by 289 support/pressure groups 6, 20 blowing-up of Belfast-Dublin railway Irish Congress of Trade Unions 44 line 146 Irish Constitution 61, 170–1, 250 British government and 114, 201 amended 64–5, 120, 266, 326, 327 ceasefires 13, 16, 20, 72, 120, 198, 260, clerical state institutionalized 329 270, 297–8, 327 irredentist claim to Northern Ireland 9, decommissioning 38, 66, 77, 79, 80–1, 58, 160, 167, 330 102, 264, 277, 286 majority consent for unification 60, 319 disagreement over 38 Irish Free State 160, 161, 240 hunger strikes 195 Protestant population 114 illegality of 320 irlandisation 245 interlocutor with International irredentism 8, 18, 114, 159–64, 310, 319 Commission 266 claims 16 Irish government responsibility for Europe 164–72 arming 162 external, end to 167 legitimizing the terrorism of 161 potential sources of 166 no widespread support 282 remains a potent political force 9 not a party to Good Friday Agreement surveys on 191 292 island status 228–52 possible to wean from its violent isolation strategy 201–2 approach 97 ISPO (International Study of presented as defender of community Peace/Conflict Resolution under siege 198 Organizations) 137 prolonged anti-terrorist operation Israel 255, 256, 257, 312, 317 against 262 Labour governments 314–15, 316 Protestant paramilitaries and 196 Likud governments 315 providing Catholics with retaliatory and see also Palestine disruptive powers 323 Italy 164–5, 167, 169, 238, 243 punishment attacks 145 Mafia 245 rise of 184 Sinn Féin and 66–7, 77, 120, 194, 195, ‘Jacksonian’ 217 197, 279, 283, 292, 296, 297, 299, 302 Jacobins 109, 111, 246 spectacular bombing campaigns in Jacobitism 182 England 195 Jamaica 232 split (1970) 138 James I, king of England 212 support of third of the Catholic James II, king of England and Scotland population 324 210 surrender of arms 262 Japan 246 346 Index

Jersey 63 irredentism 58 Jerusalem 312 lack of 196 Jews 6, 21, 312, 313, 316, 317 liberalism 39, 40, 41, 110 jobs 161, 279 liberation 291 Joint Declaration for Peace (1993) 7 national, war of 255, 282 Joint Framework Documents (1995) 326, liberation movements 278, 280, 283, 302 327 Lijphart, Arend 15–16, 18, 54, 55, 69, Jordan 314, 315 70–1, 77, 104–5 Joseph, J. S. 235 Limerick, Treaty of (1691) 21 judicial process 279 linkage theory 18–20 Lithuania 238 Kader, Gen. Nizar Abdel 258 Lloyd, John 113 Kashmir 53, 311 Lombardy 168 Keating, Michael 13 Londonderry, see Derry King, Steven 11 Los Macherteros 242 Kisraoun 257 lower-order preferences 71, 72, 73, 74, 124 KKK (Ku Klux Klan) 4, 8, 11, 111–12 Loyalist Association of Workers 138 Kosovo 9–10, 11 loyalists 11–12, 261 Kurds 311 attacks on republicans 118 Kuwait 8 ceasefires 120, 258 cultural and economic position in urban labour markets 20 centres 145 Labour Parties: decommissioning of arms 259 Northern Ireland 113, 115, 184, 198 former paramilitaries 152 Republic of Ireland 163 inclusive orientation toward 74 UK 10, 114, 119, 194, 327 intimidation by 138 LaFontaine, Louis 217, 218 militant 279 language 14, 174, 210, 287, 316, 322 paramilitaries 114, 262, 268 Anglicized 309 parties 69, 104, 153 Basque 181, 185, 189 refreshingly flexible parties 120 Corsica’s indigenous population 243 Sunningdale largely destroyed by 112 Hungarian 166 terrorism 162, 196 Irish 55, 170, 182 ‘ultras’ 14 Sinhalese 248 working-class 140 Ulster Scots 61 Lustick, Ian 21 Latins 233 LVF (Loyalist Volunteer Force) 262 Latvia 238 Lausanne, Treaty of (1923) 233 Maastricht Treaty (1992) 168 law 182, 201, 325 MacBride principles 12 affirmative action 325 McCartney, Robert 18, 73, 113, 121, 261, equality before 201 298 royal 211 Macedonia 311 law and order 215 McGarry, John 37, 46, 327 League of Nations 57, 160, 164, 313 McGimpsey, Chris 9 Lebanon 2, 19, 105, 253–74, 315 McGuinness, Martin 266, 276, 300 legislature 15, 169 McMichael, Gary 69, 301 legitimacy 193, 197, 229, 231, 240, 283, McWilliams, Monica 300 309, 321 Madagascar 232 competing claims to 287–8 Madrid Conference (1990) 315 Good Friday Agreement 250 Madrid Outline Convention (1980) 168 international 228, 250, 319, 320 Maginnis, Ken 11, 239 IRA terrorism 161 Maharaj, Mac 13, 300 Index 347 majoritarianism 15, 16, 73, 76, 327 minorities 5, 58, 166, 248, 281, 312 rejection of 93 Catholic 21, 309, 321, 324, 327–8, 330 majorities 94, 166, 201 control of 323 active consent of 60 cultural 167 black 280 enemy-affiliated 317 Catholic 280 hopeful 165 demographic 328 indigenous 310 German-speaking 164, 165 island 246 Greek Cypriot 166, 233 limited cultural and political rights to national 59 110 nationalist 161 local 189 Protestant 202, 309, 322, 327 message to 211 ruling 311 national(ist) 12, 59, 109, 110, 162, 282, Swedish-speaking 164 322 tyranny of 324 peacefully demanding civil rights 4 unambiguous 71 permanent 216 voting 173 physical hardliners 282 weighted 90 Protestant 321 majority-minority relations 164 regional 167 Makarios III, Archbishop 166, 233, 234, religious 313 235, 236, 237, 239 republican 282 Making Belfast Work (programme) 44 sharing power with 94 Malaysia 91, 103, 105, 228, 310 substantial 201 Mali 310 troublesome, dealing with 215 Mallon, Seamus 76, 77, 80, 299 Turkish 166, 233, 234 Malta 238 under-representation 72 Malvinas 160 unionists have begun to see themselves Man, Isle of 63, 231 as 96 Mandela, Nelson 5, 13, 276, 293 veto rights for 55 Mandelson, Peter 78, 81, 267 vetoes 15 manipulation 113, 118 miscarriages of justice 195 marching season 265, 271 Mississippi 4 marginalization 268, 269 Mitchell, George 20, 78, 80, 170, 265, 277, marine matters 61 296, 298 Marxism/Marxists 40, 110, 183, 194 Review and Commission Report (1996) classical 41 66, 80, 263, 260, 266, 296–7 integrationist clique 11 Mitchell, Paul 73 Matsu 229 Mitterrand, François 244 Maudling, Reginald 7 Molyneaux, James 8–9, 113 maximalism 103–5 Monaghan 112 Mayotte 232 Montcalm, Gen. Louis-Joseph 210 Maze prison 152 Montreal 211, 216 Merquior, J. G. 40 Moore, Barrington 39 Meyer, Roelf 41, 295, 296 morality 329 middle classes 187, 198 Catholic 111 Catholic 198, 324, 325 of violence 194 militants 125, 162, 184, 201, 218, 249, 283 Morris, Michael 301 military factors 7, 118, 161, 236, 270 ‘mother’ countries 277 militias 213, 248, 254–8, 262 Mouskos, Michael 233 disarmament and dissolution of 254–8, Mowlam, Mo 265 263, 270 multicultural diversity 211 Milosevic, Slobodan 117 multi-ethnic states/societies 11, 93, 278 348 Index

Munoz Marin, Luis 240 North Tyrol 168, 169 Murray, James 212–13 Northern Ireland Act (1998) 55, 63, 66, Muslims 256, 258, 313 74, 76, 77 Bosnian 117 amendments 79 Shi’a 257 Northern Ireland Assembly 9, 38, 55, 57, 61–8 passim, 112, 123, 169, 172–4, names 166 269 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France 243 Civic Forum alongside 124 national anthem 241 complex arrangements for cooperation National Council for Civil Liberties 4 204 national identity 110, 243, 249, 284, 302 elections to 69, 268 accommodating 192 members have to designate themselves asserting 242 154 distinct 117 nationalists cannot undermine 122 separate 148, 150 representation of major parties 326 nationalism/nationalists, see Basque starts to function 260 Country; Catalonia; Catholics; Fianna suspension of 64, 77 Fáil; Gaelic Athletic; Palestine; Puerto UUP agree to Sinn Féin taking seats 296 Rico; Quebec; Republic of Ireland; Northern Ireland (Elections) Act/Order Scotland; Sinn Féin (1998) 74, 75 nationality 186, 201 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 4 Organization) 9 Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Navarre 182, 186, 191, 193, 198 Action 44 Ndebele 21 Northern Ireland Human Rights Netherlands 15, 124, 238, 246, 310 Commission 122 Netherlands Antilles 105, 229 Northern Ireland Office 139, 176 Netherlands-Flanders Language Union Northern Ireland Partnership Board 45 Treaty (1982) 168 Northern Ireland Peace Forum 70 New Brunswick 14 Northern Ireland Special Powers Act New England 213 (1922) 5 New Guinea 229, 248 Northern Ireland Tourist Board 125 New Ireland Forum Report 46 North-South institutions 266 New Ireland Group 46 see also NSMC New York 213 Norway 310 New Zealand 231, 232, 320 ‘no-go’ areas 142 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) ‘no-win’ situation 311, 313 141 NSMC (North-South Ministerial Council) development of 137–8, 139, 140 13, 38, 55, 60–5 passim, 76, 96, 122, evolution 142, 144 175, 328 human rights 247 established 176 inclusivist philosophy 152 provisions for 250 values 153 unionists cannot destroy 122 Nicosia 235, 237 Nigeria 311 oaths of loyalty/allegiance 55, 198 ‘No Surrender’ 210 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 113 Nobel Peace Prize 247 O’Connell, Daniel 217, 219 Noble, Arthur 10 Official Unionist Party 96 North Africa 243 Oireachtas 61, 176 North America 320 O’Leary, Brendan 14, 16, 19, 20, 37, 46 see also Canada; Irish America; United O’Leary, Cornelius 14 States Omagh atrocity (1998) 125 Index 349

O’Malley, Padraig 13 Parliaments 160 Ontario 215 partisans and parallels 3–13 Opsahl Commission (1992–3) 44, 139 partition 6, 57–8, 111, 148, 160, 280, Orange Order 4, 117, 184, 210 309–35 militant branch 218 Cyprus 11, 166, 232, 233, 234, 237 seen as similar to Ku Klux Klan 111 device to frustrate Catholic aspirations Orangemen 12, 42, 45, 186, 211 186 ‘Order in Council’ procedures 8, 114 memory of 191 Organization of African Unity 232 Pakistan 228, 229 Orthodox Church 233 recognition of 202 Oslo Accords (1993) 315 partnerships 44–5, 46 Ottoman Turks 233, 313 paternalism 185 outsiders 185, 322 patrimony 309 P-CROs (peace-conflict resolution Paisley, Ian (Jr) 10 organizations) 137–56 Paisley, Ian (Snr) 10, 73, 79, 101, 163, 281, peace process 13, 151–5, 199, 203, 261, 298 262 Pakistan 229, 310–11 decommissioning an essential part of Palestine 21, 137, 148, 257, 263, 309–35 266 peace processes 2 early months 268 see also PLO focus of 258 Pan Africanist Congress 292 inclusivity in the early phase of 268 pan-Arabism 314 intense review of 265 Papineau, L. J. 219 less symmetrical than in South Africa Papua New Guinea 229 288 parallelization 264, 269–70 one-sided 267 paramilitaries 125, 197, 203, 249, 262, 268 threat by loyalist prisoners to withdraw appeasement of 269 support 270 communication between politicians and see also P-CROs 300–1 peacekeeping forces 248, 320 consent to decommission arms by 327 Peel Commission (1937) 313 creating confidence to decommission Persians 233 267 ‘petition of concern’ 173 decommissioning of arms 258, 265, 266 Philippines 232 disarmament of all 260 Phosa, Matthews 301 former 152 pieds noirs 243 legislation banning 270 Pitt, William 112 links with parties 259 Plains of Abraham, Battle of (1759) 210, loyalist 262, 268 212 main groupings 138 plantation of Ulster (1607) 277 prisoners 269, 270 plastic bullets 147 prominent organizations 254 pledge of office 55 Protestant 97 PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) punishment beatings/attacks 147, 149 6, 7, 13, 255, 315 sanctions rarely if ever employed against pluralism 14–18, 73, 91 270 extreme examples 20 security forces too lenient with 280 Poland 229, 238 suspicions of 272 police/policing 195, 201, 202, 280 violence 152, 326 black unwillingness to support 280 pariah groups 111 mistreatment of Catholics 322 Paris, Treaty of (1898) 240 new oath to be sworn by constables 13 parity of esteem 120, 122, 282 reforms 4, 121, 302 350 Index police/policing (cont.): local council level 42 reorganized forces 325 party-list 70 repression 324 PR-STV (proportional representation- political parties 7, 14–15, 16 single transferable vote) 123–4 catch-all 110 preference transfers 71, 72, 74 cross-ethnic 71 Presbyterians 182, 184 dominant sectarian 121 presidentialism 76 flank, ethnically based 93 Prevention of Terrorism Act (1989) 7 hardline 71, 72, 194 priests 113, 212 inter-ethnic 96 prisoners of war 195 left-wing 6, 194 see also Early Release Scheme mainstream 201 private armies 261 paramilitary links 267, 268, 269, 270 propaganda 11, 201 prosecution of 255 proportionality 73, 74 right-wing 197 norms 54–5, 73 small 69, 101, 104, 173 pragmatic 218 see also Alliance; Democratic Left; DUP; see also PR Fianna Fáil; Labour Parties; Official prosecution system 13 Unionist Party; PUP; Sinn Féin; UDP; Protestants 10, 15, 46, 94, 96, 189, 193, UKUP; UUP; Women’s Coalition 219, 230, 279 politicization 253, 261–3 appeasement of 319 Portugal 246, 248 beneficiaries of partition 318 Powell, Enoch 113 British privileges bestowed on 111 power-sharing 13, 73, 78, 96, 102, 115, Britishness of 187, 284, 291, 321 124, 169, 172, 230, 263, 321, 322–3 Catholics and 7, 18, 21, 43, 55, 97, 101, acceptance of formal arrangements 202 124, 184, 187, 209, 210, 215, 283, 324 calls for 280 chauvinistic politicians 114 centre version 98–100 consociational democracy 328 consociational 126 demanded to remain part of Britain 318 Constitution 166 destiny as Irish people in a united continental norms 15 Ireland 112 councils 43 downgraded 325 cross-community executive 54 dramatically reduced domination of devolved 20, 265 economy 143 DUP participation in 299 economic development within commu- elections for government 163 nities 142 inclusion of Sinn Féin 277 fear of being swamped or absorbed 280 institutionalized 162, 173 fulcrum for relationships with ‘state’ mandatory 119, 120, 327 140 Northern Catholics more concerned hegemony 324 with 191 industries controlled by 159 provisional establishment 296 intransigence 324 regional and provincial 165 Irish identification among 187 reluctant trust that made it possible 287 Irish Republic 321 Sinn Féin’s expulsion from 125 majority domination practised and substantial 126–7 enforced 282 transition from hegemonic regime to middle class 143, 144 209–27 minority party among 102 unionist opposition to 119, 163 most profound fear of 281 various steps towards 325 nonconformists 182 PR (proportional representation) 15, 69, overwhelmingly and vehemently oppose 71, 103, 172 unity 191 Index 351

paramilitaries 97, 299 Rasool, Ebrahim 41–2 parliament 113 rebellions 218 percentage of population 330 armed 215 plantation of Ulster 212 ethnically motivated 113 plea to embrace ‘the common name of nationalist 111 Irishman’ 116 United Irishmen (1798) 182, 184 private sector control 143 reconciliation 138, 161, 271 proportional inclusion of 91 cross-community 144, 148, 149–50, 151 right to say no to a united Ireland 283 cross-country 43 risk of religious coercion 329 full 256, 262 settlers 21, 22, 320 key agencies working for 44 shift from minority to majority status long time to achieve 283 323 national 255, 263 show of power and solidarity 210 true 253, 269 substantial majority support among Record of Understanding (1992) 295, 296 101–2 redistribution 110 unionist ascendancy leaders 202 referendums 64, 120, 248, 250 vehement opposition to Irish indepen- abortion and divorce 329 dence 318 first consociational settlement endorsed Provisional IRA 138, 144–5, 194 by 56 arming 163 Good Friday Agreement 154, 276–7, transformation of IRA’s militant wing 327 into 162 Scottish and Welsh 63, 230 Provisional Sinn Féin 194 reforms 302, 324 public-sector spending 143 anti-discrimination 12–13 Puerto Rico 2, 239–43 constitutional 169 punishment attacks/beatings 145, 147, economic 144 149, 272 police/policing 4, 121, 302 brutal 261 political 144, 148, 254 PUP (Progressive Unionist Party) 72, 74, refugees 237, 263, 312, 314 76, 269, 284 displacement of 141 decommissioning 81 regionalism 167, 245 emergence of 141 advance of 168 front for terrorist organisations 261 discrediting the espousal of any form of paramilitary organization 268 243 see also Ervine rehabilitation 255, 256 rejectionists 102, 125, 126 Qaddafi, Muammar 194 religion 182, 294 Quaker House 145 deep cleavages of 210 quangoes 175 separation 150 quasi-presidential figures 75 see Christians; Jews; Muslims Quebec 109, 117, 210, 212–15, 218–19 Remembrance Day bombing (1987) 144–5 ‘Bleu’ party 216–17 Renan, Ernest 91 non-violent dispute with rest of Canada repression 194, 212, 282, 324 2 illiberal measures of 201 Quemoy 229 police 324 Republic of Ireland 97, 175, 181, 205, 230 ‘race’/racist philosophy 41, 185 by-elections 74 Ramaphosa, Cyril 13, 295, 296 Celtic Tiger expansion 62 Ramos-Horta, José 247 Civil Service 176 Ramsay, Robert 245 clerical Catholic state 321, 329 ranking of preferences 124 decommissioning support 259 352 Index

Republic of Ireland (cont.): religious 212, 213 economic prosperity 329 see also bills of rights; civil rights; human electoral participation in elections 72 rights; right to self-determination external aggression from 8 Riker, W. H. 104 external reference point in 191 Roberts, Hugh 8, 113 full members of the EC 167 Robinson, Mary 163, 301 future role in Northern Ireland affairs Roche, Patrick 113 99 Roman Catholic Church 111, 212 institutional links between Northern Romania 166, 238 Ireland and 117 Romans 233 irredentism 8, 9, 18, 114, 159–64, 319 Rome 10 Labour Party 163 Rooney, Kevin 18 nationalists’ demand for institutions Rosello, Pedro 241 linking Northern Ireland with 16 Rose, R. 14, 187, 191 Northern Ireland has the right to join Royal Irish Regiment 202 63–4 Ruane, Joseph 19 Protestants in 321 RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) 4, 147, rejection of partition 309 283 ridiculed as a bucolic theocracy 114 attempts to recruit Catholics 202 right of people in Northern Ireland to IRA’s targeting of 283 decide whether to join 204 should be disbanded 262 secession 200 rugby touring team 231 Supreme Court 162 Russia 164 well-established as independent state 231 Saddam Hussein 9 see also Irish Constitution; Irish Free Sainte-Laguë 71 State St Gallen 168 republicanism/republicans, see Catholics; St Germain, Treaty of (1919) 169 Fianna Fáil; Republic of Ireland; Sinn St Jean-Baptiste Day parade 211 Féin Saint-Martin (St Maarten) 229 resettlement 281 Salzburg 168 residential neighbourhoods 110 Sampson, Nicos 236, 237 resignation 77, 80 schools 17, 43, 55, 110, 115 reunification 42, 58, 161, 191 Scotland/Scots 6, 109, 117 Rhodesia 11, 20, 21, 111 desire for more radical decentralization right to self-determination 7, 311, 320, 120 321 devolution 10, 13, 124, 230, 231 colonies 8 Jacobitism 182 denied/blocked 5, 6 nationalist party 193 negotiations on the basis of 205 no IRA attacks in 195 not recognized 203 Parliament 63, 69, 119 partition derives legitimacy from 310 SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour recognized 313, 315, 318, 319 Party 69, 94–5, 96–8, 102–5 passim, violation of 247 169, 173, 269 rights 55, 284, 313, 321, 326 compromise with unionists 112 collective 316 consociational government of all parties cultural 213 204 democratic 316 constitutional nationalists reorganized historic 181 in 192 individual 110, 316, 322 cross-class electorate 198 legal 58, 162 lower-order preferences 73, 74 minority 322 supporters opposed to violence 196 Index 353

rejection of violence 193 national 68 religion 197 republicans blocked from 6 Sinn Féin and 46, 54, 60, 261, 288 secessionist national 57 Stormont 163 traditional nationalist view of 171 unionist coalition with 121, 125–6 UN principles of 235 UUP and 42–3, 54, 119, 288 willingness to employ the language of see also Farren; Fitt; Hume; Mallon 58 secession 200, 210, 310 see also right to self-determination archipelagos more susceptible to 232 self-help initiatives 140, 142, 144 ethnically driven 110 Selma-Montgomery march (1965) 12 lack of a real alternative of 327 Senegal 310 pursuit of, by an island 229 separation 159, 281, 310 Second World War 246 religion, education, music and sport 150 second-class citizens 8, 12, 322 surveys on 191 secret deals 285 territorial 236 sectarianism 7, 43, 113, 119, 122, 147 separatism/separatists 113, 219, 246 agreed or united Ireland would hardline 192 transcend 46 militant 249 chief cause of 112 Serbia/Serbs 10, 114, 166 community relations officers to counter Set of Ideas (1989) 238 44 settlements: concern about the general growth in agreed 294 145 final status 317 dominant political parties 121 lasting 291 first step towards decreasing 149 negotiated 293 identities 111 outlines of 294 increasing 151 permanent 316, 328 institutions that promote 121 win-win 290 movements concerned to challenge 42 settler populations 20–2, 244, 277 need to tackle individual and group Shadow Assembly 76 levels 150 Shi’a Amal 254 new citizenship that would end 154 shipbuilding 159 security apparatus 21 ‘shoot to kill’ policy 195 violence 142, 145, 152 shootings 272 secularization 329, 330 Shouf Mountains 257 security 21, 173, 256, 283, 316 Simeoni, Max and Edmond 244 dismantling of 262 Singapore 310 measures 201 single-identity groups 146, 148, 149 policy 234 Sinhalese 248 security forces 197, 202, 235, 249, 293, 323 Sinn Féin 64, 76, 96, 103–5 passim, 121, harassment of Catholics 325 324 too lenient with paramilitary groups admission to Cabinet 102 280 bringing them into the political process see also British army; RUC 170 sedition 255 committed to the principle of consent segregation 20, 115, 141, 234 292 ‘self-denying prophecy’ 16 compromised electoral strategy 118 self-determination 63–4, 91, 193, 233, 235 curtailed ability to make compromises ‘external’ 57 125 free 161 decommissioning 66–7, 81, 266, 267, international norm of 19 286 joint act of 66 dialogue with 203 354 Index

Sinn Féin (cont.): adverse circumstances 144 DUP and 173 common interests 149 electoral consequences of colluding with imbalances 277 126 inequalities 45–6 exclusion from negotiations 260 Sota, Ramón de la 185, 186 expulsion clause for 265 South Africa 18, 137, 148, 231, 262, expulsion from power-sharing 125 276–307 front for terrorist organisations 261 ability to settle conflict 13 hardline republicans gathered in 192 anti-apartheid movement 5 inclusion in government 91, 101, 122, Boers 5, 111 277 Communist Party 41, 281 incorporation in negotiations 97 Constitution 286 influence out of proportion to its dominant settler control systems 20 numbers 288 impossibility of liberal solution for 40 IRA and 66–7, 77, 120, 194, 195, 197, linkages between conflict in Northern 279, 283, 292, 296, 297, 299, 302 Ireland and 19 key obstacle to taking up seats on Northern Ireland parallel 12 executive 253 peace processes in 2 lower-order preferences 73, 74 reintegration of territories into 6 no government, no guns’ position 263 transition from apartheid to democracy opposition to political institutions 112 40–1 opposition to political violence 197 Western Cape 42 percentage of Catholic vote 196 whites 8 pluralist and ‘civic’ Ireland the goal of see also ANC; apartheid; 111 Bophuthatswana; de Klerk; Mandela policy stance 72 South Georgia 160 regularly denounced as fascist 114 South Korea 160–1 restrictions on 201 South Sandwich Islands 160 rise of 184 South Tyrol 2, 164–5, 168, 169, 173 SDLP and 46, 54, 60, 261, 288 Austrian minority in 9 support around border with Republic Autonomy Statute 174 198 Southern Ireland 160 unionists’ intention to exclude 269 sovereignty 58, 200, 229, 235, 294, 319 UUP and 119, 287, 297, 302 constitutional claim to 9 see also Adams; Doherty; Provisional contested 19 Sinn Féin erosion of absolutist conceptions of 45 Slovakia 9, 166, 238, 311 European integration is diluting 20 Slovenia 168, 238 infringements of 236 Smith, Ian 230 internationally recognized 228 Smyth, Martin 12, 81 Irish claims over Ulster 319 social change 38, 40 joint 65, 67, 68 how liberalism and Marxism understand legitimate and essential 160 39 need for a new approach to issues of 242 progressive 137 parliamentary 66, 68, 69 strongly influenced by demographic preconceived commitments to 203 situation 42 right of states to 8 social transformation 37–52, 115–16, 125 somewhat loose and undetermined 204 socialism/socialists 190, 194, 197, 200, 203 transformation 58–9 democratic 155 violation of 320 instrument to combat 185 zero-sum contest over 192 largely squeezed out 184 Soviet Union 165, 281 socio-economic issues 124, 155 collapse/break-up 165, 311 Index 355

Spain 161, 167, 168, 172, 240 suspensory powers 81 Constitution (1978) 203 Sweden 9, 164, 310 democratic transition 193 Sweeney, Paul 45 ethnic sentiments among national Switzerland 15, 19, 167, 168 minorities 109 Syria 257, 257, 315 no precedent for secession 200 unions 186 Ta’if Accord (1989) 254, 267, 270 violent intra-state conflicts 2 Taipei 161 see also Basque Country; Catalonia Tamils 248–9, 311 Special Powers Act (1922) 323 Taylor, John 9, 11, 239 Springfield Inter-Community Taylor, Rupert 18, 115, 118, 121, 125 Development Project 149 territorial claim 170–2 Springvale 45 territorial integrity 8, 166, 228, 229, 235, Sri Lanka 2, 103, 229, 248–9, 311 249, 323 standard legislative majority rules 57 defence of 11, 236 standing orders 173 nationalist insistence on 230 state-building failures 19, 21 uncertainty over 9 statehood 241, 242 terrorism/terrorists 161, 165, 194–5, 261 stereotypes 150, 322 appeasement of 270 negative 148 campaigns 279–80 Orange and Green 43, 115 encouraging 201 Stormont regime 7, 12, 91, 99, 102, 143 front against 201 abolition/fall of 116, 138, 167, 193 indiscriminate 6 absence of an administration 140 loyalist 162, 196 civic principles 116 measures to curb 325 major weakness of 174 never accept moral responsibility 194 majoritarian parliaments 98 parties vying with each other to prove more tractable to British pressures for themselves hard on 200 reforms 324 political 196, 279 nationalist opposition to 139 released early from gaol 59 Northern Ireland affairs isolated almost renunciation of 315, 327 completely from British politics 200 republican, increasing savagery of 162 no attempt to recognize aspirations of Thatcher, Margaret 10, 115, 163, 195 the Catholic community 186 Thatcherism 154 power-sharing executive 163 Thirty-two County Sovereignty Movement previously discharged by government 121 139 Ticino 168 proroguing of 113, 162 Tierra del Fuego 229 Stranmillis 265 Timor 229, 246 structuralist attitudes 150–1, 153 Todd, Jennifer 19 Stuart dynasty 182 Tone, Wolfe 111 STV (single transferable vote) 69, 70–4, Toronto 218 89, 95, 99, 100 tourism 61, 62, 165, 169 Sudan 311 trade unions 110, 115, 154, 196 Sudetenland 9 Basque 185–6 Suharto, T. N. J. 247, 248 more successful than political socialism Sullivan principles 12 184 Sunningdale Agreement (1973) 15, 59, 60, weakened influence of 234 65, 78, 96, 112, 169, 171 transfer of power 176 Surinam 105 trans-frontier cooperation 167 surrender 253, 259, 294 transport 61, 168, 169, 170 suspension 66, 68, 78 Trento 164, 165, 168, 169 356 Index

Trimble, David 1, 12, 69, 76–81 passim, partition resolution (1947) 313 265–7 passim, 299, 301 Resolution (242) 315 Adams and 296 Security Council 230, 236, 320 Blair and 285–6 self-determination principles 235 Clinton and 20 unemployment 143, 165 cross-border cooperation 175 UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus) 236, 237 decision to negotiate facilitated by novel unification 60, 326, 329, 330 flexibility of republicans 120 attractions of 61 inauspicious beginning of Assembly 38 European 328 leadership threatened by rejectionists immediate 191 125 majority consent fro 319 Mandela and 276 no longer linked to ‘unitarism’ 64 reservations about wholly inclusive peaceful 160–1 regime 102 unilingualism 211 threat to resign 66 unionism/unionists, see Conservative and see also Bew; King Unionist Party; DUP; Official ‘Troubles’ (late 1960s) 167, 319 Unionist Party; Orange Order; Truman, Harry S 240 Protestants; PUP; UKUP; UUP Turkey 166, 232, 234, 237–8 United Irishmen 182, 184 invasion of Cyprus 236–7 United Kingdom 12, 53, 166, 167, 181, 234 relations between Greece and 239 administration of Cyprus 233 Turkish Cypriots 11, 166, 232, 234, 235, boundaries guaranteed by 165 237, 238, 239 break-up of 200 Twin Track Process 259 Catholics in favour of remaining within ‘two community’ model 153, 154 191 Conservative Party 111, 114, 119, 154, UCAN (Ulster Community Action 327 Network) 138 145, 149 ‘constitution’ 67 UDA (Ulster Defence Association) 72, devolved governments 62, 63 138, 138, 145, 262 doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty UDP (Ulster Democratic Party) 69, 284 54 emergence of 141 endorsement for a British-Irish Council front for terrorist organisations 261 250 paramilitary organization 268 ethnic sentiments among national political marginalization of 268 minorities 109 submission on ‘Illegally Held Arms’ failure to integrate the Gaelic Irish into 259 211 UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment) 202, 283 imbalances in other parts of 282 UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters) 266, 268 influence of Irish-Northern Irish UKUP (United Kingdom Unionist Party) political and economic leaders in 260 public life of 190–1 see also McCartney integrated 10, 17, 113 Ulster People’s College 145 Labour Party/government 10, 66, 69 Ulster province 112 114, 119, 194, 327 Ulster Scots 55 multicultural and multinational, Ulster Workers’ Council 169 unionist support for 11 ‘Ulsterization’ 202 Northern Ireland as part of 161, 230 UN (United Nations) 166, 239, 248 Northern Ireland’s ties with other parts apartheid condemned by 282 of 231 Declaration of Principles of Protestants who regard themselves as International Law (1970) 229 British and want to remain part of General Assembly 241, 247 280 Index 357

provision for Northern Ireland to seats 69–70 remain part of 112 Sinn Féin and 119, 287, 297, 302 public in Britain do not consider volte-face by 118 Northern Irelaned an integral part see also Donaldson; McMichael; of 7 Maginnis; Molyneaux; Taylor (John); redefining Northern Ireland’s relation- Trimble ship to 243 UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) 72, 138, right of people of Ireland to create a 262, 269, 300 united Ireland 58 right of people of Northern Ireland to Vassilou, Georgios 238 decide whether they will remain in Vatican 10 204 Venetian Republic 233 Secretary of State 56 Viczaya 198 territorial integrity 9 Vietnam 6 treaties concerning Cyprus 235 vigilante groups 138, 142 see also England; Scotland; Wales Vizcaya 183, 185, 189 United States 20, 94, 166, 205, 215, 326 voluntary sector 43, 44, 45, 46, 115 boundaries guaranteed by 165 Vorarlberg 168 civic nationalism 109 voting patterns 189–90 General Assembly 229 impact on Northern Ireland 19 Wales 6 increasingly interventionist administra- devolution 10, 13, 124, 230, 231 tion 118 insistence that Northern Ireland be interest in the Irish question 320 treated the same as 120 investment in Northern Ireland 12 National Assembly 63, 69, 119 pressure for reform of Northern Ireland no IRA attacks in 195 4 Washington Three Principles 259 talks with PLO leader 315 Way Forward (1999) 263, 265, 266, 271 see also KKK; Puerto Rico weighted majority rule 57, 77 universal suffrage 280 Weitzer, Ronald 21 University of Ulster 43 welfare state 186, 279 universities 175 West Bank 6, 309, 312, 314, 315, 316 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 172 Westphalian state 16, 120 UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) 38, 67, 73–4, Whyte, John 18, 42 95, 101–5 passim, 163, 173, 261, 284, Wilford, R. 17 288 William of Orange, king of Great Britain agreed to Sinn Féin taking seats in and Ireland 210, 212 Assembly 296 Wilson, Robin 45 bid for leadership 12 ‘win-win’ situation 295, 321 breakdown of relations between withdrawal 120, 200, 246, 249, 291, 320 secretary of state for Northern Ireland Wolfe, General James 210, 212 and 265 Women Together for Peace 138, 145, 150 committed to principles of inclusivity, Women’s Coalition 44, 69, 74, 96, 104, equality and mutual respect 267 115, 125, 153, 327 decommissioning 258, 265 see also McWilliams freed from daily attacks at the negotiat- working class 184, 189, 198, 279, 324 ing table 298 immigrant 190, 204 moderates 13 Protestant 279, 324 no attempt to reach out to Catholics workplaces 110 113 Wright, Frank 19 pressure to accept ‘fudge on arms’ 264 SDLP and 42–3, 54, 119, 288 ‘yes’ campaign 154 358 Index

Young Ireland 111 Zimbabwe 21 youth groups 196 Zionists 6, 312 Yugoslav Federation 168, 311 Zurich 234 Yugoslavia (former) 9–10, 11, 117, 256, 302 ethnic cleansing 109