SECTION 14.1 MILITARY EQUIPMENT (POST‑CONFLICT) Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 3 Background ...................................................................................................................... 3 The procurement process .......................................................................................... 3 Addressing equipment capability gaps ...................................................................... 5 The need for an expeditionary capability ................................................................... 9 Preparing for the post‑conflict phase ....................................................................... 11 Improvement in the MOD’s procurement process during Op TELIC ....................... 16 Protected mobility and the developing threat to UK troops ............................................ 21 Initial deployment of Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) in Iraq ................................ 21 Deploying PPVs to Iraq ..................................................................................... 25 The appearance of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) and the UK’s response .................................................................................................................. 32 Project DUCKBOARD evolves .......................................................................... 36 The impact of the 2004 Spending Review on FRES ......................................... 43 A “Type B” vehicle ............................................................................................. 45 The threat in mid‑2004 ...................................................................................... 48 A PPV for Afghanistan ....................................................................................... 52 Response to the increase in the threat .................................................................... 61 The impact on wider civilian operations ............................................................ 72 Decisions on the wider protected mobility capability for the Army ........................... 76 Project Vector .................................................................................................... 85 The decision to procure additional vehicles for Iraq .......................................... 88 The introduction of Mastiff ................................................................................. 99 Changes to the arrangements for identifying and funding UORs ................... 114 Protected mobility between late 2006 and mid‑2009 ............................................. 117 Introduction of a new process to determine the acceptable level of risk in operations ........................................................................................................ 126 The requirement for an “urban” PPV ............................................................... 129 FRES as a distinct requirement ....................................................................... 137 Call for a public inquiry into the use of Snatch ................................................ 142 Snatch after Iraq .............................................................................................. 144 1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry The impact of Afghanistan on the equipment available in Iraq .................................... 144 Existing capability gaps before 2006 ..................................................................... 145 ISTAR .............................................................................................................. 145 Support helicopters ......................................................................................... 158 The availability of ISTAR and support helicopters from 2006 onwards ................. 168 The DOC’s third report, 4 April 2006 ............................................................... 170 Re‑aligning assets and understanding the shortfalls ...................................... 175 Mr Browne’s concern ....................................................................................... 182 The increasing threat of indirect fire attacks .................................................... 189 Considering whether to deploy Reaper to Iraq ................................................ 207 The drawdown of UK forces ............................................................................ 208 The remaining levels of helicopter and ISTAR support in MND(SE) ............... 213 2 14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict) Introduction 1. This Section addresses: • three examples of a significant capability gap during operations in Iraq: protected mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and support helicopters; and • the impact that deploying a medium scale force to Afghanistan in 2006 had on the provision of military equipment to Iraq. 2. This Section does not address: • the process by which equipment was funded, which is addressed in Section 13.1; • MOD operational policy or the specific circumstances in which individuals lost their lives in Iraq; and • the MOD’s procedure for supporting those killed or injured in Iraq, which is addressed in Section 16.3. 3. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has agreed to declassify a large amount of material for this Section but there were places where that was not possible for national security reasons. In those few cases, the Inquiry has agreed with the MOD either to redact the material or replace it with a cipher. Where ciphers appear, they will be explained in a footnote. Background The procurement process 4. The MOD’s financial planning framework for its core budget comprised two distinct elements: • The Short Term Plan (STP); and • The Defence Programme.1 5. The STP forecast spending on operational costs. Those were predominantly the responsibilities of the Front Line Commands (FLCs). The STP looked forward four years. Significant investment programmes, where a four‑year planning horizon was too short, would be considered in the Defence Programme. 6. The Defence Programme provided a 10 year budget to balance capital spend priorities across equipment procurement, equipment support and non‑equipment investments. 1 Report Gray, October 2009, ‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’. 3 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 7. The Defence Progamme comprised three strands: • the procurement of new capability through the Equipment Procurement Plan (EPP) which looked forward 30 years; • provision of equipment support through the Equipment Support Plan (ESP) which was planned over 10 years; and • the Non‑Equipment Investment Plan which planned for investment in non‑military equipment, such as IT. 8. Collectively the EPP and the ESP were known as the Equipment Plan (EP). 9. Procuring equipment was achieved through the MOD’s Smart Acquisition process, which was established in 1998 and sought to enable a high level of confidence that equipment projects would be delivered on time and within budget.2 That process is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1: The stages of equipment acquisition Initial Gate Main Gate approval approval Concept Assessment Demonstration Manufacture In-service Disposal User A solution is Contracts are Equipment is Equipment is Equipment identifies developed to placed produced to in use and reaches the and meet the meet the User’s maintained end of its life defines a User’s need need and is need disposed of 10. Any projects exceeding £100m required explicit approval from the Investment Approvals Board (IAB) at two stages: • Initial Gate – the approval for project initiation where the parameters for the Assessment Phase are set; and • Main Gate – where the targets are set for the performance, time and cost of the Demonstration and Manufacture stages.3 2 Ministry of Defence, Acquisition Handbook Edition 4, January 2002. 3 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 2001, 23 November 2001, HC 330; Report Gray, October 2009, ‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’. 4 14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict) Addressing equipment capability gaps Three key requirements When a capability gap in equipment is identified, there are three requirements that must be fulfilled to initiate the procurement process: Statement of Requirement (SOR): A statement articulating a capability shortfall; it states what is required. Urgent Statement of User Requirement (USUR): If the SOR cannot be met by an adjustment of existing assets, a USUR is raised which indicates that there is a capability gap that currently cannot be met. If the USUR is endorsed, it will be designated as either an Urgent Operational Requirement, or an Urgent Sustainability Requirement. It cannot be both. Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR): A UOR seeks to address a capability gap by rapidly procuring new or additional equipment or the enhancement of, or essential modification to, existing equipment. That may involve bringing forward the planned procurement of equipment from the future Equipment Programme. Urgent Sustainability Requirement (USR): A USR seeks to address a sustainability gap by rapidly acquiring additional in‑service support. 11. During Operation TELIC in Iraq, Urgent Statements of User Requirements (USURs) for new equipment were forwarded to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) who retained ownership of the USUR until it was signed