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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 6 July 2016 for The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Volume VII Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016 HC 265-VII 46561_24b Viking_Volume VII Title Page.indd 1 17/06/2016 13:02 © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Where we have identifi ed any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474110136 Web ISBN 9781474110143 ID 23051601 46561 07/16 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fi bre content minimum Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce 46561_24b Viking_Volume VII Title Page.indd 2 17/06/2016 13:02 Volume VII CONTENTS 8 The invasion 1 9.1 March to 22 May 2003 131 9.2 23 May 2003 to June 2004 207 9.3 July 2004 to May 2005 397 9.4 June 2005 to May 2006 489 46561_24b Viking_Volume VII Title Page.indd 3 17/06/2016 13:02 46561_24b Viking_Volume VII Title Page.indd 4 17/06/2016 13:02 SECTION 8 THE INVASION Contents Introduction and key findings ........................................................................................... 3 The military Coalition ....................................................................................................... 4 The UK contribution ................................................................................................... 5 Command and control ............................................................................................... 7 The US campaign plan .............................................................................................. 9 The UK’s planned role in offensive operations ........................................................ 12 The invasion ................................................................................................................... 15 The decision to take military action .......................................................................... 15 The Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive ............................................................... 16 Offensive operations begin ...................................................................................... 18 The launch of the main offensive ............................................................................. 19 The air campaign ..................................................................................................... 27 The maritime campaign ........................................................................................... 28 23 and 24 March: UK forces reach Basra ................................................................ 29 25 to 27 March: an operational pause ..................................................................... 33 28 March: one week in ............................................................................................. 44 29 to 31 March: events ............................................................................................ 48 1 to 3 April ................................................................................................................ 57 4 April ....................................................................................................................... 63 US forces enter Baghdad ........................................................................................ 64 The fall of Basra ....................................................................................................... 68 The collapse of the Iraqi regime .............................................................................. 77 The immediate aftermath ......................................................................................... 81 The end of combat operations ................................................................................. 84 UK influence on the planning and conduct of the military campaign ....................... 85 1 46561_24c Viking_Section 8.indd 1 17/06/2016 13:02 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry The transition to post-conflict operations ....................................................................... 90 Phase IV military planning papers ........................................................................... 90 The relationship between the UK military and ORHA ............................................ 102 Extension of the UK AO ......................................................................................... 106 The military Statement of Requirement for a UK AOR ...........................................111 Alignment of the UK AOR with ORHA’s southern region ....................................... 115 Lessons ........................................................................................................................ 128 2 46561_24c Viking_Section 8.indd 2 17/06/2016 13:02 8 | The invasion Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses the framework for and conduct of UK combat operations, specifically: • the role of the UK in the combat phase of the military campaign; • transition to post-conflict operations in Iraq; and • the establishment of the UK’s post-conflict Area of Responsibility (AOR) in the South. 2. The Inquiry has not addressed the detailed operational and tactical conduct of the military campaign. 3. A number of issues which are relevant to this Section are addressed in other Sections of the Report, including: • The UK’s military planning for the invasion is addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, including decisions about the forces to be committed, assessments of Iraq’s conventional capabilities, the regime’s intentions, the possible responses of the regime and the Iraqi people to a military invasion, and the legal framework for the conduct of operations. • The UK’s assessment of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and its ability to deploy them, including its ballistic missile capabilities, are addressed in Section 4.1. • Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the legal basis for military action is addressed in Section 5. • The arrangements made to provide equipment to forces deploying for operations in Iraq, are addressed in Section 6.3. • Planning for post-conflict operations, including the military presence and role, which was described as Phase IV of the campaign plan, is addressed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. • The UK Government’s decision to take military action is described in Section 3.8. • The MOD’s handling of military personnel issues, including casualties, is considered in Sections 16.1 to 16.4. • The search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq is addressed in Section 4.4. • The evolution of the US/UK non-military relationship, political developments in Iraq and the adoption of resolution 1483 (2003) are addressed in Section 9.1. 3 46561_24c Viking_Section 8.indd 3 17/06/2016 13:02 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Key findings • It took less than a month to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad. • The decision to advance into Basra was made by military commanders on the ground. • The UK was unprepared for the media response to the initial difficulties. It had also underestimated the need for sustained communication of key strategic messages to inform public opinion about the objectives and progress of the military campaign, including in Iraq. • For any future military operations, arrangements to agree and disseminate key strategic messages need to be put in place, in both London and on the ground, before operations begin. • The UK acceded to the post-invasion US request that it assume leadership of a military Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, a position it then held for six years, without a formal Ministerial decision and without carrying out a robust analysis of the strategic implications for the UK or the military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region. The military Coalition 4. The combat phase of military operations is widely judged to have been a success. The Iraqi armed forces were defeated so rapidly by the Coalition that US forces were in Baghdad and Saddam Hussein’s regime had fallen by 14 April 2003. On 1 May, just six weeks after launching the invasion, President Bush declared that major combat operations had ended. 5. Those who deployed on the operation and those who planned and supported it, military and civilian, deserve recognition for what they achieved. 6. Coalition Forces were led by General Tommy Franks, the Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM). The Coalition campaign was designated Operation Iraqi Freedom. 7. Gen Franks recorded in his memoir that, by the third week of March 2003, “total strength in all components – including our Gulf State Coalition allies in Kuwait” numbered 292,000 individuals, including ground forces of around 170,000.1 8. At a press briefing on 18 March 2003, Mr Richard Boucher, the US State Department Spokesman, gave a “definitive list” of 30 countries2 that had agreed to be
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