The Possibilities of the Journalism as Peacebuilding in the

Periphery:

The Colombian Case

Dissertation

Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doktor der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer.nat)

An der

Universität Konstanz

Mathematisch – Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion

Fachbereich Psychologie

Vorgelegt von

Jairo Enrique Ordóñez Garzón

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 23. Juli 2009

1. Referent: Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Kempf, Universität Konstanz

2. Referent: Prof. Dr. Sean McCrea, Universität Konstanz

3. Referent: Prof. Dr. Georg Lind, Universität Konstanz

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes.

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I would like to acknowledge the people who contributed to my dissertation.

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Prof. Wilhelm Kempf for supervising my dissertation and prov iding an outstanding model of how to perform excellent research. Thank you for the great opportunity to work in your research team and for your invaluable advice and help during all stages of my dissertation. It was a stunning experience.

The realization of this research would have been impossible with out the scholarship and help of Colfuturo and the DAAD (Deut scher Akedemischer Austausch Dienst), thanks for believing on my ideas and giving me the resources to fulfil my dream.

I am also very grateful to profe ssors Sean McCrea and Georg Lind for his involvement as part of my dissertation com mittee. In the same way, I appreciate the continous advice, feedback and constructive cr itic of the Peace Research Group at Universität Konstanz.

Finally I want to thank to my family and friends for their support and understanding.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT...... 9

ZUSSAMMENFASSUNG...... 12

INTRODUCTION ...... 15

CHAPTER 1 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT ...... 21

1.1 Generalities about the Colombian Conflict...... 31

1.2 The Intervention of U.S.A...... 35

1.3 The Conflict Today ...... 43

1.4 Conclusions ...... 61

CHAPTER 2

THE JOURNALISM AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR PEACEBUILDING ...... 63

2.1 Genres of Journalism...... 65 2.1.1 News ...... 65 2.1.2 The Feature ...... 66 2.1.3 The Reportage ...... 67 2.1.4 The Comments...... 68 2.1.4.1 Comment ...... 68 2.1.4.2 The editorial ...... 68 2.1.4.3 Opinion Articles...... 69 2.1.4.4 Gloss...... 70 2.1.4.5 Cartoons ...... 70

2.2 Theories of Journalism...... 71 2.2.1 Normative Individualism...... 72 2.2.2 Materialistic Media Theory ...... 77 2.2.2.1 Marxist theories of Media Studies ...... 79 2.2.3 Analytic Empiricism ...... 80 2.2.3.1 Analytic Philosophy...... 81 2.2.3.2 Language Games and the Popular Scientific Journalism...... 84 2.2.3.3 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature...... 85 2.2.4 Legitimate Empiricism ...... 87 2.2.4.1 Further Explorations ...... 89 2.2.5 Critical Action Theory ...... 90 2.2.5.1 Social Inquiry as Practical Knowledge...... 94 2.2.6 Systemic Functional Theory ...... 96 2.2.7 Integrated Social Theories ...... 99 2.2.8 Cultural Studies...... 100 2.2.9 Journalism as Occupation ...... 104

2.3 Journalism of Attachment and Peace Journalism...... 107 2.3.1 Journalism of Attachment ...... 107 2.3.2 Peace Journalism...... 111 2.3.3 Interactions between the two approaches...... 114 - 5 - 2.4 Conclusions ...... 115

CHAPTER 3 THE COLOMBIAN MEDIA ...... 118

3.1 Introduction...... 118

3.2 The State’s Rural Counterinsurgency Propaganda ...... 120 3.2.1 Hearts and Minds...... 120

3.3 Self-censorship...... 124

3.4 International Press in Colombia ...... 127

3.5 Colombian Journalists in international Press...... 130

3.6 Evolution of the Colombian Newspapers ...... 135

3.7 Colombian Outlets...... 135 3.7.1 Invernac...... 136 3.7.1.1 Valórem S.A...... 137 3.7.1.1.1 Canal Caracol ...... 138 3.7.1.1.2. Internationalization of Caracol Channel...... 140 3.7.1.2 Comunican S.A...... 141 3.7.1.2.1 Cromos...... 142 3.7.1.2.2 El Espectador...... 147 3.7.1.2.2.1 Fighting for the Press Freedom ...... 151 3.7.1.2.2.2 Drug Trafficking...... 152 3.7.1.2.2.3 The pressure of the Paramilitaries and the Government...... 154

3.8 Planeta Group ...... 156 3.8.1 Casa Editorial El Tiempo ...... 157 3.8.1.1 El Tiempo...... 159

3.9 Conclusions ...... 161

CHAPTER 4 THE COLOMBIAN ATTACHMENT ...... 163

4.1 Cromos ...... 163

4.2 El Tiempo ...... 173 4.3 El Espectador...... 184

4.4 The Authors ...... 195 4.4.1 María Jimena Duzán ...... 195 4.4.2 Iván Cepeda Castro...... 196 4.4.3 Alfredo Molano ...... 197 4.4.4 Alberto Aguirre...... 199 4.4.5 William Ospina...... 199

4.5 Conclusions ...... 200

CHAPTER V THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ...... 202

5.1 Media from U.S.A...... 203 5.1.1 The New York Times Company...... 203 5.1.1.1 History...... 206 5.1.2 The International Herald Tribune ...... 211 5.1.2.1 History...... 213 5.1.3 The Boston Globe...... 215

- 6 - 5.1.3.1 History...... 216 5.1.4 The Washington Post Company ...... 217 5.1.4.1 The Washington Post ...... 219 5.1.4.2 History...... 221

5.2 The Economist Group...... 224 5.2.1 The Economist...... 227 5.2.2 History ...... 233 5.2.3 Censorship...... 236

5.3 BBC Broadcasting...... 237 5.3.1 History ...... 244 5.3.2 Competition...... 246 5.3.3 Controversies ...... 247 5.3.4 BBC NEWS ...... 250

5.4 Conclusions ...... 253

CHAPTER VI

IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL AND INTE RNATIONAL INDE PENDENT OPINION ARTICLES ON THE READERS...... 254

6.1 Experiment ...... 255 6.1.1 Methodology ...... 256

6.2 Results...... 258 6.2.1 Variables...... 261 6.2.1.1 Politics...... 263 6.2.1.2 Civilian Victims...... 265 6.2.1.3 Armed Actors ...... 267 6.2.1.4 Peace...... 268 6.2.1.5 Conclusions about variables...... 269

6.3 Analysis by level of understanding in the answers...... 270 6.3.1 Higher level of understanding with Colombian articles...... 271 6.3.2 Higher level of understanding with international articles...... 277 6.3.3 Same level of understanding between the groups ...... 282 6.3.3.1 Group number one has the same level of understanding as group three ...... 282 6.3.3.2 Group number two has the same level of understanding as group three ...... 286 6.3.3.3 Groups number one and two have the same level of understanding...... 288 6.3.3.4 The level of understanding is the same in all the groups ...... 289

6.4 Coherence ...... 290

6.5 Dispersion ...... 292

6.6 Undecided ...... 293

6.7 Conclusions about the impact of the articles on the readers ...... 296

CHAPTER VII QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLES ...... 299

7.1 Methodology ...... 300 7.1.1 Selection of articles...... 300 7.1.2 Definition of the variables ...... 301 7.1.3 Measurement ...... 301

7.2 Analysis of the Variables and the Categories ...... 305 - 7 - 7.2.1 Politics...... 306 7.2.2 Killing...... 309 7.2.3 Civilian Victims...... 311 7.2.4 Armed Actors...... 314 7.2.5 Peace ...... 317 7.2.6 Conclusions about Catgories and Variables...... 318 7.2.6.1 Conclusions about Politics...... 318 7.2.6.2 Conclusions about Killing...... 319 7.2.6.3 Conclusions about Civilian Victims...... 320 7.2.6.4 Conclusions about Armed Actors ...... 321 7.2.6.5 Conclusions about Peace...... 322

7.3 Correlations ...... 322 7.3.1 Correlations in the Colombian Articles...... 323 7.3.2 Correlations in the International Articles...... 328

7.4 Conclusions about the Quantitative Analysis of all the Articles...... 330

7.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Articles used in the Experiment...... 333 7.5.1 Methodology ...... 333 7.5.2 Analysis of the Comparisons...... 335 7.5.3 Co-ocurrence ...... 342 7.5.3.1 Co-ocurrence Colombian Articles...... 342 7.5.3.2 Co-Ocurrence International Articles ...... 344 7.5.4 Conclusions about the quantitative analysis of the articles used in the experiment...... 345

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS...... 347

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 353

ANNEXES ...... 378

- 8 - TuáàÜtvà

This dissertation analyzes the way the Colombian conflict is repres ented in Colombian and international qualitative indepen dent opinion articles and their influence on readers’ understanding of the conflict.

The Colombian gover nment has carried on an extens ive propaganda campaign to promote disinformation in order to disgui se the aims of weakening the political opposition and politically and economically ‘legalizing’ a wide range of Mafia activities in Colomb ia. This sh ows the influence t hat the pa ramilitary mafia e xercises in important areas of Colombian political and economic life. It is inherent in the high level of corruption caused by the ‘Narcot raffic’. However, the US War on Drugs demands at least some results, which until now have been minimal with respect to the Narcotraffic, although very successful against the guerrillas, who are to some extent competitors of the par amilitaries in the drug traffi c. Due to the War on Drugs, some drug lords hav e received jail sentences, although under very mild and lax conditions. This seems to be more a lega lization than a punis hment, at leas t in the case of the paramilitaries. After a short pr ison term, the drug dealer is “clean” again and is free to resume his illegal business. All th is explains the disinf ormation promoted by the official propaganda and the lack of k nowledge about the war on the part of the average Colombian.

Given this situation, it is essential for t he public to be able to rely on independent media that can expose the lies of offici al propaganda and inform the public about the risks of accepting the illegal as the law, the so-called Pax Mafiosa.1 The media must also show the importance of opting for dem ocratic ways to solve the conflict (in the current climate of polarization, the opposition and independent candidates are designated as “enemies” and “guerrille ros” by the official propaganda). Understanding what is happening in Colombia can help people take a stand against violence and criminality as solutions. The cu rrent military strategy and the infiltration of the paramilitary mafia into the government represent both violence and criminality.

1 When an illegal party won the war and imposed its order. - 9 - In Colombia there are independe nt journalists, but according to this research, they are victims of polarization and for this reas on are promoting the war, although this is not their intention. Nev ertheless, with the help of the intern ational qualitative media it would be possible to reorient Colombian j ournalism towards a journalism pro peace. For the present research, I chose thr ee Colombian media for which independent journalists write: El Tie mpo, El Espectador and Cromos, and from the internationa l media I chose: BBC News (online version), The New York Tim es Group , The Washington Post and The E conomist. In all cases, I selected what I regard as opinion articles, because unlike news arti cles, opinion articles offer analyses and are very free to be critical.

In all, 66 subjects participated in an ex perimental study designed to measure the impact of the articles on readers. Of th em, 94% were German citizens, and on average they were 24 years old. All th e subjects had little knowledge of the Colombian conflict. Three groups were set up. The first had to read 22 Colombian opinion articles, the second 22 internati onal articles , and the third both sets of articles. After reading the articles, al l the subjects completed the same questionnaires.

According to the results of the experim ent, obtained with quantit ative and qualitative analysis, the Colombian articles belong to the ‘journalism of attachment’, and the international articles to ‘journalism pro peace’. We found that when subj ects read both kinds of article, the international articles with their analytical style have a greater influence than the Colombian articles, wh ich emphas ize emotional attachment with victims. Similarly, the inter national articles allow a hig her level of understanding and coherence.

However, the international articles alone do not fully explain the conflict, because they lack the rich details that the Colombian articles offer. For this reason, a first step toward countering the official propaganda would be to combine the two types of journalism to provide Colomb ians readers with pro-peace, detailed and enlightening information. With more qualitativ e informati on, Colombian reade rs will be able t o understand, in a pro-peace style, the conflict and its causes, and to avoid polarization and one-sided attributions of guilt. Additionally, they will be better prepared to look for

- 10 - democratic solutions, such as electing ma yors, legislators and a president who are more interested in a peacefu l r esolution o f the conflict than in the current military approach.

The effort to counter propaganda is only one step on the long and very complex pat h to peace, but because no one wants Colombia to completely fail as a state, informing and enlightening Colombian c itizens about the conflict must be a priority. The research suggests that the Colombian jour nalism of attachment should be r eoriented in a more productiv e way. The results of this exp eriment are encouraging, and perhaps if they were transformed into praxis , they would provide an opportunity for a country that desperately needs peace.

- 11 - mâáátÅÅxÇytááâÇz

Das Ziel der vorliegenden Diss ertation wa r eine Analyse der Darstellungen des Kolumbienkonfliktes in unabhängigen kolumbianischen und internationalen Leitartikeln angesehener Medien, sowie des Einflusses der Darstellungen auf das Konfliktverständnis der Leser.

Die kolum bianische Regierung bedient sich umfangreicher Propaganda um die Desinformation der Bevölkerung zu fördern und das folgende Projekt zu verschleiern: die Schwächung der politischen Oppositi on und die politische und wirtschaftliche Legalisierung mafiöser Aktivitäten. Diese r Zweck ihrer Propaganda verdeutlicht die Macht der Mafia (insb esondere durch Drog enhandel) in Ko lumbien. Sie ko ntrolliert wichtige Teile des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Lebens.

Allerdings ist die USA in Kolumbien präsent und in ihrem Kampf gegen Drogen darauf angewiesen mit der Regierung zusa mmenzuarbeiten. Zwei wichtige Gruppen des Droge nhandels in Kolumbien sind Guerill a und Paramilitä rs. Die Pa ramilitärs führen ihre Geschäfte versteckt und unter dem Deckmantel der Regierung aus. Die Konsequenz daraus ist, dass d er Drogen handel b islang n ur de r Guerilla erschwert wurde und bis heute keine wirkliche Reduzierung des Drogenhandels erreicht wurde.

Als Folge des Kampfes gegen Drogen wu rden einige Drogenbar one inhaftiert, aber die Haftbedingungen hängen da von ab, ob di ese Beziehungen zur Guerilla oder zu den Paramilitärs besitzen. Die Haftbedingungen der Drogenbarone, scheinen im Fall der Paramilitärs mehr eine Lega lisierung als eine Strafe zu sein. Nach einer kurzen Verurteilung sind die Drogenbar one wieder anständige und freie Staatsbürger und können mit ihren illegalen Geschäften weitermachen.

All dies wird durch die gezielte Desinf ormation der offiziellen Tegierungspropaganda bewirkt, die vom kolumbianischen Durchschnittsbürger nicht durchschaut wird.

Es ist darum unerläss lich, sich auf unabhängi ge Medien zu stützen, um erstens die Lügen der offiziellen Propaganda aufzudecken, um zweitens die öffentliche Meinung darauf aufmerksam zu machen, wie illegale Ansichten als geltendes Recht verkauft

- 12 - werden (die sog. Pax Mafios a2); und um drittens demokratische Wege der Konfliktlösung einzus chlagen (in dem aktuellen polarisierten Klima werden Opposition und unabhängige Politiker als „Feinde“ und „Guerrilleros“ bezeichnet).

Wenn ver standen wird, was in Kolumbien passiert, kann Gewalt als derzeitige militärische Strategie abgelehnt und die Infiltration der par amilitärischen Mafia in d ie Regierung aufgedeckt werden.

In Kolumbien gibt es unabhängige Journalis ten, aber nach den Prämissen dieser Forschungsarbeit müssen sie als Opfer der Polarisierung bezeichnet werden, weil sie ohne bewusste Absicht den Kr ieg unterstütz en. Dennoch ist es eine Hy pothese dieser Arbeit, dass es mit der H ilfe internationaler renommierter Medien möglich ist, diesen unabhängigen Journalismus in Kolumbien zu eine m Journalismus Pro- Frieden zu verändern.

Für die v orliegende Untersuchung habe ich drei kolumbianische Medien mit unabhängigen Journalisten aus gewählt: El Tiempo, El Espectador und Cromos. Aus der internationalen Pr esse ha be ich v ier Medien ausgewählt: BBC Ne ws (Online version), The New York Tim es Group, The Washington Post und The Economist. In allen Fällen wurden Artikel ausgewählt, die als Leitartikel bezeichnet werden können, weil sie Analysen machen und in freier Form geschrieben sind.

Der Versuchspersonenpool set zte sich aus 66 Personen zus ammen. 94% hatten deutsche Nationalität und waren durch schnittlich 24 Jahre alt. Alle Versuchspersonen hatten nur geringe Kenntnisse des Konflikts in Kolumbien. Je 22 Personen mussten entweder 22 kolumbianische oder 22 internationale oder beide (also insgesamt 44) Leitartikel lesen und nach der Lektüre der Artikel denselben Fragebogen beantworten.

Die Ergebnisse der qualitativ en und q uantitativen Analysen des vorliegenden Experiments zeigen, dass kolumbianische Artikel eher einem „Journalis mus of Attachment“ und int ernationale Artikel eher einem „Journalis mus Pro-Frieden“ zugeordnet werden können.

2Wenn Kriminelle das Land regieren und ihre Vorstellungen von Frieden der Bevölkerung auferlegen. - 13 - Während des Experiments wurden Daten zu r Messung des Konfliktverständniss es der Leser erhoben. Diese zeig en, dass der analytische Stil der internationalen Texte einen größ eren Einfluss auf das Verständnis des Konflikts hat, als der häufiger verwendete emotionale Stil der kolumbiani schen Autoren, die vor allem das Leiden der Opfer betonen.

Weil s ie weniger Det ails als die kolumbianischen Ar tikel verwenden, sind jedoch auch die internationalen Text e allein nicht ausreichend, um den Konflikt verständlich zu machen,. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis dies er Arbeit ist es deshalb, eine Kombination der beiden Arten des Journalis mus zu verwenden, um der offiziellen Propagand a entgegenzutreten. Dem kolum bianischen Leser k ann auf diese Weise ein Journalismus pro Frieden, detaillierte Information und Aufklärung angeboten werden.

Mit mehr qualitativen Info rmationen in einem „Pro Frieden“ Journalismus könnten Kolumbianische Leser Polarisierung und Vorverurteilung vermeiden, den Konflikt und seine Ursachen verstehen und s ich damit für demokratische Lösungen entscheiden. Ein Beispiel wäre die Wahl von Bü rgermeistern, Kongress abgeordneten und Präsidenten, die die friedliche Lösung des Konflikts dem derzeitigen militärischen Vorgehen vorziehen würden.

Der Aufwand gegen den Einfluss der Propaganda ist nur ein Schritt für den Frieden, aber notwendig für Kolumbien als vertrauenswürdiger Staat. Diese Untersuchung hat gezeigt, wie der kolumbianisc he Journalis mus of Attachment verändert werden muss, um seiner Funktion als Informati on und Aufklärung der Bürger über den Konflikt gerecht zu werden.

Die Ergebnisse des Experiment s waren er mutigend, für die Praxis wird hier eine Chance für ein Land aufgezeigt, dass dringend Frieden braucht.

- 14 - \ÇàÜÉwâvà|ÉÇ

The main goal of my dissertat ion is to analy ze the repr esentations of the Colombian conflict in Colombian and international opin ion articles and to study their impact on readers’ understanding of the c onflict. In the Twentieth C entury, three civil wars wrought havoc in Colombia, and yet wa r seems a distant phenomenon for the majority of Colombians. The lar gest and most important cities have bee n growing and have experienced construction booms in t he last few years, especially private developments including luxu ry apartments, houses and shopping malls offering prestige brands. Many of their residents shop at Calvin Klein, Versace or Hugo Bos s boutiques and enjoy coffee or cocktails in elegant and exclusive bars and restaurants. At the same time, however, t housands of people have die d in t he wars, millions are displaced (Colombia has one of the worst indices of displac ement in the world, surpassed only by Sudan) , and hundr eds of people languish in the hands of kidnappers. In fact, Colombia is one of the 10 least peaceful countries in the world, 3 close in the rankings to Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, among others. How can two such different countries coexist?

Bogotá City – The Capital of Colombia

Even more surprising is that av erage Co lombians do not kn ow much a bout the Colombian conflict. For them, Colombia has problems just like any other country, and the situation is nothing special or remarkab le. In the same way, they cannot explain why the g uerrillas ar e fighting or what t he relations are betwe en the par amilitaries and the government. Furthermore – although Colombia is one of the three most important recipients of Amer ican economic aid – they also cannot explain what exactly this US aid consists in.

3The Economist Intelligent Unit (2008): Global Peace Index. London: The Economist. - 15 - However, this lack of awarenes s and the apparent economic boom are part of the same conflict that has displa ced millions of people in the last 20 years. On the one side, the government is conduc ting a massive propa ganda campaign to promote disinformation and to keep people from learni ng about its paramilitary aims. It wants a country free of guerrillas with a weakened opposition so t hat the paramilitary mafia can more freely exer cise s ignificant polit ical and ec onomic in fluence to partially legalize its criminal ac tivity in a c ountry already highly corrupted by the Nar cotraffic. Corruption has distorted the actions of th e guerrillas and of a s ignificant s hare of Colombia’s politicians and businesspeople. However, the US War on Drugs demands some results, which until now have been mini mal with respect to the Narcotraffic, but very successful against the guerrillas, wh o are to some extent th e competitors of the paramilitaries in the drug tra ffic. Another conseque nce of the war on dru gs is the imprisonment of a few drug dealers, alt hough under very favorable and lenient conditions. For this reason, we can regard these jail terms as a form of legalization: After a short jail sentence, the dr ug dealer becomes “clean” ag ain and resumes his illegal bus iness activities. All this explains the dis information promoted by official propaganda and the average Colombian’s lack of knowledge about it.

On the other hand, the appa rent economic boom in Co lombia repres ents the infiltration of the illegal economy into the legal. Many enterprises and investments are simply fronts for money-laundering activities ; others are set up using illegal money, although their activities are actually legal and may even be profitable. Many investors belong to the drug cartels, an effective strategy for small cartels, in contrast to the big and highly visible car tels of the 80s (Pabl o Escobar’s cartel, for example) . These small cartels represent a new emergent social class in Colombia, whose investments create apparent prosperity in some sectors, while for the majority of Colombians the economic situation is very harsh. Many of the three million pe ople displaced by the conflict are refugees, and millions have bec ome economic migrants living in Europe and North America. Others suffer from unemploym ent, and many others cannot compete with the enterprises founded by t he drug traffickers. The government spends most of its budget on t he military. Key sectors like logistics and s cientific research receive little attention, which makes Co lombia’s ind ustries and economy uncompetitive und unattractive for foreign investments. However, the partial defeat of the guerrillas and the impos ition of the paramilitar y regime are producin g a Pax

- 16 - Mafiosa (when an illegal party won the war and imposed its order), which offers better general indic ators (fewer violent deaths, for example) and attracts some legal national and foreign investment.

It is essential to hav e independent media t hat can expose the lies of t he official propaganda, alert citizens to the risks of accepting the illegal system (the Pax Mafiosa) and enlighten them about the importance of dem ocratic means for solving the conflict. (In the current climate of polarization, the official propaganda denounce s the opposit ion and in dependent candidate s as “enemies” and “guerrillero s”). With better information, the media audienc e w ould be in a better position to choose politicians who are interested in peace and in peaceful conflict resolution. Understanding what is happenin g in Colombia would enable citiz ens to reject illega l practices a nd the use of force as a solu tion (the current military strategy and the infiltration of the paramilitary mafia into the government).

In Colombia, there are independ ent journalists, but according to my hypothesis, they are victims of the polar ization and, therefore, they promote war, al though this is not their intention. However, with the help of international qualitative media that fortunately cover the s ituation in Colombia, it is poss ible to redirect this independen t journalism toward journalism pro peace. Fo r the present research, I chose three Colombian media for which in dependent journalists write: El Tiempo, El Espectador and Cromos, and from the internat ional media I chos e: BBC News (online version), The New York Times group, The Washington Post and The Economist. From these media, I selected what I could regard as opinion articles (unlike news articles, opinion articles offer analyses and are critical). Us ing these sources, I tested the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:

H1. The w riters of opinion articles in the international media use their independence, resources and privileged positions to do journalism pro peace.

Sub-H. 1.1. The internati onal articles focus on the c auses of the conflict more than do the Colombian articles.

Sub-H. 1.2. The international articles do not identify actors as “bad” or “good.”

- 17 - Sub-H. 1.3. The international articl es focus more than do the Colombian articles on the largest and most complex civilian actors in the conflict.

Sub-H. 1.4. The international articles devot e less space to elit e victims (and make an implicit distinction between worthy and unworthy victims).

H2. In Colombia, the independent and critical media publish qualitative opinion articles, but they h ave chosen the jo urnalism of attachment as a w ay to contribute to peace.

Sub-H 2.1. The Colombian artic les do not focus on key and v ery complex actors like the USA.

Sub-H 2.2. The Colombian articles identify actors as “bad” or “good.”

Sub-H. 2.3. The Colombian articles focus more than do the international articles on small groups, easy to identify as civilian actors in the conflict.

Sub-H. 2. 4. The Colombian articles do not focus on com plex and key situations t o help readers under stand the conflict, even wh en t hey inv olve extreme violations of human rights.

H3. Read ers of journalism pro peace can better understand the conflict tha n can the readers of the journalism of attachment.

Sub-H 3.1. With journalism pro peace, readers can more clearly identify the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.2. With journalism pro peac e, readers can gain a more coherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.3. With jour nalism pro peace, readers ca n better understand the actors and their roles in the conflict.

- 18 - Sub-H. 3.4. With journalism pro peac e, readers can understand more about complex phenomena like “parapolitics.”

H4. Journalism pro peace represents an opportunity t o re-contextualize independent Colombian journalism and to produce better understanding.

Sub-H. 4.1. When readers read both versions, they can more clearly identif y the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.2. When readers read both versions, they can gain a more coherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.3. When readers read both versions, they can under stand more about the actors and their roles in the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.4. When readers read both versions, they can better understand complex phenomena like “parapolitics”.

In order to contextualize these hypotheses, and to present the results of the study, this dissertation is divided into seven chapters: The purpose of the first, The Colombian Conflict, is to explain th e war in Colombia. The second chapter, Journalism and Its Potential for Peace Buildi ng, defines a theoret ical framework for the research as a whole. The third chapt er, The Colomb ian Media, explains how official propaganda and media outlets function in Colombia. The fourth chapter, The Colombian Attachment, presents a qualitative analysis of t he Colombian articles and their emotional attachment to the vict ims of the war. The fifth chapter, The International Media, explai ns what makes these med ia independent and pro-peace. The sixth chapter, The Impact on Readers of National and International Independent Opinion Articles, is a quantitativ e analys is of the experiment done to measure the impact of the articles on r eaders’ understanding of the conflict when they read only the Colombian, only t he international, or bo th kinds of article. The seventh chapter, International and Colombian Journalism a nd its Relationship with Journalism Pro Peace, finally, present s a content analysis of the 311 articles selected for the period from 01 January 2005 until 31 De cember 2007, a time peri od during which important

- 19 - changes occurred in the conflict. At the end of the study, in the conclusions, I discuss whether and to what extent the hypothe ses received theoretical and empirical support.

- 20 - V{tÑàxÜ D g{x VÉÄÉÅu|tÇ VÉÇyÄ|và

Map 1 – Geographical Position of Colombia

According to the Global Peace Index 2008 (GPI) 4, Colombia has a score of 2757 (less points indicates a more peaceful society), what means that between 140 countries analyzed ar ound the world, Colombia is at place number 130 surpassing only Russ ia, Lebanon, North Korea, Cent ral Af rican Re public, Cha d, Israel, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Iraq. At the same time, this means that Colombia is in company of other well known case s: Iran (Sco re: 2341); Haiti (Sc ore: 2362); Congo (Sc ore: 2417); Ethiopia (score: 2439) ; Zimbabwe (score: 2513); Pakistan (Score: 2694); D.R. Congo (2 707) and Nigeria (Scor e: 2724), and others. In other words, Colombia is one of the least peaceful countries of the world (see Map number 2).

4The GPI i s collated a nd calculated by the Eco nomist Intelligen ce Unit, a division of the E conomist Magazine. - 21 - The GPI is compos ed of 24 qualitative and qu antitative indicators from highly respected sources, which combine internal and external factors, which were selected by an inter national panel of academics, bu siness people, phila nthropist and peac e institutions, to mention some: Professor Ke vin P. Clements, Dire ctor of Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Univ ersity of Queensland, Australia; Paul Van Tongeren, Executive Director, Global Par tnership fo r the Prev ention of Armed Conflict ( GPPAC), The Neth erlands; Dr. Manuel Mesa, Director, Center for Educational and Peace Research (CEIPAZ ) and President for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Spain; Professor Andrew Mack, Director, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbian, C anada; Alyson JK Bailes, former Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (S IPRI), Sweden; Dr Bates Gill, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.

For the elaboration of the Index were used statistics collected by institutes as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Inter national Peace Research Institute of the Oslo University, The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) a nd the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The 24 indicators used to elaborate t he index were: Number of external and internal c onflicts (2001- 2006); Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external); Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal); Level of or ganized conflict (internal); Relations with neighboring countries; Level of distrust in other citizens; Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population; Political I nstability; Level of disrespect for human rights; Potential for terrorist acts; Number of homicides per 100,000 people; level of violent crime; Likelihood of violent demonstrations; Nu mber of jailed popu lation per 100,000 people; Number of internal secur ity officers and police per 100,000 people; Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people; Volume of tr ansfers (imports) of majo r conventional weapons per 100,000 people; Volume of tr ansfers (exports) of major conventional weap ons per 100,000 people; UN Deployment s 2007-08 (percentage of total armed forces); Non UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of tota l armed forces); A ggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people; ease of access to small arms and light weapons; Military ca pability /So phistication. The ov erall compos ite score a nd inde x

- 22 - was formulated by appl ying a wei ght of 60% to the measure of i nternal peace and 40% for external peace.5

The most important reason to situate Colombia at the end of the ranking is its high score in the measures of internal conf lict. For decades the g overnment combats leftist guerrillas, many of which were formed in the mid 1960 as poor peasant armies. But since 1980 the guerrilla movement is concentrated aroun d two gro ups the Fuerzas Arm adas Revoluc ionarias de Colombia (FARC) a nd El Ejér cito de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Both financ e their act ivities through drug-t rafficking, which also finances the param ilitaries and feeds the corruption. The current policy of the Colombian Government is t o weaken t he FARC to obligate the group to start peace negotiations, while with the ELN sustains preliminary peace talks since 2006.

Additionally to this situation the Colombia n homicide rate is very high (according to Peace Global Index the score is 4, on a sc ale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest). Conversely the respect fo r human rights is ver y low according to Gibney and Dalton Index 6. Level 5, where Colombia is located, means that t here is imprisonment for polit ical activity in an ex tensive way, politic al motivated executions or other politic al mur ders and brutality are co mmon across the country. Disappearance and torture are a common part of life and t he leaders of the country place no limits on the means with which th ey pursue their personal and ideological goals.

In the same way military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the highest (With Cuba) in Latin America, even though the aggregate number of heavy weapons is relatively low, small arms and light weap ons are v ery easy to access; all these conditions place Colombia at the end not only of the world ranking (Table 1), but also at the end of the Latin Amer ica Region (Table 2). In the following sections will be detailed the different aspects of the conflict.

5Global Peace Index 2008. Pg 6. Available at: www.visionofhumanity.org/images/content/Documents/2008 GPi EIU Report.pdf 6Mark Gibney and Matthew Dalton, both from the University of North Ca rolina, have coded countries on a 1 to 5 scale, according to th e level human rights respect based on the i nformation provided by Amnesty International Yearbook – in this case 2007 yearbook, referring to 2006 data. - 23 -

Map 2 - Global Peace Index 2008

- 24 -

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX – 2008 Rank Country Score Rank Country Score 1 Iceland 1.176 36 France 1.707 2 Denmark 1.333 37 Vietnam 1.720 3 Norw ay 1.343 38 Malaysia 1.721 4 New Zealand 1.350 39 Latvia 1.723 5 Japan 1.358 40 Ghana 1.723 6 Ireland 1.410 41 Lithuania 1.723 7 Portugal 1.412 42 United Arab Emirates 1.745 8 Finland 1.432 43 Madagascar 1.770 9 Luxembourg 1.446 44 Taiwan 1.779 10 Austria 1.449 45 Kuwait 1.786 11 Canada 1.451 46 Botswana 1.792 12 Sw itzerland 1.465 47 Tunisia 1.797 13 Sweden 1.468 48 Panama 1.797 14 Germany 1.475 49 United Kingdom 1.801 15 Belgium 1.485 50 Mozambique 1.803 16 Slovenia 1.491 51 Laos 1.810 17 Czech Republic 1.501 52 Cyprus 1.847 18 Hungary 1.576 53 Zambia 1.856 19 Chile 1.576 54 Greece 1.867 20 Slovakia 1.576 55 Gabon 1.878 21 Urugua y 1.606 56 Argentina 1.895 22 Netherland s 1.607 57 Bulgaria 1.903 23 Hong Kong 1.608 58 Tanzania 1.919 24 Romania 1.611 59 Nicaragua 1.919 25 Oman 1.612 60 Croatia 1.926 26 Bhutan 1.616 61 Libya 1.927 27 Australia 1.652 62 Cuba 1.954 28 Italy 1.653 63 Morocco 1.954 29 Singapore 1.673 64 Equatorial Guinea 1.964 30 Spain 1.683 65 Jordan 1.969 31 Poland 1.687 66 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.974 32 South Korea 1.691 67 China 1.981 33 Qatar 1.694 68 Indonesia 1.983 34 Costa Rica 1.701 69 Egypt 1.987 35 Estonia 1.702 70 Paraguay 1.997

Table 1 - Global Peace Index (Continued over page)

- 25 -

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX – 2008 Rank Country Score Rank Country Score 71 Senegal 2.011 106 Yemen 2.352 72 Kazakhstan 2.018 107 India 2.355 73 Malawi 2.024 108 Saudi Arabia 2.357 74 Bahrain 2.025 109 Haiti 2.362 75 Sy ria 2.027 110 Angola 2.364 76 Rw anda 2.030 111 Uzbekistan 2.377 77 Namibia 2.042 112 Algeria 2.378 78 Bolivia 2.043 113 Philippines 2.385 79 Albania 2.044 114 Uganda 2.391 80 Peru 2.046 115 Turkey 2.403 81 Burkina Faso 2.062 116 South Africa 2.412 82 Dominican Republic 2.069 117 Congo (Brazzaville) 2.417 83 Moldova 2.091 118 Thailand 2.424 84 Ukraine 2.096 119 Kenya 2.429 85 Serbia 2.110 120 Mauritania 2.435 86 Bangladesh 2.118 121 Ethiopia 2.439 87 Macedonia 2.119 122 Cote d’ Ivoire 2.451 88 Mongolia 2.155 123 Venezuela 2.505 89 El Salvador 2.163 124 Zimbabwe 2.513 90 Brazil 2.168 125 Sri Lanka 2.584 91 Cambodia 2.179 126 Myanmar 2.590 92 Cameroon 2.182 127 Pakistan 2.694 93 Mexico 2.191 128 DRC 2.707 94 Belarus 2.194 129 Nigeria 2.724 95 Papua New Guinea 2.224 130 Colombia 2.757 96 Jamaica 2.226 131 Russia 2.777 97 U.S.A 2.227 132 Lebanon 2.840 98 Trinidad and Tobago 2.230 133 North Korea 2.850 99 Mali 2.238 134 Central African Republic 2.857 100 Ecuador 2.274 135 Chad 3.007 101 Azerbaijan 2.287 136 Israel 3.052 102 Turkmenistan 2.302 137 Afghanistan 3.126 103 Guatemala 2.328 138 Sudan 3.189 104 Honduras 2.335 139 Somalia 3.293 105 Iran 2.341 140 Iraq 3.514

Table 1 - Global Peace Index (Continued over page)

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Latin America Overall Rank Overall Score Regional Rank Chile 19 1.576 1 Uruguay 21 1.606 2 Costa Rica 34 1.701 3 Panama 48 1.797 4 Argentina 56 1.895 5 Nicaragua 59 1.919 6 Cuba 62 1.954 7 Paraguay 70 1.997 8 Bolivia 78 2.043 9 Perú 80 2.046 10 Dominican Republic 82 2.069 11 El Salvador 89 2.163 12 Brazil 90 2.168 13 Mexico 93 2.191 14 Jamaica 96 2.226 15 Trinidad and Tobago 98 2.230 16 Ecuador 100 2.274 17 Guatemala 103 2.328 18 Honduras 104 2.335 19 Haiti 109 2.362 20 Venezuela 123 2.505 21 Colombia 130 2.757 22

Table 2 - Latin America Peace Index 2008

In general the small, democratic and stable countries are the most peaceful: “16 of the 20 most peaceful are west ern or central European democracies. Most of them are members of the European Union. Three Scandinavian countries are in the top ten”.7

The GPI found som e correlations related with the peace degree of a country; to illustrate the Colombian Case, I choose three of these correlations: Democracy index; Corruption perceptions and GD P per c apita. The gra phics 1, 2 and 3 illust rate the situation of Colombia. In each case, it is clear that less democracy, more corruption and less income are factors are strongly correlated with the war.

7Global Peace Index. Op Cit. - 27 -

COLOMBIA

Graphic 1 – Correlation between Democracy and GPI Score

- 28 -

COLOMBIA

Graphic 2 - Correlation between Corruption perceptions and GPI Score

- 29 -

COLOMBIA

Graphic 3 - Correlation between GDP Per Capita and GPI Score

- 30 - 1.1 Generalities about the Colombian Conflict

Throughout second half nineteenth century and first half twentieth, Colombian politics were dominated by conflicts between Parti do Liberal (PL) and Partido Conservador (PC) causing frequently civil wars; t he most notable c ases included the One Thousand Days War (1899-19 03) and a period k nown as “La Violenc ia” (The Violence) from 1948 to 1957, after the assassi nation of a leader of the Liberal Party and presidential c andidate Jo rge Eliécer Gaitán in Apr il 9, 1948, whic h caused a bloody confrontation between th e members of the two partie s. The violence of this time is explained because the identities of the C olombians existed in terms of “Liberal” or “Conservador”, like there are national identities in other parts of the world:

National loyalty is almost nonexiste nt. Until the mid-twentieth century, political parties substituted as generators of deep loyalties for the country. In de ed, the grea t “irrational” violence exp erienced du ring mid-ce ntury can b e explained only if on e accepts tha t peasants had party loyalties co mparable to national lo yalties in ot her countries. 8

This weak notion about State has its grounds in many reasons: a big inequality in the distribution of the wealth, the geography of the country, the political structure and the few possibilities for social mobility.

The inequality in Colombia has its ground in t he rural country, where few persons have the majority of the land and exercise a significant influence on the poor farmers, which is described by Kalmanovitz as the “ethos of inequality” 9. The control of the elite in the country side is v ery strong bec ause the State has little controls there, although the urban zones are more dem ocratic and permit a more democratic distribution of the wealth as well as a more rents for the State, the schema of a smal l elite who controls the majority of the capital stay s until today in the form of monopolies (one group controls the soft dr inks, another one the beers, only two media outlets control the majority of t he national cinemas, r adio and televis ion channels, etc), these monopolie s became very influential on the Government and to some degree make it dependent of their owners. Ho wever with more economical

8Rensselaer W. Lee III and T houmi, Francisco E. (2003). “Drugs and Dem ocracy in Colombia”. In: Godson, Roy (Ed.) Mena ce to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the wo rld. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick: (U.S.A) and London. Pg 73. 9Kalmanovitz, Salomón (19 99). La encrucijada de la Sinrazón y Otros Ensayos (The Cr ossroads o f Nonsense and Other Essays). Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores. - 31 - development these monopolies have admitted external par tners and competence in the recent years.

The location of Colombia between tradit ional coca gr owing areas and the most important market made the country an optimal transshipment site, moreover the presence of jungles, forest, mountains a nd the climatic conditions required to cultivate dr ugs made of Colo mbia a place f or drug proc essing and smuggling. Not surprising, between 155 countr ies analyz ed for the Inter-American Development Bank’s Index of geographic f ragmentation, Colom bia is the 3 rd count ry most fragmented in the world. As a consequence, in many regions it is very dif ficult to identify the illegal grows and processes and where the State has presence, it s representatives are very vulnerable to briberies. Additionally while small countries like all in Central Americ a and the Cari bbean, Uruguay, Ecuador and Paraguay are relative easy of monitoring, Colombia and it s relative big and difficult extens ion was another exceptional condition to locate the center of the production and process in its land. Moreover during the 70´s some count ries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile had dictators with a strong presence and control of their countries, making of Colombia and its weak Government an ideal plac e to locate the drug business. Parallel the guerrillas taking advantage of the geographical conditions started their activities since the 60´s and in this way the country was str ongly divided between four actors by the 70s: guerrillas, drug traffickers, elites a nd the Government, each one e xercising control in its zone of influence.

The Colombian Political Stru cture by the end of the 50´ s was very closed, as solution to the civil war between Liberal es and Conservadores was conceived the National Front, which was a divis ion of po wers between the Partido Liberal and the Partido Conservador, the traditional parties, w here the elites wer e very influential, it left any other party or proposal without possibilities, in e ach presidential election was only a candidate, once a Conservador, the nex t a Liberal and so on; in the c ongress, ministries and all the official institutions the participat ion was of 50% for the liberals and of 50% for the “conservadores”. The National Fr ont lasted from 1958 to 1974, time enough for the depoliticiz ation of th e parties and their t ransformation into

- 32 - clientelistic electoral machines10, because sharing the power the political fundaments took a second place and the interest of the regional elites became the central point of the parties. In fact, i n the regions the e lites had the control t hat the State should have, and without political fundaments to defend, the parties succumbed to this powerful elites. This clientelis tic structure made it poss ible to “buy ” votes and in this way, who has more money, can buy more vo tes and win the elections. For the drug traffickers it was another favorable condit ion to continue with their busines s without confrontation with the State; contrarily, it was an opportunity to influenc e it through the funding of political campaigns.

The fe w possibilit ies for social mobility caus ed by the elites who control the majority of the country and the National Fr ont that only allowed the two traditional political powers made of the illegal activities a manner to gain social status and better economical conditions, in a weak State it was accepted as a triumph, as a way to get a plac e in the society and the well being s o scarce for the most of the Colombia n Population, as illeg al and very profitable and accep ted activities we can cite the emerald exploitation at the beginning of t he century XX, after came the contraband and since the 70´s the drug traffic:

Among the main illegal industrie s were emerald mining and exp orting, diverse contraband imports, and contraban d exports of cattle and coffee, thr ough which Colombians developed foreign exchange, m oney laundering skills an d internatio nal smuggling distribution systems. Contraband imports are estimated variously to account for 20 to 40 pe rcent of leg al imports. A large info rmal and illegal econo my blurred any moral difference between drug generated income and capital and ot her income and capital, resulted in a widespread acceptance of contraband and promoted the development of money laundery skills. All these factors cont ributed to t he development of the illegal drug industry.11

This development of the illegal business in Colombia ended in the drug business as a very profitable activity very useful to win economic and political power, in fact the drug business is probably the most profitable activity in Colombia, although there are not systemic data about the dr ug traffic, authors like Clawson and Lee estimated the income at the beginning of the 90´s betw een US$3 and US$4 billions for the then or

10Leal, Francisco (1989). Estado y Política en Colombia (State and Politics in Colombia). Bogotá: Siglo XXI Editores y CEREC. 11Rensselaer W. Lee III and Thoumi, Francisco E. Op. Cit Pg 75-76. - 33 - fifteen biggest drug cartels, after paying suppliers, transport and laundering; it makes this industry the most important in Colombia.12

Such sums of money needs polit ical support to be incorporated into a relative small economy, with political support it is more easy the transportation, the making of very favorable laws, lax condemns and information about the acti ons of the army and the police again drug business (planned raids, for example), as Thoumi says:

For the most part the drug cartels require only local support networks to allow them to grow coca and poppies and to manufacture and export drugs. However, when it comes to laundering money these cartels often need to win favor with ranking officials of the central government. Such favor affords protection from the law. The reason that drug cartels have turne d to corrupting high level government officials involves the Colombian economy’s modest capacity for absorbing and hiding illegal funds.13

This alliance between dr ug traffickers and politic ians was very beneficial for the drug dealers. T hey could legalize their illegal earnings and inve sted in companies, real estate and diverse industries across the count ry. In many cases they were convicted to short prison sentences with easy possibilities to be reduced by up to two thirds and the opportunity to return to the society after these short sentences. A remarkable example of this very s oft punishment was t he case of Pablo Esc obar Gaviria, one of the most powerful drug dealers of his time, and the managers of the Cali Cartel:

The short sentences meted out to top Medellín and Cali kingpins, the farce of Pablo Escobar’s `designer` prison in his home town of Envigado, which he could leave at will to attend soccer matches and carouse in l ocal discoth eques, and the apparent ability of Cali´s Rodríguez Orejuela brothers to run their trafficking em pires from jail are testimonies to this unfortunate situation.14

For the leaders of the Colombian Governm ent the alliance with the drug dealers is also beneficial, the politici ans have access to a huge s ums of money to finance their campaigns, there is a reducti on of anti-state violence by the drug cartels and in the eyes of the American public many drug dealers are apparently punished; but of course this criminal allianc e between po litician and drug dealer s is only o ne mor e step into the corruption of t he Colombian State and its def initive capitulation to the mafias.

12Clawson, Patrick, and Rensselaer Lee III (1996). The And ean Co cain In dustry. New York: St. Martin´s Press. 13Thoumi, F rancisco E. (1 995). Political Econom y a nd Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 14Rensselaer W. Lee III and Thoumi, Francisco E. Op. Cit. Pg. 89. - 34 - 1.2 The Intervention of U.S.A.

After the Cold War the U. S.A. made em phasis on the Wa r o n Drugs; under this perspective Colombia gained significance because the country had the conditions to concentrate the drug business and could be a destabilizing fa ctor in a key region for the U.S.A. due to t he geographical proximity of Colomb ia to the U.S.A itself and a very important resources and infrastructure for the American Interests: Oil in Venezuela, The Panama Canal and Oil and Am erican Capital in Brazil, moreover Colombia is a Caribbean and Pacific nat ion, Amazonian and Andean. The larg e borders of Colombia are another condition to consider, the 6.004 kms of borders are divided in the following wa y: Brazil, 1643 kms; Ec uador, 590 Kms; Panama, 625 Kms, Peru, 1496 kms; Venezuela, 2050 kms; not only the extension is a challenge, in the most of the cases the borders are inhospitable zones very difficult to control:

If the United States, in spite of its enormous deployment of human, economic, and technological resources, has been unable to gain complete control over its border with Mexico, we need only to imagine the implications for a border that is much longer, has little state presence on either side, and is mostly jungle.15

But to wage war in Colombia implic ies to wage war against the traffickers, i t means drug cartels, Guerrillas and Paramilitaries, especially when these two last organizations are considered terrorist, a relev ant topic for the U.S.A. after September 11. This involvement of the U. S.A in the Colombia n Civil Wa r is clearly visible in the Putumayo department:

The purpose of these battalions w as, chiefly, to support the Colombian National Police in eradicating coca cultivation in the Putumayo depa rtment bordering Ecuador and Peru. This department wa s of fundamental geo strategic importance to paramilitary groups as well as the FARC. These two armed groups h ad divided the impoverished department between them, and constituted the only real authority in the area from which they derived the vast bulk of their e conomic resources, thanks t o extensive coca cultivation and processing l aboratories. Further, no state had any real control over this part of the Colombian border with Ecuador and Peru, so the regio n was conducive to drugs as well as arm trafficking.16

15Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar (2006). “Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: Lights and Sh adows”. In: Love man, Bryan (Ed.). Addicted to Fail ure. Plymouth: Ro wman an d Littlefiel d Publishers INC. Pg 56 16Ibidem. - 35 - In the Colombian cas e drug trafficking becam e linked with terrorism in a co untry with no real state control, wher e there are many internal conflicts between no state armies, which control parts of the territo ry and strategic resources. This linka ge between drugs, terrorism and failed State bec ame a string argument to continue wit h the war in Colomb ia and support the Governm ent military. However, this intervention of the U.S.A. contributes to the escalati on of the conflict and overlook the social causes that originated the conflict: the inequity of the wealth and the weakness of the State. As we can see in Table number 3, the U.S.A help focus on the military and offer little to economic and social issues: ”In other w ords, 75 – 80 percent of the resources went to military assistance and the remainder to other areas of need”17.

ITEM /YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Military and Police Assistance Programs 88.56 112.44 308.81 785.97 224.68 374.61 499.02 Economic and Social Assistance Programs 0 0.52 8,75 212 5,65 127.5 154.8 TOTAL 88.56 112.96 317.56 997.97 230,33 502.11 653.82

Table 3 – All U.S.A Aid to Colombia in millions of U.S dollars. Source: Vaicius and Isacson18

Not focusing on the causes of the problem, t he solution to the Colombian Civil War is impossible. The strengthening of the Colo mbian State is crucial to establis h a democratic State that controls the country , protects the human and politic al rights, and ensures a more equilibrated distribution of the wealth that was almost exclusively in private hands until 1975, when for the firs t time the Colombian State s tarted to receive important amounts of capital and rents different to taxes:

Tireless fighters, working day-in, day-out under the most adverse conditions, t hey have managed to survive, without, as of yet, win ning the lottery; without, like Mexico, having a Border with t he United S tates; witho ut the tour ism of Cuba, in its day; or Argentina’s or Uruguay’s grains and cattle; or the size of Brazil. Everything con spired against the survival of the Colombian State. Only in 1975 did it begin to derive income from its pat rimony –unrelated to ta x rev enue- from State owned coal, surpluse s of national petroleum for export, and cerromatoso nickel.19

17Ibidem. 18Vaicius, Ingri d and I sacson, Adam (20 03). “The `War on Drug s` meets th e `Wa r on T error`”. In: International Policy Report. Washington, D.C. Available at: www.ciponline.org 19Deas, Malcom (1993). Del Poder y la Gramática, y otros ensayos sobre historia, política y l iteratura colombiana (of Power and the Gra mmar, and other e ssays a bout Col ombian histo ry, politic an d literature). Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores. Pg. 14. - 36 - In the same extent, since 1975 t he Gini 20 Index showed a radical change, but last year the index rose to the same level as before of 1975 agin (see Graphic number 4), making Colombia today one of the most i nequality countries of the world (see Map number 3). Additiona lly, giving military help to the Colo mbian Police and Army could be very risky in a country where the police and Army are highly corrupted:

The grave i ncompetence of the Nat ional Police was notorious. There were constant revelations of corruptio n at all leve ls; negative encounters between citizens and an authoritarian and repressive police ; and evidence of police involvement in theft, ´social cleansing` activity, and massacres. 21

Graphic 4 - Evolution of the Colombian Gini1975 – 200322

And it is c lear that in or der to defeat the guerrillas the Colombian Armed Forces (Army, Police, Secret Polic e, Navy and Air Force) collaborate with the Paramilitaries , which wer e originally cr eated by land owners to defend their properties agains t guerrillas attacks. This means that the suppor t of th e U.S.A. Government indirectly reinforces the allia nce betwe en Armed Forces and Para militaries, which are supposed to be combated (and not financ ed). This contradictory behavior of the U.S.A follows the same pattern as the U.S. intervention in El Salvador:

20The Gini coe fficient is a measure of statistical dispersion most prominently u sed a s a me asure of inequality of income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. To less score less inequality. 21Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar. Op. Cit. Pg. 71. 22Montenegro Armando y Rivas Rafael (2005). Las Piezas del Rompecabezas. Desigualdad, Pobreza y Crecimiento (The Pieces of the Puzzle: Inequality, Poverty and Grow) . Bogotá: Taurus. Pg. 39-40. - 37 - ...the Clinton administration is supporting Colombian Army units whose primary mission is to fight the civil war, not the drug war. The proposed aid package, as wa s the case with El Sal vador, results in increased support for a repressive military that is closely allie d with right-wing death squads. As a result, such supp ort can only increase th e levels of violence and, as was the case in El Salvador, the civilian population will continue to be the principal victims.23

Nevertheless the U.S. strategy seems to follow the strategy used in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and other countries, where the U.S.A had financed illegal armies in order to reach key interest. With a weak state, guerrillas and paramilitaries doing what they consider t heir own j ustice and the U.S. A financing the criminal allia nce between governmental forces and para militaries, it is under standable that the levels of impunity have been increasing during the last years, what makes the possibility of a negotiated solution and a law state very difficult (see relation Investment in Justice Vs Investment in Defense in Graphic number 5):

while 11 percent of those convicted for homicide were sentenced in the 1970s, twenty years later the figure dropped to just 4 percent . A convicted murderer has a greater than 90 percent chance of never being punished. Moreover, judges who would not be corrupted faced death threats against themselves and their families, as did journalists who denounced political corruption, the guerrillas, and the drug lords.24

23Leech Garry (2000). “Are we Salvado rizing Colombia?”. In: Colombia Journal Online. Available at: www.colombiajournal.org/colombia1.htm 24Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar. Op. Cit. Pg. 71. - 38 -

Map 3 – Global Gini Index 2008

- 39 -

Graphic 5: Weight of the investment in justice (black dotted line) and in defense (red line) from 1950 until 2005.

Sources

*1950-1994: Numpaque Cielo, María, Rodrígu ez Cuestas, Ligia (1996): “Evolución y compo rtamiento del gasto publico en Colombia 1950-1991”. In: A rchivos de Macroeconomía. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Documento No. 45. May 1996. *1995-2005: Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Indicadores de Coyuntu ra Económica: Finanzas Públicas. Bogotá: Dirección de Estudios Económicos. December 2005.

All this factors and the fact that the drugs have a c onstant demand and enormous gains leav e the U.S.A. intervention in Colombia with a negativ e balanc e: the drug business continues in Colombia, the Co ca, Poppy (Origin of the heroin) and Marijuana Crops don’t decrease significantly or they move to Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, to return to Colombia when there are strong activities of eradication in theses countries. Contrary to the objective of t he U.S.A. the drug busin ess seems to stay intact and has als o gained power in Mexic o which could be a s ignificant risk for the U.S.A and become, like Colombia, a failed State. A sit uation which U.S.A. wants to prevent with the same strategy as used in Colombia:

Mr Gates , U.S.A Defense Secretary, said ai d could come in the form of military hardware, training and i ntelligence support to help the Mexican authorities in th eir fight against the well-armed and organized drugs traffickers...after the publication of a

- 40 - US Pentago n report whi ch said the drugs-relate d violence could turn Mexico into a failed state.25

Ironically the drug traffickers in Mexico are using for these criminal activities arms and guns fabricated and sold in the U.S.A, concretely in El Paso, only a few kilometers of one of the most important drug hubs in Mexico, Ciudad Juárez. However, to control the supply of arms to Mexico is very difficult because many of t hese arms were so ld legally and their transportation to Mexico is legal as well:

The gun laws in the United States allow the sale of multiple military-style rifles t o American Citizens without reporting the sales to the govern ment, and t he Mexicans search relatively fe w cars and trucks going south across their border. What is more, the sheer volume of licensed dealers – more than 6,600 along the border alone, many of them operating out of their houses– makes policing them a challenge… smugglers routinely enlist America ns with clean criminal r ecords to buy two or th ree rifles at a time…then transport them across the border in car and trucks….26

The militar y intervention of t he U.S.A. in Colomb ia is a failure. The paramilitaries, guerrillas and cartels are far from being defeated, the vio lence contin ues with thousands of civilians death each year as we ll as mem bers of the armed forces, not only in Colombia, but also in Venezuela a nd Ecuador, countries used as battlefields, shelters and routes of the imports and exports of the drug business:

Thus the la rge sums spent on enhancing the capabilit ies of the Colombian military and the increased presence of U.S advisers and private contractors have not won the war against the various militarized non-state actors that challenge the authority of the Colombian State and routinely use Venezuelan and Ecuadorian territory as smuggling routes and for sanctuary.27

Although, in some areas the U.S.A.´s intervention is posit ive, lik e the structuring of the army, reflected in the weake ning of the guerrillas and the modernizatio n of the justice system (faster trials, technical equipment, cooperation with the American system justice, etc), the c auses of the conflict are in tact. If the U.S.A. and the Colombian Government want to stop the violence inherent to the drug business they need to legaliz e the drugs (like another p sychoactive substanc es as alcohol and cigarettes). If the drug business is legalized, the violence related to the drug business may disappear, because the highly dispropor tionate gains will disapp ear when the

25San Pedro, Emilio. “US ready to aid Mexico Dru g Fight ”. In: BBC Ne ws o n line . March 2, 2009. Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7918101.stm 26Mckinley, James C. Jr. “U.S. Is Ar ms Bazaar for Mexican Drug Ga ns”. In: The New Yo rk Tim es, published by the Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 9, 2009. 27Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar. Op. Cit - 41 - State provide the drugs to a reduced price. The state wil l have t he control and the revenues, and the drug addiction will be a health problem (what it is) and not a crime, like it is no crime to drink alcohol. M any intellectuals and scientific propose the legalization as a solution, between them the Nobel laur eate in economic s Milton Friedman, who says that the criminalization of certain drugs undermines respect for the law and creates " a decadent moral climat e." He st ates that legaliz ing drugs like marijuana and cocaine would reduce the crime and the corruption:

Prohibition undermined respect for the law, c orrupted the minions of the law, a nd created a d ecadent moral climate and at the end not sto ps the con sumption of alcohol. Despite this tr agic lesson, we seem b ent on repeating precisely the same mistake in handling drugs. There is no disagreement a bout some of the facts. Excessive drinking of alcohol har ms the drinker; excessive smoking of cigarett es harms the smoker; excessive use of drugs harm the user. As among th e three; awful as it is to m ake such comparisons, there is little doubt that smoking and drinking kill more peopl e that the u se of drugs… Legalize drugs, and street crime would dro p dramatically and imme diately. Moreover, addicts and pu sher are not the ones corrupted. Immense sums are at stake. It is in evitable that some relatively low-pai d police and other government officials and some high paid one as well, succumb to the temptation to pick up easy money.28

With legalized drugs and the addiction bei ng dealed with as a health problem, the focus will not be the war, but the education and awareness to avoid the abuse of the drugs, as there are campaigns to reduce the alcohol and tobacco abus e. Ethan Nadelmann, a former Princeto n University professor and now director of the Lindesmith Center, states:

Make sure t hat junkie s have access to clean needles; make it ea sy for addict s to obtain methadone; give heroin-maintenance programs a chance to work; decriminalize marijuana; stop spending billion s on incarcerating drug users and drug dealers. We know we can reduce drug abu se more eff ectively by spending th at money on education, pre and post natal care and job-training programs.29

Since many years experts have told about sci entific methods to reduce the addiction, as Mayor Schmoke told the 1993 Drug Po licy Foun dation conf erence, “The United States' war on drugs and similar campaigns in other countries have failed. Only a harm reduction policy led by public health experts and emphasizing treatment, can be expected to reduce addiction.”30

28Milton Friedman (1994). "The Same Mistake". In: Police News, Spring 1994: 48-49. 29Ethan Nadelmann. "Dear Abby".In: The Oregonian, 22 June 1994. 30The Drug Policy Letter, 22 Spring 1994. - 42 - While Drugs received much attention a nd money, maybe the r eal problem is the tobacco and alc ohol as sust ain the Yale law professor Steven B. Duke an d Albert Gross. For them the biggest, worst dr ug problem is the tobacco and alcoho l addiction. According to him legalizing drugs would r educe the use of alc ohol and tobacco which are far more damaging than any popular illegal drug.31

In any case, legalization, education and medical guidance seem to be more adequate to confront the drugs rela ted problems (crime, addiction) tha n the failed army approach of the U.S.A. Moreover the use of drugs is a personal decision, like drinking or smoking, but the U.S.A. apparently want to continue with the military schema used to intervene in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia...

1.3 The Conflict Today

After Alvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia in 2002, the conflict escalate d under a politic of confr ontation and the strengtheni ng of the army and the paramilitaries against the guerrillas. As a re sult, the politic al homicide increased (Graphic number 6), in the same way t he clashes between gov ernment forces and the guerrilla (see Graphic number 7), while the attacks perpetrated by the guerrillas decreased (see Graphic number 8); the num ber of paramilitary attacks, specially against civ ilians increased notably (see Graphic number 9). T he linkage between Paramilitaries and g overnmental forces is demons trated in the fact that the paramilitaries practically don ’t cause cas ualties in the government forces (see Graphic number 10) while the guerrillas do in a reciprocal way (see Graphic number 11).

31Steven B. Duk e & Gros s, Albert C (1994). America's Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade against Drugs. California: Tarcher. - 43 -

Graphic 6 – Political Homicides 1957 – 2006

Source: Database of Political Homicide in Colombia 1930-2005. Constructed by Francisco Gutiérrez and William Mancera

Graphic 7

Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC (Center of Resources for the analysis of conflicts)32

32Restrepo, Jorge & Spagat Michael (20 05). The Colombian Conflict: where is it Heading ?. Bogotá: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC. - 44 -

Graphic 8

Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC.

Graphic 9

Source: Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC.

- 45 -

Graphic 10

Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC.

Graphic 11

Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC.

- 46 - The alliance between the Colombian Government, paramilitaries and U.S.A has been very successful to weaken the guerrillas, although the FARC still maintains capability to launch sporadic at tacks. They conti nue with kidnappings and attacks o n energy infrastructure, police and army installa tions. However the FARC was strongly weakened during 2008 by deaths and surrender of key commanders. In March 2008 Colombian Air Forces kille d in Ecuador the FARC sec ond commander Raú l Reyes, and another representative of FARC secretariat (maxim aut hority in the FARC) was killed later that month. The influentia l commander “Karina” surrendered May 18 and FARC c onfirmed May 25 that one of th eir top commanders, Manuel M arulanda, known as “Tirofijo”, died by a heart attack on March 26. Documents from Raúl Reyes computer seized after the attack in Ecuador revealed possible Ve nezuelan financing and arms supply to FARC, which complicated the already tense relationship between the Colombian Government (pro U.S.A and right) and the Venezuelan Gov ernment (Anti U.S.A and left)33.

The partial defeat of the guerrillas happens while the government conduces a peac e process with the paramilitaries, which is rather a legaliz ation of paramilitarism and of the infiltration of the mafia into the government. Prove of this is the participation of many important drug deal ers in the process (Gallery nu mber 1) and the continuatio n of the illeg al activities of the paramilit aries across the country (see Map nu mber 3). To some extent the infilt ration of the paramilit aries in the Co lombian Go vernment resembles the Italian mafia as said the analyst Alvaro Camacho:

In Colombi a we may be entering an ‘a la it aliana’ pha se, in which control and protection of illegal activity e xtends itself and accelerates, threatens free enterprise , overflows into politics a nd becomes a new form of organized crime t hat must be added to the already long list of threats to Colombian democracy.34

Under these conditions Colombia could be going into a Pax Mafiosa, where an illegal faction wins the war and impos e its ru le. Without opponents there is an apparent peace, but in reality it is a criminal state with a strong repression, a dictatorship of the crime. Though this could be in fact a pacifi ed society, it would not be a democratic one, however, as Hâvard, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch demonstrated. They

33International Crisis Group (2009). Conflict history: Colombia. Available at: www.internationalcrisisgroup.com 34Camacho Guizado, Alvaro. “Paramilitarismo y Mafia” (P aramilitarism and Mafia). In: El Espectador. October 3, 2004. - 47 - analyzed 152 countries in the period from 1816 to 1992 and found that both, democratic societies and authoritarian one s are peaceful (see Graphic 12), but the difference is that democratic states are peaceful because of their respect to the human rights, while authoritarian societies are peaceful because of their repression which offers stability and order in a state that lacks bot h. However, in both cases the change of regime is a threat to the peace: Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states h ave few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with politica l changes, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy...In the long run, sin ce intermediate regimes are less stable th an autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.35

A notorious example of this Pax Mafiosa can be obs erverd in Medellín, the second most important industrial and financial city in Colombia. Accordi ng to data from the city authorities, homicide-rate in Mede llín has fallen by 77% between 2002 and 2005,. In 2002 the c ity had 3,450 murders, in 2005 it had 741 (unt il December 4). In 1991, under Pablo Escobar’s kingdom, there had b een 6,349 killings (in a city of roughly 2 million habitants) making Medellín the most violent city on earth.

Graphic12 Correlation between peace and level of democracy36

35Hâvard, Hegre; Ellingsen, Tanja; Gate s, Scott & Gleditsch, Nils Petter. „Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Dem ocracy, Politi cal Change, and Civil Wa r, 181 6 – 1 992“. In: American Politi cal Scien ce Review 95 (1) 2005 Pg. 33- 48. 36Hâvard, Hegre; Ellingsen, Tanja; Gates, Scott & Gleditsch, Nils Petter. Op. Cit. Pg. 40. - 48 - Jairo Herrán Vargas, who heads the Personería de Medellín, the City’s human rights watchdog, told the Daily Journal:

The forces of the state have regained territory which was previously controlled by armed groups. In 2002 took place two huge military assault s on guerrilla strongholds in the city - Operation Orion and Op eration Mariscal- in which the "urba n militias" of the FARC and the ELN were driven out of the area know n as Comuna 13. And the demobilization of Medel lín’s paramilitary blocs, i n November 2003, remo ved another 37 source of violence.

But there is another possib ility; the level of violence in the city could hav e falle n simply because one group –the paramilitaries of "Don Berna"- won the war, and n ow control most of the city. Because of this, most of the gang violence has petered out. “Don Berna” has been in jail s ince May 2005, and faces a US extr adition order for drug trafficking, but he contin ues to control much of M edellín despite, in theory, he is demobilized.38 Fabio Orlando Acevedo former "polit ical commander" of Don Berna’s organization, and now member of the Democracy Corporation , an organization of former paramilitaries, told the Daily Journal:

We were the first blo c to demobilize, be cause of an in itiative by our maxi mum commander Adolfo Paz [another alias of Don Berna]. He g ave the ord er to lower t he intensity of t he conflict. We have to be more social, more political than military. W e went ahead with the pe ace process, but without breaking the structures. Other blocs disintegrated, but we kept our organization inta ct. We retained our presence. We are 39 social coordinators….

Amnesty International described the gov ernment’s demobilizat ion strategy as a legalization of the paramilitarism and integration into the civil and public life thanks to a fake de mobilization process made to o ffer a new image of Colombia as a more peaceful society and facilitate the integration of the paramilitary action:

Paramilitarism has not been disma ntled; it has simply bee n “re-engine ered”. Since many area s of Colo mbia have now been wrested fr om guerrilla control, and paramilitary control e stablished in m any of these, there i s no longer a need to hav e large numbers of heavi ly armed uniformed par amilitaries. Instead, the paramilitaries are beginning to contribute to the security fo rces’ counter-insurgency strategy as “civilians”. The increasing participation of paramilitaries in private security firms – both regulated and illegal – the failure to legislat e against the participa tion of armed demobilized paramilitaries in licensed private security firms, as well as the recent idea mooted by the gover nment to create a “civic guard” made up o f demobilized combatants, without effectively ensuring that n one of them are implica ted in human rights violati ons, and th e governme nt’s network of civilian informants and Decree

37Herran, Ja iro c ited b y Br istow, Matthew. “Pax Mafios a”. In: Colombia Re ports Di ciembre 11/2005. Available at: colombia-reports.blogspot.com/2005/12/pax-mafiosa.html 38Ibidem 39Ibidem - 49 - 2767, will o nly serve to ensure tha t param ilitaries will be “ recycled” a nd “legali zed” into structures which may pro ve more palatable to domest ic and international pub lic opinion.40

Gallery 1

40Amnesty Internatio nal. (2005 ). Colombia, The Param ilitaries in Medellí n: Dem obilization or Legalization. Pg 48 – 49. Available at: www.a mnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/019/2005/en/dom- AMR230192005en.pdf - 50 -

Map 4 – Paramilitary Power in Colombia 2004

- 51 - The Personería de M edellín’s annual hum an rights report in 2005 coincided with the Amnesty International:

One can ob serve a worrying situation of illegal control in areas that were formerly under the control of paramilitary gro ups. But now control is exerted in a different way, without massacres or a high nu mber of homicides, even though they mainta in authoritarian and violent means of social control... 41

Amnesty International observes in Medellí n and in all Colomb ia the development of three phases of the paramilitary strategy: Incursion, the aim here is to militarily "liberate" areas of guerr illa in fluence thr ough the use of sy stematic viole nce; Consolidation, during this phas e, the local population is "co-opted" and ter rorized into submission through the killing of thos e perceived as a threat, such as huma n rights defenders, trade unionis ts, and social activists; Legitimization: This phas e involves income generation t hrough th e purchas e of legal bus inesses. The paramilitaries create foundatio ns and coop eratives to prom ote productive projects, engage in community work especially in poor neighborhoods, and seek to control local, regional and national elect oral and po litical processes: “I n Medellín, Amnesty International has observed a process wh ich clearly reflects this three-phase strategy... the paramilitary project has entered a "legitimization phase" which includes the transformation of paramilitary forces into private security or civilia n informer structures”.42 However the advance of the paramilit arism is not an exclusive phenomenon of Medellín:

By 2003, AUC-linked p aramilitary groups were present in over 25 of th e country’s 32 departments and in over 380 of its 1,098 municipalities, and its number of combatants had increased dramatically from a repor ted 3,000 in 1995. The paramilitary advance forced the FARC and ELN to withdraw from many areas they had dominated for decades.0

In many areas of the country the paramilitaries can claim to control, either through co- option or t hreats of violence, a signif icant number of local mayors’ office s, governorships, the ju dicial apparatus, the he alth and e ducation system, public contracts, business cooperatives and other economic concerns, private security firms, and the criminal economy, including drug-trafficking, extortion, the illegal trade in gasoline, prostitution, and gambling rackets.43

41Personeria de Medellín. (2005). Informe de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Report). Medellín: Personería Municipal.. 42Amnesty International. Op. Cit. p. 9-10 43Ibidem - 52 - Paramilitarism is thus not simply a c ounter-insurgency strategy, but a phen omenon that encompasses mechanisms of political and social control and the promotion of the Colom bian traditional economic model based on the concentration of land and large-scale agricultural, mini ng and as new economic al area, infrastructure projects. This policy has been built through a wides pread and systematic vi olation of human rights, including mas s displac ement of ci vilians, wh at has facilitated the ille gal expropriation of land through which paramilitarism aims to launder the considerable wealth built up as a result of its most significant business: drug-trafficking.

However this peace is only apparent, the dr ug production could be a decis ive factor in the continuation of the war, it is like a vicious circle, where the drugs fuels the war and the war fuels the drug produ ction. First, drugs provide a financial s ource to buy arms, material and bribe t he government entities and offi cers. Particularly in the Colombian case this means that the guer rillas and the cartels (who compete with each other) can stay at war for a long time . Second, with the enormous gains of the drugs the parties bec ome very powerful and in fluential exerting a para-state in their influence zones (as seems to have happened in Medellín and other places). Third the parties at war try to be more powerful and influential producing more drugs, which is possible because the state is too weak to avoid it.44

This relatio n between drugs and war exp lains why gu errillas bec ome drug dealers. With money it is possible to do the revolution or at least some actions against a State considered unfair and at the same time to gain political and ec onomical influence. Through the years the enormous revenues of the drugs became the focus in order not to lose power and to sustain the war against competitor s and the gov ernmental forces:

Clearly drug productio n provides funding opp ortunities for rebel grou ps, but mor e importantly, it weakens the central gover nment allowing r ebels to gain in strengt h relative to t he govern ment both politically and economically. Our e mpirical analysis demonstrates that while drug pro ducing cou ntries are more prone to civil war involvement, the effect is indirect running through the quality of govern ment institutions and onto the conflict process. Drug producing states tend to have poorer quality governance, whi ch, in turn, tends to increase the p robability of civil confl ict. Governments in drug producing st ates tend to be less effective at collecting t ax revenue, have lower GDP per capita , and experience greater levels of corruption. Not

44Lektzian, David; Gates Sco tt (2005). Drug, Governance and Civil War. Oslo: Center for the s tudy of Civil War & Norwegian University of Science and Technology. - 53 - surprisingly, countries that have a difficult time controlling drug production are also not very effective at governing. In countries such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, or Colombia, where poppy and coca f armers pay taxes to rebel armies an d rely upon those force s for protection, the very essence of government legitimacy is called into question and can result in challenges to the state ’s claim to th e monopoly on the leg itimate use o f violence. Major drug producing st ates are more likely to be weak and ineffective states, and prone to violent conflict.45

Although Paramilitaries and G uerrillas are both dr ug dea lers, they have a very different manner of behavior. Th ile guerrillas use a po litical discourse to justify their actions. They practice political kidnapping in order to receive attention and to mak e pressure on their demands. They attack the o il exportation as a manner of protest against the exploitation of the natural re sources by international companies which enjoy very favorable conditions, and they realize other protest actions (see Graphic number 13 ); The paramilitaries, n the oth er hand, h ave the e xtermination of their enemies as their mai n goal (see Graphic number 14). They take control of the land and e xercise a politic al and eco nomical po wer in Co lombia. No w the paramilitarie s are winning the war, imposing a Pax M afiosa and eliminating those who they consider their enemie s: the guer rillas; the supporters of th e guerrillas; the journalist s who inform about the paramilitarism, corr uption and drug bus iness (see Cha pter 3 – Colombian Media); the trade unionist who denunciate the economical infiltr ation of the mafias into the legal business, and in general whoever coul d be considered an obstacle in the paramilitary project.

45Ibidem - 54 -

Graphic 13 Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC

Graphic 14 Source: Javeriana University; Royal Holloway College, CERAC

In alliance with this project, the Colom bian Armed Forces realize extra judicial execution as a mechanism of eliminati ng the opponents of th e alliance between government and Para militaries. Although paramilitaries are se ldom directly involv ed

- 55 - (see Graphics number 15 and 16), this exec utions are committed as a consequenc e of the mafia infiltration into the governm ent. This explains why the majority of extrajudicial executions has social leaders or other persons as their main target, who are consid ered as “undesirab le” for the ultr a right paramilitary proj ect: prostitutes, homeless, gay activists, etc:

Upon comparing the new cases that came to light during the first semester of 2008 to the cases that occurred in 2007, we may dedu ce some general trait s, such as i) an increase in the perc entage of social leaders and community leaders, which rose from of indigenous peoples, from 3.0% of the cases to 5.3%; and iii), in 2008, as opposed to 2007, the records show the appearanc e of categories of socially excluded indi viduals among the victims, such as sex workers (3.5% of the cases), persons ph ysically or mentally disabled (1.8%), and socially marginated persons (5.3% of the cases). That characterization seems to show a transit ion: on one hand, towar ds politically motivated violations of the right to life where the victims are community leaders and social leaders and, on the other hand, towards “social cleaning” violations of the right to life where t he victims are socially ex cluded and/or marginated persons.46

Graphic 15 – Extra Judicial Execution by Author – 2007 Source: Colombia – Europe – United States Coordination Group Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Observatory.

46Colombia – Europe – Un ited States Coordination Group Hum an Rights a nd Humanita rian L aw Observatory (200 8). Extra Ju dicial E xecutions: A reality that can not be covered up, 2007 – 2008. Pg.13. Available at: www.ddhhcolombia.org.co/node/166 - 56 -

Graphic 15 - Extrajudicial Executions by Author – 2008 Source: Colombia – Europe – United States Coordination Group Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Observatory.

Although the government sustai ns that the extra judicial executions ar e isolated actions, many military units across the country are involved (see Graphic number 16).

The office in Colombia continue s t o receive complaints o f extrajudicial execution s attributed to the secur ity forces. So me common characteristics of the co mplaints are the following: the victims are represented as ha ving being killed in combat; the scene of the crime has been tampered with before the bodies were identified; and often investigations have been initiated by the M ilitary Crimina l Just ice sy stem. Official investigations reveal tha t the underlying motive s in several of these cases may be related to p ressure on the military to show results or to fa lse cla ims o f succe ss in action by certain members of the security forces to obtain benefits and recognition.47

In the same way it is possible to find a correlation between the beginning of Alvaro Uribe´s Government and the increase of the Extra Judicial Exec utions as consequence of his “Democratic Security” policy:

In the past five years there has been a certified increase of 67.71% in recorded extrajudicial executions directly attri buted to law enforcement and military forces; that period coincides with th e time in which the “de mocratic security” policy promoted by the current Government which took possession on August 7, 2002 has been in place. Thus, from July 2002 t o December 2007 at least 1,122 cases have been recorded,

47United Nations, Human Rights Council (2008). Report of the Unit ed Nations High Commissioner for Human Rightson the situation of human rights in Colombia. New York: United Nations. Pg 11. - 57 - directly attributed to law enforcement and military forces, as compared to 669 cases recorded from January 1997 to June 2002.48

This correlation could be explained by the fa ct that i n many occasions there has appeared evidence linking the Colombian President with the Mafias, what means that the infiltration of the mafi a has reached the highest leve ls of the politic. T he doubts about Uribe are so strong t hat a former U.S.A. ambass ador in Colombia, Myles Frechette declared that he asked Uribe about his alleged drug ties and that he sent a report to the State Department saying he was not satis fied with Uribe's explanation49. In fact, since 1991 U.S.A. is linking Alvaro Uribe with the drug traffickers:

Declassified documents obtained in 2007 by the National Security Archives, an independent group based in Wash ington, in cluded a Defe nse Intellige nce Agency report dated Sept. 23 1991 that included comments regarding 106 people allegedly tied to the Medellín Cartel. Uribe was listed at 82nd, with a comment saying he was ''a close, personal friend'' of cartel boss Pablo Escobar.50

Like Uribe many of the mem bers of his political party and officers named by him are linked with Paramilitaries, some of them in judicial process or in prison, what increase the doubts about his ties with t he paramilitar ies in a situation called in Colombia, ironically, “Parapolítica”51. However the popularity of the pr esident is very high bas ed on some achievement s in s ecurity like the possibility to travel by s ome roads under former control of the guerrillas:

Die Führung des DAS – Colombian Secret Police - a llerdings hatt e Uribe wegen solche Vor würfe schon mehrfach auswechse ln müssen, seinem ersten DAS-Che f wurden paramilitärisch en Kontakt e nachgew iesen. Auch der Bru der seine s Innenministers paktiert e mit der rechtsradikalen Mafia. Eine Affäre nach ande ren

48United Nations (2005). Universal Period Review Report, cited by Colombia – Europe – United States Coordination Group Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Observatory, Op. Cit. Pg. 1.

49Reyes, Gerardo. “Fo rmer U.S. ambassador says he asked Urib e about drug l inks”. In: El Nuev o

Herald. February 14, 2009.

50Reyes, Gerardo.Op. Cit.

51 The Colombian parapolitics scandal or "parapolítica" in Spani sh (a mix of the t erms paramilitar and política), also kn own in th e Engli sh-speaking press as the pa ragate (from the Watergate scandal), refers to the 2006 - present Colom bian cong ressional scand al in which sev eral cong ressmen a nd other politi cians have been indicted for suspici ons of colluding wi th the Param ilitaries. In F ebruary 2007, Col ombian Senato r Jorg e Enriq ue Robl edo suggested a nother te rm, "para uribismo", pointing that the sca ndal was m ainly affectin g official s or politi cal al lies of P resident Álvaro Uri be's administration. El Tiempo. “Parapolitic caused confrontation between Congressmen and Ministries”. In: El Tiempo. February 28, 2007.

- 58 - beschädigt Uribes Image, obwohl er sich bemüht, alles an sich abtropf en zu lasse n wie an Teflon.52

But as we saw, it could be only the result of a Pax Mafiosa, which is not lasting as the Democratic Peace, particular ly when there is Drug to fuel the war for the control of one of the most profitable illegal business of the world.

52Burghardt, Peter. “Der Teflon-Präsident“.In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 28, 2009. - 59 -

Graphic 16 – % of Extrajudicial Executions committed by Military Units from 2007 to 2008 Source: Colombia – Europe – United States Coordination Group Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Observatory.

- 60 - 1.4 Conclusions

Colombia has been t hrough 3 di fferent wars through the 20 th century, the Mil Dias War, the Violencia and the actual conflict between paramilitaries, guerrillas and State with a focus on drugs traffic. In this wa r the alliance between U.S.A., Government and Paramilitaries see ms to defeat the guerr illas and to establish an apparently Pa x Mafiosa, but there are factors that influence the continuation of the civil war for a long time. The support of U.S.A. to the Co lombian Army and Paramilitaries and th e apparent support of the Venezuelan Government to the guerrillas; the production of a very profitable source (drugs) that finances arms, soldiers and logistic in all parties and pays the briberies for the government o fficers; the relevance of the Oil as a significant source of income for Colombia 53; the third largest population of Latin America (After Brazil and Mexic o), which makes the exchange of th e centre with the periphery difficult (smalls st ates with a little population t end to be more peaceful as we have seen at the beginnin g of this chapter); the mixture of autocracy and democracy what impedes to exert control on the State and makes the State weak, inefficient and very vulnerable to briberies , which is known as “anocracy” or what Huntington called “praetorian regimes”54.

All this factors ensure t he continuation of the w eakness of the Colombian Government and of the traditional ec onomic system, in whic h the lands owners control the wealth of the country and the ma jority of the populatio n stays in poverty making Colombia one of the mo st inequitable countries of t he world. To revert this situation the legaliz ation of the drugs could be essential, it could put an en d to the source of money for the Para militaries a nd the Guerrillas. Without these financial sources the Colombian Army c ould defeat the illegal armies m ore easily and the criminal structure of the dr ug cartels, the mafias could have m uch less c apacity t o influence the national politic and the economy. Once they were defeated or at least

53Oil pro ducers tend to ha ve wea ke st ate appa ratus be cause th ey have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues, see: Chaundry, Kiren (1989) “The Price of Wealth:Business and State in L abor Remittance and Oil Economies”. In: International Organization 43 (1): 101- 45; Karl, Terry L. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty. Berkeley: University Of California Press; Wantchekon, Leonard (2000). Why do Re source Depend States Have Authoritarian Governments?. Ms. Yale University. 54Huntington, Samuel P. (1968 ). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Hav en, CT: Yale University Press. - 61 - disintegrated, the Government could make presence in the zones abandoned by the mafias and exercise a real sovereignty us ing part of the resources used today in the war, to strengthen the governm ent institutions. With the strength of the government, institutions will have more respect for t he human rights, a better distribution of the wealth and the construction of a democratic State, in which, as we see, the peace is an inherent and durable consequence. But the decision about legalization depend s more on U.S.A. and its decis ion of continuing with a milit ary model to s olutionate the problems in its area of infl uence or with a model that promotes democracy and t he respect of the civil liberties.

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The journalism researches, sele cts and presen ts topics those are new, factual and relevant. He acts as a public arena, where he observes the socie ty. This observation through periodic m edia is available t o a mass audience and in this way these constru cted reality offers orientation in a complex world55.

The topics that the journalism takes in focus have three concepts that characterize its selection as important information: 1. Nove lty. The topics referred by the media lie back only some minutes, hours or days, acco rding to the periodicity (interval of emission) of each media, even in the “live emissions” the events happen at the same moment while the journalist infor ms. 2. Fa cticity. It deals with factual ev ents and not with fictions. The rules of the Journalism es tablish the verification of the facts. The facticity appoint to the direct journalisti c s ources. 3. Relevanc e. The topics ar e important for the target group of each media and s ome times for the whole society, it means that they deal with (pre sumably) current public interests. For this reason the relevance appoint to the society and the reference public of the Journalism.

The journalism is in t he modern democracies a free job: each one can call itself “Journalist”. But, who as journalis t work and live is subordinated to the context of the society, to the desires and interests of the public, to t he organizational needs of the media institutions, which they work, and to the available formats of each mediatic platform56. The journalism could be characterized into five contexts:

1. Norms: The general condit ions of the society affect the hi storical and legal formalities, as so mu ch as the political m ediatic decisions of the media system of a

55Meier, Klaus (2007). Journalistik. Konstanz: UVK, Pg. 13 56Weischenberg, Siegfred (1998). Journalistik 1.Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. - 63 - country. How large is the press freedom ? Which traditions and professiona l standards characterize the Journalism?

2. The Public: The reception of the public measured with circulation and rating define the economic success of the media institutions. Only who get enough public can freely exist in the market. For thi s reason the research about the desires and interest of the audience are elementary for the private media. But also public broadcasting s must themselves legitimate their action, bec ause they are granted with the duties of the viewers and listeners. The closeness or distance to the audience in jour nalism is always intensely debated. Be cause traditionally for the journalism the point of reference is the enlighting of the citizens and not the satisfaction of a target group defined through marketing.

3. The Organization: The technical, economical and organizational conditions of each media play a key role. Public and private media have different conditions, technical or organizational transformations implicit different routines.

4. The media produc ts and the journalisti c routines: To produce information the journalists are dependent on one side of t he information and the sources available and on the other side on the available forma ts of each mediatic platf orm. The production for print, radio, inte rnet or television is dominated by traditional fo rms of representation and coverage patterns or generally formulated as media schema: “Ein Fernsehjournalist muss in B ildern erzählen. Lassen sic h keine starken Bilder finden, ist das T hema nic ht fernsehgerecht und kann nur schwer im Pr ogramm untergebracht werden.“ 57

5. The roles: The journalists are specialized in their labor and for each spec ialization exists rules of behavior. They are Editors or Reporters; they are specialized in politic, economy, culture, or in production and research. Each journalist has also - despite all the restricti ons and conditions of moder n communications media - an autonomous scope in which his personal attitude, his training and his self role-under standing influence his labor.

57Meier, Klaus. Op.cit. Pg. 66 - 64 - 2.1 Genres of Journalism

The Journalism has basically four genres : News, The Feature, The Reportage and the Comment; howev er it is possible to find an ample variety of subgenres as result of the combination or modifi cation of these genres; for exam ple, the Portrait is the history of a person (feature); the interview as a technique become frequently as news when the declarations of a per son are the news its elf. In the same way there are many kind of styles: Scientific, Cultural , Sport, Gossip, etc. But in order to concentrate the inve stigation in the most significant points of the journalism, I will explain only the four foundational genres.

2.1.1 News

The news is the most basic, simple and popula r journalistic genre. Its main aim is to give general information about current affairs what results interesting for the audience and the media outlet:

News is any printable story which, in the opinion of the editor, will interest the readers of his paper (or the audience of his broadcast). A story is “printable” if it meets the editorial poli cy standards of the particular pap er; a story will interest readers if it concerns them directly or it makes interesting reading.58

Moreover the news to be news has to fill other 4 conditions:

1. News is always completely true. It can not re sort to conjecture or suppose, it is limited to the facts of the story, told without emotion, prejudice or opinion.

2. News has a quality of recent about it. It is the story of something that just happened or something being told for the first time.

3. News has an element of proximity about it. People are more interested in event s that are near them in time , space, and background. It m eans stories about the city, state or nation and related to the culture, social status, sex orientation and race of the audience (for example: News in The Advocate59 could be not be news in The New York Times).

58Berry, Thomas Elliott. (1976). Journalism in America. New York: Hasting House Publishers. Pg. 27 59It is a LGBT American newsmagazine. - 65 - 4. News must have s ome element of the unusual about it . It can be resum ed in the popular proverb: “if a dog bites a man, it’s not news; but if a man bites a dog, it is news”.

Usually News is structured in two parts: 1.The lead is the part that comes first. It tells the essence of the whole story in a senten ce or two. The news story could be long, but the lead must summarize it. The lead c ontains the five “W”: Where, When, What, Who and Why, when possible, it must contain also the How. 2. Body: it comes after the lead as complement. There are three defined methods to build a body: The Highlight, the Chronological and the Pyramid.

The highlight method dwells on the most important parts of a given event or situation, thus “highlighting” the news. This method is especially suitable for speeches, Sports, public events like openings, parades, celebrations, etc.

The chronological method employs the structure of the tr aditional short story with the climax at the end.

In the pyramid method the facts are ar ranged in descending order, the most important coming in the first paragraph (first pyramid), a fter comes more information in the sec ond paragr aph (second pyramid) and so on. This m ethod is especially useful to the editor, because when he has not space for the whole story, he can cut the end being sure of not elim inate something important: “When the copy editor must shorten a story cast in the pyramid method, he can simply lop off pyramids, beginning at the end and working upwards.”60

2.1.2 The Feature

A featured article is a type of journalistic story t hat entertains and infor ms. But “Entertain” doesn’t necessarily mean “amuse ”, it means that the story calls the reader’s attention with a direct, simple and casual language. Feat ured articles are a long non fictional stor y written with a clear language, it is very subjective, but not an opinion, because its main mission is to inf orm, to suministrate data about a topic, but the events are showed more than told: “The writer may take an obvious point of view,

60Berry, Thomas Elliott. Op. Cit. Pg 42 - 66 - and the story may use fictional techniques to show rather than tell the reader what is going on. In short, it’s a hybrid that requi res you combine a reporter’s skills and a storyteller’s art.” 61

Some writ ers have taken the feature into Art. This development began with the so called New Journalism or Literary Journalism when personalities as Truman Capote and Tom Wolfe realized that t hey can combine the fictional techniques of the nov el with reporting. It was:

The discov ery that it was possible in nonfic tion, in journ alism, to use any literary device from the tradit ional dialog isms of the stream of co nsciousness, and to u se many different kind s simultaneously, within a relatively short space… to excite th e reader both intellectually and emotionally.62

Because of that, smooth transitions, atmo sphere of suspense and nuances ar e more important to the feat ure story than to the news piece, while the news make focus on the five “w” , the feature makes focus in bu ild an ambiance and tell us an inte resting story, for this, many times the news tell us the data (for example, the results of the financial market in Sao Paulo) and the feature tell us a re lated story (the tension of the stockbrokers).

2.1.3 The Reportage

The Fischer Lexicon “Publiz istik” offers a clear definition of Reportage: “Die Reportage ist ein t asachenbetonter, aber persönlich gefärbter Erlebnisbericht, besonders über Handlungen.”63

The reportage has three characte ristics: 1. Facts, the r eportage is in essence news. 2. Personal Experience. The subjective perspective gives to the reportage its style 3 . The reportage must have characters, the journalist self can be a character.

The Reportage must complete the news, but in a lively way, which results closer and original to the reader. The reporter must see, understand and expe rience in order to make witness the situation to the reader. Constantly change maintains the suspense,

61Hay, Vicky. (1990). The Essential Feature. New York: Columbia University Press. Pg. 8. 62Wolfe, Tom. (1973). The New Journalism. New York: Harper & Row. Pg 28 63Projektteam Lokaljournalisten (1990). ABC des Journalismus. München: Ölschläger. Pg. 93 - 67 - und bring dynamic: ”Es muss wie in eine m elektrischen Feld Spannung erzeugt werden.”64

2.1.4 The Comments

A Comment is not news about one event or situation, but rather the opinion of the author about it (not always the authors are journalists). A comment is an explanation, an analysis of data, events and correlations between th em in order to support a personal opinion. In this ki nd of Journalism the author offers according to his experience, knowledge and research, his opini on to the readers to help them to build their own opinion or/and take a position. The comments have five forms: Comment, Editorial, Column, Gloss and Cartoons.

2.1.4.1 Comment

The comment refers to a current situat ion, stress the impor tance of the event, interpret its relevance and ponder different views to offer an insight fully picture of the topic. Generally at the end of the comment the author makes very clear his position (For example: to support or not the Banks; to join or not to the European Union). But in some occasi ons the topi c and the ar gumentations could be parti ally complex and don’t let a clear and unique c onclusion, in this opportunities the intention of the author is t o give some arguments to the r eaders about situations which it is very difficult to take a clear position (Should be allowed the clonation in human beings?).

2.1.4.2 The editorial

It is written by a group of people, usually at a print publication, who dictate the tone and direction that the publication will take about each situation (elections, laws, wars, economic affairs, etc). Editor ials are not written by the regular reporters of the news organization, but are instead c ollectively authored by a group of indiv iduals and published without bylines. In fact, most ma jor newspapers hav e a strict policy o f keeping "editorial" and "news" staffs separately. Editorials are generally printed either

64Projektteam Lokaljournalisten. Op. Cit. Pg. 94. - 68 - on their own page of a newspaper or in a c learly marked-off column, and ar e always labeled as editorials (to avoid conf usion with news coverage). When covering controversial iss ues such as gay marri age, some opinion page editors will run "dueling" editorials, with each staking out a respective side of the issue.

2.1.4.3 Opinion Articles

The opinions pages r eflect the ideas of persons, not the paper´s. The articles hav e signatures and are written by individual freelance writer s, guest opinion writers, syndicated columnist s, or a regular colum nist of the paper. The opinion c olumn is also a commentary, but is far more explic it in its intention to in fluence on the readers minds and in its analysis of the event. It could suggest a solution and speculate about it, it even can be a strong critic on specific groups:

Most omino us, once “pro-family” groups start arguing that gay couples are unfit to raise childre n we might adopt, how long before they argue t hat we’re unfit to raise those we’ve already adopted? If lesbian couples are unfit to care for foster childre n, are they fit to care for t heir own bio logical children? The lo ss in Califor nia last wee k was heartbreaking. But what may be coming next is terrifying“.65

Or it can invite to take action, as in the New York T imes black men were invited to coming out of the closet, accept their homosexuality and support the gay marriage:

So pitch it as a health issue. The more open blacks are to the idea of homosexuality, the more likely black men would be to discu ss their sexual orientation s and sexual histories. T he more op en they are , the less likely black women would be to put themselves at risk unwit tingly. And, the more open blacks ar e to homosexuality ove r all, the more open they are likely to be to gay marriage. This way, everyone wins66.

Anyway it is very important that in all the inf ormation involved, the circumstances ar e weighed, the correlations explained and the reader can understand „What is happening now“ and „How to proceed“ and not „a s well as“; but the „either – or“ as help to form his own opinion:

Wichtig ist, dass alle Inf ormationen einbezogen, die Umstände abgewog en werden, der Leser sich auf die Vertrautheit des Leitar tiklers mit allem Zusammenhänge n verlassen kann und erf ährt. "was d enn nun los ist" und "wie es weiter gehen soll".

65Savage, Dan. « Antigay, Antifamily”. In: The New York Times. November 11, 2008. 66Blow, Chrales M. “Gay Marriage and Moral Minority”. In: The New York Times. November 29, 2008. - 69 - Nicht das " Sowohl-Als-auch", sond ern das "Entweder-Od er" geben am Ende des Leitartikels dem Leser Anhaltspunkte und Hilfe zur einigen Meinungsbildung.67

The author expects that his opinion co nvince and the reader wants it done convincingly. The opinion article not alway s must be referred to current events, but the topic should be close in time, because without temporal closeness no effect on the reader may be exercised.

2.1.4.4 Gloss

It is like a commentary but shorter (the limit could be around 400 words). It i s characterized by a liv ely and humoristic language, with a relaxe d, elegant and light style. The Gloss could focus on light or rele vant topics, but only in one point of the issue, optimally in the most punchline as pect. The conclus ion is its most important value, particularly when it has short, nar row and direct sentences written with irony and humor as Werner Nowag and Edmund Schalk owski defined the conc ept: “Die Glosse ist also eine Spezialform des Kommentars, eben ein Kommentar, der sich der Mittel des Spotts, der Ironie, der Satire, des Sarkasmus, der Groteske bedient."68

The Gloss can take a long distance far aw ay from the commentary, editorial and opinion articles and be totally humoristic, passionate or acid: „Sie kann einerseits unterhalten, andererseits zum Nachdenken anregen, ebenso aber auch verspotten, erfreuen, lächerlich machen, angreifen oder verletzen“.69

2.1.4.5 Cartoons

An editorial cartoon, also known as a politic al cartoon, is an illustr ation or comic strip containing a political or social message that refers to current events or personalities. They can usually be found on the editorial page of most newspapers and magazines, although a few are sometimes found on the regular comic’s page . Editorial c artoons

67Austermann, Anton. (1988). ABC des Journalismus. München: Ölschläger. Pg. 111- 112. 68Werner Nowag , Edmund Schalkowski. (1984). Kommentar und Glosse. Konstanz: UVK Medien. Pg. 184 69Ibidem. Pg. 185 - 70 - can be very diverse, but there is a cert ain defined style among most of them. Most use visual metaphors and caricatures to expl ain political situations, and thus resume a current event with a humorous or emotional image. T heir purpose is to leave a message and try to make think the reader at the same time. In modern politic al cartooning two styles have begun to emerge. The traditional style, know as ' nast-y' style (named after Thomas Nast), involv ing visual metaphors, symbols and labels; and the more “heavy” style that tells a linear story i n the usual comic strip format. Although their style, technique or viewpoints may differ, editorial cartoonists have the same objective: call our attention to important social and political issues.

Most western editorial cartoonists by co nvenience occupy the middle politica l spectrum, however there is an ample variety of tendencies between them, which runs from the ex treme right thr ough the centre to the ex treme left. Fo r example, extreme religious or ideological movements can pr oduce statements and opinions in f orm of Cartoons.

2.2 Theories of Journalism

The Theories of journalism should complete four tasks; a. Representation: They describe the Journalism as a manner of organization of typologies and classifications. b. Explanation: They find through causes an d conditions why the Journalism is like is and not in other way. c. Forecast: They pr edict toward what direction is going the development of the Journalism. d. Normative Task: They argue about desirable goals and developments what Journalism should have.

However, there is not a fundamental theory for the Journalism (as exits a psychoanalysis theory for the Psychology, fo rm example); although there are many disciplines that are ta king part in its theoretic al construction, as the professor Martin von Löffelholz showed it. He described the most important theoretical constructs that influence on the Journalism. In order to illus trate where the focus of my research is and to loc ate the dilemma peace journalis m – journalism of attachment b etween a theoretical context, it will be presented a continuation th e most relevant theoretical influences on the Journalism accordi ng to the Professor Löffelholz´s conceptualization.

- 71 - 2.2.1 Normative Individualism

Normative theories of journalis m are related to ideal functi ons of the press, what the press should do. These ideas ar e best understood in relation to larger claims about the society as political ideal. In principle, there are a s m any normative theories of journalism as there are political system s, from Marxism-Leninism to diverse conceptions of democracy. These theories are, to a certain way, artificial constructs, because politic ians and ordinar y citizens take elements from diverse ideologies without adhering completely only to one of them. However these theories remain as a significant element of professional training . In the practice me dia outlets, private institutions and the state change and alter the principles of the theories of journalism, implicitly or explicitly, through media policies that carry incentives or penalties for any deviant conduct.

Scholars attempting to clas sify normative theories 70 have identified non-dem ocratic theories, including aut horitarian, totalitarian, Marxist- Leninist, and developmental, as well as democratic theories, including libertarian, social responsibility, democratic elite, democratic participatory, public sphere, and postmodern.

Authoritarian theory holds that journalis m should a lways be subordinate to the interests of the state in maintaining so cial order or achieving political goals 71. At a minimum, the press is expected to avoid criticisms about the government members and to do nothing to confront the established system. The press may remain free to publish without prior censorship, but the state retains the right to punish journalists or close media outlets that exceed explic it or implicit lim its on reporting and commentary.

Under more extreme authoritar ianism, or totalitarianis m, a strongly cens ored pres s promotes and extends a totalizing state cont rol over society . For example, this

70Siebert, Fredick Seaton, Peterson, Theodore & Schramm, Wilbur (1963). Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Pre ss; McQu ail, Deni s (2005 ). Mass com munication Theory . Lond on: Sage p ublishers; Fe rree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerh ards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). Shaping Abortion Discourse: Dem ocracy an d the Public S phere in Germ any an d the United States . Cambrid ge: Cambridge University Press; B aker, C.E. (20 02). Media, Ma rkets an d Democracy. Ca mbridge: Cambridge University Press. 71Siebert, Fredick Seaton, Peterson, Theodore & Schramm, Wilbur. Op. Cit. - 72 - situation took plac e in the Soviet Co mmunist countries during the Cold War 72. However, this approach stays today in the 21 st century under the to talitarian politics of Islamic governments and other forms of religious fundamentalism and in som e countries like North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam, and to a certain extent in China, a s the most consistent, self-consciously elabor ated cases. The Soviet normative theory of journalism postulates that media should not be privately owned, but it should serve the interes ts of the working classes, and most importantly , should provide a complete, objective view of the world according to M arxist-Leninist principles, which are defined by the communist party in charge of the state.

Albeit democratic normative theories have been provoking changes into non western media outlets such as the Qatar- based Arabic language cable news channel Al- Jazeera (modeled after the BBC and CNN), it means that even in the most repressive authoritarian states, the language of democracy has become commonplace.

Contrary to the authoritari anism, the libertarianism aims to maximize individua l freedom. John Locke and other liberal ph ilosophers of the eighteenth c entury conceived the libertarian theory 73, which relat es closely with laiss ez-faire capitalism. According to Locke the press should offer a marketplace of ideas, pursuing profits in a natural process believ ed to sustain democracy. Libertarian theory sees the government as the primary if not the only threat to press freedom. Perhaps the best known embodiment of this ideal is the F irst Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which specifies that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the pres s.” This formulation expresses the ideal only in negative terms, as a freedom from state intervention. Pres umably the press, left to its own course, will represent diverse voices and inquire the government being its unique prerequisite the search of its own economic interests. This pure form of libertarianism is alive and valid in the public statements of many news media outlets. (See chapters 3 and 5).

Observers and activ ists who perceive t hat a pur e market orientation does not necessarily support democracy have contra -argued t hat the pr ess must instead assume social responsibility. In 1947 the Hutchins Rep ort defined as responsabilities of the press the factual accuracy, the promotion of open debate, the representation of

72Siebert, Fredick Seaton, Peterson, Theodore & Schramm, Wilbur. Op. Cit. 73Siebert, Fredick Seaton, Peterson, Theodore & Schramm, Wilbur. Op. Cit. - 73 - diverse points of views, and t he protection of civil rights by serving as a watcher that guard against government abuses of authority 74. Any theory that sustain that the press has a voluntary duty to perform posit ive functions, could belong in this category. This ideal has become dominant globally, even among journalists in countries where strongly polari zed political environm ents make it difficult to put into practice75.

Social responsibility theory lacks any syst ematic critique of capitalist media ownership and funding 76. Most journalistic pr ofessional exhortations about ethics are social responsibility theories in th is sense, includ ing not only traditiona l defenses of investigative journalis m but also the rec ent U.S.A. movement for civic journalism 77, because individual journalists ar e supposed capable of performing their d emocratic duties under any circumstances.

Other democratic normative theories also implicit social re sponsibilities, but emphasize some more than others. Legal scholars, philosophers and socia l scientists, rather than journalists, lar gely produced these theor ies, which may not always s hare the assumption against state intervention as a legitimate means to orient journalism democratically . Representative liberal theory 78 or democratic elit e theory79 proposes that democracy works best with highly educ ated elites and specialized technicians in charge. Unde r this perspective the most important responsibilities for the press are to chr onicle accura tely the range of these elite perspectives, to examine the character and behavior of elec ted officials, and to monitor closely their activities fo r corruption or incompetence (the watchdog function)80. In other words, the pre ss should adopt a critical, se rious tone in covering public affairs, defined as the activities of government but also, in extent, of b usiness

74Quoted by Ben son, Rodney. (1 989). “Journalism, Normative Theo ries”. In: International Encyclopedia of Communications. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 75Hallin, D. & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing Media Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 76Baker, C.E. Op. Cit.; McQuail, Denis. Op. Cit. 77The civic journalism movement (also known as public journalism) is, according to Professor David K. Perry of the University of Alabama, an attemp t to aband on the notion th at journali sts and their audiences are spectators in political and social processes. In its place, the civic journalism movement seeks to treat readers and community members as participants. 78Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. Op. Cit. 79Baker C.E. Op. Cit. 80Benson, Rodney. Op. Cit. - 74 - or other powerful social institutions. Demo cratic elite theories tend to be s keptical, however, of whether the press can adequately report and analyze complex matters81.

Pierre Bourdieu’s (1998) values most highl y those forms of intellectual and artistic production free from external ec onomic or political pressures. By analogy, it c ould be understood that he would generally prefer this journalism without monopoly over public communication in order that non-journalist experts co uld directly transmit their knowledge as they see fit. However, Bour dieu’s ideal of complete autonomy could lead journalists (as well as non-journalist experts) to pur sue only their own narrow interests and ignore legitimate concerns of wider publics82.

In democratic participatory theory , journalism should promote actively the political involvement of citizens. The theory emphasiz es principles such as popular inclusion, empowerment, and full express ion throug h a rang e of communicative st yles83. Its theorists emphasize diverse viewpoints and active citizen participation more than the quality of the discourse (whether reasoned, critical, serious, or the like), but there are disagreement on the best m eans to achieve these goals. Populars forms of journalism, for example, might incite apathetic citizens to participate into politic 84, or the mainstream press might provide news from more perspectives 85. In participatory theory, however, small-scale, segmented media, commercial as well as non-profit, are best for promoting grassroots citizen involvement.

With his ideal of the public sphere, the German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989) combines concerns for the quality (reasoned, critical debate) with the quantity (broad representati on and participation) of discourse that journalists mediate86. However, public spher e theory also referred to as the disc ursive87 or republican88 ideal, plac es the greatest emphasis on quality, narrowly conc eived: the press should create a free env ironment where the better ar gument can prevail in the

81Lippmann, Walter. (1997). Public Opinion. New York: Free Press. 82Schudson, M . (200 5). “Autonomy from what?” In R. Benson & E. Neve u (ed s.) Bourdieu an d th e Journalistic Field. Cambridge: Polity. 83Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. Op. Cit. 84McNair, B. (2000). Journalism and Democracy: An Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge 85Gans, H. (2003). Democracy and the News. Oxford: Oxford University Press 86Calhoun, C. (ed.) (1992). Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 87Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. Op. Cit. 88Baker C.E. Op. Cit. - 75 - debate for social consensus. But in order to get this goal, the public sphere should be free from the state as well as the market.

By adaptation, public sphere t heory can fulfill the cond itions in western democracies. Public television as the BBC, for example, armed with legal guarantees of autonomy from political intervent ion, may be t he best current incarnation of the idea l89. French and other continental Eu ropean traditions of t he journalism of ideas rather than of raw information are also consistent90. The ideal inspired the U.S.A. movement among journalists to redefine their role from simply providi ng information to promoting reasoned and civil public debate among ordinary citizens.91

However, postmodern or cons tructionist theories 92, like democr atic participatory theories, have more space for the different styles and forms of discourse that the journalists mediate. Buildin g on the motto, “the personal is political,” post modern theory privileges individual narratives and emot ions over abstract reason, stimulating media p ieces that facilitate t he arti culation of counter-hegemonic interests. Postmodern theory insists on a journalis m open to the widest range of narrative styles and perspectives, especially those em erging from the margins of society as immigrants, gays, racial minorities, alternative cultural movements, etc.

One promising alter native approach, complex democracy 93, acknowledges the shortcomings that any type of news media confronts before the diverse democratic purposes and bec ause of that it encourages divers e jour nalistic practices. Under these postulates a working model should include multiple sector s94: a core sector of public serv ice telev ision, a supplementary private ent erprise sec tor, a professiona l sector under the control of journalists, a civic sector that social organizations support, including political parties, and a closely related sector of ideologically or c ulturally marginal media that operate in the market with partial subsidies from the state.

89Garnham, N. (1986). “Public service versus the market”. In: Screen, 24 (1): 6-27. 90Albert, P. (1998). La presse française. Paris: La Documentation Française. 91Glasser, T. (1999). The Idea of Public Journalism. New York: Guilford Press. 92Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. Op. Cit. 93Baker C.E. Op. Cit. 94Curran, J. (2000). “Rethinking media a nd democracy”. In: J. Cu rran and M. G urevitch (eds.) Mass Media and Society (3rd edition). London: Arnold. - 76 - Through broad reflec tion on the many c onstructs of politic al theory, or through comparative research on media systems, normative theorizing can continue to play a key role in communication education an d research. Value judgments guide all research, and it is important to make implicit nor mative theories explicit. Plural normative theories rather than any singular theory must help to clarify the range of policy and ethical choices that can orient the practice of journalism95.

2.2.2 Materialistic Media Theory

The term “materialistic” refers to the co mbination between dialectics and materialism in Marx's thinking as forces provoking soc ial and ec onomic changes. It i s also in relation wit h the historical materialism whic h is the name given to Marx's study of society, economics and history.

Historical materialism started from a basic schema: the communities have to satisfy the material requirements of life to surv ive and ensure the exis tence from generation to generation. It is obvious, but it was only with Marx that this was seen as foundation for understanding human society and histor ical development. Marx enric hed this premise by describing how in order to carry out production and exchange, people interact into many social relations, most fundamentally production relations.

Production implicates a divisi on of labor in which people not only do different jobs, but some people liv e from the work of other s by owning the means of production. In each society this is accomplished on diffe rent ways. Moreover, these production relations are defined by the character of t he productive forces that are present at any given epoch in history. For Marx, productive forces refer to the means of pr oduction such as the tools, instruments, technol ogy, land, raw materials, human knowledge and abilities to use the means of production.

The main modes of production that Marx identified ar e the primitive communism or tribal society (a prehistoric stage), ancient society, feudalism and capitalism. In each of these historical moment s, people interact and produce their goods in different ways. Anc ient society was based on slav es and masters; feudalism was based on landowners and serfs; and capitalism is based on the capitalist class and the working

95Benson, Rodney. Op. Cit. - 77 - class. The capitalist class owns the m eans of production, distribution and exchange (e.g. factories, mines, land, transports, shops and financial system) while the working class live by exchanging their labor with the capital class for remuneration.

Marx identified the production relations as the econom ic base of the society and in the same way customs, laws , culture, ways of thinking, morality, etc. as the constituted political/ideological s uperstructure of society. All of this not only come from the economic base but also corres pond to the character and dev elopment of that specific economic base. As principl es of the Historical Materialism can be counted the following:

• The human society is based on humans work on nature to produce the mean s of subsistence.

• There is a divis ion of labor into s ocial classes (relations of produc tion) based on property ownership where some people live from the labor of others.

• The system of class division is directly correlated to the mode of production.

• The mode of production is based on the level of the productive forces.

• Society moves from stage to stage when the class on the power is replaced by a new emerging class, by overthrowing t he political system that sustained the old relations of production no longer corresponding to the new productive forces. This takes place in the superstructure of society in t he form of revolution, whereby the und erclass creates new relati ons of production and social relations, corresponding to the new social situation.

Marx’s clearest formulation of his "Materialist Conception of Histor y" was in the 1859 Preface to his book A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably en ter Into definite relation s, which are independent of their will, namely rel ations of pr oduction ap propriate to a given stage in the deve lopment of t heir material forces of production. The totality o f these relations of prod uction co nstitutes the e conomic str ucture of society, the re al foundation, on which arises a legal and p olitical sup erstructure and to which correspond definite forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions t he general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not th e consciousness of men t hat determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of de velopment, the materia l

- 78 - productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely e xpresses the same thing in legal t erms — with the proper ty relations wit hin the framework of w hich t hey h ave operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these re lations turn into their f etters. The n begins an era of so cial revolutio n. The cha nges in the economic f oundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transf ormations it is always necessary t o distingu ish between the material transformation of the e conomic conditions of production, which can be determin ed with the precision of n atural scien ce, and the legal, political, religiou s, artistic o r philosophic — in short, ideologica l forms in which men become conscious of th is conflict and fight it out. Just a s one does not judge an ind ividual by what he thin ks about himself, so on e cannot judge such a period of transfo rmation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social force s of production and the relations of production.96

Many writers note that Historical Materialism represented a break from previous ways of understanding the under lying basis of change within dist inct human societies. The theory shows what Marx called "coheren ce" in human hist ory, because each generation inher its the productiv e forces de veloped previously a nd deve lops them before passing them on to the next generat ion. This understanding contradicts the idea that human history is simply a series of accidents caused by supernatural beings (heroes, prophets,etc.) or forces exerting t heir will on society (God, for example). Contrary this conception sees the history as a result of the confrontation between different social classes related to the underlying economic base.

2.2.2.1 Marxist theories of Media Studies

Within me dia stud ies thinkers t ry to l ook at how a given me dium reconciles the various forces of hist ory, culture, economic s or the material world, and how social actors use that medium to navigate these various meanings and values. Th e central problem for any media theorist, similar to the problem of a Marxist theorist, is to attempt to analyze what is possible and what is limited by a given medium. Or, in other words, how does the st ructure of the m edium limit how this medium can be used and how do social actors work within and against that structure?

Some thinkers are working at the interre lations of Marxism and media studies, and are attempting to analyze the various inte rrelations, contradictions, and possibilities inherent in these two constructs. Some researches s uch as Marxism And Media Studies: Key Concepts and Contemporary Trends by Mike Wayne, Media Ecologies:

96Marx, Karl. (1997). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Moscow: Progress Publishers 1977. - 79 - Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture by Matthew Fuller, Media and Cultural Studies by Meenak shi Gigi Dur ham and Doug las Kellner, Marxism and Communication Studies: The Point Is to Change It edited by Lee Artz, Steve Macek, and Dana L. Cloud, and Hypercapitalism: New Media, Language, and Socia l Perceptions of Value by Phil Graham attest to the st rength of s uch work. Many of these thinkers take as their project the inco rporation of Marxist t heory in light of new forms of media and the current social and historical events:

The method of analysis developed by Marx and Engels, is more relevant to media and cultura l studies scholarship t oday for at least two reasons: t he crisis o f neoliberalism and the collap se of Stalinism….The time has co me for crit ical scholarship to shake off the yoke of TINA (there is no alter native), and start to take seriously the bankruptcy of capitalism and the possibilities of a socialist alternative97.

In addition, this kind of analysis is poss ible accor ding to Kumar due to the contradictory nature of media:

Media texts are contradictory, as all reality is co ntradictory. And contradiction allows for change within the totality of social relations. This change is the prod uct of human beings resisting their conditions of oppression and exploitation.98

And this c ontradictory nature of the media is in turn due to the conditions in which media exist in the modern culture:

In short, ma ss-mediated products ar e determined by various factor s: the systems o f ownership, the process of cu ltural production, the level of struggle, the st ate of consciousness in society at a given time, and so on. A dialectical metho d of analysis would involve studying all these factors within a concrete historical con text so as to explain the multiple mediations that infuse a product of culture.99

In resume, the Marxis m Theories propouse a journalism conscious of its possibilities to denounce the injustice and opression of t he Capitalism and promote a more fair and balanced society.

2.2.3 Analytic Empiricism

The Empiricism holds that the experience t hrough the senses is the only possible manner to know the truth. The term also re fers to the technique o f observation and experimentation used in the natural scien ces. Empiricism is the oppos ite to the

97Kumar, Deepa (2006).”Media, Culture, and Society: The Relevance of Marx’s Dialectical Method”. In: Lee Artz, Steve Mace k, and Dana L. Cloud (Eds). Marxism and Communication Studies: The Point Is to Change It. Pg 71- 86. New York: Peter Lang. 98Ibidem Pg. 84 99Ibidem Pg. 85 - 80 - Rationalism, which holds that the mind may apprehen d some truths directly, without having the mediation of the senses.

The relation between empiricism and Journa lism is related to the means by which a truth claim is constructed by the journalis t. There are basically two ways of justifying truth claims in the epistemology of j ournalism: empirically (most common) or analytically. Journalis m prioritizes an em pirical truth, which strongly stresses observation, measurement, evidence and ex perience. Journalists who prefer the Empiricism dimension believe that truth es sentially requires to be substantiated by facts; they give priority to factual kno wledge over a priori ( analytical) knowledge, while the procedur al and methodological aspects of traditional reporting (investigation, fact checking, etc.) are highly valued. In the most radical form of empiricism, the journalists are merely a wa y to record events and let "the facts spea k for themselves".

On the other side, Journalists who prefer analytical journalism us e the form of the commentary and the opinion article, styles not based in conventional stand ards like objectivity and balanc e, but in it s ability to analyze a situation using a rat ionalistic approach, where the facts are only the starting point, whereas the objective is to give elements to the debate in the public sphere.

2.2.3.1 Analytic Philosophy

Analytic philosophy attempts to clarify, by analysis, the meaning of statements and concepts. Gottlob Frege (1848- 1925) thought that the f undaments for mathematics could be derived from logic and that a ri gorous analysis of t he underly ing log ic o f sentences would allow us to judge their truth value.

The Britis h philosopher Be rtrand Russ ell (1872-1970) combined Frege' s logical insights with the influence of David Hume's empiricism. He worked with A N Whitehead on the philosophy of mathematics attempti ng to show how mathematics could be derived from logic, as Frege did. His wor k in logic led him to examine language. Russell thought that the wor ld was c omposed of atomic facts, and the propositions, if true, must correspond to these atomic facts, for this reason one of the duties of philos ophy was to analyze sent ences to find their 'proper logic al form'. Russell thought that terms such as 'the av erage man' could lead to confusion. In the

- 81 - sentence, 'The average woman has 2.6 children'; the term 'average woman' should be understood as a logical construction. The term is not an atomic fact but a comple x mathematical statement rela ting the numbers of children to the numbers of women. Russell thought that terms like 'the State' and 'Public Opinion' were also logical constructions and that philosophers were mi staken in consider that these concepts exist. 100

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) came to study under Russell in 1912 and contributed to the theory of logical atomism. In his book Tractatus Logic Philosophicus he explains The Picture Theory of Meaning . Wittgenstein argued that s entences, if they are to represent anything, must reflect realit y in the same way that an image does. Sentences contain names that refer to objects or situations in the world. Like Russell, Wittgenstein thought that the surface gramma r of statements hides their logical form. Through analysis a t rue statement would be separated in basic particles whic h pictured the world and logic al constants such as 'if', 'not', 'and' and 'or'. A sentence, which did not picture the world, lacked of meaning101.

If only statements which picture the world, i.e. statements about facts, are meaningful then statements about God, ethics, and much of philosophy are not, strictly speaking, meaningful. This applies as much to Wittgenstein's ideas in the Tractatus as other philosophical ideas.

The called “The Vienna Circle” was profoundly influenc ed by the work of Frege and Russell. W ittgenstein, although not a mem ber of the group, di scussed philosophy with some of its members. The Vienna Cir cle consisted of a group of philo sophically scientists and logic ians. Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) was the official leader; other members were Rudolf Carnap (1891- 1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1945) and Kur t Gödel (1906-78). They started activities in the mid 1920's. Howev er, the combination of Schlick's assassination by a disturbed student in 1936 and the hostility of the Nazis forced the Circle to cease its activities.

The logical positivism that the Circle prac ticed can be seen as a development of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Only v erifiable statements were meaningful, as Schlick put

100Patterson, Wayne A. (1993). Bertrand Rusell´s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. New York: Lang. 101Wittgestein, Ludwig. (1921- 1966). Tractatus Logico Philosophocus. London: Routledge - 82 - it: "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" 102. Anything that was not empirically v erifiable was meaning less. Statements about God, ethics, art and metaphysics, were, for the Circle, literally nonsense. This emphasis on positivism was a reaction against the romantic I dealism that had been influential in German philosophy. The role of philosophy was no lo nger to outline the self awarenes s of the Geist; rather it was seen as a handmaiden to science, devote simply t o clarify concepts.103

In the 1930's, Wittgenstein bec ame critical of his earlier Picture Theory of Meaning . In his latter work, he said that the meaning of a word is no longer it's relation to some atomic fact; the meaning of a word is in its use. We use language in a variety of ways, to talk about economic, politic, scien ce, religion, art and so on. The latter Wittgenstein does not agree with the logical positivists that only scientific statements have meaning: scienc e is only one way to talk about the world, only one 'language game'. A language game reflects a human acti vity, a way of life. As well as a scientific language game, we can participa te in a c ommercial language game, a politic language game, an aes thetic language game and many others. Words derive their meaning from the function they perform within the language game.104

Words are no longer seen as having a particular essence, or to refer to a particular object. A word may have a variety of usages : what these different usages have in common Wittgenstein calls a Family Rese mblance. Members of a family bear a resemblance to eac h other, but no two mem bers of a family (apart from identical twins) look exactly alike. The same is true for the use of words. The word 'game', for example, is used to t alk about rugby gam es, poker games, Olympic Games , soccer games etc. These games do not have one e ssential condition in common; rather there are overlapping and crossing similarities.105

Wittgenstein thought t hat philosophical problems arise when we take a word and try to look at it in is olation from its language game. If we try to define the ess ence of beauty or knowledge, rather than seeing how these concepts are used in context, we

102Haller, Rudolf (Ed.). (1982). Schlick und Neurath ein Symposion. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 103Medina, José. (2007). “Verification and Inferentialism in Wittgestein´s Philosophy.” In: Philosophical Investigations 24(4). Pg. 304-313. 104Brendan, Wi lson (1998). Wittgenstein’s Philosophical In vestigations. Edinburgh: Edi nburgh University Press. 105Ibidem - 83 - will be conf used. The job of philosophy for t he latter Wittgenstein is therapeutic; the philosopher's treatment of a que stion is like the treatment of an illness. The "illness" in question is the bewitchment of intelligence by language. 106

2.2.3.2 Language Games and the Popular Scientific Journalism

What are the characteristics that are capable of making some events, among the millions of events in daily life around the world, to gain a place in a daily newspaper? Some characteristics may have a semantic nature and others a syntactical character. The semantic attributes may be the actuality of a fact, the proximity (in particular the geographical proximity), the consequence (events that change or threaten the life of persons), Human Interest (provocative of an emotion al response) relative to a war, sports, politics, etc, and Prominence of the involved actors.107

In the other side the Syntactical characteristics are related with the relative frequency of a specific fact or cat egory of facts, i n relation to other facts or events. An uncommon fact is an unexpecte d event and a frequent fact is an expected event. In science a frequent sequence of categories of facts may be represented by a scientific law. The unusual fact or s equence of facts demands a par ticular explanation. When the fact or event is of extr eme implausibility or of extr eme rarity we may say that something „extraordinary” occurs. That happens when a natural law that has been confirmed for a very l ong time is contradicted by the occurrence of an event. The uncommonness of an event means that the event is unexpected and that characteristic, independently of the semant ic char acteristics mentioned above, constitutes in itself an important syntactical attribute to the news value.

The term “news” is inseparable from the definition of “j ournalism”. The daily frequency of a news newspaper implies that the today’s newspaper must be different from yeste rday’s. The same st ory may be told, but it will hav e a different aspect, different interpretation or complementary data. The unexpected has the psychological stimulation of an element of surprise and when this el ement is aggregated to the

106Raatzch, Richard (2008). Ludwig Wittgestein zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag. 107Meyer, P. (1991). The New Precision Journalism. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Pg. 52-54 - 84 - semantic attributes of an event; the “news value” of this event receives an extra value.

Popular communication of science, being a hybrid product of scientific and journalistic discourses, has the characterist ics of both. In fact they are different language gam es understood as forms of life .108 This fact originate s some convergences and s ome diver gences relative to each language game . S ome o f these divergences may cause some perverse e ffects in the public if they present the very unusual as pos sibility, for example if they present the recovery of an AIDS patient as something possible for all the AI DS patients. In the journalistic discourse the unexpected is in general, positively evaluated, but in the scientific language game the unexpected fact is considered an exception. For the scientific language game the important is the repetition of facts that form a law and bec ome expected (For example: the fact that until today the AIDS has not cure).

2.2.3.3 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Rorty argues that ever since Descartes ph ilosophy has attempted to provide rock solid foundations for our understanding of the World. But for Rorty, human understanding is not based on some objective structure of 'mind'. Rather we interpret the world through a variety of paradigms. If there is no objective philosophical perspective then the ideal t hat philosophy should be seen as the queen of sciences, determining what counts as k nowledge, is uns ustainable. F or Rorty the aim of philosophers should be: “…to help their reader s, or society as a whole, br eak free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rat her than to provide 'grounding' for the intuitions and customs of the present”.109

Richard Rorty states that t he main aim of pragmatic philosophy is to achieve a society in which there is not metaphysics, no essentialism, nor any kind of “adoration” or cult, from the science, literature or whatsoever.110 This society, as it already exist s in many Western nations of the First Worl d, which have no altars: “and instead just have lots of picture galleries , book di splays, movies, concerts, ethnographic

108Brendan, Wilson. Op. Cit. 109Rorty, Richard (1980). Philosophy and the Mirror of the Nature . Princenton: Pri ncenton University Press. Pg 12. 110Ibidem Pg. 132 - 133 - 85 - museums, museums of science and technology , and s o on – lots of cultural options but no privileged central discipline or practice”.111

Rorty’s ideas can be divided into two parts, the speculative, when he dis cusses Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derri da and Paul De Man, and the pragmatic, when he becomes more political and is more focus ed on the politic al cris is of contemporary times. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature he proposes the br eaking up of the fundamental tradition of Desca rtes and Kant, as well as of analytical philosophy. To replace it he proposes the phi losophy of hermeneutics, in cluding Nietzsche, Dewey , Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Gadamer. 112 He vehemently denies that knowled ge is either merely the result of the mental or linguistic representation of reality, or that it is only a representation of nature.

Rorty distinguishes two projects derived from Enlightenment: the political and the philosophical. According to him, the first of these projects im plicates as much freedom as possible for society, and has been com pleted, while the sec ond, the philosophical, it is not complete. Thus, Rorty recognizes that Enlightenment achieved the abolition of the idea of G od, but he admits that it coul d not abolish the three main fundamental ideas that sustain the modernism in the Western society, which were left for post-modernism to complete: Nature, Reason and Truth. 113It is towards this aim that he dir ects his work as a pragmatist. He stresses that, in order to build a ne w society, it is necessary to have a much mo re direct approach t o reality, free from metaphysics and even from dialectics, more in relation with the existence and the body and its emotions, and with a keener direct observation of everyday life.

From this point of v iew the Journalist has to be an observer of the everyday life free of metaphysics in order to explain concrete situations that affect our societies, but without the intention of findi ng universal essences or tr uths because every thing is contingent. This perspective didn’t see the journalist in his traditional role like the “truth seeker”, but rather like an interpreter of events.

111Ibidem Pg. 132 112Rorty, Ri chard (19 79). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . Prin ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pg. 7 113Ibidem, Pg. 9 - 86 - 2.2.4 Legitimate Empiricism

Over the past 50 year s, a number of authors have attempted to review the literature or offer conceptual s chemes for classifying media effects 114. Lazarsfeld summarized the problem well: This dearth of substantial results is due to the difficult ies of the field, which become apparent as one realizes what a complexity of problems the simple term effect produces. Mass media can affe ct knowledg e, attitudes, opinions a nd behavior of individuals. These effects can be immediate o r delayed, of short dur ation or lon g- lasting. Effe cts upon in dividuals might slowly become transformed into institut ional changes. They can co me about in simple rea ctions or complicated chains as when institutional changes produced by the media in turn affect individuals.115

Along with variations in the conceptualization of the nature of what we understand by effects, studies of media effects may differ due to the special charac teristics of the media or a medium, 116 its content 117, or a specific factor within c ertain forms of communication.118 All of these conceptualizations, as well as many others, have been described as the causal agent in media e ffects studies. In addition, the notion o f causality itself has undergone multiple changes in social scientific philosophy.119

In the 1970s was born a significant trend in media effects research, although the idea had been f irst enunciated in the 60s 120, McCombs and Shaw wer e who the most clearly presented the agenda-s etting hypothesis 121, which indicated that the media set the agenda for public discussion of social issues by supply ing indications about which topic s are important to thi nk about. Agenda setting was transformed from a

114Hovland, C. I., J anis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and pe rsuasion: Psychological studies of op inion chan ge. New Haven, CT: Yale U niversity Pre ss; R oberts, D. F., & Maccoby , N. (1985). “Effe cts of ma ss comm unication”. In: G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of so cial psychology, 2, pp. 539–599. New York: Random House; Weiss, W. (1969).Effects of the mass media of communication. In: G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology, 5, pp. 77–195. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 115Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1948 ).Communication research and the social psychologist. In W. Den nis (Ed.), Current trends in social psychology. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pg. 218–273. 116McClure, R. D., & Patterson, T. E. (1974).”Televisi on news an d political a dvertising: The impact of exposure on voter b eliefs”. In: Communication Rese arch, 1, 3–31; M unsterberg, H. (1916 ). The photoplay: A psychological study. New York: Appleton & Company. 117Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976 ). “Li ving with television: The violence p rofile”. In: Journal of Communication, 26, 173–199. 118McLeod, D. M. (1995). Communicating deviance: The effects of television news coverage of social protest. In: Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 39, 4–19. 119Owens, D. (1992). Causes and coincidences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 120Cohen, B. C. (1963).The p ress, the pu blic an d fo reign poli cy. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press; Lippmann, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan 121McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1 72). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 176–185. - 87 - hypothesis to a research field, inc orporating earlier sociological affairs such as news diffusion122and gate keeping 123. Attempts were also made to relate agenda setting to other theories, such as news framing, media priming, and the spiral of silence.

Research in news framing is concerned with how the information is presented in the news, whic h details are import ant, which are trivializ ed or tangential. T he area is based on early obser vations by Gitlin 124 and studied by a number of researchers in communication and political science 125. The research suggests that, by emphas izing certain aspects of issues, framing has im plications for understanding the changes in the public opinion.

Media priming effects take the notion of priming from cognitiv e psychology, which suggests that people can be “primed” to us e certain stored sets of knowledge in making decisions or evaluations simply by exposing them to an associated stimulus126. But Media priming differs from the p sychological construct of priming in that it suggests that the audience is prim ed to make judgments on such things as political performance through repeated expos ure to news reports on the topic 127. Media priming refers to the associativ e learning which peop le make connections between Government officers and topics, for example, because they are taught those connections through news report s. Frequent presentations of the issues result in audiences’ use of those lear ned links to evaluate the Government officers and politicians. While the psychological construc t of priming refers to an activ ation of mental connections between the prime and t he object of evaluati on, media priming refers to the dominance of certain l earned connections in making an evaluation 128.

122Breed, W. (1 960).Social control in t he news ro om. In: W. Schra mm (Ed.), Mass com munications (pp. 178–194). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 123Becker, L. B., McCombs, M. E., & McLeod, J. M. (1975). The development of political cognitions. In: S. Chaffee (Ed.), Political communications: Issues and strategies for research (Sage Annual Reviews of Communi cation Research No. 4, pp . 21–63). Be verly Hills, CA: Sage. White, D. M.(1950). The “gatekeeper”: A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27(4), 383–390. 124Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley: University of California Press. 125Iyengar, S.(1991 ). Is a nyone respo nsible? How televi sion f rames p olitical issue s. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (19 87). News that matters: Television and American public opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 126Higgins, E. T., & King, G. A. (1981). “Accessib ility of soci al constructs: Inf ormation processi ng consequences of individ ual and contextual acce ssibility”. In: N. Canto r & J. F. Kihlstro m (Ed s.), Personality, cognition and social interaction (pp. 69–121). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 127Kinder, D. R. (19 98a). “Communi cation and Opinion”. In: Annual Re view of Political Science, 1, 167–197. 128Kinder. Op. Cit - 88 - Although the idea of media pr iming has generated a large am ount of research, it is a rather new idea. Ther e are conceptual issues surrounding how it works and how it differs from other related media effects per spectives such as agenda setting or other phenomena such as salience, accessibility, activation, and the psychological concept of priming129.

In the early 1970s Elis abeth Noelle-Neumann’s130 presented her idea of the spiral of silence and by the early 1980s , it had emerged as one of the most researched theories in the field. The spiral of silenc e suggested that people tend to remain silent, rather than express their opini ons, if they perce ive that their opini on is losing ground among the population.

Most researchers studying the spiral of silence pick only certain components to study because the theory requires fairly substantial data to test completely. Alth ough a number of early studies called s ome of the basic postulates into question, empirica l studies support various aspects of the theory 131. A meta-analysis conducted in the late 1990s 132 found that the general concept had sm all but statistically significant support. In addition, in one of the few studies testing the theory over time, McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman 133 used the 1948 election data collected by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 134 and found support consistent with the premises of the theory.

2.2.4.1 Further Explorations

Black Box Theory of Consci ousness holds that the mind is fully understood once the inputs and outputs are well defined, and generally couples this with a radical skepticism about the possibility of ever successfully describing the underlying

129Downing, D.H. John (Ed.) (2004).The Sage Handbook of Media Studies. Newbury Park: Sage. 130Noelle-Neumann, E. (197 4). “Th e spi ral of silence: A theory of public o pinion”. In: Journal of Communication, 24(2), 43–51. 131Glynn, C. J., & McLe od, J. M. (1984). “Publi c opin ion du jo ur: An examinati on of the spiral of silence”. In: Public Opinion Quarterly, 48, 731–740. 132Glynn, C. J., Hayes, A., & Shanahan, J. (1997). “Perceived support for one’s opinionand willingness to speak out: A metaanalysis of survey studies on the “spiral of silence.” In: Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 452–463. 133McDonald, D. G., Glynn, C. J., Kim, S. H., & Ostman, R. E. (2001). “The spiral of silence in the 1948 presidential election”. In: Communication Research, 28(2), 139–155. 134Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfel d, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. (1954). Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. - 89 - structure, mechanism, and dyna mics of the mind. The scien tific notion of Black Box could be referred to the social sphere:

The way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need f ocus only o n its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed the more opaque and obscure they become135.

Understanding how audiences understand media reality is a sub-area within the broader area of understanding what happens while communicating. The first hundred years made a number of assumptions a bout communication; the models div ided communication into v arious areas, sugges ted stages in communication processes, described encoding and decoding of messages, and so forth, but all of thes e models and theories of communication were bas ed on an assumption that either (a) we would nev er know the actual processes th at occur or (b) the processes c ould be logically deduced. As we go through the second century of media effects research, we conclude that the assumptions of (b) are insufficient for a scientific study of media effects, and although (a) may be true in the strictest sense, psychological models and methods for studying information processing hav e pr ovided a c omplex a nd closer model of understanding.136

2.2.5 Critical Action Theory

Critical Theory has a narrow and a broad meani ng in philosophy and in the history of the social sciences. Critical Theory in the narrow sense refers to several gener ations of German philosophers and social theor ists in the Western European Marxist tradition k nown as the Frankfurt School. Acco rding to these theorists, a “critical” theory may be distinguished f rom a “traditi onal” theory according to a specific practical purpose: a theory is critical to t he extent that it see ks human emancipation, “to liberate human beings from the ci rcumstances that enslav e t hem”137. Because such theories aim to explain and transform all the c ircumstances that enslave human beings, many “critical theories” in an ample sense hav e been dev eloped. They have emerged in connection with social movements that identify different aspects of the domination of human beings in modern societies. In bot h the br oad and the narrow senses, however, a critical theory present the descript ive and normative bases for

135Latour, Bruno.(1999).Pandora's Hope. Cambridge Mass; London: Harvard University Press. Pg. 304 136Downing, D.H. John. Op. Cit. 137Horkheimer, Max (1982). Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press.Pg. 244 - 90 - social analysis aimed at decreasing domin ation and increasing f reedom in all their forms.138

Critical Theory in the narrow sense has had many different aspects and quite distinct historical phases that cross several generat ions from the founding of the Institute for Social Res earch in 1929 to the present. Cr itical Theorists hav e claimed t hat socia l inquiry ought to combine rather than separ ate the poles of philos ophy and the social sciences: explanation and understanding, structure and agency, regularity and normativity. This approach, Critical Theorists hold, permits their project to be practical in a distinc tively moral (rather than instrum ental) sense. They do not merely look for providing the means to accomplish some independent goal, but rather seek “human emancipation” in circumstances of domi nation and oppression. This normative task cannot be consummate without the interp lay between philosophy and social science through int erdisciplinary empirical social res earch139. While Critic al Theory is often thought of narrowly as referring to the Fran kfurt School that begins with Ho rkheimer and Adorno and stretches to Marcuse and Habermas, any philosophical approac h with similar practical aims could be called a “critical theory,” including critic al rac e theory, gays studies, and som e forms of post- colonial criticis m. In the following, Critical Theory when capitalized refers only to the Frankfurt School. All other uses of the term are meant in the broader sense and thus not capitalized.

It follows from Horkheimer's definition that a critical theory is adequate only if it meets three criteria: it must be explanatory, practi cal, and no rmative, all at the same time. That is, it must elucidate what is wrong with current social realit y, identify the actors to change it, and provide both clear norms for criticism and achievable practical goals for social transformation. Any truly critical theory of soc iety “has as its object human beings as producers of their own historical form of life”140. In light of the practical goal of identifying and ov ercoming all the c ircumstances t hat constrain human freedom, the explanatory goal could be furthered only through interdi sciplinary research that includes psychologic al, cultur al, and social areas, as well as institutional forms of domination. The first generatio n of Critical Theory did emphasis among on a unique practical aim of social inquiry: the transform ation of the contemporary capitalism into

138Bohman, James. “Critical Theory”. In: Zalta; Edward (Ed). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter, 2003. Available at: URL:http://plato.standford.edu/ /entries/critical-theory/ 139Horkheimer, Max. (1993). Between Philosophy and Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. 140Horkeimer, Max. Op.Cit. Pg. 21 - 91 - a consens ual form of social life. For Ho rkheimer a capitalist society c ould b e transformed only by becoming m ore democratic, to make it such that “all c onditions of social lif e that are controllable by human beings depend on real consens us”141. The normative orient ation of Cr itical Theory, at least in its form of critical social inquiry, is the transformation of capitalism into a “real democr acy” in wh ich such control could be exercised142.

The focus on democracy as the location for cooperative, practical and transformative activity continues today in the work of Jürgen Habermas, as does the attempt to determine the nature and limits of “real democracy” in contem porary, complex, pluralistic, and globalizing societies.

In Legitimation Crisis 143 Habermas argues not only that the demands of capitalis m limit the po ssibilities and significance of democracy, but al so that the state is “crisis ridden” and incapable to solve structur al problems of unemployment, economic growth, and environmental de struction. These cris es promote contestation and deliberation by citizens and their involvement in new social movements. This criticism of the contemporary state is put in the context of a larger relation between democracy and ration ality. Cont rary to “formal” democracy understood as majority will, Habermas opposes “substantive democracy, ” which emphasizes the “genuine participation of citizens in political will formation” 144. The most important notion of rationality that can be applied to this pr ocess is developed in terms of the communicative procedures necessary to make public will rational and to issu e it in a genuine rather than just de facto consensus.

There are at least three aspects of practical reas on relevant to democratic deliberation: pragmatic, ethical and moral uses of reason are employed with diverse objects (pragmatic ends, the interpretation of common values, and the just resolution of conflicts ) and thus also di fferent manners of legitimacy 145. B ecause of this diversity, democratic discourses are often mixed and complex, often including various asymmetries of knowledge and information. Democratic deliber ation is thus a complex discursive network with various types of argumentatio n, negotiation, and

141Horkeimer, Max. (1982) Op. Cit. Pg. 249-250 142Horkheimer, Max. (1982). Op.Cit. Pg. 250 143Habermas, Jürgen (1997). Legitimation Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press. 144Habermas, Jürgen (1975). Op. Cit. 145Habermas, Jürgen (1993). Justification and Application. Cambridge: MIT Press.Pg. 1-18 - 92 - compromise146. Becaus e of the s ocial circumstanc es of large-sc ale and pluralistic modern societies, democratic deliberation requires the “medium of law,” it means that the results of deliber ation must be expr essed through law: “A law then would be legitimate only if it could be agreed to in a fair and open deliberative process in which all citizens may freely continue to participate whatever the outcome147”.

In this way, what is fundamental is not the agreement as itself, but how citizens reason together within a com mon public s phere, whic h im plicates an ideal of citizenship. The unresolved difficulty is that in a complex society, as Habermas asserts, “public opinion does not rule” bu t rather points administrative power in particular directions; or, as he puts it, it does not “steer” but “counter-steers” institutional complexity148. That is, members of the public do not run social processes, but they may exercis e influence through specific institutionaliz ed mechanis ms and channels of communication.

For example, a critical theory of globa lization could show t hat the democratic potential of contemporary societies is bei ng undermined by neoliberal g lobalization and denationalization of econo mic policy. For such theory the solution is t he accomplishment of more democra cy at the internation al level. It is also pos sible that the critical use of democrati c categories may require the reconceptualization of the democratic theory that has formed much of the Enlightenment Criticism in European societies149. Here critical theorists are then one sort of parti cipant in the project of redefining the democratic ideal, and not lim ited to simply showing the lack of its full realization.

One of the main continui ng legacies of Critical Theory has been to s ee tha t democracy is “the unfinish ed project of modernity” 150 and its further realization and transformation a genuine goal even in comple x and globalizing s ocieties. To do s o would involve another and more reflexiv e notion of critical social inquiry, in whic h democracy is not only the object of study but is itself under stood as a type of social

146Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pg. 286 147Bohman, J. (1991 ). New Philosophy o f Social Scie nce: P roblems of In determinacy. Cam bridge: MIT. Press. Pg. 338-339. 148Habermas, Jürgen. (1996). Op. Cit. Chapter 8 149Bohman, James. Op.Cit. 150Habermas, Jürgen (1985). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: MIT Press. - 93 - inquiry. Critical Theory would then have to change its idea of what makes it practical and democratic.

2.2.5.1 Social Inquiry as Practical Knowledge

Various perspectives for inquiry are appropriate in diverse situations. If it is to identify all the problems with cooperative practices of inquiry, it must be able to involv e diverse perspectives. Only t hen will it enable public reflection among free and equal participants. Such problems hav e emerged fo r example in the p ractices of inquiry surrounding the treatment of illness as AIDS. The continued increase of the epidemic and lack of successful treatments brought about a crisis in expert authority, an “existential problematic situation” 151. By defining expert activity through its socia l consequences and by making explic it the te rms of social collaboration between researchers and patients, participants re formulate the practices of medical knowledge and authority. The affected publ ic changed the normative terms of cooperation and inquiry in this area in order that institutions could participate in a public problem solving. If ex pertise is to be brought under democratic control, it is necessary a reflective inquiry into sci entific practices and their operative norms 152. This public test to the norms on which expert authority is based may be generalized to all varieties of research in c ooperative action. It suggests the transformation of some of the epistemologica l problems of the soc ial sc iences into the practical question of how to make their forms of inquiry and research free to the public scrutiny. This demand also means that some so rt of “practical veri fication” of critical social inquiry is necessary153.

Public sphere has become les s social ly and cultur ally homogeneous and more internally differentiated than its early modern form 154. Instead of appealing to a tacit common norm of “publicity” or a set of culturally particular routines of communication, a cosmopolitan public sphere is created when at least two culturally rooted public spheres begin to overlap and cross. Netw orks that are global in scope becom e publics only with the development and expansion of transnational civil societies. The

151Epstein, Steven.(1996). Impure Science: AIDS, Activism and the Politics of Kn owledge. Berkeley: University of California Press 152Bohman, Ja mes (1 999a). “Demo cracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Demo cratic: Pragmati sm, Social Science, and the Cognitive Division of Labor”. In: American Journal of Political Science 43, 590-607. 153Bohman, James. Op. Cit. 154Habermas, J ürgen (1 989). The Structu ral Tran sformation of the Public Sph ere. Camb ridge: MIT Press. - 94 - creation of this c ivil society is a slow and complicated proces s that needs the characteristic elaborated reflexive forms of communication, limit crossing and responsibility of developed pub lic spheres, in which their members can develop the competences of public reasoning to cro ss and negotiate meeting points between persons, groups, and cultures.

In these kinds of ample publics , the s peed, scale, and intensit y of communicativ e interaction could be facilitated by networks such as the Internet, which may represent a positive and enabling manner for doing democratic deliberation and cr eating a space for cosmopolit an democracy. Such a development hardly demands that the public sphere be “integrated wit h media sy stems of matching sc ale that oc cupy the same social spac e as that over whic h ec onomic and political d ecision will have an impact”155. But if the way to do this is thr ough disaggregated netwo rks (such as the Internet) rather than mass media, then we shouldn’t expect th at this ample public wil l exhibit features proper of t he national public sphere. Rat her, it will be a public of publics, of disaggregated netwo rks present in different or ganizations rather than a unified national public sphere.

With the arise of non-gov ernmental organizations (NGOs) and other forms of transnational civil society organiz ations, it is reasonable to expect that two different and interacting levels of multiperspectiva l innov ation may materialize: first, new institutions such as the European Unio n that are more adapted to multiple jurisdictions and levels of governance; and, second, a pu lsating transnational c ivil society that produces public spheres around va rious institutions with the purpose of making their forms of inquiry m ore tr ansparent, accessible and open to a broader class of actors and views. This approach doe s not limit the sources of the democratic impulse to transnational civi l s ocieties; rather, it s upports a vigorous interaction between publics and institutions.

A democratic nation s tate requires a public sphere to create a strong public capable of promoting and understanding debate. But a transnational, poly centric and pluralist society, such as the European Union, requires a different type of public s phere in order to promote sufficient democratic deliberation. A fluid and negotiable order might arise with plural authority st ructures along a number of di fferent dimensions rather

155Garnham, N. (19 95). “The Ma ss Medi a, Cultu ral Id entity, and th e Publi c Sph ere i n the Modern World”. In: Public Culture 5:3, Pg. 254-276. - 95 - than a unique place for public authority and pow er. Without a single location of public power, a unified public sphere becomes an obstacle to democracy rather than an enabling c ircumstance for mass participat ion in dec isions at a single loc ation of authority. The problem for this institution is how to create the adequate feedbac k relation between disaggregated publics and such a polyc entric decis ion making process. The answer to this problem must consider the extens ion of politic al space and the redistribution of political power as a new s pectrum of opportunities for innovative, distributive, and multiperspectival forms of democracy.156

As new forms of critical t heory emerge related to racism , sexual orientation, and colonialism, reflective members of the society have transfor med the democratic ideals and practices u nder the interest of their emanci pation. In debati ng new social situations, the participants of the debate transform the ideals themselves as well as their institutional forms. Although Critical theories are not democratic, their practical consequences are evaluated, verified an d transformed by inquiry into better democratic practice.

2.2.6 Systemic Functional Theory

Luhmann criticized t he sociology of his mo ment as irredeemably subjective and incapable to usefully describe reality: “Act ion theory is reconstructed as structural theory, structural theory as linguistic theor y, linguistic theory as textual theory, and textual theory as action theory” 157. According to Luhmann, the acquisition of new knowledge is derived f rom some recombination of the work of classical theor ists and in this manner social theories go into higher and higher stage of complexity, each one refocusing and realignment the classical theory layi ng in t he foundat ions, in order to do ever more complex theoretical iterations 158.Luhmann understood his personal duty as the complete theoretical reconceptualization of the sociology within a whole c onsistent framework with the aim to explain in a more logic and comprehensive way the development of the sociological constructs.

156Bohman, James. Op. Cit. 157Luhmann, Niklas (1995). Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pg. XVI 158Luhmann, Niklas. Op. Cit. - 96 - For this reason, Luhmann’s sociological systems theory makes only two fundamental assumptions: that reality ex ists, and that s ystems exists 159.The theory argues that knowledge can only exist as a construc tion of human consciousness. From these basic postulates, Luhmann attempts to build a universal social theory:

Theory… claims neither to reflect the complete reality of its object, nor to exhaust all the possibilities of knowing its object . Therefore it does not d emand exclusivity for its truth claims in relation to other, competing endeavors. Bu t it does cla im universality for its grasp of its object in the sense that it dea ls with everything social and not just sections160.

Luhmann clarify three essential differences between his theory and preceding social theories. First, his theory is univ ersal and can be ap plied to all social phe nomena. Second, his theory is self-referential, and capable of examining itself in its own terms. Third, his theory is both complex and abstract enough to accomplish the previous two goals161.

Stichweh162, a student of Luhmann’s, explains that there are two major fields of reasoning that led Luhmann to base his theory on communication rather than action. The first issue was that the actions of psychic systems (minds) and of social systems is difficult to distinguis h using action theory; to Luhmann, the so cial system emerges from the communication between psychic systems (minds), and cannot be understood as separate system “a cting” on the individual. The second issue is that action theory cannot differentiate betw een action and experience. For Luhmann the classification of information is not causally related to actors, and should be classified as experience, not action.163

One aspec t of Luhmann’s theory that is cons iderably different from others social theories is that the pe rson is not seen as the focal issu e to understanding society. In fact, Luhmann’s theor y states clearly that t he individual is not a constituent part of society. This apparent contradictory statement makes sense if one keep on mind that Luhmann’s fundamental social el ement is communication. An indiv idual is only important to society to the extent t hat he c ommunicates. Whatever does not communicate within t he society is not a par t of the society. Psychic systems, or

159Ibidem Pg. 12 160Ibidem Pg. XV 161Ibidem Pg. 18 162Stichweh, R. (2000).“Systems theory as an alternative to action theory? The rise of 'communication' as a theoretical option”. In: Acta Sociologica, 43(1). Pg. 5-14. 163Stichweh. Op.Cit. - 97 - individual minds, can think but cannot co mmunicate. In the social systems view, individuals are only means for social communication.

A system comes into existence as soon as a border can be marked between a set of communications and the context of the communication, or the system’s environment. A system is always less complex than its environment and effectively defines itself by creating and maintaining a bor der between itself and the environm ent. In the case of biological systems, this c oncept of syste mic self-generation was first defined and examined by Maturana and Varela 164.They called the self- generation of biological systems autopoietic. Luhmann t ook the concept from Maturana and Varela because he thought that autopoiesis could be conveniently applied to social systems as well. Luhmann’s autopoietic systems define their own bo rders; produce their own components and organizational structur es. The major benefit from this autopoietic perspective on social systems is that it presents them wit hout ambiguity, and not as something that can be reduced to anything ot her than itself, such as “consciousness” or a sum of actions 165. For Luhmann, communication is no t an “action” performed by an “actor” but a selection performed by a syst em. This "selection" that re sults in communication is sim ilar to Darwin’s “nat ural selection” conc ept. A social system generates communication much as a natural environment generates biological traits.

The selection process that Luhmann defined is actually a synthesis of three separate selections: the selection of information, t he selection of a form, and the s election of an understanding166. Luhmann identifies information as a selection from a “repertoire of possib ilities”167.The form of a com munication is how the message is communicated. The s election of understanding refers to w hat should be understood about the message, however understanding does not refer to the message’s reception by a person, but rather t he li nkage of the message to subsequent communications168. The result of this selection pr ocess is the creation of meaning,

164Maturana, Humberto. & Varela, Francisco. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 165Anderson, N. A. (2003). Discursive analytical strategies: understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann. Bristol: Policy Press. 166Ibidem 167Luhmann, Niklas. Op. Cit. Pg. 140 168Anderson, N.A. Op. Cit. - 98 - which is the medium of commun ication in social systems 169.Social systems construct and sustain themselves in this way through communication.

2.2.7 Integrated Social Theories

In the 1990´s started an invest igation to try to integrate theories that could overcome the dichotomy of system and subject, and struct ure a nd action. In order to try this objective, Christoph Neuberger 170 repositioned the concept of actor-structure- dynamics, introduced by the so ciologist Uwe Schimank, into the field of journalism studies. Under this perspective, instit utional theory and syst ems theories were related. In the Media outlets , for example the Cultural Channel, can be analyzed as institutional complex and a collective of actors. The different stages of journalistic roles, institutions and actions refer to each other in this approach, although are not directly linked.

An integrative perspective was also tried by Siegfried Weischenberg. According t o him, the topics of journalism are related to four context (from the most global): The Media Sys tem (Standard Contex t), the Media Instructions (Structure Context); the Media Message (Function Context); and t he actors (Role Context): “Standards, structures, functions, and roles in a medi a system determine what journalism is and how it supplies reality with designs according to these conditions and rules.”171

However, the research for an integrated t heory in which the link s between macro, meso and micro levels of journalism could be consistently explained, has just started. In the next future, substantial contribut ions might c ome from approache s as the socio-cultural constructivism, which fo cuses on the connections between c ognition, communication, media and culture.

169Luhmann, Niklas. Op. Cit. Pg. 140 170Neuberger, Chri stoph (2 000). „Jo urnalismus al s systembezogene Akteurko nstellation. Vorschläg e für die Verbi ndung von Akteur-, In stitutionen- un d Systemthe orie“. In : Löf felholz, M artin (Hrsg.): Theorien des Journalismus. Ein diskursives Handbuch. Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, Pg. 275-291. 171Weischenberg, Siegfried (1992 ). Mediensysteme, Medienethi k, Medieni nstitutionen. Oplade n: Westdeutscher. Verlag. Pg. 67 - 99 - 2.2.8 Cultural Studies

Cultural Studies is a concept derived from different approac hes as Marxism, Critical Theory, Semiotics, Linguis tic and theories of action. They focus on contextual research and the relationship between cult ure, media and power. In light of the concept’s diverse origins it is not surprisi ng that cultural studies do not represent a closed theoretical construct, especially when the definition of the term „culture“ varies greatly amongst works of cultural studies researchers.

According to the Austrian researc h Rudi Renger, journalism is a „cultural disc ourse“, and a part of popular culture. Journalism as an area of everyday culture serves as a place for the (re) production of meaning, sense and consciousness. For cultural studies scientists, the import ant are not the det ails about how journalistic messages are produced. For them, journalism is rather seen from the recipient’s pers pective as an everyday life resource, which serves the social circulat ion of meaning and pleasure. Media like the daily newspapers are interpreted as a „structure of meaning” as: “literary and visual constructs t hat apply symbolic ways and means and are shaped by certain rules, standards, conventions and traditions“172.

In the current globaliz ation of economic syst ems, world media outlets are developing quickly the production of contents and for this reason the concept of culture is gaining additional signific ance, because in a globa lized world, what separates people als o connects them and offers them the possibility of perceiving as culturally distinct.173

The cultural perspec tive wa s at the beginning lar gely textual, centered on the analysis and criticis m of texts as cultur al piec es, using methodologies primarily derived from the humanities, but with the ti me incorporated more empirical methods vary from traditional quantitative research, empirical studies of specific cases or domains, to more broadly historical research . Issues in this area analyze the politica l economy of the media, audience reception, media effects, media hist ory, and interactions of media outlets with other areas of the society, between other topics.

172Renger, Rudi (2000). Po pulärer Journalismus. Nach richten zwischen F akten und Fi ktion. Wien: Studien Verlag. Pg. 475. . 173Hepp, A. & Loeffelholz, M. (Ed s). (2002). Grundlagentexte zur tra nskulturellen Kom munikation. Konstanz: UVK. - 100 - The Frank furt school started critical co mmunications studies in the 1930s and combined many elements: politic al economy of the media, cu ltural analysis of texts, and audience reception studies. The Frank furt School analy zed mass cultural products within the context of industrial production, in whic h the products of the cultural industries exhibited the same feat ures as other products of mass production: comodification, standardization, and massifi cation. Howev er the products of the cultural industries had the specific functi on of supplying ideologic al legitimization of the capitalist societies and of integrating the audience into the framework of mass culture and society. 174 Adorno’s analyses of popular music, Lowent hal’s studies of popular literature and magazines, Herzog's studies of radio soap operas, and the critiques of mass culture developed in Hor kheimer and Adorno's study of the culture industries provided many examples of the usefulness of the Frankfurt school approach. Moreover, in their theories of the cultural industries an d critiques of mass culture, they were t he first to methodi cally analyz e and criticize mass mediated culture and communications from the angle of the critical social theory. They were the first social theorists to recogniz e t he importance of what they called the cultural industries in the reproduction of contemporary so cieties, in which the so called mass culture and mass communication lay in the center of leisur e activity, act as important agents of socializatio n and mediate the polit ical reality. Because of that, these industries should be understoo d as institutions with diverse economic, politic al, cultural and social effects.

However there are s erious limitations in the original program of critical theory which requires a radical rec onstruction of the analysi s of the cultural industries; it would include m ore empirical resear ch about the media industries and the audienc es´ recepcion and effects 175. This reconstruction of the classical Frank furt school project would empower and revalidate the critical theory of society and its activity of cultura l criticism.

In addition, the Frankfurt school dichot omy between high cultur e and low culture should be substituted for a more unified model that tak es culture as a spectr um and applies similar critical methods to all cu ltural products vary from opera to popular

174Kellner, Douglas (1 989 a ). Jean B audrillard: F rom Marxi sm to Post Modernism and Beyond. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 175Kellner, Dou glas. (1 989 a).Op. Cit; Kellner, Dou glas (198 9b). Critical the ory, Ma rxism, and modernity. Cambridge and Baltimore: Polity and John Hopkins University Press. - 101 - music, from contemporary liter ature to realities s hows. In particular, the Frankfurt school model of a uniform ma ss culture contrasted with an ideal of "authentic art," which c ircumscribed critical, s ubversive, and emancipatory moments to certain privileged elements of high culture, is highly problematic:

In the 1930 s model of critical theor y, theory was suppo sed to be an instrument of political pra ctice. Yet t he formulation of the t heory of th e culture industries by Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) in the 1940s was part of their turn t oward a mo re pessimistic phase in which they e schewed concrete politics and gen erally locate d resistance within critical individuals, like themselves, rather than within social group s, movements, or oppositional practices. Thus, th e Frankfurt School ultimately is weak on the formulation of opposition al practice s and cou nter-hegemonic cultur al strategies176.

The Frankf urt school position that all mass culture was ideologic al with the goal of duping a passive mas s of consumers, it is also questionable. One shou ld also allow expecting for the possibility that critical and subversive moments could be exist in the production of the cultural industries, as we ll as the canonized hi gh culture that the Frankfurt school seemed to prefer as the place of artistic opposit ion and emancipation. It should consider the audien ce as active, which often produces its own meanings and uses for the products of the cultural industries.

Furthermore, study of the process of production discloses how the structure of media institutions modeling the nat ure of information and ent ertainment and influence on the Agenda Setting. The system of production often determines what kind of products will be produced, what can and cannot be said and s hown, and what kind of effects the text m ay generat e. Semiotic study of codes, for example, is expanded by studying t he formulas and c onventions of television, film, and video or music production. These cult ural forms are struct ured by well defined and structured rules and conventions. The study of the production of culture can help elucidate the code s actually in play. Bec ause of their control by giant corporations oriented primarily toward profit, film and television production in the U.S.A, for in stance, are dominated by genres and cycles of the mo st popular types of producti on. This economic aspect explains why there is prevalence of cert ain genres and subgenres , “sequelmania” in the film industry, crossovers of popular films into television series, and at some extent

176Kellner, Douglas. (200 6). “No respect? Di sciplinary and Me dia Studies in Communication. Media Communication Vs. Cultu ral Studie s: overcoming the Divid e”. In: Communication T heory 5 (2). Pg.162- 177.

- 102 - homogeneity in products cons tituted within systems of production with rigid generic codes, formulas, conventions, and well delimited ideological borders.177

From this point of view to do a comp rehensive and adequate study of a mediatic phenomenon as Madonna and her effects, for instance, it is not enough to analyze the texts of the lyrics and their reception by the audience. It is necessary to situate the cultural meaning of the Material Girl during the c onservative era of the pr esident Ronald Reagan. In the same way Madonna should be related to the arising of MTV in which music videos and image became ess ential to the production and reception of popular music. In analyzing Madonna's rec eption, it s hould be necessary to observ e at the social construc tion of teenage gi rls and the ways that consumption patterns were producing new forms of teen culture. It should be an alyzed sociologically the ways whic h Madonna articula ted rebellion against middle class conformity that caused an answer in young girls and the ways that she resignified this protest in ne w forms of consumption and im age production. One must analyze how Madonna als o incorporated people belongi ng to minorities; especially hispanics, blacks, gays and bisexuals into her videos. Finally, it should be understood how Madonna herself became an important media industry and co rporation. Only through bringing suc h elements into the cultural analy sis can one adequat ely explicat e the meanings and effects of Madonna's music (and Madonna as a text) and their appropriations by multiple and varied audiences.178

Cultural st udies hav e provided indis pensable tools f or communications r esearch. Study of the production and effects of the te xt of the "Colombian War" require the tools of cultural studies to describe how the images and discours es of the “War on Drugs” mobilized audience support for the U. S.A. intervention. Using the tools of cultural studies enables one to show how images of poverty, ethnic groups, authority, "our peasants", “our kids”, "the criminals" (Drug barons) and other components of the current propaganda helped to structure audience support and mobilize consent to the U.S.A. paid fumigations, precisely, against many crops of small farmers. Study of the language and discour ses of the war is also important to analyzing the war on drugs as a media event and a moral chrusade (for U.S.A. and Colombian Government, the drugs are not a public health problem, but something wrong). From this perspective it

177Kellner, Douglas. Ibidem 178Fiske, J. (1989). Reading the popular. Boston: Unwin Hyman. Pg. 98. - 103 - would be possible to deconstruct the co mbat that the Propaganda makes between the “evil” (guerrillas) and t he “g ood” (The Colomb ian Army and the Presid ent) an d one should relate this schem a to the popular narrative schema used in the Colombian soap operas, where evil people (res entful and alone) want to destroy the goodness of the lovers. Thus, in many ways, the methods of cu ltural studies can enrich and strengthen communications studies.

2.2.9 Journalism as Occupation

The Projec t for Excellence in J ournalism179 has postulated 9 principles for the excellence of the profession:

Journalism’s first obligat ion is to the truth . Democracy depends on citizens having reliable, accurate facts put in a meaningf ul context. Journalism does not p ursue truth in an abs olute or philosophic al sense, but it can and must purs ue it in a practical sense. This "journalistic truth" is a process that begins with the professional discipline of assembling and verifying facts. Then jour nalists try to convey a fair and reliable account of their meaning, valid for now, subj ect to further investigation. Journalists should be as transparent as possible about sources and methods so audiences can make their own asses sment of the informati on. Even in a world of expanding voices, accuracy is the foundation upon which ever ything else is built: context, interpretation, comment, criticism, analysis and debate. The truth, over time, emerges from this forum. As citizens encounter an ever great er flow of dat a, they have more need not less for identifiable s ources dedicated to v erifying that information and putting it in context.

The first loyalty is with the citizens . While news organizations answer to many constituencies, including advertisers and shareholders, the jour nalists in those organizations must maintain allegiance t o citizens and the larger public interest above any other if t hey are t o provide t he news without fear or favor. This commitment to citize ns first is the basis of a news organizati on's credib ility, th e

179The Proje ct Excellen ce i n Jou rnalism (PEJ) is a rese arch o rganization d edicated to tying to understand t he pe rformance of the news m edia and the re volution tran sforming info rmation. It specializes in using empirical methods, particularly content analysis. It is non partisan, non ideological and non political and does not engage in advocacy. Begun in 1997, PEJ was affiliated for nine years with the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. In July 2006, PE J began to e xpand its research activities sub stantially and b ecame pa rt of the Pew Re search Center in Wa shington, D.C. Since its inception, PEJ has been underwritten by the Pew Charitable Trusts. - 104 - implied covenant that tells t he audienc e the coverage is not slanted for fri ends or advertisers. Commitment to citizens al so means journalism should present a representative picture of all constituent gr oups in society. Ignoring certain citizens has the effect of disenfranchising t hem. The theory underlying the modern news industry has been the belief that credibili ty builds a broad and loyal aud ience, and that economic success follows in turn. In t hat regard, the bus iness people in a news organization also must nurture , not exploit, their allegian ce to the audience ahead o f other considerations.

Its essence is a discipline of verification . Journalists rely on a professional discipline for verifying information. When the concept of objectivity originally evolved, it did not imply that journalists are fr ee of bias. It called, rather, for a consistent method of testing information, a transpar ent approach to evidenc e, precisely, so that personal and cultural bias es would not undermine the accuracy of their work. The method is objective, not the journalist. Se eking out multiple witnesse s, disclosing as much as possible about sourc es, or ask ing v arious sides for comment, all signal such standards. This discipline of verification is what separates journalism from other modes of communication, such as propaganda, fiction or entertainment. But the need for professional method is not always fully recognized or refined. While jour nalism has developed various techniques for determining facts, for instance, it has done less to develop a system for testing the reliability of journalistic interpretation.

Its practitioners m ust m aintain an independence from those they cover . Independence is an underlying requirement of journalis m, a cornerstone of it s reliability. Indepen dence of spirit and mind, rather than neutrality , is the principle journalists must keep in focus. While ed itorialists and commentat ors are not neutral, the source of their credib ility is still their accuracy, intellectual fairness an d ability to inform, not their devotion to a certain group or outcome. In our independence, however, we must avoid any tendency to stra y into arrogance, elitism, is olation or nihilism.

It m ust serve as an indep endent m onitor of power. Journalis m has an unusua l capacity to serve as watchdog over those whose power and position most affects citizens. The Founders recognized this to be a rampart against despotism when they ensured an independent press; courts have affirmed it; citizens rely on it. The

- 105 - journalists have an obligation to protect this watchdog freedom by not demeaning it in frivolous use or exploiting it for commercial gain.

It must provide a forum for pub lic criticism and compromise. The news media are the common carriers of public discu ssion, and this responsibility forms a basis for our special privileges. This discussion serves so ciety best when it is informed by fact s rather than prejudice and suppos ition. It also should strive to fairly repres ent the varied viewpoints and interests in society, and to place them in context rather than highlight only the conflicting fringes of debate. Accuracy and truthfulness require that as framers of the public discus sion we not neglect the point s of common ground where problem solving occurs.

It m ust strive to make the signi ficant interesting and relevant. Journalism is storytelling with a purpose. It should do mo re than gather an audienc e or catalogue the important. For its own survival, it must balance what readers know they want with what they cannot anticipate but need. In short, it must stri ve to make the signific ant interesting and relevant. The effectiveness of a piece of journa lism is measured both by how much a work engages its audience and en lightens it. This means journalists must continually ask what information has mo st value to citizens and in what form. While journalism should reach beyond such topics as government and public safety, a journalis m overwhelmed by t rivia and fa lse s ignificance ultimately engenders a trivial society.

It must keep the news comprehensive and proportional. Keeping news in pr oportion and not leaving important things out are also cornerstones of truthfulness. Journalism is a form of cartography: it creates a map fo r citizens to navigate society. Inflating events for sensation, neglecting others, stereotyping or being disproportionately negative all make a less reliable map. The map also s hould include news of all our communities, not just those with attractive demographics. This is best achieved by newsrooms with a div ersity of backgrounds and pers pectives. T he map is only an analogy; proportion and comprehensivenes s are subjective, yet their elusiveness does not lessen their significance.

Its practiti oners m ust be allowed to exercise their personal conscienc e. Every journalist must have a personal sense of et hics and responsibility, a moral compass. Each of us must be w illing, if fairness and accuracy require, to voice differences wit h

- 106 - our colleagues, whether in the newsroom or the executive suite. News organizations do well to nurture this independence by encouraging individuals to speak their minds. This stimulates the intelle ctual diversity necessary to understand and ac curately cover an increasingly diverse soc iety. It is th is diversity of minds and voices, not just numbers matters.

2.3 Journalism of Attachment and Peace Journalism

According to the Heidelberg Institute on In ternational Conflict Research, in the 2003 were 35 wars with a massive amount of vi olence: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, Congo, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, K ashmir, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Ugand a to only name some of them. Facing these wars many journalists think about their role and wether they can do something to contribut e to a peaceful conflict resolution. One of the most famous of these journalists is Martin Bell who believes that Journalism “is not a neutral and mechanical undertaking but in some sense a moral enterprise”, and who created the concept of Journalism of Attachment.

2.3.1 Journalism of Attachment

The news media are prone to use simplifie d frameworks and shorthand explanations. When faced with critic ism of their work, jour nalists often po int to practical limitations such as lack of time, or not audience interest. BBC correspondent Kate Adie, for example, said about reporting Bosnia that if she offered complex e xplanations she would lose out with the audience „It is not that viewers are si mplistic, it is just than in understanding any complex problem people wish to look for what i s right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad.“ 180 Similarly, Jean Seaton 181 argues t hat journalists resort to clichés bec ause t hey are under pressure from deadlines and strict news rules, in impressive situations which they have littl e ti me to understand and are constrained by audiences with very shor t attention periods. No doubt lack of time, pressure of deadlines and a low estimation of their audience motivate reporters to adopt simplified int erpretative schemas, thereby reducing complex situations to easily comprehensive and clearly discernable stories. Despite these practical factors,

180Adie, Katie. In an interview at The Guardian. January 18, 1993 181Seaton, Jean. (1999). “Why Do We Think The Serbs Do It? The New .Ethnic. Wars and the Media”. In: Political Quarterly 70, 3, Pg. 254-270. - 107 - it is important to emphasize the fact that many journal ists agree with the black and white moralism which frames contemporary conflicts.

It explains the reason why journalists w ho did longer, background pieces, seeking to explain and contextualize the wars in ma ny occasions use simple black and whit e interpretations, and failed to question or to c hallenge the official explanat ions of the conflict. For example, the BBC182 main evening bulletin on 26 March 1999 featured two background reports. One was suppos ed to give an explanati on of the events in Kosovo, which had c onvinced NATO to inte rvene. The blame for th e conflict fell on Slobodan Milosevic as unique r esponsible fo r the break-up of Yugoslavia over the 1990s. The second inform explained that NATO didn’t want to get involved into the war, but it had been f orced into bombing as consequence of the Evil of M ilosevic. The BBC programme Panorama devoted a complete edition to an alyze The Mind of Milosevic three days later. Even when reporters were not constrained by news deadlines or short bulletins, t here was still a very clos e similarity between journalistic explanation and the of ficial justifications for war offered by NATO spokesmen. As in previous conflicts, journalists reproduc ed official schemas of selec tion and interpretation of events183.

In the same way the discourse of Good versus Evil deploy ed by NATO leaders in Kosovo corresponds with interpr etative frames which journalists , commentators and intellectuals had helped to build during the Bosni an c onflict. Based on their experience in reporting from Bosnia, a num ber of high profile British and American reporters advocated a more partisan, comm itted and moral style of reporting. Most prominently, former BBC c orrespondent Martin Bell proposed a Journalism of Attachment who establishes clear differences between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor184. Similarly, CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour sustain that objectivity must go hand in han d with mor ality: “Once you treat all s ides the same in a case such as Bosnia, yo u are drawing a moral equivalence between

182The BBC is the bi ggest media outlet of the world, and although it is a qualitative media, not all its programming exhibits the same quality. 183Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1988). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books. 184Bell, Martin. (1998 ). “The Journalism of Attachment”. In: M. Kieran (ed.), Media Ethics. Pg 15-22. London: Routledge. - 108 - victim and aggressor. And from here it is a short step to being neutral. And from there it is an even shorter step to becoming an accessory to all manners of evil.”185

During the Bosnian war, some “moral” journalists start ed personal crusades as Nik Gowing notes: “there is more evidence than many media personnel care to admit that journalists embarked on crusades and became partial…”186 taking part in favor of the Bosnian Muslim government, while demonizing the Serbs.

In Bosnia, these moral journalists saw themselves as critics of Western governments, aiming to force politic ians into action by arousing public indig nation. The partisan style of “moral” journalism came from the idea that the West was potentially a force of Good against the Evil that repor ters thought they had found in the Balkans. But as many, Stephen Ward objects that “a journalism of attachment that thinks it knows the answers is not what we need in a pluralistic society with few common standards.”187

In the same line of critics, David Bind er, veteran Balkans correspondent for the New York Times, reported that the US policy through the 1990s was guided by a simplistic dogma that blames one nation, the Serbs, as the origin of evil in the Balkans : ”Portraying the Serbs as such is an unwritten doctrine adopted by the State Department at the beginning of the Yugoslavian conflict s and c ontinued t oday, a doctrine endorsed and spread by the main stream media, hum an rights groups and even some religious communities.”188

With some justification the Guardian’s reporter Maggie O’Kane complained of the criticisms which Blair’s spokesman, Alasdair Campbell, leveled at media coverage of Kosovo: “ Campbell should ac knowledge that it was the pr ess reporting of the Bosnian war and the Kosovar refugee crisis that gave his boss the public support and sympathy he needed to fight the good fight against Milosevic” 189. Quite reasonably, O’Kane wanted some credit for having made bombing the Serbs into the ethical

185Quoted by Hume, Mick. (1997 ). Wh ose Wa r Is It Anyway? Th e Dan gers o f the Journal ism of Attachment. London: Informinc. Pg. 6 186Gowing, Nik. (1997 ). Media Coverage: Help or Hi ndrance in Co nflict Preve ntion? Re port to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Carnegie Corporation. Pg 25-26 187Ward, Steph en J. (199 8). An An swer to Martin Bell: Obje ctivity and Atta chment in Journ alism. Press/Politics 3, 3, 121-125. 188www.msnbc.com/news/382058.asp 189Quoted in: Gl ass, Charles (1999). “Hacks versus Flacks: Tales from the De pths”. In: Z Magazine, August, 1999. Available at http://www.zmag.org - 109 - crusade which NATO claimed to be leading. After all, it was she and many other journalists, long before Blair was even elected, who had said that “something must be done” by the West in Yugoslav ia. Ward cri tic of this style of journalism turned out to be prophetic:

The moralizing, attached journalist may get it wrong, with harmful consequences . ..I fear that an unfettered journalism of attachment would devo lve into unsubstantiated journalism where biases parade a s moral principles…With out the cr itical perspective of objectivity, journalists, as „eager participants“, may fall into the dogmatism that they have the one truth or the uniquely right moral standard. That road leads to disaster190.

Many reporters found in the postulates of the journalis m of attachment an easy way to explain conflicts, while at the same time left them the sens ation that the reporter could “defend” the “poor” victims, blame the victimizers and in this way contribute to a better world, like in a certain kind of a moral crusade for the peace:

The Journalism of Attachment mig ht sound like a worthy appeal for concerne d reporting. But it is a me nace to good journalism and to thos e whose lives it invades. Rather than exposing the political and social roots of wars, the Journalism of Attachment depicts the m as exclusively moral struggles in which Right fights Wron g. It reduces complex conf licts to simple fairy tale confrontations between the innocent and the forces of darkness. To achieve that journalists have to appoint themselves as judges of who is Good or Evil in the world. And that means a journalist’s responsibility to report all of the facts can come a poor second for broadcasting what is considere d the morally correct line. 191

This schema of “Good” and “Bad” actors could be understood as a therapy, where the journalist acts in a very emotional way, far away of his professional role, maybe because he himself is troubled by the war as a witness and/or indirect victim:

In launchin g their mission to vanq uish “evil” in Bosnia or Rwanda, (reporters) are using other people’s life and death conflict to work out their own e xistential angst, turning the world’s war zones into priv ate bat tlegrounds where troubled journalists can fight for their own soles by playing the role of crusader192.

In the same way the journalism of attachm ent could be very useful to some of the political ac tors of the conflict and to the same extent to their propaganda: “The Political establishment in Am erica and Europe did not want to get involved, so they

190Ward, Stephen J. Op. Cit. 124 191Ibidem Pg. 4. 192Hume, Mick. Op. Cit. Pg. 18 - 110 - wrote it off as a Balkan t ragedy w here ancient ethnic hatreds had been awakened.”193

In general the journalism of attachment is criticized because it is written to achieve an end (denounce the evil) rather than inform, and subordinate the journalistic labour to this end, driving to misunderstandings and promoting the hate against one group (the evil); what turns the “attachment” into promotion of the war:

…the agenda driven coverage of the journalism of attachment increases, rather than reduces, the errors of distorted consensual reporting: moral certainty, lack of balance, selectivity, over simplification, d ichotomization, polarizat ion, dismissa l of contrary or dissenting evidence, refusal to critically evaluate claims and insufficien cy of context.194

2.3.2 Peace Journalism

Another response to the dilemm a of the journalists before cruel conflicts and their roles as agents of the public opinion, it is the so ca lled Peace Journalism. The concept was coined in the 19 70´s by the Norwegian r esearch Johan Galtung, but it was only until the Gulf War (1991) that it became a relevant topic in the journalistic debate. T raditionally news coverage focuses on the oc currence of the violence and its visible effects, such as dead, casualties, ref ugees, economic problems and material damage; moreover it has the t endency to take a side (normally the winner side) and explains the situation in terms of “we”, “our side” and “they” and the “other side”, because it focuses on the war some authors define it as “War Journalism”195:

Given its strong victory orientation, this model of journalism suspends the coverage of peace initiatives- at least as long a s it is not clear who will t he war. At the conclu sion of hostilities, War or Vi olence Journalism turns its attentio n to the next “hot” confli ct arena and may return if the old conflict flickers up again196.

193Loyn, David (2007). “Good Journalism or Peace Journalism?”. In: Conflict & Communication Online 6(2). Available at www.cco.regener-online.de 194Hammond, P hilips. (200 2). Moral Com bat: Advo cacy Journali sts and the n ew Hum anitarianism. Available at: myweb.Isvu.ac.uk/hammond-pb/2002.html 195We can find this sche ma in inform s of the we stern me dia ab out cu rrent conflicts li ke I raq o r Afghanistan. 196Hanitzsch, T homas (2 004). “Jo urnalists as Pea cekeeping Force ? Peace Journalism an d Mass Communication Theory”. In: Journalism Studies 5(4): 481-493. - 111 - Dov Shinar has resumed this orientation towa rd war of the traditional news coverage in 6 preferences197:

1.For violence, sensatio nalism, personalizat ion, patriotism and exclusion-inclusion - biases toward certain countries, groups and persons. 2.For simple descriptions rather than analyses of complex conflict origins, causes and context. 3.For fighting parties rather broader human and other conflict dimensions. 4.For coverage of conflict only when manifest violence occurs or is about to occur. 5.For `sports-like`, “us versus them”, situations that seek visible event s and result s, damage and victims, winners an d losers, ra ther than lo nger processes of conflict resolution or transformation. 6.For the relatively lower news value of peace-related stories and topics.

Moreover, the traditional new s coverage and its war ori entation represent the peace initiatives a s a po litical strategy to win ti me, or as rhetoric games to hide the rea l intentions of the parties in volved, or as a fragile agreement susceptible of being broken giv en any pr ovocation. At the same extent, the peacemaking language is understood as doublespeak and distortion.198

On the other side, peace journalism aims to explore the backgr ound of a conflict formation in order to offer a clear cause-e ffect to the audience and avoid indicating guiltiness. It seeks causes on every party and gives space to the points of views of all parts involved: “A general win-win orientati on ensures that not si mply a certain party (the “others”) is seen as the pr oblem, but the conflict itself.” 199 Nohrstedt & Ottosen have found 6 tendencies of peace journalism as opposed to the 6 preferences of “war journalism” 200:

1. Exploring backgroun ds and cont exts on conflict formatio n, and presenting causes and options on every side so as to portray conflict in realistic terms, transparent to the audience. 2. Giving voice to the views of all rival parties. 3. Offering creative ideas for conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping. 4. Exposing lies, cover up attempts and culpr its on all side s, and revealing excesse s committed by, and suffering inflicted on, people all parties.

197Shinar, Dov. Shinar (2007). “Pea ce Journalism: Th e State of the art ”. In: Shinar, Dov & Kempf, Wilhelm (Eds .), Conflict & Com munication Onli ne, 6 (1 ) 2 007. Berlin: Re gener. Available at: www.cco.regener-online.de Pg. 2 198Dente Ross, Susan (2006).(De)constructing conflict: A focuse d review of Wa r and Peace Journalism 5(2). Berlin: Regener. Available at: www.cco.regener-online.de 199Shinar, Dov. Op Cit. Pg. 189 200Nohrstedt, Stig A. & Ottosen, Rune. “War Journalism in the Threat Society: Peace Journalism as a Strategy for Challenging the mediated Culture of Fear?” In: Conflict and Communication on line, 7 (2) 2008. Available at: www.cco.regener-online.de - 112 - 5. Paying attention to peace stories and postwar developments more than the regular coverage of conflict. 6. Promotin g realistic and cautiou s attitudes with respect to the su ccess peace journalism might have in overcoming resistan ce and reject ion, as well as crit icizing excessive enthusiasm on the part of peace journalism supporters.

As Shinar said, peace journalism is strongly committed to the prevention and the end of violence and war. For this reason, it informs about cr eative conflict solutions, the peace making efforts and postwar developm ents. But it does not mean an advocacy in favor of peace nor a crusade for peac e; which would rather be journalism of attachment. Journalism as a de-escalation effort must be a natural conseq uence of qualitative journalism, based on the pr inciples described above – truth, independence, interest in the citizens, etc - and conceived as a free forum to exercise criticism.

Peace must not be an additional assignment . Journalists are responsible for the wa y they report because they hav e obligations derived from the role assigned to journalism in democratic societies. Peace j ournalism is a process which has at least two steps: 1. De-escalation oriented conflict coverage for the societies at wa r, and 2. Solution or iented conflict coverage, w hen the parties agree to develop a peac e process.201

It does not imply a naive conc eption of journa lism or t he journalists as social actors and/or as members of economic enterprises. The journalists are under the pressure of many social and working conditions, but the routines sh ould be changed. As recent studies have shown, the public is mu ch less oriented in its preferences to news factors like s implification, negativism and personal ization than is c ommonly assumed.

Although there is still a need for further intensification of bas ic peace journalistic research and the critical examination of so many myths which journalism shares with media studies, 202 unders tood as a form of quality j ournalism, constructive conflict coverage proves to have future prospects that can, however, only gain broader

201Kempf, Wilh elm; Anna bring, Ute; Hamdorf Do rothea; Jae ger Susanne. “ Constructive Conflic t Coverage.” In: The Au strian Study Center fo r Pe ace and Co nflict Re solution (Ed ). Constructive Conflict Coverage: A Social Psychological Approach. Berlin: Regener 202Kempf, Whilhem (2007). “A Tightro pe walk between advocacy journalism and constructive conflict coverage”. In: Conflic & Communication online 6(2). Available at www.cco.regener-online.de - 113 - influence through per manent changes in s pecific journalistic routines, attitudes and competencies.

2.3.3 Interactions between the two approaches.

The journalisms of attachment and the peac e journalism are two ways to c ontribute to the peace in a world affected by conflic ts in all regions. The war cost is represented in hundreds of thousands of deaths; destruction of families, communities and countries; poverty; disease; traumas and an inheritance of devastation and chaos (we can think in plac es like Somalia, a land wit hout Government and with an endless civil war between clans who disputes the control of the regions).

However, the journalism of attachment and its divis ion between “good” and “evil”, simplify the conflicts, identify guilt ies and in this way promote the hate towards to the “evil” and the compassion towards t he “good”. Therefore the Journalism of attachment not contribute to the peace, contra ry creates a bigger polarization. In the opposite side, we find the peace journalism focused on the causes of the conflict and offering a place for the dialogue and the discussion of ideas.

Should we suggest the approa ch of the peace journalism and t ake distance of the journalism of attachment? Un fortunately, in many cases the dilemma is not so easy. Normally in the countries at war, there are only propaganda and/or journalism of attachment, why? Because the peace journalism requires as pre-condition a peaceful culture: A peace journalism that goes beyond de-escalation oriented conflict coverage can probably only be employed comprehensively when peace is actually on the political agenda 203. What it means? It means t hat we could not expect peac e journalism in Chechnya, Colo mbia, Congo or Sudan. But the dilemma is t hat the societies at war need desperat ely help to de-polarisate th e positions of the parts involved and initiate the debate about t he importance and benef its of a pacific resolution. Here, it is relevant to remem ber that the peace j ournalism is a process with some pre-conditions: …there is a need first of all for objective, distanced and resp ectful reportage which is fair to all sides, does not further heat up the conflict, b ut rather takes a critical

203Ibidem - 114 - distance from war supporters of ev ery stripe a nd makes t he public a ware of what a high price a violent solution to the conflict will entail for all participants.204

This first moment must be conduced very carefully, in a s ociety at war any proposition in favor of a specific peace in itiative could be seen as propaganda, only within an atmosphere of depolarization it is possible to continue with the process: the focus on solutions and ways of reconciliation. 205 The question is: how is possible to initiate the first stage? I found th at it is pos sible to turn the journalism of attachment into a pro-peace journalism (see chapter 6). To make some fundations for the Colombian peace journalism, it is necessar y to make accessible to the reader the peace journalism, teach to the attached journalists the risk of the attachment and also to teach them to redirect their personal emotions in a more constructive (chapter four), besides the peace journalism is a real possibility in the current medi a outlets even in the News, it depends more on the training and awareness of the journalism:

No substan tial professional/ethica l obstacle e xists to the inclusion of pro peace narratives by the media, and peace journalism does not involve any radical departure from contemporary jou rnalism practice. Rather peace jour nalism requires numerous subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing, thinking, sourcing, narrating and financing the news: shifts toward citizens and aw ay from elite spokespe ople, toward the value o f peace rath er than the adrenalin rush of conflict, toward mutual b enefits rath er unilateral victory.206

2.4 Conclusions

When the authors of opinion arti cles are independent they c ould be in an excellent position to do Peace Journalis m. By independent, I mean authors who are not involved with the government and/or another party of the conflict. Authors who are interested in peace and in a peaceful conflict resolution, in democracy, the truth, the repatriation of the victims, and in the freedom of the press . Contrary to the news, the authors of opinion articles are free of strong formal conventions, they could be very critical and analyze more than inform; for th ese reasons this kind of journalism has a better position to reflect and explain the conflict in a schema pro-descalation.

204Ibidem 205Ibidem 206Lynch, Jake & McGoldrick, Annabel (2005).Peace Journalism. Stroud: Hawthorn Press. - 115 - Usually news does pr opaganda; news is simple, direct and must be about facts very recent, because of that the reporter doesn’t have time to reflect and analyze; conflicts are normally complex and to get access to a ll the parties involved could be a very complicated, risky and sometimes prohibit ed situation, for example, is it possible to the reporters to make an interview to t he most powerful drug baron in Colombia? Probably no, the loc ation of this person is a secret and he is not interested in publicity, besides he doesn’t want tell anything about his business becaus e he has many enemies interested in know about him and his business for taking his place. Under these circumstances it is understandable that the j ournalists use the material that it is more available: the informati on from the official agenc ies (propaganda) with the aggravating that news is the most read and a very influential form of journalism. But this situation is also present in the feature and reportage; as we saw, many times the journalist uses the same black/white schema of the news in other genres.

On the other side, we find the authors of opinion articles who could r esearch carefully, examine t he facts and build an elaborated reflection to promote de- escalation; without the obligation of being me rely informative. They can be analytica l and use a schema more scientifi c; also they contradict many times with their research the news and in this way becom e a counterweight to the propaganda and the lies that perpetuate the conf lict. At the same time the opinion articles give a new frame to the news and give mor e elements to the disc ussion in the different forums implicated into the public a nd civil debate inherent to t he substantive demo cracy as Habermas postulated.

Therefore the opinion articles let to the r eaders reflect about the truth and the realit y that the media const ructs in a resembl ance of the Analytic Empiricism and as continuers of the Critical Action Theory and its ideal of emanc ipation. In this case the emancipation of the lies of the main stream media and the propaganda, and in doing that, the opinion article ar e questioning the common rout ines of the journalism and the media outlets, as well as the journal istic cognitions. For t hese reas ons, the opinion articles represent the most adequate, although not the unique, genre in order to do a qualitative journalis m what implies journalism pro-de-escalation and pro- peace, to reflect about the journalism and to contribute to the construction of a more

- 116 - democratic society, wher e the readers can build el aborated opinions based in elaborated journalistic pieces.

Also the opinion articles dem onstrate that the advocacy - to exert some influence on behalf of ideas or persons - under analytic thinking rules, as opposite to the neutrality, has the ris k of becoming journa lism of attachment. This risk increases when the advocacy focus only on the “victims”, when it happens, the advocacy for the peace bec omes an indirect inst rument to continue the war (against the vic timizer). Ironically, the attached journalist s’ intentions for peace end up as instruments of the war.

Finally, I f ound that in a gl obal world the readers ( and the audience) have many sources of information, some of them propaganda, others attached, others pro peace; because of that it is essential to examine these interactions to understand the current meta journalistic frame game present in the newspapers, radio, blogs, internet, etc. I took as research object only the opinion articles, but it is an open question, maybe for further res earch, how the interactions in the others journalistic genres are.

- 117 - V{tÑàxÜ F g{x VÉÄÉÅu|tÇ `xw|t

In order to do the c urrent research were taken articles of th e International and Colombian media, in each case the selection was based in the following criteria:

- Significant impact and influence in an ample audience - Enough presence of opinion articles about The Colombian Conflict - Recognition of the media and / or the authors as independent

In this chapter will be ana lyzed the Colombian Media and in Chapt er 5 the International Media.

3.1 Introduction

Colombia is one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists to operate. Media wor kers face intimidation by the government, drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. More than 120 Co lombian journalists were killed in th e 1990s, many for reporting o n paramilit aries, drug trafficking and corruption 207. The media- freedom organisation Reporters Without Borders has denounced armed groups, corrupt politicians and drug barons as "enemies of press freedom".

Rebels have used radio to spread thei r propaganda. One of the main clandestine stations is the Farc-operat ed La Voz de la Resistencia, which the rebel gro up has described as another battlefront. In words of Jerry McDermott, the BBC correspondent in Colombia:

The conditions under which I have to work as a journalist in Colombia are the hardest anywhere, harder than in Bosnia or the Middle East. Even so, I recogn ize that it is easier for f oreign corre spondents t han for Colombian journalists. In Bosnia I w as reporting on a country in open war. It wasn’t easy but it was simpler than working out of Colombia. In Bosnia the dangers were obviou s and the greatest threats were from bombs and mines. The journalist s who died there were victims of the war and n ot murdered for the conten t of their rep orting. In bo th the Middle East and the Balkans, the rules were clear - pre-established rules th at were unwritten but were known to journalists, and if you b roke them you did so at your own peril. In Colombia there are

207BBC.com Country Profile: Colombia - 118 - no rules and you can b e threatened or mu rdered without a nyone knowing who did it or why.208

In Colombia the independenc e is a matter of lif e or death; this is the case of Maria Jimena Duzán, whose columns are part of th is research and it is one between many similar cases. In 1988 she expos ed in El Espectador the close cooperation between Colombia’s drug traffi ckers and the nation’s military, a story th at threatened not only the Colombian Gover nment itself but its lu crative aid from the USA. In 1989 Pab lo Escobar bombed El Espectador because of the columns and articles published in the newspaper, some of María Jimena Duzán, wh ich made clear the infiltration of the drug trafficking into the society, (Duz án’s house had alr eady been bombed in 1982). Besides, in 1990, her sister, a docum entary fi lmmaker was murdered b y Paramilitaries.

In her book Death Beat (1994) , Mrs. Duzán recount her life as reporter in a tim e when in Colombia half the presidentia l c andidates are assassinated before the election and drug lords who ru le country have not only declared a “total and absolute war” on the media, but have st aged attac ks to back up their threats – two of the former members of Duzán’s investigative unit are now dead; two others are in exile.209

Independent reporting is not hel ped by the generalized hostility of the armed actors toward the press, and Colombian journal ists in particular hav e been ruthlessly targeted by the various sides in the conflic t, often the only way for reporters to gain access to conflict zo nes is with a military escort. This de facto embeddin g of the press corps offers the state cons iderable influence on what stor ies get repor ted and how. As the editor in chief of El Tiempo, Colombia’s leading da ily, told the BBC, “T o move in these regions we have to ask pe rmission from the army. You go in as a group and you try to do your job. You even ha ve to confront the armed groups to say ‘Are you going to let us do our job?’ It is always risky. Y ou never know what is going to happen.”210

208Medios Para la Paz . Las Trampas de l a guerra.Periodismo y conflicto (The Snares traps of wa r: Journalism and Conflict). Medios Para Paz. Bogotá, Colombia. 209Duzán, María Jimena (1994). Death Beat. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.

210Enrique Santos Calderon, El Tiempo Editor in Chief, interview entitled “Silenced by the Gun,” on the BBC News website, Ma y 3, 200 5. Available at: http://new s.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4507047.stm. - 119 - 3.2 The State’s Rural Counterinsurgency Propaganda

The Colombian Army, in particular, use frequently psychological operations, or psy- ops, partially as a result of its training by U.S.A Spec ial Forc es detachments in Colombia and at the U. S.A Army’s School of the Am ericas (renamed in 2000, in a psy-op of its own, as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation).

The following s ections detai l some of the key techniqu es of the state’s rural counterinsurgency propaganda, as it was witnessed during the army’s Operación Nuevo Año in the southern department of Caquetá, a FARC stronghold, in Februar y 2004.211 It is important to note that rural Co lombians have tended to adjust to lif e under a given armed group as long as t hat group remained the unc hallenged authority in a given region; it is at the point when regions are contested that violence and displacement surge. 212 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Colombian military’s successful seizure of a town or village once held by the guerrillas, much of the populat ion of that community will flee; they do so either out of fear of reprisals from the conquering state fo rces (frequently accompanied by t he arrival of the Paramilitaries) or because they are forced to leave by the guerrillas.

3.2.1 Hearts and Minds

Once a co nquered to wn is s ecured, all eged members of the guerrillas c aptured during the fighting are photographed and detained. As some s oldiers search for bombs or other boob y traps, other soldiers or members of the Colombian state intelligence agency, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), interview any remaining resident s and t ake videos and

Calderon also emphasizes the n ecessity of usi ng highly mobile, non-local reporters to avoi d danger, saying, “We never have the local co rrespondent cover sen sitive issues. We send som eone from Bogotá, who does the work and returns immediately. If he stays he will be singled out and subjected to some kind of oppressive measure.”

211Fichtl, Eri c (2005). “Col ombia’s Rural Co unterinsurgency P ropaganda”. In: Colombia Journ al. August 29, 2005. Available at: www.colombiajournal.org

212For a m ore detailed anal ysis of thi s point, please see: Fli cht, Eric. “Civ ilian ‘Collaborati on’ in Colombia’s Conflict”. In: Colombian Journal. March, 2004. Available at: .www.colombiajournal.org

- 120 - photographs of the surroundi ngs, including battle damage and any dead enemy combatants. Invariably, enemy weapons or war material captured by the state forces are sorted and arranged for phot ographs with soldiers standi ng guard over t he rows of bullets, radios, pistols, and ot her wa r booty. Soldiers frequently pose with the corpses of killed enemy combatants, too. Within a short time, selected images are incorporated into offic ial press r eleases that include hyper-detai led accounts of all seized materials and captur ed or killed enemy combatants. 213 These are soon passed to members of the Colombian and international press.

Within weeks, if security conditions hold, the army may arrange press junkets, flying or driving in selected me mbers of the press to inspect the cleanse d town. For example, the army captured La Unión Peneya, Caquetá on 4 January 2004; on 25 January a first news of the town appeared on page A- 14 of the Washington Post, a Colprensa story including army photos hit Co lombian papers the same week, and an English language Associated Press story followed a few days later. 214

While the press is correct to follow such stories through whatever channels possible, over-reliance on the military for access to c onflict zones, and on official s ources for details about combat operations, gives press coverage of Colombia’s war an unmistakably state leaning bent; it grants the state what Herman and Chomsky, in their critique of mass media, have call ed a “filt er,” an oppor tunity to frame perceptions.215 This, in turn, necessarily serves the propaganda need s of the state, fostering an image of persistent progress in its count erinsurgency effort. It bears repeating that photos of c onfident Colom bian soldie rs standing guard over dead guerrilla fighters covered by sheets, wit h captured equipmen t arranged by the corpses, are a mainstay in offi cial propaganda, and the Colo mbian press is not

213For example, a press release from the 12th Brigade described the killing of three FARC combatants under the headline, “Operation New Year Continues Producing Results.” Th e followin g extract from the release details items said to be o n the body of one of the sl ain FARC fighters: “01 7.65mm pistol with silencer, 01 han d grenade, 02 b ars of pentolita [type of explosive], 0 7 e stopinas [type of detonator], 01 bolt from a 7.62 caliber Galil rifle, 02 meters of slow-burning wick, 02 meters of fuse, 01 National Police uniform, and pro paganda relate d to the 15th Front of the Terrorist FARC.” The cumulative effects of such statistics are a powerful impression that the enemy is being whittled away, fighter by fighter, bullet by bullet.

214Scott, Wils on. “Colombia Targeting Rebel Strongholds ”. In: The Washington Post , Jan uary 25 , 2004.

215Fichtl, Eric. Op. Cit.

- 121 - squeamish about presenting such images, how ever in many cases the supposed guerrillas fighters are only pea sants dea d in comb at as ma ny times Aministy International and American Righ Watch have been reported.

Aside from taking careful steps to document its victories and pr oject them to the Colombian public at large, as the state forces consolidate their grip, they build up a security presence by stationing extra poli ce and military units in town. T he army refers to this process as “Integrated Action.” An army officer in charge of coordinating these activities in Tame, Arauca, explained:

The specific mission converges in two areas. One is the military presence… includi ng attacking the illegal groups, the guerrillas, se lf-defense groups, or militias in the town center, and also narcotraffickers… Aside from our military operations, we also have to work on psychological operations. These essentially say to t he community, ‘We must invest in se curity in order to have social progr ess, because without se curity no one invests.’216

The militar y uses sev eral psy-op s to build support among the local po pulations of towns and villages they have recently taken over . These v arious tec hniques correspond to two forms of prop aganda as de scribed by Ellul: psychologic al action which aims to alter public opinion thr ough more and less subtle didactic measures, and also public or human re lations, which seek the peopl e’s integration into, and acculturation to the presence of the state.217

Early in the process, the army creates and broadcas ts (often vi a its own stations) radio spots encouraging recently displaced residents to return to their homes. Radio is perhaps the only mas s media technology fully available in rural areas, since battery powered radios ar e very common. These short announcements, backed by peppy military brass music, sound an optimistic tone as they deliver a message emphas izing the shared struggle for peace and security , a ubiquit ous

216Fichtl, Eric´s interview with Capt. Paredes , Colombian Army 18th Brigad e, Navas Pardo Bat talion, Tame, Arauca, June 10, 2003. Colombia Journal web site

217Ellul, Jacques (1965). Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New Y ork: Alfred A. Knopf. Translated by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. p. xiii - 122 - theme in state propaganda.

Radio spots, posters, flyers, and other mate rials are also aimed at members of the illegal armed groups. In additio n to winning over local c ivilians, the state forces actively seek to provoke the desertion of enemy combatants; Ellul refers to this strategy as psychological warfare. State authorities offer a long list of enticements; for example, help reunifying with family mem bers, job training, co oking kits and cash in e xchange for trading in we apons to gue rrillas or p aramilitaries willin g to desert. While attrition rates seem to be on the rise as a result of these efforts, continued rural violence, displacement, and economic dis parity also make useful recruitment propaganda for the illegal armed groups; many that would be deserters from the guerrillas and paramilitaries also lack confid ence in the state’s ability to protect them from their former comrades in arms.

While attempting to sway deserters, the milit ary also works to foster a sense of “the helping hand of the st ate” by offering f ood handouts and setting up tents where local residents can visit military doctors or get free haircuts . Soldiers chum around and smile with the locals, building up relationships on a personal level as they try to deflate the tension residents feel in the aftermath of conflict flare ups so close to home. A military band may be br ought in, while soldiers dressed as c artoon characters entertain the children.

One of the Colom bian st ate’s most exp licit psychological operations is its attempt to appeal to the hearts and minds of children in rural conflict zones. As Philip Tay lor notes, “Although much modern propaganda appeals to reason, it is more usually felt to play on emotion, with the young being part icularly vulnerable to such emotiona l manipulation.”218 In the army’s Soldier for a Day program, the childrens are shut tled

218Taylor, Philip M. (1995 ) Munitions of the Mind: A Hi story of Propaganda from the Ancie nt World to the Present Era. Manchester: Manchester University Press p. 4

- 123 - to local army bases where they ar e exposed to propagandistic indoctrination disguised as fun treats and activities.219

These “soldiers for a day,” as young as five-years-old, get to swim in the base’s pool, ride on armored personnel carriers, and wear camouflage headbands and face paint. At they same time, soldiers dre ssed as clowns dole out candy as army psychologists encourage the children to speak openl y about any people they know or s uspect to be guerri llas. Similar activities have been brought to the streets of contested neighborhoods in rural towns, with machine gun-toting soldiers escorting soldiers armed with sacks of candy and dressed as clowns as they go door to door seeking to be “friendly” with the local children. In the towns of Colombia’s war torn rural sector, it is undoubtedly the c ase that some of these children do have relatives who ar e supporters or even members of the army’s enemies.

While the army’s tactics toward childr en may yield useful bits of actionable intelligence, they also play on the in nocence of children in a very questionable manner. The propaganda value of these technique s is also questionable, as the experience of children socializing with soldiers they may otherwise fear could clearly be off putting. Howev er, the Colombian mili tary evidently feels that the children’s association of candy, clowns, and soldiers may yield long term loyalty in regions where local residents began to interact with state authority only recently.

3.3 Self-censorship

Censorship in Colombia is exercised through anonymus and different kind of threats which in many times involves murders. Although not always the number of killings are a reliable indicator of censorship.

While the 56 journalists killed worldwide in 2004 made this year the deadliest for the press in the last deca de, there were no repor ters killed in Colombia, according to the

219Fichtl, Eric. Op. Cit. - 124 - New York based Committee to Protect Journalists. 220 In fact, this year was the first year in more than a decade tha t no Colombi an reporters were killed. Ho wever, the statistic was due mor e to the increased caution being practi ced by journalists rather than an improvement in the country’s secu rity situation. Fr om a journalistic perspective, this is cause for concern becau se it appears to hav e resulted in a self- censorship that has rendered s erious inv estigative journalism virtually non- existent and led to a distorted portrayal of Colombia’s conflict.

Colombian journalists have always faced th e greatest risks. Consequently, they have learned to be selective about what stories to report a nd how to cover them. A journalist in Puerto Asís, in the department of Put umayo, admits that reporters “mainly cover social and politic life in the r egion. Most of us prefer to handle pub lic order issues in a cautious and precise manner.”221

The manner in which local journalists in Puerto Asís, south of Colombia, and other places throughout the country cover the conflict is very illustrative about the journalist and the covering of the conflict. Paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are prominent in Puerto Asís and other towns in Putumayo, while Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colomb ia (FARC) guerrillas control many of the rural areas. Due to their fear of the armed groups , local journalists in Putumayo practice what they call “socia l journalism,” in whic h they focu s on local social and political stories that do not involve the armed groups.

As one journalist points out, “It is difficult to report selective murders in the urban areas of Puerto Asís because if you don’t mention the authors you are omitting part of the story. But if you do, then you are getting direc tly invo lved with the authors.” Journalists are afraid, says the reporter, because:

...most of th e selective murders in Puerto Asís are committed by paramilitaries. S o you have t o present the information in a slanted way. When you publish this information it is better t o use an of ficial source, like the po lice or the army, and let them say it was this or t hat armed g roup. It is one of the most complicated topics t o handle so you avoid na ming the au thor as muc h as possible and just describe th e incident itself.222

220Leech, Gerry (2005). “Scared into Silence”.In: Colombian Journal January 10, 2005. Available at: www.colombiajournal.org 221Ibidem 222Ibidem - 125 - Another journalist explains how this strategy works: “If there is an attack in Puert o Asís, obviously we have to say that an attack just happened, but our job is not to assign responsibility for that a ttack to X, Y or Z. We state that this happened, at this time, in a car like this, and this number of people was hurt.” 223 Clearly, working under these guidelines makes conducting seriou s investigative journalism extremely difficult. Although it is not al ways fear for their own lives that leads journalists to hold information, as one journalist notes, “Som etimes you decide not to talk about the armed groups because you fear for the pers on’s life who is sharing the information with you.”224

Shedding light on issues of government corruption, state officials indirectly involved in the violation of its own citiz ens’ rights, or sectors of the nation’s elite hiring killers to eliminate their advers aries would, in m any countries, be on the front pages of any press or be a headline story on any televi sion news channel; how ever, this is not necessarily the case within the country of Colombia. Rather than seeing these issues presented in the media or aw ards given to those involv ed in such investigative journalism, Colombian journalis ts experience dismiss al, prision or ev en death when exposing information that places the Colo mbian st ate or the elite in a critical approach.225

The silencing of critical reporting in Colombia is not a new issue but rather a systemic policy deeply entrenc hed within the country’s contemporary political history. Dating back to t he 1950s, the Colombian state passed legislation that enabled the suppression of popular discourse by c ontrolling media information unde r Decree 3000. Passed in 1954, Decree 3000 legaliz ed the government’s ability to determine what the press could and could not divulg e to the general population. W hile suc h intentions of controlling t he press have remained constant there has nev ertheless been an observable increase in the systemic repression of open public thought and critical media commentarie s since the election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez to the presidency in 2002.226

223Ibidem 224 bidem 225Brittain, James (2006). “Censorship, Hegemony and the Media in Colombia”. In: Colombian Journal. November 27, 2006. Available at: www.colombiajournal.org 226Ibidem - 126 - One of the methods in wh ich the state has promoted the ac tual suppr ession o f journalists is best described by Doug St okes, author of America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. Stokes specifica lly critic ized the Uribe government for becoming structurally reactionary in methods of silenc ing those within the media who are critical of the state:

Uribe is also pushing for tighter control of the Colombian media by seeking to pass laws which censor reporting on Colombian ‘counter terrorism measures’ a nd Colombian military acti vity. One o f the ‘an ti-terrorism’ bil ls see ks to hand dow n sentences of eight to twelve years in prison for anyone who publishes statistics considered ‘counterproductive to th e fight against terrorism’, as well as the possible ‘suspension’ of the media outlet in question. These sanctions will app ly to anybody who divulges ‘reports th at could hamper the effective implementation of military and police operations, endanger the lives of public forces personnel or private individuals’, or commits other acts that undermine public or der, ‘while boosting th e position o r image of the enemy’ . . . The media censorsh ip laws also mean that the reporting of human rights abuses will be harder.227

3.4 International Press in Colombia

On September 10 2002, one month after coming to office, President Uribe issued a presidential decree creating two so called Rehabilitation and Cons olidation Zones. These areas, located in northern and nor theastern Colombia, were governed by appointed military commanders rather than by the elected, civilian adminis trations. Within the zones, the armed forces had a wide array of extrajudicial powers, including the right to impose curfews, set up ph one taps, monitor and restrict civilian movement, and arrest or search civ ilians and their property without warrants. According to Defense Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez, "The goal is to achieve greater control over citizens and, consequently, avoi d infiltration by armed groups—[which] have been staging tremendous acts of terror." 228

Among the measures included in Uribe's September 10, 2002 decree was a new rule requiring all foreigners planning to enter t he rehabilit ation zones to obtain official permission up to eight days in advance from the Interior Ministry. For over a month, Uribe's administration would not clarify the details of the new policy, particularly with reference to members of the press. A September 16, 2002 st atement from the

227Stokes, Doug (2005). America´s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London: Zed Books. 228Fichtl, Eri c (2002).“Uribe A dministration Impeding Fo reign P ress”.In: Colombia Report. Nove mber 25, 2002 Available at: www.c olombiareports.com - 127 - government promised that foreign journalis ts would be entitled to special passes providing for permanent or multi month access to the rehabilitation zones.

But on October 24 of the same year, despite heated opposition from the internationa l press and media groups, the Colombian go vernment rolled back the September 16 promise in favor of stricter controls on foreign journalists, who could now only receive permits to visit the zones for short periods or one o ff assignments. In addition, Colombian journalists employed by foreign press organizations would also have to apply for official per mission to enter the zones, a clause not included in Uribe's original September 10 decree.

Under the decree, foreign journalists and Colombian journalists employed by foreigners had to fax a request letter to the Interior Ministry stating their employer and providing an itinerary of w here they plan to visit and w hen. Once the information was received, the Interior Ministry informed r egional authorities a bout the journalist' s intentions. In part, authorizati on came down to the military situation in the specific areas a journalist wants to visit. Without a permit, any foreigner caught inside t he rehabilitation zones faced deportation.

Foreign journalists criticized the rules. T he International Press Alliance, a grouping of foreign correspondents from mainstream newspapers and wire s ervices, objected to the new policy on the basis that the lag ti me caused by waiting for a permit to be issued would severely hamper their effo rts to cover breaking stories in the rehabilitation zones. The Paris based m edia group Reporters Without Borders pointed out that the travel rest rictions are a direct violati on of the 13th Article of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention, which s afeguards the right of free movement for journalists. The Miami-bas ed Inter-American Pr ess Assoc iation was also quick to criticize the measures, arguing that the re strictions on press freedom and move ment were eerily re miniscent of the dark years of m ilitary dictatorship prevalent in so many Latin American countries.229

These measures would do much more than si mply hamper the mobility of foreign journalists. The permit requirement places journalists and the people they speak with in compromising pos itions. Despite reassu rances from government spokesmen that

229Ibidem - 128 - journalists were not going to be required to divulge whom they are plann ing to meet with in the rehabilitation zones , it was c lear that the aut horities would be able to determine such information through other means . With foreknowledge of journalists ' destinations, the state authorities could even more effectively utilize their network of paid c ivilian informants, thereby ascert aining just who met with whom, and where , when, and perhaps ev en what was said. This pol icy in effect would force journalists to violate one of their basic tenets, the gu arantee of confidentialit y of sources. Of course, it remained to be seen whether re sidents in the rehabilitation zones, who live day after day in a tense atmosphere of inv asive military and police presenc e, curbed civil liberties, and neighbor hood spy rings, would even have anything t o say to foreign journalists at this point.

It certainly seemed t hat the intent of the government's measures was to stifle the reporting of what was happening in the rehabilitation zones on a daily basis. The new measures were essentially a filtering me chanism that the Co lombian government could use to control the reporting in the zones, allowing it extraordinary powers to limit any potentially damaging r eports appeari ng in t he foreign press. For instance, journalists whose reports have caused them to fall out of favor with Uribe and his militaristic strategies could be denied permits, or they could be turned away simply on the basis of their media organizations lacking some "acceptable" form of accreditation. This is especially t he case for small, independent media out lets and freelance j ournalists, who oft en don't hav e the weight of an Associated Press or a New York Tim es behind them, which contribute in vital ways to the public' s understanding and knowledge of the goings on in Colombia.230

Similarly, Uribe's administration could hav e the means to carefully "spin" the stories that come out of the zones . For example, with the advanc e warning that regional authorities would receive about impending visits from the press, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where stat e-sponsored human rights abus ers "take the day off," or where ample time is allotted by "permi t processing delays" for evidence of crimes to be tampered with or rearranged for polit ical effect (like the practice of dressing massacred civilians in guerrilla fatigues). Furthermore, considering the strong but oft- denied ties between the Colomb ian military and the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), it seems likely that objective reporting of massacres and

230Ibidem - 129 - other abuses committed by the paramilitaries, often with military collusion, would also be more and more difficult to come by as a result of the press control measures.

Given the willingness of all Colo mbia’s armed actors to target domestic journalists , and the historic reluctance of these same actors to harm foreign journalists, it is clear that the foreign press has an important role to play in Colombia, a role the Colombian government seemed determined to downplay 231. Ironically, days before the restrictions on the foreign press we re announc ed, Reporters Without Borders released its first-ever ranking of global press freedom. In the report, Colombia placed 114th out of 139 countries surveyed, a lo w ranking that undoubtedly would hav e been lower had the new restrictions on foreign journ alists been factored into the judging.

On year 2003 the pr esidential decree which created t he two Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones were declared unconstitutional by the Colombian Suprem Court, but anyway, it was very clear that the government wishes to exert more control on the International Press.

3.5 Colombian Journalists in international Press

When the Colombian Journalist works for a foreign media, they can enjoy more independence; they have the support from a media free of Colombian ec onomical, military or political pressure and moreover they have an audience with more freedom to give feed back. In this way the inte rnational pr ess is like a shelter to do investigations very difficult to drive into the Colombian media. Th is situation is well illustrated by the confrontation between El Nuevo Herald and the President Uribe.

El Nu evo Herald , the Spanish-language sister paper of The Mia mi Herald 232, has performed some of the most aggressive investigative reporting about narcotraffickers’ and param ilitaries’ po wer in Colombia. Wh ile its edito rial board has been partially supportive of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, the rest of the paper has worked assiduously to reveal uncomfortable truths about Uribe, his associations, and his past as a rising politician in drug cartel dominated 1980s Medellín.

231Ibidem 232This Newspaper circulates throughout South Florida, the Caribbean, Latin America, and thro ughout the United States and has been awarded 19 Pulitzer Prizes since beginning publication in 1903. - 130 - Most of this is the work of two veteran El Nuevo Her ald reporters, Gerardo Reyes and Gonzalo Guillén. Both are Colombian. In part because they are associated with a U.S.A. based newspaper whose editors giv e them backing, they have been able to carry out investigations into topics that most Colom bian journalists would find very uncomfortable.

The work of both reveals a deep suspicion a bout Álvaro Uribe’s background. “Bombs are exploding all around Uribe and som e shrapnel has hit him,” Reyes told the Colombian newsmagazine Cambio in Nov ember, 2007. “But there is nothing strong enough to place h is credibility in question. Si nce no direct link with the paramilitaries has so far been demonstrated, the United States has not begun to exert pressure.”233

Guillén, meanwh ile, has researched more deeply int o Presiden t Uribe’s past than almost any other reporter, including allegations that, upon his father’s murder by FARC gue rrillas in 19 83, Uribe tr ied to reach the zon e in a h elicopter belo nging t o Pablo Escobar. These investigations attracted the attention of the Miami New Time s weekly, wh ich subtitle d: „El Nue vo Herald ’s Gonzalo Guillén is the latest victim of Bush buddy Álv aro Uribe“; the ar ticle ended with a rec ommedation to George Bus h: “If Congress and the Bush administration belie ve in a free press, they should take action against Uribe. Gonzalo Guillén's fa mily and all Colombians, including the estimated five million who have been forc ed to leave for Miami and other places, deserve no less.“234

In 2003, Guillén received an unexpected c all from the president . “He said he had copies of several e- mails that I had sent to people and that he didn’t like the investigation I was doing,” Guillén remembers. “People from the [American] embassy that I knew told me these calls were really threatening and dangerou s. And a secretary of the government named Moreno told me that I was really in danger.”235

Reyes, wh o liv es in USA, ha s broken many stories about paramilitary groups ’ infiltration of Colombia’s state, implicating many officials c lose to Uribe. He is one of few reporters to have interviewed Rafael García, a jailed former official of the

233Reyes, Gerardo (2007). „A Uribe le estan explotando las bombas (Bombs are exploding all around Uribe). In: Revista Cambio. Noviembre 23. 234Strouse, Chuck (2007). “A Reporter on the Lam in Latin America” In: The Miami News Time weekly, October 17. 235Colombian P rogram. “Alvaro Uribe Vs El Nuevo Herald”.In: Th e Ce nter for i nternational Policy´s December 2007. Available at: www.cipcol.org - 131 - presidential intelligenc e service, the D AS. García has become a star wit ness in several so -called “pa ra-politics” criminal investigations, incl uding one against his former boss, Jorge Noguera, who as DAS director all egedly worked closely with top paramilitary leaders for over three years.

In April 2007, speaking before journalists from around the world at the Ritz-Carlton in Coconut Grove, Uribe cast igated Guillén’s colleague, El Nuevo Herald investigative reporter Gerardo Reyes, for asking abou t the paramilitary ties. The scene wa s otherworldly weird, Reyes says — a president who follows the press too closely. “He began reciting each story I had written,” Reyes recalls. “He was furious, and he was looking right at me. Everyone turned around to look. It was very uncomfortable.”236

In May 2007, Guillén raised the stak es, publis hing a book, Pablo E scobar’s Confidants, alleging that the Uribe fam ily had links to the drug trade 237. This c learly enraged President Uribe, who singled ou t Guillén in October 2007 wh en Pab lo Escobar’s ex-girlfriend, Virginia Vall ejo, published a separ ate book including allegations that Escobar was quite fond of the young Uribe. T he tome claims that when Mrs. Vallejo asked the drug lord how he managed to have a fleet of planes and a runway, he credited Uribe, "a key guy at civil aviation." The book also c ontends Escobar termed Uribe a "bless ed kid" who had granted lic enses for the planes“. Vallejo, a former actress and television per sonality, also refers to Uribe's f ather as one of Colombia's "first drug traffickers" in her book. 238

On October 2, 2007, Uribe told a Bogotá r adio program, “Behind this woman [Vallejo] is Gonzalo Guillén, who has dedicated his journalistic career to slander and lies.” 239 Guillén, who said he had not even read Vallejo’s book, was forced to leave Colombia after receiving about two dozen threats and having one of his two DAS bodyguards inexplicably removed: “I got a call at my home … a guy said, ‘We can kill yo u,’” Guillén told the Miami New Times. “Then the threats started coming fast. Five calls at

236Ibidem. 237Guillen, Gonzalo (2007). Los confidentes de Pablo Escobar. Bogotá: News+Design. 238Vallejo, Virginia (2007). Amando a Pablo, Odiando a Escobar (Loving Pablo, Hating Escobar). New York: Random House Español. 239Strouse, Chuck (2007) Op.Cit. - 132 - my home, e-mails, 24 death threats in 48 hour s. I was afraid for me, for my family. I left the country in a sprint.”240

The Miami Herald editorial board’s respons e was surp risingly tepid, avoiding strong criticism of Uribe’s ac tions even though his words endangered one of the paper’s reporters.241 Contrary, on october 3 the Inte rnational Herald Tribune published information that supported the investigation of Guillén and the book of Mrs Vallejo:

A declassified U.S. intelligence report from 1991 described Uribe as a "close personal friend" of Escobar's. The report, by the Defense Intelligence Agency, also listed Uribe among Colombia's important drug traffickers and said he was linked to an unidentified business involved in narcotics in the United States.242

Additionally, In a detailed article, Gerardo Reyes revealed new details about the 1984 murder of Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, a crime that was ordered by drug lord Pablo Es cobar. Lara Bonilla had publicly denounced Escobar, who wa s then an alternate member of Colombia’s C ongress, and helped oversee the security forces’ takedown of an enormous cocain e lab in Caquetá called “Tranquilandia.” Mark Bowden asserted in his 2001 book Killing Pablo that Lara Bonilla’s murder is what finally caused a majority of Colombians to view the country’s newly r ich drug lords as a threat. 243 In his article, Reyes reveals so me of the testimony that Lar a Bonilla’s sister gave at juny 1984 to the authorities:

Colombia's top corruption fighter resigned Wednesday, just days aft er El Nue vo Herald reported on documents showing his fat her, then the minister of justice, ha d commented before his assassination in1985 that relatives of current President Alvaro Uribe might try to kill him. Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, chief of the Colombian presidency's anticorruption program, said he was resigning f or ''personal and family'' reasons an d didn't mention the newspaper's Sunday story. The story revolved aro und a Hugh es- 500 helicopter captured in a 1984 raid on a huge cocaine-refining complex dubbed as Tranquilandia. The air craft was registered to a company partly owned by Alberto Uribe Sierra, the late father of the president.

Over the pa st two deca des, the Uribe fa mily has steadfa stly denied any links to t he helicopter's drug work. It has said th e aircraft was sold two months before the raid t o a man later identified a s an aide to drug traffickers. The sale was not registere d because th e elder Urib e had died and his pro perties had gone in to his e state. El Nuevo Herald reported that documents gathered during the investigation of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla's assassination showed he had commented to his sister Cecilia and Police Col. Jaime Ramírez Gómez that he feared he would be killed i n

240Ibidem 241Colombian Program Op. Cit. 242Romero, Sim on. “Pre sident Uribe of Colombia de nies tie s to Esco bar”. In: International Heral d Tribune. October 3, 2007. 243Bowden, Mark (2002). Killing Pablo. New York: Penguin. - 133 - retaliation for the raid. Lara Bonilla ''said that the Tranquilandia thing was very grave and that it involved ve ry important people in the politics of the coun try, that the helicopter that was seized . . . was owned by the father of Alvaro Uribe,'' Cecilia said in a sworn deposition shortly after her brother's death. Ra mírez García testified the justice minister expressed the sa me concerns to him about the o wners of the helicopter.244

The Colombian gov ernment responded t o Reye s’ latest article with a letter to El Nuevo Herald presenting proof that Uribe’s fat her’s estate had sold the helicopter before it was found at Tranquila ndia. The letter, noting that “on repeated occasions one of your reporters has tried to stain the honor of the President of Colombia,” scolds: “Colombia c annot be tied down in a cyclical debat e with individuals determined to discredit it and to slander its legitimate authorities.”

Reyes’ article, howev er, had acknowledged t he helicopter’s earlier sale, noting that no formal record of the property transfer ex ists. It goes on to cite two source s claiming that the helicopter’s new owner was a close associate of Medellín cartel figures Fabio Ochoa and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha 245. Gonzalo Guillén was back in Colombia in December 2007, but he had to leave the country again bec ause of the death threats.

Also from an academical perspective the international organizations play a key role in the journalistic chore as Gloria Moreno, director of Media for Peace246 said:

I shall not leave you with the impression th at all is gloom and d oom. Here in Colombia, our journalists, media organizations, inform ation sour ces and pr ess organizations have met on many occasions and scrutinized our conduct, reflecting on our proble ms, approaches and dynamics to identify errors and review responsabilities. We ha ve also pro duced profe ssional tools to support journalists in their work, manuals, workshops a nd various research pa pers. The truth is that, in practically all case s, much of this work is do ne with the support of internation al organizations, perhaps, because the right to info rmation is still only a se cond or third class right in Colombia.247

244Guillen, Gonzalo. “Uribe's anticorruption chief resigns”. In: El Nuevo Herald. December 13, 2007.

245José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha (May 1947 - December 15, 1989), also known by the nickname El Mexicano, was a Colombian drug lo rd who was one of t he leaders of the n otorious Medellín Cartel along with the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar. At the height of his crimi nal career Rodríguez was acknowledged as one of the world's most successful drug dealers. In 1988, Forbes Magazine included him in their annual list of the world's billionaires. 246It is a Colombian institutio n created to study and analyzes how t o do journ alism in a middle of the war. 247Moreno, Gloria (2008). “Colombian Journalists are haunted by fear of d eath” .In: Press Freedom: Safety of Journalists and Impunity. New York: Unesco. - 134 - For this dependency of the international media is v ery important to analyze how interact the national and the international media outlets, maxime when the Colombian outlets are starting to be international themselves as we will see late in this chapter.

3.6 Evolution of the Colombian Newspapers

In the last 3 decades the Colombia Newspapers had suffered big transformations, we can resume them in 3 periods:

During the 80s their st rategic values were to defend their role and the right to inform, to watch over social responsibility, and to reach and mantain a competitive advantage, objectivity and truthfulness.

During this 90s the strategic values changed and the marketing became a relevant issue. Because of that, new values were added: to be profitable; to get specific target audiences; to understand the technological advances; and to analyze the competitors.

At the first decade of the 21t h century the strategic val ues tend to conc iliate the enterprise values with social values, as well as to po sitionate the technology as a relevant factor of success. The following could be appointed as the leading factors of the current times: R each and mantain a competitive advant age; diver sify the coverage; use new technologies; analyze the multiple com petitors; innovate; involve the personal into the goals of the News paper; create teams of high performance; satisfy the customer; elabor ate products capable of selling good and serv ices; be very profitable; operat e on th e fundaments of objectivity and veracity; and to defend their role and the right to inform248

3.7 Colombian Outlets

Despite the difficult conditions to do an independent and inves tigative journalist in Colombia, exists some authors with conditions to do it, because they write an opinion column, they have place in important media wit h a big influence into the society, they

248Cano Busquets, Ana María (2003).“Financiación, Narcotráfico y Prensa: El Espectador en los años 80´s y 90 ´s” (Fun ding, Narcotraffic and Pre ss: T he Espe ctador in the 80 ´s and 9 0`s). In : Museo Nacionla de Colombia. Medios y Nación: Historia de los medios de comunicación en Colombia (Media and Nation: The hi story of the me dia in Colombi a). Bogotá: Distribuidora y Editora Ag uilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara S.A. P. 454 – 469. - 135 - know the confl ict and they w ant to take di stance from the mani pulation and propaganda of the parts involved in the war in order to produce a more objectiv y information and promote the analysis of the fa cts. Although they are isolate cases, (we can not speak about independent media in Colombia, with the only exc eption of El Espectador until the 90´s), it i s necessary to know the media outlest where they write to understand their cont ext and the possibilities of t hese media, because as we saw, the international media is in capac ity to inform with more freedom than the national media, for this reason it is possible to le arn from the independent international media as well as from t he independent Colombian authors in order to take advantages of the internationalizacion of the Colombian media outlets.

3.7.1 Invernac

This Company is the result of the Group Santo Domingo r eengineering. The group had more than 100 companies in much divers e business, but now they are trying to focus only on key strategic business; as consequence the group exchanged the 100% of Bavaria shares, a brewery and their most profitable business, for the 16% of SAB Miller249 shares. At the same time the Santo Domingo Group owned the majority of Invernac (80% of the shares), who is the owner of Valórem S. A and Comunican S.A. Valór em is the owner of Caracol Channel, Caracol International Channel, GenTV, Radio Latina TV (a Radio Station) and Cine Colombia (a chain of Cineplex in Colombia).

Comunican S.A. is the editor company of El Espectador (News paper), Cromos and Schok (Magazines) and the websites: tecno.elespectador.com (Portal for Informatics) and clasificautos.com (Portal where the persons can sell their autos).

Currently Valórem S.A is the most important investment of the Santo Domingo Group in Colombia, this fund company represent s the most important interests and the business philosophy of the group; moreover is very possible that when the process of re- structuring of the group hav e maturated, Comunican S.A and its affiliates be incorporated to the division of Mass Media of the fund; because of that the corporate guidelines of Valórem are taken as the Guidelines of t he whole group in the present research.

249SABMiller is the second l argest brewery of the wo rld, with operations if four continent s and a production that exceeds 170 million hectolitres in more than 170 brands. - 136 - Corporate Statements

Mission: To be a group wit h high performance, what makes invest ments in Colombia and in the American Continent to maximize the value of their shares.

Vision: To be in the year 2012 a leader vehicle of investm ent in Colombia, with a capacity of market, what positionates us lik e a leader investment enterprise with high bursatility, prestige and innovation.

Valórem will be recognized by its human tal ent, its c apacity to identify opportunities and a suitable management of the risk.

Values:

• Excellence • Transparency • Responsibility before the community • Meritocracy • Integral development of the human resource

3.7.1.1 Valórem S.A

Bavaria Investment was creat ed in 1997; it was the result escition process of the Bavaria Business Group to permit this entit y to exclus ively focus on the production and sale of beer and other beverages. Independ ently, Bavaria investment opted to dedicate on the inv estment of other industries. On Nov ember 2004, Bavaria investment adopted a new name, Valórem. Since then Valórem is quoted in the Colombian stock market as investment found.

The Group's principal activity is managing local and forei gn investment portfolio. Its holdings are focused on the I ndustrial, Media Communications and Services sectors. Industrial companies include: Biofilm SA, which is dedicated in producing bio-oriented film from polypropylene used in flexib le packaging, adhesiv es, labels and graphic arts; and Refocosta, which is focused on the development of corporate activities relating to reforestation, research, plantin g, maintenance, exploration and logging for wood commercializ ation. Media Communica tion companies include: Caracol

- 137 - Television SA, which is a pr ivate channel whose princ ipal activity is to trans mit and produce soap operas, informative, journalis tic, humoristic and drama programs; Wgen-TV, which is a company held by Ca racol T V operating in Florid a; Cine Colombia, the biggest chain of cineplex c omplex in Colo mbia, and Radio Latina, an internet radio station. Lastly, the Servic es companies include: Almagran, provides warehousing services and trans port; and Dasi gno SA, whic h provides IT design, development and implementatio n, technology and content solutions, which focus is the integration of the Technology Celular, Internet and Media Communication.

3.7.1.1.1 Canal Caracol

Caracol currently produces 4,000 hours of audiov isual c ontent per year, has more than 10,000 hours of original programming, its programs have been broadcasted in nearly 100 countries throughout five continents, and local ada ptations of its scripts have become great worldwide successes. 250 Today, Caracol Televisión has elev en studios that range from 260 to 800 squar e me ters, for a total capacity of almost 20,000 square meters. Four of these studios and five mobile units are entirely equipped with High Definition technology.

In 2006 Caracol TV produced and aired Sin Tetas No Hay Paraíso (Without Tities There Is No Paradise) a famous Colombian soap opera. The show was based on the best selling novel with the same na me written by Gustavo Bolivar. 251The story shows a young girl, Catalina, who lives in the city of Pereira and becomes obses sed with getting breast implant s in order t o overcome poverty. Catalina decides to become a "prepago", a slang word for „prostitute“, who has sex with drug traffickers in exchange for gifts, money and social status.

The international and „softer“ versions of the soap opera were a sucess too in Venezuela, Ecuador, Spain, Bulgaria, Mexi co, Puerto Rico, Greece and Argentina and currently the NBC is work ing in av ersion for the U.S.A. However, the original version of Without Titties There's No Paradise pr ovocated controversies about

250One example is „Pasión de Gavilanes“ ("Passion of Hawks") a popular soap opera coproduced by the Caracol Channel, RTI Colombia and Telemundo, that ran for 188 episodes, from 2003 to 2004.The show was so popular that it had two runs (one in primetime and one in d aytime) in the United States on NBC-owned Telemundo. It has also had runs in over 100 countries—from Argentina to Romania to the Philippines (as Pasión de Amor, „Love Passion“)—and is con sidered one of the m ost successful serials ever coproduced by the Caracol Channel. 251Bolivar M oreno, Gu stavo (2008). Sin T etas no ha y Paraiso (Without Tittis th ere is not Pa radise). Bogotá: Ed Grijalbo. - 138 - Violence and Poverty, two tabu topics in Colombia. The show was sold as a faithful, albeit tragic, reflection of a Colombian culture rotted to the core by criminality.

But despite Its legions of followers, many are upset with the show for the image it portrays. In news paper columns and radio interviews, feminists and family groups have decried the s how's portrayal of wom en as a sexist affront, more inclined to satisfy male fantasies than generate meani ngful debate about Colombia's unrivaled obsession with plastic surgery and its relation with the narcotraffic.

On Aug. 30 of 2006, residents in the city of Pereira, where the show is based and partly filmed, took to the st reets to protest being s ingled out as a haven for drug traffickers, the sex trade and hit-men (sicarios) on motorbikes; problems they say afflict all Colombian c ities equally. "We we re provoked and this was a way t o stand up and say that the wom en from Pereira aren't all pros titutes," said Juan Manuel Arango Velez, the town's mayor, who's also threatened a lawsuit against the Caracol network for airing the show.

Companies have also threatened to pull ads because of the show's exp licit content. However this soap opera had a big audience 252; surpassing in Colombia the ear ly rating succ ess of "Betty La Fea," (Ugly Betty) a production of RCN Channel (the competence of Caracol Channel), whose international versions were a sucess across the world253.

Colombia's passion f or implants is almost unmatched. Accordin g to the Colombia n Society of Plastic Surgeons, more than hal f of the 450,000 operations performed in 2005 were breast augmentat ions costing an avera ge between US$2,000 and US$3,000 per procedure, more than half a year's salary in a country where the 58 percent of the population is living below the poverty lin e. That would seem to support

252The pri me time sh ow rea ched rating s nearing 6.9 million viewe rs, setting a record for th e most- watched soap opera in Colombia.

253The story seems to be attractive and original because it revolves arou nd an unattractive person in contrast with most so ap operas where the stars are always g ood looking.The o riginal Colombian version of the show h as been dubbed and broadcast in India, Lith uania, Indonesia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, M alaysia, Hun gary, Czech Rep ublic, Italy ( Betty la c ozza), Swit zerland, Jap an, Turk ey, Philippines a nd Chi na. T he sh ow was also broad cast in virtua lly all of Latin Ameri ca pl us Spai n, achieving re cord ratin gs in every sin gle country, in cluding th ose wh ere Colo mbian soaps do not usually achieve high ratings, such as Brazil and Mexico. The show was so popular that the cast went on tour to meet fans throughout the continent. - 139 - what one role in the s eries, Jessica, tells: "What matters today is having a good pair of (breasts), no matter if they're made of rubber, wood or stone", because a good pair of breats could be the way to leave the poverty and get some wellbeing in absence of other options in a world under the law of the violence and the drug dealers.

To support this „Logic“ The third largest ci ty of Colombia and famous for being the home of one of the most powerful Drug Cartels of th e world, The Cali Cartel 254, boasts that it's the plastic surgery capital of Colombia: „If you have ever been to Cali, Colombia, you already know that the wome n there look great! Cali is the undisputed plastic surgery capital of Colombia and has an extensive list of top surgeons, as well as cosmetic surgery clini cs, contributing heavily to the city’s economic growth“ 255. Moreover, radio stations t here have run contests in wh ich the winner gets a free breast enhancement.

Despite what the prot agonits of the serie defends as the show's moralizing lesson, not everyone is convinced of the show's me rits. Said Florence Thomas, a researcher of gender issues at Bogota's National University: "The only thing produc ers were after in showing so much cleavage was a higher rating".256

3.7.1.1.2. Internationalization of Caracol Channel

Today, CARACOL T V has bec ome a true powerhouse, expa nding its influenc e beyond Colombia through its I nternational Channel and Internat ional Dis tribution Division: CARACOL INTERNATIONAL, created in 2004. Operating offices en Miami and Bogot á, Caracol International distri butes CARACOL’s orig inal soap operas, series and entertainment formats. These programs have reached several countries in America, Asia and Europe, obt aining international high ra tings throughout the globe. From 2004 Caracol International is avalaibl e permanently in all U.S.A. by the cable Company Direc Tv.

254At the height of the Cali Cartel's reign, they were cited as havin g control over 70% of the world s cocaine ma rket and fo r being di rectly resp onsible fo r the growth of the cocaine ma rket in Europe, controlling 90% of the market. By the m id 1990's the trafficking empire of the Cali Cartel was a multi- billion dollar enterprise. 255www.colombianplasticsurgery.com

256Goodman, Joshua. “Breast-Obsessed TV Show a Co lombian Hit”. By: Associated Press. Sept 19, 2006.

- 140 - In addition, Caracol also provides production services in Co lombia to inter national allies for the execution of productions and co-productions upo n request. This has enabled the development of jo int busines s projects with renouned companies suc h as Telemundo-RTI (USA), TV Azteca (México) and Sony (USA).

In September 2006 started to operate GenTV Channel, supported by Caraco l Channel, designed for the Latino Community in U.S.A. It aims to get all the Spanish speaking population in the U.S.A. and be a link bet ween U.S.A. and the Latino culture; inform and entertain. Its focuses are: soap operas, series, games shows and journalistic programs.

As continuation of its international stra tegy and diversificat ion in new formats Valórem S.A. adquired the biggest chain of mu ltiplex in Colombia, what distributes in exclusive the films of Fox Cine, Warner Brother and New Line. It has 32 Multiplex in the 9 most important cities of the country. In the firs t quarter of 2008 had a turnover of 9 millions euro, 21,3% more than in the same period of 2007 257. Cine Colombia concentrates the 89% of the viewers of the country.

3.7.1.2 Comunican S.A

This company came to take financial losts for more than 33 millions Euro, but at the end of the 2007 got it s “balance point”, for this reason and with the idea to d evelop and integr ate other communicative companies Alejandro Santo Domingo 258 and Carlos Alejandro Pér ez259 (President of Caracol Tv Board), both members of the Valórem Board, are taking part in Comunican board since januar 2008. This company is the owner of the magazines Cromos and Schok, El Espectador (Newspapwer), and the web portals: tecno.elespec tador.com (informatic) and clasificautos.com (selling autos).

257El Pais. „Cine Colombia en la Mira del Grupo Santo Domingo”. In: El Pais. October 16, 2008. 258Director of Valóre m, S. A., executive manag er of Quadrant Capital Advisors, Inc. in Ne w York, member of t he SABMiller PLC Boar d, Vicepresident of SABMiller La tinoamerica, President of the Bavaria S.A. Board a nd Member of the Backus & Johnston S.A.A. Board in Perú. Additionaly he is Director of Caracol Television and the Mario Santo Domingo fundation. He is graduate of the Harvard University. 259Executive Director of Quadrant Capital Advisors, Inc. in Nueva York, member of the SABMiller PLC Board, of SABMiller Latinoamerica, of Bavaria S.A., of Backus & Johnston S.A.A. in Perú and of Valórem S.A.. He is Presi dent of Ca racol Tel evisión Board. In the past h e worked for Goldman Sachs& Co., S.G. Warbu rg & Co. and in Violy, Byor um & Partners. He is graduated of the Harva rd University and the Cambridge University. - 141 - 3.7.1.2.1 Cromos

This magazine was founded by Miguel Santi ago Valencia and Abelardo Arb oleda in 1916. Their idea was to make and Europe an magazin in Colombia. Today Cromos describe itself as a magaz in of Colombian and International c urrent events and entertainment and it is seen by the readers and the critic as a suce ssful mixture of news, opinion, photojournalism and local gossip; as c onsequence Cromos is one of the most read magazines in Colombia with a weekly circulation of 518.000 copies. In its large history Cromos have won many national and in ternational prizes, in fact, Cromos itself has created an annual prize to promote the local fashion designers.

The Magazine's histor y has three clear main periods. The first one led by two men from the ci ty of Popayan (South of Colom bia), that it could be called the Payanes period from 1916 to 1918; t he second one, when leadershi p and ownership came t o Joaquín Tamayo, called the Tamayo period from 1918 to 1953; and then, t he third one, the Restrepo Suárez per iod from 1953 to 1970s . Since then the magazin has often changed hands.

The history of the magaz ine began with the two Pay anis men named Abelardo Arboleda and Miguel Santiago Valenc ia founded Cro mos in 1916 as a social and informative magazine. Valencia was a well-known printer in Popayan, who wanted to reside in Bogotá, moved by t he illus ion of the capital. Cromos (number 3556) described him as a m an that was born in Bolívar, Depart ment of Cauca in a humble house that was used as a cock-fighting ring. When he was a child, his family moved to Popayan. He had high illus ions conc erning his future; he wanted to travel throughout the world and to become a nationally known journalist.

With this background Valencia joined a printer named Abelardo Arboleda and founded Cromos as a national enterprise some years later. Arbol eda and Vale ncia met when they were leaving Popayan on thei r way to Bogotá in 1910. They instantly became very good friends and they remained so until the end of their lives.

Bogotá, at the time they fi rst arrived, was a town of two hundred thousand people. However, they easily gained the hear t of the capital dwellers, as Cromos itself said about them in 1970. Soon afte r they had installed themselv es in the city, Arboled a

- 142 - founded a publishing house, while Valencia went to Paris. It was in Paris where the idea of founding a magazine was born in his mind. In Paris, Valencia got in touch with the Bohem ian Parisian life and met many writers lik e Ramón del Valle-Inclan 260, Ruben Darío261, and Gabriela Mistral262. Back in the Colombian capital, he convinced his old friend Abelardo Arbo leda to create a magazin lik e the ones he had read in Europe, full of photos, pictures, and with am ple information on cur rent events of the country and the world. The magazine s hould cover politic al, c ultural, soc ial and economic aspects as well.

After planning the publication, Cromos appeared for the first time on January 15, 1916 with 2500 copies at the time ( Cromos, number 3556, p.17). The publication, since the beginning organized it s information by sect ions as follows: international, national beauties and social life, culture, a nd short stories. Sinc e the initial issues, satiric cartoons were relevant in the public ation. The p ublication has preserved this original plan, with only slight variations, the inclusion of some opinions columns for example, until today. The m agazine during this time was very highly influenced b y Parisian culture; Paris was the dream s hown in the magazine. In 1918, when the magazine issued its number 146, Luis and Joaquín Tamayo t ook over the direction and ownership of the editorial enterprise . Joaquin Tamayo (1892-1941) was a liber al writer and historian who wrote about President Nuñez , and belonged to a t raditional Bogotano family. Luis Tamayo had worked in some traditional Bogotano boo kstores known as 'Librería Colombia ' a nd 'L ibrería Camach o Ro ldan'. He was r elated t o business c ircles, and had been Minister of Defense as well. They directed the magazine from 1918 until early 1953. During this time many Colombian and South American writers lik e German Arciniegas 263, Antonio Gómez Restrepo, Josi Umaqa

260He is considered perhaps the mo st noteworthy and certainly the most radical dramatist working to subvert the traditionalism of the Spanish theatrical establishment in the early part of the 20th century. 261He was a Nicaraguan poet who initiated and is the epitome of Spanish literary modernism movement. Dario is the poet who has had the greatest and most lasting influence in twentieth century Spanish literature. 262She is a Chil ean poet, educator, diplomat, and feminist who was the first Latin Ameri can to win the Nobel Prize in Literature, in 1945.

263German Arciniegas, 98, Critri c of L atin America Dictators. By Larry Rother. New York Times , 05.12.1999 “German A rciniegas A ngueyra, o ne of Latin Am erica's most prolific writers and distinguished intellectual s, died in a hospital he re la st Monday. He wo uld ha ve celeb rated his 99t h birthday next Mond ay. In a litera ry an d political ca reer th at spa nned nine de cades, M r. A rciniegas (pronounced ahr-seen-YAY-gus) wrote more than 70 books, mostly histories and biographies, and an estimated 15,000 essay s and ne wspaper a rticles. Several of hi s wo rks h ave been tran slated into English and used as college texts, am ong them ''America in E urope,'' an analysis of the influence of - 143 - Bernal, Max Grillo, T omas Rueda Vargas and Baldomero Sanín Cano 264, among others, joined the magaz ine. Due to that a ffluence of intellectuals during t hat time, Cromos was considered, according to the magazine, a cultural hous e, although closer to the local elite. For this reas on, in 1948 when the populist politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered, Cromos' buildings were set on fire and with it 30,000 of that week's issues, as other many buildings and companies related to the elite.

After Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship, in 1953, the Tamayo family, without any heirs interested in continuing t he publication, decided to sell the magazine. A new administration took ov er the 4th of July of 1953. They were the Restrepo Suárez the Ne w Wo rld on the Ol d, and ''L atin America: A Cu ltural Hi story.'' Presi dent Andre s Pastrana decreed three days of nat ional mourning, calling M r. Arciniegas ''an eminent public man, intellectual and writer'' who ''du ring almost the e ntirety of this century was a n untiring producer and promoter of culture in Colombia.''

Beginning wit h his first bo ok, ''Th e Student at the Round Ta ble,'' a study of stude nt involvement in politics publi shed in 19 32, Mr. Arcini egas wa s a critic of the military and of dictatorshi ps in L atin America. For long pe riods, the two were oft en synonymous, which, com bined with h is leftist sympathies, resulted in th e ba nning of seve ral of hi s b ooks and forced hi m in to exile in th e United States in the early 1950's. Even in old age, Mr. Arciniegas was no stranger to controversy. In 1992 he was dismissed as p resident of the national commi ssion that was organizing commemorations of the 500th anniversary of Colu mbus's arrival in the Ne w World after he clashed with Cesar Gaviria, then Colombia's president, who Mr. Arciniegas felt wanted a celebration that was ''neo-colonialist'' and too deferential to Spain.

In its obitu ary, El Tiempo, the ne wspaper for which Mr. Arcinie gas wrote from 1918 until his death, asked: ''What wa s Arcini egas: A polit ician? A d iligent p olemicist? A historian? A jou rnalist? The discoverer of a literary continent?'' The correct answer, the newspaper replied, was all of these. ''And these intellectual facets a re indistinguishable from those of his p ersonality: perpetual worker, untiring joker a nd a generous and focused te acher,'' th e n ewspaper sai d. Thou gh an intelle ctual at hea rt, defining himself as ''a n eternal student,'' Mr. Arcini egas also led a varied an d vigorous public life. He was elected three times to Colombia's national congress as a member of the L iberal Party, was twice minister of education in t he 1 940's and e njoyed a lon g dipl omatic career, with appointments as ambassador to Italy, the Vatican and Venezuela.

Beginning in the 1 940's, Mr. A rciniegas worked as a visiting p rofessor at several Ameri can universities, t eaching course s in soci ology an d L atin Ame rican history and li terature. Am ong th e institutions where he taught were Brooklyn College, Colum bia University, Mills College, the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Chicago.

While teaching at Columbia in 1953, Mr. Arcinieg as fell afoul of one of the national security measures typical of the McCarthy period. Returning to New York from a trip to Paris, he was detained and held for a ni ght at Ellis Isla nd, apparently because the di ctatorship then in po wer in Colombia had falsely told the American immigration authorities that he was a Communist. Mr. Arciniegas was married for 70 years to Gabriela Vieira, who died in 1996 and to whom he dedicated all of his books. He is survived by two daug hters, Ga briela and Auro ra, both pr ominent tran slators h ere, and a gra nddaughter, Gabriela Santa Arciniegas, who is also a writer.

264He became undersecretary of the Reyes adminstration and ambassador of Colombia in England. He was a collaborator of the Hispania magazine and an editor of the newspaper La Nación of Buenos Aires. He served as a Minister in Argentina in 1934. - 144 - family: Jaime, Guillermo, Gabriel and F ernando Restrepo Su árez. They we re former students of El Gimnasio Moderno (a traditi onal elit e school), and sons of Fabio Restrepo, who was the manager of the newspaper El Tiempo. Jaime Restrepo, who assumed the direction, cont inued and renewed the lin k with writers such as Gonzalo Arango265, Hernando Valenc ia Goekel, and Gabrie l García Márquez. This family directly or indirectly continued linked to the public ation until the late 1970s . Cromos became the first Colombian magazine with a circulation of high magnitude and has remained at the top until today.

The Parisian cultural influenc e during Sant iago Valencias period left its mark on the magazine, so much that entire sentences in French mixed with Spanish can be found in the articles: "Nuevas creaciones de la s más refinadas casas de modas! le genre chic, de grand fon et de bon gout!" (Cromos No. 1).

However, Cromos published at the same time pictures of the every day of the country and the cities, as the children who live on the streets (Picture 1), in fact the photo s files of Cromos represents one of the mo st important historic al documents of the country as well as one the most important examples of Colombian photo-journalism.

Picture 1 „Children of the Streets“, Cromos 1918.

This Parisian influence changed over ti me and during the T amayos' leadership (1918- 1953) we can see a progressive Anglo- Saxonization of the magazine. During the initial s tage of the Rest repo Suarez per iod (1953- 1979) British ideals begin to predominate, along with the Am erican. For example, in Cromos No. 1865 publis hed

265He was famous in Col ombia for being the founde r of a literature a nd philosophy movement calle d "Nadaísmo" (Nothingness). - 145 - in 1953 there are c aptions, s uch as the one her e quoted, "Este ense mble de Coleman de Califor nia es de Jersey de Orlon". This fashion is pres ented by Californian models. And at the s ame time, "guests with styles a la Grace Kelly at a year end party at the Country Club". The impor tant thing to highlight is that loca l pictures are mixed with the foreign ones, keeping to t he pattern, just as the French pattern was respected early in the century.

In 1981 Cromos, in an event almost magical, predicted the attempt on the pope:

An article in a Colombia n magazine, available on the streets this morning, predicte d that Pope John Paul II would be t he victim of an assa ssination atte mpt. Cromo s Magazine quoted Marc ellus Toe-Gucor, whom it describe d as a ''wo rld-renowned specialist'' in the occult, as saying that an analysis of the palm of the Po pe, who was shot and wounded by a gunman in Rome today, showed that ''a violent act would be committed against his life.'266

In 1992 the magazine is sold to the group Santo Domingo.

In March 2004 the magazin was awarde d with the iberoamer ican priz e Rey de España (King of Spain), in the category Don Quijote, which it is recognition to the good use of the Spanish langu age as well as the promotion of the Spanish. The winner was the redaction chief, Nelson Fr eddy Padilla 267, in the subcategory “Best article in Iberoamerica 2004” for the chronicl e ‘Los frailes del des ierto’ (Monks of the desert).

However, Cromos hasn´t been free of controversie s. Gerardo Reyes in his book Don Julio Mario (The former Chairman of the Santo Domingo Group) says that Mr Santo Domingo bought Cromos to compete with the magazin Semana, because Mr Santo Domingo was very upset about so me critics and reports of Semana about Avianca, an airline property of the Santo Domingo Group.

The first incident was on November 27 1989 when Pablo Es cobar exploited an airplane in Bogotá to assasinate Cesar Gavi ria Trujillo, then a presidentia l candidate and late President of Colombia, who di dn´t take the flight. 109 persons were murdered. Semana reported about possible thecnical failures in the airplane.

266New Yo rk Ti mes. “Magazine in Colombia Predi cted an Attempt on Life of th e Pope ”. New Yo rk Times, May 14, 1981. 267Nelson Padillla was famou s for a fo rmer article, when he was chief of inve stigation in the Cambio Magazin. His article called “Poisoned Rain” was a description how the wa r on drugs, sponsored by USA, is destroying forest and jungles and threatening the health of half million of peasants and indians in Colombia. - 146 - The second inc ident was on January 25 1990, when an Avianca airplane had an accident in New York; in this case Semana informed about one possible error of the pilots. Additionaly it was another incident about some declarations of Felipe López, Semana Director, about the supposed t helephone espionage of the Group Santodomingo.268

During this time the Santo Domingo Gr oup withdr aw the public ity of all their companies in Semana, this publicity returned partially to the magazin when Felipe López left the Direction and was elected a friend of the Group, Isaac Lee. 269

3.7.1.2.2 El Espectador

It is a newspaper with national circulation within Colomb ia, founded by Fidel Cano Gutiérrez on 22 March 1887 in Medellí n and publis hed since 1915 in Bogotá. It changed from a daily to a weekly edition in 2001, following a financial crisis, and became a daily again since 11 May 2008.

Since its first issue t o present its motto has been " El Espectador will wo rk for the good of the country with li beral criteria and for the good of the liberal principles with patriotic criteria". It w as initially published t wice a week, 500 iss ues each. It defined itself as a political, literary, news and industrial newspaper. Years later it would become a daily. Sinc e 2001, the paper us es the slogan "El Espectador: Opinion is news", implying it now focuses in opinion ar ticles, not in breaking news. This focus will continue in the daily edition started 11 May 2008270

In 1994, after conducting a survey, Le Monde considered El Espectador one of the best 8 daily newspapers in the world, along with The New Y ork Tim es (United States), Financial Times (United Kingdom), Izvestia (Russia), People's Daily (China), Al Ahram (Egypt), Asahi Shimbun (Japan), and Times of India.271 Additionally through its history El Espectador has received many prizes for its investigations.

268Semana. “Espionaje Telefónico” (Thelephone Espionage). In: Semana, April 5, 1994. 269Reyes, Ge rardo (2007). Don Julio M ario: Biog rafía No Autori zada (Not aut horized Biog raphy). Barcelona: Ediciones B. 270Osorio, Marcela. “Seguimos Adelante” (we go on). In: El Espectador. May 28, 2008.

271Annick, Cojean. “ENQUÊTE Le "New York Times " ou l'obsession de l'excellence Sûr de lui, réputé pour son esprit de série ux et ses é ditoriaux ci nglants, le jo urnal d e réf érence a méricain veu t maintenant se rapprocher de ses lecteurs». In: Le Monde. December 12, 1994.

- 147 - It is the oldest newspaper in Colombia, founded only 10 years after The Washington Post, the oldest in t he Americ as. And ac cording to the latest Estudio G eneral de Medios (EGM – Segunda Ola 2007 ( II-2007)), it is one of the most read newspapers in Colombia with 687, 900 readers every week. 272 Also it is a member of the Inter American Press Association and the Colombian Newspapers Association (Asociación de Diarios Colombianos - ANDIARIOS).It has proclaimed itself as "neutral," but in 2007 its director openly said he did not agr ee with President Álva ro Uribe Vélez 's government.273

Since its foundation, El Espectador acted as a speak er for Colombian Liberal Party, at the time oppos ed to the administrati ons of the conservative and or thodoxe “Regeneration” and through its history was cl osed by t he authorities several times because of its political postures274:

• 8 July 1887, by Rafael Núñez administration, 134 days after its first issue, until 10 January 1888. • 27 October 1888, by the then designated Carlos Holguín, until 12 Februar y 1891; previously, the Cathol ic Church had forbidden it s followers to read the newspaper, because of the critics to the lavishness of the Catholic Church i n public celebrations made by its director.275 • On 26 September 1892 the gov ernment fined the newspaper with $200.000 pesos after considering one of its articles "subversive". • 8 August 1893, by Antioquia gov ernor Abraham García, until 14 March 1896. Fidel Cano Gutiérrez was jailed. • On 27 June 1896, until 27 April 1897, due to a press law recently passed by the Congress. • The outbreak of the T housand Days War made El Espectador to suspend its activities between 19 October 1899 and 16 October 1903

272El Espe ctador. "Audien cia d e Ele spectador.com creci ó 79 po r ci ento“ (Au dience of Elespectador.com grew 79 per cent) .In: El Espectador. December 3, 2007. 273Rueda, María Isabel. "¿Quién es el Fidel Cano que hoy dirige ‘El Espectador’ que otro Fidel Cano fundó hace 120 años?” (Who is The Fidel Cano that directs “El Espectador” that another Fidel Cano founded 120 years ago?).In: Semana. March 17, 2007. 274Ospina Londono, Jorge (1977). “Historia del Pe riodismo Antioqueño” (History of the Jo urnalism in Antioquia). In: Repertorio Histórico 31 (228). Academía Antioquena de Historia. 275Martínez, Helda. “El Espectador cumple 120 años de Protagonista” (The Espectador reachs 120 years of Protagonism)t. In: Inter Press Service. March 21, 2007. Available at: ipsnoticias.net - 148 - • On 17 Dec ember 1904 it was s uspended agai n, after facing difficulties and opposing Rafael Rey es administration. It appeared a gain on 2 January 1913 as an evening daily in Medellín.

In 1948, after the murder of Liberal Party chief Jorge Eliec er Gaitán, its circulation was suspended during thr ee days. Since then, El Es pectador had to deal with the censorship of the then ruli ng Conservative Party severa l times. On 9 November 1949, Luis Cano Villegas, it s director, retired as a protest for the seizure of t he entire edition by the government, being replaced by his brother Gabriel Cano Villegas.

On 6 Sept ember 195 2, its facilit ies, then located downtown Bo gotá, as well as the building of competitor El T iempo and the houses of Liber al Party leaders Eduardo Santos and Carlos Lleras Restrepo, were looted and partially destroyed, apparently with tolerance from the government. It reappeared on 16 September.

In 1955 the newspa per outspokenly opp osed to the military gover nment of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, publishing several arti cles by Alberto Lleras Camargo 276, w ith a big effect on public opinion. In De cember, the government accused El Espectador of several ac counting and tax irregularit ies, and fined the new spaper with $10,000 pesos on 20 December 1955. On 6 Jan uary 1956 the National Taxes Direction imposed El Espectador a sanct ion of $600,000 pes os. Its directors, who were forbidden to respond the accusations on the paper, suspended its publication that day.

In order to replace El Espectador, on 15 February 1956 appeared El Independiente, directed by Alberto Lleras Camargo (a very influential politician two times president of Colombia), who retired in April when the newspaper was closed during a few months. It was published again in 1957 but due to an agreement by the oppositio n newspapers, it suspended its publication on 5 May. Five days later, Rojas Pinilla was ousted. El Independiente circulated until 1 J une 1958, when it was formally replaced by El Espectador.

276He was a m ember of th e Libe ral Pa rty of Co lombia; he served as cong ressman (1931 -1935), Minister of Education, Minister of the Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the governments of Alfonso L ópez Puma rejo and Edu ardo Santos. He served too as a cting Presid ent of Colombia between 1945 and 1946. He then served as the first secretary general of the Organization of American States fro m 1948 to 1 954. Finally, he se rved as Presi dent of Colom bia bet ween 1958 and 1962. During this la ter term, he f ounded th e Colombian In stitute for Ag rarian Reform (INCO RA), with the intention of implementing a needed degree of land reform in the country. - 149 - Throughout the 20th century El Espectador was the main Liber al newspaper, with El Tiempo, both holding an important political in fluence. Among its main contributors it had some of the most import ant Colombian journalists at the time, like Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, Alberto Lleras Camargo, Eduardo Zalamea Borda, Gabriel García Márquez, Eduardo Caballero Ca lderón, Silvia Galv is, Jo rge Child, María Jimena Duzán, Alfredo Molano.

On 29 May 1996 the then daily newspaper launched its website elespectador.com. Its design a format has been changed s everal times. In 2006 later added t he .com to its logo, comments to the articles a nd user registration. Access hits to Elespectador.com grew 79% in 2007.277

Despite El Espectador had been the Colom bian newspaper with the second highest circulation, after El Tiempo, the financial difficulties wo rsened and in 1997 the Cano family sold most of their shares in Com unican S. A., El Esp ectador publishing company, to Julio Mario Santo Do mingo, who at the time owned Cromos, Caracol Radio (later sold to Spani sh group PRISA) and Caraco l TV. In September 2001 El Espectador became a weekly newspaper.

Reporters without Bor ders stated that "media diversity suffered a heavy blow" when the newspaper "downgraded its elf to a weekly. 278 Since then, their editors tri ed to recover the financial balanc e an d the newspaper's circulatio n. As a week ly, it was published on Saturdays, with S unday's date. Counting with the free time readers have av ailable on weekends, El Espectador focused on opinion, investigation, and analysis pieces, recovering its circulation, influence, and earnings.

On 7 March 2008 elespectador.com was revam ped, setting up four "editions": online, latest news, news map and print version. It also improved the registration system and the RSS feeds, and added tags, audios, and videos taken from Noticias Caracol , newscast from sister network Caracol TV, uploaded to its YouTube.

In 2007 Fidel Cano Correa stated in an interview with Revista Sem ana that "[the return to a daily edition] is just a possib ility. We have d oing very well durin g the last

277El Espectador."Audiencia de Elespectador.com creció 79 por ciento”. Op.Cit. 278Reporters Without Borders (2001). Colombia Annual Report 2001. Availbale at: www.rsf.org - 150 - three years, especially the last one."279 The Spanish group PRISA was considered as a strategic partner, but the negotiation fail ed when Sa nto Domingo refused to cede the control of the paper to PRISA. On 11 May 2008 El Espectador became a daily again, changing from broadsheet to tabloid format.

3.7.1.2.2.1 Fighting for the Press Freedom

During the 20th cent ury El Es pectador criticized oth er mass media in Colomb ia, which preferred to remain silent instead of denouncing the atrocities happening in the country.280 On early 1980s, the then daily publ ished several articles denouncing illegal loans and other irregul arities against the Grupo Gr ancolombiano, one of the most powerful economical groups at the ti me. As retaliation, several big c ompanies pulled their ads on the paper out, which was already facing some financial is sues. El Espectador disavowed this fact a nd dedicated an editorial piece to its cred ibility and the credibility of those economical groups281.

El Espectador also demanded on its ed itorials freedom of the press and denounced the political censorship t he independent m edia outlets had to deal with to not being closed, stating that "not even in the worst tim es of press censorship or politic al retaliation, som e had to resort to crim e in order to silence the press, in one of its more noble and higher de mocratic functions." It recognized that in Colombia "the death penalty ordered and executed from the lowest social holes has b ecome a habit, as revenge to the labour of soci al sanity the press is committed to." It concluded saying that "the siege and danger feeling — on the press — would negatively be reflected on the very own democratic system." 282

The newspaper rejected to be considered as "subversive oppos ition" and criticized Liberal president Julio César Tur bay Ayala's government, which on the newspaper´s words wished to "have a totally aulic, extremely pro-government press, not silenc ed but flattering." To defend itself, the paper published 15 July 1979 a column named Si

279Rueda, María Isabel. Op. Cit. 280Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Noticiero Oficial Militar en Tv” (Military News in Tv). In: El Espectador. July 27, 1980. 281Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “La Credi bilidad de un peri ódico” (The credibility of a Newspaper). In: El Espectador. July 17,1983. 282Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Sobre la Libertad de Prensa” (about the press freedom). In: El Espectador. September 28,1983. - 151 - eso es oposición... ("If that's opposition...") 283 On the same text, the news paper declared itself "neutral", considering that a democra cy should not be polarized, "because in the times we ar e living, newspapers are incr easingly more independent from governm ents, more devoted entirel y to report and guide according to their honest knowledge a nd understanding," adding that the " unanimous, one-way, uniformed, official press is (intended) for di ctatorships and not for democracies... and we believe that Colombia is still a democracy.”

3.7.1.2.2.2 Drug Trafficking

“What this country really needs is not money, metal, pure materialism, but a deep reconquest of morals in both public and private sectors. Dr ug trafficking has corrupted us, the buying and s elling of infl uences have corrupted us, the rush for easy money has corrupted us”284.

Our mafiosos find that the no-extradition (to United States) is their best life insurance, because they know that if they co mmit any serious or sligh t offences in Colombia n territory, the generous cheque book or the sinist er machine-gun, or the paid hit man, or the unscr upulous bodyguard willing to kill at the first cha nce, will ke ep them fre e enjoying their dirty, perverse fortune.285

These short pieces of Guillermo Cano, by the time director of El Espectador, illustrate his strong position against Narcotraffic; position that he conserved until his killing.

When the international pre ss denounced Pablo Escobar as Drug Lord, by the time member of the Colombian Parlament, no one in Colombia had official evidenc es about it, b ut Guillermo Can o published a r esume of an old ne ws from 1976, whic h informed about the capture by narcotraffic of Pablo Escobar, then a unk nown name between the thousands of capt ures. Next day, Pablo E scobar was very upset and ordered to buy all the Edition of El Espectador in Antioquia, the homeland of Escobar. After that and for many months Pablo Escobar “banned” the news paper in many towns in A ntioquia and in some times was necc esary military protection for El Espectador selling points. But anyway the soci ety knew the truth and Escobar

283Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Si eso es Oposición” (If it is opposition). In: El Espectador. July 15, 1979. 284Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Libreta de Apuntes” (Notes). In: El Espectador. January 12,.1986 285Martinez, Helda. Op. Cit. - 152 - became a fugitive, but unfortunately was ordered the murder of Guillermo Cano and the destruction of El Espectador.286

On 17 December 1986, Guiller mo Cano Isaza, was assassina ted in front of the newspaper offices by gunm en paid by Pablo Escobar 287, after publishing severa l articles critical of Colombia's drug barons. Cano left the hea dquarters around 19:00 on his family station wagon. Afte r he made a U-turn on the Avenida El Espectador, one of the hitmen approached th e wagon Cano was driving, shot him on his chest eight times, and then ran away on a moto rcycle. Cano was 61 years old, and had been a journalist for 44. His murder is still considered unpunished.288

The World Press Freedom Prize, award ed annually by UNESCO since 1997, is named in his honour, for "his courage, his compromise with independent journalism and the tenacity with which he fought for his country" , which "are an example for the rest of the world to follow. Guiller mo Ca no's fate exem plifies the price paid by journalists the world over in ex ercising their profession; journalists are imprisoned and ill-treated every day and the fact that these crim es, for the most part, goes unpunished is even more alarming."289

On 2 September 1989 the paper's offices we re bombed by the Medellín Cartel. The blast occurred around 06:30; it blew the build ing's roof up, destroyed the main entry and affected the newspaper's production. The bom b was hidden in a v an parked minutes before it exploded in front of t he main entry. The same day, 6 armed men broke into an exclusive island in Islas del Rosario, near Cartagena de Indias, and set

286Salázar, Alonso (2001). La Parabola de Pablo (The Parable of Pablo). Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.

287Pablo Emilio Escob ar G aviria, a.k.a. El Patrón or E l Docto r (De cember 1, 1 949 – Dece mber 2 , 1993) gained world fame as a Colombi an drug lord. Escobar became so wealthy from the drug tra de that in 19 89 Forbes magazine listed him as the seventh richest man in the world.He is considered to be the most ambitious and powerful drug lord in history. His brutal ruthlessness was al so legendary; he would kill anyone who stood in his way and was responsible for the killing of 30 judges, 457 policemen, and other deaths at a rate of 20 e ach day for two months . In total it is said he is directly responsible for the death s of over 4,000 peo ple. Bowde n, Mark (20 01). Killing Pablo . New York : Penguin.

288Foundation f or Pre ss Freedom (2006). Guillermo Cano Chair . Bogotá: Foundation for Press Freedom. 289UNESCO. (2 006). About the UNES CO/Guillermo Cano Wo rld Press Fre edom Prize. New York : UNESCO. - 153 - fire to the Cano family's summer house. However, the next day, El Espectador's main headline was Seguimos adelante ("We are going on").290

Picture 2 – El Espectador´s redaction after the bomb.

3.7.1.2.2.3 The pressure of the Paramilitaries and the Government

On 29 May 2000 Reporters Without Borders issued a letter of protest to Interior Minister Humberto de La Calle Lombana, on the kidnapp ing of journalist Jineth Bedoya291, at the time working for El Espectador, allegedly carried out by members of the paramilitary Unite d Self-Def ence Forc es of Colo mbia (AUC). Robert Ménard, RWB's secretary general, "stated that he was "sca ndalised" by this latest attack on Bedoya".292 She would later join to El Tiempo.

On 23 August 1999, a group called Colomb ian Re bel Army (ERC) published a communiqué issuing death threats agains t 21 personalities e ngaged in the then ongoing peace proc ess, accusing them of "promoting war between Colom bians". Among those personalities two El Espectador contributors were mentioned, Alfredo Molano y Arturo Alape. On 19 January 1999, Molano left the country (he would return years later). Molano had condem ned the massacre of 130 people perpetrated weeks

290El Espectador first page. September 3, 1989. 291Reporters Without Borders (2000). Colombia Annual Report 2000. Availbale at: www.rsf.org 292Reporters Without Borders."Journalist kidnapped". May 29, 2000. Availbale at: www.rsf.org - 154 - before by members of AUC commanded by Carlos Castaño, who had r eferred to Molano as "paraguerrilla". On 18 Septem ber, Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, who had worked for El Espectador and RCN Radio, went into exile.293

Between February and May 2000, the journalis t Ignacio Gómez received at least 56 threatening letters. In an article published by El Es pectador, Gó mez had revealed that a massacre wh ere 49 pe asants wer e killed was perpetrated by p aramilitary militias supported by member s of the Colo mbian Army. After escaping a k idnapping attempt in Bogotá on 24 May, Gómez sought refuge in the United States on 1 June 2000. He would return to Colom bia one y ear later and become part of Noticias Uno TV newscast.294

On 21 March 2003 El Espectador´s columnist Fernando Garavito left Colombia for the United States, after several death th reats. He denounced human rights violations by AUC, as well as the alleged toleranc e on drug barons in the past by the then presidential candidate Álv aro Ur ibe Vélez. 295 On 8 February 200 3 photojournalist Herminso Ruiz was beaten and had his came ra confiscated by members of the Colombian National Police while he was covering El Nogal club bombing.296

On May 2003 El Espectador, through an editorial written by its then director Ricardo Santamaría, reported on "inter ference" on an investigation it was carrying on the alleged irregularities in Banco del Pacífico, claiming that Polic e intelligence officials had obtained access to a draft of the report and sent it, through the Colombian National Police director, Teodoro Campo, to the then Interior Minister Fernando Londoño, who was a chairman of the bank . Organizations defending freedom of the press expressed their contempt and th eir "deep concern". Campo denied an y involvement, while minister Londoño claim ed the draft was sent anonymously to him.297

293Reporters without Borders (2000). Op.Cit. 294Bourgeat, Régis; García, Iván. "The press as a " military target ": armed groups against press freedom". In: Reporters without Borders. November 22, 2001 Available at: www.rsf.org 295Reporters Without Borders (2003). Colombia Annual Report 2003. Availbale at: www.rsf.org 296Reporters wit hout Bo rders. "Con cern about d eath t hreats against he ad of n ews p hotographers’ association". March 7, 2007. Availbale at: www.rsf.org 297Ibidem. - 155 - 3.8 Planeta Group

The group’s origin is the central publ ishing firm around whic h the company has expanded. Since its creation Planeta’s activity has had a threefold focus: promoting Spanish language aut hors, developing the idea of b ooks as a vehic le for cultural exchange and broadeni ng the scope of books in t he Latin American market; moreover this editorial had created the Planeta Priz e298 to estimulate the literary creation.

The Planet a Group was founded in Barc elona in 1949 following the creation of Editorial Planeta. In 1966 it opened its first subsidiaries in Colombia and Mexico , marking what would be a cons tant part of its activity : an uninterrupted presence in Latin America.

Today, Planeta Group boasts over 40 publishi ng labels that publish works by over 5,000 authors including writer s of classical and contemporar y literature. It is also leader in t he commercialisation of majo r encyclopaedic works and in s ales by instalments. Addittionaly it has presence in Mass Media through 3 television channels (Antena 3 TV, AntenaNeox and AntenaNova) , 3 radio stations (Onda Cero RKOR; and Radio España), pr ess (La Razón, ADN -free ne wspaper- and Avui), and the media conglomerate under the Editorial House El Tiempo (Colombia). Furthermore in the sphere of new t echnologies it has begun to raid in the fi elds of electronic commerce and mobile telephone contents distribution

Corporate Commitments

People: T he people at the Planet a Group are the decisiv e fa ctor of our sucess. Because of that we are commited with thei r permanent development as in a personal as in a professional way. At the same we recognize and value their contribution to the company involve them into the decision process.

298The Premio Planeta is a Spanish litera ry prize, awarded since 1952 by the publish er Planeta to an original novel written in Spanish. It was cre ated by José Manuel Lara Hernández. Financially, it is the second mo st valuable lite rary a ward i n the world after the No bel Pri ze wit h the wi nner receiving €601,000. - 156 - Ethics: Our activity is based in the legal frames of the market; we are involved, in the respect of our social values and the honesty of our performance towards the persons and their environment.

Quality: We conceive the qualit y as the c omplete satisfaction of the needs of our customers, irrevocable premise of our products and services.

Market: Our products and services aim to sati sfy completely the needs of culture, leisure, formation and information of our customers.

Profitability: We seek to get a permanent prof itability as garantie of future development and generation of value for our shareholders.

Innovation: We consider the innovation, in all their rooms, as one of the key elements for our current consolidation and future growth. Bec ause of that we dedicate our biggest efforts to the research and hav e an avantgarde position into the field of development and research of new contents, products and services.

Strategy: We lead all the sector s we have proved experienc e and we establish the neccesary strategic alliances more suitables for the development of new business.

Image: Our products configurate us as a gr oup of prestigius brands. Our vocation of leadership in c ontents is founded in t he respec t to the personality and the development of each one of t hem, at the same time we are co nscious of the high importance of the Mass Media in our development.

Organization: We are a complex group oriented to the action and bas ed in a participative direction style, gifted with clear and firm structures and procedures.

3.8.1 Casa Editorial El Tiempo

The Casa Editorial El Tiempo (Editorial House El Tiem po), is a conglom erade of Mass Media b ased in Co lombia, whic h in clude the most read Ne wspaper in Colombia, El T iempo299, and the website eltiempo.com which is t he most visited website in Colombia. In July 2007, the Pl aneta Group acquired 55% of the shares of

299Although in the year 2007 El Tiempo has a reduction of 8,2% in the number of readers. - 157 - The Casa Editorial El Tiempo; while the majority of the rest of shares is owned by the Familia Santos300, the former propietary of the Media Group.

La Casa Editorial el Tiempo (CEET) is also the owner of one Tv Channel (City TV), a local television station in Colombia's capital city . CEET licensed the Canadian television system's Citytv brand. It started broadcasting on March 19, 1999.

Moreover the CEET incl udes 6 local News papers: Boyaca 7 Dias , Llano 7 Dias , Tolima 7 Dias, Portafolio , Periódico Hoy and ADN, a free Newspaper , and 4 magazines: Cambio, Don Juan, Alo and Credencial. Additionaly the group include the foloowing websit es: portafolio.com.co, cambio.com.c o, citytv.com.co, revistadonjuan.com, futbolred.com, enter.com.co (Technology), abcdelbebe.com (For Parents), motor.com.co (autos), elem pleo.com (Job Portal), metrocuadrado.com (Real State), clasificar.com (Classifieds) and vive.in (free time guide).

The magazine Cambio (Spanish for Change Magazine) is a polit ical and economics magazine. Founded with the name Cambio 16 was later sold and renamed Cambio in 1998 to Nobel laureate Gabrie l García Márquez and other associates. In 2006 the magazine was sold to Casa Editorial El Tiempo.

This magazin was denounced for difamation by one enterprise owned by Pedro Juan Moreno, a very clos e friend and adv iser of President Uribe; al though in his las t months he was very critic about Uribe´s Government and his officers.

Pedro Juan Moreno was critized by Cambio for his relation with the Narcotraffic. The magazin described how his com pany, GMP Chemical Products, apparently imported some chemicals to be used in the drug production in Colombia. As reply the Company denounced the magazin, but the Constitutional Court declared in f avor of the magazine301, raising many doubts about Mr Moreno Business.

After the distance with President Uribe, Mr Moreno created a newspaper where he critized the National Police (one regional director had to res ign), a pr esidential adviser and a Ministry. After he promissed to reveal a big and im portant truth for the country, he suffered a suddenly deathly accident, which remains without explanation.

300The Santos is a family with a large tradition into Politic 301Sentence Number T-1193/04 Colombian Constitutional Court, November 25, 2004. - 158 - Don Juan is a magazine for men with inf ormation about cars, sports, technology, culture, famous peop le, and cur rent events, illustrated with many pictures of semi- nude women.

ALO is a magazine for women with informati on about the life of the famous, advices for home, garten, beauty and health.

Credencial is a magazine for the holders of the Credit Card “Credencial”, its focus is: Culture and Current events, “always with an optimistic vision”302

This Division DATA Tiempo of the CEET offers the following services:

- Depuration, update and enrichment of data bases. - Analysis of data bases - Publicity Campaings with data bases (telemarketing, mail, emails, etc).

3.8.1.1 El Tiempo

El Tiempo (The Time) is the highest circulation daily newspaper in Colombia and a non-tabloid daily with nationa l distribution. As of 2004, it had an average weekday circulation of 314,000, rising to 453,000 for the Sunday edition. Besides, El Tiempo is part of Grupo de Diar ios Améric a (Ameri ca Newsp aper Group), an organization of eleven leading newspapers from eleven Latin American countries.

The newspaper was founded in 30 January 1911 by Alfons o Villegas Restrepo. At the beginning the Newspaper was a Tabloid. In 1913 it was purchased by his brother in law, Eduardo Sant os Mont ejo, who was the owner and director until 1976. Until 2007 El Tiem po's main shareholders were members of the Santos family, as part of the media conglomerate El Tiempo editorial house, when the Spanish Grupo Planet a obtained the majority ownership of the group.

El Tiempo enjoyed for 7 years monopoly status in Colombian media as the only daily that circulated nationally, as smaller dailies have limited distribution outside their own region, and while El Espectador, El Tiempo's longtime rival, was reduced to a weekly publication following an internal financial crisis in 2001, but returned to the daily format on 11 May 2008.

302Credencial, corporate website: www.revistacredencial.com - 159 - Several m embers of the Sant os family have participated in Co lombian politics, including Eduardo Santos M ontejo, who was President of Colombia from 1938 to 1942. Also, most recently, Vicepresident Francisco Santos Calderón and Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos have se rved during President Álvaro Uribe's administration, which cr eates doubts about the independence of the newspaper towards the Government. Additionaly, José Obdulio Gaviria, one of the closest advisers of the president has an opinion column in El Tiempo; between other reasons Mr Gaviria is critized by the following:

1. He is first cousin of the Drug Lord Pablo Escobar Gaviria

2. Roberto Escobar Gaviria, brother of Pabl o Escobar Gaviria, wr ote in his book My Brother Pablo: “he (José Obdulio Gaviria) visited us (Pablo and Roberto Es cobar) in the Catedral 303, and Pablo gifted him 10 ó 15 Millio ns Pesos for his person al expenses and his political campaign”.

3. In the same Book, Roberto Escobar wr ote that P ablo Escobar was adviced by José Obdulio Gaviria to do Politic, a ke y strategy to the advance of the Drug Business.304

303La Cated ral was a prison overloo king the city of M edellín in Colombia. The prison was built to specifications ordered by Medellin Cartel leader Pablo Escobar, under agreement with the Colombian government. Esco bar wou ld surrender to authorities, serve a ma ximum term of five years, and the Colombian government would not extradite him to the United St ates. In addit ion to the facility being built to Escobar's specifications, he was also given the right to choose who would guard him, believing to have cho sen guards only loyal to him. The pri son was believed to be de signed more to keep o ut Escobars' enemies from assassination attempts, than to keep Escobar in.

The finished prison was o ften called "Hotel Esco bar," or "Clu b Medellin," du e to its ame nities. La Catedral featured a soccer field, a giant doll house, a bar, jacuzzi, and a waterfall. Escobar also had a telescope installed that all owed him to l ook down onto the city of Medellin to hi s daughter's residence while talking on the phone with her.

PBS reports that even though the government was willing to turn a blind eye to Escobar continuing his drug smuggling, the arra ngement fell apa rt when it wa s re ported E scobar brought fou r of his lieutenants to the La Catedral to be tortured and murdered. The Colombian government decided it had to move Escobar to a standard prison, of whi ch Pablo refused. In July 1992, after serving one year and one month, Pablo would again be on the run. With the Colombian National Army surrounding the facility, it is said Pablo simply walked out the back gate. The ensuing manhunt would employ a 600- man unit, specially trained by the United States Delta Force, named Search Bloc.

304Escobar, Roberto (2008). Mi hermano Pablo (My brother Pablo). Bogotá: Ed Oveja Negra, Bogotá. - 160 - 4. Some of Mr. Gaviri a´s ideas like in Co lombia there is not conflict; not displaced, but economic migrants; and that the Kidnappeds are te rminal patients, cause a constant protest and requests for his resign.

5. Some persons, lik e Iván Cepeda Castro, Columnist of El Espectador, say that he promotes the violence against the opposition and the movements from left.305

6. Sometimes he int ervenes in Politic only to do a defense of t he establishment and agaisnt the evidenc es, like when he said that Mario Uribe, a cous in of the Pr esident Alvaro Uribe, was innocent, despite the fa ct that the Colombia n Justice Department had a clear and strong serie of evidenc es against Mr Uribe for his links with Paramilitaries.306

3.9 Conclusions

The Colombian outlets have become international outlests. It is a great opportunity to have more independence from the Colombian political an d economic powers. In the same way the development of the media outlests produces m any benefits, for example: the content of the newspapers is available in internet , in a multimedia l plataform with videos of the television channels and audio fr om the radio st ations. It could permit the newspapers t o be more a ttractive and to reach new audiences, particularly because these webs ites are fr ee of charges. In this new con text the opinion articles can have more impact thanks to the attractive format and the higher readiness. International outlest will have internati onal teams, which will be a great help in or der to break the journalism of attachment with a more “detached” perspective.

Because international outlets hav e to sa tisfy the minim um common denominator in order to reach very large audiences, inte rnational outlest bear the risk to become excessively commerci al and to promote mo re the entertainment than the depth information, However , this risk could be minimized, if we keep in mind that international media outlets must produce di fferent products to cover all t he social groups (Children, Teenagers, Women, Men, Academics, Elderly, etc). From this point

305Cepeda Cast ro, Ivan. “La destitución d e José O bdulio Gaviri a” (The Destitucion of Jose O bdulio Gaviria). In: El Espectador. March 14, 2008. 306El Espectador. “Fiscal critica al consejero presidencial José Obdulio Gaviria” (General Prosecutor criticizes the Presidential Adviser José Obdulio Gaviria). In: El Espectador. April 10, 2008. - 161 - of view, the internationalizatio n of the Colombian m edia outlets could s ignify the strengthening of all the secti ons, among the others, the edito rial and opinion section, therefore.

In any case, the internationalizat ion of t he Colombian media is a positive influence. The higher availability of resources and technology; the wider audienc e and particularly the conformation of internati onal teams and contact with others ways of working are key elements that help to break the current attachment.

- 162 - V{tÑàxÜ G g{x VÉÄÉÅu|tÇ Tààtv{ÅxÇà

The Colombian Attachment Journalism will be analyzed in the selected media for this analysis: Cromos, El Tiempo and El Espectador, in each case we will see a different kind of attachment and its corresponding ex planation. To measure the attachment were used parametric and non parametric stat istical tests in order to compare the variations in the presence of the variables of analysis under different manners and to do a clear difference between tendency to be si gnificant and real significant (staying of the significance under di fferent tests) . In the 7 th c hapter is described how were selected and measur ed the v ariables and which and why we re selected some test and not others. At the same extent, in the 7 th chapter are presented the results of the comparison between the Co lombian media and the inte rnational media and ho w quantitatively takes place the attachment in the Colombian articles.

The present chapter has as objective to detail how the Colomb ian attachment is manifested in the 200 articles of the se lected media from a qualitative pers pective and how this attachment has relation with the biography and use of language of each author.

4.1 Cromos

On politics this magazine uses t he strongest language, using words as “Nazism” 307, which is not presence in the ot her media; and “Dictatorship” 308, which in Cromos has the biggest presence. In the selected opinion articles of Cromos there is a clear focus on Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia, as a bad person and source of conflicts. Because of that, the following remarks are told about the President: “Feudal

307Aguirre, Alberto. “Son Enemigos” (They are Ene mies). In: Cromos April 4, 2005; Aguirre, Al berto. “Dizque Penalista” (Apparently Lawyer). In: Cromos June 10, 2005; Aguirre, Alberto. “Pais Peligroso” (Danguerous Country). In: Cromos April 4, 2006; Aguirre, Albe rto. “Renace el Nazismo” (The Nazism Reborns). In: Cromos. March 2, 2007. 308For example in: Aguirre, Alberto. Poder Arbitrario (Arbitrary Power). In: Cromos. August 06, 2007. - 163 - Lord”, “Master” 309; “he plays a childish game” 310, etc. Following this r adical div ision between “good citizens” and “bad president ”, there are also many pejorative remarks for the Government: “S upporters of killers” 311, “...for the State, fe d with the thesis of Schmitt (Carl) and Hobbes, the residents of San José de Apartadó (...) don’t deserve its protection, less its commiseration” 312, etc. For Cromos the political sphere of the conflict has some cruel protagonists as the President and his Government, which are forming a dictatorship under certain Naz i in fluence, against the citizens, while they receive help from U.S.A, who are called “gringos” 313 -from the expression: “green go” (green refers to militaries)-, wh ich makes the politics d espicable314. In all the articles there is a clear, and at some extent, l ogic relation bet ween politics and power, and from that, the authors do anot her clear white/black division between riches and poor, and the riches represents the putrefacti on: “the putrefaction of the Colombian oligarchy has no limit” 315; and the poor are victims of t he riches: “in the last dec ades thousands of poor were killed by very rich people.”316

Not always U.S.A. is represent ed as a negative actor, but the most important things about U.S.A.; the way they are supporting paramilitaries and drug traffickers (Chapter 1), while of ficially they are agains t them, it is never told. In the same way a decisiv e phenomenon into the Colombian Conflict, the Pa rapolitic (the infilt ration of the mafia in all the levels of the gover nment) is the topic that rece ives less attention as graphic number 17 shows.

When Cromos speak s about politic promotes the polarization using a pe jorative, emotional and strong language, focusing in the pers ons or doing clear division s between victims and victimizers, ignoring the fact that t here is an ample composition of armed actors (for exam ple, many “poor” peasants b ecame guerrilla or paramilitary soldiers); and victims (for example, some ex-paramilitary or ex-guerrilla soldiers after their demobilization are pursued by their ex -mates becoming vict ims). But the most

309Aguirre, Alberto. „Se Alza el Indio“ (The Rebel Aborigine).In: Cromos. May 20, 2005. 310Ospina, Willi am. „Entre la Impunid ad y la Incoherencia“ (Between the Impunity and the Incoherence). In: Cromos. August 3, 2007. 311Ospina, Willi am. „En Busca de la Semilla del De sorden“ (Looki ng for the Seeds of Chaos). In: Cromos. May 25, 2007 312Aguirre, Alberto. „Son Enemigos“. Op. Cit. 313Aguirre, Alberto. „Tan Querido Mr Woods (Mr Woods, so lovely)“. In: Cromos. December 13, 2006. 314Aguirre, Alberto. „Olla Podrida“ (Stew). In: Cromos. Februar 2, 2006. 315Aguirre, Alberto. „Olla Podrida“. Op. Cit. 316Ospina, William. „Las Convulsiones de Colo mbia“ (The convulsions of Colombia). In: Cromos. July 7, 2007. - 164 - important is that Cromos opinion articles don’t search or explain the causes of the war and the role of a key actor like the U.S. A. is not explained. Moreover complex processes like the Parapolitic that affecst the direction of the country and the war, although appointed: “ outrageous alliances of powerful per sonalities from politics and business with murderers”317, receives only a tangential attention.

POLITIC

50 45 40 35 30 25 46 20 15 10 18 16 5 7 6 4 0 3

cy m a is rship r USA o ment az t rn N aro Uribe e moc v icta Parapolitic De Al D n Gov a mbi lo o C

Graphic 17 – Presence of the Variables related to Politic

On Killing Cromos makes focus on Killings as a general conc ept to refer to the casualties of the war, although in the 25% of the occasions it prefers to use the term Massacre and of the links the concept to a systematic persecution of the rich against the poor: “The massacre of Caño Seco was one more episode of this relentless persecution against the working class.”; 318

At the same time the po lice opened fire on the indigenous in Cauca, this Friday the 9th, the p resident of Colombia, under th e protectin g glance of the U.S.A. ambassador, in a luxury hotel in Medellin, san g praises to the policy of peace an d security. The ambassador smiled, while the great press applauded.319

As in the t opic politic s, the articles personalize and t ry to reduce the Colombian Conflict to a confrontation between rich and powerful people vs. poorest, ignoring the

317Ospina, william. “En Busca de la Semilla del Desorden”. Op. Cit. 318Aguirre, Alberto. “Las Mentiras del Gobierno para Justificar el Asesinato de Sindicalistas” (The Lies of the Government to Justify the Killings of Trade Unionists). In: Cromos. September 7, 2007. 319Aguirre, Alberto. “Tierra por Plomo” (Land for Bullets). In: Cromos. September 23, 2005. - 165 - complexity of the armed actors (the ma ssacres are perpetrated by peas ants who became soldiers, so peasants kill peasants) and at the same time leaving aside many social situations which explain the demand for drugs and the intricate structure that support one of the most profitable business of the world: the Narcotraffic.

Beside Killings and M assacres, Cromos us es the term Homicide, which is a legal term used more in civil s ituations (for ex ample, interfamily violence) and for this reason is not adequate to describe the casualties of the Colombian War, although the authors use it as equivalent of Killings.

The variables with the least representation in this category are Genocide and Extra Judicial Executions, two dramatic situatio ns that deserve more attention for their ethical im plications and t he consequenc es they imply for a democratic state. Moreover many killings could c orrespond to one of these categories, but as happens with politics, Cromos avoids to explain complex situat ions and prefers to explain, in the majority of the opportunities, the casual ties in Colomb ia simply as Killin gs or Massacres within a conflict schema of rich es Vs poor. Graphic number 18 shows the distribution of the presence of each variable related to the casualties.

KILLINGS 60

50

40

30 51 20

25 10 11 66 0 Killings Homicide Massacre Genocide Extra Judicial Executions

Graphic 18 - Presence of the variables related to Killings

Although the opinion articles in Cromos speak about genocide, the term is used as a synonym of killing and mass acre, what is incorrect, because genocide is the deliberate and systematic destruc tion, in whole or in par t, of an ethnic, racial, religious, s ocial, or national group: „In San José de Apartadó, the 21st February,

- 166 - were killed (…) the state is guilty for this massacre (…) diverse international organizations about that genocide told…”320

On civil victims Cromos makes a clear emphasis on I ndigenous, continuing with its thesis that the conflict is a confrontation between ri ches and poor, in which t he president has a relevant role:

(The Colombian President) doesn’t doubt to use the weapo ns to defend the land t hat the landowners had snatched from the Indigenous through centuries. The big press is on the side of the power and the owners (…) but despite th e abuses and killings the Indigenous nation does not surrender.321

The author makes a clear distinction bet ween the “bad” ric hes and the “good” Indigenous. Because of that when the Indi ans support an independent politician, who did much to improve t he quality of life of m any citizens in Bogotá, he sees that as a treason: “The Indigenous Soc ial Alliance gives its electoral support to Antana s Mockus322. What does t he race supporting a m an from The Andes belonging to the capital bourgeois?”323

The author believes t hat taking side with t he Indigenous implies to attack the elite, who is seen as victimizer and as the caus e of the suffering of the Indigenous . Once again there are no explanat ions, but an emotional reac tion which leaves the possibilities of a political solution (t he support of indep endent candida tes, for example) as way as any explanations re lated to the posses sion of the land in Colombia and/or to the fact that the exclusion of the Indigenous is rooted in their lack of economical, educational and social integration.

However, it is very interesting that although there are 4 millions of internally displaced people in Colombia, they don’t receive much attention in Cromos. A possi ble explanation be, that displa ced are a very diverse group and they are not so easy to identify and isolate as the Indigenous, the Children or the Trade Unionists, precisely the groups that receive more attention as Graphic number 19 shows.

320Aguirre, Alberto. “Los Dejo Solos” (He leaves them alone).In: Cromos. March 3, 2005. 321Aguire, Alberto. „Sin tierra“ (Without Land). In: Cromos. November 25, 2005. 322Under Mockus's leadership, Bogotá saw improvements as: water usage dropped 40%, the homicide rate fell 70%, traffic fatalities dropped by over 50%, drinking water was provided to all homes (up from 79% in 1993), and sewerage was provided to 95% of homes (up from 71%). 323Aguirre, Alberto. „Olla Podrida“. Op. Cit. - 167 - CIVIL VICTIMS

35

30

25

20

15 30 25 24 10

13 5 8

0 0 Indians Displaced Peasants Children Journalists Trade Unionists

Graphic 19 – Presence of the variables related to Civil Victims

In contrast to El Espectador and El Tiempo, the journalists in Cromos, don’t speak about journalists as victims. Despite the fa ct that Colombia is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists in the wo rld, the black/white schema they use, dones not put them i n the role of victims, themselves,. Th is could be interpreted as the attempt to take distance from their own status as victims, to try to be “neutral” and to see the conflict as an observer but not as an involved party.

On Armed actors, Cromos foc uses equ ally on the Guerillas a nd the Colombian Armed Forces. While the origin of the guer illas is seen as a logic response: “so the guerrilla was born, like a d isproportionate response of some peasa nts to the disproportionate and violent offense of a State accustomed to hit when it is asked for something to eat” 324, their current behavior is strongly criticized: “It is true that the guerrillas represent n ow little of its idea ls: their persistence in in human crimes such as kidnapping makes them completely unac ceptable as a political alternativ e to the community”.325 As cons equence, t he majority of the information about guerrillas is negative; the opinion articles speak prevai ling about current events and because of that all the information about the declarati ons, actions, attacks and soldier s of the guerrillas become a reminder of their negative behavior.

324Ospina, William. “En busca de la semilla del desorden”. Op.Cit. 325Ibidem. - 168 - On the other hand, the Colombian Armed F orces are criticized by their relations with Paramilitaries:

Jorge Noguera, former director of t he DAS ( Colombian Secret Police ), President’s friend, collaborated with paramilitary groups to facilitate acti ons in the Atlantic Coast , and sponsor partnerships between senior officials of t he DAS and the Northern Bloc of the Paramilitaries.326

Throughout all of the articles, there are ma ny details about these relations and how these forces have the president as their chief. At this point Cromos takes distance from the official propaganda, which focuses on the gu errillas, but denies the cooperation between paramilit aries and the Colombian Armed Forces. T he same happens with terrorism, the name given to the guerillas by the official propagand a, which it is used by Cromos only in the 6% of the occasions that refer to armed actors

Criminals is a term used mostly to refer to Paramilitaries or illeg al groups r elated to the government: “This punitive association, what is happening in Colombia, including politicians, criminals and paramilitaries is a pure fascist stock”. 327 Although the term also refers to guerrillas or in a more general sense to someone that uses violence.

However two very important actors almost don’t have representation: Mafia and the Drug Trafficking as graphic number 20 shows. The drug trafficking is the cause of the U.S.A. intervention, of the arising of the paramilitary power, and the corruption of the politicians, the Colombian Armed Forces and the guerrillas. Moreover it is necessary to understand that Narcotraffic uses differ ent nets of organized crime (Mafias) in order to pursue its business. Making no focus on Narcotraffic means not to explain or at least not to mention the point of conv ergence of the different actors, because in a way or another all the actors (except the Colombian Armed Forces) depend on Narcotraffic to finance their activities. In ot her words, all the a rmed actors are drug dealers to some extent. Besides, the enormous resources used for the War on Drugs are not getting results; the demand is constant and the production stays more or less stable, while many peasants are suffering fr om the fumigations with Glyph osate and many are dying as consequence of the combats on all the sides. Despite its importance the topic is not discussed in depth in Cromos, neit her are proposed solutions. In a typical attachment schema th e journalist describe in detail the actions

326Aguirre, Alberto. „El Pais se Deslie“ (The country is dissolving). In: Cromos. December 4, 2006. 327Aguirre, Alberto. „Renace el Nazismo“. Op. Cit. - 169 - of the armed actors and criticiz e them, but do not explain the complex relations between them and do not propose any solution for a conflict that each year leaves thousands of casualties.

ARMED ACTORS

35

30

25

20

15 32 32

10 16 5 11 6 0 2 1

s g la e n fia sm inals ril c ki a ri r or c M o m F ffi rr ri a e C Gue d T e Tr ug Paramilitaries Arm r n D ia b m o ol C

Graphic 20 – Presence of the variables related to Armed Actors

It is also possible to see the attachment of Cromos in the distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy” victims (for th is research was selected the case of Ingrid Betancourt, an ex-member of the Colombian Parl iament). When the articles in Cromos speak about kidnapping in Colombia, in the 22% of the cases they refer to Ingrid Betancourt, which is a very high percent age if we k eep in mind that there are thousands of kidnapped persons in Colombia. This focus on only one person, creates, indirectly, the notion that some victims are more important than others and to the same extent, that some casualties ar e less valuable than others. Doing this, the fate of the unworthy victims takes a second place and the notion of victim is distorted. The graphic number 5 illustrates the focus on Ingrid Betancourt.

- 170 - WORTHY VICTIMS

22

78

Kidnapped Persons Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt

Graphic 21

Despite the fact that ther e are victims between all the armed actors, li ke in all conflicts, this kind of victims are almost in existent for the Cromo´s articles when the y speak about paramilitaries and guerrillas as graphics number 22 and 23 show.

However, when they speak abo ut the Colombian Armed Forc es as victims, there is another tendency. Although their representation as victims is small (6%) compared to the representation as armed actors (94%) (see graphic number 8), it indicates some concordance with the official propaganda, whic h sees victim s on its own side only (Armed Forces and Paramilitarie s) and doe s not consider the gu errillas as victims (see graphic number 24).

Guerrillas as Victim

1,3

98,7

Guerrillas as Victims Guerrillas as Victimizer

Graphic 22 – Data in Percent

- 171 - Paramilitaries as Victim

0,3

99,7

Paramilitaries as Victim Paramilitaries as Victimizer

Graphic 23 – Data in Percent

Colombian Armed Foces as Victim

6

94

Colombian Armed Forces as Victim Colombian Armed Forces as Victimizer

Graphic 24 – Data in Percent

In general, Cromos uses an attachment schema to explain the conflict, describing the conflict in terms of “good” and “bad” actors , promoting the polariz ation and r educing the complexity of the conflict to a simple c onfrontation of rich vs. poor. There are no explanations of the causes of the conflict and key actors like the Narcotraffic, U.S.A, the mafias and the Parapolitic have almost no presenc e. In the same way c omplex actors like displac ed people receive not mu ch attention. The focus lies on victims easy to isolate and identify like indigenous and children. The victims are located only on the c ivil side with the (small) excepti on of the vict ims of the Colomb ian Armed

- 172 - Forces and highlighting worthy victims. There are some co incidences with the official propaganda, although the opini on articles also tell about genocide (situation not recognized by the Colombian Government) and extra judicial e xecutions (rarely recognized by the Colombian Government). The language is very strong, some times pejorative, very informal, colloquial and sometimes colorful.

4.2 El Tiempo

On Politics the select ed opinion articles of El Tiem po make emphasis on Alvaro Uribe, who like in Cromos, is s een as the personification of the causes of the Colombian War. In a clear patron of journalism of attachment, Alvaro Uribe represents the “Evil” and the explanations for his popularit y lies in a mental problem of the population: “It is a fact that to be a follower of Uri be model 2005, it is required, above all, to be mentally weak”. 328 In the same way are some exaggerations to stand out the evilness of the president:

In the Uribe’s Colombia only live grateful Colombians with a president who only works works, works and works. As proclaimed b y Huxley, the lang uage has become in this Colombia ru led by Urib e an essential weapon to exert soc ial control a nd establish who is against this “deep democracy”.329

Although the reference to Al dous Huxley and his work Brave New World could be very pedagogic to explain what autocracy is and the manner how the free expression is censored in this kind of si tuations, the identification of Brave New World with Alvaro Uribe distorted the reference, because it identif ies the Colombian President with the “Evil”. Alvaro Uribe is not the “E vil”. The problem in Co lombia can not be attributed to only one person. Moreover the constant use of nicknames (for example, Messiah330) for the President cont ributes to si gn him as Evil and in this way to the polarization between “Evil” and “Good” so typical of the journalism of attachment.

However, the focus o n President Uribe is always very critic about his populism and his links with the paramilitaries:

328Duzán, Ma ría Jimen a. “Urib e Mod elo 2005: La f uerza de la retórica” (Uri be model 2 005: the Strength of the Rhetoric). In: El Tiempo. May 23, 2005. 329Duzán, Ma ría Jime na. “E l Lengu aje y las Perce pciones: El mundo feliz de Alvaro Uribe ” (The language and the perceptions: the happy world of Alvaro Uribe). In: El Tiempo. June 20, 2005. 330Duzán, María Jimena. „Uribe Modelo 2005“. Op. Cit. - 173 - In a country where the heroic figur e of Uribe emerges as a big prote cting streng th over our politica l syste m, the fact that almost all the advertising campaigns in the media have the same message to exalt t he fibers of nationalism is not the best invitation for the Colo mbians to practice the culture of tolerance in favor of t he diversity of opinions an d views, but an invitatio n for the pr osperity of t he unanimity culture.331

In the same way and with irony the Presid ent´s position toward the relation between politicians and paramilitaries is critized: “And it wa s the president, who sustained the strange thesis that the para-po liticians are mostly victims of the Paramilitaries, who obligate them to make fortune, to alterate voting and be elected against their will”. 332

As we ca n see, the references point to very rele vant affairs as para militaries, populism and political culture; all desirable t opics to explain the Colombian Conflict, however this enormous focus on Uribe takes complexity from the analysis and makes believe that President Uribe is the origin of the problem. For example, the topic of the parapolitic doesn’t get much attention because it is seen mostly through the president and although the idea that t he Colombian Government is a dictatorship receives almost not attention at all, the references to democracy focus on the President as his enemy and danger:

The other danger that looms ove r the Colombian democracy is more difficult t o confront because it has to do with the great acceptance what is having between the public op inion the thesis that in o rder to end with the snake of the FARC, it is necessary the reelection of Preside nt Uribe, be cause he is the only on e capable o f undertaking such feat.333

Under this perspective a very decisive acto r in the conflict is left (U.S.A.), although the Colombian Government receives milliard s of dollars to wage the war. It happens because the focus is on President Uribe, he is the foc us of the c ategory Politic, the focus of the Parapolitic and the focus of the Dem ocracy (lik e its opposite) and inclusive the focus of the U.S.A. intervention:

To these new prerogatives are added the existent certifications in the field of human rights and d rug control, which allows the U.S.A. to punish u nits and members of the security (Colombian) forces who have problems in these two fields. In short, if we do well, the only thing that President Álvaro Uribe will be able to do without requiring pre-

331Duzán, María Jimena. “Pasión por Colombia” (Passion for Colombia).In: El Tiempo. July 30, 2006. 332Duzán, M aría Jim ena. “La Cru zada p or lo s Pa ras: el Cambi o Extremo” (The Cru sade f or the Paramilitaries: the Extreme Change). In: El Tiempo. July 30, 2007. 333Duzán, María Jimena. “La Muerte de Raúl Reye s: Somos el Isra el de la Regi ón?” (The Death of Raúl Reyes: are we the Israel of the region?). In: El Tiempo. March 2, 2008. - 174 - certification before the U.S.A. it is to stay befo re FIFA for the rights of the Andea n highlands.334

In the Same way Pr esident Uribe is the focus of the topic go vernment becoming inclusive its synonym:

"Colombia has superseded the Paramilitarie s." This phra se gave by the Presid ent Uribe's speech on July 2 0 before a Congress that will do history not for his initiatives, nor for its corruption, b ut by the number of congressmen are in priso n due to their links with th e paramilitaries. Of course, this phr ase is the best cover lie up of this government.335

The graphic number 24 illustrates the distribution of the categories related to Politics:

POLITIC

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30 56

20

10 18 10 8 6 0 2

e ip A itic rib rsh US U o rnment e rapol ctat a emocracy i P D Alvaro D

lombian Gov Co

Graphic 24 – Presence of the variables related to Politic

On killings the focus of the opinio n articles o f El Tiempo is on killings as a general concept to describe the casualties of the war, for example: „The paramilitaries, whose killings remain unpunished, have also had more luck than their victim s”.336 The categories Genocide and Extra Judic ial Executions don’t have presence being a notorious difference with El Espectador and Cromos. Homicide has a small presence as graphic number 25 shows. For this, the ca tegory Killings is practically centered on

334Duzán, María Jimena. “Nuevos Condicionamientos del Plan Colombia” (The New Conditions of the Plan Colombia). In: El Tiempo. June 24, 2007. 335Duzán, M aría Jim ena. “El Maquillaj e Pre sidencial: el Paramilitarismo Vivito y Col eando” (The Presidential Make Up: The Paramiltarism is Alive). In: El Tiempo. July 22, 2007. 336Duzán, María Jimena. “La Mano Larga de Pablo” (The Big Hand of Pablo).In: El Tiempo. May 15, 2005. - 175 - killings and Massacre, which are pres ented as an act of the Paramilitaries 337: “The peace process with the 'nar co-paramilitaries' failed bec ause they were not demobilized. The only thing they accompli shed was the reduction of the homicides. They don’t massacre anymore, only selective killings. It's simple. It's tragic.”338

KILLINGS

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30 56

20 39

10

5 0 0 0 Killings Homicide Massacre Genocide Extra Judicial Executions

Graphic 25 – Presence of the variables related to Killings

About Civil Victims the focus is on Journalists, in this ca se the author makes a c lear difference between “they” (The Paramilitar ies, The Preside nt) and “us” (The journalists, the victims), although there are personal reasons to do so:

The only victims who have really become visible in Colombia are those (…) notorious victimizers, as is the case now with Mancuso and the Castaño brothers, graduates by certain governmental voices -including that of vice president Santos- with the resplendent status of new victims on the ground that they had to resort to t he weapons to defend their farms given that the State was unable to come to th eir rescue. But those who never resorted to the use of arms, which became not guerrilla s

337Duzán, Ma ría Jime na. “Uribe Mo delo 2005”. Op. Cit; “La Herencia d e O sorio” (T he L egacy o f Osorio). In: El Tiempo, Julio 24, 200 5; “27 año s del Colombian Dream” (The Colombian Dream: 27 Years). In: El Tiempo, October 16, 2006; “Una Corte Valiente pero Sola” (A b rave but solitary Court). In. El Tiempo. November 13, 2006. “El Pacto de Railito entre Paras y Dirigentes” (The Agrrement of Railito between Paras and Leaders). In: El Tiempo. Januar 29, 2007; “Mejora la Imagen” (The Lo ok improves). In : El Tiem po. April 22, 2 007; “Aniversa rio of 11 S” (11.09 Annive rsary). In: El Tiem po. September 1 0, 2007; “To da una T rampa” (A whole Tra p). In: El Tiem po. September 23, 2007; between other articles. 338Duzán, M aría Jim ena. “El Fra caso del Proces o de Pa z con lo s Pa ras: la Me ntira de l a Desmovilización” (The F ailure of the Peace P rocess with the Paramilitaries: the Lie of the Demobilization).In: El Tiempo. February 12, 2007. - 176 - or members of the Paramilitaries, n or killed in r etaliation to anyone, when they kille d our parents, our mother or our sister, are invisible…339

The perspective of the author, María Jime na Duzán, is very understandable, since she not only she lost her si ster; but was herself many times victim of the armed actors of the conflict. Because of that sh e feels herself as a victim, a situation mentioned with details in many of her articles, for example in 2007 she wrote:

On February 26, 1990 was another massacre in Cimitarra, Santander. Three peasant leaders and a journa list who was d oing a do cumentary for Channel Fo ur in Londo n (BBC) were massacred. The massacre occurred one Friday at a cafe in a plaza full of people, around 9 p.m. an hour in which everyone was on the street s celebrating. All the people saw how the paramilitaries entered the restaurant where the three peasant leaders and the journalists were. How they sat next to them and how they opened fire on them. Don’t you still remember? The murderers esca ped and un til today th e material or intellectual a uthors of th is massacre remained unknown. Th e advantage with this, Don Ramón, it is that in this case isn’t necessary to find sources to confirm what I am remembering you: the fallen journalist riddled with bullets that night was my sister Silvia.340

This emphasis on journalists illustrates very well the condi tions of the journalists in Colombia and the difficulties to inform in t he middle of a conflic t, but this complet e and detailed description lost it s strength when it is fr amed into the context of the attachment: “they” the victimizers, and “us” the victims; letting no place for nuances as the fact that, precisely, the at tachment of some independent journalists and their emotional defense of the victims contribute to the polarization, particularly when there exists a very strong personaliz ation on the fi gure of the president as a cause of the conflict as we saw before. Besides, as grap hic 26 shows, this big emphasis lets few space for others groups of victims that r epresent millions of pe rsons like peasants and displaced. Indigenous peop le and Children don’t have any representation at all and only trade unionists receive enough attention and some context:

From Urabá to the Sierra Nevada d e Santa Ma rta, the FARC defende d itself actin g like they were: the loca l authority, securing its territory and exerting strict control over it at a ll levels of de cision. Its Infiltration in the tr ade unions was strong, although w e have now f orgotten it. Probe of thi s, it is the fact that there was always a bra ve resistance of a union movement tha t never wan ted that the decisions of the workers were taken in the mountains. Among massacres on one side and the other, gradually, the FARC had been displaced and the local authority was taken by the paramilitaries,

339Duzán María Jimena. “Las Victimas Somos Invisibles” (We the Victims are Invisible). In: El Tiempo. June 27, 2005. 340Duzán, Ma ría Jime na. „A yuditas pa ra la Memo ria: Un Record eris a Ramón I saza“ (Little Help to Remember: a Reminder to Ramón Isaza). In: El Tiempo. June 10, 2007. - 177 - so simple and so cruel. But, of course, none of this justifies the murder of nine trad e unionists or the others Colombians who have fallen in this conflict.341

CIVIL VICTIMS

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30 52

20

27 10 14 7 0 0 0 Indians Displaced Peasants Children Journalists Trade Unionists

Graphic 26 – Presence of the variables related to Civil Victims

Inclusive we can see in this fragment t he relations b etween guerrillas, paramilitaries and trade unionists, what break s the schema of “victim” and victimizer” used in the other analyzed items, for this reason I c onsider that in this case there are no t attachment and the explanation is very in sightful to understand some of the attacks on trade unionists and their new relations with the paramilitaries.

On Armed Actors there is no pr esence for the general category of Criminals. This means that all the armed actors are clas sified into a specif ic group. The term Terrorism usually us ed by the official propaganda has a little presence. There is some presence for Mafia (see graphic 27) , although with an equ ilibrated and illustrative explanation: „ Peace is not the end of the illegal …It is possible t hat this process will lead us to the peac e. But we do not know if it will take us to a mafia pa x or a peace, in which will not be tolerated by unlawful”.342

341Duzán, María Jimena. „El Boicot a Coca Cola “ (The Boycott to Coca Cola). In: El Tiempo. Januar 16, 2006. 342Duzán, María Jimena. „La Paz no es el Fin de lo Ilegal” (Peace is not the End of the Illeg al).In: El Tiempo. September 13, 2005. - 178 - ARMED ACTORS

45 40 35 30 25 20 39 15 10 20 16 15 5 6 4 0 0

a a ll nals ri ries afi r M orism rimi ue rr C G milita Te ra Pa Drug Trafficking

olombian Armed Forces C

Graphic 27 – Presence of the variables related to Armed Actors

Corresponding to the Colombian Armed F orces the articles are very critic and detail their relation with the mafias and paramilitaries, for example:

Since the disastrous assault of the Palace of Justice, throu gh the assa ssinations of Luis Carlos Galán and Alvaro Gó mez, today th e country does not kn ow who are the military that allowed the infiltration of the drug trafficking, or those who worked side by side with the paramilitaries, or those who participated in the assassinations.343

The same happens with the Drug Trafficking. The topi c rec eives a significant presence and many details are told, but it is related exclusive ly to the paramilitaries. Ignoring its relations with t he guerillas, the relation bet ween paramilitaries and drug trafficking is so strong in El Tiempo that there is through the w hole articles a term to mention it (narco-paramilitar ies), which is some times used ind istinctively for paramilitaries and for drug traffi cking: “It i s obvious that the heads of the narco- paramilitaries are relu ctant to tell the whole truth and just want to tell a ver y, very small part of it. (If 'Don Ramón I saza' confessed 78 m urders suffering of Alzheimer, how many would he have confessed if he had not lost his memory?)”344

In concordance with the personif ication in President Uribe and th e distinction “they” and “us” here we find another patron of the journalism of attachment: the highlighting

343Duzán, María Jimena. “Los Intocables” (The Untouchables).In: El Tiempo. August 5, 2007. 344Duzán, María Jimena. “La Parafarsa: la Verdad es que no les Gusta la Verdad”. (The Parafarce: the Truth is hat they don’t like the Truth). In: El Tiempo. May 7, 2007. - 179 - of a relevant problem to Colombia (the drug trafficking) only in the side considered as “evil”, ignoring most of the times that all th e stratums of the society are related with the Narcotraffic to a more or less extent.

In this reasoning the Guerrillas are seen as the side that is losing the war and who is defined as the enemy by the official propaganda: “I n a country where the dis owning toward the guerrilla s and their inhum ane practices is fortunately a national consensus, this theory – that those who ar e not with Uribe are wit h the guerrillas- is extremely arbitrary, but clearly profitable for the Government.” 345 In the same line of thinking the articles r epresents this refer ence to the guerrillas as a tactic of the president and his government to gain f ollowers and accept ation to t he “new” Colombia, which implicies the extermination of the guerrillas (the “evilness” according to the Government), the domain of the vi olence and t he paramil itaries as t he new power:

There is no doubt that we face a p ublic opinion that is tuned with Álva ro Uribe in an unknown dimension. He is seen n ot just as a president, but as an ico n that sums up the new Col ombia, which in reality is not so new. That one that comes from winnin g the war in t he countryside to the gu errillas, that one that has an irrefutable economic and politica l power, amassed in re cent years with blood and fire; that one that professes the culture shortcut, that one believes that the end justifie s the means, that one that is contrary openly to the urban elites, perhaps more modern.346

Although the articles describe well the way in which the official propaganda refers to the guerrillas, at some extent the focus on the guerrillas as an instrument of the governmental propaganda is a cont inuation of the personification of the “evilness” on sides of the government and specially in Alvaro Uribe, which it is a distortion of the causes of the conflict and of the role of t he guerrillas in the war, who are a very complex character. Some gue rrillas coop erate with the paramilit aries in the drug trafficking, others combat the paramilitaries, others represent an economic possibility for many citizens, others are only criminals, others terrorists, etc.

Explaining the involvement of the guerrillas in the co nflict is also strongly c riticized the kidnappings made by them : “A guerrilla that treats its kidnapped like animals,

345Duzán, Marí a Jimen a. “No Somos Mu chos, pero: el Derecho d e ser Antiuri bistas” (We are not many, but: the Right of Being Anti Uribistas). In: El Tiempo. September 26, 2005. 346Duzán, María Jimena. “La Traquetización de la Opinión” (The Narcotization of t he Opinion). In: El Tiempo. June 12, 2006. - 180 - degrading their human beings c ondition to the point of taking away their will to live”.347 In this way the articles present the us e of the guerrillas made by the official propaganda to justify the war and as an armed actor who commits atrocities as the Paramilitaries.

But the pa ramilitaries are those who rece ive the most attention among the armed actors. There are many details ab out the paramilitaries, descriptions of their activities and their relations with the government, the president and the politicians:

But it has also been the President, not the Court, who has tried more t han once the release of prisoners of their party me mbers prosecuted by the researches that i n good time started the Su preme Court which revealed the strong relationship between the paramilitaries and the country's regional political class.348

In the same way, it is clear in the articl es that the paramilitarie s are winn ing the war and through the President Alvaro Uribe conso lidate their power in the whole society: “The Congress would strengthen the melting pot that politics has become since the paramilitaries supported their e nthronement in the social and politic al life of the country in the reelection of Uribe” 349. Although in essence this sentence and the idea is true, in this context it is only another contribution to sign the President Uribe as the Evil ignoring the long history of relations between the Colombian politicians and elites with the drug dealers and paramilitaries. The cause of the conflict is not Alvaro Uribe; the problem is the lack of democracy in Colombia. Without democracy there is not control over the government and because of that the corruption domain. This lack of democracy can lead into a new feudalism, where there is not warranty for the well being of all the citizens. Who has the polit ical power helps his followers and neglects the others.

It is also possible to see the attachment in the way the articles speak about kidnapping. As Graphic number 28 shows, in 16% of the o ccasions when the articles speak about kidnapping; they speak about Ingrid Betancourt, making a clear focus on one person, which implies that the others kidnapped are anonymous and impersonal. But this one, Ingrid Betancourt is very important and deserves much attention and

347Duzán, María Jimena. “La Carta de Ingrid: la Lectu ra del Dolor”. (Ingrid’ s letter: the Readi ng of the Pain) In: El Tiempo. December 2, 2007. 348Duzán, María Jimena. „La Cruzada por los Paras“. Op. Cit. 349Duzán, Marí a Jimen a. „El país de la reele cción: co nsecuencias del artículito ” (the count ry of the reelection: consequences of the article). In: El Tiempo. October 10, 2005. - 181 - details. In contrast to the other cases, the kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt is a special case, very personal. In the same way the articles don’t say anything about the victims of the guerrillas or paramilit aries’ (see graphic 29 an d 30), while there are some exceptions with respect to the C olombian Armed Forces: In 3% of the cases when the articles speak about them, the Colombian Armed Forces are presented as victims (Graphic number 31).

Although in El Tiempo the language and the explanations are more refined than in Cromos, it is also a ty pical case of journalism of attachment. The distinction between “they” and “us” is used to identify “bad” and “good” actors; moreover the personification on one person (in this case the Colombian Presiden t) as a cause of the conflict is very cle ar. However it is also clear that the aut hor makes an important critic about the official propaganda and its refer ences to the guerrillas as “evil” . In the same way, the explanations about the relations between paramilitaries and politicians are very illustrative and clar ify some important points of the infiltra tion of the mafia in the current government. Besides, the emphasis on the paramilitaries as drug dealers and the g uerrilla as kidnappers ignor es much of the c omplexity of these ac tors and distorts them. There are also worthy and unworthy victims and a c lear divis ion between victims and victimizers.

WORTHY VICTIMS

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84

Kidnapped Persons Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt

Graphic 28

- 182 - Guerrilla as Victim

0

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Guerrillas as Victims Guerrillas as Victimizer

Graphic 29

Paramilitaries as Victim

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Paramilitaries as Victim Paramilitaries as Victimizer

Graphic 30

- 183 - Colombian Armed Foces as Victim

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Colombian Armed Forces as Victim Colombian Armed Forces as Victimizer

Graphic 31

4.3 El Espectador

Like in El Tiempo, the authors in El Espectador focus on the President Uribe and his links with the paramilitaries:

The Preside nt Uribe ha s a part icular responsi bility in this sini ster net work of mafia clans. Under his leadership, the soci al sectors who designed the paramilitarism were able to convert the experiment conducted in a r ural town, Puerto Boyaca, in a model of social co ntrol at the national le vel. Hi s responsibility is polit ical a nd historica l. Sooner or later it will also have criminal connotations.350

In the same way the articles are very crit ic of the government and appoint him as a source of many problems and conflicts:

Because what we wit nessed is a govern ment that restricts each t ime more t he separation of powers, which has as presidential program, to bury the liberalism and unleash a new massacre of Co mmunists, which has tried to settle the NGOs, whic h has made the rich richer and the poor poorer, living on their knees before the U.S.A., which has sold the forest and the waters, and it is mo ving toward a hegemony which hosts generously the paramilitarism and the drug trafficking.351

350Cepeda Castro, Iván. “La Responsabilidad del Presidente” (The responsibility of the Pre sident). In: El Espectador. November 25, 2006. 351Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „Envión Final“ (Last Push). In: El Espectador. May 27, 2006. - 184 - Although this pattern is similar to the El Tiempo’s and Cromos´; in these articles we find a relevant difference. The authors in El Espectador give relevance to the role of U.S.A. in the conflict, inclusive offer to the topic more space than for Parapolitic as figure number 32 shows.

POLITIC

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30 25

20 37 33 15 10 20

5 7 3 0 0

e ip A itic rib rsh US U o rnment e rapol ctat a emocracy i P D Alvaro D

lombian Gov Co

Graphic 32 – Presence of the variables related to Politic

In El Espectador the U.S.A. are one of the most important po litical actors. There are many details about the U.S.A. intervention in Colombia, in cluding the description of the U.S.A. involv ement in the drug and weapons trafficki ng and the support of the paramilitarism, which is e xactly the oppos ite of the official objec tives of the U.S.A Intervention in Colom bia: To combat the drug and weapon trafficking as well as the guerrillas and paramilitaries:

This year, every month comes new reports of offense s that are committed by American militaries or "contractor s“: traffickin g cocaine, car accid ents caused by alcohol consume, weapons trafficking, links to Colombian paramilitaries. In fact, the last of such episodes is the provision of thousands of munitions that, as far as is known, two Marines were doing to a paramilitary group in th e department of Tolima . The U.S.A. ambassador says that this is an isolated case. But it is not.352

These details about the U.S.A: are very helpful to understand the Colombian Conflict, because it makes clear that t here are significant internati onal interests in play, that

352Cepeda Castro, Iván. „Crimenes Internacionales“ (International Crimes). In: El Espectador. May 14, 2005. - 185 - the war involves international actors and that the President and the Colombian Government are not the only re levant political actors. In fact the articles show how the President, although very close to the param ilitaries, has to follow the instruction s of the American Government even if they imply to break the promises made to the paramilitaries:

What may come if the promises made to the paramilitaries aren’t kept, it's just that the paramilitaries could undress much of our political class. Total chaos. All informers. So it might be fun. The Government does not se em willing to give the reason to Don Vicente Castaño ( a ve ry im portant param ilitary chief ) an d sign the agreement of Ralito because the gringos will protest.353

In this relation between the Colombian Pr esident and the U.S.A, there is a clear attachment of the journalists: While they f ocus on the president and to the same extent on his government as the cause of th e war,, they see his relations with U.S.A. as a continuation of his “evilness” . The U.S.A. is seen as a victimizer who intervenes in Colombia for its own benefit waging a war, in which thousands of Colombians died:

The central objective is to intensify t he war. The military budget for 200 8 reached a record figure of U.S$ 9.000 millions which equates to 5.6% of the PIB. It also aims to pass the security forces from 400,0 00 to half a million members.... At the head of the execution of this strateg y will be th e Center of Integral Action, a department of th e Presidency of the Rep ublic whi ch will supp orted by multiple state a gencies, the Southern Command and the U.S.A. Embassy.354

In this context the relation between the Colo mbian President and the U.S.A. confirms the evil ch aracter of the preside nt and his interest to perpetuate the war (not telling that are many who are interested in continuing the war: among others, the guerrillas, who are also drug dealers). From this perspective, although the explanation about U.S.A. locates the Colombian Conf lict in a more ample vision than Cromos´ and El Tiempo’s, it uses the same schema: The “bad” president and his allies against the “poor” civilians, for example: “The Police often fumigate small farms belonging t o peasants without touching the major coca fi elds that are in the hands of the Paramilitaries.”355 Ignoring the fact that the coca grows always in small fields as strategy to hide it between other products (Corn, Café, Banana, etc).

353Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „S e Enred a la Pita“ (The Sit uation Get s Complicated). In: El Espe ctador. November 18, 2006. 354Cepeda, Ca stro, Iván. „La Nu eva Etapa de la Guerra“ (Th e New Stage of the War).In: El Espectador. November 25, 2007. 355Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „Tierra de Patrones“ (Landlords). In: El Espectador. November 11, 2006. - 186 - About Killings, the authors fo cus on Massac re, use the gener al term of Killings, the official term of Homicide, but in contrast to Cromos and El Tiempo they make more use Genocide and Extra Judicial Execution (as graphic number 33 shows).

KILLINGS

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35

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20 37 15 25 10 16 5 11 10

0 Killings Homicide Massacre Genocide Extra Judicial Executions

Graphic 33 – Presence of the variables related to Killings

Genocide is seen as a general situation in Colombia:

Like other f orms of violence in Colombia, genocide and t he attempt to extermina te social, political or ethnic groups, has not yet attracted the condemnation of the majority of the society. The process of systematic elimination of populations or groups in our conte xt is perpetr ated in prolonged perio ds of time, and through very different forms of persecution.356

This genocide referres always to the Colombian Government as aut hor: “No argument can legitimize the persecution, wh ich bey ond the state repression, it has transformed in a genocide t hat pursued the gradua l annihilation of a whole legal political or ganization.”357 In the same way the extra ju dicial ex ecutions are alw ays related to the Colombian Government as well:

The platform of huma n rights organizations Coordination Colombia -Europe-U.S.A. has elaborated a series of reports t hat demonstrate this trend and documented 90 8 cases of for ced disappearances and extrajudicial execution s allegedly committed by

356Cepeda Castro, Iván. „Contra el Genocidio” (Against Genocide). In: El Espectador. July 21, 2007. 357Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Asimetrias de la Verdad Histórica” (Asymmetries of the Historical Truth). In: El Espectador. August 1, 2006. - 187 - State agents between 2002 and 2007 in 27 regions of Colombia. The region most affected is Antioquia with 183 victims. In relation to the preceding six years, the data shows a tot al increase of 92%. This increa se corresponds to the implementation of the policy of "democratic security", based on the repeated denial of the principle of distinction between civilians and military, and the pressure on results e xerted by th e President on the members of the Force public.358

This focus on genocide and extra judicial executions helps to understand the motives of some killings into s pecific groups. In this way the a uthors go beyond the simple fact of denunciating deaths. Moreover the authors indicate indirectly that some extrajudicial executions are financed by U.S.A.:

In Antioquia, there are 30 cases of civilians who, accordi ng to the Army, are no t missing, as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right s said, but „casualties“, killed in clashes with security forces. The Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor must be conclusive in this mat ter. The U. S.A. are ge tting tired of financing extrajudicial executions.359

The father of Iván Cepeda Cast ro was a member of the Un ion Patriotic (the target group of the genoc ide) and probably this has an important influenc e on his articles. His personal experience could lead to better knowledge of the topic and in this way to deeper explanation. In these cases (Genoci de and Extra Judicial Exec utions) the attachment is not present and the arti cles help to understand the role of the government and U.S.A. in the war.

About Civil Victims there is not presence of children a s victims, although Co lombian has thousands of children soldiers. Journalists, Trade Unionists and Peasants have a small pres ence in c omparison to Indi genous an d Displaced who received the attention of the authors. Like in Cromos the Indians are seen as an innoc ent and indefense victim of the riches:

When the confrontation begins, the governor of Cauca, w ho, with the exception of Tunubala, is always like this one th at today governs, a landowner, gives the official version: The Indigenous want take our land, invade us, kill us, they are dirty, ignorant, protestants, Jews, gypsies, masons, communists, drug dealers, terrorists. The names change, depending on the time and mood of the governor, but no indictment.360

358Cepeda Castro, Iván. „Ce rca de 10 00 Ejecu ciones Extrajudicial es“ (Almost 1.000 Extraj udicial Executions). In: El Espectador. October 6, 2007. 359Molano Bravo, Alfredo. L a Verdadera Pesadilla (The Real Nightmare). In: El Espectador. June 9, 2006. 360Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „Disfrazar Re alidades“ (Di sguising Rea lities). In: El Espe ctador. May 19, 2006. - 188 - On Displac ed the articles speak the most of the times about the displace d by the paramilitaries and how the c ondition of the displaced is crit ical without effective h elp of the government, while the demobilize d paramilit aries received help and are integrated into the society:

Despite official promises, most of the houses of displaced persons stay in ruins. They have been asked to reconstruct th em by themselves with the meager resources that have not yet come. We are informed that, in co ntrast, the demobilized have integral assistance programs, and many of them wo rk as pol ice a uxiliaries. Moreover, they have received land to develop productive projects.361

The attachment is clear in the c ase of the Indigenous, who are t he “poor” victims of the “evil” riches, but about displaced the sit uation is more equilibrated at first view. It is not told that the gu errillas provoke the d isplacement of thousa nds, althou gh this fact is coherent with the pr esentation of the President and the Government as the causes of the conflict, who protect the par amilitaries and attack the guerrillas and the poor Indigenous. Isolated, the topic of the Displaced has not an evident attachment, but put in perspective is obvious the pattern of “bad” president and government who helps the ex-paramilitaries but forgets the displaced. Nevertheless the articles explain how the government has alliances with the authors (the Paramilitaries in this case) of the displacements:

What local officials responsible for attending the needs of the victims are appointed by corrupt politicians that serve to th e authors of crimes and the forced displaceme nt is a measur e of what is happening in Colombia. That those officials responsible for ensuring th e rights o f t he displa ced become who defames, divides and persecutes the victims, shows the degradation of the stat e institutions. That victims of violence who choose to organize themselves to seek a decent life are displa ced again and again, and even killed, shows how far it is real reparation.

Despite the focus on the displacement obligated by the paramilitaries, the articles get to explain the associa tion between politicians and paramilitaries to displace citizens in order to serve the interest of this alliance. So far, there is practically no attachment, only that the authors pref er to speak about the mo st common situation of displacement, although a more proactiv e journalis m would tell us about the displacement provok ed by the Colombia n Armed Forces, the fumigations of glyphosate made by t he U.S.A contractors, the guerrilla, etc. The graphic 34 shows the presence of the civil victims in the articles.

361Cepeda Castro, Iván. „Qué Significa estar Desplazado en Sucre?“ (What Means to be di splaced in Sucre). In: El Espectador. September 2, 2006. - 189 -

CIVIL VICTIMS

45

40

35

30

25

20 39 32 15

10 12 5 10 7 0 0 Indians Displaced Peasants Children Journalists Trade Unionists

Graphic 34 – presence of the variables related to Civil Victims

On Armed Actors the emphasis lies o n thr ee actors: Guerilla s, Paramilitaries and Colombian Armed Forces.

Paramilitaries and Armed Forces are seen as allies who work to gether to gain po litic and economic power:

As in other regions of t he country, a chain of crimes preceded the control of loca l administration. In Cúcuta ( A Colombian City), numerous alliances with paramilitarie s, scandals, political murders and corrupt dealings, have compromised t he administration of Mayor Ramiro Su árez. Similarly, other state agencie s have become paramilitary dependences of the power paramilitary. Such wa s the case of DAS ( The Colombian secret Police ). Witnesses cla im th at the lead ers of the Bloc Catatumb o (Paramilitaries) had badges and ve hicles of this institutio n and sent written orders to his manager, Jorge Enrique Diaz (killed in April 2005). In mid 2003, the newspaper La Opinión reproduced a t elephone conversation of “The Iguano” in which one of his lieutenants said that he had been eight days in the installa tions of the DAS, because a committee of the District Attorney, sent from Bogotá, was looking for him. Ana Maria Flórez, regional director of the District Attorney was (...) seen at parties and meetings with the pa ramilitaries, understandable since she was the girlfriend of one of its leaders, Carlos Enrique Rojas, "El Gato”. The involvement of the District Attorney and Police with the para-state groups came to the point where there were cases of killings of people who hours earlier had made complain ts before these agencies. The Police Chief, Colonel Luis Andres Estupiñan Chaustre was moved to the city of Barranquilla, where he was accused of returning to the mafia a shipment of cocaine seized by the DEA (..) The control ov er local institutions has served to promote the legalization of

- 190 - fraudulent f unds. After the image of econo mic progress lies a g igantic money- laundering operation.362

The articles explore the re lation between Paramilitari es, Politicians and Armed Forces as an alliance for which the conso lidation of a criminal organization and the aim for economic benefit ar e more important issues than the fight against the guerrillas. This e xplanation is very il lustrative and repre sents an economic explanation of the Colombian War which helps to understand the economic boom in some regions of Colombia and how this high pr ofitability makes this allianc e successful. This explanation is in concord ance with some experts that locate the cause of the conflict in economical reason s as we saw in the chapter 1. Howev er there is a subtle attachment. The guerrilla is part of the narcotraffic business, but that is no a relevant issue in the articles. The main issue is the “bad” president and his government (including the Armed Forces) w ho have alliances with the paramilitaries in order to do illegal business and receiv e enormous earnings, while they attack the guerrillas in order to justify the war and the millions inve sted in the army, which is needed in order to occupy la nd, kill or let disappear op ponents, exercise control on the population, etc:

I think the biggest challenge of peace negotiations with the guerrillas is the opposition of the Arme d Forces and not by mere conviction, but for a simple reason: the great economic benefits and the extensive legal benefits that war produces them. If this reason has been a tradition, today, when the war budget is three times higher than five years ago, the resistance is much stronger. If the guerrillas surrender, it will mean that the Armed Forces had to give their bud get to the civilian auth ority and this situation is unthinkable while the war is a business backed by the U.S.A.363

According to this article, the Colombi an Army doesn’t want peac e with the guerrilla . But the fact is that as par tners of the paramilit aries, the Colomb ia Army wants the defeat or the surrender of the guerillas. Without the guerrillas, the w hole dru g business would go to the param ilitary control and indir ectly to the Government and the Army. Besides, the militar y support of U.S.A. is temp orary and demand s results. Like the article uses a logic of “victimize r” and “victims”, it points the Colombian Army as the “bad” part, interested on the war; oppos ite to the guerrillas, whose fight is at least to some extent legitimate and imp lies the reform of the State: “would be

362Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Los Campo s de Extermini o y las Fosas Comun es en el Catat umbo” (Extermination Camps and Mass Graves in Catatumbo). In: El Espectador. July 1, 2006. 363Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „Trabas“ (Obstacles). In: El Espectador. October 7, 2006. - 191 - healthier for everyone an a ll inclusive o pen negotiation with the guerrillas as a step towards a new constitutional assembly.”364

However, the articles get to explain that the goverment is more interested in a military solution than in a peace negociation with the guerrillas:

Since 25 years, the settlers of L a Macarena have prop osed a civil solution: t he creation of a rural reserve in the right bank of t he Guayabero river. But the generals felt that accepting the demand for a peaceful solution, which is also established in the law 160 of 1994 and has been supported, among others, by the World Bank is to give up before the guerrillas. And so we start for another quarter century. 365

In general the attachment on Armed Actors follows the same schema as in Politic al Actors: “the bad actors” are against the peace and the poor. But this schema doesn’t explain the American economical interest on the war (a more peaceful country allows to U.S.A more easy access to the Colombian natural resources, for example) and the interest of the guerrillas, who, as we said before, are profiting of the drug trafficking too. Graphic 35 shows the distribution of t he presenc e of the Armed Actors in the articles.

ARMED ACTORS

40 35 30 25 20 35 33 15 10 20 5 6 3 0 2 2

s g a n fi inal a icki M im f af Cr Guerrilla militaries r Terrorism a g T Par u Dr

Colombian Armed Forces

Graphic 35 – Presence of the variables related to Armed Actors

364Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Canje o Negociación”. (Exchange or Negotiation) In: El Espectador. August 12, 2005. 365Molano Bravo, Alfredo. „La Macarena“ (The Macarena).In: El Espectador. February 12, 2006. - 192 - The attachment is also clear in t he presence offered to Ingrid Betancourt. In 18% of the occasions where the articles speak abo ut kidnapping; they speak about her (see graphic number 36).

WORTHY VICTIMS

18

82

Kidnapped Persons Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt

Graphic 36

Despite of the identification of the Colombian Armed Forces as “bad” actor; in the 4% of the occasions when the articles speak about them, they are represented as victims (graphic 37), which softens partially the attachment against them.

Colombian Armed Foces as Victim

4

96

Colombian Armed Forces as Victim Colombian Armed Forces as Victimizer

Graphic 37

- 193 - The guerillas are represented as victims in the 5,3% of the occa sions (See graphic number 38 ). This representat ion of the gu errillas a nd the Armed Forces a s armed actors and victims contributes to show that the victims of the war are present in all sides, with the exception, in this case, of the paramilitaries, who are seen only as armed actors and never as victims (See graphic number 38).

Guerrillas as Victim

5,3

94,7

Guerrillas as Victims Guerrillas as Victimizer

Graphic 38

Paramilitaries as Victim

0

100

Paramilitaries as Victim Paramilitaries as Victimizer

Graphic 39

- 194 - GAG g{x Tâà{ÉÜá Five authors of opinion articles were selected for the present research: María Jimena Duzán from El Tie mpo; Iván C epeda Cas tro and Alfredo Molano Bravo from El Espectador; Alberto Aguirre and William Ospina f rom Cromos. With the only exception of William Ospina, all of them are direct ly or indir ectly victims of the Colombian violence and this experience could exert some influence in their articles. They feel t hemselves as victims and this si tuation confers to their work a particular point of v iew and reinforces their atta chment with the victims and against the victimizers, for them, the paramilitaries, the president, The Colombian Gov ernment and U.S.A. In the next pages we present a short biography of each author where it is possible to see their relation to the conflict. GAGAD `tÜ•t ]|ÅxÇt WâéöÇ

María Jimena Duz án started to write when she was 16 years old and sent to the El Espectador’s Director a letter motivated by the deat h of her father. After reading it, the Director took the decision to give her an opinion c olumn in t he newspaper and María Jimena Duzán became the youngest columnist at the country. After, she studied Politics at the Andes University and in Paris; she also studied in U.S.A. when she received the Niemann scholarship at the Harvard University.

In February 1982 she was k idnapped for a short time by the M-19 guerrillas and released with a peac e proposal to the Gove rnment. In March of the same year a bomb exploded in front of her house, a fe w minutes before her arrival. Guillermo Cano, her tutor, fr iend and director of El Espect ador, was killed in 1983. El Espectador was completely destroyed by a bomb in 1989. In 1990 her sister, also

- 195 - journalist, was killed by the paramilitaries 366. Two of the former members of her investigative unit are now dead, two other in exile.

Between 1992 and 1993 Du zán wrote for the Semana Magazine . In 1994 she published in U.S.A. the book Death Beat : " A Colombian journalist's life inside the cocaine wars", in which she recounts her days at El Espectador, The book was an economic success in the U.S.A and in Colombia.

Duzán founded and directed by five years the first master of journalism in Colombia at the Andes Un iversity. Duzán worked many times outs ide of Colombia also. She was Consul in Barcelona, she wrote for The Wall Street Journal, Newsday and Marie Claire. In 1990 s he received t he " Courage Award " granted by the International Women’s Media Foundation.

In 2005 s he received the Colombian prize Simon Bolivar as “Journalist of the Year”. In 2008 after many years in the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo she came back to work for the Semana Magazine. Besides her activities as columnist, Duzán works for the regional television channel Canal Capital and for the radio broadcasting Caracol. GAGAE \äöÇ VxÑxwt VtáàÜÉ

366El Tiempo. María Jimena Duzán. In: El Tiempo. March 15, 1993. - 196 - Iván Cepeda is a human rights defender. He has pr omoted the right s of victims of Colombia’s War and created a nat ional social movement to call for justice. He was motivated into activis m by the killing of his father, the Colo mbian Senator Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who was killed during a se ries of killings commited against the political movement Union Patriotic. In the 80s and 90s, two presidential candidates, 8 congressmen, 13 deputies, 70 councilors, 11 majors and t housands of members of the Union Patriotic were killed.

Mr. Cepeda is a columnist at El Espectador and the Director of the Nationa l Movement for Victims of State Crim es, an umbrella organizati on of more than 200 Colombian human rights organizations. Mr. Cepeda has demonstrated that paramilitary groups, with the complicity of me mbers of the Colombian Armed Forces, are responsible for s erious human rights vi olations. He has helped to d ocument approximately 40,000 cases of human rights violations in Colombia since 1966. 367

In 2007, Human Rights Firs t aw arded Mr. Cepeda the Roger N Baldwin Medal of Liberty. The Award recognizes the importance of Mr. Cepeda human rights work and others Colombian human rights defenders. In 2008 Mr. Cepeda was unjustly charged with slander and libel by the Colombian Government for informing about human rights violations that involve government officials. In Dece mber of the same year he published the book “ A las Puer tas del Uberrimo ” (At Uberrimo´s Doors), where he describes the close ties between the Colombian President and the paramilitaries. GAGAF TÄyÜxwÉ `ÉÄtÇÉ

Alfredo M olano, soc iologist, writer and jour nalist. His topics of interest are the Colombian War and the current colonization pr ocess in Colombia. He studied at the National University, where he was influenced by the academic Marxism and German philosophers. After his degree, he worked in the government of the president Carlos

367Data took it from: www.humanrightsfirst.org - 197 - Lleras Restrepo, traveling through Colombia in order to develop a project of agrarian reform: “we were paid to do the revolution”368.

After this experience, he was pr ofessor at the Antioquia Univer sity. When he was expelled, he decided to study in Paris. Lat er he came back to Colombia with the idea to do a study the economic system of the commercialization in the eastern region, but once in the region, he decides to dedic ate himself to collect the stories told by the peasants, which he f ound more interesting and more complete than the st atistics to understand the life in the region.

With this perspective he publis hed 3 book s about the colonizat ion proces s in the eastern, telling not the history of the hero, but the history of the ordinary people, which one can find in bars, pl azas, streets, etc. But thes e books with editions of only 2000 copies had a little impact. For this re ason he started to wr ite reportages and features in El Espectador , additionally he made a documentary series Journey for television with the objective to show the other “Colombia”; the Indians, the Afro- Americans, the settlers, etc. His sociology is literary and journalistic, founded in ethic premises:

I do my job based on ethical and political perspectives, to pursue a different, more egalitarian and more just society. To do this I appealed to the mass media becau se the books have a limited impact and the academic world with its t ightness an d dogmas prevent the country to realize itself.369

Alfredo Molano won the prize Simon Bolivar for the best reportage for a documentary of the Journeys series. Since 1985 Molano has written more than 15 books. Moreover he writes a column in El Espectador and oc casionally contributes to other newspapers like El T iempo, El Pais (Madrid), El Periódico (Bar celona), and for the Colombian magazines: Gatopardo, Cromos and Cambio 16.

In many occasions and because of his wo rk, Alfredo Molano h as left the country for death threats of the paramilitaries.

368Fog, Lisbeth. “Alfredo M olano: una Sociología Distinta” (Alfredo M olano: a Different Sociology). In: Universia. May 10, 2006. Available at http://www.universia.net.co/ 369Ibidem. - 198 - GAGAG TÄuxÜàÉ Tzâ|ÜÜx

He was lawyer, Judge, profe ssor, writer, editor and bookse ller, but since many years Mr. Aguirre is dedicated to the journalis m. He has written for Colombian Newspapers like El Mundo and El Co lombiano; for an academic Jour nal: Boletin Cu ltural Bibliográfico Anti oquia Universit y, and for the magazine Cromos. Becau se of h is articles he has been in exile many times. Two of his first cousins were killed.

GAGAH j|ÄÄ|tÅ báÑ|Çt

He started to study Po litic and Law at the Santiago de Cali University , but after a couple of years he changed to lit erature and journalism. He spent 3 years in Europe from 1979 to 1981, fixing his residence in Bogotá s ince 1981. In 1982 he won the

- 199 - National Essay Prize of the Nariño University (Pasto, Colombia). After, he found the literary magazine Número (Number).

From 1988 to 1989 he was editor of the Sunday edition of the newspap er La Prensa (The press), where he wrote essays about im portant literary authors. In 1992 he won the National Poetry Prize giv en by the Colombian Culture Institute . In 2005 he published his first novel, wh ich is about the Spanish co lonization in north of Colombia. In 2006 he received the National Literature Prize.

He wrote for many years in Cromos a weekly opinion article and now he is writing for El Espectador (Cromos and El Espectador belong to the same editorial house). He believes that the culture could be an antidote against the war. The idea of confronting the current war with culture „(…) was origina lly a conversation with Garcia Márquez, and took f orce in dialogue with many Co lombians who believ e that culture and education are the key to solve our national tragedy".370

4.5 Conclusions

In all three of the selected media, t here are clear pattern s of journalism of attachment. All of them identify the Colo mbian President and t he government as the bad actors into the Colombian Conflict. In El Espectador, also U.S.A. is ide ntified as bad actor. In the same schema there is a cl ear identification of the poor Colombians as victims and the ric hes as vict imizers. Despite of the attachment, all the authors analyze the paramilitaries and their relatio ns with the government and the politic ians in depth (at national and regiona l level, the infiltration into the police, the army and the Colom bian secret police, as well as the different methods used to gain dominance in different zones of the country), but unfortunately there is no a similar analysis of the guerrillas or U.S. A.. For th is reason, key events of the conflict are disregarded or explained only superficially.

Although the authors take side wi th the victims, they offer space for civil v ictims only. For victims belonging to the armed actors, the space is inexistent or scarcely offered.

370Ospina, William. “Colombia en el planeta: Relato de un pais que perdio la confianza”. (Colombia in the Planet: Narration of a country what lost its Confidence). In: Número 32. - 200 - The attachment is als o present when they speak about the kidnapping, all the three media focus on Ingrid Betancourt (elite victim) in a significant measure, while the rest of the victims of kidnappi ng (not elite) are treated in a general way. This personification is also visible when the ar ticles speak about the president. For all of the three media, the President represent the “Evilness” and the cause of the conflict.

In general, all of the three media follow the pattern of journalism of attachment. They; identify bad actors, poor victims, distinguish between elite and not elite victims, divide between t hem (victimizers) and us (victims) and concentrate their criticism and analysis on specific situations ignoring the complexity of the actors and the complexity of the conflict and its caus es. Nonetheless, the articles allow to understand the relations between the pres ident, the Colombian Armed Forces and the para militaries. In spit e of the attachment this e xplanation may result complementary to the international arti cles which offer information about drug trafficking, U.S.A., guerrillas and victims (like children) who are scarcely mentioned in the national articles, allo wing a bigger under standing and r edirecting the attachment into journalism more pro peace as we will see in the chapter 6 and 7.

- 201 - V{tÑàxÜ i g{x \ÇàxÜÇtà|ÉÇtÄ `xw|t

The international media sele cted for this research ( The New York Times , The International Herald Tribune , The Bos ton Globe , The Washington Post , The Economist and BBC World News –online-) display a trad ition and commitment with independent journalis m and freedom of the press. Although the BBC must avoid opinions because of its public character, it is clear that its style, selection of topics and sourc es of information obeys to a v ery critical journalis m, independent and analytical. According to the characteristics of the journalism of the BBC (explained in detail in the chapter 5) , it is possible to s ay that the BBC presents indir ectly its opinions and pos itions in favor of democ racy, freedom and peace, which explain it s bann in some countries under dictatures. In th is sense, although the selected articles of the BBC are not exactly opinion articles its c haracter put them very close to the opinion articles of the other media outlets selected for this research.

Also it is possible to say t hat there are not internationa l media anymore; today there are international media outlets which o ffers Tv, Internet information services, Magazines, News papers and s pecialized publications (f or children, houswifes , teenagers, business men, minorities, etc) , but despite the size of these conglomerates, they obey to the same polit ic and cor porate principles and in many occasions the content of one media flow to t he others, for example, some articles of the Ny Times are publis hed in the International Herald Tribun e, in the w ebsites of each publication, and in many newspapers s upplements across the world in different languages and ways according t o the region of the world where they are publis hed. For this reason, it is necessary to know these conglomerates to know the media selected; how are they owned, what intere sts they pursue and what can we infer of their history, successful and struggles.

- 202 - 5.1 Media from U.S.A.

5.1.1 The New York Times Company

The Ne w York Time s Co mpany, a leading media c ompany with 2007 revenues of $3.2 billion, includes The Ne w York Time s, The International Herald Tribune , The Boston Globe, 16 other daily newspapers, WQXR-F M and more than 50 W eb sites, including NYTimes.com, Boston.com, Advocate.com and About.com.

Over the years, The Tim es Com pany's properties have been awarded many journalism awards, including a total of 120 Pulitzer prizes, more than any other news organization; moreover, The New York Tim es Company has won prizes for its leadership, innovation, inclusion, equality and social responsibility.

The New York Tim es is the largest metropolitan ne wspaper in the United States, "The Gray Lady"—named for its staid a ppearance and style—is regar ded as a national newspaper of records. It has won 98 Pulitzer Prizes, more than any other newspaper. The company's chairman is Art hur Ochs Sulzberger Jr., whose family has controlled the paper since 1896.

The newspaper is organized into three secti ons: News, Opinions, and Features. The NY Times stayed with the eight-column format fo r several years after most papers switched t o six columns, and it was one of the last newspapers to adopt color photography. The NY Tim es website is rated as one of the most popular websites online, receiving over 14 million unique visitors in August 2008

The New York Tim es trails in circulation only to USA Tod ay an d The W all Street Journal. In March 2007, the paper reported a circulation of 1,120,420 c opies on weekdays and 1,627,062 copies on Sundays.

The Ochs-Sulzberger family, one of the United States' great newspaper dynasties, has owned the Times since 1896 After the publis her went public in the 1960s, the family continued to exert control through its ownership of the vast majority of Class B voting shares. Class A shareholders cannot vote on many important matters relating to the company, while Class B sharehol ders can vote on all matters. Dual-clas s structures caught on in the mid-20th century as families such as the Grahams of the

- 203 - Washington Post Company sought to gain access to public capital without losing control. Dow Jones & Co., publisher of The Wall Street Journal , had a similar structure and was controlled by the Bancroft family; bef ore the company was later bought by the News Corporation in 2007371.

Major Class A shareholders, as of Dece mber 31, 2006, inc luded the Sulzberger family (19%), T. Rowe Price As sociates, Inc. (14.99%), Private Capital M anagement Inc. (9.34%), MFS Investment Management (8.28%) and Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc. (7.15%). The Ochs-Sulzber ger family trust controls roughly 88 percent of the company's class B shares. Any alteration to the dual-class structure must be ratified by six of ei ght directors who sit on the board of the Ochs-Sulzberger family trust. The Trust board members are Daniel H. Cohen, Ja mes M. Cohen, Lynn G. Dolnick, Susan W. Dryfoos, Michael Gold en, Eric M. A. Lax, Arthur O. Sulzberger, Jr. and Cathy J. Sulzberger372.

So far the company's dual-class ownership structure has deterr ed outside investors from pushing for change in Ochs-Sulzberger control. But in 200 8 two hedge funds, Harbinger Capital and Firebrand Pa rtners, bought 19% of The Times 373. On September of 2008, it was r eported that Mexican Carlos Slim, one of the world's wealthiest men, had acquired a 6. 4 percent stake for $120 million 374. These moves are seen as putting increasing pressure on the company, whose advertising and circulation have faltered recently. The downturn in print advertising sales has recently spread to t he internet, and s ome observers s peculate that the rec ent acquisitions of Times Company stock might put increasing pre ssure on the family to sell, or take the company private to escape Wall Street's unwanted attention.

371MSNBC. "Murdoch clinches deal for publisher of Journal". August 1, 2007. Available at: (msnbc.msn.com).

372The Wall Street Journal. "How a Money Manager Battled New York Times". In: The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 2007. 373 Foley, Stepehn. "Battle for the New York Times". In: The Independent September 12, 2008.

374It Times. „Carlos Slim kauft die New York Times - ein bisschen“. September 11, 2008. Available at: It- times.de

- 204 - Corporate Commitments375

The Company’s core purpose is to enhanc e society by creating, collect ing and distributing high-quality news, information and entertainment. The core values that enable the Company to achieve its core purpose are:

• Content of the highest quality and integrity--This is the basis for our reputation and the means by which we fulfill th e public trust and o ur customers' expectations. • Fair treatment of employees based on respect, accountability and standards of excellence. • Creating long-term sharehol der value through invest ment and constancy of purpose. • Good corporate citizenship.

Rules of the Road

Success at The New York Times Company means more than achieving financial and journalistic goals. The New York Times Co mpany believes that all employ ees should conduct themselves in a manner consistent with their tenets of behavior, their Rules of the Road:

• Be stewards of our Company’s brand reputation and assets. • Treat each other with honesty, respect and civility. • Uphold the highest journalistic, business and personal ethics. • Keep a relentless focus on serving our customers. • Innovate to reach our full competitive potential. • Execute with urgency, agility and excellence. • Champion diversity. • Collaborate to harness our collective strengths. • Achieve results by challenging yourself and mentoring others. • Maintain perspective and a sense of humor.

375Information from the NY Times Company Corporate Website. Available at www.nytimes.com - 205 - 5.1.1.1 History

The New York Times was founded on September 18, 1851, by journalist and politician Henry Jarvis Raymond and former banker George Jones as the New-York Daily Tim es. The paper changed its name to The N ew York Times in 1857. The newspaper was originally p ublished every day but Sunday , but during the Civil War the NY Times, along with other major dailies, started publis hing Sunday iss ues. The paper's influence grew during 1870–71 when it published a series of exposés of Boss Tweed that led to the end of the Tweed Ring´s domination of New York's city hall. In the 1880s, the NY Times transitioned from supporting Republican candid ates to becoming politic ally indepen dent; in 1884, the paper suppo rted Democrat Grover Cleveland in his first presi dential election. While this move hurt the NY Times's readership, the paper regained most of its lost ground within a few years.

The NY Times was acquired by Adolph Oc hs, publisher of The Chattanooga Times, in 1896. The following year, he coined the paper 's slogan, "All the News T hat’s Fit to Print", this was a jab at competing papers such as the New York World and the New York Journal American wh ich were known for lurid yello w journalism. Un der h is guidance, The Ne w York Time s achieved international scope, circulation, and reputation.

In the 1940s, the paper extended its breadth and r each. The crossword began appearing regularly in 1942 and the fashion section in 1946. The NY Times began an international edition in 1946. T he inter national edition stopped publishing in 19 67, when it joined the owners of the New York Herald Tribune and The Washington Post to publish the International Herald Tribune in Paris. The paper bought a classica l radio station (WQXR) in 1946. I n addition to owning WQXR, the newspaper als o formerly owned its AM sister , WQEW (1560 AM). The cl assical music f ormat was simulcast on both frequenc ies until the early 1990s, when the big-band and standards music format of WNEW-AM (now WBBR) moved from 1130 AM to 1560. The AM station changed its call letters fr om WQXR to WQEW. By the beginning of the 21st century, the Times was leasing W QEW to A BC Radio for its Radio Disney format, which continues on 1560 AM. Disney became the owner of WQEW in 2007.

- 206 - The history of The NY Times shows its struggles to do an inde pendent journalis m and defend the press fr eedom, a continuation some relev ant cases in the history of The New York Times illustrate it.

1863 July 13 to 16

Mobs riot i n New Yor k to protest the draft; more than 100 are killed. The NY Tim es, pro-union and anti-slavery, is a leading target. Its Park Row building is defended by Henry Jarvis Raymond (one of the founders of The NY Times), and others with rifles and Gatling guns; mobs attack the Tribune building instead.

1876 November 7

With the Headline "A Doubtful Election", The NY Times goes it alone and declares that the presidential contes t between Rutherford B. H ayes and Samuel J. Tilden is without a victory; the other papers give the election to Tilden. After months, an electoral commission and Congress decide in Hayes's favor.

1937 February

The NY T imes begins an editor ial crusade, one of th e most int ensive in it s history, against Fr anklin D. Roosevelt’s plan to pack the Supreme Court. "Though not fashioned by the hand of a dictator," it says, the plan "smacks of the dictator’s method."

1952 March 29

Radio Moscow attacks The NY Times as a "tool of the monopo lies" and charges that the paper "distorts the peaceful policies of the Soviet government."

1956 January

Mississippi investigates assertions that The NY Times’ s staff ha s "100 Communist Party members." An editorial responds that if "the real purpose of the present inquiry is to demonstrate that a free newspaper’s policies can be sway ed by Congressional pressure, then we s ay to Mr. Eastland and his counsel that they are wasting their time."

- 207 - Times v. Sullivan

The paper' s involvem ent in a 1964 libel ca se helped bring one of the key United States Supreme Court decisions supporting freedom of the press, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In it, the United States Supreme Court established the "actual malice" standard for press reports about public offici als or public figures to be consider ed defamatory or libelous . The ma lice standard requires t he plaintiff in a defamation or libel case prove the publisher of the statement knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity376.

1970 February 2

Earl Caldwell, a repor ter, is supported by The NY T imes in resist ing a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating Black Panthers. In a landmark ruling, in June 1972. the Su preme Court will estab lish a limit ed privilege against disclosing unpublished information.

The Pentagon Papers

In 1971, the Pentagon Papers, a secret Un ited States Department of Defense history of the United States' politic al and military involvement in the Vietnam War from 1945 to 1971, were given ( "leaked") to Neil Sheehan of The New Yor k Times by former State Department official D aniel Ellsberg, with his friend Anthony Russo assisting in copying them. The NY Tim es began publishing excerpts as a series of articles on June 13. Controversy and lawsuits follo wed. The papers revealed, am ong other things, that the Government had deliber ately expanded its role in the war by conducting air strikes over Laos, raids along the coast of North Viet nam, and offensive actions taken by US Marines we ll before t he public was told about the actions, and while Pr esident Lyndon B. Jo hnson had been pro mising not to expand the war. The document increased the credibility gap for the US Government, and hurt efforts by the Nixon administration to fight the on-going war.

When The NY Times began publishing its series, Pres ident Nixon became in censed. His words t o National Security Advisor He nry Kissinger included "people ha ve gotta be put to the torch for this sort of thing..." and "let's get the son-of-a-bitch in jail." After

376 Supreme Court of the United States (1964). NY Times Co. Vs Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. Washington. - 208 - failing to get The NY Tim es to stop publis hing, Attorney General John Mitchell and President Nixon obt ained a federal court injunction that The NY Times cease publication of excerpts. The newspaper appealed and the case began working through the court system. On June 18, 1971 , The Washington Post began publishing its own series. Ben Bagdikian, a Post editor, had obtained portions of the papers from Ellsberg. T hat day The Post received a c all from the Assistant Attorney General, William Re hnquist, as king them to stop publis hing. When The Post refused, the U.S.A Justice Department s ought another injunction. The U.S.A District court judge refused, and the government appealed. On June 26, 1971 the U.S.A Supreme Court agreed to take both c ases, merging them into New York Times Co. v. United State s 403 U.S.A 713. On June 30, 1971 t he Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision that the injunctions were unc onstitutional prior re straints and that the Government had no t met the burden of proof required.

1973 January 3

Daniel Ellsberg goes on trial, accused of theft and conspiracy in t he disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. The charges are eventually dismis sed when it is discov ered that White House operativ es had broken into his psychiatrist’s office – part of a chain of events that ends in the Watergate scandal and Richard M. Nixon’s resignation.

1978 July 24

M. A. Farber, a reporter for The NY Times , is found guilty of crim inal contempt in a New Jersey court for refusing to turn over his notes in the case of a doctor suspected of murdering patients. He is jailed for 40 days.

The NY Times has had a strong presence on th e W eb since 1995, and has bee n ranked one of the top W eb sites. The domain nytimes.com attracted at l east 146 million visitors annually by 200 8 according to a Compe te.com study. The NY Times website ranks 59th by number of unique v isitors, with over 14 million unique visitor s in August 2008. On September 17, 2007, The NY T imes announced that it would stop charging for access to parts of its Web site, reflecting a growing view in the industry that subscription fees cannot outweigh the potential ad revenue from increased traffic on a free site, although access to the Premium Crosswords section continues to require either home delivery or a subscri ption for $6.95 per month or

- 209 - $39.95 per year. The NY Times columnist s includ ing Nicho las Kristof and Thomas Friedman had criticiz ed the pay ing to read their opinion articles 377, with Fried man going so far as to say "I hate it. It pains me enormously because it’s cut me off from a lot, a lot of people, es pecially because I have a lot of people reading me ov erseas, like in India ... I feel totally cut off from my audience.378"

Like a Plus and free service to its audience The Ny Tim es developed The Times Reader, a digital version of the Times. It was created v ia collaboration between the newspaper and Microsoft. Times Reader takes the principles of print journalism and applies them to the technique of online re porting. Times Reader uses a series of technologies developed by Microsoft and t heir Windo ws Presentation Foundation team. It was announc ed in Seattle in April 2006 by Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr., Bill Gates, and Tom Bodk in. The NY Times is also the fir st newspaper to offer a video game as part of its editorial content, Food Import Folly by Persuasive Games379.

Joining a roster of other major Americ an newspapers in recent years, including USA Today, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post , The New Yor k Tim es announced on July 18, 2006 that it would be narrowing the size of its paper by one and a half inches. In an era of dwindling circulation and significant advertising revenue losses for most print versions of American newspapers, the move, whic h was also announced would result in a five percent reduction in news coverage, would have a tar get savings of $12 million a year for the paper 380. The change from the traditional 54-inches broadsheet style to a more compact 48-inch web width was addressed by both Executive Editor Bill Keller and The New York Tim es Pre sident Scott Heekin-Canedy in memos to the staff. Keller defended the "more reader- friendly" move indicating that in cutting out the "flabby or redundant prose in lo nger pieces" the reduction would make for a be tter paper. Similarly, Keller confronted the challenges of covering news with "less ro om" by proposing more "rigorous editing"

377Stabe, Martin. "NY Times columnist hates subscription wall". In: Online Press Gazette. June 13, 2006 378 "Thomas Friedman at Webbys". YouTube. Retrieved on 12.06.2006. 379McCauley, Dennis. "Cultural Milestone: New York Times to Carry Newsgames".In: Game P olitics. May 25, 2007. Available at: gaypolitics.com 380 Seelye, Katharine Q."Times to Reduce Page Size and Close a Plant in 2008". In: The New York Times. July 16, 2006. - 210 - and promised an ongoing commitment to "hard-hitting, ground-breaking journalism"381. The official change went in to effect on August 6, 2007.

The paper, like many news organizations, has often been accused of giving too little or too much coverage to events for reasons not related to objective journalism. One of these allegations is that before and during World War II, the newspaper downplayed accusations that the Third Reich had targeted Jews for expulsion and genocide, in part bec ause the p ublisher, who was Jewish, fear ed the taint of taking on any "Jewish cause"382.

Reporter Judith Miller retired after criticisms of her reporting of Iraq war and the Bush administration, for which The NY Times was forced to apologize 383.But reporter Michael G ordon, who shared by line credit with M iller on some of the early Iraq stories, continues to report on military affairs for The Times.

In mid 2004, the newspaper's then public editor (ombudsm an), Daniel Okrent, wrote a piece in which he c oncluded that the Times did ha ve a li beral bias in co verage of certain social issue such as gay marriage. He claimed that this bias reflected the paper's cosmopolitanism, which arose naturally from its roots as a hometown paper of New York City. Okrent did not comment at l ength on the issue of bias in coverage of "hard news", such as fiscal policy, foreign policy, or civil liberties.

5.1.2 The International Herald Tribune

“The International Herald Tribune creates, collects and distributes world news, information, entertainment and opinion of the highest jour nalistic integrity. Its balanced perspective addresses all areas of human intere st and is trusted and enjoyed by people in all corners of the globe”.384

Established in Paris in 1887, today t he IHT is owned by The New York Times Company and continues to ex pand the reach of its author itative journalism through

381The New Yorker Observer. "New York Times to Cut Size 5 Percent; Keller Says Paper Better Off Smaller“. In: The New York Observer. July 17, 2007.

382Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies.„New York Times". Available at: www.aihgs.com 383Ricks, Thomas E. (2006). Fiasco. London: Penguin Press. 384International Herald Tribune. Corporate Web Site. Available at: www.iht.com - 211 - the world. The news paper is sold in 180 countries and via computers and mobile devices at IHT.com. In year 2007 its daily circulation was of 241.625.

Corporate Commitments385

Mission

To enhance the global community by creating, collecting and dist ributing high quality news, information and entertainment.

We are dedicated to the ideal of independ ent, fair and unbiased journalism. News, opinion and advertising are and mu st remain clearly separated. Equally, we are all united in our dedication to the success of the International Herald Tribune as a viable and vital business.

Diversity gives our enterprise versatility and strength. That is why we are committed in all our endeavors, journalistic and commercial, to embrace and respect the cultural differences of our co-workers and our readers.

We are cognizant of every country and captive of none.

As member of the NY Times, the IHT has the same Rules of the Road:

Editorial Profile

The International Her ald Tr ibune’s intelligent, independent news coverage helps its readers better understand what’s going on in t he world, and how it affects them. In addition, every day across a wide range of features, they can enjoy hon est and engaging journalism from award-winning IHT and New York Times writers and critics.

The IHT has joined forces with Reuters to produce Business with Reuters and Business Asia with Reuters, a weekday secti on in the Atlantic and Asia editions that combines the global knowl edge of the IHT with the news gathering power of Reuters

385Information from the International Herald Tribune Corporate Website - 212 - to give readers a superb daily r eport on world and regional fina ncial and business developments.

The IHT’s opinion and editorial pages prov ide a unique platform for commentary and debate that challenges and shapes world opinion. Renowned IHT and New York Times columnists such as Roger Cohen, Thomas L. Friedman 386, Maureen Dowd 387 and Nicholas D. Kristof 388 are joined daily by eminent contributors, among them Mikhail Gorbachev, Tony Blair, Madeleine Albright, Ban Ki Moon 389, José Manuel Barroso390, to name but a few.

Each day (Except Sunday) the IHT present s two pages of opinion, edit orial and letters edited by Pulitzer-prize winner Serge Schmemann.

5.1.2.1 History

On October 4, 1887, James Gordon Bennett Jr. published the first issue of the New York Herald’s European edition. Fr om the beginning t he Paris Herald’s world news coverage was, for its day, remarkably extensive. Bennett brought to Europe such innovations as the linotype, color comic strips, and halftone engravings of news photographs.

He was the first to give sports events fr ont-page play and one of the first to give prominent attention to the news of sci ence and medicine. A pioneer in cable communications, Bennett was also the first to use radio to send news.

After Bennett’s death in 1918, but the Paris Herald continued the tradition of adopting new technology to better serve readers. In 1928, it became the first newspaper

386Thomas L. F riedman won the 2002 Pu litzer Prize for commentary, his third Pulitzer fo r The New York Times. 387Maureen Do wd, winn er of the 1999 Pulitzer Pr ize for di stinguished com mentary, be came a columnist on The New York Times Op-Ed page in 1995 after having served as a correspondent in the paper's Washington bureau since 1986 388Nicholas D. Kristof. A two-time Pulitz er Prize winner, he previou sly was a ssociate managing editor of The Times, responsible for the Sunday Times. 389Ban Ki Moon is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations. 390José Ma nuel Barro so i s t he 12th President of the Europ ean Co mmission. He served as Prime Minister of Portugal from 6 April 2002 to 17 July 2004. - 213 - distributed by airplane, flying copies to London in time for breakfast. The paper survived the Depression of the 1930’s withou t missing an issue, and was int errupted only by the occupation of Paris in June 1940. It resumed publication in December 1944. After two changes of ownership follo wing the death of Bennett, and a merger with the New York T ribune which resulted in the creation of the New Y ork Herald Tribune, the paper and its European edition were sold in 1959 to John Hay Whitney, then U.S. Ambassador to Britain. Alt hough the New York paper closed in 1966, Whitney was determined to keep the Pa ris paper alive, and to this end The Washington Post and The Ne w York Time s joined the paper’s ownership. On May 22, 1967, the newspaper appe ared for the first time under its new name, The International Herald Tribune . In 1991, The Post and The T imes purchased the Whitney interest and became equal co-owners.

The IHT retained its independent spark a fter the 1967 ownership change, and it continued to strengthen its reputation for cl ear, objective present ation of significant international news. Non-American readers, only one third of the paper’s audience in 1970, outnumbered American readers by 1980, and now form more than two-thirds of the total readership. In the 1970’s, the IH T renewed its tradition of technologica l innovation. In 1974 it pioneered the electronic tr ansmission of facsimile pages from one country to another with the opening of a printing site near London. A second site was opened in Zurich in 1977. I n 1978, it became one of the most technologically advanced newspa pers in Euro pe by ins talling a wholly co mputerized editin g typesetting system. In September 1980, another historic step was taken as the paper began to send page images via satellite from Paris to Hong Kong – becoming the first daily news paper to be electronically sent from one continent to another, making it simultaneously available to readers on opposite sides of the world.

In 2003, The New York Times acquired full ownership of the IHT as part of its long- term strategy to reac h the world’s audien ce with the hig hest quality journalism. Today, the IHT has timely access to the unparalleled news reso urces of The Time s and an expanded network of its own corres pondents to provide readers with an international, independent perspective on global news and events.

- 214 - The IHT’s distribution network and its international circul ation has been further enhanced by the opening of ma ny other print sites around the world: Athens, Bali, Bangkok, Birr (Ireland), Bologna, Cairo, Dhaka, Doha, Dubai, F rankfurt, Hong Kong, Hyderabad (India), Istanbul, Jakarta, K uala Lum pur, Kuwait City, Linköping (Sweden), London, M adrid, Manilla, Mechel en (Belgium), Moscow, Nagoya, New York, Nimes, Osaka, Paris, Sao Paulo, Se oul, Singapore, Sydney, Taipei, T el Aviv, Tokyo and Zurich. Simultaneous printing in 35 sites, including 14 in Asia, makes it possible for the International Herald Tr ibune to be deliv ered to more than 180 countries every day.

5.1.3 The Boston Globe

The Boston Globe (and Boston Sunday G lobe) is the most widely circulated daily newspaper in Boston and in New England, United States. Owned by The New York Times Company, the broadsheet Globe's local print rival is t he Boston Herald . In 2008 the Globe's average weekday circulation fell to 350,605, down from 382,503, or 8.3 percent. Sunday circulation fell 6.5 percent to 525,959391.

Corporate Commiments392

At the Bos ton Globe, as is customary in the news industry, the editorial p ages are separate from the news operation. Editorials represent the o fficial view of the Boston Globe as a community institution. The publis her P. Steven Ains ley reserves the right to veto an editorial and usually determines political endorsements for high office393.

Describing the politic al position of the Globe in 2001, editorial-page edit or Renee Loth told the Boston University alumni magazine:

The Globe has a long and proud tradition of being a progressive institution, especially on social issues. We are pro-choice; we're against the death penalty; we're for g ay rights. But i f people rea d us caref ully, they will find that on a whole se ries of oth er issues, we are not kne e-jerk. We'r e for charte r schools; we're for any number of business-backed tax breaks. We ar e a lot more nuanced a nd subtle th an that liber al stereotype does justice to394.

391Palmer, Thomas C., Jr. " Globe Sale Points to Newspapers' Strength". In: The Boston Globe, page A1, June 12, 1993. 392Information from The Globe corporate Website available at: www.boston.com 393Ibidem 394Ibid. - 215 - Vision

We seek to inform, to explore, to ent ertain, to contribute creatively to the commonwealth. To grow and prosper. To extend our franchise in the written word. To capture new growth in Great er Boston and beyond, while st ill s erving our core. To excel in all ways that this region can excel.

Purpose

• To be the indispensable source of trus ted relevant and authoritative news and information for all our readers, thereby helping them meet the challenges in their lives. • To set a thoughtful agenda of iss ues that require attention in the c ommunities we serve. • To provide a lively forum for a variety of viewpoints • To build and sustain a r eadership that is large enough to respond powerfully en masse and yet targeted enough to support geographic and subject interests. • To create a vibrant marketplace for our advertisers, providing them with the most effective means of reaching consumers.

5.1.3.1 History

The Boston Globe was started in 1872 by six Bost on business men, led by Eben Jordan (founder of the retail store Jordan Ma rsh – now Macy’s), who jointly invested $150,000. The first issue was published March 4, 1872 and cost four cents.

In August 1873, Jordan hired General Charles H. Taylor as temporary busines s manager to turn around financ ial difficultie s. Taylor was a 27-year old Civil War veteran, a staff member and printer for the Boston Traveler, and stringer for The New York Tribune.

As a result of his suc cess in stabilizing the paper, and setting it on a suc cessful growth pat h General Taylor became a partner with Jo rdan, who was t he only remaining investor in the paper. Subsequently, T aylor was named publisher. Members of the Taylor family served as publishers of The Boston Globe until 1999.

- 216 - The Globe was a private company until 1973 when it became a subsidiar y and principal pr operty of the ne wly f ormed Aff iliated Publications. Over a span of 20 years, Affiliated's interests expanded into television and radio stations, magazines, a daily and a week ly paper and c ellular te lephones. On October 1, 1993, T he Ne w York Times Company purchased The Boston Globe and Affiliated Publications395.

Originally a daily, morning paper, the Glob e began Sunday public ation in 18 77. One year later, the Globe star ted an afternoon paper called The Boston Evening Globe , which lasted 100 years and ceased publication in 1979.

Over the years the Globe has evolved from a newspaper into a multi-media source of news and information. Boston.com was laun ched in 1995 and is now is one of the country’s strongest regional websites. The New York Times Company purchased the Worcester Telegram & Gazette in 1999 to complement the Globe’s circulation area. Additional investments in the New England Sports Venture and the Boston Metro allow the Globe to reach new audiences. Globe Direct , a dire ct mail and insert delivery unit is also part of the Globe media group.

Globe reporters were an instrum ental part of uncovering t he Roman Catholic Church sex abuse scandal in 2001-2003, especially in relation to Massachusetts churches. They were awarded the Pulitzer Prize for their work, one of several the paper has received f or its investi gative journalism. Today, The Globe now hosts 28 blogs covering a variety of topics including Boston sports, local politics and a blog made up of posts from the paper's opinion writers.

5.1.4 The Washington Post Company

The Washington Post Company (NYSE:WPO) is a diversif ied education and media company whose principal operations inc lude educ ational and career services, newspaper and magazine pub lishing, televis ion broadcasting, cable television systems a nd electronic information services. The Company owns The Washington Post; Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive (WPNI), the online publishing subsidiary whose flagship products include wash ingtonpost.com, Newsweek.com, Slate,

395Glaberson, William. “The Media Buus iness; Times Co. Acqui ring Boston Globe for $1.1 Billion”. In: The New York Times. June 11, 1993.

- 217 - BudgetTravel.com and Sprig.c om; Express; El Tiem po Lati no; The Gazette and Southern Maryland newspaper; The Herald (Everett, WA); Newsweek magazine; Post-Newsweek Stations (Detroit, Hous ton, Miami, Orlando, San Ant onio and Jacksonville); Cable ONE, serving subscribers in midwestern, western and southern states; and CourseAdvisor, an online lead generation provider.

The Company also owns Kaplan, Inc., a l eading international provider of educational and career services for individuals, school s and businesses. Its four areas of focus are: Kaplan Kids and Schools, Kaplan Test Prep and Admiss ions, Kaplan Higher Education and Kaplan Professional. In 2007, Kaplan had more than $2 billion in revenue.

The Company has an ownership interests in the Los Angeles Times, Washington Post News Service and Bowater Mersey Paper Company.

The Company defines its products in the following way:

Newspapers. Newspapers are fleeting. Today's path-breaking story is tomorrow's common knowledge. The job of a paper, every day, is to tell readers some things they didn't know.

Magazines. A magazine's mission is to break news, identify trends, and provide compelling voices in journalism.

Education. We are setting professional standar ds in an era of educationa l innovation, global expansion and technological advancement.

TV Broad casting. Our television stations pr oduce high-quality local news and information programming and strive to be constructive members of their communities.

Cable. We take great pride in the high c ustomer satisfaction ratings achiev ed by our cable division.

Internet. Interactive deliv ers award-winning news, information, and entertainment resources on the web.

The Washington Post Company aim:

- 218 - 1. To produce the best news papers, magazines, television programs, educational services and other products we can. 2. To run an outstanding business, meas ured by the increase in intrinsic shareholder value over time. 3. To be not just a good, but an exce ptional place for people to work, and a leader in the hiring and promotion of minorities and women. 4. To be a company that provides outstanding customer service. 5. To be cre ative, ada ptive, flexible a nd in telligent e nough to adapt to the changes in our business environment. 6. To be a respected part of the communities where we do business.

5.1.4.1 The Washington Post

It is the largest and most circulated news paper in Washington, D.C. (715,181 from Monday to Friday, 660,182 on Saturday and 983,243 on Sunday according to the ABC Auditors in 2005).

It is also one of the city's oldest paper s, having been founded in 1877. It is widely considered to be one of the most important new spapers in the United States due t o its particular emphasis on national politics , and international affairs, and being a newspaper of records. Even so, the Washington Post has always been defined as a local paper and does not print any editions for the outside region beyond that of the D.C., Maryland, or Virginia editions for daily circulation.

Since Leonard Downie, Jr. was named executive editor in 1991, the Post has won 25 Pulitzer Prizes, more than half of the paper's total collection of 47 Pulitzers awarded. This includes six separate Pulit zers give n in 2008, the second-highest record of Pulitzers ever given to a single newspaper in one year396. The Post has also received 18 Nieman Fellowships, and 368 White House News Photog raphers As sociation awards, among others.

396Kurtz, Howard. "The Post Wins 6 Pulitzer Prizes". In: Washington Post. April 8, 2008 - 219 - Corporate Statements397

Eugene Meyer had a vision of what makes a newspaper truly great, and that vision included s erving the public ac cording to se ven principles. He offered them in a speech on March 5, 1935 and published them on his newspaper's front page:

1. The first mission of a newspaper is to te ll the truth as nearly as the truth can be ascertained.

2. The newspaper s hall tell ALL the truth so far as it can learn it, concerning the important affairs of America and the world.

3. As a disseminator of new s, the paper shall obs erve the decencies that are obligatory upon a private gentleman.

4. What it prints shall be fit reading for the young as well as the old.

5. The newspaper's duty is to its readers and to the public at large, and not to the private interests of its owners.

6. In the pursuit of truth, the newspaper shall be prepared to make sacrifices of its material fortunes, if such a course be necessary for the public good. 7. The newspaper s hall not be the ally of any spec ial interest, but shall be fair and free and wholesome in its outlook on public affairs and public men.

The News department is respons ible for local, national and international news and features, as well as sports, financial and entertainment ne ws. The Editorial department publishes the editorials, letters to the editor and opinion pages. So as not to compromise the objectivity of the new s department, the editorial staff operates independently; its editor, Fred Hiatt, reports directly to The Post's chairman.

The editorial board m eets daily t o discuss issues and plan the unsigned editorials that present the newspaper's views on matters of local, national and international concern. The opinion page publishes piec es by both regular columnists and guest

397Information from the Washington Post Company Corporate Website. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com - 220 - contributors. Like the editorial page, the opinion page appe ars every day. On Sundays, t he depart ment publishes an extra opinion page, Close to Hom e, that emphasizes issues of local interest. Letters to the editor also appear every day; they are meant to reflect a wide range of reader opinion and to allow r eaders to comment on Post coverage. On Saturdays , an extra le tters page, Free For All, gives r eaders more room to talk back.

In 1970, the Post became one of the fi rst newspaper s in the United States to establish a position of "ombudsman", or readers' representative, assigned to address reader complaints about Post news coverage and to m onitor the newspaper's adherence to its own standards. Ever since, the ombudsman's commentary has been a frequent feature of the Post editorial page.

Its editorial pos itions have tak en both liber al and conservative stances: it has steadfastly supported the 2003 invasion of Ir aq, warmed to President George W. Bush's proposal to partially privatize Social Security, opposed a deadline for U.S.A. withdrawal from the Iraq War, and advo cated free trade agreements, including CAFTA.

5.1.4.2 History

The paper was founded in 1877 by Stilson Hutchins and in 1880 added a Sunday edition, thus becoming the city's first new spaper to p ublish sev en days a week. In 1889, Hutchins s old the paper to Frank Hatton, a former Postmaster General, and Beriah Wilkins, a former Democratic congressman from Ohio.

Wilkins acquired Hatton's share of the paper in 1894 at Hatton's de ath. After Wilkins' death in 1903, his sons John and Robert ran the Post for two years before selling it in 1905 to Washington McLean and his son John Roll McLean, owners of the Cincinnati Enquirer. When John died in 1916, he put the paper in trust, having little faith that his playboy son Edward "Ned" McLean could manage his inheritance. Ned went to court and broke the trust, but, under his managemen t, the paper slumped toward ruin. It was purchased in a bankruptcy auction in 1933 by a member of the Federal Reserve's board of governors, Eugene Meyer, who rest ored the paper's health and reputation. In 1946, Meyer was succeeded as publisher by his son in law Philip Graham.

- 221 - In 1954, the Post consolidated its position by ac quiring and merging with its last morning rival, the Washington Tim es-Herald. The merger left the Post with two remaining local c ompetitors, the afternoon Washington Star (Evening Star) and The Washington Daily News, which merged in 1972 and f olded in 1981. The Washington Times, establis hed in 1982, has been a local ri val with a circulation (as of 2005) about one-seventh that of the Post398.

After Graham's suicide in 1963, control of the Washin gton Post Company passed to Katharine Graham, his wife and Meyer's daughter. No wom an before had ev er run a nationally prominent newspaper in the United States. S he described her own anxiety and lack of confidence based on her gender in her autobiography, and she did not assign duties to her daughter at the paper as she did to her s on. She s erved a s publisher from 1969 to 1979 and headed the Wa shington Post Company into the early 1990s as chair man of the board and CEO. After 1993, she retained a pos ition as chairman of the executive committee until her death in 2001.

Her tenure is credited with seeing the Post rise in national statur e through effective investigative reporting, most notably to assure The New York Times did not surpas s its Washington reporting of the Pentagon Papers and Wate rgate scandal. Executive editor Ben Bradlee put the paper's reputati on and resources behind reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, who, in a long series of articles, chipped away at the story behind the 1972 bur glary of Democratic National Com mittee offices in the Watergate Hotel com plex in Washington. The Post's dogged coverage of t he story, the outcome of which ultimately played a ma jor role in the resignation of President Richard Nixon, won the paper a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.

Like The New York Times , the Post was slow in moving to color photographs and features. On January 28, 1999, its first color front-page photograph appear ed. After that, color slowly integrated itself into other photographs and adv ertising throughout the paper.

In 1992, the PBS invest igative news program Frontline suggested that the Post had moved to the right in response to its smaller, more conservative rival The Washington

398The Washington Post. “Times circulation climbs to buck trend”. In: The Washington Post. May 18, 2005. - 222 - Times. The program quoted Paul Weyrich, one of the founders of the conservative activist organization the Moral Majority, as saying:

Narrator: „Paul Weyrich, a co-fo under of the Moral Majority , refuses to take Moon' s money. But he hails Moon's newspaper as an ant idote to its liberal competitor, The Washington Post“.

Weyrich: "The Washington Post became very arrogant and they just decided that they would determine what was news and what wasn't news and they wouldn't cover a lot of things that went on. And The Washington Times has forced the Post to cover a lot of things that they wouldn't cover if the Times wasn't in existence”.399

In 2008, Thomas F. Roeser of the Chicago Daily Observer al so me ntioned competition from the Washington Times as a factor moving the Post to the right400.

On March 26, 2007, Chris Matthews said on his te levision program, "Well, The Washington Post is not the liberal newspaper it wa s, Congressman, let me t ell you. I have been reading it for year s and it is a neocon newspaper401". In November 2007, the Washington Pos t was criticized by independent journalist Robert Parry for reporting on anti-Obama chain e-mails without sufficiently emphasizing to its readers the false nature of the anonymous claims 402. However, it has regularly published an ideological mixture of op-ed columnists, so me of them center-left (including E.J.

399MediaChannel.org - Frontline: “Reverend Moon”. January 21, 1993. 400Chicago Dail y Obse rver. “How the Li beral Me dia S tonewalled th e Edwa rds”. In: Chicago Dail y Observer. August 18, 2008. 401MSNBC. “-' Hardball with Chri s Mat thews' fo r March 23 -“. March 24, 2005. Available at: MSNBC.com 402Parry, Robert. “Was hington Pos t Buys into An ti-Obama Big otry”. In: Consortium news.com. November 29, 2007.

- 223 - Dionne403 and Richard Cohen) and some cente r-right (including George Will 404, Michael Gerson405, and Charles Krauthammer406)

5.2 The Economist Group

The Economist Group is a recognized leading source of analy sis on internationa l business and world affairs. They deliv er information through a range of formats, from newspaper and magazines to conferences and el ectronic services. They define their products saying: “What ties us together is the objectivity of our opinion, the originality of our insight and our advocacy of ec onomic and political freedom around the world!407”

Graphic 40 – The Economist Group

403He i s a Uni versity Profe ssor at Ge orgetown University a nd a se nior fello w at T he B rookings Institution. Dionne has been a frequent commentator on politics for National Public Radio, ABC's "This Week," and NBC's "Meet the Press." His b ook " Why America n In 2002, he receive d the Empath y Award from the Volunteers of America, and in 2004 he won the National Hu man Services Assembly's Award for Excellence by a Membe r of the Media. His book “Why American Hate Politics" (1 991), won the Los Angeles Times Book Prize and was a National Book Award nominee. 404Will was the recipient of a 1978 National Headliners Award for his "consistently outstanding special features columns" appearing in Newsweek. A column on New York City's finances earned him a 1980 Silurian A ward for Editori al Writing. In 1985, Th e Washington Jo urnalism Rev iew named Will "Best Writer, Any Subject." He won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary in 1977. 405Gerson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as a policy adviser and chief speechwriter to President George W. Bush fro m 2000 to 2006. He is the auth or of the boo k "Heroic Conservatism" 406He i s the re cipient of n umerous awards, in cluding t he National Magazine Award for e ssays an d criticism in 1984, the Puli tzer P rize fo r distin guished comme ntary in 19 87 a nd the B radley Prize in 2004. 407The Economist Corporate Web Site. Available at. www.economist.com - 224 - The share capital of The Econom ist Newspaper Limited , The Economis t Group's parent company, is divided int o ordinary shares, "A" special shares, "B" special shares and trust shares. The company is private and none of the shares are listed.

Ordinary shares are princi pally held by employees, pas t employees, and founding members of the company. The or dinary shareholders are not entitled to partic ipate in the appointment of directors, but in most other respects rank pari passu with the other shareholders. The transfer of ordinary shares must be approved by the board of directors.

The "A" special s hares are held by indivi dual share holders including the Cadbury, Rothschild, Schroder and other family intere sts as well as a number of staff and former staff shareholders.

The "B" special s hares are all held by The Financ ial Tim es Limited 408 which hold s 50% of the total share capital of the company excluding the trust shares.

The trust shares are held by trustees, wh ose consent is needed for certain corporate activities, including the transfer of "A" special and " B" special shares. The rights attaching t o the trus t shares provide for the continued in dependence of the ownership of the company and the editorial independence of The Economist. Apart from these rights, they do not include the right to vote, receive div idends or have any other economic inter est in the company . The appointments of the ed itor of The Economist and of the chairman of the company are s ubject to the approv al of the trustees.

The general management of t he business of the company is under the control of the Board of directors. There are 13 seats allowable on the Board, seven of which may be appointed by holders of the " A" special shares and six by the holders of the "B" special shares.

408The F inancial T imes G roup, one of the worl d's leadi ng bu siness information compani es, ai ms to provide a broad range of business information and services to the growing audience of internationally minded bu siness pe ople. The FT Grou p incl udes The F inancial Times, one of the world 's lea ding business newspapers, which i s recognised interna tionally for it s auth ority, integrity and accuracy. Providing extensive news, com ment a nd analy sis, t he newspaper is pri nted i n 19 cities a cross the globe, h as a daily circul ation of over 480,000 a nd a rea dership of more than 1.6milli on peo ple worldwide.

- 225 - As The Financial T imes Limited does not hold a majo rity of the shares of the company (ie not over 50%) and is entitled t o appoint less than half of the board, the company is not a subsidiary of The Financial Times Limited nor of its parent, Pearson plc. However, Pearson plc treats its investment in The E conomist Group as an associate in its group accounts.

The Board currently comprises ten non-ex ecutive directors and three exec utive directors. The non-executive directors hav e a breadth of successful commercial and professional experience and they exercise independent judgment.

Corporate Statements409

The Board wishes the Group to operate in a clear and ethical context and has therefore approved the following Guiding Principles:

• We aim to offer insight and analysis that are valued by our customers.

• Our ambition is to own and develop acro ss the world intelligent media brands for the high-end audience that clients valu e. Underpinning our ability to fulfil this objective is our commitment to independenc e, integrity and delivering quality in everything we do. These values govern our relationships with readers, customers and client s, s hareholders, staff, suppliers and t he community at large.

• We believe in conducting business with common decency. We are opposed to bribery and do not engage in corrupt practices. We abi de by strict guideline s governing the acceptance of gifts and t he disclosur0e of potent ial conflicts of interest.

• As an inter national company, we conduct business in many different markets around the world. In the countries in which we operate, we abide by local laws and regulations. We make an active contribution to local charities by charitable giving. We encourage our people to par ticipate in community activity. We permit them to take time off for this purpose and we t rack the extent to which they take advantage of this policy.

409Information from The Economist Corporate Website. - 226 - • We respect environmental standards and c omply with the relevant local laws. We take environmental issues seriously and consider these when plac ing contracts with suppliers of goods and services.

• We value our colleagues and treat each other fairly . The Group is committed to equality of opportunity in all employment practice s and polic ies. We do not discriminate against employees or job applicants based on the grounds of age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, race, colour, religion, natio nal origin or disability, and we provide equal opportunities training for our staff. We support staff who through dis ability or illness are unable to perform their duties, by adapting the work environment and hours of work to suit the employee wher e it is reasonable for the business.

We recognise that it is essential to k eep employees informed of the progress of the Group. We regularly provide employees with information on the Group's activities and its financial performance through staff me etings and communication through our intranet. We have a s trong consultative cu lture and we follow le gal and regulatory requirements to consult with staff on major issues affecting the company.

5.2.1 The Economist

The Economist is a weekly news and internati onal affairs publication owned by The Economist News paper Ltd and edited in London. Cont inuous public ation began under founder James Wilson in September 1843. While The Economist calls itself a "newspaper", each issue appears on glossy paper, like a newsmagazine. In 2008, it reported an average circulation of just over 1.337.184 million copies per issue, about half of which are sold in North America 410, with a clear tendenc y of growing as graphic 41 Shows. The Ec onomist c laims sales, both by subscription and on newsstands, in ov er 200 count ries. Global sales hav e dou bled since 1997. Of its American readers, two out of three make more than $100,000 a year411.

Founded to support the cause of free trade, The Economist is and always has been a publication of someti mes radical opinion wit h a reverence for fa cts. It is firmly established as one of the world's most authoritative and influential publications.

410The Economist. “World Circulation”. In:The Economist. Jan – Juny 2008 Available at www.economist.com 411Langfitt, Frank. “Economist Magazine wins American Readers”. In: NPR.com. March 8, 2006. - 227 - The Ec onomist claims it "is not a chronic le of economics." Rather, it aim s "to take part in a severe contest between intel ligence, which presse s forward, and an unworthy, timid ignor ance obstructing our progress." It takes an editorial stance based on f ree trade and globalisation. It ta rgets educated read ers and boasts an audience containing many influential executives and policy-makers412.

Graphic 41 – The Economist Circulation

The Ec onomist's priary focus is world news, polit ics and bus iness, but it also run s regular sections on science and technology as well as books and the arts.

Articles often take a definite editorial st ance and alm ost never carry a byline, not even the name of the editor (from 2006, John Micklethwait) is printed in the issue. Authors refer to themselves within articles as "your correspondent" or "this reviewer." It is a longstanding tradition that an editor' s only signed ar ticle during his tenure is written on the occasion of his departure from the position. The au thor of a piece is named in certain circumstances: when notabl e persons are invited to contribut e opinion pieces; when Economist writers compile spec ial r eports; and to highlight a potential conflict of interest over a book review. The names of Economist editors and

412The Economist Corporate Website. - 228 - correspondents can be loc ated, however, vi a the media directory pages of the website.

The publication boasts a tight writing style that seeks to include the maximum amount of information in a limited space. Atl antic Monthly publisher David G. Bradley described the formula as "a consistent worl d view expressed, consistently, in tight and engaging prose.413"

Since 1995, The Economist has published one obit uary every week, of a significan t person (once published an "obituary" of God), not necessarily famous, from any field of endeavour. In addition, The Economist is known for its Big Mac Index, whic h uses the price of a Big Mac hambur ger sold by McDonald' s in different countrie s as an informal measure of the purchasing power of currencies.

The publication includes several opinion columns, whose names reflect the topic they concentrate on:

• Bagehot (Britain) — named for Walter Bagehot, nineteenthvcentury British constitutional expert and early editor of The Economist. • Charlemagne (Europe) — named for Charlem agne, founder of the Frankis h Empire. • Lexington (United States) — named for Lexingt on, Massachusetts, the site of the beginning of the Amer ican War of Independence, and written by Adrian Wooldridge • Buttonwood (finance) — named for the butt onwood tree where early Wall Street traders gathered. Un til September 2006 this was available only as an online column, but it is now included in the print edition. • Face Value: about prominent people in the business world. • Economics Focus: a general economics column frequently based on academic research.

The magazine goes to pre ss on Thursdays, is av ailable online from Thursday between 6 and 7pm GMT, and is available on newsstands in many countries the next day. It is printed at seven sites around the world.

413The Economist. (2008). “The Economist Style Guide”. Available at: www.economits.com - 229 - The Ec onomist also produces t he annual publication The World in . In addition, it sponsors yearly "Innovation Awards", in t he categories of bioscience, computing and communications, ener gy and th e env ironment, social a nd ec onomic innovation, business process innovation, consumer products, and a special “no boundaries” category. It also sponsors a writing award.

Corporate Statements414

"Our vision of the wor ld, our style and our whole philosophy are di fferent from other publications. We are international, we stress the links between politics and business , we are irreverent and we are independent”

John Micklethwait, Editor in Chief

Values

The Economist has f ounded its labor in 3 val ues: Independenc e, Objectivity, and Topicality.

Independence

Editorial independenc e lie s at the heart of The Economist . The constitution of the company does not permit any individual or organisation to gain a majority shareholding. The Editor is appointed by Trustees , who are independent of commercial, political and proprietorial in fluences. T he respect accorded to The Economist's journalists because of their independence is such that they enjoy access to political and business leaders who make the news and whose views can illuminate what is happening, or is about to happen.

Objectivity

The Ec onomist is diff erent from other publications because it has no by lines. It is written anonymously because it is a paper whose c ollective voice and personality matter more than the identities of individual journalists. This ensures a continuity o f tradition and consistency of view which few other publications can match.

414Information from The Economist Corporate Website. - 230 - Topicality

Although The Economist is published weekly in a magazine f ormat, it is called a newspaper because it covers news as we ll as opinion and works to a newspaper deadline. Great care is taken to ensure its topicalit y; so much of its editorial is rewritten up to the moment of going to press late on Thursday in Europe, Asia and the U.S.A.

Political Position

The editorial staff enforces a uniform voice throughout its pages, as if most article s were written by a s ingle author. The pa per's treatment of economics presumes a working familiarity with fundamental concepts of classical economics. For instance, it does not explain terms like inv isible hand, macroeconomics, or demand curve, and may take just six or seven words to expl ain the theory of comparative advantage. However, articles involving economics do not presume any formal training on the part of the reader and aim to be acc essible to t he educated layperson. The newspaper usually does not translate short French quot es or phrases, and sentences in Ancient Greek or Latin are not uncommon. It does, however, describe the business or nature of even well-known entities; writing, for example, "Gol dman Sachs, an investment bank."

When the newspaper was founded, the term "economism" denoted what would today be termed "fiscal cons ervatism" in the United States, or "economic liberalism" in the rest of the world (and historically in the United St ates as well). The Ec onomist supports free markets, globalis ation, and fr ee immigration. It also supports social liberalism, including legalised drugs, gay rights and pr ostitution. According to former editor Bill Emmott, "the Economist's philos ophy has alway s been liberal, not conservative.415" Although Individual contributors take diverse views.

The Economist has endorsed both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in recent British elections, and bot h Republic an and Democratic candidates in the United States. Economist.com puts its stance this way:

415Emmot, Bill. “Time for Referendum in the Monarchy”. In: The Guardian, December 8, 2000. - 231 - “What, besides free trade and free markets, does The Economist believe in? It is to the Radicals that The Economist still likes to think of itself as belonging. The extreme centre is the paper's histor ical position." That is as true today as when former Economist editor Geoffrey Crowt her said it in 1955. The Economist considers itself the enemy of privilege, pomposity and predi ctability. It has backed conser vatives such as Ronald Reagan and M argaret Thatcher. It has supported the Americans in Vietnam. But it has also endorsed Harold Wilson and Bill Clinton, and espoused a variety of liberal caus es: opposing capital punishment from its earliest da ys, while favouring penal reform and decolonisation, as well as —more recently—gun control and gay marriage416.

The Economist frequently accuses figures and countri es of corruption or dishonesty. In recent years, for example, it criticised World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's Prime Minister (who dubbed it The Ec ommunis417); Laurent Kabila, the late president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Robert Mugabe, the head of government in Zi mbabwe and, recently, Cris tina Kirchner, the president of Argentina: „Dashing hopes of change, Argentina's new president is leading her country into economic peril and social conflict“.418

The Econom ist als o called for Bill Clinton' s impeac hment and later for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation after the emergenc e of the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse419. The Economist initially was a voc al supporter for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but it has later c alled the operation "bungled from the start" and critic ised the "almost criminal negligence" of the Bush Administration’s handling of the war, while maintaining, as of April 2008, that pulling out in the short term would be irresponsible420. In the 2004 U.S.A. election, the editors backed John Kerry. 421 The paper has also supported some left-wing i ssues such as progressiv e taxation, criticising t he U.S.A. tax model in a recent issue, and seems to support some government regulation on health issues, suc h as smoking in public, as well as bans

416The Economist Corporate Website 417Indymedia."Report of Rome anti-war demo on Saturday 24th with photos".In: www.indymedia,org. September 30, 2005. 418The Economist. „Cristina in the Land of make believe“. In: The Economist. May 1, 2008. 419The Economist. „Resign Rumsfeld“. In: The Economits. May 6, 2004. 420The Economist. „America´s Debacle in Iraq“. In: The Economist. March 22, 2007. 421The Economist. „Our US Election Endorsement“. In: The Economist. October 28, 2004. - 232 - on spanking children 422. The Economist consistently favours guest worker programs, parental choice of school, and amnesties for illegal inmigrants423.

5.2.2 History

From its beginni ngs in 1843, when The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a global media company t hat develops “intelligent brands for a high- end audience”.

Established in 1843 to campaign on one of the great politic al issues of the day, The Economist remains, in the second half of its sec ond century, true to the principles of its founder . James Wilson, a hat maker from the small Sc ottish town of Hawick, believed in free trade, inte rnationalism and minimum in terference by government, especially in the affairs of the market. Though the protectionis t Corn La ws which inspired Wilson to start The Economist wer e repealed in 1846, the newspaper has lived on, never abandoning its commitment to the classical 19th-century Liberal ideas of its founder.

The Corn Laws, which by taxing and rest ricting imports of corn made bread expensive and starvation common, were bad for Britain. Free trade, in Wils on's view, was good for everyone. In his prospectus for The Economist, he wrote: "If we look abroad, we see within the r ange of our commercial intercourse whole islands and continents, on which the light of civilisa tion has scarce yet daw ned; and we seriously believe that free trade, free intercourse, will do more t han any ot her visible agent to extend civilisation and mora lity throughout the world - ye s, to extinguis h slavery itself."

Wilson's outlook was, therefore, moral, even civilising, but not moralistic. He believed "that reason is given to us to sit in judgm ent over the dictates of our feelings. " Reason convinced him in parti cular that Adam Smith was right, that through it s invisible hand the market benefited profit-seeking indiv iduals (of whom he was one) and society alike. He was himself a manuf acturer and wanted es pecially to influence "men of business". Ac cordingly, he ins isted that all the argum ents and propositions

422The Economist. “Spare the Rod, Say Someone”. In: The Economist. May 29, 2008. 423The Economist. “Inmigration Reform in the United States“. In:The Economits. June 30, 2006. - 233 - put forward in his paper should be subjected to the test of facts. That was why it was called The Economist.

Walter Bagehot was the paper's third edito r, from 1861 to 1877. Bagehot was a banker, but he is best remembered for his political writing and notably for his articles on the British constitution. The monarch, he argued, was head of the "dig nified" parts of the cons titution, those that "excite and pr eserve the re verence of the pop ulation"; the prime minister was head of the "efficient" parts, "tho se by which it, in fact, works and rules." The distinction is often drawn, even today.

It was Bagehot who broadened the range of the paper into politics. He was als o responsible for greatly strengthening the interest in America that The Economist has always shown. Under the editorship of Bagehot, who argued that "The object of The Economist is to throw white light on the s ubjects within its range", the paper's influence grew. One British fo reign secretary, Lord Granvil le, said that whenever he felt uncertain, he lik ed to wait to see what the next iss ue of The Economist had to say. A later admirer of Bagehot's was W oodrow Wilson, pr esident of the United States from 1913 to 1921.

The paper, however, had to wait nearly half a century before getting another remarkable editor. He came in 1922, in the sha pe of Walter Layton, whos e achievement, in the words of The Economist's historian, Ruth Dudley Edwards, was to have the paper "read widely in the corridors of power abroad as well as at home", even if critics said it was "slightly on the dull side of solid". That was certainly not a criticism that could be lev elled at hi s successor, Geoffrey Crowther, who was probably The Economist 's greatest editor since Bagehot. His contribution was to develop and improve the coverage of forei gn affairs, especially American ones, and of business. Its authoritativeness had never been higher.

From the earliest days , The Economist had looked abroad, both fo r subjects to write about and for circulation. Even in the 1840s, it had readers in Euro pe and the United States. By 1938, half its sales were abroad although thanks to world war, not for long. Crowther's great innovation was to start a section devoted to American affairs, which he did just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. "American Survey" (renamed "United States" in 1997) was aimed not at Americans but at British readers, who, Crowther believed, needed to know more about their new allies. In

- 234 - time, however, it earned a following in the United States that became the base for the great rise in American circulation that began in the 1970s.

For most of its existence The Economist has been c ontent with a small circulation. When Bagehot gave up as edit or, it stood at 3,700, and by 1920 had climbed to only 6,000. After the Second World War, it rose r apidly, but from a base of barely 18,000, and when Crowther left it stood at only 55,000, not r eaching 100,000 until 1970. Today circulation is over 1m, more than fou r-fifths of it outside Br itain. The American circulation accounts for over half of the total.

A recent editor, Rupert Pennant-Rea, once described The Econom ist as “ a Friday viewspaper, where the readers, with high er than av erage inc omes, better than average minds but with less than average time, can test their opinions against ours. We try to tell the world about the world, to persuade the expert and reach the amateur, with an injection of opinion and argument.” With readers such as these, and aims such as these, The Econom ist was bound to find it progressively harder to increase its circulation in Britain. That became especially true in the 1960s and 1970s, when British daily papers started to carry more of the interpretive, argumentative and analytical ar ticles that had traditionally been the preserve of the weeklies. The Economist has s urvived, and indeed pr ospered, by buildin g on the internationalism of its outlook and by selling abroad.

In this it has been helped enor mously by its coverage of business and economic affairs. Wilson believ ed that ev en statistics, so far from being du ll, could “afford the deepest and often the most excit ing interest.” To this day, readers such as Helmut Schmidt, chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982, agree. But few readers buy The Economist for one thing alone, and in recent years the paper has added sections devoted to Europe, Asia, Latin America, international issues, and science and technology. It has also expanded coverage of books and arts and introduced a new column on financial markets, Buttonwood.

Initially, the paper was written largely in London, with reports from merchants abroad. Over the years, these gave wa y to stringers who s ent their stories by sea or air mail, and then by telex and cable. Nowadays, in addition to a worl dwide network of stringers, the paper has about 20 staff correspondents abroad. Contributors have ranged from Kim Philby, who spied for the Sovi et Union, to H.H. Asquith, the paper' s

- 235 - chief leader writer before he be came Britain's prime minist er, Garret FitzGerald, who became Ireland's, and Luigi Einaudi, presid ent of Italy from 1948 to 1955. But even the most illustrious of its staff, however , write anonymously. In May 2001, a redesig n introduced more navigational information fo r readers and full colour on all editorial pages. Since July 2007, there has also been a complete audio edition of the magazine available 5pm London time on Frida ys, the day after the print magazine's publication. A group of Britis h newsreaders records the full text of the magazine in mp3 format, including the extra pages in the UK edition. The weekly 130 M B download is free for subscribers and available for a fee for non-subscribers.

5.2.3 Censorship

Sections of The Econom ist criticising authoritarian regi mes, such as China, are frequently removed from the newspaper by the authorities in those countries. Despite having its Asia-Pac ific office in Singapore, The Econom ist regularly has difficulties with the Lee dynasty, which has successfully sued it for libel on a number of occasions:

The Lees are highly sensitive to the sort of criticism that Che e Soon Juan, secretar y general of t he Singapo re Democratic Party, has publicly aired about the family's concentration of power over the national fin ances. The Lees in 2004 sued The Economist for libel and won an a pology and damages worth US$2 30,000 in a Singaporean court after the respected int ernational publication made crit ical references to Ho Ching's appointment to the top of Temasek. More rece ntly, the Lees banned and filed def amation charges again st the Hong Kong-based Far Easter n Economic Review o ver its publishing of a critical interview with Ch ee. The Do w Jones-owned FEER an d its sister publication the Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) had for more than a de cade kowto wed to the senior Lee by refraining from critical political ne ws coverage, and af ter his pro dding even appointed a relative ly inexperienced Singaporean national to the editorship of AWSJ. 424

In 2002, the Thailand police banned an iss ue of The Economist containing a survey on Thailand. 425 On June 15, 2006 Iran banned the sale of The Economist when it published a map labelling t he Persian Gulf simply as " Gulf" — a choice that derives its political significance from the Persian Gulf naming dispute426.

Robert Mugabe's gov ernment in Zimbabwe went further, and imprisoned Andrew Meldrum, The Economist's correspondent there. The government charged him with

424Crispin, Shawn. “Inconvenient Truths in Singapore“. In: Asian Times. December 1, 2006. 425Reporters Without Borders (2004). Thailand Annual Report 2003. Available at: www.rsf.org 426Jerusalem Times. “Iran bans The Economist over map“. In: Jerusalem Times. June 14, 2006. - 236 - violating a statute on "publishing untruth" for writing that a woman was decapitated by Mugabe supporters. The decapitation claim was retracted and allegedly fabricated by the woman's husband. The correspondent was later acquitted, only to receive a deportation order427.

5.3 BBC Broadcasting

The British Broadcast ing Corporation, whic h is usually known more simply as the BBC, is a UK based Broadcasting Corporation and is the world's largest broadcasting corporation employing 28,500 people in t he United Kingdom alone with an annua l budget of more than £4 billion. The BBC is a quasi-autonomous public corporation as a public s ervice broadcaster and is run by the BBC Trust; it is, per its charter, supposed to "be free from both political and commercial influence and answer only to its viewers and listeners”428. It was established by a Roya l Charter and funded by the licence fee that is paid by UK households.

The BBC uses the income from the licence f ee to provide in the UK services including 8 nati onal TV channel s pl us regional pr ogramming, 10 national radio stations, 40 local radio stations and an extensive website, bbc.co.uk.

BBC World Service broadcasts to the world on ra dio, on T V and online, providing news and information in 32 languages. It reac hes more than 200 countries and is available to more than 274 million h ouseholds, to CNN's (its nearest competitor) estimated 200 million, which als o gives it the largest News c hannel in the world. Unlike the other departments of the BBC, BBC World Service is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, more commonly known as the For eign Office or the F CO, is the British government department responsible for promoting the interests of the United Kingdom abroad.

The BBC has a commercial arm, BBC Worldwid e, which operates a range of businesses including Tv Channels around the world ( Animal Planet and People and Arts Channels, BBC Canada, BBC food, for example), publishing books, Magazines,

427Reporters Without Borders. „Guardian and RFI Correspondent Risks Two Years in Jail“. November 6, 2002. Available at: www.rsf.org 428BBC Corporate Website. Available at: www.bbc.com - 237 - Audiobooks, Travel Guides (L onely Planet), DVDs and me rchandise. Its profits are returned to the BBC for investment in new programming and services.

The BBC is governed by the BBC Trust, which repr esents the interests of licence fee payers and sets the overall strategy. The Trust's Chairman is Sir Michael Lyons.

The BBC's Executiv e Board, chaired by the Director-General, Mark Thompson, manages the day-to-day operation of the corporation.

In order to fulfill its obj ectives the BBC has developed the following c orporate structure:

• Trust Unit • Content Groups

o Journalism (incorporates News, S port, Global News and Nations and Regions)

o Vision (incorporates all TV production)

o Audio and Music (incorporates all radio production, music commissioning and BBC Radio Resources)

o Future Media and Technology (I ncorporates New Media, R&D, Information and Archives) • Professional Services

o Strategy (formerly Strategy and Distribution and merged with Policy and Legal)

o Marketing, Communications and Audiences

o Finance

o BBC Workplace (Property)

o BBC People (to 2004, Human Resources & Internal Communications)

o BBC Training & Development • Commercial Groups

o BBC Resources Ltd

o BBC Worldwide Ltd

- 238 - BBC Trust

The BBC is a nominally autonomous cor poration, independent from direct government intervention, with its activities being overseen by the BBC Trust, formerly the Board of Governors. G eneral management of the organisa tion is in the hands of a Director-General, who is appointed by the Trust: "The BBC Trust works on behalf of licence fee payers: it ensures the BBC provides high quality output and g ood value for all UK citizens and it protects the independence of the BBC."429

The Trust sets the overall strategic dire ction for the corporation and assesses the performance of the BBC Executive Board. The Trust has twelve trustees.

Executive Board

The Executive Board oversees the effective delivery of the corporation's objectives and obligations within a fr amework set by the BBC Trust, and is headed by the Director-General, Mark Thompson. In De cember 2006, Thomps on announced the final appointments to the new Executive Board, consisting of ten directors from the different operations of the group, and five non-executiv e directors, appointed t o provide independent and professional advice to the Executive Board.

Corporate Commitments430

Mission

To enrich people's lives with programmes and services that inform, educate and entertain.

Vision

To be the most creative organisation in the world.

Values

• Trust is the foundation of the BBC: we are independent, impartial and honest.

429BBC Trust. Available at: www.bbc.com 430Information from the BBC Corporate Website - 239 - • Audiences are at the heart of everything we do. • We take pride in delivering quality and value for money. • Creativity is the lifeblood of our organisation. • We respect each other and celebrate our diversity so that everyone can give their best. • We are one BBC: great things happen when we work together.

The Royal Charter and Agreement also sets out six public purposes for the BBC:

• sustaining citizenship and civil society • promoting education and learning • stimulating creativity and cultural excellence • representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities • bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK • in promoting its other purposes, helping to deliv er to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies and services and, in addition, taking a leading role in the switchover to digital television. • The BBC must display at leas t one of the following characteristics in all content: high quality, orig inality, innovation, to be challenging and to be engaging. • The BBC must demonstrat e that it provides public value in all its major activities.

Guidelines

Truth and accurac y. We strive to be accurate and es tablish the truth of what has happened. Accuracy is more important t han speed and it is often more than a question of getting the facts right. We will we igh all relevant facts and information to get at the truth. Our output will be well sourced, based on sound evidenc e, thoroughly tested and presented in clear, pr ecise language. We will be honest and open about what we don't know and avoid unfounded speculation.

Impartiality & diversity of opinion. We strive to be fair and open minded and reflect all significant strands of opinion by explor ing the range and conflict of views. We will be objective and even handed in our approac h to a subject. We will provid e

- 240 - professional judgments w here appropriate, but we will never promote a particular view on controversial matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy.

Editorial integrity & independence. The BBC is independent of both state and partisan interests. Our audiences can be c onfident that our decisions are influenced neither by political or commercial pressures, nor by any personal interests.

Serving the public interest. We seek to report stories of signif icance. We will be vigorous in driving to the hear t of the story and well info rmed when explaining it. Our specialist expertise will bring authority and analysis to the complex world in which we live. We will ask sear ching questions of those who hold public office and pr ovide a comprehensive forum for public debate.

Fairness. Our output will be based on f airness, openness and straight dealing. Contributors will be treated honestly and with respect.

Privacy. We will respect priva cy and will not inf ringe it without good reason, wherever in the world we are operati ng. Private behaviour , correspondence and conversation will not be br ought into the public domain unless there is a clear public interest.

Harm and offence. We aim to reflect the world as it is, including all aspec ts of the human experience and the realitie s of the natural world. But we balanc e our right to broadcast and publis h in novative and challenging c ontent with our responsibility to protect the vulnerable.

Children. We will always seek to safeguard the welfare of children and young people who contribute to and feature i n our cont ent including their right to be heard, wherever in the world we oper ate. We will also schedule cont ent whic h might be unsuitable for children appropriately.

Accountability. We are accountable to our audiences and will deal fairly and openly with them. Their continuing trust in the BBC is a crucial part of our contract with them. We will be open in admitting mistakes and encourage a culture of willingness to learn from them.

- 241 - Editorial integrity and independence editorial principles

• We must be independent of both state and partisan interests. • We must not endors e or appear to endorse any other organisation, its products, activities or services. • We should not give undue prominence to commercial products or services. • There must be no product placement in programmes. • We should ensure that on air and online credits are clearly editorially justified. • We must not unduly promote BBC or BBC related c ommercial products and services on our public service outlets. • The outside activities of people working for the BBC, includ ing presenters, must not improperly influence BBC programmes or corporate decision making.

There are specific iss ues concerning BBC commercial services for audiences in the UK and around the world.

Impartiality lies at the hear t of the BBC's commitment to its audienc es. It applies across all of our servi ces and output, whatev er the format; from radio news bulletins via our web sites to our commercial m agazines and inc ludes a commitment t o reflecting a diversity of opinion.

The Agreement accompany ing the BBC's Charter requires us to produc e comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the UK and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate. It specifies tha t we should do all we can to treat cont roversial subjects with due accur acy and impartiality in our news services and other programmes dealing with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy. It also states that the BBC is forbidde n from expressing an opinion on current affairs or matters of public policy other than broadcasting. Special cons iderations ap ply during the campaign periods for elections.

What commitment to impartiality means431:

• we seek to provide a pr operly balanced s ervice consisting of a wide range of subject matter and views broadc ast over an appropriate time scale across all

431BBC Corporate Website - 242 - our output. We take particular c are w hen dealing with political or industrial controversy or major matters relating to current public policy. • we strive to reflect a wide range of opi nion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under represented. • we exercise our editorial freedom to produce content about any subject, at any point on the spectrum of debate as long as there are good editorial reasons for doing so. • we can explore or report on a specific as pect of an issue or provide an opportunity for a single view to be ex pressed, but in doing so we do not misrepresent opposing views. They may also require a right of reply. • we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects. • the approach to, and tone of, BBC stories must always reflect our editorial values. Pr esenters, reporters and correspondents are the public face and voice of the BBC, they can have a signific ant impact on the perceptions of our impartiality. • our journalists and presenter s, including those in ne ws and current affairs, may provide professional judgments but may not express personal opinions on matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy. Our audiences should not be able to tell from BBC programmes or other BBC output the personal views of our journalists and presenters on such matters. • we offer artists, writers and ent ertainers scope for individual expression in drama, arts and entertainm ent and we seek to reflect a wide range of talent and perspective. • we will s ometimes need to report on or interview people whose views may cause serious offence to many in our audie nces. We must be convinced, af ter appropriate referral, that a clear public interest outweighs the possible offence. • we must rigorously test contributors expressing contentious views during an interview whilst giv ing them a fair chance to set out their full res ponse to our questions. • we should not automatically assume that academics and journalists from other organisations are impartial and make it clear to our audience when contributors are associated with a particular viewpoint.

- 243 - 5.3.1 History

The original Brit ish Broadcasting Company was fo unded in 1922 by a group of telecommunications companies—Marc oni, Radio Communication Company, Metropolitan-Vickers, General Electric, Western Electric, and British Thomson- Houston—to broadcast experimental radio services. The first transmission was on 14 November of that year, from station 2LO, located at Marconi House, London432.

The Company, with John Reith as general manager, became the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1927 when it was granted a Roy al Char ter of incorporation and ceased to be privately owned. To represent its purpos e and values, the Cor poration adopted the coat of arms, incorporating t he motto "N ation shall speak peace unto Nation". Experimental televis ion broadcasts were started in 1932 using an electromechanical 30 line syst em developed by John Logie Baird. The broadcasts became a regular service (known as the BBC Television Service) in 1936, alternating between a Baird mechanical 240 line system and the all electronic 405 line M arconi- EMI syste m. The superiority of the electronic system saw the mechanic al system dropped later that year. Television broadc asting was suspended from 1 September 1939 to 7 June 1946 during the Second World War.

The European Broadcasting Union was formed on 12 February 1950, in Torquay with the BBC among the 23 founding broadcasting or ganisations. Competition to the BBC was introduced in 1955 with the commerci ally and independently oper ated television network ITV, howev er, the BBC monopoly on radio s ervices would p ersist into the 1970s. As a result of t he Pilkington Committee report of 1962, in which the BBC was lauded and ITV was very heavily crit icised for not providing enough quality programming433, the BBC was awarded a second T V channel, BBC2, in 1964, renaming the existing channel BBC1. BBC2 used the higher resolution 625 line standard which had been sta ndardised across Eur ope. BBC2 was broadcast in colour from 1 July 1967, and was joined by BBC 1 and ITV on 15 November 1969 . The 405 line VHF tr ansmissions of BBC1 (and ITV) were conti nued for compatibility with older television receivers until 1985.

432BBC. "BBC Press Office: Key BBC Dates”. Available at: www.bbc.com 433BBC. (1962).Committees of Enquiry: Pilkington Committee". London: BBC. Pg. 4. - 244 - Starting in 1964 a series of pirate radio stations (starting with Radio Caroline) came on the air, and forced the Brit ish government finally to regulate radio services to permit nationally-bas ed advertising-fi nanced servic es. In response the BBC reorganised and renamed their radio channels . The Light Programme was split into Radio 1 offering continuous "Popular" music and Radio 2 more "Easy Listening". The "Third" programme became Radio 3 offering classical music and cultural programming. The Home Service became Radio 4 offering news, and non musical content such as quiz shows, readings, dramas and plays. As well as the four national channels, a series of local BBC radio stations was established.

In 1974, the BBC's teletext service, Ceefax, was in troduced, developed initially t o provide subtitling, but devel oped into a news and inf ormation service. Since 1975, the BBC has also pr ovided its TV programme s to the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS), allowing mem bers of HM Forc es serving all over the world to watch and listen to their favourite programmes from home on two dedicated TV channels.

Since the deregulation of the UK televis ion and radio market in the 1980s, the BBC has faced increased competition from the commercial s ector (and from the advertiser-funded pub lic servic e broadcast er Channel 4), espe cially on satellite television, cable television, and digital television services.

The BBC Research Department has play ed a major part in t he dev elopment of broadcasting and recording techniques. In the early days it carried out essential research into acoustics and programme level and noise measurement. More recently this department is working on BBC HD (High Defin ition). The corporation has been producing programmes in the format for many years, and states that it hopes to produce 100% of new programmes in HDTV by 2010.

On 18 October 2007, BBC Director General Mark Thompson announced a controversial plan to make major cuts and reduce the size of the BBC as an organisation. The plans inc lude a reduc tion in posts of 2,500; including 1,800 redundancies, consolidating news operations , reducing programming output by 10% and selling off the flagship Te levision Centre building in London. These plans have been fiercely oppos ed by unions, who hav e threatened a series of strikes, however the BBC have stated that the cuts are essential to move the organisation forward and concentrate on increasing the quality of programming.

- 245 - 5.3.2 Competition

The BBC was the only telev ision broadcaster in the United Ki ngdom until 1955 and the only legal radio broadcaste r until 1969, because of that Its cultural im pact was therefore signific ant sinc e the country had no choice for its information and entertainment from these two powerful media.

Even after the advent of commerc ial television and radio, the BBC has remained one of the main elements in Brit ish popular culture through it s obligation to produce TV and radio programmes for the mass audiences. However, the arrival of BBC2 allowed the BBC also to make programmes for mi nority interests in drama, documentaries, current affairs, enterta inment and sport. Exampl es are cited s uch as I, Clau dius, Civilisation, Tonight, Monty Python's Flying Circus , Doctor Who and Pot Black , but many other ground-breaking examples can be given in each of these fields as shown by the BBC's entries in the British Film Institut e's 2000 list of the 100 Greatest British Television Programmes.434

Possibly the most critically acclamied Documentaries in TV history have been produced by the BBC at the very beginning of the 21st Century , Blue Planet and Planet Earth received awards worldwide ar e c onsidered to be the finest examples around of capturing nature in the wild. Indeed Planet Earth is to this day the biggest selling Blu- Ray High Definition titl e around the world. In radio the BBC has also maintained a high standard of news, drama, entertainment, documentaries, sport and music for all tastes, and still dr aws large audiences, while a lso serving minority tastes.

The BBC's objective of providing a s ervice to the public, rather than just entertainment has changed the publ ic's perception in a wide range of subjects from health to natural his tory by ma intaining a high standard the BBC also defined a quality threshold that the commercial companies had to reach to retain their licences. The export of BBC programmes, the BBC World Service and BBC World have meant that the cultural impact of the BBC has been also experienced worldwide.

Competition from In dependent Television, Channel 4 , Sky and other broadcast television stations, has slightly lessened the BBC's reach, but nevertheless it remains

434BBC corporate website - 246 - a major influence on British popular cult ure. Many popular everyday say ings ar e derived from BBC produced television shows.

5.3.3 Controversies

The BBC is required by its charter to be fr ee from both politic al and commercial influence and answer s only to its viewers and listeners. Nevertheless, the BBC's political objectivity is s ometimes question ed.In April 2005 Ka thy Gyngell and Dav id Keighley published a paper where they analyze the bias of the programm Today in a critic period:

This paper has filled th e gap by mounting det ailed scrutiny of a range of transcr ipts from a flagship part of the BBC’s o utput, the Today programme. Producer Guidelines dictate that it must be politically balanced. It is also one of the na tion’s agen da setters, on air for 17 hours a week. While it is impossible to cover all of the corporation’s 243 hours a week of new output, it is possible to disce rn significan t patterns from close analysis of representative periods of such flagship output435.

Although the researchers found some bias, it seems not to be a clear pattern of bias:

A paper such as this cannot demonstrate whether the BBC is systematically hostile to centre-right views. It do es seem that there ma y be proble ms with one of its flagship news programmes. This is not to suggest that there is deliberate or even consciou s bias. But there is evidence of weak editorial co ntrol and uneven levels of consistency and balance. Urgent action is required to put this right.436

Following t he 2003 invasion of Iraq a study, by the Cardi ff University School of Journalism, of the reporting of the war, found that nine out of 10 references to weapons of mass destruction during the war assumed that Iraq possessed them, and only one in 10 questioned this assumption. It also found that out of the main British broadcasters covering the war the BBC was the most likely to use the British Government and military as its s ource. It was also the least likely to use independent sources, like the Red Cross, who were m ore critical of the war. When it came to reporting Iraqi casualties the study found fe wer reports on the BBC than on the other three main channels. The report's author, Justin Lewis 437, wrote of his findings : "Far

435Gyngell, Kathy and Keighley, David (2005). BBC Bias? Two short case Studies. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 436Ibidem

437Justin Lewis is Professor of Communication and Head of the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. He returned to Britain in 2000, having worked for 12 years in the United States at - 247 - from revealing an ant i-war BBC, our findings tend to gi ve credence to those who criticised the BBC for being too s ympathetic to the government in its war coverage. Either way, it is clear that the accusation of BBC anti-war bias fails to stand up to any serious or sustained analysis."438 But it is important to see that the study was granted by the BBC.

Prominent BBC appointments are constantly a ssessed by the British media and political establis hment for si gns of political bias. The appointment of Greg Dyke as Director-General was highlighted by press sources because Dy ke was a Labour Party member and former activist, as well as a friend of Tony Blair. The BBC's current Political Editor, Nick Robinson, was some years ago a chairman of the Young Conservatives and has, as a r esult, attrac ted informal criticis m from the current Labour government, but his predecessor Andrew Marr faced similar claims from the right because he was editor of the liber al leaning Independent newspaper before his own appointment in 2000.

In many situations the BBC has had to confront difficult si tuation to defend it is right, for example in the year 1956 while the Suez Crisis.

the University of Massachusetts.He has written widely about media, culture and politics. Recent books include Con structing Pu blic Opini on (Ne w York: Co lumbia Un iversity Pre ss, 2001 ), Cit izens o r Consumers: What the me dia tell us ab out political participation (Open Unive rsity Press, 2005) a nd Shoot First and Ask Questions Later: Media Coverage of the War in Iraq (Peter Lang, in press). He is also the Se ries Editor fo r the list in Me dia and Culture for Pete r Lang Publishers, and has produced edited collections for Blackwell’s and Westview Press.

He has written articles fo r The Guardian, The Los Angeles Times and The Bo ston Globe, and is a regular commentator on media, politics and cultural issues for regional and national US and UK media, including BBC Radio Five, the Today Prog ramme, BBC TV Ne ws, The Independent, The Washington Post, the NB C Tod ay Show an d National Publi c Radio. He h as written a nd pre sented two video s: Getting The Message Across and Constructing Public Opinion for the Media Education Foundation.

Recent funded research includes various projects commissioned by the BBC (on the Iraq War and on 24 Hour News), the BBC Tru st (on im partiality), two studies for the Economic and So cial Research Council (on media and citizenship and the public understanding of science) and a proj ect funded by the Office of Science and Technology on the media reporting of science. He was a m ember of the Royal So ciety’s working group o n ‘B est p ractice in commu nicating n ew scientific research to th e public’, and is on the Government’s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) Panel on Communication, Media and Cultural Studies. He has advised a range of bodies on media and cultural issues, including OfCom, the Department of Trade and Industry and BBC Wales.

438Lewis, Ju stin; Brooke s, Rod; Mosd ell, Nick an d Threadg old, Terry (200 6). Shoot First an d Ask Questions Later: Media Coverage of the War in Iraq. Berlin: Peter Lang. - 248 - The Suez Crisis 1956

A recurring challenge for the BBC is its s tance when the country goes to war. In World War 2 its progr ammes and journalis m had reflected a na tion squarely behind the struggle against the Nazi threat. But the question is less clear-cut when the nation itself is divided over the decision to mobilise.

The Falk lands War in 1982 was a case in point, as was Suez 26 years earlier. Memories of the suc cessful allianc e between the broadcas ter and the wartime Coalition Government were still fresh wh en Britain and France sent in troops to recapture the Suez Canal after Egypt 's President Nasser had nationalised the Anglo- French Suez Canal Company and taken contro l of the vital sea route to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

At home there was limited appe tite for m ilitary action. The La bour Opposition wa s against it, and the BBC's view was that it had to reflect that divide. No one reflected it more starkly than Oppositi on leader Hugh Gaitskell in a televis ion broadc ast. The Conservative Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden was incensed by the BBC's decision to grant Gaitskell airtime to challenge his own televisi on and radio broadcasts explaining the Government's decision to mobilise. He was angrie r still when the BBC refused to tone down World Service broadc asts to the Middle East reflecting the divided opinion.

Relations between the Government and the BBC became increasingly bitter, and schemes to "discipline" the Corporation were discussed. These are believed to have included the Government taking editorial control of the BBC. In the event, the conflict lasted only three day s before the UN brok ered peace and the cr isis lifted. But it left an indelible mark on Eden. His press adv iser, William Clark, resigned, and Eden himself stepped down a few months later. For the BBC, there were no dis ciplinary sanctions and its reputation for proper impartiality survived more or less intact.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The BBC has faced accusations of holding bot h anti-Arab and anti-Israel biases, and being anti-semitic. For example, Dougl as Davis, the London correspondent of The Jerusalem Post, has described the BBC's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict as:

- 249 - … a relentle ss, one-dimensional portrayal of Israel as a de monic, criminal state and Israelis as brutal oppressors [which] bears all the hallmarks of a concert ed campaign of vilification that, wittingly or not, has the effect of delegitimizing the Jewish state and pumping oxygen into a dark old European hatred that dare d not speak its name fo r the past half-century.439

Nevertheless, an independent panel was set up in 2006 to re view the impartiality of the BBC's coverage of the Israeli-Palestinia n conflict. The panel' s assessment was that "apart from individual l apses, there was little to su ggest deliberate or systematic bias." 440 The report listed examples of how the BBC could be said to be biased in favour of Israel in section 4.7. Mor eover, The Guardian too has noted that "The BBC has had a difficult time over its coverage of Israel, with regular accusations of bias coming from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides"441.

5.3.4 BBC NEWS

It gathers and produces national daily news, business, polit ical and current affairs programmes on BBC television and radio. It is also r esponsible for the continuous news channels BBC News 2 4, BBC Parlia ment, BBC World , interactive se rvices, Ceefax and the web site BBC News Online . As the whole BBC group its policy focuses on analysis and qualitative journa lism: “All our journalism striv es to be impartial, fair and ac curate. Our strength is in the depth of knowledge in our journalism, the quality of ana lysis and range of subjec ts, original first hand reporting and investigations from around the world” 442.

BBC News is the largest broadcast news operati on in the world with more than 2,000 journalists and 48 newsgather ing bureaux, 41 of which are overseas. In 2007 BBC News reported from more t han 150 countries and produced more than 45,000 hours of programming - that works out at an average of 120 hours of news broadcasting for every day of the year.

BBC Ne ws is also a globa l news provider r eaching more than 260 million viewers through the international T V news channel BBC World and more than 150 million

439Douglas, Da vis (2 003). "Hatre d in th e air: the BBC, Israel and Antisemitism". In: Iganski, Paul & Kosmin, Barry. ( eds) A New A nti-Semitism? De bating Judeophobia in 21 st century B ritain. Lond on: Profile Books. p. 130. 440BBC. (2006). Impartiality Review: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: BBC Governors. Available at: www.bbc.com 441Conlan, Tara. "BBC World dropped for al-Jazeera English in Isra el“. In: The Guardian. December 13, 2006. 442Information from the BBC Corporate Website. - 250 - listeners via BBC World Service. These ser vices are f unded by grants for the World Service and commercial income for BBC World.

The bulk of programming come s from the news centre in Television Centr e, West London - t he largest such operat ion in the world. But BBC News does not produce the BBC's UK regional news programmes and serv ices but works very clos ely with BBC Natio ns and Regions across all media to ensure t hat they reflect the diverse picture of life in communities throughout the UK.

BBC News is respected both in the UK and ar ound the world for the strength of its journalism and impartialit y. Since the first radio news bulletins almost 80 year s ago, BBC Ne ws has become the fi rst place people tu rn to during big news events. According to an ICM poll, 93% of the UK population turned to BBC television, radio, text or online during t he first two weeks of the war in Iraq. In the first week of the conflict, BBC News was seen by 70% of the populatio n - 40 million people. Traffic to BBC News Online increased massively with one week in March seeing a rec ord 140 million page impressions - a typical weekly figure would be 45 million.

However, BBC News reporters and broadcasts are now and have in the past been banned in several countries pr imarily for reporting which has been unfavourable to the ruling government. For example, co rrespondents were banned by the former apartheid régime of South Africa. The BBC is currently banned in Zimbabwe, whos e government has proscribed it as a terrorist organis ation443. The BBC has been banned in Myanmar (Burma) sinc e the anti-government protes ts there in September 2007. Other cases have included Uzbekistan:

The govern ment denou nced the BBC and blo cked it. But they could not stop it. Someone, night after night, pushed printed pages from the BBC News website under peoples' doors in Andijan. With a soft, warning knock they disappeared . In Tashkent, people who never thou ght twice about politics sat huddled around radios in th e evening, craning to hear every story on the BBC.

Word spread, from stre et to street. And anger grew. Ang er, first about the killin gs, then anger about the scale of what many saw as a hu ge, official lie. So I sh ould not have been surprised when the f oreign ministry summo ned me and read out a prepared statement, accusing me of complicity with terrorist s. They made it clear that I had to leave, quickly. A day later, I was gone and the unravelling of the bureau had begun. So I should not have been surprised. But I was.

443Afrol News. "Broadcasting of BBC in Zimbabwe stopped“.May 10, 2002. Available at:www.Afrol.com - 251 - We had been in Uzbekistan for so long - the only international broadca ster to set u p there in the early 1990s when the S oviet Union collapsed and Uzbekistan became a country. In those days, we worked from a li ttle house on Ulitsa Ivleva (Ivleva Street ), famous among the tiny band of journalists an d others who were dra wn to Central Asia. There were always guests, a lunch for anyone who dropped in, sometimes even people camping in the garden. Communications were so poor that th e whole office sometimes took it in tur ns for hours raising a d ialling tone on the phon e. Long, hot nights were lost trying to send a fax, waiting anxiously for acknowledgement that it got through. And all becau se in this fascinating, un known land every story was fresh and new. No press relea ses, no press pack, just amazing, solitary journeys up mountains and through deserts to report real news.444

There have been other cases in China 445, and Pakistan: „Police in Karachi entered the offices of Mast FM with officials from the Pak istani Electronic Media Regulator y Authority. The station, which broadcasts BBC programming in Ur du to four Pakistani cities, had been carrying special extended c overage for a Pakistani audienc e since the earthquake in October“.446

The BBC online news site's Persian version wa s rec ently block ed from the Iranian internet: “Samiei, 27, is among the gro wing ranks of Iranian bloggers who are relentlessly pushing the boundaries of free expression, making Farsi one of the 10 most popular languages for blogs. The blogger s are testing just how much politic al and social dissent the nation's rulers will tolerate on the Internet.

The authorities are pushing back. They have blocked access to thousands of websites in recent years that are deemed to threaten Iran's Islamic revolution, including t he BBC's Farsi-language site. A trial began this month against four bloggers on charges includi ng propaganda against th e state. And in October, the government barred high-speed Internet service in private homes“. 447

444Whitlock, Monica. “Uzbeks banish BBC after massacre reports”. November 5, 2005. Avail able at: www.bbc.com

445Pruszewicz, Marek. “Suppressed coverage”. March 17, 2008. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk

446BBC. “Urdo taken off Pakistan radio – BBC News website”. November 15, 2005. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk 447Smith, James F. and Barnard, Anne. "Iran bloggers test regime's tolerance“.In: The Boston Globe. December 18, 2006. - 252 - 5.4 Conclusions

The international media selected for this research show that it is possible and profitable to do independent a nd qualitative journalism. It happens in the private enterprises like The New York Times , The Washington Post and The Economist, as well as in public ent erprises lik e the BBC. In the same way, these media have developed an internal structure and values that allow them to be free of politic al influence.

However, these structures seems to be more mature in the BBC and The Economist, because both enjoy of recognition and broad gains (it is important to note that the BBC is not only profitable because of the t axes it rec eives, but because it produce s very successful productions, especial ly in TV). On the other side, The Ne w York Times and The Was hington Post confront reductions in their audiences and are looking to reduce cos ts in order to surviv e. It is not gratuitous. Both are familiar enterprises. But if they want to continue as a model of qualitat ive journalism, they have to change their structures, accept new and diverse partners, diversify their products and allow a more democratic control of the companies. The Econom ist´s structure could be a model to follow. Many investors and an independ ent administration seem to work. Additionally the development of specific productions for international audiences could attract new audiences and earnings. The BBC and The Economist have a very well recognized in ternational character, while The New York Times Company and The Washington Post Company, although read worldwide, have still a strong local character.

The Colombia media is in transition from familiar companies to internationa l outlets. As we saw, this could be a great opportunity for a be tter journalism, although it implices co mplex stru ctures of administration. But, just as the international opinion articles are a model to follow, also the st ructures of the inter national outlests could serve as orientation for the Colombian media.

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The independent journalists of the internat ional media are in a better position to explain and understand comple x local conflicts lik e that in Colombia, t he cas e selected for this analysis. They can get an overview of the whole conflict, understand its motivations and dy namics and are capabl e of detachment; for these reasons they can observe the conflict like a scientist examining a sample. In contrast, the Colombian media of ten draw on the in ternational media for information about Colombia. This is a paradox indicative of the high degree of escalation reached in the Colombian conflict. The level of polarizat ion is s o high that even independent journalists have pr oblems in observi ng, understanding and informing about perspectives differing from their own. For this reason, they understand the conflict only in terms of oppositions: “enemies” and “friends,” “we” and “they,” “right” and “wrong,” “ good” and “evil,” etc. C onsequently, the independe nt writers of opinion articles for international media (journalis m pro peace) could aid readers to obtain a more balanced version of the conflict and thereby contribute to depolarization.

However, to create communication pro peac e, one has to do more than merely present or dispos e of international ar ticles. Colombian ar ticles hav e many advantages, as well as defects, just as do international articles (Tables 4 and 5). Therefore, we must analyze t he interre lation between b oth st yles in order to determine how a com munication model could be p ossible t hat c an facilitate a high level of understanding of the conflict and at the same time a more pro-peace style.

Moreover, we have to consider another impor tant fact about thes e articles: in som e cases both media agree, in others they disagree, and in still others, they present very

- 254 - different, conflicting information. Because of this some questions arise: If readers can read both types of article, wh ich articles will have mo re credibilit y or conclusions more “attractive” to them: ones that practice advocac y (Colombian articles) or more analytical ones (international articles)? Can readers discount false or distorted information and c oncentrate on the facts, disregarding unsuppo rted statements in each of the media? Or would they simply be confused?

COLOMBIAN ARTICLES INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES

PROVIDE MUCH MORE INFORMATION AND PROVIDE QUALIFIED INFORMATION, BUT DETAILS ABOUT THE CIVIL WAR NOT AS MUCH CAN USE THE SAME LANGUAGE AS LANGUAGE COULD BE A BARRIER, READERS AND LOCAL COLOR TO MAKE ESPECIALLY IN AN ALMOST MONOLINGUAL ARTICLES VERY INTERESTING COUNTRY READERS CAN READ ARTICLES ABOUT INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS IS CURRENT EVENTS NOT ALWAYS PROVIDED READERS HAVE CLARITY ABOUT WHO IS IN SOME CASES THE AUTHOR DOES NOT WRITING IDENTIFY HIM/HERSELF

Table 4448

COLOMBIAN ARTICLES INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES

HAVE A TENDENCY TO PERSONALIZE AVOID PERSONALIZING AND FOCUS ON SITUATIONS AND NAME GUILTY PARTIES CAUSES HAVE TOO MUCH AMBIGUITY USE ACCURATE, DIRECT LANGUAGE MAKE EXAGGERATED, UNREALISTIC AND FIND CONNECTIONS WITH THE HISTORY MISPLACED ASSOCIATIONS THAT DISTORT AND CONTEXT OF THE COUNTRY EVENTS TAKE POSITIONS IN FAVOR OF CIVILIAN VICTIMS PROPOSE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS

Table 5

6.1 Experiment

We carried out one experim ent to com pare the impact on readers of the representations of the Colombian conflict in selected independent opinion articles in Colombian and international media.

448These tables summarize the analysis of 350 articles published between 2005 and 2007. - 255 - 6.1.1 Methodology

The impact on readers of an ar ticle on the Colombian conf lict is measurable through their degree of understanding and ability to coherently explain the conf lict and distinguish among the actors and their role s. This implies agr eement between the subjects’ answers and the fact s of the conflict. For exa mple, take one fact: The Chief of the Colombian Sec ret Police (DAS) was prosecuted for having relations with the Colombian Mafia. If a subject responds with Disagree to the statement: The Chief of the Colo mbian Secre t Police had relations with the Mafia , the answer is false. I understand coherenc e in the s ense of the following exampl e: If the chief of the Colombian Secret Police and other important police officials have close relations with the Colom bian Mafia, it is obvious that the Mafia has relations with the Colombian Secret Police. If, however, a subject answers that important officials of the Colombian Secret Police have relations with the Mafia, but that the Mafia does not have relations with the Colombian Secret Police, his response is not coherent.

To compare the two kinds of journalism, we selected three groups and asked the members to read different types of article. These were published between 01 January 2005 and 31 December 2007 – years of great change in the conflict (see Chapter One):

*Group 1 read 22 articles taken from the Colombian media. *Group 2 read 22 articles taken from the international media. *Group 3 read both the Colombian and the inte rnational articles so that we could compare and measure the influence of ea ch of the media when readers have a chance to read both kinds of article.

Each group included 22 subjects, and in order to avoid ”contamination,” before the experiment all subjects were asked to prov e their lack of previous knowledg e of the Colombian conflict (see the preliminary test in Annex 1). During the experim ent, they had to make every effort to avoid wa tching programs on or reading about the Colombian conflict (see the agr eement form in Annex 2). Likewis e, pers ons from America (North, Central and South) and S pain, and persons with contacts to or knowledge about Colombia, wer e not inc luded in the study, because it would be

- 256 - impossible to tell whether they were respo nding to the selected articles or to their previous knowledge and experiences.

Each group had to evaluate 122 statements in order to measure the members’ lev el of understanding and coherence (o r consistency) conc erning the Colomb ian conflict (see questionnaires in Annex 3).

Each statement had 5 possible responses, for example:

Peasants earn m ore from drug crops th an from pineapples or other traditional products.

Agree Agree Partially Don’t know Disagree partially Disagree

We defined understanding as knowledge that permits subjects to link the actors in the conflict with their ac tions, explain the true caus es and true consequences of measurable and relevant facts, and give a temporal perspective to the conflict.

The subjects were on the av erage young persons, ca. 24 y ears old. The m ajority of them were students at the University of Konstanz, and 94% were of German nationality. The rem aining 6% were from other countries of Europe, Asia and Oceania; 47% were men and 53% women.

In all, we chose 44 articles from the following media:

From Colombia: “El Espectador,” “El Tiempo,” “Cromos.” From the international media: “ The New York Times ” (USA), “ The International Herald Trib une” (USA – France), “ The E conomist” (GB), and “ BBC NEWS ” (World Online version).

We used four criteria for this selection: 1) Presence of independent and qualitativ e opinion articles about Colombia; 2) Parallelism of topic; 3) Conflict Illustration: topics relevant for understanding the Colombian c onflict; 4) Contextualization: presence of

- 257 - enough explanatory details to make each ar ticle understandable without additio nal information.

To measure the results for each group, we performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA). This is a method that is widely us ed when it is necessar y to compare and analyze more than t wo variables. As a follow-up to ANOVA, we us ed t he non- parametric Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests to ens ure the robustness of the results and to distinguish clearly between significant and non-significan t results. Using only one test, the differentiation wo uld be weak , but with follow-up tests, the differentiation becomes clear and very well supported. Non-param etric tests were preferred, because, for two reasons, the num ber of subjects was limited to 66: It was very difficult to find s ubjects with little knowledge about Colom bia, a conflict with a long-term presence in the media. Moreov er, subjects had to have enough time to read the articles, which took 5 to 10 hours or more, depending on the group.

The variables were defined in t erms of th e explanations of t he Colombian conflict given by the selected articles . For example, in the s elected articles the focus was on paramilitaries and not on guerrilla s. For this reason, ‘Pa ramilitaries’ is a variab le, but not ‘Guerrillas ’. Anot her criterion for sele cting varia bles came from the followin g questions in the basic scheme of conflict: Who is fighting (Armed Actors)? Who are the civilian victims? What is the political pers pective of the conflict (Political Actors)? Are there any peace init iatives? The question: Why are they fighting ? does not have a simple or direct answer, and it is answered with the other questions; for this reason there are no specific variables for this question.

We conducted the experiment in Germany with the s upport of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz. For this reason, we translated all the articles into German, and all the questionnaires were likewise in German.

6.2 Results

When we examine the general percentages of understandi ng (based on th e sum of all variables), we obtain the following results (Figure 42):

- 258 -

- Group 1 (which read only the Colombia n articles) had the lowest level of understanding (35.88%). - Group 2 (which read only the internat ional articles ) had a better level of understanding, but it not very different from that of Group 1 (41.13%). - Group 3 (which read both the Colombian and the international articles) had the highest level of understanding (47.17%).

General Understanding

47,17% 50,00% 41,13% 45,00% 35,88% 40,00% 35,00% 30,00% 25,00% 20,00% 15,00% 10,00% 5,00% 0,00% Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Reihe1

Figure 42 – General % of Understanding

From this illustration, we c an conclude that for 64% of the questions Group 1 (Colombian articles) selected an answer that did not agree with the facts. For Group 2, this percentage was 59%, and for Group 3 it was 53%. In none of the c ases did the two media enable the readers to underst and the majority of the facts of the conflict. Probably in a long-runn ing conflict like the Colombian, with many actors, many facts, many changes ov er time 449 and a complex historical background, it is difficult for the media to offer a complete explanation. This is a relevant point, because it indicates how limited the media ar e in giving explanations and serving as a useful instrument for creat ing a peaceful society. From this perspective, the media are significant actors, important tools, but not definitive. The signif icant actors are the

449The Colombian conflict has been going on for appro ximately 60 years, but this duration i s a hotly debated topic. For example, the government claims there has been a conflict in Colombia “only” for the last 20 years. - 259 - government, the internati onal community, judicial systems (international and Colombian), the parties and the organization s of civ il society, which can create an adequate space for discussion, definite polit ics, and means and laws to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The difference between the general perc entages of understandin g is signific ant when we compare all the groups, and Groups 1 and 3, as we can see in the following tables:450 451 a,b Statistics for Test Understanding

Understanding Mann-Whitney 86,000 Chi-square 12,207 U Df 2 Wilcoxon W 339,000 Asymptotic .002 Z -3.664 Significance Asymptotic a. Kruskal-Wallis Test Significance .000

b. Group variable: All (2-sided) groups a. Group variables: Group 1,3 Statistics for Test a Table 6 – Significance all groups Table 7 – Significance of Groups 1 and 3

When we compare Groups 1 and 2, and Gr oups 2 and 3, the difference is not significant, but when we compar e Groups 1 and 3 the difference is signific ant. This means that Group 2 is closer to Group 3 than is Group 1. For this reason, we can say that the international articles (read by Group 2) exert the strongest influence on Group 3 (which read articles from both media).

450 In all the cases in this analysis, we used non-parametric statistical tests (Kruskal Wallis as standard and Mann Whitney U as a follow-up). (See Annex 4 with all the values). 451 When we compare the results of the Kruskal Wallis test with the results of the ANOVA test, we find that both te sts indicate that the same variables are significant (ChSoldiers, Refugees, ColPresident, ColArmy, Co lGov_Para, Oppo sition a nd Para mil). When we compare the results of th e Mann U Whitney test with the resul ts of the Bon ferroni test, we obtain a similar level of significance between the groups for the same variables, with one exception. With the Kruskal Wallis test, ColPresident is significant only between Groups 2 and 3, but with the Mann Whitney U test for this variable, the results are s ignificant in tw o ca ses: be tween G roups 2 and 3; and b etween G roups 1 a nd 2. After th e Bonferroni correction, the following variables lost their significance when we compare Groups 1 and 3: ColArmy, ColGov_Para and Opposition. When we compare Groups 2 and 3, the following variables lost their significance: ColPresident and ColArmy. However, it i s possible to say that the re is a high level of similarity betwee n the param etric an d the non-p arametric analy ses, and pro bably these variables, non-significant after the Bon ferroni correction, could be significant wi th more d ata. In other words, th e tende ncy of t he Bonfe rroni test and B onferroni correction suggests th at the variable s ChSoldiers, Paramilitaries and Refugees are highly significant, while the others have a tendency to be significant a nd to mat ch t he no n-parametric test s. (See An nexes 5 and 6 with all the val ues of the ANOVA and Bonferroni tests). - 260 - Statistics for Testa Understanding Mann-Whitney 179,500 U Wilcoxon W 432,500 Table 8 – Significance Groups 1 and 2 Z -1.468 Asymptotic Significance .142 (2-sided) a. Group variables: Groups 1, 2

Statistics for Testa Understanding Mann-Whitney 172,000 U

Wilcoxon W 425,000 Z -1.644 Table 9 – Significance Groups 2 and 3 Asymptotic Significance .100 (2-sided) a. Group variables: Groups 2, 3

6.2.1 Variables

Table 10 presents all the variables analyzed and the percentages of understanding of each group:

% of Understanding Variable Category Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Child Soldiers Civilian Victims 19.09% 52.73% 53.64% Colombian Army Armed Actors 30.91% 30.00% 45.45% Colombian Government Parapolitics Politics 35.04% 43.75% 46.78% Colombian President Politics 36.36% 29.34% 40.50% Colombian Secret Police Armed Actors 45.45% 45.45% 45.45% Demobilization Peace 48.48% 44.55% 51.52% Elite Victims Civilian Victims 42.05% 51.14% 48.86% Indians Civilian Victims 32.47% 33.12% 38.96% Opposition Politics 26.26% 31.31% 39.90% Paramilitaries Armed Actors 29.22% 42.42% 47.84% Refugees C ivilian Victims 45.45% 34.85% 55.30% War on Drugs Politics 41.36% 51.82% 52.73%

Table 10

- 261 - These are the general results, but when we compare each of the variables, we c an see that 58% of the variables show a significant difference, as Table 11 shows.

Variable P Value all Groups Child Soldiers 0.000 Refugees 0.008 Colombian President 0.020 Colombian Army 0.040 Colombian Government Parapolitics 0.047 Opposition 0.026 Paramilitaries 0.001 Table 11

When we compare Groups 1 and 2, we find 2 significant variables:

Variable P Value Groups 1 and 2 Child Soldiers 0.000 Paramilitaries 0.048

Table 12

When we compare Groups 1 and 3, we find 6 significant variables:

Variable P Value Groups 1 and 3 Child Soldiers 0.000 Colombian Army 0.032 Colombian Government_Parapolitics 0.013 Opposition 0.005 Paramilitaries 0.000

Table 13

When we compare Groups 2 and 3, we find 3 significant variables:

P Value Groups 2 and Variable 3 Refugees 0.004 Colombian President 0.008 Colombian Army 0.027

Table 14

- 262 - The following Figure summarizes the level of understanding of each group and the significant variables when we compare the three groups at the same time:

Demobilisation

ColSecretPolice

ParaMil

Opposition

ColGov_Para

ColArmy*

Variable ColPresident*

Refugies**

ChSoldiers***

Evictims

Indians

WarDrugs

0 10203040506070 % of Understanding

Group 3 Group 2 Group 1

*Indicates significance Figure 43

6.2.1.1 Politics This categ ory refers to the role in the Colombia n conflict of the Colombian government, the Colombian Presiden t, the oppos ition, the phenomenon of parapolitics (infiltration of the paramilitaries into the government) and the War on Drugs, where the USA plays an important role. Table 15 illustrates the percentage o f understanding in each group of each variable in relation to this category:

- 263 - POLITICS Variable / Group 1 2 3 Colombian Government / Parapolitics** 35.04 % 43.73% 46.78% Colombian President*** 36.36% 29.34% 40.50% Opposition** 26. 26% 31.31% 39.90% War on Drugs** 41.36% 51.82% 52.73% ***Significant between Groups 2 and 3 ** Significant between Groups 1 and 3 Table 15

Colombian Government Parapolitics

This variable is significant when we com pare Groups 1 and 3. F or the international media, it is very clear that the paramilitaries are infiltrating the government, as well as that the Colombian government plays a key role in the conflict, since the government supports the paramilitaries. Fo r the Colombian media, this relation is not so clear, and consequently readers can le arn more from the international ar ticles. These exert the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

Colombian President

This variable is significant when we com pare Groups 2 and 3. This difference in the percentage of understanding aris es becaus e the Colombian media emphasize the President of Colombia (as t he opposite of the “good” cit izens) and offer many details about him. For this reason, it is possibl e for readers to get a more complete and balanced picture of the President when they have both versions. It is impor tant to note that despite the affective attachment of the Colombian m edia, they enable a higher percentage of under standing than do internatio nal media and theref ore have the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 1 and 3).

Opposition

This variable is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3. The Colombian media have a tendency to speak more about conc rete persons and conc rete situations, but

- 264 - not to analyze phenomena as a whole, e.g., the political opposition (although in some cases the Colombian media offer more information and details). The reader can learn more about the opposition from the internat ional media, whic h exert the s trongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

War on Drugs

This variable is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3. The internationa l media hav e a general tendenc y to show an interest in the role of the USA for Colombia and its War on Drugs, in which Colo mbia plays a central role. In contrast, the Colom bian media tend to make more lo cal references, including ones to topics like the War on Drugs. Even though America in vests billions of dollars to support the war, the Colombian media se ldom mention the USA in this connection. T he reader can understand more if they read the inter national media, and these media have the strongest influence on Group 3 (There is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

6.2.1.2 Civilian Victims

This category refers to t he civilian v ictims that have a presence in the selected articles: Child Soldiers, Elite Victims, Indians and Refugees. Table 16 illustrates the percent of understanding in each group.

CIVILIAN VICTIMS Variables / Group 1 2 3 Child Soldiers* 19.09% 52.73% 53.64% Elite Victims 42.05% 51.14% 48.86% Indians 32.47 % 33.12% 38.96% Refugees** 45.45 % 34.85% 55.30% *Significant between Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3 ** Significant between Groups 2 and 3 Table 16

- 265 - Child Soldiers

This variable is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3. The international media put more emphasis on the situations of child soldiers than do the Colombian media, because Co lombia and Haiti are unique cases in the Americas. 452 In these countries children serve in private armies, and from this perspective they are interesting cases for the international pre ss. In contrast, the Colombian media see the situation as more “normal,” and conseq uently they do not explain the problem of child s oldiers in depth, resulting in the lowest level of underst anding on the part of readers. Moreover, the internatio nal media exert the strong est influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

Elite Victims

With this variable, it is possible to see t hat international articles enable a higher leve l of understanding than do the Colombian m edia with their affective attachment. However, this variable does not reflect a significant difference between the groups.

The explanation for this result lies in the style of informing readers about victims. The journalism of attachment dis tinguishes between “important ” and “unimportant victims.” This means that vi ctims who are from the “good” people are more valuable than victims who are from t he “bad people.” Moreover, the journalism of attachment tries to commove, and for this reason it identifies a victim and tries to create an emotional attachment between the reader and this victim. In contrast, journalism pro peace tries to inform about the victims in all parties, does not make a distinction between important and unimpor tant victims and does not try to create a specia l emotional relationship between t he reader and a v ictim “from the good people.” For this reason, Group 2 can unders tand more about Ingrid Betancourt (the elite victim referred to by the m edia in the selected articles) and her k idnapping. Since the articles are less emotional, readers are able to give a more analytical reading.

452Human Rights Watch. “Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War”. In: www.hrw.org February 22, 2005 - 266 - However, Group 3 exhibited a lower le vel of unders tanding than Group 2, which means that in this case the emotional version has some influence when subjects read both versions.

Indians

With this variable the percentage of underst anding for Groups 1 and 2 is practically the same, although Group 3 has the highest level of understanding (a clear tendency observed across all the variables), although this difference is not significant.

Refugees

This variable is significant when we co mpare Groups 2 and 3. It implies that the Colombian media have the strongest infl uence on G roup 3 (there is no s ignificant difference between G roups 1 and 3). This m eans that despite the attachment, the Colombian media make possible a hi gher level of understanding than the international media, probably because in order to create sympathy (attachment) the Colombian media offer numerous details.

6.2.1.3 Armed Actors

This category refers to t he armed actors referred to in the selected articles: the Colombian Army, the Colombian Secret Police an d the paramilitaries. Table 1 4 illustrates the percentage of understanding in each group.

ARMED ACTORS Variables / Groups 1 2 3 Colombian Army* 30.91% 30.00% 45.45% Colombian Secret Police 45.45% 45.45% 45.45% Paramilitaries** 29.22 % 42.42% 47.84 *Significant between Groups 1 and 3, and 2 and 3 ** Significant between Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3 Table 17

- 267 - Colombian Army

This variable is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3, and 2 and 3. T he level of understanding is practically the same in Groups 1 and 2. Probably in this case the two versions complement each other.

Colombian Secret Police

This variable has the same level of un derstanding in all gr oups. Probably the information about the Colombian Se cret Police is very spec ific in the Colombian and international media, and c onsequently the level of under standing is the same for all three versions.

Paramilitaries

This variable is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3. The Colombian media devote much space to t he paramilitaries, but they do not give a concrete, clear and direct explanation. For th is reason, these media contribut e to the lowest level of understanding. In contrast, the international media are very clear and direct, and therefore enable a higher lev el of understanding and are the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

6.2.1.4 Peace

This category refers to the peace proc ess between the Colombian govern ment and the paramilitaries. For this study, I chos e the term “demobiliz ation,” which was often used in the media. Table 18 shows the percentage of understanding in each group.

PEACE Variable / Group 1 2 3 Demobilization 48.48% 44.55 % 51.52 %

Table 18

- 268 - This v ariable does not represent a s ignificant difference between the groups, although the level of understand ing is higher in Group 1 than in Group 2, perhaps because for the Colombian media the param ilitaries are “Bad People,” and therefore they place great emphasis on the paramilitaries and their actions.

6.2.1.5 Conclusions about variables

When we compare the level of understanding by variable between the three groups , we can conclude:

- With 83.3% of the variables (10 cases), Group 3 has the highest score. - With 92% of the variables (11 case s), Group 3 has a higher score than Group 1. - With 83.3% of the v ariables (10 ca ses), Group 3 has a higher score than Group 2. - With 8.3% of the variables (Elite Victims), Group 2 has the highest score. - With 58.3% of the variables (7 cases), Group 2 has a higher score than Group 1, although in one case the difference is only 0.25%. - With 33.3% (4 cases) of the variables, Group 1 has a higher leve l of understanding than Group 2, although in one case with a difference of only 0.91%. - With 8.3% of the variables (1 ca se), Groups 1, 2 and 3 hav e the same percentage of understanding (Colombian Secret Police). - With 12.5% of the signific ant variables (1 case of 8), it is not possible to determine which media exert the stronges t influence on Group 3 (there are no significant differences between the groups). - With 62.5% of the significant variables (5 cases of 8), the international articles have the strongest influence on Group 3. - With 25% of the significant variables (2 c ases of 8), the Colombian artic les have the strongest influence on Group 3.

The variables display the same tendency as the general analys is of the answers: Group 3 has the highest degree of understanding; Group 2 does better than Group 1,

- 269 - and in one case better than Group 3; the in ternational articles have the strongest influence on Group 3.

6.3 Analysis by level of understanding in the answers

When we examine the level of understanding question by question, the number of hits for each statement is central (the ma ximum number is 22, bec ause there are 22 persons in each group). We can see that with some questions Group 1 (Colombian articles) has the highest num ber of hits. With many questions, Group 2 (internation al articles) has the highest number of hits. With the majority of questions, Group 3 (both media) has the highest number of hits. However, many situations require analys is, e.g., in some cases Groups 3 and 1 have the same number of hits.

Table 19 summarizes the comparisons of the groups based on the percentage of correct hits for each statement. It must be noted that this comparison is question-by - question and not by variable.

Comparisons Values G1 has more hits than G3 28.69% G3 has more hits than G1 63.11% G1 and G3 have the same number of hits 8.20% G2 has more hits than G1 54.10% G1 has more hits than G2 36.89% G2 and G1 have the same number of hits 8.01% G3 has more hits than G2 56.56% G2 has more hits than G3 34.43% G2 and G3 have the same number of hits 8.01%

Table 19

According to the qualitative analy sis, the Colombian articles exemplify the journalis m of attachment, and the international articl es tend to represent journalism pro peace. When they read both types of article, reader s try to refrain from attachment get a better understanding of the conflict. Howe ver, readers do not display the same behavior in all cases. Sometimes, readers who only read the Colombian articles have a better understanding; likewis e, in some ca ses the readers of only inter national articles have a better expla nation. Another spec ial case is that sometimes there are

- 270 - no differences between the groups, and the le vel of understanding is the same. In order to define when and why we find these results, we next analyze each situation.

6.3.1 Higher level of understanding with the Colombian articles

With 28.69% of the st atements, Group 1 (which read only Colombian articles) had a greater number of answers consistent wit h the facts than did Group 3 (which read both Colombian and international articles). However, there is no clear pattern; the answers are not concentrated in a special variable or category, and they are present with all the variables. With particular questions, Group 1 has a higher level of understanding than Group 3, but this is more an exception to the clear pattern of a higher level of understanding exhibited by Group 3. As the data show , Group 3 does better than Group 1 with 63.11% of the answers.

To the same extent, Group 1 shows si milar behavior in relation to G roup 2 (international articles) . Group 2 does better than Group 1 wit h 54.10% of the answers, but with 36.89% of the answers, Group 1 does better than Group 2. As in the comparison between Groups 1 and 3, there is no clear pat tern of behavior or concentration in a specific variable or category.

For this reason, a further analys is shows the specific statements where Group 1 has a higher score for understanding than Groups 2 and 3, and in eac h case I suggest a possible hypothesis:

Statements: 1. The manual eradication of drug crops is an effect ive way to eliminate the cultivation of drugs. (Answer: Disagree) 6. The drug trade has strengthened the paramilitaries. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: The eradic ation of drug crops is a sensit ive issue in the Colombian conflict, in particular because the USA inves ts hundreds of millions of dollars each year to fight the drug business. T here are m any strategies to eliminate drug cu ltivation: by hand,

- 271 - eradication by spreading glyphos ate, substitution of drug crops with legal cultivation, and military confrontation. Different combin ations of these strategies are employed: two, three or all at the same time or onl y one at a time. Each case is uniqu e. Many actors and situations play a role. For exam ple, spraying with herbicides is p rohibited in n ational parks. In some case s, guerrilla s prevent eradication by h and; in other cases, substitution is a failure and other strategies are necessary. In still other cases, the police or the army c ooperate with drug traffickers to prevent eradication. Moreover, eradication is a c entral issue in the War on Drugs, because according to the American logic, a solution to the problem of drug addict ion is only pos sible b y attacking drug cultivation and trafficking.

The Colombian articles offer a better expla nation for these statements. They provide all the details and minutiae of the eradication programs and off er an oppo rtunity to compare the different versions: those of the army, police, USA, Colombian government, peasants (who cultivate the crops), NGOs, Indians (who use some drug crops for ceremonial purposes), etc., espec ially when these versions are sometimes contradictory. Only with a ll the background about the c ountry and cultur al, socia l, geographical and historical knowledge of the regions is it possible to understand how eradication proceeds in each region. Cons equently, the Colombian articles have an advantage and give a better explanation in two c ases. However, with the other 8 questions about eradication, the in ternational articles (alone) or in combinat ion with the Colombian articles offer a better explanation. It is interesting to see h ow the international articles aid in , and are aided in, explaining such local and specific situations.

Statements: 12. The government and landowners cooperate to expropriate Indian lands. (Answer: Agree partially) 13. The Colombian Army suppresses the pr otests of the Indians. (Answer: Agree partially) 14. The government takes actions to protect the Indians. (Answer: Agree partially)

- 272 - Hypothesis: In this case, the explanation is quite cl ear. As the quantitative analysis showed, the Indians have ample r epresentation in the Colomb ian arti cles, which describe their situation with many details that facilitate the highest level of understanding.

Statement: 18. Ingrid Betancourt has acquired mythic al status in Europe. (Answer: Agree partially)

Hypothesis: The Colom bian media use this argument to defend Ingrid Beta ncourt, and this is probably why the Colombian articles give this argument more attention and explanation.

Statement: 25. The government denies violence against children. (Answer: Agree partially)

Hypothesis: Thousands of children take part in the Co lombian conflict, and each party denies this as much a s possible. Guerrillas, paramilitar ies, drug d ealers, etc. – no o ne wants to admit responsib ility for children serving in t heir militaries, whic h is a violation of international human rights laws, and even t he government prefers not to say much about it. The Colombian articles very clearly report on this denial, while internationa l articles prefer to ignore the lies of t he parties and the governm ent and desc ribe the situation using more impartial s ources. For this reason, the Colombian m edia are better at explaining the Colombian government’s lies.

Statements: 27. In Colombia dis placed per sons receive enough and effec tive aid from the government. (Answer: Disagree) 32. Those responsible for the displace ments enjoy immunity. (Answer: Agree partially)

- 273 - Hypothesis: I agree with the position of The Economist about displaced persons in Colombia: Over the pa st decade, t he conflict b etween the government, leftist guerr illas and the paramilitaries has uprooted some 2.5m Colombians – a number of "displaced people" surpassed only in Sudan. Colombia's desplazados, as they are called, are less visible than those of Africa. Rather than living in tente d refugee camps, they melt into slu ms or shantytowns on the fringes of cities and of society.453

In Colombia, displaced persons receive too little attention and aid. In many cases, the government uses the euphemis tic concept of “economic migrants.” Society has discriminated against the displaced, and consequently they prefer to be called “poor,” “victims of the violenc e,” “migrants,” etc. For this reas on, they ar e marginalized as displaced persons; an unusual situation, because displaced persons normally receive aid (in par ticular from the international c ommunity) when they are dec lared to be “displaced” or “refugees.” Howev er, in Colo mbia there are no refugee camps; to the contrary, displaced persons become “lost” in society. Locating and identifying them is complicated. Moreover, many of them don’t want to be identified, as they are afraid of being attacked or displaced aga in, or that they will be killed by their victimizers, who in many times act with impunity. Perhaps, giv en this atypical sit uation, international journalists have trouble explaining t he phenomenon, while t he authors of the Colombian articles have the advantage that they live close to the problem.

Statements: 33. One can say that Mr. Uribe is an autocrat. (Answer: Agree partially) 35. In Colombia there is no place for political opposition. (Answer: Agree partially) 37. Alvaro Uribe’s politics could end the violence in Colombia. (Answer: Disagree) 40. Alvaro Uribe claims that democracy in Co lombia has “depth,” but this is not true. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: Alvaro Uribe is very media-orient ed; he uses the media as a way to build his support and diminish the opposition’s. Independent journalists know this very well, but they are subject to direct and indirect censorship, especially when they criticize his politics and his anti-democratic measures. Thus, it is not surprising that the Colombian articles give better explanations for these statements.

453The Economist. ”No Direction Home: Colombia´s displaced people”. In: The Economist. February 11, 2006. - 274 - Statement: 47. The Army and the paramilitaries coordi nate their attacks. (Answer: Partially agree)

Hypothesis: In Colombia, there are many armed acto rs: guerillas (among others, the FARC, EPL and ELN), the Colombian Armed Forces (arm y, police, anti-narcotic squads, the DAS – secret police), many gr oups of paramilitaries; gangs, sicarios, the services and the collaborators of the USA, etc. Perhaps this explains why it is hard for the international articles to understand and explain the activities of each group and their alliances.

Statement: 54. The p aramilitaries are resp onsible for killing hu man rights workers active in Colombia. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: Some of the authors of the Colombian independent opinion ar ticles selected for this study are human rights activists or have close ties to them (e.g., Alfredo Molano, Ivan Cepeda), and consequently the Co lombian articles offer a be tter explanation for this statement.

Statement: 59. The Colombian government commits crimes against its critics and opponents. (Answer: Partially agree)

Hypothesis: As victims of the governmen t, independent journalists in Colombia are in a better position to explain the crimes against critics and opponents.454

Statements: 68. The pa ramilitaries have incr eased their power principa lly through vio lence and massacres. (Answer: Agree) 81. The paramilitaries compensate their victims. (Answer: Disagree partially)

- 275 - 89. In Colo mbia, there is a close relati onship between p aramilitaries and politicians. (Answer: Agree) 94. The Mafia (in this case paramilitaries) has neither influence on nor relations with the Colombian government. (Answer: Disagree partially) 98. The paramilitaries strongl y influence the Office of the State Attorney. (Answer: Agree) 103. Due to infiltration by the paramilitaries, the Secret Poli ce (DAS) cannot fulfill its mission. (Answer: Agree) 104. The DAS is a stronghold of the paramilitaries. (Answer: Agree partially)

Hypothesis: The paramilitaries have a long “tradition” in Colombia. Si nce 1940, they have played a key role in the Colombian conf lict and work very closely with the govern ment and the Colombian Armed Forces. Consequently, the Colombian media know v ery wel l what methods the paramilitaries use and how they treat their victims.

Statements: 110. The “Peace and Justice Law” ought to be called the "I mmunity for Mass Murderers, Terrorists and Major Cocaine Traffickers Law."455 (Answer: Agree) 119. The demobilizat ion of t he paramilitaries does n ot mean integration into civil society. It is more a legalization of crime. (Answer: Agree) 120. There is no legal frame for the prosecution of ex-combatants. (Answer: Disagree partially) 121. For some persons the demobiliz ation of the paramilitaries is a farce. (Answer: Agree) 122. Colombia is in danger of succumbing to a Mafia Peace. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: Colombia has had some unsat isfactory experiences with the peace process. One of the most famous cases was the Union Patriotica’s peace process, in which ex- combatants laid down thei r weapons and founded a political movement. After that, government forces, or groups acting on the orders of the governm ent, killed thousands and nearly destroyed all of them . There are other similar cas es in the

455The New York Times: “Colombia´s Capitulation.” In: The New York Times. July 4, 2005. - 276 - recent history of Colombia, and consequ ently the Colombian media have a better background with which to explain some of the statements about the failures of the current peace process with the paramilitaries. In Colombia a ‘pe ace process’ usually means anything but peace.

6.3.2 Higher level of understanding with the international articles

With 34.43% of the statement s, Group 2 (which read t he international articles) had a greater number of answers consistent wit h the facts than did Group 3 (which read both Colombian and internatio nal articles ). However, there is no clear pattern of behavior. There is, however, a particular c oncentration in the r esponses t o state- ments about the paramilitaries.

To the same extent, Group 2 shows si milar behavior in relation to G roup 1 (Colombian articles); Group 2 did better than Group 1 with 54.10% of the answers.

Below, we show specific statements where Group 2 has a high er score for understanding than Groups 1 and 3, and in each case we suggest a possible hypothesis:

Statement: 2. The guerrillas support the eradication of the drug crops. (Answer: Disagree)

Hypothesis: Guerrillas are common in the international media. Especia lly in the 60s, guerrillas received much attention from the media, and in some cases, many persons , groups, organizations and co untries regarded their st ruggle a s just. Guerrillas aro und th e world have an ideological and po litical background, and, at least in their manifestos, they stand for noble ideals: justice, redist ribution of wealth and an equalitarian society. With these precedents, it is very probable that international media are in a better position to und erstand some of the ac tions of the guerrilla s than those of the paramilitaries, who are seen as ultra-right-wing and ruthless. In this case a nd in the following, despite the better level of under standing of Group 2, when readers hav e

- 277 - both sets of article ( Group 3) , the Colombian articles wo rk like “background noise” and cause a lower degree of understanding.

Statement: 5. The gov ernment cannot spray some areas of the f orests (to destroy drug crops ), because this is illegal. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: While the Colomb ian articles criticize the overall problems caused by spraying, the international media focus on specific issues such as spraying in national parks.

Statements: 11. The justice system does not prosecut e attacks on Indians. (Answer: Agree partially) 16. Attacks on Indians are mainly committed against their leaders. (Answer: Agree) 17. The ( Colombian) Army claims that the Indians support the FARC. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: In Colombia, immunity and crimes of st ate are a relatively common situation (immunity in Colombia is around 90% in a ll judicial cases), and consequently the local media probably give too little attention to this topic.

Besides, the international articles analyze th e pattern of attacks a gainst the Indians, while the Colombian articles, as the qualit ative analysis shows, have a tendency to analyze less and make more protests and accusations.

Statements: 20. The special attention given to Ingrid Betancourt annoys many people. (Answer: Agree) 21. The foreign followers of Ingrid Be tancourt have a good knowledge of the Colombian conflict. (Answer: Disagree)

- 278 - Hypothesis: The international articles compare the arguments of the international followers of Ingrid Betancourt with the facts of th e conflict and can clarify many of the misunderstandings about the case and the annoyance of Colombians about this lack of knowledge. On the other hand, the Colombian m edia are involved in a debat e between media that support Mrs. Betancourt and media that oppose her. This topic is very emotional in Colombia, bec ause many think that Mrs. Betancourt’s situation is representative of thousands of victims, while others think that it is a media show staged by Mrs. Betancourt to get attention and political power. For this reason, the discussion is more emotional in the Colo mbian articles, and this easily leads to confusion. Howev er, the de bate turned in favor of Ingrid Betanc ourt in 2008, when the guerillas sent the media dramatic images of her in captivity. Today, the majority of the Colombian media regards Mrs. Betancourt as a martyr.

Statements: 23. Usua lly, child so ldiers are c ompelled to take par t in armed conflict. (Answer: Disagree) 26. The majority of the child soldiers fight for the guerrillas. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: The topic of child soldiers receives emoti onal treatment by the Colombian media, but these media do not adequatel y explain some important topics. These include recruitment tactics and the degr ee of partici pation of children in different military groups.

Statements: 29. Afro-Americans and Indians are disproportionately victims of forced displacement in Colombia. (Answer: Agree) 30. Displaced persons are principally th e poorest people in Colombia. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: The Colombian media frequently ignore Colomb ian blacks. When they do giv e them attention – like the Indians – the perspecti ve is in many cases paternalistic and

- 279 - romanticized, linked to a vision of them as victims of colonialism. Deeper analyses of their situation in the conflict are the exception.

It might seem obvious, but the Colombian m edia have never said that the poor were more severely affected by the forced disp lacements. Furthermore, there are many kinds of displaced persons. The majority belong to the poorest groups, but according to the Colombian artic les, the poorest ar e the only v ictims of the displacements, not the most severely affected.

Statements: 39. Alvaro Uribe’s government represents a perfect dictatorship. (Answer: Disagree) 88. The current government in Colombia is the opposit e of democracy and pacifism. (Answer: Agree partially)

Hypothesis: This kind of exa ggeration, typic al of the journalism of atta chment, differs strongly from the more balanced reports given by the international media.

Statements: 50. Colom bian government declarations ca n be understood as a green light to kill human rights workers. (Answer: Agree) 51. The Colombian Government calls hum an rights workers terrorists. (Answer: Agree) 55. Those responsib le for crimes aga inst human rights worke rs will be arrested. (Answer: Disagree partially)

Hypothesis: Traditionally, official pr opaganda and the Colombian gove rnment have downgraded human rights workers. For this reason, journalists writing independent opinion articles in Colombia have to provide elementary explanations, such as, e.g., why human rights workers are not terrorist s. In contrast, because they do not relate human rights workers to terrorists, international journalists can give better explanations.

- 280 - Statement: 57. Today fewer killings are committed against trade unio nists, because the Colombian government pursues a policy of intimidation. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: Such kinds of statement are used in many international articles and are characteristic of them. They can describe a sit uation with a few precise words. On the other side, Colombian articles tend toward verbosity, but seldom use words with prec ision. In this case, both media say the same thing, but the i nternational articles are more direct, and therefore their readers can better understand the situation.

Statements: 66. The paramilitaries are drug lords. (Answer: Agree) 74. The influence of the paramilitaries is particularly great on the Caribbean coast, where drug smuggling takes place. (Answer: Agree) 75. The paramilitaries aspire for amnesty. (Answer: Partially agree) 78. The government believes in the motto: He who is not with me is a gainst me. (Answer: Agree) 79. Martial law guaranteed official immunity. (Answer: Agree) 82. Although an amnesty for paramilitaries seems unsatisfactory, in Colombia there is a tendency in this direction. (Answer: Agree) 85. The “Democratic Security” Program ha s drastically decreas ed the nu mber of killings, kidnappings and terrorist attacks, but peace and security are still not assured for the majority of citizens. (Answer: Agree). 95. Political power has a high priority for the paramilitaries. (Answer: Agree) 96. The “Peace and Justice Law” reflects the great politic al power of the paramilitaries. (Answer: Agree) 106. The DAS and the paramilitaries have c ooperated to murder trade unio nists and to frustrate operations against drug lords. (Answer: Agree) 116. The “ Peace and Justice Law” has brought neither peace nor functional justice, because t here is no credible p unishment for perjury, concealing crimes or ille gal enrichment. (Answer: Agree)

- 281 - Hypothesis: With regard to the pa ramilitaries, the intern ational media are very direct an d critical. In Colombia, there is much ambiguity about the paramilitaries. People sometimes call them mafias, private armies, self-defense fo rces, militias, etc. Similarly, Co lombian journalists make vague st atements (through irony and exaggeration) about the facts of the paramilitaries. They prefer making indirect allusions to them and their relations with the dr ug trade, the army, the secret po lice (DAS), to the immunity they enjoy, their political power and their role in the official program “Democratic Security,” which claims to offer a higher level of security through a military strategy.

In some cases, statements ab out the pa ramilitaries are taken directly from the Colombian media, but due to ambiguity, unsystematic and emoti onal argumentation and the informal structure of the articles, the statements are better understood in the frame of the international articles.

6.3.3 Same level of understanding between the groups

6.3.3.1 G roup one has the same level of understanding as Group Three

With 8.20% of the statements, Groups 1 and 3 have the same percentage of answers in agreem ent with the facts. As in the ot her cases, there is no clear pattern of behavior, although in this case the Colombian articles have the strongest influenc e on Group 3, which is an exception, becaus e in the majority of the cases the international articles have the s trongest in fluence, as the analy sis of the variables indicated.

Below, we show specific statements for which Groups 1 and 3 hav e the sam e understanding score. For each case, I suggest a possible hypothesis:

- 282 - Statement: 21. The foreign followers of Ingrid Be tancourt have exc ellent knowledge of the Colombian conflict. (Answer: Disagree)

Hypothesis: The great attention that Ingrid Betancourt received in France between 2000 and 2005 was an unusual cas e for the Colombian and in ternational articles selected for this study. In particular, this was bec ause the French followers of Ingrid Betancourt have insufficient knowledge about the complex conflict in Colomb ia, and Ingrid Betancourt has no legacy to show. She has not accomplished any important law or project. She was a politician like many others with no particular achievements. Perhaps the perplexity is the same with both media, and consequently there is no difference in the degree of understanding achiev ed by the readers, regardless of whether they read only the Colombian articles or both sets of articles.

However, in the case of Statement 21, the explanation for the higher level of understanding in Group 2 coul d be that international media are geographically “closer” to the situation in France (a European e dition of The New York Times is published in France). Also, they may devote more space to France on their pages, and for this reason they include more cont ext for analyzing the French interest in Ingrid Betancourt. In Colombia, however, t he media have a very local character and there is a great gulf (cultural, econom ic and geographic) between Co lombia and France. For this reason, it is harder for t he Colombian articles to explain the French interest in Ingrid Betancourt.

Statement: 31. Estimates of the number of displace d persons in Colom bia are inaccurate. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: In Colombia, there is a great discrepancy between the different estimates of the number of displaced persons. Each group has its own version: Government agencies give their own estimates, international or ganizations offer other figures, and NGOs make still other estimates (also differing) , etc. Colombia’s National Ins titute for

- 283 - Statistics (DANE) is s ubject to intense pressu re from political interests and is for this reason unreliable. In the absenc e of a credible source of information, each group makes its own calculations and as a re sult, nobody knows the exact number of displaced persons in Colombia. Perhaps th is explains why the level of understanding is the same whether the reader reads only the Colom bian articles or both kinds of article. But when readers have only internat ional articles, the level of understanding of this statement is lower, because in th is case readers only hav e the figures of the international media, which pr efer i ndependent sources (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.). Consequently, readers interp reted these numbers as correct, and there seemed to be no room for confusion. However, when readers have only the Colombian articles, they can notice some discrepancies between the sources (local and international), and this could be the same when they can compare the Colombian and international articles.

Statement: 48. The Colombian Army must obtain results at any price. (Answer: Disagree).

Hypothesis: This statement is a common criticism in Colombia of how the gov ernment pressures the Colombian Army to get results. Pe rhaps this statement makes a strong impression on reader s because of the clear a llusion to Machiavelli, regardless of whether they have only the Colombian articles or als o the inter national articles. I n both cases, they have a tendency to mark the statement as false.

In this case, the readers wit h only the international arti cles have a lower level of understanding, and they have a tendency to judge the statem ent to be true. Perhaps this is because the international media ar e more exposed to the enormous pressure of the USA and the necessity in the USA to convince Congress that the billions of dollars invested in the Colombian War were not wasted.

Statement: 63. When it is convenient, the Colomb ian government doesn’t hesitate to commit crimes of state. (Answer: Agree)

- 284 - Hypothesis: With this statement, when r eaders read only the int ernational articles, the level of understanding is lower. Perhaps this is because this statement could seem too ironic, and for this reason is very diffe rent from the styl e of the international articles , which have a tendency to make less extreme statements.

Statements: 92. The relations between drug lords and politicians are not new. (Answer: Agree) 93. The paramilitaries commit electoral fraud. (Answer: Agree) 97. Paramilitary leade rs gain political po wer without in praxis renouncing v iolence. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: When readers have only the Colombian ar ticles and when t hey have both the Colombian and the international articles , t hey can p erceive and understand the enormous political power and influenc e of the param ilitaries. Thank s to the Colombian articles, they can know the deta ils of this power, and in some cases, these details are more illustrative than the analys is. For examp le, the paramilitary leaders have body guards and a rmored cars, but a very important critic of the government and member of Congress does not have an ar mored car and as a consequence is in danger of being killed by a terrorist attack.

In contrast, international ar ticles do not provide as many details, and in some cases offer a more general v ision of the paramilitaries, and for this reason with these three statements the reader s of the international articles achieve a lower level of understanding.

Statement: 113. The debate on the “Peac e and Jus tice Law” ignored the victims. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: This statement may seem exaggerated, but, unfortunately, it is true. Consequently, when readers have only the Colombian ar ticles or both the Colombian and the

- 285 - international articles, they have a tendency to mark the statement as false. Howev er, when readers have only intern ational articles they have a tendency to mark the statement as true. This means that with this frame of more analytical articles they can more clearly understand that this statement is true, without the emotionalis m of the Colombian media.

6.3.3.2 Group two has the same level of understanding as Group three

With 8.01% of the statements, Groups 2 and 3 have the same percentage of answers consistent with the facts. As in the other cases, there is no clear pattern, and Group 2 seems to be like the strongest influence on Group 3.

Below, I give specific statements wher e Groups 2 and 3 have the same score for understanding. In each case, I suggest a possible hypothesis:

Statements: 7. The drug business has strengthened the guerrillas. (Answer: Agree) 8. Drug eradicators are easy targets for the guerrillas. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: In this case, Group 1 has the lowest level of understanding. This indicates that it was hard for the Colombian articles to explain simple facts, presumably due to their confused explanations and ambiguity.

Statement 25. The government denies violence against children. (Answer: Partially agree)

Hypothesis: In this case, the Colombian articles offe r the highest level of understanding. Perhaps their emotional attachment explains and has an impact on the reader regarding how for political reasons the government deni es this kind of violence, while the international articles do not offer enough details about it.

- 286 - Statements: 38. Alvaro Uribe’s economic success is only accidental. (Answer: Partially agree)

Hypothesis: In this cas e, the Colombian articles enabl e the lowest level of understanding. This analysis linking facts and consequences is characteristic of the international articles and is frequently abs ent in the Colombian articles, which a ttribute guilt more often than they identify objective causes.

Statements: 65. The pa ramilitaries were set u p in order to combat the FA RC in the abse nce of a strong central government. (Answer: Agree) 69. The paramilitaries kill more civilians than do the guerrillas. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: As in the last case, the analysis of caus es and comparisons between the data in the international articles enables a better understanding.

Statement: 76. Paramilitaries and the FARC have increasingly become drug traffickers. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: Surprisingly, this transformation is not at all clear in t he Colombian articles. Becaus e of this, they offer the lowest lev el of und erstanding, while the in ternational articles enable a higher degree of understandi ng and clarify the situatio n in a very concrete way.

Statement: 94. The Mafia has neither influence on nor relations with the Colombian gov ernment. (Answer: Disagree)

- 287 - Hypothesis: In Colombia, this phenomenon is called “parapolitics.” This is a scandal and the local media hav e given it extens ive coverage. Consequently, in this case the Colombian articles offer a higher degree of understanding.

Statement: 117. The new “Peace and Justice Law” makes big concessions to the paramilitaries. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: This phras e summarizes the problem with th is law. Howev er, this direct and clear statement is less well under stood when the reader has only the Colombian a rticles, which in this case enable the lowest degree of understanding. This is probably due to the confusing and ambiguous explanations in the Colombian articles.

6.3.3.3 Groups one and two have the same degree of understanding

With 8.01% of the statements, Groups 1 and 2 have the same percentage of answers consistent with the facts, and as in the ot her situations, there is no clear response pattern. With this group of statements, readers get confused in 66% of the cases, probably because the conclusions of the Co lombian and international articles are inconsistent, although taken separately both media enable t he same level of understanding.

Below, we show spec ific statements where Groups 1 and 2 hav e the same s core for understanding. In each case I suggest a possible hypothesis:

Statements: 10. The government has not kept the prom ises it made to the drug eradicators. (Answer: Agree) 49. The Colombian government protects the paramilitaries and den ies that there are victims. (Answer: Agree)

- 288 - 52. The US government financed some of the crimes committed by the Colombian Army. (Answer: Agree) 64. State crimes are not impartially investigated. (Answer: Agree) 70. The paramilitarie s will stay in prison for a long time, because they committed crimes. (Answer: Disagree) 109. Whereas the government ignored attacks committed by the paramilitaries during the ceasefire, it takes military measures against the FARC. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: With these statements, the degree of understanding is lower when subjects read both kinds of ar ticle together. This is a typica l c ase where differences in the presented information confuse readers, although presented s eparately each style makes possible the same level of understanding.

Statements 36. In Colombia, the eradication of drug crops was successful. (Answer: Disagree) 108. The “Peace an d Justice Law” cann ot break u p the para militaries’ crimina l network. (Answer: Agree) 112. Despite the demobilization, the paramilitaries can preserve their structures and power. (Answer: Agree)

Hypothesis: In this case, the result is the opposite of what it was in the previous case. The level of understanding was the same with the Colombian articles as with international articles when read separately; but when the two kinds were read together, there was a higher degree of understanding. Probably this is because the information presented in each type of media was clear enough to be complementary.

6.3.3.4 The level of understanding is the same in all the groups

Statement: 19. In many French cities, Ingrid Betancourt is an honorary citizen. (Answer: Agree)

- 289 - Hypothesis: Probably because the facts can easily be checked, th e degree of understanding is the same in all three experimental conditions.

Statement 41. Alvaro Uribe pretends to be a savior. (Answer: Agree partially)

Hypothesis: This statement has the same level of understanding in all three groups. The expression comes from the Colombian ar ticles, and readers presumably f ind this comparison adequat e independently of the arti cles they have read and that it is consistent with the autocratic tendencies of Alvaro Uribe’s government.

6.4 Coherence Another category of analysi s was the degree of coherence 456 within each group, in other words, the degree of coherence or consistency of each subject’s answers . Figure 44 shows the results by group.

88

86

84 82 86,36 80

78 78,75 78,87 76 Coherence 74 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Coherence

Figure 44

456To measure coherence, we analyzed 15 cases with 45 questions. It was not possible to measure all the questions, because not all the questions are related. - 290 - Similar to the score for understanding, we can see a clear difference between the groups:

- Group 1 has the lowest score for coherence (78.75%). - Group 2 has almost the same score as Group 1 (78.87%). - Group 3 has the highest score (86.36%).

When we compare the three groups, we find a significant P Value (Table 20). When we compare Groups 1 and 2, there is no significance (Table 21).

When we compare Groups 1 and 3, there is a high level of significance (Table 22). When we compare Groups 2 and 3, there i s also a high level of signific ance (Table 23).

a,b Statistics for Test Statistics for Testa Coherence Coherence Chi-square 10,565 Mann-Whitney U 236,500 Df 2 Wilcoxon W 489,500 Asymptotic .005 Z –.130 significance Asymptotic a. Kruskal-Wallis Test Significance (2- .897 b. Group variables: All Groups sided) Table 20 Table 21

Statistics for Testa Statistics for Testa Concordance Concordance Mann-Whitney U 128,500 Mann-Whitney U 118,000 Wilcoxon W 381,500 Wilcoxon W 371,000 Z -2.681 Z -2.934 Asymptotic Asymptotic significance (2- .007 significance (2- .003

sided) sided) a. Group variables: Groups 1, 3 a. Group variables: Groups 2, 3 Table 22 Table 23

Based on this data, we can affirm that Groups 1 and 2 have the same level of coherence, despite the great difference betw een the styles of journalism and despite Group 2’s significantly greater number of correct answers. This means that each k ind of article is coherent in it s own way. As is a clear te ndency throughout the analysis, Group 3 has the highest score.

- 291 - 6.5 Dispersion

Further, we analyzed the dispersion of each group. This means the difference in each group between the statistical median value of the answers of the subjects and the correct answer. Figures 45, 46 and 47 show the results in each case. The degree of dispersion is highest in Group 1, lowest in Group 3; and between Groups 1 and 2 there are many similarities, although in Gr oup 2 the degree of dispersion is lower. This indicates that in all cas es Group 3 has a tendency to come closer to hav ing the correct answers, while in all cas es Group 1 has a tendency to be farther from the correct answers; Group 2 is in the middle, al though it is closer to Group 1 than is Group 3.

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 103 109 115 121

Figure 45457 – Group 1

457The red lines indicate the correct answers. - 292 -

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 103 109 115 121 Facts_2 MEDIAN_2

Figure 46 – Group 2

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 103 109 115 121

FACTS_3 MEDIAN_3

Figure 47 – Group 3

6.6 Undecided

In order to measure whet her readers were conf used or not, the category of “Undecided” was defined. This refers to the number of “I don’t know” respons es. The more a subject answers “I don’t know,” t he higher is his degree of confusion .

- 293 - Similarly, fewer “I don’t know” responses indicate a lower degree of confusion. Figure 7 shows the percentage of “I don’t know” answers in each group:

18,00% 16,00% 14,00% 12,00% 10,00% 17,81% 8,00% 12,89% 6,00% 8,72% 4,00% 2,00% % of undecided 0,00% Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Figure 48 This difference between the percentages is always significant when we compare all the groups, or when we compare two of them, as the following tables show:

All the groups:

Statistics for Testa,b,c Undecided Chi-square 19,155 Df 2 Asymptotic significance .000 a. Kruskal-Wallis Test b. Group variables: All groups c. Some, or even all, statistics cannot be precisely calculated, due to insufficient available storage space.

Table 24

- 294 - Statistics for Testa Undecided Mann-Whitney U 139,500 Wilcoxon W 392,500 Table 25 – Groups 1 and 2 Z -2.410 Asymptotic significance (2- .016 sided)

a. Group variables: Groups 1, 2

Groups 1 and 3:

Statistics for Testa Statistics for Testa Undecided Undecided Mann-Whitney U 70,500 Mann-Whitney U 131,000 Wilcoxon W 323,500 Wilcoxon W 384,000 Z -4.030 Z -2.610 Asymptotic Asymptotic significance (2- .000 significance (2- .009 sided) sided) a. Group variables: Groups 1,3 a. Group variables: Groups 2,3

Table 26 – Groups 1 and 3 Table 27 – Groups 2 and 3

The relationship with the degree of under standing is inversely proportional to the degree of confusion: With more understanding, there is less c onfusion and vice versa. Therefore, Group 1, with the lowest degree of understandi ng (35.88%), has the highest level of indecisi on (17.81%). Group 3, which has the highest level of understanding (47.17%), has the lowest degree of indecisi on (8.72%). Group 2 is in the middle, with 41.13% understanding and 12.89% confusion, as Figure 49 shows.

- 295 -

50,00% 47,17% 45,00%

41,13% 40,00%

35,88% 35,00% 30,00%

25,00%

20,00% 17,81% 15,00% 12,89% 10,00% 8,72%

5,00%

0,00% Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Understanding Confusion

Figure 49

This indicates that the reader s of the Colombian artic les are c onfused with 18% of the questions. For the readers of both versi ons, with only 9%, there were 50% fewer confused readers in comparison with Gr oup 1. The 13% of the readers of the international articles were undecided; th is means 25% fewer were undecided than in Group 1. According to this data, it is evident that the journalism of attachment has a greater tendency to create confusion.

6.7 Conclusions about the impact of the articles on the readers

*Those who read the international articl es (journalism pro peace) have a greater tendency to give answers that are more consistent with the facts than those who read only the Colombian articles (journalism of attachment).

*When the reader has both media, in most cases international articles (journalism pro peace) have the strongest influence.

- 296 - *The readers of journalism of attachment articles have the lowest level of understanding (consistency with the facts of the conflict) regarding the majority of the statements.

*Groups 1 and 2 exhibit the s ame level of coherence, despite the differences between the styles and the percentages of understanding.

*The international articles are an alternativ e to the local media in Co lombia for de- escalation-oriented conflict coverage. Probabl y they could be an alternative for other conflicts at the periphery, because the international qualitative articles focus on facts, data and trying to find the objective causes of the conflict.

*Despite the contradictions between the Colombian and the international articles, the readers in Group 3 (the group presented with both types of article) have a tendenc y to choose the answer most consistent with the facts of the conflict, to gi ve more consistent answers and to be less confus ed. This in dicates that readers separate “advocacy” from “analysis” and prefer the latter, because, as we see, the international articles exert the strongest influence on Group 3.

*Those who read only the inter national ar ticles do better than those wh o r ead only the Colom bian articles, but not much bette r. It is only when the reader has bot h versions that he acquires a better and more complete understanding. This shows that the international articles (journalism pro peace) alon e are not enough to explain the conflict, but they of fer an adequate frame to re-contextualize and clarify the Colombian articles (journalism of attachment), as Figure 50 shows:

FRAME 1 CLASH FRAME 2 COLOMBIAN MEDIA INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

FRAME 3 READER`S INTERPRETATION AND GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Figure 50 This also indicates that international journalism (when it is journalism pro peace) is an adequate f rame in order to redirect the jour nalism of attachment to journalism pro

- 297 - peace. This could be a temporary or pe rmanent solution, in order to correct communication deficiencies (F igure 51) in Colombia and in countries where independent journalists use the journalism of attachment approach.

COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR

INDEPENDENT INFORMATION: OFFICIAL INFORMATION: PROPAGANDA JOURNALISM OF ATTACHMENT PROMOTES THE WAR

DISINFORMATION DISINFORMATION

Figure 51

- 298 - V{tÑàxÜ i\\ dâtÇà|àtà|äx TÇtÄçá|á Éy à{x TÜà|vÄxá

In order to analyze and com pare the relationships betw een the international and Colombian opinion articles about the Colo mbian conflict, we made a quantitative analysis. In all, we selected 311 opinion ar ticles, 200 from the Colombian media and 111 from the international media published over a period of 3 years (January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007). Using this ma terial, we created a matrix with 18 comparisons, which served as the basis of the entire statistical analysis. This is the distribution of the articles by media:

Number of articles published and number selected MEDIA/YEAR 2005 Sample 2006 Sample 2007 Sample Sample Size 1-Cromos 20 12 23 14 27 20 2-El Tiempo 28 17 28 21 29 22 200 3-El Espectador 43 26 44 33 47 35 4- BBC 11 100 14 100 11 100 5- USA458 11 100 15 100 11 100 111 6- The Economist 13 100 14 100 11 100

Table 28

In each case, we were able to obtain 100% of the articles we selected for the sample of international articles, because all the arti cles are available in the Internet. At the time of the analysis, in contrast, the Colo mbian articles were not available in the Internet, and it was not possible t o buy them online or by mail. Consequently, access to them from Germany was very difficult, but with the help of journalists, study groups and friends, it was possible to obtain a significant sample of articles.

458Initially I chose The New York Tim es for the analy sis, but becau se of the smal l number of opinion articles about the Colombi an war, I had to use ar ticles from the other newspapers published by the New York Ti mes Co mpany: The Inte rnational Herald T ribune (the internatio nal versio n o f the NY Times) and The Boston Globe. Moreover, I had to take articles from other qualitative newspapers: The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, The Boston Herald, The Miami Herald and The Seattle Times. In all, the numb er of article s of the New Y ork Times Group represents 50% of the article s used in th e category “USA.”

- 299 - In any case, the situation concer ning access to information illustrates the enormous difference between the inter national and the Colombian media. On one side, the international articles are available on the Internet, often free of charge, and it is possible to read them at any time, in any place and have an informative text about a fact or situation. On the other side, acce ss to the Colombian media is more difficult, even in Colombia, because readers have to go to the offices of each newspaper and pay for copies or buy individual copies of each news paper. Under these conditions , for someone who does not live in Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia and home of the leading newspapers, it is easier to get access to and read the files of the international media t han those of the Colo mbian m edia. This situation s hows the opportunity and influence that the internat ional media can hav e in countries like Colombia.

7.1 Methodology

7.1.1 Selection of articles

For this analysis, we selected ar ticles published between 2005 and 2007, because in this period the Colombian conflict underw ent significant transformations, among others:

– For the first time, a very large number of members of the go vernment coalition (approx. 50, including members of congress, ministers, mayors, governors and other office holders) are in jail or being pros ecuted on charges of having links with the Mafia. – It is now possible t o assess t he results of the gov ernment “Democratic Security” program, a military strategy for achieving peace, after a first period of implementation (2002-2006) and the beginning of the second period (according to the government, the “solution” and “end” of the Colombian conflict). – For the fi rst time, the phenomenon of parapol itics (the relations between the Mafia and politic s) is being widely discussed by the media and ack nowledged by the government. – For the first time, the guerrillas (especially the FARC) seem to be losing the war.

- 300 - – For the first time, a Colombian president has been re-elected to consecutiv e terms despite numerous accusations that he supports the Mafia.

7.1.2 Definitions of the variables

We defined the variables based on medi a explanations. For example, when the media spe ak about guerrillas, they speak about the FARC but ignore oth er small groups and dissident activities. For this reason, we c hose the F ARC as a variable related to the category of Armed Actors, but other groups and dissidents belonging to the guerrillas do not appear in the present analysis, since without information about them, it is pointless to assign them a variable. Another criterion to select the variables relates to the following questions from t he basic conflict scheme: Who is fighting (Armed Actors)? Who are the civilian victims ? What is the political perspective of the conflict (Politics)? Ar e t here any peace initiativ es? Why are they fighting ? is a question with no simple or direct answer, and it is answered with the other questions. For this reason, there are no specific vari ables for this question . Table 29 show s all the variables selected.

7.1.3 Measurement

To measure the presence of t he variables in the articles we used QDA Miner v 2.0.7, a program designed for quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

Each article was entered into the program in the space created for each media ( The Economist, El Tiempo, etc.) in the corresponding y ear (2005, 2006, 2007). After that, each category and its related variables wa s created in the progr am (the categories contain more than one variable), and when a variable was found in the text, it was coded, making it recognizable to the computer program, as Illustration 1 shows. Once the variables were recognizable, it was possible to measure the number of times (presence) that each variable appears in the text. For exampl e, if we search for the variable Colombian President in El Tiempo for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the program can count each code marked as Colombian President and indicate that this variable appears 293 times, as Illustration 2 s hows. For this analysis, a total of 7,171 codes were marked for all the variables.

- 301 -

Variable Category Colombian Government Politics Colombian President Politics USA Politic s Parapolitics Politics Democracy Politic s Killing Killing Massacre Killing Homicide Killing Genocide Killing Extra-Judicial Executions Killing Children Civilian Victims Indians Civilian Victims Journalists Civilian Victims Trade Unionists Civilian Victims Displaced Persons Civilian Victims Kidnappings Civilian Victims Peasants Civilian Victims Evictims Civilian Victims Colombian Armed Forces Armed Actors FARC Armed Actors Paramilitaries Armed Actors Criminals Armed Actors Drug Trafficking Armed Actors Mafia Armed Actors Terrorism Armed Actors Peace Peace Demobilization Peace

Table 29

In some cases, the code has exactly the sa me name as the variable. In other cases, it is linked by a pronoun, nam e, adjective or any allus ion to the variable ma de by the author of the article.

After measuring each variable, it was neces sary to standardize (in percentages) the presence of each acc ording to t he total num ber of codes in eac h media by year, as Annex 7 s hows, in order to make a co mparison of t he standar dized v alues and a corresponding statistical analysis of them.

To measure the results for each group, we used different tests, parametric as well as non-parametric: ANOVA, Kruskal Wallis, Mann Whitney U, and Bonferroni, to ensure the robustness of the results and obtain clea r differences among strongly significant,

- 302 - significant, tendency to be significant, and not significant. With only one test, this differentiation would be very weak, but wit h many tests, the differentiation becomes clear and very well supported.

Variable Article

Codes Topic

Illustration 1

- 303 -

Years and Media Number of Codes

Topic

Variable Original Text

Illustration 2

- 304 - 7.2 Analysis of the Variables and the Categories

When we compare all the variables in all the articles, the following are significant:

Variable P Value USA 0.016 Democracy 0.045 Homicide 0.030 Genocide 0.029 ExtJudExec 0.049 Criminals 0.018 DrugTrafficking 0.028 Demobilization 0.042

Table 30 (Kruskal Wallis Test Values)

When we use the Mann Whitney U test to compare each media with eac h of the other (this means 15 pair comparisons of the 27 variables, with a total of 405 comparisons), we find 108 pair comparisons with a signific ant P value distributed among all t he variables, with only three exc eptions: Trade Unionists , Terrorism and Peace. For these variables, there is no P signifi cant value in any pair comparison, as Annex 8 shows.

When we compare the 6 media outlets and the 27 variables using the same test (a total of 405 comparisons), we find 19 significant pair comparisons, as T able 31 resumes by categories:

Media Media Category P Value Media Civilian Cromos The Economist Victims 0.050 Both Civilian Both Cromos U SA Victims 0.050 Civilian Both El Espectador The Economist Victims 0.050 Civilian Both El Espectador USA Victims 0.050 Cromos The Economist Killing 0.050 Both Cromos USA Killing 0.050 Both Cromos BBC Killing 0.050 Both El Espectador The Economist Killing 0.050 Both El Espectador USA Killing 0.050 Both El Espectador BBC Killing 0.050 Both El Espectador The Economist Politic 0.050 Both El Espectador USA Politic 0.050 Both The Economist USA Killing 0.050 Only International USA BBC Politics 0.050 Only International El Tiempo Cromos Killing 0.050 Only National Civilian El Tiempo Cromos Victims 0.050 Only National Civilian El Tiempo El Espectador Victims 0.050 Only National El Tiempo El Espectador Killing 0.050 Only National El Tiempo El Espectador Politics 0.050 Only National

Table 31

According to the Mann Whitney U test, the majority of the significant differences among the categories appear when we compare the internat ional articles with the Colombian articles. T his confirms that each of the media has a s ignificantly different informative style (use of variables and categories).

Below, we analyze each of the categories and the related variables.

7.2.1 Politics

Politics refers to the following variables: The Colombian Government, the Colombian President, USA, Parapolitics and Democracy.

Figure 52 shows the average pe rcentage of presence in the media for this category over the three years selected for the analysis.

- 306 -

POLITIC

40,00% 35,44% 35,00% 33,21% 33,31%

30,00% 28,33% 25,18%

E 25,00% 21,75%

20,00%

PRESENC 15,00%

10,00%

5,00%

0,00% El Tiempo Cromos El The USA BBC Espectador Economist MEDIA

Figure 52

Politics is the second most important category for both media after Armed Actors. There is a high level of similarity bet ween the percentages of presence of this category in El Tiempo, The Economist and USA. Cromos, El Es pectador and BBC are also similar. There is a significant 459 difference in the percentage of presence of the variables related to th is category when we compare El Espectador with The Economist, USA and El Ti empo; and when we compare USA with BBC . In each case, the P value is 0.050, but according to the Kruskal Wallis test it is not significant. This means that Politics has a tendency to be significantly different in the percentage of presence when we compare both media.460

Below I analyze each of the variables of this category.

459 In all cases the values presented here are those of the Mann Whitney U test. If another test is used this is always indicated. 460 For the practical effects of this research, when significance is indicated by only two test s, it means a tendency t o be significant; whe n si gnificance is indicated by more th an t wo te sts, thi s mea ns significant, an d when th e s ignificance r emains a fter a Bo nferroni correction, this mea ns highly significant. - 307 - Colombian Government

This variable is significant when we compare Cromos with El Espectador and Cromos with The Economist, in both cases with a P value of 0.050. But this variable is not significant with the Kruskal Wallis, Anova 461 or Bonferroni tests, and consequently it is only possible to say that this P value indicates a tendency to be significant.

Colombian President

This variable is significant when we compare El Tiempo with El Espectador, the USA and BBC and when we compare El Espectador with The Economist, in all cases with a P value of 0.050, although it is not significant with the Kruskal Wallis and the Bonferroni tests. With the A nova test, it is signific ant with a value of 0.026. As wit h the variable Colombian Government, the results indicate a tendency to be significant.

USA

This v ariable is s ignificant whe n we com pare El Tiem po and Cromos with the international media, when we compare El Espectad or with the USA and when we compare The Economist with the USA and BBC, in all cases with a P value of 0.050. In the same way, it is signific ant with the Kruskal Wallis (P 0.016), Anova (0.001) and Bonferroni tests in the following comparisons: El Tiempo and USA (P 0.006), Cromos and USA (P 0.002), and between El Es pectador and USA (P 0.016). This variable stays significant with a Bonferroni correctio n (in this case, all values under P 0.009). Thus, we can interpret these values as highly significant.

Parapolitics

This variab le is signifi cant when we compare El Tie mpo with the other Colombian media ( Cromos and El Espect ador) and with USA. In the same way, when we compare The Economist with USA and El Espectador, in all cases with a P value of

461In order to support the significance, for each variable we performed a Mann Whitney U test, Kruskal Willis test and two parametric tests: Anova and Bonferroni. With the Bonferroni te st, it was signifi cant; a Bonferroni correction was also performed. Tables showing the test results can be found i n Annex 9 (Kruskal Wallis Test) and Annex 10 (Anova Test). - 308 - 0.050. However, it is not si gnificant with the Kruskal Wa llis, Anova or Bonferroni tests. For this reason, it is possible to say that these P values mean a tendency to be significant.

Democracy

This variab le is signifi cant when we compare Cromos with the internation al med ia (The Economist, USA and BBC), and BBC with El Tiempo, El Espectador and The Economist, in all cases with a P value of 0.050. In the same way, it is significant wit h the Kruskal Wallis (P 0.045), Anova (0.026 ) and Bonferroni tests in the following comparison: Cromos and BBC (P 0.028), But this variable does not stay significant with a Bonferroni correction (in this case, all values under 0.009). Based on these values, it is possible to say that this variable is significant.

7.2.2 Killing

Killing refers to the following variables: Killing, Massacre, Homicide, Genocide and Extra-Judicial Executions. Figure 53 shows the percentage of presence in the media for this category over the three years selected for the analysis.

KILLINGS

9,00% 8,20% 7,96% 8,00%

7,00%

6,00% E 5,00% 3,98% 4,00% PRESENC 3,00% 2,66% 2,18% 2,00% 1,61%

1,00%

0,00% El Tiempo Cromos El The USA BBC Espectador Economist MEDIA

Figure 53

- 309 - Killing shows a great difference between the percentages of presence in each media, however, it is possible to distinguish two tendencies: the highest presence, offered by Cromos and El Espectador; and the lowest by El Tiempo, The Economist, USA an d BBC. In this case, there is a significant di fference in the presenc e of the variables related to this category when we com pare El Ti empo with Cromos and El Espectador; Cromos with The Economist , USA a nd BBC; El Espectador with The Economist, USA and BBC, as well as when we compare The Economist and USA. In all cases, the P value is 0.050. T he variable is also significant with the Kruskal Wallis test (P 0.017), and for this reason, Kil ling represents a signific ant difference and marks a clearly different focus between both media.

Next we will analyze each of the variables of this category.

Killing

This varia ble is s ignificant whe n we com pare Cromos with El Ti empo and The Economist, in both cases with a P va lue of 0.050. Howe ver, it is not significant wit h the Kruskal Wallis, A nova or Bonferroni tests. For this reason, it is possible to say that these P values mean a tendency to be significant.

Massacre

This variab le is sign ificant when we compare The Economist with Cromos and El Espectador; and El Espectador with BB C, in all cases wit h a P v alue of 0.050. This variable is also s ignificant with the Anova t est (P 0.044) , but not with the other tests included in this analysis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Homicide

This variable is significant when we compare El Tiempo with El Espectador (P value of 0.050), The Economist with Cromos, El Espectador with BBC and The Economist (in all cases with a P Value of 0.037), and when we compare BBC with Cromos (in both cases with a P value of 0.037). It is also significant with the Kruskall Wallis test (P 0.030), but not with the other tests included in this analysis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

- 310 - Genocide

This variable is significant when we compare El Espectador with El Tiempo, USA and The Economist (in all cases with a P value of 0.037), and El Espectador with USA (P 0.046). It is also significant with the Krus kal Wallis (P 0.029) , Anova (P 0.011) and Bonferroni tests when we co mpare the following media: El Espectador with El Tiempo; and The Economist and BBC (in both cases with a P value of 0.029). But the variable is not significant wit h a Bonferroní correction (in this analys is, all va lues under P 0.009). Therefore, we can interpret these values as significant.

Extra-Judicial Executions

This variab le is sig nificant when we c ompare El Espectador wit h El Tie mpo, The Economist and BBC (In all cases with a P value of 0.037). This variable is als o significant with the Kruskal Wallis test (P 0.049), but not with t he other tests used in this analys is. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

7.2.3 Civilian Victims

Civilian Victims refers to the following vari ables: Children, Indians, Journalists, Trade Unionists, Displaced Pers ons, Kidnapped Persons, Peasants and Elite Victims. Figure 54 shows the percentage of presence in the media for this category during the three years selected for the analysis.

Civilian Victims shows a big difference bet ween the percentages of presence in eac h media, but it is poss ible to distinguish two tendencies: The greatest presence is that of Cromos, El Es pectador and BBC, and the lowest that of El T iempo, The Economist, and USA. There is a signific ant di fference between the percentages of the presence of the variables relat ed to this category when we compare El Tiempo with Cromos and El Espectador, Cromos with The E conomist and USA, and El Espectador with The Economist and USA. This difference is not signific ant with the

- 311 - Kruskal test, which means that it is not significant, but there is a tendency to be significant.

CIVIL VICTIMS

20,00% 18,95%

18,00% 16,87% 16,00% 16,00%

14,00%

12,00%

10,00% 8,71% 7,49% 8,00% PRESENCE 6,29% 6,00%

4,00%

2,00%

0,00% El Tiempo Cromos El The USA BBC Espectador Economist MEDIA

Figure 54

Next I will analyze each of the variables of this category

Children

This varia ble is s ignificant whe n we com pare Cromos with El Ti empo and The Economist (in both cases with a P value of 0.037), and Cromos with USA (P 0.037). However, this variable is not significant wi th the other tests included in this analys is. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Indians

This variable is significant when we compare El Espectador with El Tiempo and USA (in both cases with a P value of 0.050), and The Economist with El Espectador and El Tiempo (in both cases with a P value of 0.037). Bu t this variable is not significant with the other tests included in this analys is. F or this reason, we c an interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

- 312 - Journalists

This varia ble is sig nificant wh en we co mpare Cromos with El Ti empo and El Espectador (in both cases with a P value of 0.037), and The Economist with El Tiempo and El Espectador (in both cases with a P Value of 0.046). But this variable is not significant with the other tests included in this analysis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Trade Unionists

This variable is not significant with any of the tests included in this analysis.

Displaced Persons

This varia ble is sign ificant whe n we compare El Es pectador with El T iempo an d Cromos (in both cases with a P value of 0. 050). Howev er, this variable is not significant with the other tests i ncluded in this analy sis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Kidnapped Persons

This variable is signif icant when we compare BBC with El Tiempo and USA (in bot h cases with a P value of 0.050). But this var iable is not significant with the ot her tests included in this analysis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Peasants

This varia ble is sig nificant wh en we co mpare El Tie mpo with Cromos and El Espectador (in both c ases with a P value of 0.050) . Howev er, this varia ble is not significant with the other test s included in this analysis, and for this reason we c an interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

- 313 - Elite Victims

This variable is significant when we compare USA with El Espectador, El Tiempo and BBC (in all cases with a P value of 0.037). However, this variable is not significant with the other tests included in this analys is. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

7.2.4 Armed Actors

Armed Actors refers to the following variables: Colombian Armed Forces, Guerrillas, Paramilitaries, Criminals, Drug Trafficking, Mafia, and Terrorism. Figure 55 shows the percentages of presence of this category over the three years selected for the analysis.

ARMED ACTORS

52,00% 50,18% 49,81% 50,00% 48,77% 48,22% 48,00% 46,42% 46,00%

44,00% 43,36% PRESENCE

42,00%

40,00%

38,00% El Tiempo Cromos El The USA BBC Espectador Economist MEDIA

Figure 55

Armed Actors exhibits a very similar per centage of presence with each media. However, it is possible to see that Cromos is somewhat different from the other media, which exhibit an almost uniform lev el of presence, while Cromos has the lowest presence, alm ost 7 points under El Ti empo, which with 50.18% has the

- 314 - highest level. However, t he statistical analysis found no significant difference between the media.

Next, I analyze each of the variables of this category.

Colombian Armed Forces

This variable is s ignificant when we compare El Esp ectador with The E conomist, USA and BBC (in all cases with a P value of 0.050), and Cromos with USA (P 0.050). This variable is also signific ant with t he Anova (P 0.027) and the Bonferroni tests when we compare El Espectador with USA (P 0.045), but it is not significant with the Bonferroni correction. For this reason, we can interpret these values as significant.

Guerrillas

This v ariable is signi ficant when we compare The Economist with El Tie mpo and USA, El Espectador with USA and BBC, and BBC with El Tiempo and USA (in all cases with a P value of 0.050). However, this variable is not significant with the other tests included in this analys is. For this r eason, we c an interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Paramilitaries

This variable is significant when we compare Cromos with all t he other media ( El Tiempo, El Espectador, The Economist, USA and BBC), in all cases with a P value of 0.050. However, this variable is not significant with t he ot her tests included in this analysis. For this reason, we can interpret these values as a tendency to be significant.

Criminals

This variable is sign ificant when we compare Cromos with El Tiempo (P 0.046) and Cromos with all the other media ( El Espectador, The Economist, USA and BBC ), in all cases with a P value of 0.050. It is also significant when we compare USA with El

- 315 - Espectador, The E conomist and BBC (in all cases with a P value of 0.050). Moreover, it is signific ant when we compar e USA wit h El Tiempo (P 0.046), and El Tiempo with El Espectador (P 0.046).

This variable is also significant with t he Kruskal Wallis (P 0.018), Anova (P. 0.001) and Bonferroni tests when we c ompare the following media: El Tiempo with Cromos (P 0.002), Cromos with El Espectador (P 0.007), Cromos with The Econom ist (P 0.004), Cromos with USA (P 0. 027), and Cromos with BBC (P 0.005). In all cases, the variable stays significant with a Bonferr oní correction (in this analysis, all values under 0.009). In this case, we can interpret these values as highly significant.

Drug Trafficking

This variable is significant when we compare Cromos with El Tiempo, El Espectador, The E conomist, USA and BBC, in all c ases with a P value of 0.037, and El Espectador with El Tiempo, USA and BBC, in all cases with a P value of 0.050. This variable is also sig nificant with the Kru skal Wallis (P 0.028), Anova (P. 0.010) and Bonferroni tests when we compare Cromos with USA (P 0.023). But the variable is not significant with a Bonferr oní correction (in this anal ysis, all values under 0.009). For this case, we can interpret these values as significant.

Mafia

This variable is significant when we compare El Tiempo with Cromos, The Economist and USA, in all cases with a P value of 0.050, El Tiempo with BBC (P 0.046), and El Espectador with The Economist (P 0.050). This variab le is not significant with the Kruskal Wallis test (P 0.084), but it is si gnificant with the Anova test (P. 0.016) and the Bonferroni test when we compare El Tie mpo wit h The E conomist and BBC, in both cases with a P v alue of 0.026. But the variable does not st ay significant with a Bonferroní correction (in this analysis, a ll values under 0.009). In this case, we can interpret these values as significant.

- 316 - Terrorism

This variable is not significant with any of the tests included in this analysis.

7.2.5 Peace

Peace refers to the follo wing variables: Peace and De mobilization. Figure 56 shows the percentage of presence of this category during the thr ee years selected for the analysis.

PEACE

9,00%

8,00% 7,66% 7,57%

7,00% 6,13% 5,84% 6,00% E 5,00% 4,31% 4,00% 3,61% PRESENC 3,00%

2,00%

1,00%

0,00% El Tiempo Cromos El The USA BBC Espectador Economist MEDIA

Figure 56

Armed Actors exhibit s two clear tendencie s. One is a tendency to a percentage of presence between 5 and 7 percent for this variable ( El Tiempo and the internationa l media), the other is a tendency to one between 4 and 5 percent ( Cromos and El Espectador). There is a significant difference between the presenc e of the variables related to this category when we compare El Espectador with USA (P 0.050), but this difference is not significant according to t he Kruskal Wallis test. For this reason, we can say that with this category there is a tendency to a significant difference in the percentage of presence when we compare both kinds of media.

- 317 - Next, I will analyze each of the variables of this Category

Peace

This variable is not significant with any of the tests included in this analysis.

Demobilization

This variable is sign ificant when we compare El Tiempo with Cromos, El Espectador and The Economist, Cromos with The Economist and USA, and USA with The Espectador and The Economist, in all cas es with a P v alue of 0.050. This variable is also s ignificant with t he Kruskal Wallis (P 0.042), Anova (P. 0.017) and Bonferroni tests when we c ompare Cromos with The E conomist (P 0. 039). However, the variable is not significant wit h a Bonferroní correction (in this analys is, all values under 0.009). Therefore, we can interpret these values as significant.

7.2.6 Conclusions about the Categories and Variables

According to the statistical analysis, some variables have a tendency to be significant, are significant or are highly significant, as Table 32 shows. Lik ewise, 3 variables are not significant.

7.2.6.1 Conclusions about Politics

The international articles give more emphasis to the role of the USA in the Colombian conflict, for which it is a high ly significant variable. They also devote somewhat more space to the phenomenon of “ parapolitics.” Both are key topics for understanding the course of the war over the last few years, the defeat of the guerillas and the consolidation of the political and economic power of the Mafia.

On the other side, the Colombian arti cles tend to emphasize Alvaro Uribe (personalization of the conflict) and say more about democracy, but do so only in order to make a clear distinction between the good and the bad.

- 318 - All the variables related to Politics, with the exception of USA, have a tendency to be significant when we c ompare both media. This means that there is a tendency to a significant difference in the presence of each variable in the Colombian and the international articles.

Variable Results of the tests Media Col Gov Tendency to be significant Both Col. Pres Tendency to be significant Both USA Highly Significant Both Parapolitics Tendency to be significant Both Democracy Significant Both Killing Tendency to be significant Both Massacre Tendency to be significant Both Homicide Significant Both Genocide Significant Both Extra-Jud Exec. Tendency to be significant Both Children Tendency to be significant Both Indians Tendency to be significant Both Journalists Tendency to be significant Both Trade Unionists Not significant No difference Displaced Persons Tendency to be significant Only in The Colombian media Kidnapped Persons Tendency to be significant Both Peasants Tendency to be significant Only in the Colombian media E Victims Tendency to be significant Both Col Arm.Force Significant Both Guerrillas Tendency to be significant Both Paramilitaries Tendency to be significant Both Criminals Highly Significant Both Drug Trafficking Significant Both Mafia Significant Both Terrorism Not significant No difference Peace Not significant No difference Demob. Significant Both

Table 32

7.2.6.2 Conclusions about Killing

It is possible to say that the internationa l articles have a general vis ion of the category of Killing, they prefer to speak about killings and massac res, but do not say much about polemical and dramat ic situations with strong pol itical connotations. The

- 319 - USA media deviate somewhat from this tendency, probably because of the great involvement of the USA in the Colombian conflict.

On the other side, the Colomb ian articles, especially in El Espectador, give a more detailed explanation of the different kinds of Killin g in Colombia, although El Tiempo is an exception to this t endency and is close to t he in ternational articles. Two variables in this category have a signific ant P value, Homicide and Genocide, which appear more frequently in the Colombian arti cles, thereby creating a clear differenc e in their c ommunicative style in comparis on with the international articles. The Colombians are more specific about Killing than the general view found in the international articles.

The other variables r elated to Killing hav e a tende ncy to be signific ant when we compare both media. This means that in this category there is a tendency to a significantly different presence for each variable in the Colombian and the international articles.

7.2.6.3 Conclusions about Civilian Victims

In this category, we found that Peasants and Displaced Persons have a tendency to be significant, but only in the Colombian articles. However, in some cases we find the same values when we separately compar e each of the Colomb ian media with the international media. This could reflect the controversies surrounding the way this category is perceived by Colombian society, where victims are “ non-existent.” (For example, there are no ref ugee camps in Colombia, even though Colombia has the second highest number of displaced pers ons in the world. For more details, see Chapter One on the Colombian Conflict).

It is interesting to see how, regardless of the dramatic situation of the Trade Unionists in Colombia (in international comparison t he country has the highest rate of crimes against trade unionists), none of the media em phasize this topic, and to the contrary it is partially ignored. Because of this both media are alike in th is “ignorance” and do not show a significant difference in the presence (in this case, actually abs ence) of these civilian victims.

- 320 - The other variables related to Civilian Victims have a tendency to be significan t when we compare both media. This means that there is a tendency to a si gnificantly different presence for each variable in the Colombian and the international articles.

7.2.6.4 Conclusions about Armed Actors

When the Colombian articles discuss Armed Actors, they focus on Criminals, Colombian Armed Forces and the Mafia (for which the P values exhibit significance or high significance when we compare the Colombian articl es with the internationa l articles). Although the Colombian articles ar e very critical of the government, they have a tendency to use more terminology borrowed from official propaganda, such as Criminals. Likewise, they have a tendency to give more space to the Colombian Armed Forces, making a clear differentiation betw een “them” and “us” (journalists as “good” and the Colombian Armed Forces as “bad”). In contrast, the international articles avoid the terminology and conceptions of official propaganda.

The Colombian articles also dev ote more space to the Mafia variable than do the international articles, alt hough both media give it a ma rginal presence, the only exception being El Ti empo. However, its presence is signific antly greater in the Colombian articles, and this is a very important point, because Mafia is a concept that the official propaganda avoids. It is a conc ept that helps us to understand the new political and economic situation in Colombia.

The international articles focus on Drug Trafficking (whose P value is significant when we compare the Colombian articles with the international articles). Drug Trafficking is one of the principal “Armed Actors” and one of the most important causes of the war.

Terrorism, a typical concept in the official pr opaganda, is avoided by both media, and consequently, its presence is very margi nal. This variable does not display a significant difference in presence between the articles.

The Guerrillas and Paramilitaries variables also have a tendenc y to be significant when we compare both media. In general, this means that there is a tendency to find

- 321 - a different presence for each variable in a signific ant way when comparing the Colombian articles with the international articles.

7.2.6.5 Conclusions about Peace

Peace as a category has a very marginal pres ence in both media, and therefore it does not display a significant difference.

To the contrary, the param ilitaries’ demo bilization pr ocess shows a significant difference in its presence. This could refl ect the strong criticis m from both media, made in dif ferent ways. It has more presence in the inter national articles, where this polemical process is clearly defined as a legaliz ation of the crimes of the paramilitaries, rather than as a process of justice intended to build peace.

7.3 Correlations462

To do a quantitative analysis of the articles, it is necessary to examine not only th e presence of the variables used by the media to explain the conflict, but also the way these variables are correlated. Both media can use different correlations of variables to make very different expl anations, although in both case s the presence of each of the variables could be the same or very similar.

For this reason, we examined the correlati ons between the articles. Three conditions were considered: r (C oefficient of Correlati on), P (Significance) and Scatter Plot. In some cases, correlations were discarded because they were based on data with 0 values, and the program identified the simultaneous absence of values of two different categories as a correlation, when it was only an absence of data.

Below, I discuss the correlations of each kind of article.

462The values presented here relate to the Spearman Correlation Test. - 322 - 7.3.1 Correlations in the Colombian Articles

In the Colombian articles, the highest correlation values are concentrated in about 15 variables: the USA, Parapolitics, Journalists, Killing, Massacre, Homicide, Extra- Judicial Executions , Trade Unionists , Displaced Persons , Kidnapped Persons , Criminals, Colombian Armed Forces, Guerrillas, Paramilitaries and Drug Trafficking, as Table 33 shows:

Variable 1 R P Variable 2 USA -0.883 0.005 Democracy Parapolitics -0.695 0.038 Massacre Parapolitics -0.700 0.036 Homicide Parapolitics -0.800 0.010 Indians Journalists -0.681 0.043 Criminals Journalists -0.797 0.010 Democracy Killing 0.733 0.025 Democracy Killing -0.746 0.021 Journalists Killing 0.711 0.032 Criminals Killing -0.729 0.026 Drug Trafficking Killing -0.733 0.025 Demobilization Massacre 0.745 0.021 Terrorism Homicide 0.892 0.001 Extra-Judicial Executions Homicide 0.817 0.007 Indians Homicide 0.783 0.013 Colombian Armed Forces Homicide -0.817 0.007 Mafia Extra-Judicial Executions 0.769 0.015 Indians Extra-Judicial Executions 0.883 0.002 Colombian Armed Forces Extra-Judicial Executions -0.726 0.027 Mafia Extra-Judicial Executions -0.691 0.039 Demobilization Trade Unionists -0.667 0.050 Demobilization Displaced Persons 0.700 0.036 Peasants Kidnapped Persons 0.818 0.007 Guerrillas Kidnapped Persons 0.818 0.007 Elite Victims Criminals 0.812 0.008 Trade Unionists Criminals 0.678 0.045 Peasants Criminals -0.879 0.002 Demobilization Criminals -0.770 0.015 Paramilitaries Colombian Armed Forces -0.800 0.010 Peace Guerrillas 0.833 0.005 Elite Victims Paramilitaries 0.700 0.036 Mafia Drug Trafficking 0.879 0.002 Journalists Drug Trafficking -0.877 0.002 Criminals Drug Trafficking 0.746 0.021 Mafia Drug Trafficking 0.865 0.003 Demobilization

Table 33

- 323 - USA

In the Colombian articles, this variable has a negativ e correlation with Democracy. For the Colombian articles, the USA and Democracy are opposites and mutually exclusive.

Parapolitics

This variable has a negative correlation with Massacre, Homicide and Indians. The Colombian articles p refer to write s eparately about the milita ry violenc e of the paramilitaries and their massac res, homic ides and attacks committed against the Indians and about their political strategies, although both phenomena are very closely related.

Journalists

This variable has a negative cor relation with Criminals and Democracy. As in other situations, the Colombian articles prefer to treat each variable separately.

Killing

This variable has a negative correlation with Journalists, Drug Trafficking and Demobilization. Despite the attacks on jour nalists, it is very clear in the Colombian articles that they are not the principal vict ims of the war. However, these articles do not relate Killing with Drug Trafficking , although drug trafficking is one of the most important causes of the conflict. Journalists treat Demobilization as an independent phenomenon unrelated to Killing, although t he most important Colombian drug lords take part in it and for many this process is a legalization of their crimes, which include homicide, massacre, killing and many others.

This variable als o has a positive correlation with Democracy and Criminals. For the Colombian articles, Killing is a th reat to De mocracy, and for this reason, they speak in parallel about Killing (as a problem) and Democracy (as the solution). The relationship between Criminal and Killing corresponds with the sc heme Perpetrator – Crime.

- 324 - Massacre

This varia ble correla tes positively with Terrorism. For the Colombian articles, Massacres are Terrorism. However, this equation is inaccurate, because usually Massacres are committed for economic benef its, and they are not committed as retaliation against state actions.

Homicide

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Extra-Judicial Ex ecutions, Indians, and Colombian Ar med Fo rces. For the Colombian articles , some homicides ar e Extra- Judicial Executions. They emphasize that the Indians are victims of homicide and in many cases describe these homicides as cr imes committed by the Colombian Armed Forces.

In the Colombian artic les, this variabl e also has a negative correlation with Mafia. It means that the Mafia variable is not directly related to Homicide, although the Mafia commits many crimes in Colombia. The Colombian articles prefer to use other names for the Mafia, and consequently the Mafia seems an isolated phenomenon.

Extra-Judicial Executions

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Indians and Colombian Ar med Forces. The Colombian articles emphasize the Extra-Judicial Executions of the Indians and likewise treat Extra-Judicial Exec utions as acts committed by the Colombian Armed Forces.

This variable als o has a negativ e correlation with Mafia and Demobilization. For the Colombian articles, Extra-Judicial Executions are not directly related to Mafia or the process of Demobilization, although Extra-Judicial Executions could be committed by the paramilitaries, wh ich are part of the Mafia and are taking part in the demobilization process.

- 325 - Trade Unionists

This variable has a negative cor relation with Demobilization. The Colombian articles do not directly link crimes against Trade Unionists to the Demobilization Process, although it is likely that m any of the perpetr ators of thes e crimes are pa rticipating in the process.

Displaced Persons

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Peasants. According to the Colombian articles, Displacement is strongly related to Peasants (who ar e the group most affected by displacements).

Kidnapped Persons

This variable has a positive correlation with Guerrillas and Elite Victim s. F or th e Colombian articles, in the majori ty of cases Guerrillas are behind kidnappings, and the articles have a st rong tendency to id entify the kidnapped persons wit h Ingrid Betancourt (the Elite Victim of this analysis).

Criminals

This variable has a positive correlation with Trade Unionists and Peasants. When the Colombian articles refer to Criminals without identifying Guerrillas, Paramilitaries or any others, they relate these Criminals with Trade Unionists and Peasants as their victims.

This variable also has a negative correlation with Demobilization and Paramilitaries. Although many of the Demobi lized and the Paramilitaries are criminals, this h appens because journalists link and replace the te rm “parami litaries” wit h criminals and for this reason; the terms are not usually used at the same time.

- 326 - Colombian Armed Forces

This variable has a negative cor relation with Peace. For the Colombian articles, the Colombian Armed Forces are synonymous with war and for this reason represent the antithesis of Peace, and in the articles, the presence of one exc ludes that of the other.

Guerrillas

This varia ble has a positive correlation with Elite Victim s, because Guerrillas kidnapped Ingrid Betancourt.

Paramilitaries

This varia ble h as a positive c orrelation with Mafia. For the Colombian articles, ‘Paramilitaries’ is related to Mafia, but although this correlation is strong, it is not very frequent.

Drug Trafficking

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Journalists, Mafia and Demobilization. For the Colombian articles, Drug Trafficking is a threat t o freedom of the press. Drug Trafficking is related to the Colo mbian Mafia and the Process of Demobilization, in which many drug lords are taking part.

This variabl e al so has a negative correlation with Criminals. In the Colombia n articles, Criminals is a vague and general term not explicit ly related to Drug Trafficking.

- 327 - 7.3.2 Correlations in the International Articles

In the international articles, the highest co rrelation values are concentrated in ca. 7 variables: USA, Parapolitics, Killing, Peace, Kidnapped Persons , Guerrillas an d Demobilization, as Table 34 shows:

Variable 1 R P Variable 2 USA -0.700 0.036 Colombian President Parapolitics -0.795 0.010 USA Parapolitics 0.678 0.045 Kidnapped Persons Parapolitics -0.865 0.003 Drug Trafficking Parapolitics 0.712 0.031 Elite Victims Killing 0.780 0.013 Trade Unionist Peace -0.700 0.036 Killing Peace -0.767 0.016 Journalists Peace -0.797 0.010 Trade Unionists Kidnapped Persons 0.957 0.000 Elite Victims Guerrillas -0.703 0.035 Criminals Demobilization -0. 778 0.014 Parapolitics Demobilization -0.700 0.036 Kidnapped Persons Demobilization -0.683 0.042 Colombian Armed Forces Demobilization 0.733 0.025 Paramilitaries Demobilization -0.766 0.016 Elite Victims

Table 34

USA

This variable has a negative correlation with Colombian President . For the international articles, the USA is an independent power in the Colombian conflict. For this issue, they s peak separately about the Colombian President and the USA. The USA, with its high lev el of intervention in and policy-making for Colombia, is seen as an independent key actor, al though an intruder and in opposition to the Official Government.

Parapolitics

This variable has a positive correlation with Kidnapped Persons and Elite Victims. For the international articles, Parapolitics, Kidnapped Persons and the Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt (an Elite Victim ) are symptoms of the politic al crisis in Colombia . Parapolitics represents the infiltration of the Mafia into the go vernment, and the - 328 - Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt, the failure to reach an agreement with the guerrillas to liberate hundreds of polit icians, members of the Co lombian Armed Forces and civilians – in other words, the inability of the government to hold talks with the guerrillas.

This variable als o has a negativ e correlation with the USA and Drug Trafficking. For the international articles, Parapolitics is a v ery independent and local phen omenon not directly related to the USA or Drug Trafficking, although indirectly related to both. This is bec ause indirectly part of the US military aid goes to the paramilitaries, and drug trafficking is one of the causes of Parapolitics. Together with it go the c orruption of Colombian politic ians, t he development of diverse or ganized criminal structures, the desire of the param ilitaries for territory and p olitical po wer, the interest in defeating t he gu errillas and the interest of t he crimina ls in taking part in le gal an d profitable business, and with other reasons, as we saw in the chapter about the Colombian conflict.

Killing

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Trade Unionists . For the international articles there is a ver y clear pat tern of Killing committed again st members of trade unions, m any of them with impunity and probably committed by paramilitaries o r agents of the state.

Peace

This variable has a negative correlation with Killing, Journalists and Trade Unionists. For the international articles, the Killing of civilians, the censorship of Journalists and the attacks on Trade Unionists are the oppos ite of a democratic peace. Consequently, when t hey s peak about peac e they avoid t hese terms and pr efer to relate peace to democracy.

Kidnapped Persons

This variable has a positive correlation wit h Elite Vic tims. In a way similar to the Colombian articles, the international articles relate the drama of kidnapped persons in

- 329 - Colombia to the kidnapping of the politician Ingrid Be tancourt, a figure who for the media symbolizes the suffering of thousands of kidnapped persons in Colombia.

Guerrillas

This variable has a negative correlation wit h Criminals. As opposed to the official propaganda, the internationa l articles treat the guerrillas as not simply criminals. In this way, the international articles distanc e themselves from the official prop aganda and define guerrillas in their own terms.

Demobilization

This variable presents a negativ e correlation with Parapolitics, Kidnapped Persons , Colombian Arm ed Forces and Elite Vict ims. For the international artic les, the Demobilization Process, although controversial and closely related to the other circumstances of the war, is analyzed separately from other very important aspects of the war.

This varia ble a lso has a p ositive correlation wit h Paramilitaries, because the demobilization process focuses on the paramilitaries. Moreover, the articles focus on this process, because it does not have clear rules, is very lax with the paramilitaries and doesn’t offer adequate compensation to victims.

7.4 Conclusions about the Quantitative Analysis of all Articles

The Colombian articles have a tendenc y to use some concepts from the official propaganda more frequently than the international articles (e.g., Criminals ), w hich demonstrates the power of t hese concepts to simplify t he conflict and define “good” and “bad.” This is no surprise, because th e journalism of attachment is propaganda, although in a reversed sense, since it sides with the victims against the government.

Nevertheless, the Colombian articles have some merits; they c an more precisely define the kinds of Killing taking place in Colombia (Genocide, Extra-Judicial Executions, etc.) and their perpetrators.

- 330 - On the other side, international articles focus on very important issues, like the role in the conflict of the USA, a key actor that has defined the course of the war with money and technology. For this reason, it is i ndispensable to understand America’s role in the Colombian war.

In the same way, the international arti cles speak more about the most important Armed Actors: Guerrillas, Par amilitaries and Dru g Traffickers (although the Colombian articles report more on relation ships to drug trafficking), one of the most relevant issues of the Colombian war. This is because t he illegal drug traffic finances illegal private armies, fosters the corruption of the gover nment, strengthens the Mafia and produces phenomena like Parapol itics, the infiltration of the Mafia into the government. Clearly, Drug Trafficking is a key topic t o explain and understand the Colombian war.

However, both media offer a very low presence to key i ssues like the Mafia (although with significantly more presence in the Colombian articles), Parapolitics and Peace. The Mafia is a v ast, complex phenomenon wi th politic al, s ocial and economic implications and national and international consequences. The Mafia helps to explain the growth of the Colombian economy, the development of criminal organizations to import and export drugs, weapons and “m oney laundering” through many complex procedures. Moreover, the Mafi a represents the new political powers that control the country.

We could see how when dealing with ve ry complex phenomena, the Colombia n media hav e a tendency to speak about each actor separately and not identify the deeper relationships between and among them. In contrast, the internation al media tend to present more complex relati onships. One example of this is Parapolitics, which no media relate to the Colombian Government , the Colombian President , Democracy or Peace. Nevertheless, the internationa l articles offer a correlation between Parapolitics and Demobilization. This correlation in the international articles helps us to more clearly understand how paramilitarism is being pardoned (under the facade of a demobilization process) and is cons tituting itself as the most relevant actor in the most important political and milit ary spheres. Its victims, to the contrary,

- 331 - are being persecuted, and the oppositi on to the government and to the demobilization process is being defamed, disqualified, persecuted, and censored.

However, peace is a marginal topic in bo th media, although it should be a very important issue in or der to initiate a di scussion, at least among readers , of the peaceful r esolution of the conflict. To the contrary, both media devot e space principally to Armed Actors (an average of 48% of all the analyzed codes). Another very important topic for both medi a is the political aspect of the conflict (Government, President, USA, figures of Parapolitics – elite paramilitaries and politicians), with an average of 30% of all the analy zed codes, in dicating the elite orientation of both media. The victims appear in third place in terms of presence, wit h only 12% on the average of all the analyzed c odes. In four th place comes peace, with an average of 6% of all analyzed codes. In last place, in terms of level of presence, we find Killing, with an av erage of 4% of all analyzed co des. Perhaps devoting more space to variables r elated to the category of Killing, like Extra-Judicial Executions, Genocide and Massacre could help readers to understand the cr itical human rights situation in Colombia and would ther efore sensitize people to the wa r crimes taking place in the country.

After this analysis, it is clear that each of the media offer different percentages of presence for each of the most important categories and variables they use to explain the Colombian conflict (56% of the variab les have a tendency to be significant, 26% are significant, 7.5 % have high significance, and only 11% are not significant). In the same way, each of the media portrays diff erent relationships between the variables, offering different pictures of the conflict. As we see with the qualitative analysis of the articles and the analysis of the experimen t, each of the media offers a different version, permits different levels of understanding and in some cases presents contradictions as similarities whic h the r eader has to confront in order to achieve a greater level of understanding than each of the media offers separately.

- 332 - 7.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Articles Used in the Experiment

In order to measure the relationships between the articles used in the experiment and the readers’ answers, we compared the level of presence of each variable in these articles with the readers’ levels of under standing. This showed the following: If both versions devote the same space to each of the variables, then the level of understanding does not depend on the amount of information provided, but rather on the informative style used. In this case, t he comparison is like the difference between the journalism of attachment (Colombi an articles) and journalism pro peace (international articles).

7.5.1 Methodology

To measure the percentage of presence f or each variable in the articles, t he same articles us ed in the experim ent and Prov alis QDA Miner 2.07 463 software were employed t o measure the presence of each variable and their co-occurrence 464 in each kind of article. The sample corresponds to 22 of the international articles and 22 of the Colombian artic les. In the Colombian articles, 363 codes were marked, and in the international articles 474 codes were marked, making a total of 837 codes.

Sometimes the code has the same name as the variable, and in other ca ses it is linked with a pronoun, name, adjec tive or any allus ion to the variable made by the author of the article.

Figure 57 illustrates the par allelism in the presence of each variable, a c ondition necessary for comparing the two kinds of st yles, because it is very possible that if one variable has s ignificantly more presenc e in one kind of articl e, it might provide readers with more information and in that wa y make possible a greater degree of understanding.

463This i s the same softwa re used to do the quantit ative analysi s of the articl es bet ween 2005 and 2007. 464Co-occurrence an alysis i s a met hod often ap plied in text mini ng, compa rative gen omics, and promoter analysis. Various statistical m odels were used to evaluate the si gnificance of associations between co-occurring entities. In this study, we used the Jaccard coefficient, working directly with QDA 2.07 Miner. - 333 - 40

35

30

25

20

15

% of Presence 10

5

0

r s y -5a ms ns e m ti r c A i ndia uge ecPol zation I S Paramil ColPres li hildatw Ref Col C Col ColGovPar Opposition Elite V WaronDrugs Demobi Variables

National International

Figure 57 – % of presence of the variables in the articles

After measuring the percentage of presence of each variable in the articles, we made two comparisons: the first with the percentage of understanding of each experimental group (Table 35), the second with the degree of statistical significance of these levels of understanding (Tables 36, 37 and 38). T he object of the comparisons was to determine the relationships between the styl es of the articles (Colombian or international) and readers’ levels of understanding.

% of Understanding Variable Category Group 1* Group 2** Group 3 *** Civilian Children at War Victims 19.09% 52.73 % 53.64% Civilian Elite Victims Victims 42.05 % 51.14% 48.86% Civilian Indians Victims 32.47% 33.12 % 38.96% Civilian Refugees Victims 45.45 % 34.85% 55.30% ColArmy Armed Actors 30.91% 30.00% 45.45% ColSecPol Armed Actors 45.45% 45.45% 45.45% Paramil Armed Actors 29.22% 42.42% 47.84% ColGovPar Politics 35.04% 43.75% 46.78% ColPres Politics 36.36% 29.34% 40.50% Opposition Politics 26.26% 31.31% 39.90% WaronDrugs Politics 41.36% 51.82% 52.73% Demobilization Peace 48.48% 44.55% 51.52% * This corresponds to the readers who only read Colombian articles. ** This corresponds to the readers who only read international articles. *** This corresponds to the readers who read both kinds of articles. Table 35 – % of understanding of the 3 groups in the experiment

- 334 - P Value Groups 1 and Variable 2* Child Soldiers 0.000 Paramilitaries 0.048 *Values corresponding to the Mann Whitney U test Table 36 – Significant variables between Groups 1 and 2

P Value Groups 1 and Variable 3* Child Soldiers 0.000 Colombian Army 0.032 Colombian Government_Parapolitics 0.013 Opposition 0.005 Paramilitaries 0.000 *Values corresponding to the Mann Whitney U test Table 37 – Significant variables between Groups 1 and 3

P Value Groups 2 and Variable 3* Refugees 0.004 Colombian President 0.008 Colombian Army 0.027 *Values corresponding to the Mann Whitney U test Table 38 – Significant variables between Groups 1 and 3

7.5.2 Analysis of the Comparisons

Colombian President

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 36.35%; when they have only the international articles, the percentage is 29.34%; and when they have both kinds of article, the percentage is 40.50%.

According to the Mann Whitney U test, 465 these values are significant when we compare Group 2 with Group 3 (P 0.008). T his means that if the difference between Groups 1 and 3 is not significant, then it is possible to say that Group 1 is closer to Group 3 than is Group 2. This could be int erpreted to mean that readers distance themselves from the inter national articles and prefer the version offered by th e Colombian articles. Of course it is quite possible that they take some information from

465In all cases, the P values cited in this section are those of the Mann Whitney test. - 335 - the international articles and thereby reach a higher level of understanding than does Group 1.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 17.63% of all the analyzed variables, while in the inter national articles the indicato r is 17.72%. Althoug h the presence is the same in both kinds of article, the Colo mbian articles enable a higher percentage of understanding than the international articles.

Child Soldiers

When readers have only Colombian articles , the percentage of understanding of this variable is 19.09%, when they have only inte rnational articles , the percentage is 52.73%, and when they have both kinds of article, the percentage is 53.64%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 1 with Gr oup 2 (P 0.000) and Group 1 with Group 3 (P 0.000). This means that the level of understanding that each version enables is significantly different and that Group 2 is closer to Group 3 than is Group 1. T his could be interpreted to mean that readers distanc e themselv es from the Colombian articles and prefer the version given by the international articles. Since the percentage of understanding of Group 2 is practically t he same as that of Group 3, it is very probable that the readers in Gr oup 3 completely reject the version of the Colombian articles.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that it represents 3.30% of all the analyzed variables in the Colombian articles, while in the international articles the indica tor is 4.43%. It has practically the same presence in both sets of articles, even though the internationa l articles enable a higher percentage of understanding than the Colombian articles.

Colombian Army

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 30.91%. When they hav e only the international articles, the

- 336 - percentage is 30.00%, and when they hav e both set s of article the percentage is 45.45%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 1 with Gr oup 3 (P 0.032) and Group 2 with Group 3 (P 0.027). This means that the level of understanding that each version enables is the same, and when t he readers have both versions, they take information from both in order to gain a hi gher level of understanding without taking sides.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 15.15% of all the analyzed variables, while in the international articles the indicator is 13.08%. There is no significantly different presence in both sets of articles, and s imilarly, each set of articles enables t he same percentage of understanding.

Colombian Government_Parapolitics

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 35.04%. When they have only international articles, the percentage is 43.75%, and when they have both sets of articles the percentage is 46.78%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 1 with Group 3 (P 0.013). This means that Group 2 is closer to Group 3 th an is Group 1, which could be interpreted to mean that the readers distanc e themselves from the Colombian articles and prefer the version of the international articles. It is, however, very probable that t hey take some information from the Colombian articles in or der to gain a higher level of understanding than that of Group 1.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articl es it represents 7.98% of a ll the analyzed variables, while in the international articles the indicator is 4.00%. There is no significantly different presence in both set s of articles, but t he international arti cles enable a higher percentage of understanding.

- 337 - Paramilitaries

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 29.22%. When they hav e only the international articles, the percentage is 42.42%, and when they have bot h sets of articles the percentage is 47.84%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 1 with Group 3 (P 0.000) and when we compare Groups 1 and 2, (P 0. 048). This means that the level of understanding that each version allows is significantly di fferent and that Group 2 is closer to Group 3 than is Group 1. This c ould be interpreted to mean that the readers distance themselves from the Colombian arti cles and prefer the version offered by the international articles. It is very probable that they take some information from the Colombian articles in order to obtain a higher level of understanding than achieved by Group 2.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 24.51% of all the analyzed variables, while in the international articles the indicator is 33.00%. There is more presenc e in t he international articles, and similarly they enable a higher level of understanding.

Refugees

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 45.45%. When they hav e only the international articles, the percentage is 34.85%, and when they have bot h kinds of article the percentage is 55.30%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 2 with Group 3 (P 0.004). This means that the level of understanding that each v ersion enables is s ignificantly different and that Group 1 is c loser to Gr oup 3 than is Group 2. We could interpret this to mean that the r eaders in Group 3 di stance themselves from the int ernational articles and prefer the vers ion offered in t he Colombian articles. It is very probable

- 338 - that they take some information from the international articles in order to gain a higher level of understanding than achieved by Group 1.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 9.09% of all the analyzed variables, while in the international articles the indicator is 4.64%. There is no significant difference in presence, although t he Colombian articles enable a higher level of understanding than the international articles.

Opposition

When the readers have only the Colombian articles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 26.26%. When they hav e only the international articles, the percentage is 31.31%, and when they hav e both set s of article the percentage is 39.90%.

These values are significant when we compare Group 1 with Group 3 (P 0.005). This means that Group 2 is closer to Group 3 than is Group 1. This could be interpreted to mean that the readers in Group 3 distance themselves from the Colombian articles and prefer the version given by t he international articles. It is quite possible that they take some information from the Colombian articles in order to gain a higher level of understanding than acquired by Group 2.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 0.82% of all the analyzed variables, while the indicat or is 0.21% in the international articles. The presence is practically the same, although the internat ional arti cles enable a higher percen tage of understanding.

Indians

When readers have only Colombian articles, the percentage of unde rstanding of this variable is 32.47%. When they have only inte rnational articles , the percentage is 33.12%, and when they have both types of article, the percentage is 38.96%.

- 339 - These values are not signific ant when we compare the groups. Th is means that the readers’ levels of understanding are close, and it is not possible to determine a clear influence on Group 3.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 3.58% of all the analyzed variables, while in the inter national ar ticles the indicator is 4.43%. T he presen ce is practically the same, and likewise both kinds of arti cle enable the same percentage of understanding.

Elite Victims

When readers have only Colombian articles, the percentage of unde rstanding of this variable is 42.05%. When they have only in ternational articles the percentage is 51.14%, and when they have both kinds of article the percentage is 48.86%.

These values are not signific ant when we compare the groups. Th is means that the readers’ levels of understandi ng are clos e to each other, and it is not possible t o determine a clear influence on Group 3.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articl es it represents 2.75% of a ll the analyzed variables, while in the inter national ar ticles the indicator is 1.89%. T he presen ce is practically the same, although the international articles enable the highest lev el of understanding, and the Colombian articles the lowest. Perhaps G roup 3 has a lower level of understanding than Group 2 becaus e readers in Group 3 may be confused by the contradictions between the two versions, even though the greater similarity between the level of understanding of Groups 2 and 3 could suggest a higher level of influence by the international articles.

- 340 - War on Drugs

When readers have only Colombian articles, the percentage of unde rstanding of this variable is 41.36%. When they have only inte rnational articles , the percentage is 51.82%, and when they have both kinds of article the percentage is 52.73%.

These values are not signific ant when we compare the groups. Th is means that the readers’ levels of understandi ng are clos e to each other, and it is not possible t o clearly determine an influence on Group 3.

When we compare the percentage of presence of this variable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 2.47% of all the analyzed variables, while in the inter national ar ticles the indicator is 4.85%. T he presence is practically the same, although the international articles enable a higher level of understanding than the Colombian articles. Moreover, Groups 2 and 3 dis play practically the s ame level of understanding. This could suggest that the international articles have a higher level of influence on Group 3.

Colombian Secret Police

When readers have only the Colombian arti cles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 45.45%. When they hav e only the international articles, the percentage is also 45.45%, and when they have both ki nds of article the percentage is likewise 45.45%.

These values are not signifi cant when we compare the groups, because the levels of understanding are the same, and it is not po ssible to determine a clear influence on Group 3.

When we compare the percentage of presence of this variable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articles it represents 4.68% of all the analyzed variables, while in the inter national ar ticles the indicator is 3.16%. T he presence is practically the same, and similarly t he level of understanding is the same in the three groups. For this reason, it is impossible to suggest a possible influence on Group 3.

- 341 - Demobilization

When the readers have only the Colombian articles, the percentage of understanding of this variable is 48.48%. When they hav e only the international articles, the percentage is 44.55%, and when they have bot h kinds of article the percentage is 51.52%.

These values are not signific ant when we compare the groups. Th is means that the readers’ levels of understandi ng are clos e each ot her, and it is not possible t o determine a clear influence on Group 3.

When we compare the percentage of presence of the v ariable in the articles, we find that in the Colombian articl es it represents 7.99% of a ll the analyzed variables, while in the inter national ar ticles the indicator is 8.23%. T he presence is practically the same, and likewise the lev el of understanding is ver y similar in the two kinds of article, although Group 1 is c loser to Group 3 than is Group 2. This could suggest a greater influence of the Colombian articles on Group 3.

7.5.3 Co-occurrence

With QDA software, it is poss ible to det ermine and graph the co-occurrence of the variables. This permits us to establish how the articles relate the variables. Therefore, for each kind of article we made a co-occurrence test using the Jaccard coefficient.

7.5.3.1 Co-occurrence in the Colombian Articles

In the Colombian art icles there are two c lusters of variables. The first consists of Paramilitaries, Opposition and War on Drugs; the second c luster consists of Refugees, Colombian Ar my, Colombian Govern ment_Parapolitics and Demobiliza- tion, as Figure 58 shows.

- 342 -

Figure 58 – Co-occurrence in the Colombian Articles

Based on the co-occurrence of the variables in c luster one, it is clear that the Colombian articles make a c onnection between the War on Drugs and the Paramilitaries, who are both victims and beneficiaries in the war: They are victims, because they are un der attack as drug bar ons. At the same time , the para militaries fight on the side of the Colombian Army against the guerrillas, who are also dru g barons. For that reason, the paramilitaries are indirectly beneficiaries of American aid to the Colombian Army. On the other side, there is a relationship between the War on Drugs and Opposition and Paramilitaries. This could be explained by the fact that the paramilitaries try to eliminat e the opposition to the governm ent by illegal means, and sometimes the War on Drugs is used to eliminate the opposition under the pretext that they are auxilia ries of the guerrillas (and by ext ension auxiliaries of drug dealers).

In the second cluster t here is a r elationship between Colombian Government_Para- politics and Demobilization. For the Colombian articles, it is very clear that the infiltration of the pa ramilitaries into the governm ent is c losely related to th e paramilitaries’ Demobilization process, which many view as legaliz ing their crimes and an example of their politic al power. In the same way, these two variables ar e related to the Colombian Ar my and Refugees, becau se the military actions of the

- 343 - paramilitaries and sometimes of the Colombian Army have led to the displacement of many civilians.

The other 5 variables appear to be isolated and not related.

7.5.3.2 Co-Occurrence in the International Articles

In the international articles, there are three clusters of va riables. The first consists of Paramilitaries, Colombian President , Indians and Colombian Government_Para- politics. The second c luster consists of Child Soldiers and Elite Victims, and the third cluster consists of Colombian Secret Police and Colombian Army, as Figure 59 shows.

Figure 59 – Co-occurrence in the International Articles

Based on the co-occurrence of the variable s in cluster one, there is a relation between t he paramilitaries, the Colombian President and the infiltration of the paramilitaries into th e governm ent, three vari ables that are ve ry closely related, because the paramilitaries ta ke part in the government and have the support of the Colombian President. From this perspective, it is possible to establish a causal effect: The para militaries won po litical po wer, and con sequently they infiltrated the

- 344 - government, including the Pres idency. Moreover, there is another variable related to these three: Indians, because am ong the m ost severely affected victims of this triad are the Indians, who own land that is key to the political and economic projects of the paramilitaries and the government.

In the second cluster, there is a relationship between Child Soldiers and Elite Victims. These two extreme gr oups show that both t he most vu lnerable and poorest persons and also the rich and elites are victims of the war.

In the third cluster, there is a relationship between the Colombian Secret P olice and the Colo mbian Ar my, two institutions that became allies of the paramilita ries an d consequently oppose those who criticize them and the governm ent: trade unionists, independent politicians, N GOs, human rights organizations , etc. This situation illustrates how great the danger is that Colombia will become a failed state.

The other three variables appear isolated and unrelated.

7.5.4 Conclusions of the quantitative analysis of the articles used in the experiment

– When the variables are significant (7 cases), in 4 cases the international articles seem to exer t the strongest in fluence on Group 3. The Colombian articles seem to be the strongest influenc e in two cases, and in one c ase it is not possible to determine the influence of the articles on Group 3.

– When we c ompare the percent age of pres ence of each variable in both kinds of article, we can see that the presence of the variables is very similar or the same for 11 variables (the exc eption is Paramilitaries). However, with 8 variables we see a difference in the lev el of under standing between Groups 1 and 2 (although it is statistically signific ant in only two cases, it is imposs ible to ignore the tendency of Group 2 to have the highest percentages of understanding). This means that the level of understanding is not det ermined by the presence of the va riables, but rather by the style of the articles.

- 345 - – With 9 variables, it is possible to sugges t that the strongest in fluence is that of the international articles on Group 3, because of the closeness of the scores between Groups 2 and 3.

– In the Colombian artic les, the relations hips established between t he variables mix political factors with militar y factors, and also with the victims, as we can see in cluster one: Paramilitaries, Opposition and War on Drugs, and in cluster two: Refugees, Colombian Ar my, Colombian Govern ment_Parapolitics and Demobiliza- tion. Moreover, there are 5 isolated variable s, two more than in the int ernational articles.

– In the international articles, the va riables are clearly related in three categories: Politics ( Colombian Government_Parap olitics, Colombian President , Paramilitaries and Indians), Civilian Victims ( Child Sold iers, Elite Vict ims) and Colombian Armed Forces ( Colombian Ar my and Colombian Secret Police ). Only three variables are isolated.

Although each of the variables has the same percentage of presence in the two kinds of article ( with t he exception of the Paramilitaries), the international articles have a tendency to enable a higher lev el of under standing, to be the strongest influence on Group 3 and to make the relationships between the variables increasingly clear.

- 346 - ZxÇxÜtÄ VÉÇvÄâá|ÉÇá

Through the qualitativ e analysis of the Colombian opinion articles , the experiment to measure the impact of the Colombian and international articles on the readers and the content analysis of the 311 articles selected for the current research, we r eached the following conclusions with respect to our hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:

H1. The w riters of opinion articles in the international media use their independence, resources and privileged positions to do journalism pro peace.

This thesis receives s upport. The internatio nal articles offer ex planations with more depth, focus on the topics and the causes related to the conflict, avoid using a Manichean scheme, refrain from assigning guilt, and devote space to explaining the actions and motives of all parties. They use a more scientific sc heme: Usually they present a thesis, offer some arguments and reach a conclusion. However, they offer only limited information about Colombia, because, as international media, they do not assign Colombia high priority. Consequent ly, the international articles provide information irregularly and are less detail ed than the Colom bian articles. More information and details about Colombia would be desirable, especially because the Colombian conflict is one of the worst in t he world and is increa singly becoming a destabilizing factor in Latin America. Th is is suggested by Mexic an invo lvement in Colombian drug distribution networks.

Sub-H. 1.1. The international articles focus on the causes of the conflict more than do the Colombian articles.

This sub-hypothesis receives support. The in ternational media focus on inequality in wealth, the weakness of the state and the drug traffic as causes.

Sub-H. 1.2. The international articles do not identify “bad” and “good” actors.

This sub-hypothesis receives support. This scheme, typical for the journalism of attachment, is one that all the international opinion articles avoid. - 347 - Sub-H. 1.3. The internationa l articles focus more than do the Colom bian articles on the largest and most complex civilian actors in the conflict.

This sub-hypothesis receives support. The in ternational opinion articles focus on the peasants, who are the largest group of civ ilian actors in the conflict and have the diversity typical of a large group. Some peasants become refugees, some homeless, some become human rights activists, and some are forced to cooperate with the guerrillas o r paramilita ries, et c. Peasants ar e a grou p of very div erse and c omplex actors who receive more attention and anal ysis in the international than in the Colombian articles.

Sub-H. 1.4. The international articles devote le ss space to elite victim s (and the implicit distinction between worthy and unworthy victims).

This sub-hypothesis receives support (for t he present research we selected the case of Ingrid Betancourt). In general, this case was not as important for the international media as for the Colombian. The inte rnational m edia prefer to speak about kidnapped persons in general, without disti nguishing individual perso ns. This situation is particularly striking in The New York Tim es, where t here is not a single reference to the Betancourt kidnapping in the selected period.

H2. In Colombia, the independent and cr itical media publish qualitative opinion articles, but they h ave ch osen the jo urnalism of attachment as a w ay to contribute to peace.

Sub-H 2.1. The Colombian articles do not focus on key and very complex actors such as the USA.

Sub-H 2.2. The Colombian articles identify actors as “bad” or “good.”

Sub-H. 2.3. The Colombian ar ticles focus more than do the international articles on small groups, easy to identify as civilian actors in the conflict.

- 348 - Sub-H. 2.4. The Colombian articles do not focus on com plex and key situations to help under stand the conflict, even though extr eme v iolations of hum an rights are involved.

This hypot hesis and the related sub-hypot heses receive support. The Colombian authors clearly take sides in favor of the vi ctims of the conflict, and in this way they use a Manichean sch eme, where the “bad” Pr esident, the rich and the paramilitaries attack the “innocent” peasants. In this s cheme, the favored groups are easily identifiable as the I ndians and the journalists themselv es, while complex and diverse groups such as the peasants receive less a ttention. Due t o this sim plification, complex and key military actors such as the USA (which finances the war, is playin g a key role in the current def eat of the guerrillas a nd supports, but at the same time combats, the paramilitaries) have a marginal presence in the analysis. To a similar extent, the Colombian authors offer littl e space to the violence against trade unionists, which is among the worst in the world. T his may be because the trade unionists, although a small group, are very diverse, and inf iltration by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries makes it difficult to locate them in a Manichean scheme.

H3. The readers of journalism pro peace can understand the conflict better than can the readers of the journalism of attachment.

Sub-H 3.1. With jour nalism pro peace, t he reader can m ore c learly identify the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.2. With journalis m pro peace, the reader can gai n a m ore coherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.4. With journalis m pro peac e, the reader c an underst and more about complex phenomena like “parapolitics.”

There is s upport for this hypothesis and fo r Sub-hypotheses 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. With the international articles, the reader c an understand better, more easily identify the causes of the conflict and explain it c onsistently, but thi s higher level of understanding is not statistically significant, only higher in percentage.

- 349 - Sub-H. 3.3. With jour nalism pro peace, the reader c an underst and more about the actors and their roles in the conflict.

This sub-hypothesis is partially disconfirme d: For 8 actors selected, in two cases (Children and Para militaries) the internat ional articles enab le greater, statistically significant understanding. In two cases, they enable greater understanding that is not statistically significant (Opposition and USA). In 3 cases (Colombian Army, Colombian Secret Police and Indians) the le vel of understanding is practically t he same, and in one case the le vel of understanding is lower, but not in a statistically significant manner. It appears that for readers asked about conc rete actors and their actions, the Colombian and in ternational articles enable a ver y similar level of understanding. Nevertheless, it is a little greater with the international articles.

H4. Journ alism pro peace r epresents an opp ortunity t o re-contextualize independent Colombian journalism and generate understanding.

Sub-H. 4.1. When readers read both versions, they can m ore clearly identify the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.2. When readers read both versions, they can gain a m ore c oherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.3. When readers read both versions, they can better understand the actors and their roles in the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.4. When readers read both versions, they can better understand com plex phenomena like “parapolitics.”

This hy pothesis and all the related sub-hy potheses find su pport. This is not simply because together the two kinds of article offer more info rmation, as in som e cases the articles are contradictory or offer co mpletely different information and a different perspective. In the majority of cases, t he reader must take a decision and decide which articles are more accurate. The tests made (ANOVA, Kruskal Wallis, Mann Whitney U, Bonferroni) indicate, in a statis tically significant manner, that with 7 of 12

- 350 - variables t he reader who had both versio ns understood more than the reader with only the Colombian articles. Vari ables that show a s ignificant difference in t his case are: Colombian Government -Parapolitics, Opposition, USA, Child Soldiers, Colombian Army, Paramilitaries and Refugees- Displaced. However , in the comparison with the international articles, t here is a signific ant statistical difference only in three cases: Refugees-Displaced, Colombian President and Colombian Army.

The question is: Which articles exercis e more influence on readers who have both kinds of ar ticle? According to the same test s, it is plausib le to suggest that when readers have the Colombian and international articles (situation 3), the international articles have the strongest influence. This is becaus e when readers have only the international articles (situation 2) , their scores are more similar to those of r eaders who read both types than to the readers of only the Colombian articles (situation 1).

The other five variables ex hibit a particular behavior. For the Colomb ian Secret Police, the level of underst anding is the same in all three sit uations. With Elite Victims, the higher score occu rs in Situation 2, althoug h it is followed very closely by Situation 3. With two variabl es, Situation 1 is more sim ilar than is Situation 2 to Situation 3: Colombian President and Dem obilization. However, when we keep in mind the level of coherence, the identific ation of the causes and the level of understanding of complex phenomena, it is clear that the international articles are the strongest influence for readers with both k inds of article, due to the similar ity of the scores. Of course, there are the two exceptions mentioned: Colombian President and Demobilization. That c ould be because of the detailed in formation about them in th e Colombian articles and their tendency to pers onalize the conflict in concrete figures like the Colombian President and the leaders of the demobilization.

In summary, the Colombian articles repres ent the journalism of attachment, and the international articles, journalism pro peace. When readers have both versions, the international articles with their analytical style have a stronger influence than the Colombian authors’ emotional at tachment to the victims. Howev er, the international articles alone are not enough to explain the conflict adequately, because they lac k many details found in the Colo mbian articles. For this reason, the best way t o offer Colombians detached, pro-peace information w ould be to combine the two types of

- 351 - journalism as a first step toward counter ing the of ficial pr opaganda. With more qualitative information, Colombian reader s could understand the conflict and its causes, avoid polariz ation and the assignm ent of guilt. They would als o be better prepared to look for democratic solution s, such as the election of mayors, congressmen and a president more interest ed in t he peacef ul resolution of the conflict than in the current military approach.

There are many ways to st imulate and promote the compet ency of the international pro-peace media: Journalis m students should study jour nalism pro peace at the university. Teaching English as a sec ond language must be an educational priority, because a lack of language skills is a barrier for the majority of Colombians. Media outlets or independent journalis ts should pr omulgate international articles by making Spanish translations and offering a perio dical public ation with the most pertinent Colombian and international opinion articles, etc.

The effort to counter propaganda is just a step on the long and very complex path to peace, but informing and enlightening citizens about the conflict must have priority, or Colombia could fail as a st ate. Today we live in an in formation age in which it is essential to have acc ess to reliable informa tion. At present, journalism is promoting war in Colombia. For this reason, it has to be redirected in a more positive and productive direction. The result s of this research are encouraging. This offers an opportunity for a country that desperately needs a chance for peace.

- 352 - U|uÄ|ÉzÜtÑ{ç

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Articles in Newspapers and Magazines

A

Aguirre, Alberto. “Los Dejo Solos” (He leaves them alone). In: Cromos. March 3, 2005. Aguirre, Alberto. “Son Enemigos” (They are Enemies). In: Cromos. April 9, 2005. Aguirre, Alberto. „Se Alza el Indio“ (The Rebel Aborigine). In: Cromos. May 20, 2005. Aguirre, Alberto. “Dizque Penalista” (Apparently Lawyer). In: Cromos. June 10, 2005. Aguirre, Alberto. Tierra por plomo (Land for Bullets).In: Cromos. September 23, 2005. Aguirre, Alberto. „Sin tierra“ (Without Land). In: Cromos. November 25, 2005. - 363 - Aguirre, Alberto. “Olla Podrida“ (Stew). In: Cromos. February 2, 2006. Aguirre, Alberto. “Pais Peligroso” (Danguerous Country). In: Cromos. April 4, 2006. Aguirre, A lberto. “El Pa is se Deslie “ (T he country is dissolving). In: Cromos. December 4, 2006. Aguirre, Alberto. “Tan Querido Mr Woods (Mr Wo ods, so lovely)“. In: Cromos. Dezember 13, 2006 Aguirre, Alberto. “Renace el Nazi smo” (The Nazism Reborns). In: Cromos. March 2, 2007. Aguirre, Alberto. “Las mentiras del Gobi erno para Justificar el Asesinato de Sindicalistas” (The Lies of the Governm ent to Justify the Killin gs of Trade Unionists). In: Cromos: September 7, 2007. Annick, Cojean. «ENQUÊTE Le "New York Times“ ou l'obsession de l'excellence Sûr de lui, réputé pour son esprit de sérieux et ses éditori aux cinglants, le journal de référence américain veut maintenant se rapprocher de ses lecteurs». In: Le Monde, December 12, 1994. Associated Press. “Violence Turns Village into Ghost Town”. February 1, 2005.

B

Blow, Chrales M. “Gay Ma rriage and Moral Minority”. In: The New York Times . Nov 29, 2008. Brook Stephen. “Let the Bad Times Roll“. In: The Guardian. February 25, 2008. Burghardt, Peter. “Der Teflon- Präsident“.In: Süddeutsche Zeit ung. Febr uary 28, 2009.

C

Camacho Guizado, Alvaro. “Paramilitarism o y Mafia” (Paramilitarism and Mafia). In: El Espectador. October 3, 2004. Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Si eso es Oposición” (If this is opposition). In: El Espectador. July 15, 1979. Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Noticiero Oficial Militar en Tv” (Official News Magazin in TV). In: El Espectador. July 27, 1980.

- 364 - Cano Isaz a, Guiller mo. “La Credib ilidad de un Periód ico” (The credibility of a newspaper). In: El Espectador. July 17, 1983. Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Sobre la Libertad de Prensa” (About the Press Freedom) In: El Espectador. September 28, 1983. Cano Isaza, Guillermo. “Libreta de Apunte s” (Notes). In: El Espectador. January 12, 1986. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Crimenes Internac ionales“ (Internationa l Crimes). In: El Espectador. May 14, 2005. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Asimetri as de la Verdad Histórica” (A symmetries of the Historical Truth). In: El Espectador. August 1, 2006. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Qué Significa estar Desplazado en Sucre?“ (What Means to be displaced in Sucre). In: El Espectador. September 2, 2006. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “La Responsabilidad del Presidente” (The responsibility of the President). In: El Espectador. November 25, 2006. Cepeda Castro, Iván. „Contra el Genocidio” (Against Genocide). In: El Esp ectador. July 21, 2007. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “Cerca de 1000 Ejec uciones Extrajudic iales“ (Alm ost 1.000 Extrajudicial Executions). In: El Espectador. October 6, 2007. Cepeda, Castro, Iván. “La nueva Etapa de la Guerra“ (The New St age of the War).In: El Espectador. November 25, 2007. Cepeda Castro, Iván. “La destitución de J osé Obdulio Gaviria” (The Destitution o f Jose Obdulio Gaviria). In: El Espectador. March 14, 2008. Chicago Daily Obser ver. “How the Liber al Media Stonewalled the Edwards”. In: Chicago Daily Observer. August 18, 2008. Conlan, T ara. "BBC World dropped for al-Jazeer a English in Israel“. In: The Guardian. December 13, 2006. Crispin, Shawn. “Inconvenient T ruths in Singapore“. In: Asian Times . December 1, 2006.

D

Duzán, María Jimena. “La Mano Larga de Pablo” (The Bi g Hand of Pablo). In: El Tiempo. May 15, 2005.

- 365 - Duzán María Jimena. “Las Victimas Somos In visibles” (We the Victims are Invisible). In: El Tiempo. June 27, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “Uribe Modelo 2005: La fuerza de la retórica” (Uribe model 2005: the Strength of the Rhetoric). In: El Tiempo. May 23, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “El l enguaje y las percepciones: El mundo feliz de Alvaro Uribe” (The language and t he perceptions: the happy world of Alvaro Uribe). In: El Tiempo. June 20, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Herencia de Osorio” (The Legacy of Osorio). In: El Tiempo, Julio 24, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Paz no es el Fin de lo Ilegal” (Peace is not the End of the Illegal).In: El Tiempo. September 13, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “No Somos Muchos, pero: el Derecho de ser Antiuribistas” (We are not many, but: the Right of Being Anti Uribistas. In: El T iempo. September 26, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “El País de la Reel ección: Consecuencias del Artículito” (The country of the reelection: c onsequences of the article). In: El Tiempo. October 10, 2005. Duzán, María Jimena. “El Boicot a Coca Cola“ (The Boycott to Coca Cola). In: El Tiempo. Januar 16, 2006. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Traquetización de la Opinión” (The Narcotization of the Opinion). In: El Tiempo. June 12, 2006. Duzán, María Jimena. “Pasión por Co lombia” (Passion for Colombia).In: El Tiempo. July 30, 2006. Duzán, María Jimena. “27 años del Colo mbian Dream” (The C olombian Dream: 2 7 Years). In: El Tiempo, October 16, 2006. Duzán, María Jimena. “Una Corte Valiente pero Sola” (A brave but solitary Court). In. El Tiempo. November 13, 2006. Duzán, María Jimena. “El Pacto de Railit o entre Paras y Dirigentes” (The Agrrement of Railito between Paras and Leaders). In: El Tiempo. Januar 29, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “El Fracaso del Proc eso de Pa z con los Paras: la Mentira de la Desmovilización” (The Failure of t he Peace Process with the Paramilitarie s: the Lie of the Demobilization).In: El Tiempo. February 12, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Mejora la Imagen” (The Lo ok improves). In: El Tiempo. April 22, 2007.

- 366 - Duzán, María Jimena. “La Parafarsa: la Verdad es que no les Gusta la Verdad”. (The Parafarce: the Truth is hat they don’t lik e the Truth). In: El Tie mpo. May 7, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Ayuditas para la Me moria: Un Recorderis a Ramón Isaza“ (Little Help to Remember: a Reminder to Ramón Isaza). In: El Tiempo. June 10, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Nuevos Condicio namientos del Plan Colombia” (The New Conditions of the Plan Colombia). In: El Tiempo. June 24, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “El Maquillaje Pres idencial: el Para militarismo Vivito y Coleando” (The Presidential M ake Up: The Paramiltarism is Alive). In: El Tiempo. July 22, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Cruzada por los Paras: el Cambio Extremo” (The Crusade for the Paramilitaries: the Extreme Change). In: El Tiempo. July 30, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Los Into cables” (The Untouchables).In: El Tiempo. August 5, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Aniversario of 11 S” (11.09 Anniversar y). In: El Tie mpo. September 10, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “Toda una Trampa” (A whole Trap). In: El Tiempo. September 23, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Carta de Ingrid: la Lectura del Dolor”. (Ingrid’s let ter: the Reading of the Pain) In: El Tiempo. December 2, 2007. Duzán, María Jimena. “La Muerte de Raúl Reyes: Somos el Israel de la Región?” (The Deat h of Raúl Reyes: are we the Isr ael of the region?). In: El T iempo. March 2, 2008.

E

El Tiempo. “María Jimena Duzán”. In: El Tiempo. March 15, 1993. El Tiempo. “Parapolítica pr ovoca enfrentamiento entre Congresistas y Ministros” (Parapolitic caused confrontation between Congressmen and Ministries). In: El Tiempo, February 28, 2007. El Espectador. "Audiencia de Elespectador .com creció 79 por ciento“ (Audience of ElEspectador.com incr eased 79 percent).In: El Espectador . December 3, 2007.

- 367 - El Espect ador. “Fiscal Cr itica al Consejer o Presidencial José Obdulio Gaviria” (General Prosecutor criticizes the Presidential Advise r J osé Obdulio Gaviria).In: El Espectador. April 10, 2008. Emmot, Bill. “Time for Referendum in the Monarchy”. In: The Guardian, December 8, 2000. F

Foley, Stepehn. "Battle for the New York Times". In: The Independent. September 12, 2008.

G

Glaberson, William. “The Media Buusin ess; Times Co. Acquirin g Boston Globe for $1.1 Billion”. In: The New York Times. June 11, 1993. Guillen, Gonzalo. “Uribe's anticorruption chief resigns”. In: El Nu evo Herald . December 13, 2007. Goodman, Joshua. “ Breast-Obsessed TV Show a Colombian Hit”. By: Associated Press. Sept 19, 2006.

J

Jerusalem Times. “Iran bans The Economist over map“. In: Jerusalem Times. June 14, 2006.

K

Kurtz, Howard. "The Post Wins 6 Pulitzer Prizes". In: Washington Post. April 8, 2008.

M

Martinez, Margarita. “No nos moverémos de este pueblo” (We are no leaving this town). In: Colprensa. January 29, 2004. Mckinley, James C. Jr. “ U.S. Is Arm s Bazaar for Mexican Drug Gans” . In: The New York Times, published by the Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 9, 2009. - 368 - Molano Br avo, Alfredo. “Canje o Negoc iación”. (Exc hange or Negotiation) In: El Espectador. August 12, 2005 Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “La Macarena“ (The Macarena).In: El Espectador. February 12, 2006. Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Disf razar Rea lidades“ (Disguising Realities) . In: El Espectador. May 19, 2006. Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Envión Final“ (Last Push). In: El Espectador. May 27, 2006. Molano Br avo, Alfredo. “La Verdadera Pe sadilla” (The Real Nightmare). In: El Espectador. June 9, 2006. Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Trabas“ (Obstacles). In: El Espectador. October 7, 2006. Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Tierra de Patrones“ (Landlords). In: El Esp ectador. November 11, 2006. Molano Bravo, Alfredo. “Se Enr eda la Pi ta“ (The Situation Gets Complic ated). In: El Espectador. November 18, 2006.

N

Nadelmann, Ethan. "Dear Abby".In: The Oregonian. June 22, 1994. New York Times. “Magazine in Colombia Predicted an Attemp t on Life of the Pope”. In: The New York Times. May 14, 1981.

O

Ospina, William. “En Busca de la Semilla del Desord en“ (Looking for the Seeds of Chaos). In: Cromos. May 25, 2007. Ospina, William. „Las Convulsiones de Colombia“ (The conv ulsions of Colombia). In: Cromos July 7, 2007. Ospina, William. “Entre la Impunidad y la Incoherencia“ (Between the Impunity an d the Incoherence). In: Cromos. August 3, 2007. Ospina, William. “Colombia en el plan eta: Relato de un pais que perdio la confianza”. (Colombia in the Planet: Narration of a country what lost it s Confidence). In: Número. 32.

- 369 - P

Palmer, Thomas C., Jr. "Globe Sale Po ints to Newspapers' Strength". In: The Boston Globe. June 12, 1993.

R Revista Semana. “Espionaje Tele fónico” (Telephone Espionage). In: Revista Semana. April 5, 1994.

Reyes, Gerardo. “A Uribe le estan expl otando las bombas (Bombs are exploding all around Uribe). In: Revista Cambio. November 23, 2007.

Reyes, Gerardo. “Former U.S. ambassador says he asked Uribe about drug links”. In: El Nuevo Herald. February 9,.2009.

Romero, Simon. “President Uribe of Colo mbia denies ties to Escobar”. In: International Herald Tribune. October 3, 2007.

Rother, Larry. “German Arcini egas, 98, Critic of Latin American Dictators”. In: The New York Times. December 5, 1999.

Rueda, María Isabel. "¿Quién es el Fidel Cano que hoy dirige ‘El Espectador’ que otro Fidel Cano fundó hace 120 años?. (Who is The Fidel Cano that directs “El Espectador” that another Fidel Cano founded 120 y ears ago?) In: Revista Semana. March 17, 2007.

S

Savage, Dan. “Antigay, Antifamily”. In: The New York Times. November 11, 2008. Seelye, Katharine Q."Times to Reduce Page Size and Clos e a Plant in 2008". In: The New York Times. July 16, 2006. Smith, James F. and Barnar d, Anne. "Iran bloggers test regime's tolerance“. In: The Boston Globe. December 18, 2006.

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T

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- 377 -

Annexes

- 378 -

Annexe 1 Preliminary Test

- 379 - Einleitende Fragen

1. Welches ist Ihre hauptsächliche Informationsquelle? (Mehrfachantworten sind möglich).

Internet

Printmedien

Radio

Fernsehen

Persönliche Kommunikation

Sonstige, und zwar ______

2. Lesen Sie Leitartikel?

Nie selten manchmal häufig sehr häufig

3. Im Vergleich mit den Nachrichten sind die Leitartikel:

Oberflächlicher langweiliger gleich interessanter anschaulicher

4. Wie würden Sie Ihre Kenntnis des Kolumbien-Konflikts einschätzen?

Sehr gering gering mittelmäßig gut sehr gut

5. Sind Sie in Kolumbien gewesen?

Noch nie

einmal

mehrmals

6. Haben Sie Freunde aus Kolumbien?

Nein

Einige

Viele

- 380 - 7. Wie nahe geht Ihnen der Kolumbien-Konflikt?

Gar nicht wenig Teilweise sehr

8. Können Sie den Kolum bien-Konflikt von ande ren in der Dritten W elt unterscheiden?

Gar nicht sehr wenig wenig teilweise vollständig

9. Welche sind die Gründe des Kolumbien-Konflikts

a. ______

b. ______

c. ______

d. ______

Ich weiß nicht

10. Welche ist der Unterschied zwischen Paramilitärs und Guerrillas

______. ______

______

______

Ich weiß nicht

- 381 -

Annexe 2 Agreement Form

- 382 -

Einverständniserklärung

Ich, ______nehme in einem Experiment über den kolumbianischen Krieg teil.

Ich werde ____ Artikel Lesen.

Ich versuche, im Zeitraum des Experiments keine Nachrichten über Kolumbien zu lesen, zu sehen oder zu hören.

Am Ende des Experiments werde ich ______Euro bekommen.

______Datum Unterschrift

- 383 -

Annexe 3 Questionnaires

- 384 - Erste Teil - Die Drogen – Der Konflikt – Die Opfer

Ausrottung

1. Das Ausreißen der Drogenpflanzen per Hand ist effektiv um den Drogenanbau zu beseitigen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

2. Die Guerrillla unterstützt die Ausrottung der Drogen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

3. Die Bauern bauen die Drogen an

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

4. Die Bauern verdiene n viel mehr an Koka als an Ananas oder anderen trad itionellen Produkten

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

5. Die Regierung kann das Schädli ngsbekämpfungsmittel in einigen Teilen des W alds nicht benutzen, weil es das Gesetz verbiet.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

6. Der Drogenhandel hat die Paramilitärs gestärkt

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

7. Der Drogenhandel hat die Guerillas gestärkt

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

8. „Pflanz enzerstörer“, deren Arb eit es ist, die Drogenpflanzen aus zureißen, sind für die Guerrillas leicht zu treffende Ziele.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

9. Trotz der Milliarden Dollar aus Hilfsmitteln, verlieren USA und Kolumbien die Schlacht gegen den Drogenanbau

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

10. Die Regierung hat die Ver sprechen nicht eingehalten, die sie d en „Pflanz enzerstörer“ gegeben hat.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 385 - Indianer

11. Angriffe gegen Indianer werden strafrechtlich nicht verfolgt

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

12. Regierung und Gr undbesitzer haben sich verbündet, um sich das Land der Indianer anzueignen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

13. Die Kolumbianische Armee unterdrückt die Proteste der Indianer.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

14. Die Regierung ergriff Maßnahmen zum Schutz der Indianer

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

15 Trotz des Waffenstill stands verüben die Pa ramilitärs weiterhin Mordanschläge gegen die Indianer

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

16. Die Angriffe gegen Indianer richten sich gezielt sind auf deren Führer

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

17. Die Armee behauptet, dass die Indianer die die FARC unterstützen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Ingrid Betancourt

18. Ingrid Betancourt hat in Europa mythischen Status erreicht

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

19. In vielen Städten Frankreichs ist Ingrid Betancourt eine Ehrenbürgerin

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 386 - 20. Viele L eute in Kolumbien fühl en sich du rch die besondere Aufmerksamkeit, die Ingrid Betancourt geschenkt wird, irritiert.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

21. Die ausländischen Anhänger Ingrid Betancourts haben gute Kennt nisse de s Kolumbianischen Konflikts

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Kinder in dem Konflikt

22. In dem Kolumbianischen Konflikt werden viele Kinder als Soldaten eingesetzt

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

23. Normalerweise werden diese Kindersoldaten gezwungen am Konflikt teilzunehmen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

24. In eigenen Fällen haben die Kindern andere Menschen gefoltert

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

25. Die Regierung bestreitet, dass Gewalt gegen Kinder ausgeübt wird

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

26. Die Mehrheit der Kindersoldaten gehört den Guerrillas an

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Flüchtlinge

27. Die Flüchtlinge in Kolumbien erhalten von der Regierung ausreichende und effektive Hilfe.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

28. Das Flüchtlingsproblem wird übersehen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 387 - 29. Schwarze und Indianer sind unverhältnismäßig stark betroffen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

30. Der Flüchtlinge sind hauptsächlich die ärmsten Leute in Kolumbien

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

31. Die Zahl der Flüchtlinge wird falsch angegeben

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

32. Die Verursacher der Flüchtlingsbewegung genießen Straffreiheit

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

TEIL II.

Alvaro Uribe

33. Von Herrn Uribe man kann sagen, dass er ein Alleinherrscher ist

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

34. Alvaro Uribes Verwaltung möchte der Arme e erlauben, Zivilisten ohne Gerichtsbefeh l festzunehmen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

35.In Kolumbien gibt es keinen Raum für politische Opposition

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

36. Die Vernichtung der Drogenpflanzen in Kolumbien war erfolgreich

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

37. Durch die Politik Alvaro Uribes konnte die Gewalt in Kolumbien eingedämmt werden

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

38. Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg von Alvaro Uribes Politik ist bloßer Zufall

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 388 - 39. Alvaro Uribe repräsentiert eine perfekte Diktatur

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

40. Alvaro Uribe behauptet, dass die Demokratie in Kolumbien „tief“ ist, aber das ist falsch.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

41. Alvaro Uribe gibt vor, Kolumbiens Messias zu sein

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

42. Alvaro Uribe hatte indirekte Verbindungen zu Drogenhändlern

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

43. Es gibt enge Verbindungen zwischen Paramilitärs, Armee und Polizei.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Armee

44. Die Menschenrechtsbilanz der kolumbianischen Armee hat sich nur deshalb verbessert, weil ihre Verbrechen privatisiert durch die Paramilitärs ausgeführt werden

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

45. Die kolumbianischen bewaffneten Kräfte genießen Straffreiheit.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

46. Die Verb rechen der kolumbianischen Armee werden mit der Notwendigkeit, gerechtfertigt, die Guerillas zu schwächen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

47. Armee und Paramilitärs koordinieren ihre Übergriffe

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

48. Die kolumbianische Armee muss „um jeden Preis“ Ergebnisse erzielen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 389 - Menschenrechte

49. Die kolumbianische Regierung gewährt den Paramilitärs Schutz und leugnet deren Opfer.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

50. Die Aussagen der kolumbianisch en Regierung könnten als grünes Licht für die Ermordung von Menschenrechtskämpfern verstanden werden

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

51. Die kolumbianische Regierung bezeichnet in Kolumbien aktive Menschenr echtler al s Terroristen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

52. Einige Verbrechen der kolumbianischen Armee werden von den USA finanziert.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

53. Die kolumbianisch e Regie rung weist B erichte übe r Mensch enrechtsverletzungen in Kolumbien zurück.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

54. Die Ermordung aktiver Menschenrechtler in Kolumbien geht auf d as Konto der Paramilitärs.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

55. Die Verantwortlichen für die Vergehen an aktiven Menschenrechtlern in Kolumbien werden in der Regel festgenommen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Opposition

56. In Kolumbien werden Gewerkschaftler systematisch getötet.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

57. Heutz utage werden weniger Morde an Ge werkschaftlern verübt, weil die kolumbianisch e Regierung eine Politik der Einschüchterung praktiziert.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 390 - 58. In Kolumbien unterliegt jegliche Kritik an der Regierung einer Zensur.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

59. Die Kolumbianische Regierung begeht Verbrechen an ihren Kritikern und Gegnern.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

60. In Kolumbien wurden viele Journalisten ermordet.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

61 Die R egierung garantiert die freie B erufsausübung von Gewerk schaftlern un d Oppositionellen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

62. Einige sehr qualifiz ierte, regierungskritische Journalisten Kolumbiens müssen ihrer Arbei t außerhalb Kolumbiens n achgehen, da sie in ihrer Heimat ständigen Drohungen ausgesetzt sind.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

63. Wenn e s als zweckdienlich er scheint, sch reckt Kolumbien vor Staatsverbrech en nicht zurück.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

64. Der „Aufklärung“ der Staatsverbrechen mangelt es an Unparteilichkeit.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Dritter Teil

Paramilitärs

65. Die P aramilitärs wurden gebildet, um die FARC trotz Fehlens ein er starken Zentralregierung bekämpfen zu können.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

66. Die Paramilitärs sind Drogenhändler.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

67 Die Führer der Paramilitärs könnten in den USA wegen Drogenhandels gerichtlich verfolgt werden.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 391 - 68. Die Paramilitärs haben ihre Macht hauptsächlich durch Gewalt und Massaker gefestigt.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

69. Die Paramilitärs ermorden mehr Zivilisten als Mitglieder der Guerrilla.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

70. Die Paramilitärs werden für lange Zeit ins Gefängnis kommen, weil sie viele Verbrechen begangen haben.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

71. Einige Paramilitärs werden in den kolumbianischen Medien als Helden dargestellt, obwohl sie keine Helden sind.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

72. Einige Paramilitärs werden in den kolumbianischen Medien als Opfer dargestellt, obwohl sie keine Opfer sind.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

73. Die Paramilitärs sind Mitglied der Drogenmafia.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

74. Der Einfluss der Paramilitärs ist entlang der Karibikküste, wo der Drogenexport abgewickelt wird, besonders groß.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

75. Die Paramilitärs streben an, amnestiert zu werden.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

76. Paramilitärs und FARC werden zunehmend zu Drogehändlern.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

77. Die massiven Verhaftungen von Mitgliedern der Guerilla laufen prob lemlos und fehlerfrei ab.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

78. Die Regierung handelt nach dem Motto, wer nicht für sie ist, ist gegen sie.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

79. Das Militärgesetz garantiert den Offizieren Straffreiheit.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 392 - 80. Durch di e Unterstützung der kolumbianische n Armee unterstützen die USA indirekt auch die kolumbianischen Paramilitärs.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

81. Die Paramilitärs werden ihre Opfer entschädigen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

82. Obwohl ein Straferlass für Paramilitärs unang emessen erscheint, gibt es in Kolumbien ein e Tendenz in diese Richtung.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

83. Trotz der erhöhten Verteidigungsausgaben und der amerikanischen Militärhilfe, bleibt der landesweite Einfluss der Kolumbianischen Armee sehr begrenzt.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

84 Das amerikanische Außenministerium betrachtet die Paramilitärs als Terroristen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

85. Das Programm „D emokratische Sicherheit“ hat die An zahl der Morde, Entführungen und Terrorangriffe drastisch verringert, aber Frieden und Sicherh eit für die Mehrheit des Bürgers es immer noch nicht.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Politik

86 Die Paramilitärs kontrollieren einen Teil des Kolumbianischen Parlaments.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

87. Die Paramilitärs sind in den Lokalregierungen von Kolumbien präsent.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

88 Die aktuelle Regierung in Kolumbien ist das Gegenteil von Demokratie und Pazifismus.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

89. In Kolumbien gibt es enge Verbindungen zwischen Paramilitärs und Politikern.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

90 Die Paramilitärs haben ihre Politischen Kandidaten mit Gewalt durchgesetzt.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 393 - 91. Die Paramilitärs haben die gesamte Regierung durchdrungen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

92 Die Verbindungen zwischen Drogenhändlern und Politikern sind nicht neu.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

93 Die Paramilitärs haben Wahlbetrug praktiziert.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

94. Die Mafia hat weder Einfluss auf noch Verbindungen zur Kolumbianischen Regierung.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

95. Politische Macht besitzt für die Paramilitärs höchste Priorität.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

96. Das Friedens- und Justizgesetz reflektiert die große politische Macht der Paramilitärs

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

97. Paramilitärische Führer gewinn en politisch e Macht, o hne wirkli ch in der P raxis auf Gewalt zu verzichten.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

98. Die Staatsanwaltschaft wird von den Paramilitärs stark beeinflusst.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

99. Die USA drückten ihre Besorgnis darüber aus, dass Para militärische Kommandanten die kolumbianischen Kongresswahlen manipulieren könnten.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

100. 2003 übernahmen Paramilitärs die Kontrolle über viele Büros der Landesgouverneure und der Bü rgermeister in N ordkolumbien, inde m sie ihre Konkurrenten tötet en, abschr eckten oder bestachen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

101. Die Paramilitärs haben Wahlen in Bundesländer manipuliert.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

102. Paramilitärische Kommandanten sagten öf fentlich, dass sie ein Drittel des Ko ngresses kontrollieren.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 394 - D.A.S.

103. Die Geheimpolizei (D.A.S.) kann ihre Mission aufgrund der Infiltration durch die Paramilitärs nicht erfüllen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

104. Der D.A.S. ist eine Zitadelle der Paramilitärs.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

105. Der D.A.S ist eine Organisation, die keine Verbindungen zu den Paramilitärs besitzt.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

106 Der D.A.S. und die Paramilit ärs haben zusammen gea rbeitet, um Gewerkschaftler zu ermorden und Operationen gegen Drogenhändler zu vereiteln.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

107. Jorge Noguera war trotz seiner Verbindungen zu den Paramilitärs Konsul in Mailand.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

Demobilisation

108. Das „F riedens und Justiz gesetz“ kann die kriminellen Netz e der Paramilitaries nicht abbauen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

109. Währe nd Sie vor Verletzungen des Waffens tillstandes durch die Paramilitärs die Augen verschloss, ergriff die kolumbianische Regierung gegen die FARC militärische Maßnahmen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

110. Das „Friedens un d Justiz gesetz“ sollte b esser als „ Gesetz der Straflos igkeit für Massenmörder, Terroristen und bedeutenden Drogenhändlern“ bezeichnet werden.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

111. Paramilitärs, die Gewalttaten begangen haben, können straffrei ausgehen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

112. Trotz Demobilisierung können die Paramilitärs ihre Strukturen und Macht erhalten.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

113. Die Debatte um das „Friedens und Justizgesetz“ ignorierte die Opfer.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 395 - 114-. Das Gesetz lässt die kriminellen Tätigkeiten der Paramilitärs (Erpressung, Drogenhandel, Mord) unbeeinträchtigt.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

115 Mit diesem Gesetz können die Verantwo rtlichen fü r die schändlichsten Menschenrechtsverbrechen straffrei ausgehen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

116. Das „F riedens- und Justizgesetz“ bringt weder Fried en noch eine funktionierende Justi z, weil es kei ne glaubwürdigen Strafen für Lügen, versteckte Verbrechen oder illegale Bereicherung vorsieht.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

117. Das neue „Friedens- und Justizgesetz“ macht den Paramilitärs große Zugeständnisse.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

118. Die USA unterstüt zen das „Friedens und J ustizgesetz“, Obwohl sie die Parami litärs als terroristische Organisation eingestuft haben

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

119. Die D emobilisation der Paramilitärs bed eutet noch nicht deren Integration in die Zivilgesellschaft. Es ist mehr eine Legalisierung ihrer Verbrechen

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

120. Für di e Veru rteilung der Verbrechen ehemaliger Kä mpfer existiert kein geset zlicher Rahmen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

121. Für einige Leute in Kolumbien ist die Demobilisierung der Paramilitärs eine Farce.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

122. Kolumbien läuft Gefahr, einem Mafia-Frieden zu erliegen.

Stimmt Stimmt überwiegend Weiß nicht Stimmt eher nicht stimmt nicht

- 396 -

Annexe 4 Kruskall Wallis and Mann Whitney U Test

- 397 - Statistik für Testa,b,c War

Drugs Indians Evictims ChSoldiers Refugees ColPresident ColArmy ColGov_Para Opposition ParaMil ColSecretPolice Demobilisation Chi-Quadrat 4,792 1,538 1,734 23,388 9,743 7,800 6,420 6,102 7,333 13,072 ,052 3,437 df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Asymptotische ,091 ,463 ,420 ,000 ,008 ,020 ,040 ,047 ,026 ,001 ,975 ,179 Signifikanz Exakte Signifikanz ,469 ,426 ,000 ,006 ,039 . . ,975 . Punkt- ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 . . ,000 . Wahrscheinlichkeit a. Kruskal-Wallis-Test Significant b. Gruppenvariable: All Groups Statistik für Testa War

Drugs Indians Evictims ChSoldiers Refugees ColPresident ColArmy ColGov_Para Opposition ParaMil ColSecretPolice Demobilisation Mann-Whitney-U 170,500 240,500 190,500 67,500 165,500 174,000 237,000 177,000 209,000 158,000 242,000 188,000 Wilcoxon-W 423,500 493,500 443,500 320,500 418,500 427,000 490,000 430,000 462,000 411,000 495,000 441,000 Z -1,711 -,036 -1,264 -4,201 -1,885 -1,638 -,124 -1,534 -,796 -1,981 ,000 -1,290 Asymptotische ,087 ,971 ,206 ,000 ,059 ,101 ,902 ,125 ,426 ,048 1,000 ,197 Signifikanz (2-seitig) a. Gruppenvariable: Group 1 and 2 Significant Statistik für Testa War

Drugs Indians Evictims ChSoldiers Refugees ColPresident ColArmy ColGov_Para Opposition ParaMil ColSecretPolice Demobilisation Mann-Whitney-U 157,500 196,000 203,500 71,000 176,500 185,500 154,500 137,000 126,500 84,000 230,000 206,500 Wilcoxon-W 410,500 449,000 456,500 324,000 429,500 438,500 407,500 390,000 379,500 337,000 483,000 459,500 Z -2,022 -1,116 -,937 -4,121 -1,610 -1,369 -2,144 -2,486 -2,791 -3,726 -,292 -,847 Asymptotische ,043 ,264 ,349 ,000 ,107 ,171 ,032 ,013 ,005 ,000 ,770 ,397 Signifikanz (2-seitig) a. Gruppenvariable: Group 1 Significant and 3 Statistik für Testa War

Drugs Indians Evictims ChSoldiers Refugees ColPresident ColArmy ColGov_Para Opposition ParaMil ColSecretPolice Demobilisation Mann-Whitney-U 224,000 200,000 230,000 237,000 121,500 131,000 151,500 209,500 174,500 186,000 238,500 171,500 Wilcoxon-W 477,000 453,000 483,000 490,000 374,500 384,000 404,500 462,500 427,500 439,000 491,500 424,500 Z -,430 -1,034 -,300 -,124 -2,898 -2,657 -2,212 -,767 -1,614 -1,322 -,085 -1,686 Asymptotische ,667 ,301 ,764 ,902 ,004 ,008 ,027 ,443 ,106 ,186 ,933 ,092 Signifikanz (2-seitig) a. Gruppenvariable: Group 2 and and 3 Significant

Annexe 5 Anova Test

ONEWAY ANOVA

Quadratsumme df Mittel der Quadrate F Signifikanz WarDrugs Zwischen den Gruppen 17,545 2 8,773 2,401 ,099 Innerhalb der Gruppen 230,227 63 3,654 Gesamt 247,773 65 Indians Zwischen den Gruppen 2,758 2 1,379 ,873 ,423 Innerhalb der Gruppen 99,500 63 1,579 Gesamt 102,258 65 EVictims Zwischen den Gruppen 1,576 2 ,788 ,631 ,535 Innerhalb der Gruppen 78,682 63 1,249 Gesamt 80,258 65 ChSoldiers Zwischen den Gruppen 42,636 2 21,318 19,516 ,000 Innerhalb der Gruppen 68,818 63 1,092 Gesamt 111,455 65 Refugees Zwischen den Gruppen 16,576 2 8,288 6,785 ,002 Innerhalb der Gruppen 76,955 63 1,222 Gesamt 93,530 65 ColPresident Zwischen den Gruppen 16,939 2 8,470 4,627 ,013 Innerhalb der Gruppen 115,318 63 1,830 Gesamt 132,258 65 ColArmy Zwischen den Gruppen 8,273 2 4,136 4,393 ,016 Innerhalb der Gruppen 59,318 63 ,942 Gesamt 67,591 65 ColGov_Para Zwischen den Gruppen 94,182 2 47,091 3,369 ,041 Innerhalb der Gruppen 880,682 63 13,979 Gesamt 974,864 65 Opposition Zwischen den Gruppen 16,939 2 8,470 3,613 ,033 Innerhalb der Gruppen 147,682 63 2,344 Gesamt 164,621 65 Paramil Zwischen den Gruppen 177,909 2 88,955 7,064 ,002 Innerhalb der Gruppen 793,364 63 12,593 Gesamt 971,273 65 ColSecPol Zwischen den Gruppen ,000 2 ,000 ,000 1,000 Innerhalb der Gruppen 111,091 63 1,763 Gesamt 111,091 65 Demob Zwischen den Gruppen 12,091 2 6,045 1,025 ,365 Innerhalb der Gruppen 371,500 63 5,897 Gesamt 383,591 65 Significant

- 400 -

Annexe 6 Bonferoni Test

- 401 -

Mehrfachvergleiche Bonferroni 95%-Konfidenzintervall Abhängige (I) (J) Mittlere Variable Gruppe Gruppe Differenz (I-J) Standardfehler Signifikanz Untergrenze Obergrenze WarDrugs 1 2 -1,04545455 ,57638380 ,223 -2,4631190 ,3722099 3 -1,13636364 ,57638380 ,159 -2,5540281 ,2813008 2 1 1,04545455 ,57638380 ,223 -,3722099 2,4631190 3 -,09090909 ,57638380 1,000 -1,5085735 1,3267553 3 1 1,13636364 ,57638380 ,159 -,2813008 2,5540281 2 ,09090909 ,57638380 1,000 -1,3267553 1,5085735 Indians 1 2 -,04545455 ,37891773 1,000 -,9774346 ,8865255 3 -,45454545 ,37891773 ,704 -1,3865255 ,4774346 2 1 ,04545455 ,37891773 1,000 -,8865255 ,9774346 3 -,40909091 ,37891773 ,853 -1,3410709 ,5228891 3 1 ,45454545 ,37891773 ,704 -,4774346 1,3865255 2 ,40909091 ,37891773 ,853 -,5228891 1,3410709 EVictims 1 2 -,36363636 ,33695397 ,854 -1,1924030 ,4651303 3 -,27272727 ,33695397 1,000 -1,1014939 ,5560393 2 1 ,36363636 ,33695397 ,854 -,4651303 1,1924030 3 ,09090909 ,33695397 1,000 -,7378575 ,9196757 3 1 ,27272727 ,33695397 1,000 -,5560393 1,1014939 2 -,09090909 ,33695397 1,000 -,9196757 ,7378575 ChSoldiers 1 2 -1,68181818* ,31512654 ,000 -2,4568984 -,9067380 3 -1,72727273* ,31512654 ,000 -2,5023529 -,9521925 2 1 1,68181818* ,31512654 ,000 ,9067380 2,4568984 3 -,04545455 ,31512654 1,000 -,8205348 ,7296257 3 1 1,72727273* ,31512654 ,000 ,9521925 2,5023529 2 ,04545455 ,31512654 1,000 -,7296257 ,8205348 Refugees 1 2 ,63636364 ,33323493 ,182 -,1832557 1,4559830 3 -,59090909 ,33323493 ,243 -1,4105284 ,2287102 2 1 -,63636364 ,33323493 ,182 -1,4559830 ,1832557 3 -1,22727273* ,33323493 ,001 -2,0468921 -,4076534 3 1 ,59090909 ,33323493 ,243 -,2287102 1,4105284 2 1,22727273* ,33323493 ,001 ,4076534 2,0468921 ColPresident 1 2 ,77272727 ,40792684 ,188 -,2306031 1,7760576 3 -,45454545 ,40792684 ,808 -1,4578758 ,5487849 2 1 -,77272727 ,40792684 ,188 -1,7760576 ,2306031 3 -1,22727273* ,40792684 ,011 -2,2306031 -,2239424 3 1 ,45454545 ,40792684 ,808 -,5487849 1,4578758 2 1,22727273* ,40792684 ,011 ,2239424 2,2306031 ColArmy 1 2 ,04545455 ,29256832 1,000 -,6741418 ,7650509 3 -,72727273* ,29256832 ,047 -1,4468691 -,0076763 2 1 -,04545455 ,29256832 1,000 -,7650509 ,6741418 3 -,77272727* ,29256832 ,031 -1,4923237 -,0531309 3 1 ,72727273* ,29256832 ,047 ,0076763 1,4468691 2 ,77272727* ,29256832 ,031 ,0531309 1,4923237

- 402 - ColGov_Para 1 2 -2,09090909 1,12730880 ,205 -4,8636199 ,6818017 3 -2,81818182* 1,12730880 ,045 -5,5908926 -,0454710 2 1 2,09090909 1,12730880 ,205 -,6818017 4,8636199 3 -,72727273 1,12730880 1,000 -3,4999835 2,0454380 3 1 2,81818182* 1,12730880 ,045 ,0454710 5,5908926 2 ,72727273 1,12730880 1,000 -2,0454380 3,4999835 Opposition 1 2 -,45454545 ,46163305 ,986 -1,5899708 ,6808799 3 -1,22727273* ,46163305 ,030 -2,3626980 -,0918474 2 1 ,45454545 ,46163305 ,986 -,6808799 1,5899708 3 -,77272727 ,46163305 ,297 -1,9081526 ,3626980 3 1 1,22727273* ,46163305 ,030 ,0918474 2,3626980 2 ,77272727 ,46163305 ,297 -,3626980 1,9081526 Paramil 1 2 -2,77272727* 1,06996489 ,036 -5,4043959 -,1410587 3 -3,90909091* 1,06996489 ,002 -6,5407595 -1,2774223 2 1 2,77272727* 1,06996489 ,036 ,1410587 5,4043959 3 -1,13636364 1,06996489 ,877 -3,7680322 1,4953050 3 1 3,90909091* 1,06996489 ,002 1,2774223 6,5407595 2 1,13636364 1,06996489 ,877 -1,4953050 3,7680322 ColSecPol 1 2 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 3 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 2 1 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 3 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 3 1 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 2 ,00000000 ,40038025 1,000 -,9847689 ,9847689 Demob 1 2 ,59090909 ,73217145 1,000 -1,2099282 2,3917463 3 -,45454545 ,73217145 1,000 -2,2553827 1,3462918 2 1 -,59090909 ,73217145 1,000 -2,3917463 1,2099282 3 -1,04545455 ,73217145 ,475 -2,8462918 ,7553827 3 1 ,45454545 ,73217145 1,000 -1,3462918 2,2553827 2 1,04545455 ,73217145 ,475 -,7553827 2,8462918 * Die Differenz der Mittelwerte ist auf dem Niveau 0.05 signifikant. Significant after Bonferroni´s Correction Tendence to be significant (It could be significant with more data)

- 403 -

Annexe 7 Presence of the Variables in the Articles

- 404 -

PRESENCE IN % OF EACH VARIABLE IN EACH MEDIA Media/ Variable Col Gov Col. Pres USA Parapol Democracy Year El Tiempo 7.4829932 24.829932 1.02040816 2.04081633 2.721088435 2005 Cromos 5.1282 0513 13.6752137 1.28205128 0 1.709401709 2005 El Espectador 9.56719818 7.51708428 7.97266515 0.45558087 0.455580866 2005 The Economits 5.88235294 12.8851541 7.28291317 1.40056022 1.120448179 2005 USA 4.7457 6271 8.81355932 18.6440678 0.6779661 1.355932203 2005 BBC 7.6045 6274 10.2661597 12.5475285 0 0 2005 El Tiempo 3.56435644 15.8415842 5.34653465 3.56435644 1.188118812 2006 Cromos 4.9382 716 18.1069959 2.4691358 1.64609053 4.115226337 2006 El Espectador 6.05095541 10.6687898 2.22929936 0.63694268 2.070063694 2006 The Economits 6.8762279 21.611002 6.48330059 1.76817289 0.785854617 2006 USA 4.4368 6007 12.9692833 16.3822526 0 1.023890785 2006 BBC 4.6263 3452 10.3202847 7.47330961 2.4911032 0.355871886 2006 El Tiempo 7.01970443 17.2413793 2.83251232 3.69458128 1.231527094 2007 Cromos 5.2863 4361 7.48898678 1.10132159 1.3215859 7.268722467 2007 El Espectador 6.16740088 5.72687225 3.30396476 0.88105727 1.54185022 2007 The Economits 6.21572212 21.2065814 6.39853748 5.11882998 1.279707495 2007 USA 7.7170 418 12.8617363 8.68167203 1.28617363 0.321543408 2007 BBC 3.0172 4138 13.7931034 8.18965517 3.87931034 0.431034483 2007 TOPIC POLITIC

PRESENCE IN % OF EACH VARIABLE IN EACH MEDIA Media/ Variable Killings Massacre Homicide Genocide Extra Jud Exec. Year El Tiempo 1.36054422 0.68027211 0 0 0 2005 Cromos 1.7094 0171 2.56410256 1.70940171 0.85470085 0.854700855 2005 El Espectador 1.13895216 3.18906606 0.91116173 0.91116173 0.227790433 2005 The Economits 0.84033613 0.56022409 0 0 0 2005 USA 0.6779 661 2.71186441 0 0.33898305 0 2005 BBC 0.3802 2814 0.38022814 0 0 0 2005 El Tiempo 1.58415842 0.59405941 0.1980198 0 0 2006 Cromos 6.5843 6214 1.2345679 0.82304527 0.82304527 0.823045267 2006 El Espectador 1.75159236 2.70700637 0.31847134 0.79617834 0.477707006 2006 The Economits 1.57170923 1.17878193 0 0 0 2006 USA 1.7064 8464 0.68259386 0.34129693 0 0.341296928 2006 BBC 1.7793 5943 1.42348754 0 0 0 2006 El Tiempo 1.23152709 2.09359606 0.24630542 0 0 2007 Cromos 4.4052 8634 1.98237885 0.22026432 0 0 2007 El Espectador 3.08370044 1.98237885 1.76211454 2.42290749 2.202643172 2007 The Economits 1.64533821 0.73126143 0 0 0 2007 USA 2.5723 4727 1.60771704 0.64308682 0 0.321543408 2007 BBC 0.8620 6897 0 0 0 0 2007 TOPIC KILLINGS

- 406 -

PRESENCE IN % OF EACH VARIABLE IN EACH MEDIA Media/ Variable Children Indians Journalists Trade Unions Displaced Kidnapings Peasants E Victims Year El Tiempo 0 1.02040816 0.34013605 0.34013605 1.020408163 0.34013605 0 1.70068027 2005 Cromos 1.7094 0171 18.8034188 0 3.41880342 0.427350427 0 0.42735043 0 2005 El Espectador 0 9.11161731 2.50569476 0.6833713 4.328018223 0 3.18906606 0.22779043 2005 The Economits 0 0 0 0 0 0.84033613 0.56022409 0 2005 USA 0 0 0 0 0.338983051 0.6779661 0.33898305 0 2005 BBC 0 0 0 0 0.380228137 2.66159696 0.38022814 0.38022814 2005 El Tiempo 0 0.1980198 2.77227723 1.98019802 0.198019802 0 0.3960396 0.1980198 2006 Cromos 6.1728 3951 1.2345679 0 0.82304527 0.823045267 3.7037037 0.82304527 3.29218107 2006 El Espectador 0 1.59235669 0.63694268 2.70700637 7.165605096 0 2.22929936 0.15923567 2006 The Economits 0 0 0.19646365 0.39292731 4.715127701 2.35756385 0.78585462 0.19646365 2006 USA 0.3412 9693 0.34129693 0 7.84982935 0.341296928 1.36518771 1.36518771 0 2006 BBC 3.9145 9075 2.84697509 1.06761566 1.42348754 6.40569395 3.55871886 1.42348754 0.71174377 2006 El Tiempo 0 0.49261084 1.97044335 0.24630542 0.492610837 1.47783251 0.24630542 3.44827586 2007 Cromos 0.4405 2863 0 0 3.74449339 1.101321586 1.54185022 2.20264317 6.16740088 2007 El Espectador 0.44052863 5.28634361 0.22026432 0.66079295 1.762114537 3.96475771 0.44052863 3.30396476 2007 The Economits 0 0 0 4.57038391 0.365630713 6.21572212 0 1.2797075 2007 USA 0 0.32154341 3.53697749 6.43086817 0 2.25080386 0.64308682 0 2007 BBC 0 0 1.72413793 4.74137931 0 11.2068966 0.43103448 4.74137931 2007 TOPIC CIVIL VICTIMS

- 407 -

PRESENCE IN % OF EACH VARIABLE IN EACH MEDIA Media/ Variable Col Arm. Forc Guerrillas Paramilitaries Crimi nals Drug Traffic Mafia Terrorism Year El Tiempo 4.76190476 7.4829932 20.7482993 0 8.503401361 2.38095238 0 2005 Cromos 19.230 7692 7.26495726 5.55555556 2.13675214 0.854700855 0 7.26495726 2005 El Espectador 10.9339408 7.97266515 14.8063781 0.6833713 4.328018223 1.13895216 2.27790433 2005 The Economits 9.80392157 19.3277311 18.2072829 0.56022409 12.60504202 0 1.40056022 2005 USA 1.0169 4915 7.79661017 23.3898305 1.69491525 9.830508475 1.69491525 5.08474576 2005 BBC 3.4220 5323 17.1102662 20.5323194 0 12.92775665 0 1.14068441 2005 El Tiempo 12.4752475 6.53465347 16.4356436 0.3960396 16.633 66337 4.75247525 0.79207921 2006 Cromos 13.168 7243 10.6995885 8.64197531 4.9382716 0.823045267 0.41152263 0.41152263 2006 El Espectador 18.9490446 7.80254777 21.9745223 0.95541401 2.547770701 2.70700637 0.79617834 2006 The Economits 9.03732809 11.7878193 17.2888016 0 7.858546169 0.19646365 0.19646365 2006 USA 7.1672 3549 7.50853242 9.55631399 1.02389078 18.77133106 0.34129693 0.34129693 2006 BBC 9.6085 4093 16.7259786 9.60854093 0.71174377 7.829181495 0.35587189 0.71174377 2006 El Tiempo 5.78817734 9.85221675 22.1674877 0 7.019704433 2.09359606 1.72413793 2007 Cromos 8.1497 7974 24.8898678 6.16740088 6.82819383 0.881057269 1.3215859 0.44052863 2007 El Espectador 20.0440529 13.215859 14.9779736 0.44052863 1.982378855 0.22026432 0.66079295 2007 The Economits 5.48446069 14.4424132 12.797075 0.73126143 4.0219 37843 0.18281536 0.36563071 2007 USA 4.8231 5113 5.78778135 22.5080386 1.28617363 9.003215434 0 0.64308682 2007 BBC 8.6206 8966 15.0862069 9.9137931 0.86206897 8.189655172 0 1.29310345 2007 TOPIC ARME D ACTORS

- 408 - PRESENCE IN % OF EACH VARIABLE IN EACH MEDIA Media/ Variable Peace Demob. Year El Tiempo 4.76190476 6.46258503 2005 Cromos 2.5641 0256 0.85470085 2005 El Espectador 2.73348519 2.73348519 2005 The Economits 4.48179272 2.24089636 2005 USA 5.7627 1186 4.40677966 2005 BBC 6.4638 7833 3.42205323 2005 El Tiempo 1.58415842 2.77227723 2006 Cromos 2.4691 358 0 2006 El Espectador 0.79617834 1.27388535 2006 The Economits 2.5540275 2.1611002 2006 USA 2.3890 785 3.41296928 2006 BBC 3.9145 9075 0.71174377 2006 El Tiempo 4.06403941 3.32512315 2007 Cromos 5.5066 0793 1.54185022 2007 El Espectador 1.3215859 1.98237885 2007 The Economits 4.93601463 2.01096892 2007 USA 0.3215 4341 6.43086817 2007 BBC 2.1551 7241 0.86206897 2007 TOPIC PEACE

Media/ Variable Total in % Year El Tiempo 61.9047619 2005 Cromos 78.205 1282 2005 El Espectador 74.0318907 2005 The Economits 71.4285714 2005 USA 65.762 7119 2005 BBC 69.581 749 2005 El Tiempo 70.4950495 2006 Cromos 68.724 2798 2006 El Espectador 78.343949 2006 The Economits 62.475442 2006 USA 65.187 7133 2006 BBC 74.733 0961 2006 El Tiempo 67.9802956 2007 Cromos 77.533 0396 2007 El Espectador 82.3788546 2007 The Economits 59.7806216 2007 USA 69.131 8328 2007 BBC 70.689 6552 2007

Annexe 8 Mann Whitney U Test (Articles)

Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 1 3 4,67 14,00 2 3 2,33 7,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 1 3 2,00 6,00 2 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 1 3 2,00 6,00 2 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 1 3 4,33 13,00 2 3 2,67 8,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 1 3 4,67 14,00 2 3 2,33 7,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 1,000 ,000 ,000 2,000 1,000

Wilcoxon-W 7,000 6,000 6,000 8,000 7,000 Z -1,528 -1,964 -1,964 -1,091 -1,528 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,127 ,050 ,050 ,275 ,127 Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,200a ,100a ,100a ,400a ,200a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 1 3 5,00 15,00 3 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 1 3 2,00 6,00 3 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 1 3 2,00 6,00 3 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 1 3 3,67 11,00 3 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 1 3 4,67 14,00 3 3 2,33 7,00 Gesamt 6

- 412 - Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U ,000 ,000 ,000 4,000 1,000

Wilcoxon-W 6,000 6,000 6,000 10,000 7,000 Z -1,964 -1,964 -1,964 -,218 -1,528 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,050 ,050 ,050 ,827 ,127

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,100a ,100a ,100a 1,000a ,200a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 1 3 3,33 10,00 4 3 3,67 11,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 1 3 3,67 11,00 4 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 1 3 3,00 9,00 4 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 1 3 3,67 11,00 4 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 1 3 4,00 12,00 4 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 4,000 4,000 3,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 10,000 10,000 9,000 10,000 9,000 Z -,218 -,218 -,655 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,827 ,827 ,513 ,827 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] 1,000a 1,000a ,700a 1,000a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media

- 413 - Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 1 3 3,33 10,00 5 3 3,67 11,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 1 3 2,33 7,00 5 3 4,67 14,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 1 3 3,00 9,00 5 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 1 3 3,67 11,00 5 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 1 3 3,67 11,00 5 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 4,000 1,000 3,000 4,000 4,000

Wilcoxon-W 10,000 7,000 9,000 10,000 10,000 Z -,218 -1,528 -,655 -,218 -,218 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,827 ,127 ,513 ,827 ,827 Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- 1,000a ,200a ,700a 1,000a 1,000a seitig Sig.)] a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 1 3 4,67 14,00 6 3 2,33 7,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 1 3 4,33 13,00 6 3 2,67 8,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 1 3 3,00 9,00 6 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 1 3 3,67 11,00 6 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 1 3 4,00 12,00 6 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6

- 414 - Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 9,000 Z -1,528 -1,091 -,655 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,127 ,275 ,513 ,827 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- a a a a a seitig Sig.)] ,200 ,400 ,700 1,000 ,700 a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 2 3 4,33 13,00 3 3 2,67 8,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 2 3 4,00 12,00 3 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 2 3 4,00 12,00 3 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 2 3 2,67 8,00 3 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 2 3 4,00 12,00 3 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 2,000 3,000 3,000 2,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 8,000 9,000 9,000 8,000 9,000 Z -1,091 -,655 -,655 -1,091 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,275 ,513 ,513 ,275 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,400a ,700a ,700a ,400a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media

- 415 - Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 2 3 2,33 7,00 4 3 4,67 14,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 2 3 5,00 15,00 4 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 2 3 5,00 15,00 4 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 2 3 3,33 10,00 4 3 3,67 11,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 2 3 3,00 9,00 4 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 1,000 ,000 ,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 7,000 6,000 6,000 10,000 9,000 Z -1,528 -1,964 -1,964 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,127 ,050 ,050 ,827 ,513 Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,200a ,100a ,100a 1,000a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 2 3 2,33 7,00 5 3 4,67 14,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 2 3 5,00 15,00 5 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 2 3 5,00 15,00 5 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 2 3 2,67 8,00 5 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 2 3 2,67 8,00 5 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6

- 416 - Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 1,000 ,000 ,000 2,000 2,000

Wilcoxon-W 7,000 6,000 6,000 8,000 8,000 Z -1,528 -1,964 -1,964 -1,091 -1,091 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,127 ,050 ,050 ,275 ,275

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,200a ,100a ,100a ,400a ,400a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 2 3 3,00 9,00 6 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 2 3 5,00 15,00 6 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 2 3 3,67 11,00 6 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 2 3 2,67 8,00 6 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 2 3 3,00 9,00 6 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 3,000 ,000 4,000 2,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 9,000 6,000 10,000 8,000 9,000 Z -,655 -1,964 -,218 -1,091 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,513 ,050 ,827 ,275 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,700a ,100a 1,000a ,400a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media

- 417 - Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 3 3 2,00 6,00 4 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 3 3 5,00 15,00 4 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 3 3 5,00 15,00 4 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 3 3 3,67 11,00 4 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 3 3 2,33 7,00 4 3 4,67 14,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U ,000 ,000 ,000 4,000 1,000

Wilcoxon-W 6,000 6,000 6,000 10,000 7,000 Z -1,964 -1,964 -1,964 -,218 -1,528 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,050 ,050 ,050 ,827 ,127 Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- ,100a ,100a ,100a 1,000a ,200a seitig Sig.)] a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 3 3 2,00 6,00 5 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 3 3 5,00 15,00 5 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 3 3 5,00 15,00 5 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 3 3 4,00 12,00 5 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 3 3 2,00 6,00 5 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6

- 418 - Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U ,000 ,000 ,000 3,000 ,000

Wilcoxon-W 6,000 6,000 6,000 9,000 6,000 Z -1,964 -1,964 -1,964 -,655 -1,964 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,050 ,050 ,050 ,513 ,050

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,100a ,100a ,100a ,700a ,100a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 3 3 2,33 7,00 6 3 4,67 14,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 3 3 5,00 15,00 6 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 3 3 3,00 9,00 6 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 3 3 3,67 11,00 6 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 3 3 3,00 9,00 6 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 1,000 ,000 3,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 7,000 6,000 9,000 10,000 9,000 Z -1,528 -1,964 -,655 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,127 ,050 ,513 ,827 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,200a ,100a ,700a 1,000a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media

- 419 - Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 4 3 4,00 12,00 5 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 4 3 2,00 6,00 5 3 5,00 15,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 4 3 3,33 10,00 5 3 3,67 11,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 4 3 3,67 11,00 5 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 4 3 3,00 9,00 5 3 4,00 12,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 3,000 ,000 4,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 9,000 6,000 10,000 10,000 9,000 Z -,655 -1,964 -,218 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,513 ,050 ,827 ,827 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- a a a a a seitig Sig.)] ,700 ,100 1,000 1,000 ,700 a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 4 3 4,33 13,00 6 3 2,67 8,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 4 3 4,00 12,00 6 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 4 3 2,67 8,00 6 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 4 3 3,67 11,00 6 3 3,33 10,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 4 3 4,00 12,00 6 3 3,00 9,00 Gesamt 6

- 420 - Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U 2,000 3,000 2,000 4,000 3,000

Wilcoxon-W 8,000 9,000 8,000 10,000 9,000 Z -1,091 -,655 -1,091 -,218 -,655 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,275 ,513 ,275 ,827 ,513

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,400a ,700a ,400a 1,000a ,700a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media Nichtparametrische Tests Mann-Whitney-Test Ränge

Mittlerer Media N Rang Rangsumme Politic 5 3 5,00 15,00 6 3 2,00 6,00 Gesamt 6 Killings 5 3 4,67 14,00 6 3 2,33 7,00 Gesamt 6 CivilVict 5 3 2,67 8,00 6 3 4,33 13,00 Gesamt 6 ArmedActors 5 3 3,33 10,00 6 3 3,67 11,00 Gesamt 6 Peace 5 3 4,33 13,00 6 3 2,67 8,00 Gesamt 6 Statistik für Testb Politic Killings CivilVict ArmedActors Peace Mann-Whitney-U ,000 1,000 2,000 4,000 2,000

Wilcoxon-W 6,000 7,000 8,000 10,000 8,000 Z -1,964 -1,528 -1,091 -,218 -1,091 Asymptotische Signifikanz (2-seitig) ,050 ,127 ,275 ,827 ,275

Exakte Signifikanz [2*(1- seitig Sig.)] ,100a ,200a ,400a 1,000a ,400a a. Nicht für Bindungen korrigiert. b. Gruppenvariable: Media

- 421 -

Annexe 9 Kruskal Wallis Test (Articles)

- 422 - Nichtparametrische Tests Kruskal-Wallis-Test Ränge

MEDIA N Mittlerer Rang POLITIC 1 3 13,00 2 3 6,33 3 3 3,00 4 3 13,67 5 3 13,33 6 3 7,67 Gesamt 18 KILLINGS 1 3 6,33 2 3 16,00 3 3 15,00 4 3 5,33 5 3 10,33 6 3 4,00 Gesamt 18 CIVILVICTIMS 1 3 5,00 2 3 14,67 3 3 13,00 4 3 6,00 5 3 6,33 6 3 12,00 Gesamt 18 ARMEDACTORS 1 3 11,00 2 3 6,00 3 3 11,00 4 3 9,67 5 3 9,33 6 3 10,00 Gesamt 18 PEACE 1 3 13,00 2 3 7,00 3 3 4,67 4 3 10,67 5 3 13,00 6 3 8,67 Gesamt 18 Statistik für Testa,b,c

POLITIC KILLINGS CIVILVICTIMS ARMEDACTORS PEACE Chi-Quadrat 10,520 13,772 9,234 1,795 5,912 df 5 5 5 5 5 Asymptotische Signifikanz ,062 ,017 ,100 ,877 ,315 a. Kruskal-Wallis-Test b. Gruppenvariable: MEDIA

- 423 - Statistik für Testa,b,c ColGov ColPresident USA Parapolitic Democracy Killings Massacre Homicide Genocide ExtraJudExec Children Chi-Quadrat 3,175 9,749 13,936 8,794 11,363 6,567 9,355 12,339 12,453 11,129 9,497 df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Asymptotische Signifikanz ,673 ,083 ,016 ,118 ,045 ,255 ,096 ,030 ,029 ,049 ,091 Exakte Signifikanz ,007 ,008 ,021 ,078 Punkt- Wahrscheinlichkeit ,000 ,002 ,000 ,010

Indians Journalists TradeUnionists Displaced Kidnapping Peasants ColArmForces Guerrillas Paramilitaries Criminals DrugTrafficking Chi-Quadrat 8,981 8,285 2,742 7,323 6,405 7,563 9,608 10,427 9,164 13,638 12,587 df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Asymptotische Signifikanz ,110 ,141 ,740 ,198 ,269 ,182 ,087 ,064 ,103 ,018 ,028 Exakte Signifikanz ,082 ,119 ,001 Punkt- Wahrscheinlichkeit ,001 ,000 ,000

Mafia Terrorism Peace Demobilisation EVictims Chi-Quadrat 9,715 1,795 3,550 11,503 7,518 df 5 5 5 5 5 Asymptotische ,084 ,877 ,616 ,042 ,185 Signifikanz a. Kruskal-Wallis-Test b. Gruppenvariable:

Zeitungen Signifikant

Annexe 10 Anova Test (Articles)

ONEWAY ANOVA

Mittel der Quadratsumme df Quadrate F Signifikanz ColGov Zwischen den Gruppen 10,203 5 2,041 ,697 ,636 Innerhalb der Gruppen 35,116 12 2,926 Gesamt 45,319 17 ColPresident Zwischen den Gruppen 293,799 5 58,760 3,830 ,026 Innerhalb der Gruppen 184,090 12 15,341 Gesamt 477,889 17 USA Zwischen den Gruppen 339,253 5 67,851 8,199 ,001 Innerhalb der Gruppen 99,305 12 8,275 Gesamt 438,558 17 Parapolitic Zwischen den Gruppen 17,793 5 3,559 2,169 ,126 Innerhalb der Gruppen 19,687 12 1,641 Gesamt 37,480 17 Democracy Zwischen den Gruppen 30,847 5 6,169 3,853 ,026 Innerhalb der Gruppen 19,216 12 1,601 Gesamt 50,063 17 Killings Zwischen den Gruppen 20,577 5 4,115 2,876 ,062 Innerhalb der Gruppen 17,173 12 1,431 Gesamt 37,750 17 Massacre Zwischen den Gruppen 8,633 5 1,727 3,238 ,044 Innerhalb der Gruppen 6,399 12 ,533 Gesamt 15,031 17 Homicide Zwischen den Gruppen 3,040 5 ,608 3,019 ,054 Innerhalb der Gruppen 2,416 12 ,201 Gesamt 5,456 17 Genocide Zwischen den Gruppen 4,564 5 ,913 4,991 ,011 Innerhalb der Gruppen 2,195 12 ,183 Gesamt 6,758 17 ExtraJudExec Zwischen den Gruppen 2,198 5 ,440 1,811 ,185 Innerhalb der Gruppen 2,913 12 ,243 Gesamt 5,111 17 Children Zwischen den Gruppen 18,884 5 3,777 1,587 ,237 Innerhalb der Gruppen 28,554 12 2,379

- 426 - Gesamt 47,438 17 Indians Zwischen den Gruppen 128,367 5 25,673 1,207 ,363 Innerhalb der Gruppen 255,349 12 21,279 Gesamt 383,716 17 Journalists Zwischen den Gruppen 6,710 5 1,342 1,012 ,452 Innerhalb der Gruppen 15,915 12 1,326 Gesamt 22,625 17 TradeUnionists Zwischen den Gruppen 28,840 5 5,768 ,997 ,460 Innerhalb der Gruppen 69,455 12 5,788 Gesamt 98,295 17 Displaced Zwischen den Gruppen 35,947 5 7,189 1,573 ,241 Innerhalb der Gruppen 54,854 12 4,571 Gesamt 90,801 17 Kidnapping Zwischen den Gruppen 52,189 5 10,438 1,616 ,229 Innerhalb der Gruppen 77,520 12 6,460 Gesamt 129,709 17 Peasants Zwischen den Gruppen 5,646 5 1,129 1,860 ,175 Innerhalb der Gruppen 7,284 12 ,607 Gesamt 12,930 17 ColArmForces Zwischen den Gruppen 312,753 5 62,551 3,789 ,027 Innerhalb der Gruppen 198,126 12 16,510 Gesamt 510,879 17 Guerrillas Zwischen den Gruppen 240,010 5 48,002 2,469 ,093 Innerhalb der Gruppen 233,286 12 19,441 Gesamt 473,296 17 Paramilitaries Zwischen den Gruppen 332,827 5 66,565 2,950 ,058 Innerhalb der Gruppen 270,737 12 22,561 Gesamt 603,564 17 Criminals Zwischen den Gruppen 42,627 5 8,525 8,300 ,001 Innerhalb der Gruppen 12,326 12 1,027 Gesamt 54,953 17 DrugTrafficking Zwischen den Gruppen 302,752 5 60,550 5,108 ,010 Innerhalb der Gruppen 142,253 12 11,854 Gesamt 445,005 17

- 427 - Mafia Zwischen den Gruppen 18,766 5 3,753 4,481 ,016 Innerhalb der Gruppen 10,051 12 ,838 Gesamt 28,818 17 Terrorism Zwischen den Gruppen 9,329 5 1,866 ,453 ,803 Innerhalb der Gruppen 49,418 12 4,118 Gesamt 58,747 17 Peace Zwischen den Gruppen 13,120 5 2,624 ,764 ,593 Innerhalb der Gruppen 41,223 12 3,435 Gesamt 54,343 17 Demobilisation Zwischen den Gruppen 35,508 5 7,102 4,352 ,017 Innerhalb der Gruppen 19,580 12 1,632 Gesamt 55,088 17

Mittel der Quadratsumme df Quadrate F Signifikanz EVictims Zwischen den Gruppen 18,968 5 3,794 1,046 ,435

Innerhalb der Gruppen 43,531 12 3,628

Gesamt 62,499 17 Signifikant

- 428 -