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Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia

Ting Gong, Ian Scott

Corruption Networks in China

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 Jiangnan Zhu Published online on: 05 Dec 2016

How to cite :- Jiangnan Zhu. 05 Dec 2016, Corruption Networks in China from: Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia Routledge Accessed on: 03 Oct 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315716732.ch3

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The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 similar to the generic denition of “abuse of public power for private gain” but, on the other, other, the on but, gain” private powerfor public of “abuse of denition generic the to similar hand, one on the be, to seems China in Corruption secrets. state leaking even or duty, ing 2014), since neglect media o cial the in appearing (a term adultery committing mistresses, having as such failings personal for vilied always almost is o cial acorrupt embezzlement, or bribery as such activities monetary to addition In dened. broadly is China in Corruption corruption. of convicted ever o cial highest the date to is who (CCP), Yongkang, Zhou Party Communist Chinese the of (PSC) Committee Standing Politburo the of member aformer of case the using illustrated are features These • • • in China: chapter The empires. corrupt of establishment the and o cials high-level very involving scale grand on a corruption into developed cases some in have networks corrupt These a syndicate. like operate sectors private and localities, departments, government dierent from ipants partic of network acomplex which in corruption collective of incidence high the is tion corrup of intensication this of indication One 2008). Guo 1997; 2004; (Gong Wedeman scope and complexity, severity, increasing of corruption by accompanied been has growth economic that evidence is there 1990s, late the since 1999). China, In (Rose-Ackerman activities illicit and extraction wealth of networks existing re-enforcing for and ruption cor of forms new institutionalising for opportunities provides growth economic Rapid party and the privatisation of public power by family members of government o cials. government of members family powerby public of privatisation the and party ruling the within networks factional the especially politics, informal of prevalence the and economy; atransitional in collusion business-government regime; authoritarian fragmented functionally and ageographically in power concentration identies three major politico-economic features leading to this form of corruption corruption of form this to leading features politico-economic major three identies CO RR Corruption in China: denitions and trends and denitions China: in Corruption An i An UPTION nstitutional A nstitutional IN Jiangnan Zhu Jiangnan Introduction CH 3 27 NET INA nalysis WOR KS

- - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 After After 2004. by 3,208,000 to further increased and 1991 2000 and between yuan 2,968,000 to 1978 1991 and between 17,000 from yuan dramatically rose cases those in involved money 198 in ing advantage of the dual-price system between the low state-set prices and the much higher higher much the and prices low state-set the between system dual-price the of advantage ing tak speculation, o cial was corruption of form popular most the 1980s, 1997, the In 2002). (Gong environment social changing the reecting characteristics, and causes sophisticated yuan. million 200 reaching amount highest the with yuan million 50 than more constantly was purloined money illicit of amount average the 2005, after that, shows also dataset The secretary. party acounty only hewas 1992 when since ities activ corrupt in engaged been 2015, hehad early in arrested only was Jianye, Ji Nanjing, of mayor former the although example, For that. before long corruption in involved were cials o investigated newly However, many 2012. of end the powerat to hecame after Jinping Xi President by launched campaign anti-corruption scale large the of result the apparently is 2013 after number large The dataset. whole the of cent per 46 for accounting corruption, for investigated were o cials 2013, 126 After digits. double reached number the years several in and years consecutive in up show to began o cials senior corrupt 1995 onwards, From numbers. small very in and sporadically appeared only o cials senior 1994, corrupt 1986 and Between corruption. with charged o cials senior of number increasing asteadily It shows over time. o cials these of distribution the 3.1 illustrates 1986.Figure since corruption of accused o cials senior of list complete almost an be should 275 o cials some of dataset this Thus, them. report always media mass the importance, political have o cials high-level very those involving cases 2015. Because June 1986 and between corruption for punished or charged were who level vice-provincial/ministerial above or at o cials senior of ports re media and websites, publications, government including sources, public available from Wu 2012). and (Gong cases reported publicly among actors major the of cent per 64 for ( level county/department above or at o cials involved which system, inspection disciplinary the by led cases major instance, For uncovered. funds corrupt of amounts growing the and charged, o cials senior of number the led, cases major of percentage rising the by gauged Wang 2013). and it (Gong constrain to eorts in help or corruption of low tolerance with correlate necessarily not do denitions However, broad functionaries. state of behaviour unacceptable socially the and corruption of types typical both control to CCP’s attempts the reects corruption of denition broad This immorality. of forms other many and squandering mistresses, having torture, shirking, as such malfeasance o cial and responsibility istrative admin of violation by caused misconduct castigates and standards moral formal high to holds discipline Party malpractices. and duties of dereliction the also but properties state of disposal unauthorised and sources, unidentied with property of amount ahuge holding propriation, misap embezzlement, graft, bribery, as such corruption, economic only not regulates law nal crimi The discipline. party and law criminal both to subject is China in corruption Second, Weng 2011). and (Ko interests public compromises misbehaviour their if corruption commit to considered be also may services public in engaged people ordinary even and organizations public of sta the o cials, government are corruption Chinese in actors major the although First, party. the of role the and interest public the of context the in that than more rather cantly, high-level o cials, especially those at or above bureau-level ( bureau-level above or at those especially o cials, high-level cantly, xian Underlying these numbers are constantly changing forms of corruption with increasingly increasingly with corruption of forms changing constantly are numbers these Underlying a dataset I compiled corruption, high-prole in on trends particularly Concentrating be can and 1990s late the in increased China in corruption that argue scholars Several / ke 2001, 78.6 per cent of major cases exceeded one million yuan (Guo 2008). Signi (Guo 2008). yuan million one exceeded cases major of cent per 78.6 2001, 7–1 ) and illicit monies exceeding 10,000 yuan, jumped from approximately 6 per cent cent 6per approximately from jumped yuan, 10,000 exceeding monies illicit ) and 988 to more than 30 per cent in 2000 (Wedeman 2004). The average amount of of amount average The 2004). (Wedeman 2000 in cent per 30 than more to 988 Jiangnan Zhu 28 chu, ting, ju ting, chu, ), accounted ), accounted ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 (Gong and Wu 2012). and (Gong corruption of incidences high with plagued also were services of outsourcing and curement pro 2012). Government 2008, Zhu 2004; (Sun areas less-developed in corruption of types common more were positions o cial selling and buying and fraud, nancial evasion, tax regions, coastal active economically the in frequent more be to tended smuggling and kets, mar- estate real burgeoning the in speculation violations, market stock 1997). While (Gong appeared activities corrupt new many reforms, housing and banking, outtaxation, carried and prices the liberalised further state the when 1990s, the In materials. raw for prices market Source: 3.1 Figure corrupt networks can inltrate and take over state institutions (Shieh 2005). (Shieh institutions over state take and inltrate can networks corrupt because shows, countries post-communist of experience the as destructive, politically is tion corrup Collective enforcers. law and bureaucrats, leaders, party governors, local gangsters, managers, (SOE) enterprise state-owned entrepreneurs, private included networks criminal the in players major the cases, 2013). these (Wang In Chongqing in underworld criminal the of protectors unlawful the as acted policemen, local his with together Wen Qiang, bureau, security public Chongqing the of head former the recently, More Shenyang. and Zhanjiang in discovered also were cases Similar 2005). (Shieh country the of parts other in and Xiamen in military the even and banks leaders, local o cials, security public of support the cultivated and Xiamen in house custom entire the suborned Xiamen in empire asmuggling of boss the Changxing, Lai 1990s, late the in investigated case smuggling Yuanhua notorious the in instance, For 2002). (Gong government the outside actors to and systems bureaucratic local dierent in o cials among interests transfer which networks, corrupt complex includes tion corrup collective most o cials, government involve only embezzlement, collective as such cases, some Although 2002). (Gong noticeable particularly been has a maa, like oratively Since the late 1990s, collective corruption, in which groups of o cials working collab working o cials of groups which in corruption, collective 1990s, late the Since 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 Based on the author’s dataset of 275 senior o cials drawn from cases reported in the Chinese press. Chinese the in reported cases from drawn o cials senior 275 of dataset author’s the on Based

1 Number of disciplined vice-provincial/ministerial-level o cials, 1986-June 2015 1986-June o cials, vice-provincial/ministerial-level disciplined of Number 2 0 4 1 2 0 11 C 6 orruption 33 6 networks in China networks 8 29 10 9 7 8 11 9 12 10 33 15 6 8 20 71

35 e - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3

Case No./name 3.1 Table came involved in corruption to see which government sectors were most vulnerable to to vulnerable most were sectors government which see to corruption in involved became chapter. the in later discussed is which Yongkang, Zhou of case the as such leaders, government central implicated even Some bureaucracy. or locality asingle beyond repercussions wider had cases other corruption, military Caihou’s Xu and system, Tienan’s energy Liu gang, Shanxi the of downfall the Shanghai, in case Liangyu’s Chen as such system, functional or locality asingle in concentrated cases some Table As 3.1 while shows, case. same the to linkage their of because caught were o cials senior Several cases. corruption 9. 8. 3. 5. 6. 7. 2. 4. 1. Bo Xilai’s case Bo Xilai (Politburo Member, Party Party Member, (Politburo Xilai Bo case Xilai’s Bo

Tao Siju’s case Tao Siju (Minister of Public Security, Security, Public of Tao (Minister Siju Tao Siju’s case

I also categorise the senior o cials in my dataset by their positions when they rst rst they when positions their by dataset my in o cials senior the categorise I also collective 17 in dierent involved were 58 o cials, 275 senior the of dataset my In Gang Petroleum The case Xitong’s Chen case Guizhi’s Han case Wengui’s Guo case corruption military Caihou’s Xu Corporation Petrochemical China - Tonghai Chen case smuggling Yuanhua

Senior o cials involved in collective corruption collective involved in o cials Senior CPPCC, 2014) CPPCC, Twelfth the of (Vice-Chairman Rong 2014), Su Commission, Administration and Supervision Assets State-owned of Director CNPC, of (Chairman Jiemin 2014), Jiang Member, PSC (Former Yongkang Zhou Department Logistics PLA of Minister Deputy Gu Junshan 2014), Commission, Military Central Secretary of Chongqing, 2012) Chongqing, of Secretary 2007) Committee, Municipal Qingdao of Member Shandong, of Secretary Party (Deputy Shicheng Du 2007), Ltd., Co., &Chemical Petroleum China of Director Corporation, &Chemical Petroleum China of Manager (General Tonghai Chen Xu Caihou (Vice-Chairman of the the of (Vice-Chairman Caihou Xu 2002) 2001) Hebei, of (Vice-Governor Fukui 2001),Cong Fujian, and Xiamen of Secretary (Party Zhaobin Shi of the Provincial PPCC, 2004) PPCC, Provincial the of Chairman Department, Organizational Provincial of Head Heilongjiang, of Secretary (Deputy Guizhi Han State Security, 2015) Security, State of Minister (Deputy Jian Ma 2006), Beijing, of (Vice-Mayor Zhihua Liu Beijing, 1995) Beijing, of Secretary (Party Xitong Chen of investigation) of Major participants ( , 2012) Lieutenant General, General, Lieutenant (title, year year (title, Jiangnan Zhu 30 (2014), Mao Xiaobing (2014) (2014), Xiaobing Mao Enpei (2013), Bai Chongxi Li (2014), (2015), Wenlin Ji Weize (2013), Yang Dongsheng (2013), Yongchun Wang Li (2013), Yongxiang Guo (2012), Chuncheng Li Gao Xiaoyan (2014) Xiaoyan Gao (2013) Zheng Liu Wang Lijun (2012) Lijun Wang (1999) (1999), Jizhou Li Shengde Ji (2004), Xu Yandong (2004) Yandong Xu (2004), Fa Xu (2003), Guangju Fan Wang YoujieWang (2005) Wang Baosen (suicide in 1995) in (suicide Baosen Wang investigation) of (year participants Other Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 17. press. Source 16. 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 10. People’s Liberation Army. Liberation People’s Source: 3.2 Figure with less public supervision and transparency given the condentiality of national security. security. national of condentiality the given transparency and supervision public less with military the in concentrated more poweris government, civilian to comparison In cers. of corrupt 48 with Army People’s the by Liberation followed is group This governments. local by controlled resources various powerand executive large the given surprising not is This leaders. government local were 49 o cials that shows 3.2 Figure intrusion. corrupt

Kunming case Bai Enpei (Party Secretary of Yunnan, Yunnan, of Secretary (Party Enpei Bai case Kunming

Energy system Energy water systems JiujiangJiangxi Shanxi Gang Ling Jihua’s case Ling Jihua (Vice-Chair of CPPCC, CPPCC, of (Vice-Chair Jihua Ling case Jihua’s Ling case Jin’sWang railway case railway Zhijun’s Liu pension scandal pension Shanghai 10 20 30 40 50 60

: Based on the author’s dataset of 275 senior o cials drawn from cases reported in the Chinese Chinese the in reported cases from drawn o cials senior 275 of dataset author’s the on : Based 0 Based on the author’s dataset of 275 senior o cials drawn from cases reported in the Chinese press. PLA, PLA, press. Chinese the in reported cases from drawn o cials senior 275 of dataset author’s the on Based

49 Number of disciplined vice-provincial/ministerial-level o cials, by a liations 48 33 Commission, 2013) Commission, Reform and Development National the of Director (Deputy Tienan Liu (Party Secretary of Nanjing, 2015) Nanjing, of Secretary (Party 2014), Yang Weize Jiangsu, of Secretary Party Deputy PSC, Provincial Jiangsu of (Member Shaolin Zhao 2014) 2015) PPCC, Provincial Jiangxi of (Vice-Chair Anzhong Chen 2013) Railways, of (Minister Zhijun Liu Shanghai, 2006) of Secretary (Party Liangyu Chen of Shanxi Provincial PPCC, 2014) PPCC, Provincial Shanxi of (Vice-Chairman Zhengce 2014), Ling Shanxi, 2014) Shanxi, of Governor (Deputy Runhou Ren 2014), Shanxi, of Governor (Deputy Shanxue Du 929 29 C orruption 25 networks in China networks 31 20 11 9 (2014), Wu Changshun (2014) (2014), Wu Changshun (2014), Jiacheng He Min Wang Tianxin (2014), (2015) He Qiu Tianxin (2015), Zhang Jinsong Gao (2014) Zhiyong Zhao (2014), Yun (2014) Bai (2014), Chuanping Chen Weichen (2014), Chunyu Nie (2014), Shen Daoming Jin 8 7 6 1 - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 ment, or a large number of its o cials, engage in violations”. in engage o cials, its of number alarge or ment, govern local entire an “almost which in corruption, collective of incidence the increased has corruption in involvement their administration”; alocal in top very “the at are o cials corrupt some 121) (2004: observes, Sun As asystem. or alocality of leaders top the cluded in often has and arenas government dierent across spread has how corruption illustrates 3.2 2015). Figure al. et (Chase problem aserious become has military the in Corruption responsibility to lower level governments to optimise economic growth has inadvertently inadvertently has growth economic optimise to governments lower level to responsibility greater of delegation The unit. functional or jurisdiction geographical each in leaders party in centralised poweris which in way hierarchical aclearly in run is bureaucracy functional or provincial decentralised However, each 2005). (Mertha decision-making political and nomic eco in SOEs and departments, functional governments, level local to granted authority 1988). Oksenberg and (Lieberthal cracies bureau functional vertical of that is concept organizing other the while locale the and centre Ok and (Lieberthal stratied” and segmented, divided, be to reality outin turns command of chain hierarchical aunied, be to “appears What regime. authoritarian afragmented in power concentration is networks corruption syndicated the to leading factor primary The politics. informal of prevalence 3) the and economy; atransitional in collusion fragmented functionally and a geographically 1 important: been have causes related three that Iargue 1990s. late the since cases corruption collective major many in apparent networks corrupt the of roots tional institu the explaining on focuses section This 1990s. late the until up corruption explaining Although 1995). Hao and Johnston 2004; Manion 2000; (Lu corruption for ground fertile provided also have enforcement law and supervision ineective power, and political to subordination to subject and nepotism by beset system, service civil decay, anon-professional moral O cials’ 2004). (Sun SOE managers and cadres for opportunities proteering many corruptio in engage to many led have may which deprivation, relative of a sense felt employees Public public the and employees sector private the between gap income an to led sition tran market early the outthat Kwong (1997) points instance, For reform. market probably is China in corruption of kind this of growth the for reason attributed widely most The China. in corruption of form current the to leading causes institutional the explores section next The process. promotion and recruitment cadre the and industry estate real the as such development, political and economic national for crucial sectors several inltrated also have networks corrupt Complex 1990s. late the since China in corruption of percentage ahigher for accounted have networks, complex with tion High-prole cases, including senior o cials, large sums of money, and collective corrup collective money, of and sums large o cials, senior including cases, High-prole From the reform era onward, China has been run in a decentralised manner with greater greater with manner adecentralised in run been has China onward, era reform the From senberg 1988: 137). One signicant fault line in the system is the division between the the between division the is system the in line fault 1988: 137). signicant One senberg n, and justify it as an income supplement. The marketisation reforms also created created also reforms marketisation The supplement. income an it as justify and n, many of these problems continue to persist, these factors are especially important in in important especially are factors these persist, to continue problems these of many Power concentration in a geographically and functionally Institutional causes: major causes: Institutional factors shaping corruption in contemporary China contemporary corruption in fragmented authoritarian regime authoritarian fragmented Jiangnan Zhu 32 authoritarian regime; 2) bus regime; authoritarian ) power concentration in in power concentration iness- go employees. employees. vernment vernment arbitrary ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 protable SOEs to establish collusive relationships. collusive establish to SOEs protable and leaders provincial to look also contracts government seeking Firms networks. ruption cor large develop to positions their use easily more can them to close those and leaders provincial guanxi, as such ideas cultural by inuenced deeply state authoritarian an in ability a as but growth economic promote better will initiative new the that feel they if government central the of those from dier may that policies implement to them allows provinces to granted autonomy of level The policies. implement to and CCP the of authority the tain main to government local on relies instead but implementation, policy of control direct supervision. public and oversight central of independent kingdoms” vertical or “local closed many of development the to led tering the market to maintain the state’s monopoly prots (Pei 2006). The government also also government The 2006). (Pei prots monopoly state’s the maintain to market the tering en from blocked largely are companies foreign and rms, domestic private rms, state the among competition limited despite sectors, these In automobiles. and tele-communications, steel, energy, as such sectors, key in player adominant also is state The 2006). (Pei yuan $1.2 trillion worth assets, industrial xed national the of cent per 56 controlled state the economy. 2003, the of In heights commanding the of control secure maintained has state The role. indispensable an played power has bureaucratic transition, economic the guide to First, networks. corrupt many of basis the forms which relationship government and business 2004). (Manion reform to resistance bureaucratic neutralised and superiority o cial reasserted Corruption households. power towards economic shifted and resources governmental eroded which prices of arealignment driven has process 1992). This Naughton and (McMillan incentives market-like state-imposed by energised SOEs of performance improved and rms, non-state and rms state between and rms state among both competition in increase adramatic rms, non-state of entry massive the from resulted has success economic The system. planned acentrally by initiated reform step-by-step featured has China in transition Economic support. for province the on reliant more becoming o cials level prefecture/city the with and secretary party provincial the in centralised more powerbecoming with kingdom each strengthen to served only has centralisation 2010). soft Thus (Lam Beijing to of instead units level provincial to now who report level, prefecture at over cadres control greater given been also has government Provincial-level governments. provincial to but government central the to re-delegated been not powerhas units, level town and village powerin local reduced has this While 2005). (Mertha chain the in up higher leaders to but o cials local to report longer no bureaucracies key where model centralisation” a“soft adopting and hierarchies powerful. extremely secretaries, party the especially leaders, provincial making government, provincial the through handled are contracts and projects government province, the reaches money the once resources, of allocation and forces armed the powerthrough assert can centre the Although 2004). thal nation-states of that to similar resources economic control provinces, coastal auent more the in cially the central government requires that political stability be maintained (Lieber maintained be stability political that requires government central the quo pro quid This pattern is especially strong at provincial level. The central government does not have have not does government central The level. provincial at strong especially is pattern This Several other characteristics of the transitional economy have promoted the collusive collusive the promoted have economy transitional the of characteristics other Several espe leaders, provincial China, powerof economic increasing and size the Given functional readjusting by recentralise to eort some made has government central The . With such wide-ranging responsibility, little oversight and lack of account of lack and oversight little responsibility, wide-ranging such . With Business-government collusion in collusion a transitional economy Business-government C orruption networks in China networks 33 ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 dents in coal mines (Nie et al. 2013). al. et (Nie mines coal in dents acci as such outcomes, serious very to led have which regulations and rules bypassing for exchange in received benets on built sometimes are relationships symbiotic These nessmen. busi with relations collusive or bribery involved 158 cases least at o cials, 275 senior the of database my In bottom. to top from relationships business-government collusive entrenched 2008). (Dickson growth economic continued ensure to and support ideological their win to as so ranks its within entrepreneurs private integrate to tried also has party The 2006). (Pei party the by appointed are executives corporate senior all of cent per 56 and executives SOE chief of cent per Eighty-one 2000). (Crawford capitalism” “nomenklatura as described been even has elites economic and political Chinese between relationship the system, state 2014). al. et (Sun promotion political for bribes deliver to wallet o cials’ local the become even may enterprises Private unemployment. local reducing and SOEs, performing poorly aiding purchases, government reimbursing as such above, from assigned orders policy and outadministrative carry help to entrepreneurs private require economy, often local the promote to pressured and sources re scal by constrained are who o cials, Local projects. individual for bribes than more 2014). al. et (Sun delegates of nomination the secure to o cials local bribe entrepreneurs private Sometimes 2008). al. et (Li conferences consultative political or people’s to congresses CCP, delegates or the of members as such connections, political with those often are capitalists Successful bureaucrats. to kickbacks as such corruption, rampant to leading assets, state stripping of aim the with o cials government approach actors business Many rights. land-use grant to and credit long-term issue powerto its using projects investment over most control tight keeps ful patron. Thus, both the patron and client will strive to provide each other with protection protection with other each provide to strive will client and patron the both Thus, patron. ful power their from promotions or treatment preferential obtain can who clients and followers of group large his through others powerto signal to need may apatron popular, more are elites political which measure to away as elections democratic Without together. fall and rise members Faction subordinates. their are clients and o cials higher-level are patrons where pairs patron-client of aseries 1988). include They Oksenberg and (Lieberthal members their for benets seeking leaders, their toward loyalty and responsibilities, bureaucratic and reers ca intertwined background, shared by bound emerge, to groups permits 1995)Tsai which and (Nathan a structure of aconsequence but culture-given or China to limited not is China. in networks corrupt stimulate particularly politics informal of aspects Three corruption. to conducive naturally is politics informal Thus, 2004). (Shih absent usually are policies and procedures xed while individuals, towards loyalty entails essentially politics informal preferences, policy and ests inter institutional on based policies and procedure bureaucratic to adheres which politics, formal Unlike protection. gain power and secure to elites political for tool a convenient becomes politics informal 1995). aresult, As (Pye o cials of behaviour the regulate fully can order amoral nor system alegal neither past, the in as today China In politics. informal of prevalence the been has networks corrupt of growth the in factor institutional Another The mutual needs of businessmen and government o cials have consequently generated generated consequently have o cials government and businessmen of needs mutual The the Within elites. economic embrace to approach acorporatist followed has party The o cials government benets also businessmen with relationship crony A continuing First, the primary reection of informal politics in China is factionalism. Factionalism Factionalism factionalism. is China in politics informal of reection primary the First, e prevalence of informal politics ofinformal prevalence e Jiangnan Zhu 34 ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 mobilise the primary, secondary, and tertiary ties of his network to engage in politics ( politics in engage to network his of ties tertiary and secondary, primary, the mobilise powerto the has Apatron size. in increase to faction the enable which networks, munication com developed have factions that observes (2004) Shih expands. itself faction the as extended combat. to di cult consequently is and setting “safe” arelatively in operate to tends ties factional by buttressed Corruption patron. the implicate even may and patron the of weakness the of asign considered is fall clients’ a because them protect to incentivised is patron the corruption, for investigated are clients When selling. and buying o ce as such means, corrupt by provided advantage mutual the in born is relationship patron-client the cases, other In loyalty. their show to order in members family his and patron the to bribes, including benets, deliver constantly clients Some ages. link- corrupt into degenerate easily can bonds patron-client Such struggles. political during relations. For example, when Chen Xitong, the former party secretary of Beijing of secretary party former the Xitong, Chen when example, For relations. patron- multiple the through tiers into develop also could networks 1973). Corruption in turn further extend the corruption networks. corruption the extend further turn in families o cials’ involve deeply networks corruption many 2012). Thus, al. et (Power kin” “cadre by owned enterprises private to assets owned publicly of ownership ferring trans or relatives their by run rms new establishing proxy, by control retain often o cials directly, businesses running or owning of instead instance, For prots. collect to o cials for means the become o cials, of mistresses including members, family cases, 1995). many In guanxi of means by success to road the smooth to status family their use example, for princelings, The relatives. and members family leaders’ benet also connections Personal leaders. their of relatives and members family with connections sonal per establishing through superiors their from patronage obtain to try o cials lower level Many private. and public the between boundary the blurs consequently politics informal and 2012) al. et (Shih promotion for opportunities more have princelings, or leaders, top of ospring The marriage. or kinship on primarily based mostly are memberships China, in leaders by formed networks political the amongst (1995) Tsai and argue, Nathan As politics. informal within tendency inherent an is politics in involvement members’ power. Family public of privatisation the to leading network, political a leader’s in involved become often places. both from prots extract to kingdom corrupt his use to able still hewas province, Sichuan and (CNPC) Corporation Petroleum National China the left Zhou Even after point. this exemplies well case Yongkang’s Zhou track. career o cial’s an following localities or and/ systems across expands it also line, hierarchical patron-client asingle along develops only not network acorrupt Thus, demands. his meeting in advantage apecuniary anticipate would subordinates former his position, ahigher to promoted been has leader the If worked. ously heprevi which in localities or system the from rents seek still can apparently aleader cases, corruption many In 2000). (Huang a position leaves a leader after even eect long-lasting a have powermay Informal o ce. in term the beyond extend networks informal from inuences powerbase, patrons’ the forms loyalty personal clients’ 2015). because Moreover, (Miller Beijing in links deep Chen’s and broad from resulting Committee Party Municipal Beijing the in network corruption alarge discovered authorities the corruption, for tigated corrupt independent kingdoms. Informal politics further supplements the growth of corrupt corrupt of growth the supplements further politics Informal kingdoms. independent corrupt building of away provided has regime authoritarian fragmented the in power concentration The o cials. government and gangsters, even sometimes and businessmen, between actions inter crony encouraged has relationship business-government collusive The networks. tion Second, because of the enduring inuence of informal power, corruption networks can be be can networks power, corruption informal of inuence enduring the of because Second, These institutional causes have led to the creation and sustainability of complex corrup complex of sustainability and creation the to led have causes institutional These o cials government of members family politics, informal of prevalence the with Finally, C orruption networks in China networks 35 or personal connections (Pye (Pye connections personal or , was inves , was Nathan , who , who client ------

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A simplied illustration of Zhou’s corrupt network Zhou’s of corrupt illustration A simplied President of Jiang Jiemin Manager of Zhou Lingying Zhou Lingying (Sister inLaw) Li Hualin (Deputy General (Former CNPC) CNPC) e case of Zhou Yongkang e case (Second Wife) Jia Xiaoye Zhou Feng Zhou Feng (Nephew) b Jiangnan Zhu ). Corresponding to the three features of the state, state, the of features three the to ). Corresponding Zhou Yuanqing Zhou Yuanqing 36 (Brother) (Former DeputyParty Secretary ofSichuan) Li Chungcheng Yongkang Zhou Zhou Bin (Son) Chairman ofSichuan Li Chongxi(Former Security Minister) (Former Deputy (Former Deputy Li Dongsheng (Son’s Mother (Son’s Mother Governor of (Daughter in (Daughter in Huang Wan Politburo Zhang Minli Member) (Former Ji Wenlin Bo Xila Hainan) PPCC) in Law) Law) i Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 Ji Wenlin, Li Chongxi, and Guo Yongxiang were all Zhou’s personal secretaries during during secretaries Zhou’s personal all were Yongxiang Guo and Chongxi, Li Wenlin, Ji 2012. in campaign anticorruption the during targeted he was before Sichuan of secretary party deputy of position the reached CCP. the of nally Li Committees Central Eighteenth and Sixteenth the of member alternate an elected as well as city, Sichuan’s capital Chengdu, of mayor the of position the to promoted rapidly was Congress, Party Eighteenth the after investigated be to level provincial the on o cial rst the Chuncheng, Li instance, For ies. secretar personal several his including allies, his for positions important most the reserved he again, Once activities. corrupt venuefor major asecond into developed which China 2012. to 2002 from PSC the in zenith its reached career Zhou’s when increased further kingdom petroleum his in involvement members’ Family ( CNPC the to exclusively equipment wellhead selling Corporation Hysco 1992 called in a company registered 1980s, the in States United the in settled had who Yusheng, Huang Bin’s Zhou son father-in-law, elder His sector. oil the with interests economic and Zhou’s political entangling further PetroChina, and CNPC the from money network. political long-lasting his bolstered turn in which business powerover the his consolidated Yongkang Zhou people, own his with sector oil state-owned the in posts important the Wang 2014). and By lling (Xie sector oil the in positions his heleft after even revisited hefrequently which oilelds River Liao and Daqing the as such oilelds backstage the in also but companies oil giant the in only not ence inu personal his prolong to Zhou enabling oilelds, the in worked also had o cials cated impli Several Xinquan. Ran PetroChina, of vice-president former Wang Yongchun and and Hualin Li CNPC’s the as such o cials high-ranking including investigated, been have Gang” “Petroleum the of members 40 than more Jiang, Including presence. global panding ex an enjoying Asia in company protable most the and capitalisation, market by China in company largest the producer, oil largest China’s became head, its as Jiang with also CNPC, the of arm listed the PetroChina, 2012. to 2007 from PSC the on Zhou’s tenure during six-fold rose CNPC the of assets the operation, direct Jiang’s and Zhou’sUnder patronage 2015). (Gan 1980s late the in province Shandong in together worked had they since aide Zhou’s been had 2015). Jiang Areddy and (Chen CNPC the of secretary party deputy the as Zhou’s was successor corruption, for investigated and Zhou with linked publicly was who o cial rst the Jiemin, Jiang example, For system. the in individuals important of support the hehad that ensure to sector oil the in decades over several cultivated hehad relationships inter-personal the on drew also Zhou department. independent and mature arelatively was it because partly nature, state-owned its to due partly rapidly, empire a corrupt develop to opportunity a great Zhou oered sector oil The inuence. personal enormous accumulate milestone. political next his reaching CNPC, the of secretary party and manager general became Zhou 1996, In province. Liaoning in acity Panjin, of secretary party deputy and mayor appointed 1984, hewas in Wang 2014). and Nonetheless, (Xie illegally wealth accumulating was Zhou that suspicion some was there time, that At management. political to labour technical from work his shifting department, political Agency’s Exploration leum Petro River Liao the of director deputy the 1976 in became and Revolution Cultural the during times several promoted He was life. athrifty lived and province Liaoning northeastern the in surveyor ageological as heworked 1966, in graduation CCP. the of After a member 1964, he became In town. home backward his from someone for days those in occurrence arare exploration, oil study to Petroleum of Institute Beijing the to admitted was Yongkang From 1999 to 2002, Zhou served as party secretary of Sichuan province in mid-west mid-west in province Sichuan of secretary party as served Zhou 2002, 1999 to From make to ways various found who members, family his of many involved Zhou’s empire oil to sector resources natural powerover the his of advantage took Zhou CNPC, the In C orruption networks in China networks 37 2013). 2013). Times Want China - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 By linking his three spheres of inuence with key gures like his son and personal secretaries, secretaries, personal and son his like gures key with inuence of spheres three his By linking kingdoms. separate establishing in and departments respective their handling in responsibility and freedom great Zhou like o cials high-ranking aorded era reform the following system political China’s of nature decentralised The sectors. security public and resources natural the in means of kinds all by wealth amassed agents glove white and members Zhou’s family short, kidnapping fraud, loan justice, of obstruction criminals, harbouring assaults, multiple murders, nine for 2014) responsibility al. of et Wei Liu (Lim brother his with Post ( yuan 855 million estimated an worth conglomerate energy a prominent into Hanlong, Sichuan company, his 2014). built al. et He later (Lim tourism and generation power in Bin Zhou with together worked Liu notorious. and prole high more much though agent glove Zhou’s white also 2015, was early in executed was who 2013). Han, Chiu Liu and (Zhai yuan of billions worth region the in stations hydroelectric two of construction the as such ious businesses in Sichuan ( Sichuan in businesses ious var in puppet family aZhou as acted businessman”, wealthy a“mysterious as media Chinese the in portrayed Wu Bing, involvement. direct from leader their protected so and legal be to appeared that transactions illegal performed who agents using methods glove” “white of means di cult for the central government to control. to government central the for di cult it making remained, sectors business state-owned the in inuence extensive and indirect his Sichuan, left Yongkang Zhou Even after industries. wine the and electronics, tourism, as such businesses, local of kinds over various control had and o ce higher attained all they Subsequently, system. Sichuan his of gures core the among were and Sichuan in time his Xinhua Net (Xinhua prots exorbitant reap to company the to States United the in wells oil dry selling CNPC, the embezzled reportedly companies new The Hysco. old the to similar businesses running International, Newrun and Corporation Hysco California, in companies registered newly two by replaced eventually was which CNPC, to tied closely poration Cor Hysco America-based the of shareholders were Bin’s Zhou parent-in-laws stations. gas CNPC to software computer selling to addition in CNPC, the with extensively deals that Technology Gas Natural and Petroleum Yangguang Zhongxu Beijing called arm in stake cent per 80 an took 2014). Bin, Zhou son, Yongkang’s Zhou (Huang (Canada) International CNPC of manager general the was Xiaoxia, Jia 2014). sister-in-law Another (Xie business gas liqueed the in specialises which subsidiary aCNPC Energy, Kunlun and mining, ash pot for Company Investment Honghan Beijing dealership, Audi 2010 an for in up set bile Automo Benyue Jiangyin instance, for included, rms The CNPC. the to tied closely rms in stakes enormous had who Lingying, Zhou sister-in-law his as such members, family to sector. security the with system Sichuan the linking Government, Central the to him followed secretary, personal Zhou’s long-time Ji Wenlin, example, For sector. security the in 10 years his during occurred gradually mini-kingdoms Zhou’s of three overlapping of degree Agreater network. patronage larger even an develop to him enabled society Chinese the of levels other and system court the with dealings his and stability social maintain to action strong He took Spring. Arab the and Xinjiang, and Tibet in unrest Olympics, Beijing the as events sensitive politically such of because system legal Chinese power over the extraordinary up built and tsar” “security the he became system, security public the in 10 years his 2007. During in China, of organ state highest the PSC, the in commission aairs legal and political central the of secretary as appointment lowed his by Zhou Yongkang received great benets not only via his close family members but also by by also but members family close his via only not benets great received Yongkang Zhou In 2002, Zhou was promoted into the politburo as the minister of public security, fol security, public of minister the as politburo the into promoted was Zhou 2002, In During this time, Zhou used his inuence in the CNPC to give preferential treatment treatment preferential give to CNPC the in inuence his used Zhou time, this During 2015). Meanwhile, Liu rose to be the gang leader of Sichuan and was ultimately accused accused ultimately was and Sichuan of leader gang the be to rose Liu 2015). Meanwhile, Xinhua Net Xinhua 2013). In 2001, Wu featured in several lucrative deals deals lucrative several in 2013). Wu 2001, featured In Jiangnan Zhu 38 , and contract rigging. In In rigging. contract , and South China Morning Morning China South 2013). - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 business-government collusion, and informal politics. informal and collusion, business-government system, fragmented functionally and ageographically in powerconcentration state: Chinese the of features decisive three the reect all empires corrupt these Moreover, Commission. Reform and Development National the of vice-chairman former Tienan, Liu and Shanxi, vice- former both Chuanping, Chen and Shanxue Du as such o cials, fallen of a group of support the with clout personal his developed also province, Shanxi northern of head factional the Jihua, Ling example, For Yongkang’s. Zhou with similarities shared all empires corrupt Their campaign. anticorruption Jinping’s Xi in indicted also were mission, Com Military Central the of vice-chairman former Caihou, Xu and Conference, sultative Con People’s Political Chinese of vice-chairman former the Rong, Su Conference, Consultative People’s Political Chinese the of vice-chairman and O ce General Committee Central Par the of director former the Jihua, Ling including o cials, national-level other Several collapse. to begun had empire enormous his fall o cial Yet his before long imprisonment. life to sentenced and guilty found was 2015, Zhou June In secrets. state leaking power, and of abuse corruption, for indicted and party the from expelled he was later, months Fourteen 2013. August in started corruption his into investigation the and 2012 in PSC the from retired Zhou Zhou’s of empire. downfall the up sped only course, of which, Jinping, Xi against coup a plotted Chongqing, of secretary party former the Xilai, Bo heand that circulated Rumors power. for reckless and ambitious more be to Zhou encourage to seemed only network tion corrup massive His empire. corruption political-economic acolossal build to able was Zhou the same time maintaining a stable regime and sustained economic growth. economic sustained and regime astable maintaining time same the at while systems and bodies public into corruption of penetration the with deal how to CCP: the party, ruling the for challenge agreat poses situation complicated This government. the of legitimacy overall the undermining consequently and PSC, body, the decision-making highest the in place taking as far-reaching as even systems, economic and political Chinese the within acts corrupt of depth alarming the revealed also but outcorruption root to nation determi government’s the shown only not has o cials state high-ranking discrediting cases corruption of exposure blatant Furthermore, networks. personal enormous atop perch and branch government or region acertain powerin political and economic amass that oligarchies powerful of aggregation an into turn well could China in corruption cronyism, and tionalism fac pervasive of element third the account into economy. Taking a transitional in collusion business- factor, institutional second the to relates latter the while fragmentation, functional and geographical chapter, this in examined feature state rst the to points former The globalisation. and decentralisation forces: combining two of aconsequence is which China. in corruption on features these of inuence the illustrates case Yongkang Zhou high-prole the of example The aairs. public in involvement members’ family and factionalism particularly politics, informal of prevalence 3) the and economy; a transitional in collusion 2) business-government regime; authoritarian fragmented tionally func and ageographically in 1) powerconcentration namely: corruption, of form the shape that factors institutional three We identify networks. complex involving corruption lective col nurture institutionally which systems oligarchic developing toward atendency in China: corruption of intensication an suggests Evidence studies. case and analysis, data original review, aliterature on based China in corruption of overview abroad oers chapter This China. China. contemporary in small, or large networks, corrupt many of one but was Zhou’s empire Zheng (2006) characterises the current Chinese political system as “de facto federalist”, federalist”, facto “de as system political Chinese current the characterises (2006) Zheng C orruption Conclusion networks in China networks 39 governors of of governors government government ty’s ty’s ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 01:40 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315716732, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315716732.ch3 Crawford, D. (2000) “Chinese capitalism: cultures, the Southeast Asian region and economic globali economic and region Asian Southeast the cultures, capitalism: “Chinese D. (2000) Crawford, corruption China’s in o cials key links trial Jiemin T.-P.Chen, “Jiang (2015) J.T. and Areddy Berkowitz S.K. and S.W. Puska S. Harold, Gunness, K.A. T.M. Cheung, Engstrom, J. M.S., Chase, Post, Morning China South allies”, close Yongkang’s Zhou charge prosecutors “Chinese (2015) N. 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