UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA

DIPARTMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE

CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN STUDI INTERNAZIONALI

THE THREAT OF THE ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALWS) IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY

RELATRICE Prof.ssa ENRICA LEEMI

CANDIDATO

Joseph OKIRU

Academic Year 2014/2015

DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this work to my grandmother, Aketch Esther for her constant sacrifice, love and care that has enabled me to be what I am today.

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ACKNOWLEGDEMENT

I have no words to express my joy! I would like from profound heart, thank all those who have journed with me in this intellectual marathon. Special recognition goes to Professor Enrica Lemmi for mentoring and guiding me during this research. Thanks to Professor Ghiraldi Fabrizio for his tireless time he dedicated in correcting this work. Big thanks goes as well to Dott.ssa Rosanna di Stefano for proof reading and to all Lectures and staff of the Department of Political Science in the University of Pisa.

To different families, Maria Cira Salomone, Daniela Peruzzi and all others, thanks a lot for all you contribution during this stage of study not forgetting my family of origin in Uganda, thanks for your patiency. A vote of thanks to my Uncle Odoi John Francis for his encouragement, Awori Teopista for the constant support.

To all friends in your different capacities, I have treasured and listened to your comments. I am proud of you all! “I am because you are, since you are therefore I am”. Rafael Cejas, I will never forget you because you made look at things differently. I remember the brain storming we did to make up this project. I took you seriously and here we are to share a smile together. Special thanks goes to Alessandra Gibertini Aling, your kindness and generosity has taught me non academic lesson. Lucia Rotondaro, I appreciate every piece of advise you gave me and all other colleagues I have not been able to mention.

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Abstract

Right from the time of decolonization, followed by end of , Sub-Sahara Africa has enjoyed a relative peace. This is due to continued civil wars that still exist. The preliminary research on this topic found that the Sub-Sahara Africa appears to have an abundant supply of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) such as AK-47, which are supposed to be exclusively owned and used by the military, police officers or other security agencies in the region. In Liberia, the emergence of domestic conflicts flared up by and Warlordism during the reign of ex president Charles Taylor that led to the rampant use of SALWs in conflict areas.

Nonetheless, the threat of illegal supply of SALWs has not been placed under International security priorities. In fact, illegal production, transfer and possession of firearms are considered only as criminal activities. This thesis has an important question; to what extent the circulation and the illicit proliferation of SALWs have posed a threat to Liberian national security? The major assumption is that the illicit proliferation of SALWs in Liberia’s conflict areas such as , , and basin, threatened not only its national but rather regional and continental security because it became a base for nurturing radicalist minds like Al-queada. Thus, this research aims firstly to analyse SAWLs proliferations in Africa and Liberia and secondly to analyse the capability of the regional states (ECOMOG), African Union, international bodies like UN how it responded to those threats. This research used quantitative methods by using primary as well as secondary data as major sources of references. Primary data gathered were from government official documents as well and some scholars on the issue.

The findings of the research show that the illicit proliferation of SALWs has threatened wide range of national security at three levels: individual, societal and state and as well as at Continental and International level. Furthermore, this thesis concludes that the Liberia’s national legislations on SALWs are insufficient to regulate and control SALWs proliferation. Hence, the research suggests that Liberia should accept the assistance offered by the: Regional Programmes on SALW, Proper disarmament and rehabilitation, Role of African Union and European Union, Program of Action (UNPoA) to update and develop its national legislation on the illicit proliferation of SALWs.

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ABBREVIATIONS ACS American Colonialization Society AFL AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council AIDS Acquired Immune Defiency Syndrome. AK-47 Automa Kalashnikova ALCOP All Liberia Coalition Party ANAD Accord for Non-Aggression and Defense AOF Afrique Occidentale Française APCS Armed Personnel Carriers APRM African Peer Review Mechanism ATT Arms Treaty Trade ATU Anti-Terrorist Unit AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Company BCE Before Christ Era. CADSP Common African Defense and Security Policy CCW Convention on Conventional Weapons CDF Congo Defense Force CIJ Coalition for International Justice CIVPOL Civilian Police CNN Cable News Network CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement NPFL-CRC National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council CSO Civil Society Organization DD Disarmament Demobilization

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DDRR Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration DICON Defense Industries Corporation of DLH Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EARPCCO Eastern African Regional Police Chiefs Conference ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOMOG Economic Community of Monitoring Group ECOSAP Ecowas Small Arms Control Program ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ERP Equal Right Party ETC Etcetera EU European Union EUCS End- User- Certificates FDPL Foundation for Peace and Development in Liberia GDP Gross Domestic Product GSD Governance, Security and Diplomacy HIV Human Immune Virus HREA Human Rights Education and Training Centre. HRW Human Right Watch HSIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms ICC International Criminal Court IED Improvised Explosive Device. IGNU Interim Government of National Unity IGO International Government Organization IHL International Humanitarian Law

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IHRL International Human Right Law IMIP Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan INA Interim National Assembly INCHR Independent National Commission on Human Rights INGO International Non Government Organization INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia IPS International Police Service IR International Relations IRI International Register Inc. IS International Studies KP Kimberley Process KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme LAMCO Liberian-American-Swedish Mining Company LDF Lofa Defense Force LGSA Liberia’ General Service Agency LINU Liberian National Union LISCR Liberia International Ship and Corporate Registry LNCG Liberian National Coast Guard LNP LP Labor Party LPA Liberian Part Action LPC Liberian Peace Council LPP Liberian People’s Party LUP Liberian Unification Party. LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy MIC Military Industrial Corporation

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MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia MRU NAHHRM National Human Rights Monitor NATCOM National Commission NB Nota Bene NDPL National Democratic Part of Liberia NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development NGO Non Governmental Organization NIMCO Nimba Mining Company NISAT Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer NOD Non-Defensive NORINCO China North Industries Corporation NPLF National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPP New Patriotic Party NRA New Regional Approach NRC Nimba Redemption Council NRP National Reformation Party NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia OAU Organization of African Union OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OTC Oriental Timber Corporation PARA Paragraph PCASED Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development PMAD Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense PMC Private Military Company PPP People’s Progressive Party

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PRC People’s Redemption Council PREPCOM Preparatory Committee PSC Peace and Security Council RAP Reformation Alliance Party REC Record RPG Rocket -Propelled Grenades RR Rehabilitation and Reintegration RUF Revolutionary United Front SADC Southern African Development Community SALWs Small Arms and Light Weapons SATCRA Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa SAS Small Arms Survey SAU Small Arms Unit SCSL Special Court for SOD Special Operation Division SSR Security Sector Reform SSS Special Security Service SSU Special Security Unit. TNCs Transnational Corporations TRC Truth and Reconciliation Committee TWP True Wing Party ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Johnson’s faction) ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Kromah’s faction) UN United Nation UNDP United Nation Developmental Program

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UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNGA United Nation General Assembly UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR United Nation High Commission for Refugees UNREC United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa UNICEF United Nation Children’s Fund UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNOMIL United Nations Observer in Liberia UNPoA United Nation Program of Action UP UPP United People’s Party US/A United State of America USD Dollar USSS United State Secret Service VOL Volume WAANSA Action Network on Small Arms ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front ZDI Zimbabwe Defense Industry

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TABLE CONTENTS Page DEDICATION……………………………………………………………...……………….i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ……………………………………….………...……….……..ii ABSTRACT………………………………………………………..……………….…..…iii ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………..…………iv-ix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION……….……………………………...... 1 1.1. Background of The Study……… ...... 1 1.2. Realism…………………………………...... 1-3 1.3. Liberalism ……………………………...... 3-4 1.4. Realism, Liberalism, And The African Reality………………………………...….4-16 1.5. Statement of the Problem……………………...…………………..…………….16-19 1.6. Objectives of the Study…………………………………………..……………...19-20 1.7. Research Methodology and Considerations…………………………….…………20 1.8. Research Hypothesis…………………………………………….……………….20-21 1.9. Scope of the Study…………………………………………………………………..21 2.1. Significance of the Study…………………………………………………………...21 2.2. Limitations to the Study…………………………………………………………..22-24

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CHAPTER TWO 1.0 . Literature Review of Liberia…………………………………………..……………25 1.1. Map of West Africa……………..…………………………………………………...25 1.2. Geography and People of West Africa………………………..…………………25-27 1.3. Black Colonization………………………………………….……………………27-28 1.3.1 The American Colonization Society……………………..………………….28-29 1.4. From Colony to Republic……………………………………………………….29-30 1.5. Early Liberia…………………………………………...………………………….30-33 1.6. Tensions Increase…………………………………….…………………………33-338 2.0. Liberia’s First Civil War 1989-1997……………………………..…………………38 2.1. Ethic Theory………………………………………..………………………….38-39 2.2. The Institutional Pathology Theory………………………………………………39 2.3. The Spiritual Anarchy Theory…………………………..……………………..39-40 2.4. The Political Culture Theory……………………………..…………………...40-43

2.4.1. Rise of the Independent National Patriotic Front Of Liberia…………...43-44 2.4.2. First Battle for Monrovia: July 1990…………………………………..…44-47

2.4.3. ECOWAS Intervention Force (August 1990) ...... 47-50 2.4.4. Attack on Monrovia (1992)…………………………………………………..50-52

3.1. UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)....……...... 52-53

3.1.1. Akosombo Agreement: 1994…………………………………………………....53-55

3.1.2. I: August 1995 And The April 6, 1996 War………………………….55-57

4.1. Abuja II: August 1996 and Fighting in Monrovia…………………………….…57-59 4.1.1. But How and Why Did Charles Taylor Win Election of 1997?...... 59-61

4.1.2. Post Election Administration Of Charles Taylor……………………....61 4.1.2.1. The Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU)……………………………..……...61-62

4.1.2.2. The Special Security Unit (SSU)………………………….……………62

4.1.2.3. Special Security Service (SSS)………………………………..…….62-64

4.1.3. Native Culture of Taylor……………………………………..………..64-65

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5.1. Second Civil War In Liberia-1999…………………………………..………….65-70

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..70

CHAPTER THREE

THE THREAT OF THE ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALWS) IN AFRICA:CASE STUDY LIBERIA 1.0 .Definition of Terms and Concepts…………………...………………………………71 1.1 Proliferation………………………………………………….…………………...71-72 1.2. Small Arms and Light Weapons……………………………………………………..72 1.2.1 Small Arms……………………………………………………………………………….72 1.2.2 Light Weapons……………………………………………...………………………..72-75 1.3 The Proliferation and the Use of SALW In Liberia……………………….…….. 76 1.3.1. Simplicity and Durability…………………………………………………..……….76 1.3.2. Low Costs and Wide Availability……………………………………..………76-77 1.3.3. Portability and Easiness to Conceal………………………………….…………77 1.3.4. Lethality………………………………………………………………………….…….77 1.3.5. Porous Borders…………………………………………………………….…………78 1.3.6. Ineffectiveness To Guarantee Internal Security………………………………..78 1.3.7. Corruption and Low Income…………………………………………..………….78 1.3.8. Insurgency and Terrorism………………………………………………..……….79 1.3.9 Surplus of Arms……………………………………………………………..………..79 1.4. Peace Keeping Missions…………………………………………………….……79-80 1.5. SALW Trafficking Methods and Routes………………………………….……..81-84 1.5.1. Political Authority…………………………………………………..………………84-85 1.5.2. Transnational Actors and Arms Suppliers………………………………………85-89

1.5.2.1 Financial Income Earning Of Taylor…………………………..…………….89

1.5.2.1.1 Bong Iron Ore……………………………………………………...89-90

1.5.2.1.2 Timber Companies………………………………………………..90-92

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1.5.2.1.3 Nimba Mining Company……………………..……………………92-93 1.5.2.1.4 Mines……………………………………………………….93-94 1.5.2.1.5 Liberian Maritime Registry System………………………………..94-96 1.5.3 Policy Implications For Taylor’s Criminal Network……………………….…96-99 1.5.3.1 Policy Implications For Conflict ……………………………..99-101 1.6. Arms Transfer in Liberia………………………………………………………..101-104 1.6.1 Transfer From And Use In Liberia ……………………………...105-107 1.6.1.1 The French Connection………………………………………………..107-108 1.6.2. Trafficking Methods……………………………………………………………….108 1.6.2.1 Covert And 'Gray-Market' Channels……………………………………108-109 1.6.2.2 Illicit And Black-Market Channels………………………………………109-110 1.6.2.3 Arms Brokers……………………………………………………………….110-112 1.6.2.3.1. China Arms Transfer…………………………………………………………….112-116 1.7. The Effects of Arms Proliferation in Liberia…………………………………116-119

1.7.1. Forced Displacement…………………………………………………………119-120 1.7.2. Food As A Weapon of War……………………………………………………...120-121 1.7.3. Widespread Looting…………………………………………………………………121 1.7.4 Restrictions on Movement…………………………………………………………..121-122 1.7.5. Collective Punishments ……………………………………………………………….122 1.7.6. Taking of Hostages and Outrages upon personal Dignity…………………….122 1.7.7. Forced Labor…………………………………………………………………………...122 1.7.8 Summary Executions……………………………………………………………122-123 1.7.9. Threats Attacks Against Civilians……………………………………………………123 1.7.9.1. Attacks Against Humanitarian Aid Workers and Medical Personnel ….123 1.7.9.2. Child Soldier………………………………………………………….123-124 1.7.9.3 Policy Implications for Child Soldiers……………………………..125-126 Conclusion……………………………………………………………..…………126-127

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CHAPTER FOUR

EFFORTS AND IMPACT TO CONTROL THE INFLUX OF SALW ( ARMS CONTROL) IN WEST AFRICA

1.1. Agreements…………………………………………………………………….128-129 1.2. Function of Arms Control……………………………………………………129-131 1.3.The UN General Overview on SALW Control………………………………..131-133 1.4 Arms Embargo on Liberia……………………………………………………..133-135 1.5 The African Union…………………………………………………………….135-136 1.6 The Bamako Declaration………………………………………………………....136 1.6.1 The Peace and Security Council (PSC)……………………………….……...137-138 1.7. The ECOWAS………………………………………………………..………..138-139 1.7.1. ECOWAS Reform…………………………………………………………………...140 1.7.2. Problem Areas in ECOWAS Cooperation…………………………….140-142 1.7.3. Ideal Birth Plan of ECOWAS Moratorium…………………………….….142-144 1.7.3.1. Background for and Making of the Moratorium……………….144-145 1.7.3.2. Implementation of a Moratorium………………………………………...145 1.7.3.2.1. The Code of Conduct………………………………………………….…145-146 1.7.3.2.2. The Plan of Action ………………………………………………………146-147 1.7.3.2.3. Analysis of the Implementation…………………………………………147-150 1.7.3.2.4. A Theory and Implementation………………………………………………...150 1.7.3.2.5. A Culture of Peace as a Goal of Formal Regionalism………………..150-151 1.7.3.2.6. The Existence of Transnational Networks in Weak States…………151-152 1.8 The Program of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)- 1999 -2004………………………………………………..….152-154 1.8.1. The Border Frontier…………………………………………………..…….154-158 1.8.2.Areas where the Implementation does not reflect the central Aspect…………………………………………………………………………………………….158 1.8.3. The Operations Of Transnational Networks…………...... 158-162 1.8.4. End-User Certificates (EUCS)…………………………………………………162-164

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1.9. Local (Artisan) Production of Arms…………………………………………165-167 2.1. Regionalism from Below Related to ECOWAS Top-Down Information Strategies……………………………………………...... …….167-168 2.1.2 Sudan………………………………………………………………………...... 168-169 2.1.3 Nigeria…………………………………………………………………...... 169-170 2.1.4 Kenya……………………………………………………………………...... ….170-171 2.1.5.Uganda………………………………………………………………………...... 171 2.1.6. Tanzania…………………………………………………………………...... …171 2.1.7. Zimbabwe……………………………………………………………………………...172-173 2.2. Civil Society as an Actor in West African Regionalism……………………..…173-175 2.2.1. Distrust Among Member States………………………………………………….…175-179 3.1. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP)……………………………………179 3.1.1. The Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials………………………………….…179-180 3.1.2 Economic Community of Central African States (Agreements)…………180- 181 3.1.3.Linkages with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)..181-182 3.1.4. Linking The Development of ECOSAP to Existing African and International SALW Control Initiatives………………………………………………….….182-183 3.1.5.Un Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Proliferation of SALW in all its Aspects……………………………………………….…..183-185

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..185-186

CHAPTER FIVE. 0.0. Security Reform in Liberia 1.1. International Efforts………………………………………………………….187-188 1.2 Regional Efforts…………………………………………………………….….188-191 1.3. The Concept of Security Sector Reform……………………………………….…191 1.4. Background to Security Sector Reform Assisted by UNOMIL in

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Liberia…………………………………………………………………………..191-193 1.5 Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Reforms in Liberia…………………..193-195 1.6 The Roles of Truth in the Reconciliation Process…………………………….195-198 1.7. The Security Sector Reform in Liberia……………………………………..198-201 1.8 Liberia’s Security Complex and Concerns: The Way Forward for Security Sector Reform…………………………………………………………………………….201-205

2.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

2.1 Recommendation……………………………………………………………………..205

2.2 Establish International Norms……………………………………..…………….206-207

2.3 Increase International Transparency………………………………………………...207

2.4. Increase State Accountability…………………………………………………...207-208

2.5. Regional and International Efforts……………………………………………..…208

2.6 Reducing Surplus Weapons…………………………………………………..…209-210

2.7 Role of CSO…………………………………………………………………...210-211 2.7.1. Governance …………………………………………………………………………..….211 2.7.2. Security ……………………………………………………………………………….....212 2.73. Diplomacy……………………………………………………………………………..212-213

3.1. General Conclusion………………………………………………………………..213

BIBLIOGRAPHY…...... 214-23

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Back Ground of The Study.

It’s very possible that some students, lay people have difficulty differentiating between International Studies (IS) and International Relations (IR). IS is a new discipline in the field of Political Science and it generally refers to the specific university degrees and courses which are concerned with the study of ‘the major political, economic, social, and cultural issues that dominate the international agenda’. The term itself can be more specifically defined as ‘the contemporary and historical understanding of global societies, cultures, languages and systems of government and of the complex relationships between them that shape the world we live in1 and can encompass all phenomena which are globally oriented.

The terms and concepts of IS and IR are strongly related. However, IR focuses more directly on the relationship between countries, non-state entities, and issues relating to international identities. The threat of ‘proliferation of small arms and light weapons’ (SALW) in Liberia, which is being considered in this work, quantifies it as one example of an IR issue.

Most theories of IR are based on the political experiences of Western world. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples many students and researchers who have applied different theories in the study of African politics. The primary and theoretical view is based on realism and liberalism.

1.2 . Realism

Basing on the fact of African findings in International relations, more is left to be searched in order to understand and get clear picture about Sub-Sahara due to its complexity. When we speak about Political realism, it is a school of thought that explains

1 Cfr. www.flinders.edu.au/courses/undergrad/bis, retrieved on, 08.11.2014.

1 international relations in terms of power. This power extends beyond territorial control hence causing insecurity, fear and even conflict in the case of different Political Ideology. In fact classic realists like Machiavelli argues that, the supreme value of politics is National Liberty, independence, and the principal of responsibility in which the government is always obliged to follow and defend its proper interest of its own State and therefore to guarantee its survival2. Due to different nature of Political ideology, Thomas Hobbes backs his argument by underlining the nature of political life as indispensable and to imagine living in a situation of “nature”, before invasion of State Sovereignty , circumstance that defines “State of nature”. For him, the nature of the State for human beings, is a condition of life extreme, unfavorable, characterized by permanent “State of War” (every man against every man).3 As such, powerful States always push their ideologies to less powerful that at times end up in conflict through alliance, however, Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone, as key influences on international events.4

The world from its time of revolution, has seen gradual changes in all spheres. It has been ear marked been by insecurity, fear and conflict between groups. According to the theory of realism, these features are as a result of the way both individuals and states relate to one another in international society. Classical realist like Hans J. Morgenthau attributed these problems to the nature of human beings. He bases this on the theory of Thomas Hobbes, who said human beings by nature are conflict oriented. Classical realist transfer this human quality directly to political system.5

According to realists, there are fundamental aspects of the International system; anarchical, conflict and war are rooted in human nature and lastly power being substantive focus of realism.6 Power is in this sense is defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it

2 Cfr. Jackson Sorensen, Relazioni Internazionali, (second, ed., Maria Weber), Oxford University Press, 2007, p.72. 3 Cfr. Ibidem., p.74 4 Cfr. Nardin,Terry and David R. Mapel, eds. Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge, 1992; Cfr also: Long, David, and Peter Wilson, eds. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. Oxford, 1995,pp.1-22. 5 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p.21. 6 Cfr. Ibidem., p.22.

2 would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it would have done). A variation on this idea is that, actors are powerful to the extent that they affect others more than others affect them. These definitions treat power as influence. If actors get their way a lot, they must be powerful. However, this definition is limited in the sense that we seldom know what a second actor would have done in the absence of the first actor’s power. There is a danger of circular logic: power explains influence, and influence measures power. States interact within a set of long-established “rules of the game” governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other. Together these rules shape the international system.7

Based on this understanding of the driving forces in international politics, we arrive at what R. B. J.Walker refers to as the “inside/outside” perspective of realism.8 Within the borders of the state there is peace and order. Social change is primarily related to development and progress. It is therefore meaningful to talk about a difference between the past and the present. Outside the state that is, between the states there is anarchy, disorder, and war.9

1.3. Liberalism

Like realism, liberalism is not a unitary theory. Nevertheless, we can talk about some basic understandings that most liberalists share. The theoretical point of departure for liberalism is the individual, and liberalists have a positive view of human nature. Their focus of analysis is individuals and various collectivities of individuals, that is, first and foremost states but also corporations, organizations, and various kinds of associations. Liberals maintain that both cooperation and conflict shape international affairs.10

Essentially, though, liberalists are optimists; they believe that when humans employ reason they can arrive at mutually beneficial cooperation. In this way, an end can be put to war. As generally used . . . “liberal” and “liberalism” . . . denote in politics, and to some extent

7 Dehio, Ludwig. The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle. Translated by Charles Fullman. Vintage Books, 1962 (from the German version of 1948), p.40. 8 Cfr. Carlo Bromley, International Journal Vol. 51, No. 1, Africa's Prospects (Winter, 1995/1996), pp. 171- 173. 9 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, op.cit., p.22. 10 Cfr. Ibidem.

3 in literature and philosophy, the party which wishes to alter existing institutions with the view of increasing popular power. In short, they are not greatly remote in meaning from the words “democracy” and“ democratic.11 Duncan Belli in his article to define “what is Liberalism”, he points out the Lockean narratives as reconfigured ideological, other of ‘totalitarian’ ideologies, left and right.12

The optimism of this theoretical direction is closely connected with the rise of the modern state. Liberalists believe that modernization means progress not only within states, but also in international society.13 Liberal arguments for more cooperative international relations can be divided into four different strands: sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism.14

1.4. Realism, liberalism, and the African reality

IR theories use the Westphalian state as their point of departure. The concept of the Westphalian state stems from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and introduced the European state system. The newly independent states were all given the same legal rights: territory under their sovereign control, the freedom to conduct relations and negotiate treaties with foreign powers, and the authority to establish whatever form of government they chose. The concept of “State sovereignty” that no one is above the state captures these legal rights. It is the Westphalian system that provides the terminology used to describe the primary units in international affairs.15

The classical theories also refer extensively to Max Weber’s definition of the modern state, which emphasizes three main aspects of the state: its territoriality, its monopoly of the means of physical violence, and its legitimacy. Weber argues that if a state lacks monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory, anarchy will ensue. We shall see in

11 Cfr. James, Fitzjames Stephen, “Liberalism, Patriotism and English Liberty, Cornhill Magazine V , 1998, pp.72–73. See also: Cfr. Leonard Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction (: Unwin, 1904), 166. 12 Cfr. Duncan, Bell, What is Liberalism Political Theory? Vol. 42,no. 6 2014, p. 698. 13 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, op.cit., p.23. 14 Cfr. Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, New York/London, 2003, p.135. 15 Cfr. Kegley and Wittkop, World Politics: Trend and Transformation. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997 (6th ed.),1997, p.39.

4 the following chapters that African states do not depict these classical pictures of what a state should be.

A few years later after the end of Cold War and the collapse of , Sub-Sahara according some scholars, it became “sense of profound disorder on the continent”.16 This can be seen from a number of devastating conflicts notably, those in Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

During the previous decades, international society has sustained these monopoly of the regimes as Cold War proxies, protectorates of ex-colonial powers, or both. Clapham advances a revised of the postcolonial era by describing the onset of a second Cold War in the mid- 1970s in which Africa became more important as an arena of International rivalry, as reflected in arms sales that increased significantly for example in Liberia.17

The Cold War ended a classic period of Nuclear deterrence and was followed by a number of wars in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa characterized by the employment of relatively low-tech weaponry, but with very heavy death tolls. Some of these conflicts were also characterized by great savagery, leading to some commentators to suggest that these conflicts were also a novel form of war18 and that such war would be characteristic of the post Cold War, postmodern world: that the era of industrialized great power war had passed.19 The principal instrument deployed in this struggle, were

16 Adebayo, O.Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, eds., Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa, Nordiska Afrikainsitutuet, Uppsala in cooperation with Institute of Developmental Studies University of Helsinki, 1996, p.8. 17 Christopher Clapham, African and International System, The politics of state survival, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.274. 18 It is a war in which the primary action takes place in a field of armed combat, or in a domestic setting where the characters are preoccupied with the preparations for, or recovery from, war. Its sometime referred to as military fiction. 19 John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the contemporary World, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.56.

5 diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, and, more importantly, arms transfer and various forms of direct and indirect intervention.20

The end of the Cold War was thought to generate a worldwide optimism for international peace and security through negotiations dealing with some of the most stubborn and difficult wars of proxy. A shift from the Super Power proxy-wars in the Third World to socio-economic development (through liberalization of trade and the embrace of democratic values) seemed a viable project. However, events in the last few decades and recent years disastrously shattered those expectations, especially in the third world Africa in particular. In place of enhanced security, vituperative internal conflict, crimes and gross violation of human rights have emerged at an alarming rate.21The question is, would the fall of Berlin Wall and the rapid dismantling of the communist states in Eastern Europe remove the former obstacles to democratic reform, national and regional reconciliation, and continental Africa?

Karin answers this question, pointing out that there is both pessimism in the analysis and prognoses of the question. The optimist expected African states to move toward Western- style-democratic systems of government. The pessimists feared that the removal of one set of problems for Africa would only make room for another.22 We need to bear in mind that the geopolitical situation particularly, affected economic and military aid to most of African countries. For economic aid, it meant a substantial decrease. To a large degree, African states were now left in a security-political vacuum.23 To this dictum, the geo- colonial impact in Africa touched the pivotal point of the Africans, that is, the land in which most European powers claimed as their possession, either as colonies or protectorate, or as in the case of King Leopold of Belgium, as private property in the form of the Congo Free State. The distribution arising out of the powers’ was formally recognized by their representatives at the Congress of Berlin, 1884-85. In all

20 Cfr. MacFarlane, Intervention and Security in Africa, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol.60, No.1, Winter, 1983-4,pp.53-73. 21Emmanuel, K.J, Proliferation of Small Arms and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria; Implication for the National Security, A PhD Thesis, St. Clement University September 2005, pp.1-5. 22 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, op.cit., p.31. 23 Cfr. Ibidem.,

6 of this, Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal paid no regards to enormous differences among the different African societies, which ranged from small- scale, self governing, hunting-and-gathering bands to large, hierarchical political systems, as in empires of , , and Songhay in West Africa. People with diverse cultures, religions, languages, and political systems who had previously lived alongside one another, sometimes peacefully and sometimes in violent conflict, but without formal boundaries, were now pulled together into entirely artificially created ‘nation’- states.24

By the end of Cold War, there was a general perception that the security was closely related to states and the sovereignty of states. In fact, ever since Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau introduced their classical works, security had been referred to as “security of states”, with military apparatus playing the most important role in its maintenance. Security was traditionally considered to be synonymous with military security because most challenges to a state’s integrity seemed to come from external violence.25

The beginning of 1990s would inaugurate a new world order if wars were not vindicated. The number and overall cruelty of conflicts, as measured by battle deaths, decreased overall, but it was instead earmarked by violent breakdown of civil society, the socialist states of the former Soviet bloc to Africa, together with outbreak of ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic and other forms of communal strife. With the collapse of Soviet Bloc and the consequent blow to the status of state socialism, liberal democracy and the market economy became dominant paradigms for social change and foreign assistance. This was particularly challenging as it was combined with the melting away of social norms and government structures that would otherwise contain the violence. The surface manifestations seemed chaotic, with military factions mobilized along clan, tribal, or ethnic lines, fighting for no political agenda apart from capturing the state. With the end of the globalised struggle between communism and capitalism, analyst struggled to understand the nature of these and other conflicts in the developing world. The explanation focused

24 Cfr. Peter, Burnell, Lise Rakner, Vicky Randall, ( 4th eds.), Politics in the Developing World, Oxford University Press,2014,p.186. 25 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, Environment, Security and Regional Integration in West Africa, Dissertation submitted to the Dept of Political Science, University of Oslo. 1997, p.69.

7 variously on ethnicity and tribalism, the structure of resources, , poor governance, democratization, and state failure. But this was a clear sign of state fragility, state failure, or state collapse. These terms at times are always used interchangeably.26

But according to Zartman, citing Monika Francois and Inder Sud, “failed state is one that has few or no functioning state institutions that can offer identity and assure security to the population. In the process, the government loses its legitimacy, both nationally and Internationally.”27 While according to U.S- government- commissioned State Failure Task Force, it links state failure to a widespread of internal conflict of various kinds. The report lists revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicizes as the most important kinds of conflict that further destabilizes an already weak regime.28

On the other hand Robert Jackson distinguishes the two terms; the “collapse state”-the international system is not easily capable of bringing the state back, “failed state” defined by the shrinking into virtual irrelevance of the state’s institution apparatus and its incapacity to assure the general welfare or protect the security of the citizenry.29 According to Zartman, collapsed state refers to a situation where structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.30 He further indicates that the state collapse in Africa occurred in two waves: one came towards the end of the second decade of independence from a factional civil war among the guerrilla victors over the previous regime, and the second round came another decade later and continues to extend into the 1990s and into new cases.31 He indicates that many countries in the developing world have de jure status, that is, they are formally recognized in their international systems as states, but lack de facto statehood, that is, the

26 That is the case in the reports of the so-called State Failure Task Force from 1998, led by Ted Robert Gurr (Cfr. Gurr et al. 1998). 27 Monika, Francois and Inder, Sud Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed state, developmental, review, 2006, 24, (2):142. 28 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African security Politics redefined, p.42. 29 Cfr. Jennifer, A. Widner, States and Statelessness in Late twentieth Century Africa, Vol. 124. No.3, The quest for World Order (summer, 1995), pp.129-153. 30 Cfr. I. William Zartman, Collapsed States, The Disintegration of The Legitimate Authority (ed.) SAIS African Studies Library, USA, 1995, p.1. 31 Cfr. Ibidem., pp. 2-3.

8 capacity to perform basic functions associated with modern state, above all providing security and basic services for development, as a result, they become ‘quasi-states.’32

Citing Zartman, “Posing the problem of state collapse”, Nellier in 1993 characterized half the African states as being in serious or maximum danger of collapse, if not already gone. He argues that the condition is not different from the earlier cases: the authoritarian successors of nationalist generation were overthrown by a new successor regime that can destroy but not to replace, and government functioning and legitimacy has receded. In this process, coinciding with Huntington’s third wave of democratization as well as with ambitious philosophical mind like Robert Kaplan’s vision of ‘the coming anarchy’ and the decline of global civilization.33 “The coming anarchy”, he writes that “crime is what makes West Africa a natural point of departure for my report on what political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century.”34 Kaplan further adds that “West Africa is becoming the symbol of a worldwide demographic, environmental and social stress, in which criminal anarchy is becoming a real strategic danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-state and international borders, and empowerment of private armies and security firms and international drug cartels are demonstrated through a West Africa prism.35

To Zartman, the concept of state collapse is a situation where the state can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states. A state is the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory.36 This definition focuses on three functions: the state as the sovereign authority, the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory, and lastly it becomes difficult to establish an absolute threshold of collapse.37

32 Jackson, R.H, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.21-22. 33 Cfr. Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly; The Coming Anarchy; Volume 273, No. 2; 1994, pp.44-76. 34 Ibidem., 35 Cfr. Ibidem., 36 Cfr. Dawisha and Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, zed books, 1988, p.7. 37Cfr. I. William Zartman, Collapsed States, The Disintegration of The Legitimate Authority (ed.), p.5.

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The collapse of the state means that the basic functions like laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced.38 As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy.39 As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and out puts no longer function with either traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy.40 As we shall see in the following chapter a state collapse in Liberia, the government retracted and the countryside was left on its own, organizing its own life, for or against the rebellion or the remnant state. This will be clearly evidenced with so many ethnic- cleansing in the countryside by different tribes.

The state collapsed is also marked by the loss of control over political and economic space just like it happened in Liberia. The informal economy took over, overshadowing the formal economy in its transactions and escaping the control of the state.41 Thus, paradoxically, as the Cold War was being won, a ‘decline of the West’ was being foreshadowed in new forms of violent horrors and terrorism, indicating that the basic Western ‘values’ could no longer be relied upon as a foundation for universalist consensus.42 Televisions images at the time in Liberia seemed to confirm the return of the repressed of atavistic forms of witchcraft, cannibalism and barbarism, enhanced by the use of globalised synthetic drugs, rock music and Rambo videos-apocalyptic visions of ‘a rundown, crowded planet of skinhead Cossacks and juju warriors, influenced by the worst refuse of western pop culture and ancient tribal hatreds, and battling over scraps of overused earth in guerilla conflicts that ripple across continents and interest in no discernible pattern.43

In Africa, the very nature of violence was transformed from traditional combat between nation-states to inter-communal conflict within states involving wide variety of factors,

38 Cfr. Badie and Birnbaum, The sociology of the State, The University of Chicago Press, USA, 1983, p.171. 39 Cfr. Ibidem., 40 Cfr. I. William Zartman, Collapsed States, The Disintegration of The Legitimate Authority (ed.), p.5. 41 Cfr. Ibidem., p.9. 42 Cfr. Spengler (1918-22), Violence, Political culture and Development in Africa (ed.), by Preben Kaarsholm, Oxford, 2006, p.1. 43 Cfr. Kaplan The Coming Anarchy, op.cit., p. 29.

10 including governments, rebel movements, armed political militias, ethnic and religious groups, tribes and clans, expatriate and Diaspora groups, criminal gangs and mercenaries.44

William Reno has urged , the ‘criminalization of the state’ in Africa need not to be a symptom of its collapse, but could indicate rather a consolidation and expansion of resources, a process not dissimilar to the ways in which wars, piracy and gangsterism contributed to state building in early modern Europe.45 Thus, ‘the crisis of very weak states may eventually favor the growth of internal order and promote their insertion in the global economy and political activities that are more acceptable in the international system of states’.46

In recent years, attention has come to focus on the ways in which the increased availability of low-cost SALW contributes to the likelihood, intensity and duration of armed conflict. Although these conflicts often possess deep and complex roots, it is evident that the widespread availability of modern light weapons has emboldened belligerents to pursue their objectives on the battlefield, rather than at the bargaining table.

An analysis of contemporary warfare also reveals that such conflict overwhelmingly takes place in the world's poorest countries. In the 1990s, thirty of the sixty least-developed countries in the world had experienced conflict directly, while another twelve had to support large refugee populations from neighboring countries in conflict.47 We shall discuss more on this in another chapter as regards the consequences of illicit Proliferation of SALW in Liberia.

In addition to those issues mentioned, Jackman attributed three other reasons for conflicts in Sub-Sahara; social mobilization or modernizations, cultural pluralism and Political factors (for example political party systems and mass participation). According to him,

44Cfr. Arms Control Today, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War August/September 1998. 45 Cfr. Charles, Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Oxford, 1990, p.5. 46 Willaim Reno Humantarian Emergencies and Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,1997, working paper n°.140, p.11. 47 Cfr. Steven Holtzman, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction, “Environmental Department, Work in Progress, The , Social Policy and Resettlement Divisions, Washington, DC, 1996, p.1.

11 both social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group and destabilizing consequences for the newly established states in sub- Sahara in Africa. He also argued that a multiplicity of political parties can be destabilizing, whereas single party dominance has had a stabilizing effect on post-independence governments.48 In fact, Adedeji points out that the real reason for the security crisis is Africa’s political crisis “civil wars and civil strife exist because of violent reactions to the pervasive lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, the complete disregard of the sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment of the people, lack of accountability and generally poor and bad governance.”49

However, the common distinguishing characteristics of intra-state conflict include multiple warring parties, blurred lines of conflict, greater involvement of civilians, and the fact that the conflict itself is not fought on traditional battlegrounds within society itself. There is also irregular and paramilitary forces. Too often, the vulnerable like children and teenagers are recruited or forced into these organizations and then made to kill, loot and rampage.50

The scale of these homegrown challenges like proliferation of armed groups, poor stockpile management,51 corruption,52 and the recirculation of existing stocks on the continent stem from domestic problems that African governments and policy makers face. African governments, rather than international actors, are often the primary source of arms and ammunition for these and other groups. While some groups receive support from foreign governments (many on the continent) or from private interests or companies from outside the continent, most seem to have obtained their weapons locally.53

48 Jackman, Robert W. The Predictability of Coups d’état: A Model with African Data, American Political Science Review,1978,Vol. 72. 49 Adedeji, Adebayo, Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts, London: Zed books,1999.p.10 50 www.armscontrol.org/, retrieved on 8/10/2014. 51 The accumulation, in large quantities of SALW in illegal hands. 52 The Cambridge Advanced Learners’ English Dictionary 3rd ed. Defines it as “illegal, bad or dishonest behavior, especially by people in positions of power. 53 Cfr. Small Arms Survey, Guns and the City; Cambridge University Press. 2007, p.6.

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The widespread of death and suffering resulting not from the major conventional weapons traditionally associated with war tanks, aircraft and warships, but rather from SALW. Of the forty nine major conflicts that have broken out since 1990, light weapons were the only arms used in forty six, whereas only one conflict (the 1991 Gulf War) was dominated by heavy weapons.54

Taya Weiss explain that SALW now goes beyond superpowers’ use of conventional weapons to include guns that are easily held and operated by even the smallest child soldier (the AK -47 automatic rifle weighs about 4.5kg and has only nine moving parts).55 Some estimates place a number of SALW in circulation at more than six hundred millions, enough for one in every ten people on earth.56 According to Small Arms Survey (SAS)57 2002, recent studies of battlefields statistics indicate that people wounded in combat by small caliber ammunition frequently rises above 70 percent.58 In the last decade, however, this number has tripled due to the increase in conflicts and wars such as in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan among others.

The possession of SALW explains why there were several insurgencies in Liberia in the aftermath of cold war. After the death of Gen. Samuel Kanyon Doe, who had been elected president in 1985, he was deposed and killed as rival rebel groups struggled with government forces for control. The ECOWAS, which had sent force to Liberia in August 1990, backed the nomination of as Interim President, and in January 1991, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was appointed. Civil war continued, however, in July 1993 a UN-sponsored peace agreement was signed by the

54 The major wars are those with at least 1,000 deaths per year, though most of these conflicts have resulted in far more fatalities and wounded. Cf. Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, 1996. 55 Cfr. Taya Weiss, Africa Review, A Demand-side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation, published online: 21/July/2010, p.6. 56Cfr. Graduate Institute of International studies, Small Arms Survey 2002: counting the human cost, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, forwarded by Kofi Annan. 57 SAS is an independent research institute based at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. The project benefits from working closely with a global network of partners, on some 30 projects per year. About a dozen countries provide financial support to SAS, principally Switzerland, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Germany and the United States are the most recent contributors. In addition, SAS works on a project-related basis with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 58 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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IGNU, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)under the leadership of Charles Taylor and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) headed by Alhaji Kromah. It provided for a ceasefire, the encampment of troops and the formation of a transitional civilian administration.59 But many Liberians and International observers believed that ULIMO was being supported by ECOMOG and that it forces, rather than being demobilized, were, in fact, being integrated into ECOMOG. According to the NPLF, ECOMOG was no longer neutral force.60

Throughout 1995 and 1996, intensive multi -sided fighting continued between and among the NPLF, ECOMOG, ULIMO, the LPC (Liberian Peace Council), a breakaway ULIMO faction, and the remaining elements of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Clashes between the ULIMO breakaway faction known as ULIMO-J, because of its leader and ECOMOG in the west of the country in December 1995 and January 1996 left 16 peacekeepers dead and saw the capture of 130 more, all of whom were Nigerians with rumors that it was due the effect of an agreement reached between Nigerian strong man and Taylor made during a secret trip the latter took in Nigerian capital Abuja in mid-1995.61

By this time, ECOMOG forces had been augmented to some 12,000, versus an estimated 60,000 rebel fighters in the various factions. While the latter and especially the NPLF, controlled most of the interior of the country, ECOMOG was largely isolated around the capital and in the various ports.62

By mid 2003, however, rebel forces of the Liberians Democracy under the leadership of Sekou Damante Konneh (LURD)63 and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)64 had closed in on Monrovia (city named after President James Monroe US,

59 Political Parties of the world, 6th ed. John Harper Publishing, Great Britain, Cromwell Press, 2005, p.378. 60 Cfr. Encyclopedia Since World War II, ed. By James Ciment and Kenneth Hill, FD. Publishers, vol. I, 1999, p.149. 61 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.149-150. 62 Cfr. Ibidem., 63 LURD began fighting against the government of President Charles Taylor in the country’s north-west in 2000. The group was reportedly supported by the regime of President Lansana Contè in Guinea. 64It was dominated by the Krahn ethnic group of the late President Samuel Kanyon Doe and was supported by the government of President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire .

14 president, 1817-1824) and the President who had been indicted of by UN prosecutors in Sierra Leone came under intense international pressure to agree to resign.65 We shall look at detail in the second chapter.

Other parties in Liberia includes; The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) by .66 All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP) under the leadership of Lusinee Kamara, Equal Right Party (ERP)- this was a signatory to the peace agreement signed in August 2003, Freed Democratic Party (FDPL) by Sarh Ciaph Gbollie, Labour Party (LP)- Rev. R. Reuben, Liberia National Union (LINU)-Jonathan K. Weedor, Liberian Part Action (LPA)- , Liberian Peole’s Party (LPP)- Togba-Nah Tipoteh, Liberian Unification Party (LUP)- Joseph Merchant, National Democratic Part of Liberia (NDPL)- Isaac Dakinah, National Reforamtion Party (NRP)- Martin Sherif, New Democratic Alternative for Liberia, People’s Democratic Part of Liberia (PDPL), People’s Progressive Party (PPP), Reformation Alliance Party, (RAP), True Wing Party (TWP), United People’s Party (UPP), Unity Party (UP).67

Rapid globalization68 may have united the world around certain shared values, but in weak states,69 it has also ruthlessly exposed the inadequacies of governance and catalyzed the violent empowerment of non-state actors like warlords, terrorists, private military entrepreneurs. We live in an era when state and non-state alike are guaranteed speedy and often indiscriminate access to lethal technologies, including night-vision equipment, satellite communication gadgets, and rocket- propelled grenades. Africa becomes the destination of choice for much of this deadly merchandise, Liberia falls a victim of this.

65 Ibidem., 66 Cfr. Colin M. Waugh, Ambition and Atrocity in African’s lone Star State, Charles Taylor and Liberia, Zed books, 2011, pp.158-60. 67 Cfr. Political Parties of the World, p.379. 68 Globalization can be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transaction, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power (Cfr. Held and McGrew, et al. 1999). 69 Weak state is defined by despotic power where the government uses coercive abilities and the exercise of force to impose its rule on civilians. Its characterized by institutional weakness, political instability, centralization of power, unconsolidated democracy, economic crisis, external vulnerability, social divisions, lack of national identity and ongoing crisis of legitimacy. (Cfr. Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, 3rd ed. Oxford university press, 2013, pp.163-164).

15

The local warlords are the major principal actors in illegitimate resource appropriation is the major cause of ongoing asymmetric warfare70 in Africa and the proliferation of weapons and provocative elements in these wars.71 That is why the private army units of Liberian leader Charles Taylor, Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels were at heart of the diamonds-for-guns operations that illegally exploited Sierra Leone’s diamond, a portion of which were bartered for sophisticated weaponry to fuel the decade- long civil war.72

Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and by extension Còte d’Ivoire are located in the so called Mano River Basin that has an attractive market place for illicit weapons trade.73 The region has rich natural resources of diamonds, rubber, and timber, which are used for purchasing the weapons utilized in insurgencies and wars. Experts have estimated that during the civil war in Liberia, 350 millions of dollars worth diamonds were spent every year to fuel the war.74 These SALW surfaced on the global policy-making radar recently as 2001.75

1.5. Statement of the Problem

The problem of Proliferation of SALW in Liberia intensified greatly between 1989-2003. This was during the reign of ex- president Charles Taylor. Through many relations all over the world including West Africa, the Middle East and the United States, Charles Taylor controlled Liberia for several years. Prior to his Presidential election, the NPFL controlled many industries within Liberia and the diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Once in power, Taylor maintained power over the natural resources, increasing his influence and wealth. This made Liberia to become more chaotic as well as criminalized State in Political

70 Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality. 71 Cfr. Abdel-Fatau Musah, Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa,Oxford,2002, p.914. 72 Cfr. Ibidem., 73 Cfr. Bah, Alhaji, Micro-Disarmament in West Africa: ECOWAS AS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, African Security Review, Vol.13, n° 3, 2004. 74 Cfr. Fung, Ivor Richard and Kouyatè, Lansana, The making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, Oslo: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in Cooperation with NUPI, 2000. 75 Although a UN Governmental Expert’s Panel was initiated in 1995, the first UN Conference on the illicit trade in small arms and was not held until 2001.

16 scenario hence becoming a shadow state according to William Reno. Nikki Funke and Hussein Solomon in authoring their article ‘on William Reno’s conception of the African State as a “Shadow State”.

Quoting Reno, “Shadow State rulers manipulate external actors access to both formal and clandestine markets, by relying on the global recognition of sovereignty, and are thereby able to undermine formal government institutions. This is often if not always to their benefit especially as such institutions may acquire interests and powers at odds with the rulers’ efforts to retain power. Another way in which rulers undermine formal government institutions is by way of weakening bureaucratic structures and manipulating markets in order to “enrich themselves and control others”. Thus Shadow States or “informal commercially orientated networks” are created that operate alongside remaining government bureaucracies.”76

To many Liberians, life became unbreakable that somehow ‘jungle law’ was applied “survival for the fittest”. This situation was punctuated by purchasing and smuggling of SALW in order to meet demands. This became modus agendi in the Republic of Liberia (meaning ‘Land of the Free’), which gained its independence from ‘The American Colonization Society’ (ACS) on 26 July 1847, became later a theatre of War during early ‘90s. This did not affect only Liberians, but its neighbors as well77 more specifically Sierra Leone.

The multiplication of armed militias, the scale of the atrocities by all sides, the exploitation of child soldiers, the ideological void surrounding the fighting, the instrumentalization of high -value resources to finance insurgency, and the high degree of external involvement in efforts to halt the combat all foreshadow patterns that shaped subsequent internal wars.78

The striking parallels between the two polities, and the broad similar chronologies of conflict, reinforce the invitation to paired analysis. Both countries grew out of externally

76 Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Occasion Paper, n°.5, 2002, p.1. 77 Cfr. Us Committee for Refugees, 2002 Country Report (www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/liberia.htm) 78 Cfr. Crawford Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa, the University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, p.250.

17 sponsored resettlements of free slaves, (1787) and Monrovia (1822).79 The cultural groupings that emerged from this origin, creoles in Sierra Leone and Americo - Liberians in Liberia, were distinct from the vastly more numerous hinterland populations in their Victorian synthesis of European and African social practices and their habits of entitlement.80

Attempts to explain these wars commonly underlines the problem of state recession, combined with the emergency of Warlords and Warlordism. The question is why do movements that began as social albeit violent-rebellion against an authoritarian and deeply corrupted state end up as a perverted mirror-image of the state they originally set out to destroy?

According to Morten, rebel (case in Liberia) groups forsake political agendas to become profit-seeking, market-based entities may best be understood using a dual analysis: contextualization of insurgency in regard the pre-conflict levels of structural and actual level in the society. The other analysis being that ‘just because these guerillas act within local, social, economic and historical contexts does not mean that their trajectories are entirely unique’.81

The problem of illicit production, Sales, distribution and trafficking of SALW became a total threat to human welfare and dignity in many parts of the country and across the border. Ranging from distortion in National economy due to violence, terrorism and assassination, to corruption of public officials, especially, the law enforcement agents who were faithful to Charles Taylor.

79 Cfr. Christopher Clapham in The Politics of Failure: Clientelism, Political Instability and National Integration in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in Private Patronage and Public Power: Political clientelism in the Modern State, ed. Christopher Clapham, New York: St. Martin’s 1982, pp.176-92. 80 Cfr. Crawford Young, The postcolonial state in Africa, op.cit., p.250. 81 Routledge studies on African Politics and International Relations, Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, ed., Daniel C. Bach and Mamoudou Gazibo, USA and Canada, 2012, p.124.

18

Despite the ECOWAS moratorium, armed crimes, violence and conflicts remain a reality across West African borders and coasts. Instead of providing a Framework for responses, the moratorium appears to have remained as expression of intent.82

That is why this research paper is going to centre on “The proliferation and SALW in Liberia after the Cold War”. It’s on this back ground that we shall reflect together on the following:

 What are some of the factors that fuelled up the proliferation of SALW in Liberia after the Cold war ( from 1989-2003)?  What are the underlying factors that increased Insecurity in Liberia?  What role did International, Regional, National organization play in averting Proliferation of SALW?  Was it really impossible to control or put strict and respected measure to minimize proliferation of SALW, what were the loopholes in case it existed?, was there any strategic thinking above all?

1.6. Objectives of the Study

In general terms, the study seeks to explain in a comprehensive manner, the link between SALW proliferation and Politics , the social, economic, and consequences for the security and stability of Liberia.

 We shall therefore attempt to Identify and explain the roles of small arms and light weapons in the escalation in Liberia civil war. We shall explain as well the difference between Small Arms and Light weapons according to UN definition of 1997.  Examine the role of states, sub-regional and International Organizations in efforts to control the proliferation of these “little arms” and “mobile weapons”  Examine the possible causes of the proliferation and why it is considered as a Human Security threat

82 Cfr. Adebisi J, My Document; International Crimes Control Strategy, 22nd, July, 2008, pp.4-5.

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 Examine the effectiveness of the ECOWAS Moratorium (in details) and other organization in trying to address the proliferation small arms and light weapons.  Contribute to existing policy frame works for the management of small arms and light weapons.

1.7. Research Methodology and Considerations

The study shall rely quantitative research that will help us to confirm our hypotheses on both primary and secondary sources; State Documents, journals, books, newspaper, Internet, films and other academic publications, not forgetting documents from UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and technical reports by International governmental and Non- governmental Organizations. I have chosen Liberia among all other West African states. Shall we call it case study? Yes! This is because case study has a distinct advantage when, “a, “how” or why”. These are Questions that are being asked about a contemporary set-off events over which the investigator has little or no control.”83

According to Yin’s technical definition, “case study is an empirical inquiry, that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident.”84 This research is not seeking to find any general truths. There might arise the question about internal validity85 of the findings.

1.8. Research Hypothesis

A hypothesis is an idea or explanation for something that is based on known facts but which has not yet been proved. The more explicit and focused a research is, the easier it is

83 Yin Robert K., Case study Research: Design and Methods, London: sage, 2nd ed. Applied Social Research Methods Series, vol.5, 2003, p.9. 84 Ibidem., p.13. 85Cfr. Internal validity concerns the causal interpretation of dat. Is “A” the cause of “B”?

20 to develop a hypothesis from it. A hypothesis formulates a relation, which then will be tested empirically.86 It is therefore prudent to concentrate on the following:

 the conflict(s) in Liberia was not caused only by Proliferation of SALW but also bad and poor governance along other factors.  The proliferation of SALW is partly due to poor management of governments to regulate the inflow of illegal arms, which may either be due to corruption or negligence, as well as International and the ECOWAS treaty on free movement of people, goods and services  Personal interest of neighboring State leaders to amass wealth.  Poor regional Laws and violation of territorial sovereignty.  Common interest of States and non-state actors.

1.9. Scope of The Study

Although Liberia as a country was well know for peace and democracy, almost the structure of America in its Political setting, considering that its National Constitution was drafted in Washington, but after the cold war precisely from 1989-2003, Liberia became weak state hence dilemma of insecurity or what Jackson may term it as “quasi-states.”87 This is evidenced by Taylor’s domestic and foreign policy. It’s of no doubt that during this period, the stockpiles of SALW both at local and International got more market in Liberia.

2.1. Significance of The Study

The work is also momentous as it seeks to shed light on threat of illicit Proliferation of SALW in Liberia being as a weak State with its related problems and globalization forces.

86 Cfr. UWE F. Introducing Research Methodology: A Beginner’s guide to doing a Research Project. Sage publication Ltd, London. 2009, pp .27-28. 87 Are states that are recognized as sovereign and independent units by other states but cannot meet the demands of empirical statehood, which requires the capacity to exercise effective power within their own territories and the ability to defend themselves against external attack.

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2.2. Limitations to The Study

Not being a Liberian, does not mean not seeking to know about Liberia, but as student of International Relation in the department of International studies, and as an African, am obliged to make research about it. We may call it “epistemological quest”- Epistemology (from Greek-ἐπιστήμη, episteme/knowledge, understanding/λόγος, logos/study of ...).88

The worrying situation of endless Wars and Conflicts in Africa, has motivated me a lot to seek, understand, and to know why the conflicts are continuous. Of course many Europeans would explain in two words “we are ignorant and stupid” that is why we have endless Wars and conflicts. I chose to make my research on Liberia, the famous country that I use to hear about from my childhood. It’s obvious that this will limit my research. Due to the nature of the topic and the current outbreak of in West Africa, time limit, financial constraints explains why I will not be able to meet the major actors of proliferation of SALW in Liberia or those in Prison like ex president Charles Taylor, and Victor Bout.

Yet other limited factors like reliability, sources and data collection can’t be ignored of the sensitivity of the Topic due to methodology being applied. We are aware of understanding of such events (methodology) that depends critically on more self-conscious about what observers bring to analysis. What each analyst sees, thinks and judges to be important is not only function of the evidence about what happened. But also of the “conceptual lenses” through which he/she looks at the evidence.”89

Yin mentions six main sources of evidence one can use in a case study. Which we shall consider some of them in this research paper. For example just to mention; documentation and archival records. This is because they are stable, unobtrusive, and exact and they have

88 Cfr. Ferrier James Frederick, Encyclopedia Britannica, (11th ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1899. 89 Allison Graham, and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missiles Crisis, ( 2nd ed.) New York: Longman, 1996, p.689.

22 broader coverage. Their weaknesses are that they may have irretrievability, authors may have been biased and access can be a problem.90

To study African affairs is different from studying European affairs. Yin mentions, official documents are scarce and difficult to find. The content of the those that can be found is so limited to help researchers, in part because one cannot place trust in them. Pragmatism is commonly used in Politics and especially in African Politics. This has lead to several situations where state leaders and major key players have signed documents which is contradictory with the goals. I hope not to be misinterpreted about irrationality of African political players, rather, African politics in which it involves a different kind of rationality and approach with different priorities than those which appear to be modern and classical.

In western and state-centric IR theory, Policies, Protocols, Charters and Treaties are often sacrificed on behalf of the pragmatism or they are formulated order to reach a specific goal through what we may call alliance. This can be seen in light of what Joakim Bakke in his thesis about “Regionalism Approach?”91 referred to as “summit-diplomacy” and also there many different identities of African leaders.92 Coupled to this, we also have to consider the ex-colonial master’s way of thinking and doing or the so called ‘pros and cons’ which influences most of African leaders in their roles in the service of the State.

Yin also presents the three principals of data collection. The first one is use of multiple sources of evidence.93 This relies mainly on documentation. Of course this is time saving compared to field work research or other sources. The aim of using these two, is that the aim of using multiple sources is data triangulation, this is in order for the case study to be more convincing and accurate. The reason for not using other four which is direct observation, participant-observation, interviews and physical artefacts is already explained above.

90 Cfr. Yin, op.cit, p.80. 91 Joakim Bakke, Implementing the ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium, A New Regional Approach, Master Thesis, Oslo University, 2005, p.11. 92 Cfr. Joakim Bakke discusses in detail in chapter four of his thesis. 93 Cfr. Yin, op.cit.,p.90.

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But am convinced and sure that, the number of sources from various actors will hopefully ensure satisfactory triangulation and better reliability of this research. Quoting Sorensen, “I do not believe that I will increase the validity of my study by using multiple sources as part of the same study, but I do believe it will increase the reliability”94.

However, I may not give an excuse of poor research work that may contradict the methodology, but, it will be a challenge to get the whole truth and picture of the topic. The reason being most of Africans and European leaders through their organization documentation may not give the real and true information because of the interests. Often one actor can have contradictory goals and hidden agenda.

Basically in my opinion I keep wandering where were the International, Regional organization to avert what happened in Liberia? why did they wait for all that to happen in Liberia? Can African leaders and their Western allies explain the atrocities in Liberia by only forming up ICC for Taylor? Will they give correct information? It depends!

94 Sorensen, op.cit., p.12.

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CHAPTER TWO

1.0. Literature Review Of Liberia

1.1. Map of West Africa95.

1.2. Geography and Peoples96

Liberia is located on the Atlantic coast in West Africa and encompasses a territory of 43,000 square miles.97 The country shares borders with Sierra Leone to the northwest, Guinea to the north, and Côte d’Ivoire to the east. The country is rich in natural resources including iron ore, timber, diamonds, and gold, and provides a favorable environment for growing rubber trees.98 Liberia is divided into 15 counties whose territories correspond in some measure to territories claimed by particular Liberian ethnic groups.99 English is the

95 www.mapsopensource.com, (retrieved on 21. Jan. 2015). 96 The audience for this report includes some individuals who have in-depth personal knowledge of Liberia and others who may be learning for the first time about Liberia, including its people, history, and the recent conflict. Accordingly, the following background and historical overview provides context for later sections of this report. This information is not intended as a definitive discussion of Liberian history and culture. 97 Cfr. Ayodeji, Olukoju, Culture and Customs of Liberia , USA, 2006, p.2. 98 Cfr. Ibidem., 99 Cfr. D. Elwood Dunn, Amos J. Beyan & Carl Patrick Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Liberia Map 1: Languages and Ethnic Groups, 43- 44,146-48, 216, 221-22, 235, 251,279, 302 (2nd ed. 2001).

25 official language of Liberia, although more than twenty indigenous languages and a form of English known as Liberian English are also widely used.100

Although Liberia is a small country, it has an ethnically diverse population. Ethnicity in Liberia, sometimes referred to as tribal identity, is a complex and often artificial notion101 just as it is in other parts of Africa and the world.102 At least 95 percent of the population is of indigenous African origin.103 A defining feature of Liberia’s recent social, cultural, and political history is that a small proportion, less than 5 percent, of its population consists of descendants of repatriated Africans, including freed slaves from the Americans and the Caribbean, free-born African-Americans, and Africans captured from slave ships on the high seas.104

This latter group, also known as Americo-Liberians, settlers, or Congo105 forms one of the seventeen generally recognized socio-cultural groups in Liberia.106 The other sixteen groups include indigenous Africans based on cultural and linguistic similarities, specifically the Gbandi, Bassa, Gio, Dei, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Kru, Kuwaa (Belle), Loma, Ma(Mano), Mandingo, Mende, Vai, and Krahn107. According to Liberian historians, “intermarriage, modern education and westernized , Islam and other foreign influences have blurred some of the distinctions” between these socio-cultural groups.108 These indigenous groups arrived in Liberia in waves beginning in 6000 B.C.E. and have

100 Cfr. Ayodeji Olukoju, Culture and Customs of Liberia, op cit.p.2. 101Cfr. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From ‘Paternaltarianism’ to State Collapse, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press,2005, pp.17-18. 102 Cfr. Mary H. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy (discussing the fallacy of the New Barbarism hypothesis in the context of so- called “tribal” conflicts in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, pp. 15-17. 103 Cfr. Dunn et al., also in Sandra Yin, Population Reference Bureau, Liberia Takes its First Census in 24 Years, April. 2008, ww.prb.org/ Articles/2008/liberia.aspx (noting that Liberia’s first census since 1984 was conducted in March 2008). 104 Cfr. Ayodeji Olukoju, Culture and Customs of Liberia, op cit, p.2 . 105 The terms Americo-Liberian and Congo have distinct meanings; Americo-Liberian refers to free blacks who migrated from the United States to Liberia and Congo refers to blacks from slave ships that were intercepted on the open ocean and who were then sent to Liberia. Over time these terms have come to be used interchangeably to refer to individuals of African–but not indigenous Liberian– descent who were settled in Liberia. These terms are used interchangeably in this report. 106 Cfr. Ayodeji Olukoju, Culture and Customs of Liberia, op cit, p.2. 107 Cfr. Ibidem., 108 Cfr. Ibidem.,

26 cross border ties with similar ethnic communities in other West African countries.109 The last group to arrive was the Americo-Liberian settlers in the nineteenth century.110 Liberia also has a significant Lebanese community. People of Lebanese descent, and all other people of non-African descent, are not permitted to hold Liberian citizenship even if born in Liberia.111

After the struggle for liberty in the , freed and enslaved faced continued hardship and inequality. A number of white Americans, for a variety of reasons, joined them in their efforts to resolve this complex problem. One possible solution (advocated at a time when the assimilation of free blacks into American society seemed out of the question) was the complete separation of white and black Americans. Some voices called for the return of African- Americans to the land of their forebears.112 The transition from a slave-based economy to a capitalist one, created a massive pool of unemployed Black people, and this frightened the American ruling class.113 The fear was precipitated by the perception that such a reservoir of unemployed Black people could occasion cause serious social-cultural, economic and political problems that could adversely affect the interests of the ruling class.114

1.3. Black Colonization

Hamstrung by the United States’ weak position in the global division of power, as well as the imperatives of the country’s policy of isolationism, the U.S. government, the bureaucratic wing of the ruling class, outsourced the repatriation project to the ACS.115

109 Cfr. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, United Kingdom, 1999, pp.35-43. 110 Cfr. Robin Dunn-Marcos et al., Liberians: An Introduction to Their History and Culture 5-7 (Donald A. Ranard ed., Center for Applied Linguistics 2005), www.cal.org/co/liberians/ liberian_050406_1.pdf. retrieved on 15.10.2015 111 Cfr. Jonathan Paye-Layleh, Lebanese Demand Liberia Poll Rights, BBC News, July 22, 2005. 112 Cfr. Ibidem., 113 Cfr. Smith Robert, The American Policy in Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia, Providence publications, 1822- 1971; Kieh George Klay, Dependency and the Foreign Policy of Small Power: the Liberian case. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, p.106. 114 Kieh , op cit, p.107. 115 Cfr. Striner Richard. Father Abraham: Lincoln's Relentless Struggle to End Slavery. Oxford University Press, 2006 pp.2-4.

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In1815, African-American Quaker and maritime entrepreneur Paul Cuffee (or Cuffe) financed and captained a successful voyage to Sierra Leone where he helped a small group of African-American immigrants establish themselves. Cuffee believed that African Americans could more easily "rise to be a people" in Africa than in America with its system of slavery and its legislated limits on black freedom. Cuffee also envisioned a black trade network organized by Westernized blacks who would return to Africa to develop its resources while educating its people in the skills they had gained during captivity. Cuffee died in 1817 without fully realizing his dream. In the same year of his death, The American Colonization Society was established.116

1.3.1 The American colonization society

The ACS was established in 1817 in Liberia as a free place for freed slaves to call it their home. This idea was brought upon by upper class white citizens who weren't ready to view the freed blacks equal rights to whites. This movement was mostly supported by southern plantation owners who saw them as a threat in the United States. In 1819, the Congress approved $100,000 to return the illegally brought Africans back to Africa. However, some of the blacks didn't consider themselves African because they were born in United States and African was only their heritage. In 1821, the U.S. Navy purchased this land called Liberia for the placement of the freed blacks from the United States. Up until 1840 when the American Colonization Society declined more than 11,000 blacks were placed in Liberia. However, the United States took responsibility for Liberia until 1912. ("American Colonization Society")

The partial success of Paul Cuffee's African venture encouraged white proponents of colonization to form an organization to repatriate those free African Americans who would volunteer to settle in Africa. Prominent Americans such as , John Randolph of Roanoke, and Justice Bushrod Washington were members of ACS during its early years. Many freed African-Americans, however, including those who had supported Paul Cuffee's efforts, were wary of this new organization. They were concerned, that it was dominated by Southerners and slave holders and that it excluded blacks from membership.

116 Cfr. www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/afam004.html, (retrieved on 22.01.2015).

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Most free African-Americans wanted to stay in the land they had helped to build. They planned to continue the struggle for equality and justice in the new nation.117

1.4. From Colony to Republic

In 1820, The American Colonization Society sent its first group of immigrants to Sherbro Island in Sierra Leone. The island's swampy, unhealthy conditions resulted in a high death rate among the settlers as well as the society's representatives. The British governor allowed the immigrants to relocate to a safer area temporarily while the ACS worked to save its colonization project from complete disaster.118

In 1821, ACS dispatched a representative, Dr. Eli Ayres, to purchase land farther north up the coast from Sierra Leone. With the aid of a U.S. naval officer, Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton, Ayres cruised the coastal waters west of Grand Bassa seeking out appropriate lands for the colony. Stockton took charge of the negotiations with leaders of the Dey and Bassa peoples who lived in the area of . At first, the local leaders were reluctant to surrender their peoples' land to the strangers, but were forcefully persuaded some accounts say at gun-point to part with a "36 mile long and 3 mile wide" strip of coastal land for trade goods, supplies, weapons, and rum worth approximately $300.119

Believing that the colonial agent had allocated town plots and rationed provisions unfairly, a few of the settlers armed themselves and forced the society's representative to flee the colony. The disagreements were resolved temporarily when an ACS representative came to investigate the colony's problems and persuaded Ashmun to return. Steps were initiated to spell out a system of local administration and to codify the laws. This resulted, a year later, in the Constitution, Government, and Digest of the Laws of Liberia. In this document, sovereign power continued to rest with the ACS's agent but the colony was to operate under Common Law. Slavery and participation in the slave trade were forbidden. The

117 Cfr. Schick, Tom W. Behold the Promised Land: A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth-Century Liberia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1980, pp.24-7. 118 Cfr. Western Expansion & Reform (1829-1859). Library of Congress, (retrieved on 3 June 2013). 119 Cfr. Karnga, Abayomi Wilfrid, . D. H. Tyte, 1926.

29 settlement that had been called Christopolis was renamed Monrovia120, in the Grain Coast (now Liberia). With economic and military support from the U.S. government, the ACS embarked upon the quest for territory for the establishment of a colony.121

Functionally and operationally, the ACS became a quasi-colonial power, because it undertook the search for territory in Africa where it could establish a colony under its control. This was a calculated dumping ground for the negated African now freed. This was because the freed African, as we have discussed, were viewed as threats to White hegemony in the United States.122

1.5. Early Liberia

Once the free blacks, called Americo-Liberians, got to Liberia they modeled their Constitution in 1847. While living in Liberia, the Americo-Liberians oppressed the native Liberians as they had been oppressed in the U.S. This created tension between the two groups. For almost a century and a half the Americo- Liberians, who made up 5 percent of the population, controlled the government and gave few rights to the native Liberians. This created the beginnings for a civil war.123 Initially, these indigenous ethnic groups were receptive to the repatriates, whom they saw as their lost kin, who had returned home, after years of enslavement in the United States.124 Unfortunately, conditioned by what Brown calls a “slave psychology,”125 the repatriates were not interested in joining with their brothers and sisters to build a democratic and prosperous state. Instead, consumed by a

120 Cfr. Jones Abeodu Bowen, The Republic of Liberia, In Ade Ajayi, J.F.; Crowder, Michael. II. London: Longman,1974, p.315. 121 Cfr. Kieh G. K. (2008), The : The Crises of Underdevelopment, New York, Peter Lang Publishing, vol.5. issue 1 and 2. 122 Cfr. Beyan, A. J. (1991) The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State: An Historical Perspective, 1822-1900, Lanham, MD, University Press of America. 123 Cfr. A. Jones Maldwyn, Storia degli Stati Uniti d'America dalle prime colonie inglesi ai giorni nostri, Bompiani, 2007, p.154. 124 Cfr. Kieh, op cit.,sopra note 121. 125 Brown, G. W. The Economic History of Liberia, Washington D.C., Associated Publishers Brown, 1941, p.10.

30 false sense of superiority,126 the repatriates perceived themselves to be better than the indigenes.127

Accordingly, the repatriates believed that theirs was a “Christianizing and civilizing mission” designed to transform the indigenes into American styled Christians and Westerners. To use the Huntingtonian parlance, “the resultant clash of civilizations”128 led to conflicts and wars between the repatriates and the various ethnic groups. However, with American military support, the ACS was able to establish a colony in Liberia under its suzerainty.129 Subsequently, the light-skinned repatriates, to whom the ACS had ceded some degree of autonomy in 1839, declared Liberian an independent and sovereign state in 1847.130

Interestingly, once the Liberian colony was established, the United States assumed a nonchalant attitude. Two major reasons accounted for this. The establishment of the Liberian colony signified the conclusion of the repatriation project, and the overarching achievement of the central objective of the American ruling class to rid the United States of an excess pool of freed Black people. The other reason was that Liberia did not have an economic and/or strategic value to the United States at that time. Such an approach is a characteristic of American foreign policy, because economic and strategic resources are more important than humanitarian concerns. This will explain also why in the first civil war, US was aloof despite of humanitarian atrocities that occurred in Liberia.

It is not surprising that after the 1884 at Berlin Conference, Europeans nations, after dividing up the entire patchwork quilt map of Africa among themselves like a ‘piece of cake’, where thereafter were forced to exert control over their new possession’s vast perimeters. More often than not, these formed the boundaries of economically uninteresting and ethnically illogical subdivisions of ancient Africa, but nevertheless it

126 Cfr. Dolo, E.T. (1996), Democracy versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa’s Oldest Republic-Liberia, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 127 Cfr. Supra note at 31. 128 Cfr. Huntington, S. P. (2007), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon and Schuster 129 Cfr. Movement for Justice in Africa, 1980 130 Cfr. Ibidem.,

31 became inviolable territorial touchlines, the defense of which was essential to anchor the commercially lucrative at coastal outposts which were original reasons for the Europeans’ presence on the continent.131

However, by 1862, there was a shift in the United States’ attitude toward Liberia: the United States recognized the independence of Liberia, and began to take renewed interests in the country. The policy shift was propelled by the exigencies of America’s economic interests. American policy-makers received new information that Liberia was rich in minerals, such as gold that was pivotal to America’s industrial development. About four decades later, Liberia’s economic value to the United States was confirmed with the discovery of gold. Accordingly, various American companies flocked to Liberia and got involved in the mining of gold and the resultant private accumulation of capital through profit-making. However, no effort was made to industrialize Liberia. This was because the United States wanted Liberia to be a supplier of raw materials. On the other hand, being industrialized would have made Liberia a competitor to the United States and other developed capitalist states.132

In the nineteenth century, colonial case and the governments of the early Liberian Republic, where the resources required for the administration of a territory were unavailable and the challenge of maintaining control in the absence of infrastructure was great, the resort to violence as means of control may have been the only option available from the point of view of the ruling authority thus, requiring arms for settlement since there was no culture for peace.133 This is because among other factors during World War II, the United States continued the process of transforming Liberia into a neo-colony.134

131 Cfr. Colin, op.cit., p.195. 132 Cfr. The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.5, no.1, March 2012. 133 The culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations (UNESCO 2010). 134 Neo-colonialism is…the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility, and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony, those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism, neither is the case (Nkrumah’s (1965: xi) definition of neo-colonialism as its conceptual framework).

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According Nkwame Nkrumah, neo-colonial states are nominally independent and sovereign. This is because they have all of the outward trappings of international sovereignty. However, in reality, their economic systems and thus their political policies are directed from the outside.135 This then has the net effect of the neo-colony doing the biddings of its imperial patron. For example, the U.S. constructed an airport and a deep water port on Liberian soil to help advance its war efforts. Thereafter(beginning in 1945 to 1989), the U.S. took other steps, including the support for various authoritarian regimes, the continual use of Liberia to advance American strategic interests, especially during the Cold War and as an investment haven for American multinational corporations and other businesses.136

1.6 Tensions Increase

The late twentieth century says Luis Roniger “Comparative study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in Contemporary World”, has been marked by twin processes of increased mobilization, democratization, and Liberalization, on the one hand, and decentralization of power structures, pluralism, and renewed ethnic and national conflict on the other. These processes have been for the most part of internal contradictions, struggles, and unraveling of ruling coalition, followed by redrawing of international boundaries and agreements.

In Liberia, Politics and state were understood to operate through rent seeking, personal rule and patrimonialism whereby tradition lost its force as source of legitimacy without having been replaced by legal, rational and modernity. As a consequence, forms of personal rule that did not correspond to any of the three weberian idea types of legitimacy (legal- rational, traditional or charismatic) essentially owed their maintenance to material incentives and rewards, notably political clientelism (whereby an exchange relationship between unequal, which provides a political advantage to the more powerful agent and a

135 Cfr. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, London; Published in the USA by International Publishers Co., Inc., 1966, p.1. 136 Ibidem.,

33 material advantage to the less powerful agent)137 and corruption. This may be because “social classes were not yet sufficiently developed and organized to play any dependent and decisive role”.138

We must also acknowledge that when a state fail to maintain human security and it encompasses in violence, the ensuing vacuum feed tensions that often lead to civil conflict and unrest. Without discarding the notion of national responsibility, it is important to note that the breakdown of state structures in maintaining internal peace is often taken out of its larger geo-political context. The rise of civil tension usually stems from economic, social, and political power brokering, and other factors to make disenfranchised groups as in the case of Liberia basing on ethnicity, easy prey for those seeking to build their own militias or crime syndicates.139 This was due to the availability of guns in Liberia a long side other factors which became a symbol of Identity and social meaning or what Jacklyn says is “not just a gun”, but a “mythic icon” and a “maker of group identity, serving as a kind of code to assert one’s political allegiance”.140

Looking at Liberia, when Jr., was elected president in 1971, as the last of many leaders of Americo-Liberians, his presidency was run short in 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a military coup against him. After executing Tolbert, along with thirteen of his employees by firing-sguard, Doe began the first Republic lead by native Liberians. Doe's seizing of the government started out in an economic collapse, so the U.S. sent Doe $60 million in an effort to keep communism out of Africa (MSN Encarta Online Encyclopedia).

137Cfr. Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (ed.)Luis Roniger, Ayşe Güneş-Ayat, Lynne Reinner, USA, 1994, p.3. 138 Preben Kaarsholm (ed.)Violence, Political Culture & Development in Africa, Ohio University Press,1997, p.192. 139 Cfr. African review 12 (2) 2003. 140 J Cock, A sociological perspective on small arms proliferation in South Africa, in J. Dhanapala, M. Donowaki, S. Rana, and L. Lumpe (eds.), Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, UNIDIR/ Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, p.157.

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When Doe took power in 1980, was the first to recognize the new regime and readily acted to foster diplomacy between the two states.141 In addition to establishing diplomatic ties with the Doe regime, Libyans had also established a business presence in Liberia during the 1980s, owning the Pan-African Plaza office block and Monrovia’s bottling plant.142 But the relationship cooled as Doe accepted U.S. support, including a purported ten million dollars in cash on condition that Doe would cancel his scheduled visit to Libya.143 Liberia’s diplomatic overtures toward Israel further abated relations between Liberia and Libya, leading to the expulsion of Libyan diplomats and Libya’s severance of ties to Liberia.144

Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe was poorly educated member of Krahn clan ethnic group, one of the poorest and most isolated of Liberia’s sixteen indigenous people. Doe was ambitious man and quick to study. He soon gathered around him many of the reformist intellectuals at the who had led the protest against the last Americo regime on the 1970s. Indeed, the head of these reformers, Professor Sawyer once taught Doe in the night school where he had set up for working people and soldiers in Monrovia. Doe picked Sawyer to head a commission to design new constitution for the country.145

At the same time, Doe introduced the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). The, largely composed of military personnel, chaired by Doe himself and ran the country alongside the council of Ministers, which included civilians. But the coalition fell within a couple of years. Many of the reformers hoped that the Doe’s administration would allow them to carry out their radical plans for a redistribution of resources to the countryside and the establishment of genuine democratic rule. It became clear that they were being

141 Cfr. Kenneth Noble, The United States, Libya, and the Liberian Civil War, 18 Alicia Paterson Found. Rep. 4 (1998),www.aliciapatterson.org/APF1804/ Noble/Noble.html (Retrieved on 16. Oct. 2014) 142 Cfr. Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War,1998, p. 104. 143Cfr. Global Witness, The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (2003) (hereinafter Usual Suspects); Int’l Crisis Group, Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, (2002 (hereinafter Ending Regional Instability), www. crisisgroup.org. 144 Cfr. Nicolas Cook, Cong. Research Serv. Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, Dec. 31, 2003. 145 Cfr. Encyclopedia of conflicts since World War II, vol. II, James Ciment and Kenneth hill (eds.), FD, 199, p.939.

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marginalized by Doe’s fellow soldiers, some of the more idealistic reformers left government, while others began to partake of the corruption themselves.146

Meanwhile, the Doe’s government regime struggled to win international recognition, he was forced to pledge that there would be no more summary executions of members of the previous government. But it was his effort to curry favors from the West that won his government the biggest benefits. Instead Tolbert had favored the position of the non- aligned movement in the cold war confrontation strict neutrality between the West and East. He allowed Soviets to open up an embassy for the first time in Monrovia and he ousted the Israelis. Doe turned this policy around, welcoming back the Israelis and cozying up to the Americans.147

During his administration, largely coinciding with the Regan years, Doe received nearly $500 million aid, more than Liberia had received from the United States making it next to Israel the largest recipient from US. In return, the US won the use of Liberian territory as a listening post for the South Atlantic, a way station for the shipment of arms to anticommunist rebels in Chad and Angola, and a site for the Voice of America’s African transmission tower.148

By the mid 1980s, the excess of the Doe’s administration were becoming embarrassing for Regan White House. The Liberian leader was executing opponents and unleashing his security forces on the populace to crush dissidents. Meanwhile US began pressing Doe to hold elections, under the constitution that had been ratified by early 1983. While it was not much different from old constitution, it did get rid of property qualification for voting and banned the hated hut tax, the flat property paid by every head of the house-hold.149 In 1984, Doe dissolved the PRC, replaced it with Interim National

146 Cfr. Ibidem., 147Cfr. Ibidem.,p.940 148 Cfr. Ibidem., 149 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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Assembly (INA), also under his chairmanship, and established the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) as his own electoral vehicle.150

In 1985 Doe won a rigged presidential election and then turned to oppressing tribes in Nimba County. Although Doe was unpopular with the Mano and Gio tribes who lived in this area, he kept tight control of the army and secret police to stay in power. Later, Doe survived military coups with the support of the United State's Reagan Administration.151 This support was given because Liberia was not a supporter of Iran and Libya, two countries which the Reagan Administration was fighting against. In the same year, however, as his relationship with the United States soured, Doe re-initiated dialogue with Libya and paid the country a visit in 1988.152

As resistance to the Doe government grew, human rights violations became widespread. Torture, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, imprisonment of opposition leaders, and restriction of freedom of expression were all commonplace of violations of human rights under Doe's government. As Doe's power base diminished, he began to rely on the AFL to carry out atrocities. After 1985, a year in which Doe had been challenged by Jackson Doe (no relation to ) and General ,153 the AFL began to target as well the Mano and Gio ethnic groups in Nimba county because both Jackson Doe154 and Quiwonkpa155 were natives of that region.

Of course, there is no surprise that the victims experienced this inequality and insecurity that is far removed from global perspective. Rampant criminal activity, competitive access to scarce resources, and the absence of authoritative public institutions leaves groups economically, socially, politically, and geographically vulnerable to fend for themselves.

150 Cfr. Ibidem., 151 Cfr. Akpan, Monday B. Black imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African peoples of Liberia, 1841-1964. In Canadian Journal of African Studies ,1973, pp.217-236. 152 Cfr. Mark Huband, op.cit, p.104. 153 The name Quikwonkpa is a nome de guerre(about war) taken from Legendary Gio warrior Wonkpa. 154 Jackson Doe was a Liberian politician in the late twentieth century and a native of Nimba County. Immediately before the 1980 military coup d'état, Doe served as Nimba County's senior senator, but when the government was overthrown, he lost his office, was tried for treason, and imprisoned at the Barclay Training Center. 155 Thomas Quiwonkpa (1955-1985), a Gio from Nimba County, was a Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and founder of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

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The multidimensional crises of underdevelopment in cultural, economic, political, security and social phenomenon, have their origins in the establishment of the Liberian colony in 1820, and the resultant civil conflict reached their climax in 1989. This was vividly reflected in the increased level of the crisis of illegitimacy.156 Frustrated by the failure of various neo-colonial regimes, including the Doe government, to address their cultural, economic, political, security and social needs, the majority of Liberians became distant from the state.157 For these citizens, the neo-colonial Liberian state had become irrelevant to their lives.

2.0 Liberia’s First Civil War 1989-1997

The theoretical and complex nature of civil War and its concomitant conflicts right from 1980s, most scholar have underlined issues such as root causes; protagonist involved and the peace making, peace keepers and post conflict building efforts. According to Kieh advances five arguments for outbreak of first civil war in Liberia: ethic, elite pathology, Institutional pathology, spiritual anarchy, and political culture.158

2.1. Ethic theory

According to Kieh, ethic theory has been the most dominant aspect to explain the first civil war in Liberia. This is based on several postulates. First, the major group to actors in Liberian Politics were ethnic stocks and groups as stated above “Americo-Liberian” or “ settler’s stock” and the sixteen indigenous group. Each group having its own set of institution setting, practices, and values. Quoting Levitt (2005: 246) asserts, “settlers and indigenous societies were established on diametrically opposed principles. Secondly, each group had it own set of distinctive interest and agenda. Hence competition of ethnic interest that sparked broad gamut from political to social. Thirdly, the Liberian state was dominated by Americo-Liberian stock from 1847-1980, wielding all political, economic and social powers and by the Krahn ethnic group that ruled from 1980-1999. Fourth, the

156 Cfr. Kieh, op cit. pp. 121; 124. 157 Cfr. Ibidem. 158Cfr. George Klay Kieh, Jr., The First Liberia Civil War, “The crisis of Underdevelopment” Zen Publisher, 2008, p.18.

38 failure to have corresponding agenda which was exacerbated by “hegemonic practices” of the two clans Americo-Liberian and Krahn.159

2.2. The Institutional Pathology Theory

This theory is based on poor structure of institution from the State especially the public one that did fail to perform according to the expectation of the citizens. The legislature, Executive and Judiciary did not have proper coordination. Another factor is that the elites were conditioned by the dynamics of the institutional defects and came to accept them as normal, meaning there was nothing to do about it. These elites are as a result of dysfunctional institutional arrangement which provides breeding ground for the growth of and development of their pathological behaviors. This pathology led the government incapable of addressing the various challenges the country confronted. As a result, it generated mass resistance and hostilities towards not only the elites but each group targeting each other hence political unrest that ended up in civil War in Liberia.160

2.3. The Spiritual Anarchy Theory

In explaining the complexity of African belief and its civil wars, it’s known for barbarous culture of political violence guided by spirits guided by religious rituals that rationalize anarchy. Looking at Liberia, there is intrinsic connection between the invisible world spiritual world and physical one. Once there is disorder in one, it affects the other. They believe that spiritual forces conditions the political behavior, the cycle of disorder in the traditional Liberian cosmological world where the forces of rebellious behavior first developed by the NPFL and others militias also followed as well. According to Ellis, Spiritual imaginations entails a mental process of legitimizing the linkages among political, physical and spiritual powers. In other words, using the mind of individual as religious crucible, war-making is rationalized as a by-product of the inter-play between the forces of spiritual world and physical one.161

159 Cfr. Ibidem., 160 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.20 161 Cfr. Ibidem., pp.21-22

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To back this theory, religious power is accessed through sacrifices of which at time human beings are sacrificed for ritual cleansing, followed by cannibalism. Acts of unmitigated violence are rationalized by combatants (as we shall see with Charles Taylor) as integral to the maintenance of connection with the spiritual forces that serve as sources of the war. In summary, since war was caused by rumblings in the invisible world, the making of human sacrifices during the act of warfare is a pivotal to the maintenance of the causal chain.162

2.4. The Political Culture Theory

Kieh here quotes (Yoder 2003) who says that Liberian Civil War was caused by country’s illiberal and undemocratic values. From here derives several arguments. They argue that both settlers Americo-Liberian and indigenous ethnic groups did not have democratic political culture. Before the expansion of Liberia as a state, they were two distinct political systems: the settler Political system and the indigenous one. Each had it proper political orientation. Both of them seem to have authoritarian political ambition.163

Another factor is that after the expansion of the settler state and the subsequent establishment of a Liberian polity that embodies both settlers and the indigenes, a national political culture was crystallized. During interaction between the two groups, each acquired certain value that influenced relationship. The Liberians interacted with people from various countries including USA that have democratic system hence introduction to Liberal democratic values; the emphasis on political rights and civil liberties, including tolerance and pluralism. However, because Liberians had been socialized in the values of their illiberal political culture they were thus unaffected by exposure of democratic to democratic values.164

However, to Charles Taylor, this was not what he could swallow in his political ambition. He had prepared fertile ground to wage war. He is characterized by all the above factors we have seen above. It is not by surprise that in one of his statement: “When wartime come

162 Cfr. Ibidem., p.22 163 Cfr. Ibidem., 164 Cfr. Ibidem.,

40 and I say, get-from-daway you m’ist down there and say “fwenken”.“I won’t say fwenken”, I will say “foot help de body.”165

The Liberian civil war began on Christmas Eve 1989, when a group of roughly one hundred and fifty ill-equipped rebel soldiers, supported by Libya and crossed into Nimba County, Liberia from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire under the command of Charles Taylor, former director-general of Liberia’s General Services Agency (LGSA) and leader of the NPFL, who returned to Liberia after breaking out of a prison for embezzlement charges he committed in Liberia. Initially this group enjoyed massive and popular support, with many young men and women joining them, armed only with single barreled guns and at times sticks.166And within five months, the NPFL controlled 90 percent of the country. ‘ I started with a shotgun and three rifles and a few dozen men behind me’ Taylor narrates two years later.

“They thought we had a multitude…it was dark, and they just assumed. Their guilt and their corruption magnified their enemies in their sight…they ran without fight. Now we had arms to take the next garrison. General Varney and Prince Johnson, seasoned military men, joined our cause. Suddenly we’d become formidable”!167

The small rebellion army of Taylor soon became pivotal to some of the most dramatic events ever experienced in West Africa. The main reason was that Taylor’s had deep knowledge about the African state system, which is a combination of strong regimes and weak states and the contradictions built into such a system. The government had no real control, either over the international borders or over the more remote provinces of the country as noted in the previous chapter.

NPFL gained members through the reconciliation of several ethnic tribes; however, the insurgency focused on attacking those other tribes that benefitted from association with

165 Dialogue between the author and her sister in Helen Cooper , The House at the Sugar Beach, Simon and Schuster, London, 2008. Liberian English ‘fwenken’ is an expression of hesitation or indecision while ‘ foot help de body’ expresses a decision to run from danger. 166 Cfr. Preben Kaarsholm, Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa: (ed.), Oxford, 2006, p.162. 167 Denis Johnson, Harper’s magazine, October 2000.

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President Doe, causing intense ethnic violence and cleansing throughout those first months.168 Doe sought assistance from the international community, calling on the United Nations, however, he was unable to received assistance due to NPFL support from ECOWAS member states, specifically Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire.169 It ultimately provided Cease-fire Monitoring Group forces (ECOMOG) to end the conflict and human rights violations (more details to be discussed ahead). With the assassination of Doe, several Liberian political groups created the IGNU with the backing of Nigeria. Taylor, backed by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya, had still control the majority of Liberian territory hence refusal to acknowledge IGNU.170

When the war first started, it was difficult to know exactly what happened to the Special Security Service (SSS) during this time. Although the AFL was viewed as the official Liberian army, members of the SSS may have collaborated with the AFL to put down the rebellion. As the analyst pointed out, the SSS had a fluid and undefined role. As such, they could easily have been included with the AFL and deployed alongside the AFL in terms of presidential protection. As the NPFL insurgency progressed, Doe directed the AFL to respond with violence in both Greater Liberia and Monrovia. Government forces engaged in a violent campaign throughout the country, committing widespread killings in Monrovia,171 as well as indiscriminately shooting unarmed population in several villages, looting possessions, and burning homes.172 Liberians, particularly residents of Nimba County, were targeted for suspected opposition activity or ethnic affiliation. Statements reveal that government forces deliberately sought out and persecuted Mano- Gio, Americo-Liberians, and other suspected rebel supporters.

168 Cfr. Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of African Civil War. London, UK: 1999, p.78. 169 Cfr. Levitt, op.cit, p.207. 170 Cfr. Ibidem., p.208. 171 Cfr. Human Rights Watch, Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster: Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict 8- 9, Oct. 26, 1990 [hereinafter Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster], www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia1990.pdf (retrieved on 5.May.2015) 172 Cfr. Flight from Terror, U.S. Dept of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990: Liberia 192 (1991).

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The Liberian army, AFL, continued fighting and was later aided by another faction, the LPC originating in the south- east of the country. Other factions, often enjoyed localized regional support, came and went, such as the LDF and the Congo Defense Force (CDF). The main incentive to continue the war was, however, financial. Soldiers sought to obtain instant booty, whilst warlords aimed at gaining control over productive geographical areas, especially those with gold and diamond deposits, as well as timber and rubber, and cocoa plantations. Rebel movements kept some amount of popular regions and ethnic groupings. These were further politicized by the war itself.173 In reality, the brutality of combatants towards the very people they claimed to serve kept civilians submissive. Shady international businessmen, conglomerates of West Africa stated that at times foreign departments of powerful Western states all supported the warlords.174

In due course, following an internal struggle, the NPFL, created another group, INPFL under Prince Y. Johnson leader of the Gio tribe. Taking different directions and at the time of fighting each other, both defeated the AFL and reached the Atlantic coast of Monrovia in July 1990. In August, a West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG), was created under leadership of Nigeria and sent to take control of the situation in Monrovia.175 Prince Yormie Johnson seemingly struck a deal with the peacekeepers and lured President Doe into a trap, capturing, torturing, beaten, mutilated then shot, on 176 September 1990. His torture and execution was videotaped by his captors.

2.4.1. Rise of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL )

The hostilities between Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Doe’s AFL were soon exacerbated by the rise of another fighting faction. In July 1990, a split developed between Taylor and a

173 Cfr. Atkinson, Philippa “Deconstructing Media Mythologies of Ethnic War in Liberia”, 1999 in T. Allen and J. Seaton (eds.), The Media of Conflict: War reporting and representation of Ethnic Violence, London: Zed Books,pp.192-218. 174 Cfr. Reno Humantarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,1997. 175 Cfr. Adebajo, 2002; Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998; Olonisakin, 1997; 2000. 176 Cfr. Armon, Jeremy; Andy Carl , Liberia: Chronology", In Conciliation Resources, 1996, (Retrieved on 26.02.2007).

43 group of NPFL fighters led by Prince Johnson.177 Prince Johnson launched a splinter group known as the INPFL, comprised of approximately five hundred combatants.178 The INPFL gained control of areas in Monrovia, and established its base in the city’s outskirts at Caldwell. The rise of the INPFL increased the risks of violence to the civilians, as they did not only become subject to violations by fighters of INFPL, but also could be suspected of association with yet another faction. The INPFL often arrested and detained people at Caldwell, where they would be tortured, sometimes to the point of death.179 Statement givers described the atrocities that took place at the INPFL base, including “manhandling of people; severe torture; summary executions.”180

2.4.2. First Battle for Monrovia: July 1990

The Civil War in Liberia in 1990s, was due to two cleavage lines in analysis of rebel factions. First, there was a line between local communities and the nation-state, as opposed to ethnic groups. The troublesome relationship between the state and local communities exceeded that of any ethnic logic. Politicized ethnicity would rather be recognized as a further consequence. Secondly, a cleavage line between the youth and gerontocratic leadership became more increasingly evident in the conflict.

By summer 1990, Monrovia remained an area of contention among warring factions. Doe, while still in office, was losing his ability to administer the country and enforce the rule of law181. The INPFL commanded various areas of Monrovia, as well as Bushrod Island.182 Taylor controlled large, key parts of Liberia, but Monrovia still remained outside of NPFL control. As different forces sought to acquire or retain control of the capital, intense fighting around Monrovia surged during battles of 1990, 1992, and 1996. These three battles afforded factions not only the opportunity to seize Monrovia, but also the chance

177 Ellis notes that as early as February 1990, there were indications of division between the NPFL and INPFL. Human Rights Watch estimates that the INPFL split from the NPFL as early as February 1990. Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster, Cf. Beyan, 1991. 178 Cfr. Ibidem., 179 Cfr. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Diaspora Statement Rec. 919. 180 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 403. 181 Cfr. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990: Liberia 192 (1991). 182 Cfr. Human Rights Watch, Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster: Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict, pp. 8- 9, Oct. 26, 1990.

44 for opportunists to plunder and take revenge.183 Numerous statement givers gave eyewitness accounts of atrocities committed by both rebels and government soldiers as they fought for control of the capital. The statements again reveal the multiple forms of violence and the targeting of certain groups and ethnicities:

They (INPFL) started going on a house to house…Within that instant, my boss lady, M.M., whom I was assistant to, was arrested, tortured, beaten, raped and she was subsequently executed (beheaded). My husband, M.K., a Mandingo by nationality, was a businessman. He was arrested and executed. Realizing that my life was at stake, I decided to run away with my two kids, but I was caught by the rebel. They started to beat me with the gun butt. I was stabbed with the soldier knife in my stomach and lost consciousness. So they thought I was dead, so they left me.184

AFL soldiers were equally ruthless in their attempts to defeat the rebels. The atrocities were often misdirected or senseless and they resulted in the loss of numerous innocent lives. For example, one statement giver described how the AFL shot indiscriminately, opening fire on everyone at the supermarket in July 1990.185 As the INPFL approached, the AFL retreated, slaughtering many people as it did so.186 The terroristic impact of the killings was magnified by mutilation and other inappropriate treatment of the bodies.187 One statement giver described finding the bodies of his family after they were murdered by AFL soldiers on July 30, 1990.

My father’s body was terribly mutilated. My mother’s stomach was ripped open. She was eight months pregnant. I was so frightened I couldn’t even touch them. My sister had been shot right in the middle of her head. I was in a terrible state. I couldn’t even look at them closer because I was just in shock. I mean even to see my father was hard. I could just recognize him by his watch which was still on his hand.188

During their flight from the battle, Liberians were subject to additional abuses. One statement giver described his experience during the siege:

183 Cfr. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, UK, 1999, pp78-79. 184 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1576. 185 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 106. 186 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 34. 187 Cfr. Other inappropriate treatment of the bodies included cannibalism. 188 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1354.

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During the first week in July 1990, when Taylor attacked Monrovia, my mother, six brothers and I sought to flee to Kakata by way of the Fendell campus. As we were walking, we were detained by Taylor’s militia…The leaders directed militia members to beat my older brother. My brother was also subjected to tabay189 and was killed in front of my eyes. The following day my mother instructed me to proceed without her and to flee with my five younger brothers. As my brothers and I resumed walking, we were again detained by Taylor’s militia. The militia cut one of my young brothers then shot all of them dead -- only I was spared.190

Later, the statement giver learned that his mother had also been killed.191

This breakdown of the state led the whole region of West Africa to implode into the developing Liberian war economy. One fallout was the war started by , a well-known rebel in the civil war in Sierra Leone, and others close to him, against the military regime in the Sierra Leone capital, Freetown, taking advantage of the unrest in the region. But Sankoh was not the only one who sought to use the Liberian civil war for his own purposes. Liberian warlords as well as civil and military governments of other West African countries, such as Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and , to mention the most active ones, took active participation. This kind of regional dynamics that the civil wars, first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone, triggered and revealed a number of transnational relations between the various actors of the regimes of these countries. At the same time, the regional dynamics also led to the creation of new political situations. These regional alliances turned out to be extremely unstable. They were to a considerable degree ad hoc and were not based on any established institutional structure.192

After the killing of President Doe, the INPFL continued playing an active role in Monrovian politics until Johnson was brought into exile in Nigeria in late 1992. Meanwhile, several other rebel factions appeared. The ULIMO created in 1991 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with assistance from Sierra Leonean government. Soon

189 ‘Tabay’ is a torture on victims, tying their elbows together tightly behind their backs with wire until bones break and blood oozed out from the arms 190 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1554. 191 Cfr. Ibidem., 192 Cfr. Dokken, African Security politics redefined, op.cit., p.51.

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‘The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy’ by Kromah faction (ULIMO) itself split into two: ULIMO-J led by Roosevelt Johnson an ethnic Krahn Fighters loyal to Johnson triggered the first major violation of the Abuja Accord in December 1995, resisting ECOMOG deployment around the diamond mines near Tubmanburg. He was dismissed from the ULIMO-J leadership in early 1996.193

Like many others involved in the Liberian civil war, Johnson was known to use mercenary fighters to further his causes. One notable example was his funding of Joshua Milton Blahyi, commonly known as “”. The General commanded a brigade of drunken or otherwise intoxicated young teenage boys who would fight naked or in women's clothing because of a belief that it would protect them from bullets. Such was the mix of politics, semi-religious belief, uneducated leaders, drugs and utter fall of civil society that typified the Liberian conflict.194

Another faction under ULIMO, was ULIMO-K led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah which was mainly comprised of Islamic Mandingo tribe. Its power base was in northwestern Liberia, in and around Lofa County. Kromah was a special assistant to the Vice-President and later Assistant Information Minister during the regime of President William Tolbert before becoming Director General of the Liberian Broadcasting System in 1982 and Minister of Information in 1984 under President Samuel Doe and denied the government's crackdown leading to some deaths at the University of Liberia in 1984. He went into exile in June 1990, months after the civil war began in Liberia.195

2.4.3. ECOWAS intervention force (August 1990)

On 7, August 1990, the 16-member ECOWAS agreed to deploy a joint military intervention force, the ECOMOG, and place it under Nigerian leadership. Nigeria persuaded the other member states to establish a peacekeeping force officially to try to separate the combating parties. Its real objective was probably very different. The Nigerian

193 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/473 ( June 10, 1995). 194Cfr. www.org/wiki/Roosevelt Johnson (retrieved on 4.2. 2015). 195 Cfr. Ibidem.,

47 president, , was concerned that an armed insurgency was about to overthrow a military regime in a neighboring country. His words to the other ECOWAS leaders illustrate this: “Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any of you”.196

This possibility was alarming to the Nigerian military government as well as to the other authoritarian regimes of West Africa. In particular, they feared that a Liberia governed by Taylor would become a breeding place for other West African rebellion groups. The intervention in Liberia was therefore necessary, not primarily to protect the Liberian government but to protect the regimes of the other member states. General Momoh of Sierra Leone, for instance, felt a danger of the rebellion spreading from his closest neighbor and therefore offered his country as a base for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia. Thus, Taylor, in view of the unity among dictators in the region, had an obvious motive to support fellow-rebel Sankoh and the RUF in the first phase of the Sierra Leonean civil war. This is an important element in the regionalization of the civil wars in the two countries.197

Another similarly important element in the spread of the Liberian war was the challenges to the leaders’ regional interests as a result of the war. At that time there were very close political and economic relations between Babangida’s regime in Nigeria and Doe’s regime in Liberia. This alliance had a counterpart in an alliance centered on former president of Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny. For many years, Houphouet-Boigny had had close relations with two leaders of Liberia, first with and later with Adolphus Tolbert.198

One of his cousins (of Houphouet-Boigny) was married to Tolbert’s son. Both Tolbert and his son were killed in Doe’s coup, but Houphouet- Boigny’s cousin survived. She fled to Burkina Faso, where she married Blaise Compaoré (who later became the president of Burkina Faso). “The Doe-Babangida axis during the late 1980s was therefore seen by Houphouet-Boigny not only as the perpetuation of the personal humiliation he had suffered

196Adeleke, Ademola. The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia. Journal of Modern African Studies 33 (4)1995,p.577. 197 Cfr. Dokken, African security politics redefined, op.cit, p.51 198 Cfr. Charles Taylor and his role in Liberia, Huband 1998.

48 when the upstart Doe had been responsible for the murder of his son-in-law, but also as the reversal of previous diplomatic alliance linking Abidjan (the capital of Côte d’Ivoire) and Monrovia (the capital of Liberia)”.199 The focus of attention of the regional networks was the question of who would be in control of the lucrative formal and informal trade networks in the region and the question of who would be in control of Liberia’s natural resources.200

Particularly important was the large amount of iron ore in Nimba county. Nimba is reckoned to be one of the richest sources of iron ore in the world, and French, British, as well as American companies were eager to get admittance to the area. Taylor argued that Nigeria’s involvement in the conflict was an Anglo-American plot to undermine French influence in the region. This kind of political rhetoric is interesting, because it illustrates how alliances shift. Liberia had never been a part of francophone Africa. Traditionally, the country had been the closest ally of the United States in the region. When Taylor started to plan his insurgency against Doe, he therefore first went to the United States to ask for support. However, his appeal was rejected by the American government, which continued to support Doe even though it was aware of the extensive corruption and the violation of human rights committed by Doe’s regime. The regionalized civil war in West Africa was now a reality, and the regionalization was to a large degree propelled by the transnational relations facilitated by a system consisting of strong regimes and weak states.201

The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG’s objectives were to impose a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethno-linguistic social relations with Liberia. The ECOWAS attempted to persuade Doe to resign and go into exile, but despite his weak position besieged in his

199 Ellis, Stephen, Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency. In African Guerrillas, (ed.)Christopher Clapham, Oxford: James Currey,1998, p.166. 200 For further analysis of this kind of economic questions, Cfr. Duffield 2001. 201Cfr. Dokken, African security redefined, op.cit, p.52.

49 mansion, he refused. ECOMOG, an ECOWAS intervention force, arrived at the on August 24, 1990, landing from Nigerian and Ghanaian vessels.202

2.4.4. Attack on Monrovia (1992)

Peace was still far off as both Taylor and Johnson claimed power. ECOMOG declared an IGNU with Amos Sawyer as their president, with the broad support of Johnson. The implementation of ECOWAS brokered peace accords203, disarmament, safeguarding aid supplies, sheltering troops204, helping supervise elections of 1997,205 and promoting security by helping to rebuild Liberia’s military, police and security forces.206

The regional forces successfully repelled the NPFL invasion.207 Nevertheless, political undercurrents and inadequate planning, logistics, and lack of equipment hindered ECOMOG’s initial efficacy.208 Preexisting regional political tensions led to division among ECOWAS members.. With the exception of Guinea, the Francophone nations (led by Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) supported Taylor and objected to the intervention; the Anglophone countries, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, supported the intervention. Logistical factors, including inadequate force levels, the lack of a Monrovia- based ECOWAS official to facilitate political negotiations, and inconsistent interpretations of the mandate, reduced ECOMOG’s effectiveness of widespread looting by ECOMOG soldiers, alleged sales of weaponry by Nigerians to armed groups, and concerns about

202 Cfr. Adekeye Adebajo, Boulder, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea- Bissau, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p.75. 203 ECOWAS helped broker seven major peace agreements prior to the Accord of 1993. The agreements included the Bamako Ceasefire of November 1990, the Joint Statement of December 1990, the February 1991 Lomé Agreement, and the Yamoussoukro I, II, III and IV Accords of June-October 1991. (Cfr. Charles Abiodun Alao, Commentary on the Accords, Conciliation Resources, www.c-r.org/our- work/accord/liberia/ commentary.php, (Retrieved on 19. Nov. 2014). 204 Cfr. Christopher Tuck, 174 Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia, 4 African. Studies Quarterly (2000), Cfr: www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1. htm. 205 Cfr. Michelle Pitts, Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment, 19 J. Conflict Studies 49-68 (1999). 206 Cfr. Human Rights Watch, World Report 1998 – Liberia Human Rights Developments 47, Jan. 1, 1998, Cfr. also: www.unhcr.org/refworld/ publisher,HRW,LBR,3ae6a8c04,0.html (Retrieved on 3.March.2015). 207 Cfr. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990: Liberia 192 (1991) [hereinafter Dep’t of State Country Reports 1990]. 208 Cfr. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From ‘Paternaltarianism’ to State Collapse, 2005,p.206.

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Nigeria’s support for the LPC.209 Its deficiencies were quickly evidenced by its failure to prevent the assassination of President Doe by INPFL forces less than two weeks after its arrival.

Early on, Taylor viewed the ECOMOG intervention as a threat to his objectives and as an adversary.210 In August 1990, prior to ECOMOG’s deployment, Taylor criticized the peacekeeping force, which he considered an act of aggression. He proclaimed he would “fight to the last man,” stating, “I’ve given orders to open fire on any strangers setting foot on our territory.” NPFL-controlled radio frequently broadcast anti-ECOMOG messages. The NPFL intended to weaken the political resolve of ECOMOG’s member states so that Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens would force their governments to withdraw.211

Although it was intended to be a neutral peacekeeping force, ECOMOG soon assumed a more offensive role. As early as October of 1990, violence erupted between ECOMOG and the NPFL as ECOMOG successfully pushed the NPFL out of Monrovia.212

Another consequence of Taylor’s hostility toward ECOMOG was that foreign nationals became the target of human rights abuses.213 The NPFL targeted citizens of ECOWAS countries in retaliation for ECOMOG’s role in the conflict. Specifically, the NPFL adopted a policy of targeting Nigerian, Ghanaian, and other ECOWAS civilians in retribution for the deployment of ECOMOG.214 Referring to the ECOMOG force, Taylor reportedly

209 The 1993 Cotonou Agreement appeared to address these concerns by requiring that ECOMOG include non- West African troops and joint implementation with UNOMIL. (Cfr. Cotonou Accord, Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU) - National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), art. 3, July 25, 1993, www.c-r.org/ our- work/accord/Liberia/cotonou-accord%20.php, (Retrieved on 9. Oct. 2014)) 210 Cfr. Human Rights Watch, Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster: Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict n° 8- 9, Oct. 26, 1990 (hereinafter Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster), www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia1990.pdf, (Retrieved on 22. Dec. 2014) 211 Cfr. Liberia’s Cowboys, Economist, Oct. 13, 1990. 212 Cfr. Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Sub regional Peacekeeping in Liberia, J. Humanitarian Assistance (September 1995), Cfr: www.jha.ac/articles/a005.htm; The five members of the SMC (, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, with Guinea and Sierra Leone as observers) met in Banjul, Gambia in July 1990 with representatives of Doe and Taylor and proposed an ECOWAS Peace Plan, which called for (among other things) an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a peacekeeping force.. 213 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1440 (“In retaliation for the ECOMOG soldiers’ aggression, Taylor lined up and shot some of the nationals he had been holding in captivity.”) 214 It was also difficult to move goods within the countryside. For example, a person carrying letters through a checkpoint would be required to surrender them to soldiers. (Cfr. Human Rights Watch, The Cycle of

51 stated that, “for every Liberian that’s killed I’m going to make sure some other nationals get killed too.”215 In a widely reported massacre of foreigners, the NPFL killed two hundred ECOWAS nationals in 1990.216

Taylor launched an assault on Monrovia on October 15, 1992, named 'Operation Octopus.217 The assault may have been led by Burkina Faso soldiers.218 The infamous operation Octopus which lasted nearly 120 days reportedly sparked-off after series of harsh and unfavorable political and economic exchanges from interim President Amos C. Sawyer on one hand, ex-president Charles Taylor, and the former leader of the INPFL Prince Yormie Johnson.219 Attacking ECOMOG positions around Monrovia, and even striking at the AFL, which was encamped at its Schiefflin barracks on the outskirts of the city.

For almost a month, ECOMOG struggled to repel what has been called "the ." Fighting raged in and around the city, with the suburban areas of Gardnerville, Barnesville, New and Caldwell particularly had hard hit. Approximately 200,000 people displaced from these areas flooded into the central city to escape the fighting. Other civilians were pushed behind Taylor’s lines into the country's interior, joining thousands of displaced persons there. Those who refused to cooperate were often executed by the NPFL.220

3.1. UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)

In 1993, ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, . Following this, on

September 22, the United Nations established UNOMIL while the war continued. UNOMIL in early 1994 deployed three hundred and sixty eight military observers and

Abuse: Human Rights Violations since the November Cease- Fire, Oct. 21, 1991; Cfr also: www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/liberia/, (Retrieved on13. Feb. 2015). 215 Cfr. Liberian Rebel Boss Threatens Civilians, Courier Mail, Aug. 23, 1990. 216 Cfr. Liberian Rebels Kill 200 Foreigners, Times (London), Sept. 1, 1990. 217 Cfr. Ellis, Mask of Anarchy, op cit, pp. 98-99. 218 Cfr. Herbert Howe, Ambiguous Order, 2005, 143. 219 Cfr. www.allafrica.com/stories/201210151222.html (Last visited on 12.07.2012). 220 Cfr. Ibidem.,

52 associated civilian personnel to monitor implementation of the abortive Cotonou Peace Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for February/March 1994.221

Renewed armed hostilities broke out in May 1994 and war continued, becoming intense in July and August. ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage by some factions. By mid-1994, the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, but humanitarian agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general insecurity.222

3.1.1. Akosombo Agreement: 1994

Factional leaders agreed in September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a supplement to the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was signed. On September 12, 1994, three warring factions, the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and AFL, signed the Akosombo Agreement. The accord granted Taylor considerable dispensations, including a seat on the five-person Council of State,223 much to the displeasure of the Nigerian government224. Subsequently, ECOMOG attacked in September 1994. Civilians in Gbarnga found themselves in the midst heavy fighting and bombings. The attack, although unsuccessful, nevertheless demonstrated that Nigeria would not passively accept Taylor’s ascent to power.225

Various factors, including politico-historical roots, ethnic divisions, and ECOMOG’s maneuvering among the armed groups, continued to splinter the factions. Alliances between ECOMOG and other factions proved unstable, leading to severances and attacks between factions and the peacekeeping force.226 For example, ECOMOG and the Nimba

221 Cfr. UNOMIL , September 1993 September 1997, (retrieved on 21.01.2015). 222 Cfr. Cindy Shiner, In Battle and in Politics, Liberia’s Motley Factions Fight On, Wash. Post (Foreign Serv.), Aug. 7, 1994. 223 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 176. 224 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 205. 225Cfr. Ibidem., 226 For example, ULIMO-J forces violated the Abuja I ceasefire agreement and attacked ECOMOG forces in December 1995. (Cfr. The Secretary-General, Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the

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Redemption Council (NRC) had discussed plans to launch a second front against the NPFL in early 1993.227 Upon deployment, the NRC’s spokesman issued a statement announcing the formation of the NRC and calling for support for ECOMOG’s deployment.228 To his surprise, however, ECOMOG forces were not deployed alongside the NRC combatants as planned.

The security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the face of ECOMOG funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants to honor agreements to end the war, the UN Security Council reduced to about ninety the number of UNOMIL observers. It extended UNOMIL’s mandate and subsequently extended it several times until September 1997.229

In 1994, division within the NPFL arose, leading , Sam Dokie, and Lavelli Supuwood to form the NPFL Central Revolutionary Council.230 By 1995, there were seven different fighting factions, including the NPFL, NPFL-CRC, LDF, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, AFL, and LPC. The exclusion of the newer, non- signatory factions from the Akosombo negotiations remained contentious.231 Thus, the factions convened to sign two more agreements on December 21, 1994.232 The Agreement enabled, inter alia, accession to the Akosombo Agreement, a ceasefire to begin midnight of December 28, 1994, and the

United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1996/47 ( Jan. 23, 1996).

228 Cfr. Kerper Dwanyen, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Community of Liberia, pp. 25-27 ( June 14, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with author). 229 www.org/wiki/First Liberian civil War. (retrieved on 23, December, 2014). 230 Sesay Woewiyu has suggested that it was his support for and Taylor’s rejection of the interim government that led to their split. (Cfr. Telephone interview by Dorsey & Whitney, LLP with Thomas Woewiyu ( July 17, 2008) (on file with author). 231 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1995/9 ( Jan. 6, 1995). 232 Cfr. LIBERIA: A Chronolog y of 25 years of conflict and turmoil, IRIN News, www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx? ReportId=57838 (Retrieved on 21. Apr. 2009); On December 21, 1994, ULIMO (Roosevelt Johnson), the LDF (Massaquoi), the LPC (Boley), NPFL-CRC (Woewiyu), and the LNC ( Junius), as non-signatories, signed the Acceptance and Accession Agreement, thus signifying their accession to the Akosombo agreement and the agreement on clarification of the aforesaid Akosombo agreement; Acceptance and Accession Agreement 1, Dec. 21, 1994,www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_12211994_accept.html (retrieved on 20.Jan.2015).

54 establishment of a new Council of State composed of five representatives selected by the various fighting factions.233

During this time, hostilities remained widespread throughout 80 percent of the country, but at a lower level of intensity.234 A U.N. report noted the segmenting of fighting into different territories according to the warring factions. For example, the NPFL and LPC coalition forces primarily battled in the eastern, northern, and to some extent, southern, parts;235 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K fought in the western areas;236 ULIMO-K and the NPFL fought in Lofa County;237 and ULIMO-J and the NPFL fought in Bong and Margibi Counties238. Most fighting consisted of skirmishes, looting, and attacks on infrastructure.239 In December 1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement, a supplement to the Akosombo Agreement. Disagreements ensued and fighting continued.

3.1.2. Abuja I: August 1995 and the April 6, 1996 War

On 19 August 1995, the main factions signed an agreement largely brokered by Ghanaian President , Abuja 1. At a conference sponsored by ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity 240 now the African Union. The agreement provided for a new Council of State,

233 Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and Accra Clarification, Preamble, Parts I-II, Dec. 21, 1994, (Cfr. www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ Liberia/accra-clarification.php; see also The Secretary General, Eighth Progress Report) 234 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eighth Progress Report. 235 Cfr. The Secretary General, Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/781 (Sept. 13, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, Twelfth Progress Report]; The Secretary General, Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/158 (Feb. 24, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, Ninth Progress Report]. 236 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observe Mission in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/473 ( June 10, 1995). 237 Cfr. Ibidem., 238 Cfr.Ibidem., 239 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eighth Progress Report, (TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1740.); see also The Secretary General, Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/781 (Sept. 13, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, Twelfth Progress Report]; The Secretary General, Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/1995/158 (Feb. 24, 1995) [hereinafter The Secretary General, Ninth Progress Report]. 240 Cfr. Thomas Jaye, Liberia: An Analysis of Post-Taylor Politics, 30 Rev. Afr. Pol. Econ. 643, 646 (2003); Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa 112 (2002) [hereinafter Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War].

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241 disarmament, and elections. On September 1, 1995, a collective transitional government known as the Liberian National Transitional Government II (LNTG II), headed by Taylor, 242 Alhaji Kromah, , and three civilian representatives, came into power. By bringing factional opponents into the political realm, the Abuja agreement ushered in 243 political strategy as another means to gain control of the country.

Notably, ULIMO-J was excluded from direct participation in the Abuja peace negotiations.244 Although the agreement included a provision granting ULIMO-J’s 245 Roosevelt Johnson a head position at the Ministry of Rural Development, the exclusion of his faction from negotiations and the implicit failure to recognize ULIMO-J as a major force within the conflict likely served to alienate Johnson and ULIMO-J from the final terms of the Abuja accord. The outcome proved detrimental to both Roosevelt Johnson and Kromah, as ULIMO-J’s alienation and the new political framework converged against 246 both leaders’ limited political backgrounds and mass appeal. As a result, it essentially preserved the potential for future conflict.

Under the terms of Abuja I, a ceasefire commenced on August 26, 1995.247 Once again, the brokered peace remained tenuous. In December 1995, ULIMO-J forces violated the ceasefire agreement, attacking ECOMOG forces in Gbarma and Tubmanburg248 and

241 Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-K)- (LPC)-Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)-United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-J)-Lofa Defense Force (LDF) National Patriotic Front of Liberia Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC)-Liberia National Conference (LNC), Part II (A)(i), Aug. 19, 1995, (Cfr.www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08191995.html, (Retrieved on 29. Feb. 2015) 242 The Secretary General, Twelfth Progress Report, 9-10; Liberia: A Chronology of 25 Years of Conflict and Turmoil, IRIN News, Jan. 17, 2006, www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=57838 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 243 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 230. 244 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 115. 245 Cfr. Samuel K. Woods, II, Statement on Development in the Peace Process, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Apr. 3, 1996 partial text www.africaaction.org/ docs96/lib9604.2.htm.(Retrieved on 17. Jan. 2015) 246 Cfr. Ellis, Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency, op cit, p.166. 247 Cfr. Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, 60-61 (2002). 248 Cfr. Human Rights Watch, Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster: Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict 8-9, Oct. 26, Cfr. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia1990.pdf. (Retrieved on 14.Dec.2014).

56 repeatedly using civilians as human shields.249 During the fighting, ULIMO-J forces killed sixteen Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers, wounded seventy eight others, and seized the peacekeepers’ arms.250

At this time, Taylor was setting the stage for a third battle in Monrovia by contriving a rift between ULIMO-J and ECOMOG.251 Using a murder reportedly committed by Roosevelt Johnson’s forces, Taylor urged the government to respond252. The Council of State attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, compelling him to seek refuge in AFL military barracks253. Roosevelt Johnson insisted that the police represented henchmen of Charles Taylor’s NPFL and would not afford him just treatment.254 The confrontation launched, the third battle for Monrovia on April 6, 1996.255 ULIMO-J, LPC, and AFL forces fought against NPFL and ULIMO-K.256 Within the first few days, an estimated 2,000 people were killed,257 with total fatalities rising to 3,000 people.258 One statement giver recalled that the death toll was so high that human bones began to pile up in the streets. Another statement giver witnessed combatants throwing bodies into the river.259

4.1. Abuja II : August 1996 and Fighting in Monrovia

Heavy fighting broke out again in April 1996. This led to the evacuation of most international Non- governmental Organizations and the destruction of much of Monrovia.

Liberia: Action/Background Docs., 04/11/'96 -Since the weekend's breakdown of the Liberian peace agreement, events have moved rapidly. Despite reports of a renewed ceasefire early in the week, as of this posting heavy fighting was still continuing and the West African peacekeeping force had not yet taken action to stop the fighting. The

249 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1652. 250 Cfr. Ibidem., 251 Cfr. Ellis, the mask of Anarchy, op.cit, pp.35-43. 252 Cfr. Department of State Country Reports 1990. 253 Cfr. Global Connections: Liberia, Events, op.cit., p. 96. 254 Cfr. Amnesty Int’l, Liberia: Action Must Be Taken Now to Protect Lives of Civilians Threatened by Armed Conflict, AI Index: AFR 34/01/1996, Apr. 12, 1996, Cfr: www.asiapacif ic.amnesty.org/library/print/ ENGAFR340011996. (Retrieved on 15. Dec. 2014). 255Cfr. Ellis, op.cit, p. 251. 256Cfr. Global Connections: Liberia, Events, 1971-200. 257 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 41. 258 Cfr. Ellis, op.cit., pp. 251; 255 ; see also Global Connections: Liberia: Events 1971-2000,www.pbs.org/ wgbh/global connections/Liberia/timeline/time4. Html (Retrieved on 10. Dec. 2014) 259 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1734.

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action and background information in this posting and the next, from the Friends of Liberia and the Africa Faith and Justice Network, provide information that is still relevant for anyone concerned about Liberia. While the media, particularly in the United States, are putting their primary focus on the evacuation of foreigners, there is urgent need to refocus on what can be done to restore the fragile peace.260

On August 17, 1996, another ECOWAS-brokered peace agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria with a revised timetable that called for elections to be held in 1997.261 The agreement extended the timetable for disarmament and elections beyond the original timetable of Abuja I and added the threat of sanctions, including a bar against running for elected office and prosecution for war crimes, against anyone violating the agreement262. Under the terms of Abuja II, ECOMOG began disarming the fighting factions in November 1996 with assistance from the United Nations.263 A new ceasefire was declared on August 20, 1996, and elections were set for May 30, 1997, although ECOMOG later postponed the elections until July 19, 1997, to allow time for preparation.264 On 3 September 1996, Sankawulo was followed by as chairwoman of the ruling council, who served until 2 August 1997 handing over the office to Taylor as elected president.265

Having fought his way to military dominance in Liberia, the flamboyant rebel leader was finally elected president in 1997 with more than 75 percent of votes in an election that most poll monitors deemed to be largely a fair contest. His nearest rival, , who is now president, took only 10 percent of the votes.

“Taylor’s thirst for state power was unquenchable and far greater than the international community’s to forestall the conflict. For Taylor, peace without power was simply not an

260 "Washington Office on Africa" [email protected], (retrieved on, 7.01.2015). 261 Cfr. Supplement to the Abuja Accord, Aug. 17, 1996,www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/abujaaccord supplement.php; Human Rights Watch, Emerging from the Destruction - Human Rights Challenges Facing the New Liberian Government, Oct. 1, 1997, Cfr:www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/liberia/; Global Connections: Liberia, Events, op.cit., p. 258. 262 Cfr. Terrence Lyons, Liberia’s Path from Anarchy to Elections, 97 Current Hist. 229, 230 (May 1998). 263 Cfr. Emerging from the Destruction, supra note 438; Liberia: UNOMIL Background, www.un.org/Dept s/dpko/dpko/co _mission/UNOMI l F T. htm#DECEMBER (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 264Cfr. Ibidem., 265 Cfr. Carl Ek, Cong. Research Service, Liberia: Issues for the United States (Nov. 21, 1996),www. fas.org/man/crs/96-025.htm (Retrieved on 11. Sept. 2015).

58 option” . In 1997, after the fourteenth peace agreement, elections were held where Charles Taylor was declared President in a landslide victory; however the next years were not peaceful as Taylor’s government and armed forces committed human rights violations.266

4.1.1. But how and why did Charles Taylor win election of 1997?

Why a man commonly derided as a brutal warlord should win so clearly puzzled many foreign journalists. As head of the strongest military faction, it was reasoned by Liberians that he could bring stability to a war torn country. Certainly experience had brought too much of Liberia, and people in the country side to appreciate what Taylor had done. For example, in Agricultural sector where he had shown generosity in raising wages and improving conditions. Furthermore, among ordinary Liberians, they preferred a candidate ( Taylor) that had gain a reputation as family man, and a soft touch with children, earning his nickname ‘Papay’. This was a refreshing positive in an increasingly dysfunctional post- civil war society where many men who lost interest in providing for their families and took off with young women, abandoning their wives and families. The electorate believed that, despite his faults, Taylor was a man who would not abandon his ‘Liberian family’ when times got tough.267

By contrast, the electorate was also not impressed by the new breed of politicians that by then aspired to represent them. The melting pot of wartime had exposed people to new faces and new personalities, whether from their experiences in refugee camps or in the cauldron of Monrovia.268

Another factor at the front of the voters’ mind was the near certainty that Taylor’s failure at the polls would result in a resumption of hostilities by the NPFL, and so there was more to the decision than just choosing the strongest leader. It was a calculated risk which entailed a high element of insurance against further insecurity.269

266 Cfr. Ibidem., 267 Cfr. Colin, op cit., p.231. 268 Cfr.Ibidem., 269 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.232

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Intimidation by another name perhaps, but tarnishing Taylor success at the polls in 1997 with his assessment, his detractors could ignore the fact, that, in addition to the NPFL, many other factions and forces had also been responsible for the trauma of the Liberian civilian population since 1990. In particular, the looting and destruction unleashed upon them by ECOMOG force throughout the early years of their deployment must also have been the major consideration for ordinary Liberians trying to give their country a fresh start under a strong and experienced national leader. After all that had happened in the previous seven years, at the hands of outsiders as well as home-grown warlords, Liberians had decided to give Charles Taylor one more chance. The performance that had earned the rapacious earlier peacekeepers of the ECOMOG force their Liberian nickname ‘ Every Car Or Moving Object Gone’.270

Granted that the population was in a situation of extreme pain and desperation, many saw Taylor as both Satan and savior. They only knew that if his takeover of Monrovia in July- August 1990 succeeded, it would at least have brought an end to the starvation and the inhumanity of life in a city under siege by rebel armies, ravaged by rampaging remnants of its own government’s army.271

With memories of the Easter 1996 bloodbath still fresh in the minds of Monrovians, and for the Krahn, Mandingo and other groups in the country side still particularly vulnerable to a return to violence, it was less a case of the man they wanted than the man they knew through bitter experience. The logic of support for Taylor can be better explained by his NPP’s presence deployment across the country, he perceived power as a leader much feared as well as loved and the sheer exhaustion of the electorate with the prospect of continued inter-factional chaos.272

On September 18, 1998, security forces including the SSS in Monrovia conducted a military assault, with code named Camp Johnson Road. This district was a stronghold of Roosevelt Johnson, a former faction leader of ULIMO-J, and his supporters, who were

270 Cfr .Ibidem.,pp232-33. 271Cfr. Ibidem., 272 Cfr.Ibidem.,p.234.

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members of the Krahn ethnic group. There had been some unrest in the area due to attacks by supporters of Roosevelt Johnson, who were apparently acting with impunity. The government indicated that they were entering the area to restore law and order. Hundreds of SSS officers and members of the police Special Task Force, joined by scores of irregular former combatants of Taylor's NPFL, employed automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and mortars. According to the US Department of State, "credible reports indicate that as many as 300 persons, most of them Krahns, comprised of women and children, were killed in a 17-hour battle and in subsequent house-to-house searches and summary executions by government forces”.273

4.1.2. Post election administration of Charles Taylor

After election, Charles Taylor’s administration began showing the contrary; series of murders and disappearances attributed to his personal security forces in his presidential term rapidly disillusioned supporters in Monrovia and abroad. He formed tightened security through groups like ATU, SSU, and SSS.

4.1.2.1. The Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU)

One militia, ATU, was controlled by his son Chucky Taylor Junior, who had moved from the US to join him. ATU soon gained a reputation for lawlessness and brutality, and in later years, was in theft, as well as far worse offences on a number of occasion. One of the methods applied in brutality was to tie prey to a mattress as they were being beaten, to lessen evidence of external bruising so that all injuries would be internal and less easy to identify when victim would arrive in hospital. Chucky applied also the so called ‘Tabay’.274

As a commander of the ATU, Chucky ordered and committed numerous acts of torture and murder not only against civilians but on occasions against his own staff. One such unfortunate, Lieutenant Isaac Gono, was employed by Chucky Taylor as a driver. He had gone for over a year without payment, reported Chucky due to his delayed payment. But it

273 Cfr. Ibidem., 274 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.252.

61 was discovered that Chucky kept the salary allocated to his driver and for his father’s staff. Gono wrote a letter begging for some compensation from his superiors, which angered Taylor Jr. On 18 September, 2002, Gono was driving in town and hit a dog, splashing the animal’s blood over the front of Taylor’s car. When he saw the mess, ordered his men to punish Gono severely which led to his death few days after in the hospital.275

On 9 January, 2009, Chucky Taylor was convicted by a Florida court under a law that allows US citizens to be tried for acts of torture committed overseas. He is serving a 97- year sentence for torture and conspiracy to commit torture, under a 1994 federal law allowing US citizens to be tried and convicted for acts of torture committed overseas.276

4.1.2.2. The Special Security Unit (SSU)

Additionally, the Taylor administration created a new security unit, known as the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit or simply as the Special Security Unit (SSU). This unit was initially intended for the protection of the President and his family. However, these men were seen not around the mansion or the residence of the President, but all over the city, at check points, major intersections, and in the communities carrying long-range weapons. Most of the men in these units were former fighters of the NPFL, who were trained for war and not for civilian protection. The SSU may be a small part of the larger, 1500-member SSS; however, this was unclear.

4.1.2.3. Special Security Service (SSS)

The Special Security Service (SSS), led by , was the president’s personal security force charged with guarding access to the executive Mansion, the airport and the other key installations, and protecting senior diplomats and Very Important Persons (VIPs). It was a security force within the government of Liberia dedicated to the protection of the president. Prior to 1980, the unit was specifically

275 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.254. 276 Cfr .Ibidem.,

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designated for presidential protection. It was created by President Tubman and modeled on the United States Secret Service (USSS).277

During the interim government, the SSS was dormant. However, when Charles Taylor was elected to the presidency and took power, the SSS was reactivated. By the end of the war in 1997, the Abuja Accord called for elections and disarmament. By the terms of the accord, the army was to be reconstituted to include members from all of the warring factions. However, after Charles Taylor's victory in the presidential elections on 19 July 1997, he did not acknowledge that part of the peace accords. Rather, the police, SSS, and military were filled with former soldiers of the NPFL. Every able-bodied NPFL person was integrated into the new army, such that 60-75 percent of the personnel of the new national security forces were Taylor’s supporters. The Monrovia-based National Human Rights Monitor (NAHRM) reported in 1998 that "the SSS, since the inauguration of the new government, has been infested with former fighters of the rival NPFL of the incumbent President, Charles Taylor".278

By 2002, in rural areas, particularly in remote parts of Lofa and Gbarpolu Counties, armed security forces illegally entered homes, most often to steal food, money, or other property. Members of the security forces in rural areas generally were paid and provisioned inadequately and often extorted money and goods from citizens. Local communities were compelled to provide food, shelter, and labor for members of the security forces stationed in their villages. Human Rights Watch reported that President Taylor's security services, the SSS and the Special Operation Division (SOD), both mobilized to combat LURD rebels, consisted of former NPFL rebels who were paid a one-time fee of $150 (8,200 ld) and were expected to loot and pillage thereafter to support themselves.279

Coupled to security , Business was one thing Liberia’s new head of state certainly knew something about; just as he had worked out his commercial connections in the region, in

277 Pajibo, Ezekiel, (Senior Policy Analyst), Africa Faith and Justice Network, 29 August 2000. Telephone Interview. 278 Jones Mohamedu, (Human Rights Attorney), Liberians United for Peace and Democracy, 12, September, 2000. Telephone Interview. 279Cfr. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/sss.htm, (retrieved on 15.12.2014).

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Europe, the Middle East and in the United States during wartime. He was now able to generate more profitable opportunities for Liberia and for himself once in office. He combined aptitude for running government business and personal business simultaneously, despite the new constraint of having a government administration and the country at peace to impose checks and balances on his activities. Government business would help finance personal deals. This included cuts he was able to take on government monopolies in timber, gold and diamond in mining, as well as commissions taken on the exclusive control of commodity import such as rice. One diplomat tracking the presidential stake in Liberia’s economy estimated it as ‘possibly equal’ in size to the actual national budget.280

Avoidance of accountability also seemed to be the mantra of the incumbent Taylor’s administration: it quickly became clear that his government did not intend perhaps surprisingly- to hold any one responsible for the officially estimated 150,000 deaths and even less surprisingly the wholesale looting of the country’s resources of iron ore, gold, diamond, rubber and timber over the preceding seven years.281

4.1.3. Native culture of Taylor

In the context of Charles Taylor’s assimilation to native culture and his ascent to the Dakhpannah of the Poro, suggestions emerged that, while he was based in Gbarnga, rituals were being carried out as his headquarters which went well beyond usual tradition secret society practice and included cannibalism. In such accusation, he was named as an actor in ‘ritualistic consumption of human body parts’. The accusation appeared in an article published in The Times on 2 November 1999, citing Ellis book, Mask of Anarchy as its authority.

In courtroom, a prosecution witness, Joseph "Zigzag" Marzah, maintained that he and Taylor had eaten human hearts together. The “juju”282 practice is supposed to

280 Cfr. Ankomah Baffour, New Africa, London, March 2000. 281 Cfr. Ibidem., 282 “Juju” is a word of either West Africa or French Origin used previously by Europeans to describe traditional West African Religions. Today it refers specifically to objects, such as amulets, and spells used superstitiously as part of Witchcraft in West Africa.

64 enable the victor to absorb his victim's powers. The former president's lawyers dismissed the claims as untrue and denied that Marzah had never been close to Taylor. “I felt like throwing up when I heard that nonsense" Taylor told the court, "and I think even the prosecution were shocked at listening to that foolishness”.283

A showman by nature, Taylor often appeared dressed head to toe in white robes to proclaim his innocence and stress his supernatural or pseudo-angelic status. An eager adapter of religious symbols, he even announced once that he had converted to Judaism, he said, ‘because of my background’ and ‘because my ancestry links me to Judaism’, while declining to elaborate on what links might be.284

5.1. Second civil war in Liberia-1999

The formation in 1999 of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) under command of marked the beginning of the end. The commander was married to Ayesha Conneh, the spiritual advisor of Guinean president Lansana Conteh. LURD was founded in 1999, composed mostly of Liberians of Mandingo and Krahn ethnicity. LURD members moved freely on Guinean territory and used Guinean border towns as a point of transit points. In addition , LURD also recruited soldiers in Guinean refugee camps (HRW 2003). Its first significant incursion into Liberia was in April 2000, when fighters crossed into Lofa county, attacking civilians in areas the Guinean border. US for its part began a program of support for military training for the Guinean military, which in turn backed up LURD in its cross-border raids into northern Liberia. Having dithered for a decade through following a policy of avoiding military involvement in Liberia, unofficially but unmistakably the US at last had an armed proxy in the region for its battle against the rule of Charles Taylor.285

LURD’s leadership, under Sekou Conneh, had always sworn that its only objective was to remove Taylor from power and that they would hand back control of captured towns, plantations, mines, Ports and other assets of the country as soon as he left office. Over the

283Cfr. www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/26/charles-taylor-profile-liberia (retrieved on 23.Aprile.2015) 284 Charles Taylor in an interview with Colin M. Waugh, 2011. 285Cfr. Colin, op cit., p.264.

65 course of the following three years, LURD fought a campaign against Taylor government first in Lofa County and then in the west and centre of Liberia, ultimately capturing a large swath of territory and moving on to encircle the capital. Its campaign further impaired the government’s effort to revive the economy, and, with an international arms embargo imposed on Liberia but not Sierra Leone or Guinea, both of which armed and supported LURD, it was an uphill struggle to keep the rebels at bay.286

The resurgent regional civil war that began in Liberia in 1999, engulfing Sierra Leone and a also parts of Guinea, soon dragged yet another victim into its clutches. Confronting an increasingly well-backed threat from LURD in the north west, the Taylor government’s stance towards its eastern neighbor was then polarized by a political and constitutional crisis which broke out in September 2002 in Cote d’Ivoire.287 Could we say that the LURD was chasing Taylor into ‘his mothers' womb as well? Yes of course! This is ‘because the hole you dig, may someday be your own." Goes African proverb.

With the region now awash with Sierra Leonean and Liberian mercenaries, after over a decade of armed conflict in both countries, many who had apparent interest in demobilization and civilian life were drawn to wherever there were opportunities to fight and, of course to loot. The Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, was fighting civil war in his own country against northern rebels, and sent a delegation to President Taylor in Monrovia seeking helicopter support for his forces. But the old regional alliances between formal regional franco-phone alliances had broken down since the days of Fèlix Houphonuèt- Boigny and his successor Henri Conan Bédié. Burkina Faso’s Blaise- Compaoré was now sympathetic towards the northern rebels in Cote d’Ivoire’s civil strife, and maintaining US acceptance through a good relations with Compaoré was now a priority for Taylor, so he turned down Gbagbo’s request and sided with his opponents.288

Gbagbo took revenge on Taylor in 2003, and in the process helped to seal the Liberian president’s fate, by backing and arming another Liberian Anti-Taylor faction allied to

286Cfr. Ibidem.,p.265. 287 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.266. 288 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.276.

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LURD in the south-East of the country. The group, led by Thomas Nimley, known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), succeeded in capturing the key logging port of Harper, and later Buchannan, as well as much territory that lay in between. By mid -2003, the combined forces of LURD and MODEL controlled over 70 percent of the Liberian territory, and it was Charles Taylor who found himself hemmed into enclave in Monrovia, defending the capital against well-armed and well-backed. As fighting against LURD, There were UN security council resolutions condemning his regime for arms sales and in 2002 the UN-sponsored special court for Sierra Leone was established.289

The absence of capacity within Charles Taylor’s government, which assumed power in 1997, coupled with adherence to the principle of attaining peace at all costs, compromised efforts to bring to justice former combatants who were accused of atrocities. It is not surprising therefore that this contributed in part to the emergence of new groups who perpetrated further rounds of atrocities in the recent conflict. In the human rights abuses that followed, the protagonists carried out arbitrary killings, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners, summary executions, rape, hostage taking, forced displacement of civilians, and forced labor, including recruitment of child soldiers.290

The collapse of states like Liberia based upon patronage systems of rule also exposes the hollowness of claims that former rulers acted for people on whose behalf they claimed sovereignty. Sovereignty was a pretext for extracting resources from outsiders in exchange for diplomatic support. Incumbent regimes and insurgents started openly to contest state sovereignty, but not in terms of liberation for a particular people. War in both of these cases is an outgrowth of the struggle between once dominant regimes and increasingly enterprising strongmen to control markets, both internally and externally, and convert that control into political authority and turmoil.291

First, contenders who seek to control elements of the once centralized patronage networks treat outsiders as though they were private traders. They use connections with outsiders to

289Cfr. Ibidem., 290 Cfr.Ibidem., 291Cfr. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, vol.14, London; Zed Books, 2001.

67 accumulate more resources just like Charles Taylor did in Liberia. Here insurgencies can be regarded much like rival entrepreneurs.292

Second, this political economy breaks down patronage systems and highlights the importance of the distribution of natural resources in driving warfare. Concentrated, portable natural resources attract outside partners, whose marketing connections, access to foreign exchange, and possession of private armies can be used to follow up on military advantages and deny resources to rivals. The political context of this partnership undermines the arguments of some observers that effective private militaries can be relied upon to restore failing states, not just incumbent rulers, in lieu of capacity or political will on the part of the United Nations or its member states.293

Third, the Liberian experiences demonstrates the lack of reciprocal relations between rulers and the bulk of local populations. Cold War era patronage networks provided some support for significant segments of the population. Some hitch their fortunes to strongman entrepreneurs. Others try to opt out of political deals altogether. This situation points to the importance of decentralizing control over natural resources, so that potential rulers are forced to bargain with local populations, protecting community interests as a way to advance their own.294

Research on contemporary civil war points to the salience of economic factors in exacerbating and perpetuating conflict. While their role in the onset of conflict is typically indirect, they can influence the character, duration, and adaptation of war in consequential ways295, together with low intensity conflict in which small arms are critical, and widely used, become a threatening to non-negotiable core value (national security) especially in developing countries of West African Sub-Region; in particular Liberia.

292Cfr. Ibidem., 293Cfr. Rubin, 1997, Harper's Magazine, February, pp.44-55. 294Cfr.William Reno, Warlord Economies in Liberia and. Sierra Leone, August 1997. 295 Cfr.For further reading on the political economy of armed conflict, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance, Policy Research Working Group Paper no. 2355, Washington DC; The World Bank; Cfr. also Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Cfr. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

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The process of state collapse in Liberia also had a major impact on the ability of the state to guarantee the rule of law. As sufficiently argued by Abiodun Bashua in Chapter Six, the rule of law, coupled with good governance, respect for human dignity, and sustainable economic development, is a sine qua non for sustainable peace and stability. This facet was missing in the Liberian environment, which encouraged further fratricidal tendencies.296

As a consequence, there has been so many statistical data about the people who are being affected right from economy to insurgency. This is due to SALW in Liberia that has been used to terrorize both the Liberians and neighboring countries creating a great negative impact on social-economic development. Thus, a large number of documents by non- governmental organizations, international organization and even articles in the peer- reviewed medical literature have cited figures which are increasingly been used as ‘evidence’ by those concerned with weapons availability and misuse, but which are difficult, if not impossible to substantiate.

Christopher Louse, in his work ‘Relationship between the proliferation of Small arms and Light weapons, stated that the effect of globalization and societal disintegration have been greatly under-researched. The absence of serious enquiries into this phenomenon is all the more significant because such weapons continue to be most commonly used in many of the violent civil and ethnic and religious conflicts of the post cold war era.297

But Krause argues that the covert trade in weapons involves three systems; the black markets, secret government to government deals, and sponsorship of sub-state groups. This last category usually relies upon sympathetic support from a foreign government, although private assistance from arms dealers or altruistic interest groups is not uncommon.

296 Cfr.Ebo Adedeji, Security sector reform as an instrument of sub-regional transformation in West Africa, see also , p 5, citing A-F Musah, in Small arms – a time bomb under West Africa’s democratization process, The Brown Journal of World Affairs IX(1), Spring 2002, p.241. 297 Cfr.Christopher L. “The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation; International Alert”. A discussion paper the UNIDIR, 1995.

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Estimate of the size of this trade range from $2billion in a lean year to $10 billion in a profitable one.298

Krause further asserted that the availability and use of more sophisticated weapons has contributed to the erosion of state authority. This has become particularly evident in the escalation of crime. It is widely held that guns are not the root cause of crime, but rather, that, crime is rooted in the inept structural forms which create or sustain human insecurity in its broad sense. It is clear that the proliferation of SALW is in part, a response to demand for personal security when normative social relations collapse or are seen to be on the brink of collapse. It is also evident that the widespread availability of arms accelerates and appreciates dysfunctional trends.299

Conclusion

In summary, American neo-colonialism played a pivotal role in helping to generate the multidimensional crises of underdevelopment that culminated in civil conflict, and eventually the first Liberian civil war in 1989. Using an assortment of neo-colonial instruments, the United States exploited Liberia economically, politically and strategically. The United States’ stranglehold was made possible through the establishment of a patron- client relationship between the American government and various Liberian neo-colonial regimes. Using the power of the state, the various neocolonial regimes created the conditions for Liberia to serve the interests of the United States.

These Civil wars in Liberia did not come as a result only from the impact of domestic social forces and the failure of governing elite. They also emerged from forces, events, and activities originating outside the country, from the surrounding region or the world at large. It on this analysis that we shall see in the following chapter how one of the factors like SALW proliferation changed the face of Liberia in all spheres.

298 Cfr.Krause Keith, The Challenges of Small Arms and Light Weapons; Being a paper presented at the 1st Conference of the International Peace Academy, Switzerland. IPA Publications 2007. 299 Cfr.Ibidem.,

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CHAPTER THREE

THE THREAT OF THE ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALWS) IN AFRICA:CASE STUDY LIBERIA

Each individual has a set of beliefs, opinions, values and interests which shapes their attitude towards politics and the political process. These political ‘preferences’ often derive from deep historical or cultural identities such as nationality, religion, or language. Political preferences also stem from economic interests, such as whether a policy will increase a person’s income. Inevitably, different individuals and social groups have different preference and this produces conflicts.300 This is the case as we have seen in previous chapter about Liberia and its counter parts in West Africa. At the same time, the various conflicts in West Africa are woven together through strategic elite alliances, through regional (formal and informal) economy and trade networks, through the steady stream of refugees, and through the large amount of mercenaries301 moving between and among neighboring countries. There were also numerous reports of cross- border movement of natural resources, weapons, with the political elites playing a central role in many of the activities that led to increase of proliferation of SALW in Liberia between 1989 t0 2003.

1.0 Definition of Terms and Concepts

1.1 Proliferation

This is the spread of SALW, either into a country or across international bounders. It may be vertical proliferation (meaning, an increase in the amount or devastating capacity of any

300 Cfr.Simon Hix and Bjorn Hoyland, The Political system of the European Union, 3° ed. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.105. 301 Mercenaries here refers to professional soldiers who fight for profit in a conflict or country which is not their own.

71 currently existing SALW within a state) or, Horizontal, (meaning, the spread of SALW to a state that have not previously possessed them).302

1.2. Small Arms And Light Weapons

The term “Small Arms and Light Weapons” will mean any portable lethal weapon that launches a shot, bullet, or projectile by the actions of an explosive. It can be referred also, to mean weapons that can be carried by a single person, either for militancy, military or civil use. The term covers a wide range of weapons from pistols, machine guns and other fire arms, to grenades, portable anti-tank systems and mortars303 not forgetting as well Improvised Explosive Device (IED) although it at the beginning it was not indicated in the above definition.

1.2.1. Small Arms

They are broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include inter alia revolver and self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.304

1.2.2 Light Weapons

They are weapons designed for use by two or more persons serving as crew, although, some may be carried and used by a single person. They include inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted launchers, portable antiaircraft guns, portable launcher of anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimeters. Although SALW are thus, distinct categories of weapons, the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) uses the term ‘small arms’ to cover both small arms and light weapons.305

302Cfr. How to Guide the Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission; Being a Publication of the UNDP, May 2008, p.2. 303 Cfr.Ibidem., 304 Cfr.Ibidem., 305Cfr. Ibidem.,

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Although UN panel provided the definition of SALW, Governments have yet to agree on a universal definition of small arms and light weapons.306 Differences of opinion have centered on civilian versus military classifications, and on whether certain weapons such as shotguns or hunting rifles should be included. Moreover, the distinction between what constitutes a ‘small arm’ and what qualifies as a ‘light weapon’ can vary from document to document.

Until the establishment, in 1996, of a Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the UN had not significantly addressed SALW. The UN Experts Panel 1997 report, roughly categorized certain varieties of SALW as well as their ammunitions and explosives. In addition, the Panel listed: ammunition and explosives, which includes cartridges (rounds) for small arms; shells and missiles for light weapons; mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades; landmines; and explosives.307

The Panel provided additional clarity for some terms, obfuscated others, and chose not to address anti-personnel landmines. Notably, it used the concept of portability to delimit and distinguish SALW from each other and from larger conventional weapons. According to the Panel, the defining characteristic of small arms was that they could be carried ‘by one person’. By contrast, light weapons necessitated transportation ‘by two or more people, a pack animal or a light vehicle’.308 The Panel indicated that anti-personnel landmines came under its mandate, but decided not to include them in its deliberations as the international community was dealing with the issue in other forums.309

The portability distinction was not, however, uniformly applicable to the weapons in the two categories. Some light weapons in the Panel’s list, such as rocket-propelled grenade

306 Cfr.Definition by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts in its 1997 report (UNGA, 1997). For a discussion of other definitions, Cf. Small Arms Survey, 2005, pp. 123–27; 2006, pp. 103–04. 307 Cfr.United Nation General Assembly, 1997, para. 26. 308 Cfr.UNGA, 1997, para. 27. 309Cfr, In December 1997 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (commonly known also as the Mine Ban Treaty or the Ottawa Convention) was concluded and opened for signature. It entered into force the following year. See also Cfr.www.icbl.org (retrieved on 23 Jan 2014).

73 launchers, can be carried and operated310 by a single person, while some small arms, such as light (as opposed to heavy) machine guns, may need to be transported and operated by a small team of people (particularly when large volumes of ammunition are involved). The Survey largely accepts the categorization for light weapons that the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts used.

Bearing in mind these distinct definitions, in Africa it is estimated that half of the world trade in small arms is represented by illicit trafficking. An estimated 8 million weapons were circulating in West Africa alone, and 50 percent of them are probably illicit.311 Although the UN has guaranteed a sum of $300 to each combatant handing in weapons in Liberia, the problem of small arms going out of control in the country was not solved. One of the reasons for this is that, small arms are one of the main features of illicit transnational activity in West Africa. The availability of SALW is often linked to the changing nature or transformation of conflict since the end of the Cold War from predominantly interstate to predominantly intrastate. Arms transfers during the Cold War were primarily motivated by ideological and geopolitical considerations and primarily consisted of heavy, high maintenance equipment. In the post Cold War era, arms trafficking in light weapons in the gray and black markets, Illicit and Black-Market Channels, Cross-border arms trafficking (we shall discuss more on these factors later) increased. These light weapons are of low-maintenance, durables, including AK-47s,312 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and land mines. The primary motivation for the suppliers in these transfers is economic gain.313

310 The word ‘operated’ here does not include ancillary (although often necessary) personnel, including spotting or security details that usually accompany the deployment of light weapons, such as MANPADS and mortars. 311 Information based on interviews in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, April 2000. 312 The AK-47 is a selective-fire, gas-operated 7.62×39mm assault rifle, first developed in the Soviet Union Design work on the AK-47 began in the last year of World War II (1945). After the war in 1946. In 1948, the fixed-stock version was introduced into active service with selected units of the Soviet Army. An early development of the design was the AKS (S—Skladnoy or "folding"), which was equipped with an under- folding metal shoulder stock. In 1949, it was officially accepted by the Soviet Armed Forces and used by the majority of the member states of the Warsaw Pact (www. ospreypublishing.com, retrieved on 25.09.2014). 313Ibidem.,

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According to Dr Amos Sawyer, former Liberia interim president (1990- 1994); “The proliferation of SALW in Africa have been stamped as channels that increases repression and the capacity by which those who wield them become increasingly more repressive against innocent civilian populations”. He made this statement while serving as a key note speaker at the African Day program of the of the UN conference on illicit trade in SALW at New York (which held from 9th-20th July, 2001).314 SALW have killed far more than biological, chemical or any other weapons of mass destruction. According to the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/70, 15th January, 1996, SALW are the most devastating conventional weapons.315

Some other scholars argue that SALW do not cause conflict, is accepted, but, it is believed that its effect on conflicts cannot be ignored. According to Ero and Ndinga- Muvumba, “While SALW do not of course, cause conflicts, they soon become part of the conflict equation by fuelling and exacerbating underlying tension, generating more insecurity and adding to the number of casualties”.316

Citing Abdel-Fatau Musah, Egungbemi says that, in Africa, the sources of SALW proliferation are many and varied. While the thrust of international efforts to curbing proliferation tend to concentrate on the manufacturer and supply of new weapons, a major pipeline of SALW remains the stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the ‘70s and ‘80s by the ex-Soviet Union, the USA and their allies to fan or sponsor proxy interstate wars. These leftover weapons, Musah claimed, have found their way through clandestine networks involving rogue arms broker, primary military companies, shady airlines companies and local trans-border smuggler to exacerbate ongoing tension and facilitate the growth of new ones in the country.317

314 Cfr.Musue N. Naddad, A Perspective of the UN Conference on illicit Trading of SALW, 20th July 2007, p.9. 315Cfr. UN General Assembly Resolutions; www.unorg/documents//resga.html (retrieved on 5.May.2015) 316 Cfr.Ero C. and Ndinags-Muvumba, A., “Small Arms and Weapons” in Adekeye A. and Ismail R. West Africa’s Security challenges ; Building Peace in Trouble Region, London; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 317 Egungbemi Olatunji Joseph, 2003, Small arms, Light weapons Proliferation, and trans-border terrorism; a case study on Nigeria, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of bachelor of science (b.sc) degree in international relations, Nigeria, p.22.

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1.3. The Proliferation And The Use Of SALW In Liberia

As opposed to heavy conventional weapons like battle tanks armored vehicle, artillery, warship, combat aircraft and other heavy arms and weapons, many features make SALW attractive to paramilitary, irregular forces and even untrained civilians to use. Apart from the fact that many governments increased their demands for SALW to counter political insurgencies and suppress domestic opposition movements. some of factors that favored the Proliferation of SALW among others are; simplicity and durability, Low Costs and Wide Availability, Portability and Easiness to Conceal, lethality, porous border, Ineffectiveness to guarantee internal security, Corruption and Low Income, insurgency and terrorism, surplus of arms, peace keeping mission.

1.3.1. Simplicity and Durability

Due to their relative simple nature, SALW are quite easy to use even by people who have had very little or no military training. This explains their use by untrained combatants and even child soldiers as it was the case in many armed conflicts like in Liberia. In addition, they require little maintenance and logistical support and can remain operational for very long periods of time for example AK-47, in cases where they begin to break down due to age and wear, they can be replaced by new ones or spare parts taken from other weapons318.

1.3.2. Low Costs and Wide Availability

Due to the fact that the production of SALW does not necessarily involve sophisticated or hi-tech capacity and also because they are produced for military, police and civilian usage, this makes them cheap to procure especially as much of them are being recycled from conflict to conflict. A brand new AK-47, much coveted for its firepower and simplicity, can be purchased from a Russian factory at 240 US Dollars depending on the derivative

318 Cfr.UNDP Report 2002, Development Herd Hostage, Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, a Preliminary study of the socio-economic impacts and Arms Proliferation, Cfr. www.undp.org/cpr/documents/sacontrol.pdf (retrieved on 12.10.2014).

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(type) and the amount bought. In certain parts of Africa, where supplies are plentiful, it can be bought for 30 USD. The availability and cheapness of SALW in Sub-Sahara Africa is further enhanced by the fact that 12 African countries have joined the ranks of producers, though, on a much lower scale. They include; Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Tanzania, Guinea and Ethiopia319.

1.3.3. Portability and Easiness to Conceal

As their definitions demonstrate, SALW can be moved from one place to another by a single person or by a light vehicle. They can thus be smuggled quite easily from one place to another. In the ECOWAS Sub- region, SALW shipments are sometimes disguised as non-lethal cargo or as humanitarian supplies and are often discovered only after the traffickers fail to bribe police and customs officers or when a plane crashes and reveals the hidden nature of its cargo.320

1.3.4. Lethality

Though many SALW are quite simplistic in nature, their lethality has increased making it possible for a single combatant to constitute a big threat to an entire society. Today’s assault rifles and other automatic weapons can fire up to several hundred rounds a minute. An AK-47 assault rifle can release 600 rounds per minute as long as the trigger remains pressed down and when being operated in automatic mode. Its maximum range lies between 800 to 1000 meters, but its accuracy is guaranteed when used by a trained marksman with the range of 400 to 600 meters.321

319 Cfr.Control Arms Briefing Note, the AK 47. The world’s Favorite Killing Machine, June 2006. www.controlarms.org/findout more/report/AK47.pdf , (retrieved on 4.10.2014). 320 Cfr.Ibidem., 321 Cfr.Ibidem.,

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1.3.5. Porous Borders

Due to the sheer size of Africa, there is the chronic problem of porous border322 security. Arms traffickers exploit this situation to smuggle SALW into the country. It is also interesting to observe that all three largest sub-Saharan countries, namely Sudan (the continent’s overall largest), the DRC (3rd overall largest) and Chad (5th overall largest) have been experiencing instability and armed conflict for long. It may well be that their size and their porous borders make it easy for weapons to be smuggled inflaming and protracting violence.323

1.3.6. Ineffectiveness to guarantee internal security

In Liberia, citizens felt a strong need to acquire arms in order to protect themselves and their property from armed violence. This mostly occurred in places where there was lack of confidence in security forces, understaffing or sometimes simply the inability of security agencies to carry out their duty effectively. This can clearly be demonstrated in Nimba county. Where there was a lot of political chaos characterized by dilemma of security to protect the citizens.

1.3.7. Corruption and Low Income

The vicious cycle of low salaries and corruption creates breeding grounds for the proliferation of SALW among the civilian population. Customs officers were bribed by weapons dealers, while soldiers, police officers and security forces are known to have sold government weapons to criminals.324 In some situations they are being hired to criminals than selling. A live example was along Mano River in Liberia.

322 This is the chronicle problem of border insecurity which allows for ineffective control over national borders. While many writers would attribute this to the effect of the growing tides of globalization, many would link it to the attitude of a national government (UN General Assembly Resolutions available at www.unorg/documents//resga.html (retrieved on 24.Dec. 2015) 323Cfr. Ayissi A, Ibrahima S. (eds.), Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for training Armed and Security Forces, United Nations, 2005, pp. 55, 68, and 59. 324 Cfr.Ibidem.,

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1.3.8. Insurgency and Terrorism

Political instability, violence and lack of a culture for peace in African states like Liberia, have remained a factor for the destabilizing use of SALW or explosives. Other factors that encourage the use of small arms are; drug trafficking, smuggling, criminality, political thuggery, and terrorisms. All these acts, involves the use of weapons either for offensive or defensive purposes.

1.3.9. Surplus of arms

The more these arms are in governments hands, the more they slip into private hands. This is in conformity with the realist assumption that the more a country girds up for security by way of armament, the more danger and security threat the country is exposed to. This is the case in Liberia.

1.4. Peace keeping missions.325

Several UN peace keeping or post conflict peace-building operations have resulted in incomplete disarmament of former combatants owing to peace agreements or mandates which did not cover SALW disarmament, or the shortfalls in implementation of the mandates because of inadequate operational guidance or resources. This large number of surplus of weapons became available in the conflict areas for criminal activities, recirculation and illicit trafficking.326

Some of these weapons for example AK-47, has become more of cultural icon. It is not more than an effective tool of war; in many countries it featured on the coasts of arms: Zimbabwe and Mozambique and previously on that of Burkina Faso (until it adopted a

325 The concept emerged during the Cold War when UN failed to implement the Charter’s collective security enforcement arrangements. They can be traditional, Cold War type, and the multidimensional post- Cold type. 326 Cfr.Onuoha , Freedom, Gaiya, Blessing and Namiji Rhoda(2010), Crisis and National Security; A Reflection. Nigerian Forum, March, April, 2011.

79 more peace- oriented symbol), and appears on the Mozambican flag and currency until 2005.327

However, non- state groups in different environs also use AK-47s and other guns in their logos. According to Rachel Stohl Matt Schroeder Dan Smith, “The Small Arms Trade” they cite examples like how Hamas and the An-Najah Student Cell of the Islamic Palestine Block use the M16 and three well-known terrorist groups use the AK-47 in their insignias to signify a commitment to armed struggle. They further elaborate that, the Palestinian Liberation Front, which operates in Israel, Lebanon and Egypt, has AK-47s in its emblems and the salafist Group for Call and Combat, which operates in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, has a sword and an AK-47 in its symbol. Hezbollah’s symbol includes a fist clutching an AK-47, with AK-47 forming the ‘I’ of Allah’.328

In anthropological platform, AK-47 takes a new trend. Like in South Africa, an anti- apartheid music group named itself AK-47. The name ‘Kalash’, is common in some countries in Africa due to history in the use of AK-47. In another development, when Kalashnikov was introduced to guerilla fighters in Mozambique, they told him (founder) that they had named babies after his weapons.329

In another development, images of the AK-47 appear in some conflicts. Video of Osama Bin Laden showed him firing the above or sitting with one close to hand. This can be viewed in video released by from ‘Boko Haram’ as well. when the US forces captured Saddam Hussein’s , there was a video show of two AKs in his bunger.

327 Michael Wines, ‘symbols are important. So what does a gun symbolize?, The New York Times, October 7, 2005, p.4. 328 Anti- Defamation League, International Terrorist Symbols Database, 2006, www.adl.org/terrorsim/symbols/default.asp; Fisk, ‘Dealer’s Choice. (Retrieved on 25.Aprile 2015) 329 Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes, Exchanging guns tools: The TAE approach to practical disarmament- An assessment of the TAE project in Mozambique, Bonn International Centre for Conversion Brief 29, April 2004, p.7, Cfr: www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief29/brief29.pdf; Parfitt, “Manly’ But Less Lethal Products’. (retrieved on 4.August, 2014).

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1.5. SALW Trafficking Methods And Routes

The following list of legal, illegal and covert methods by which SALW are sold, transferred and exchanged underscores the complexity of the problem:

. Grants or gifts by governments to allied governments abroad; . Sales by governments to client governments abroad; . Commercial sales by private firms to governments and private dealers in other countries; . Technology transfers associated with domestic arms production in the developing nations; . Covert transfers by governments to friendly insurgent and separatist groups in other countries; . Gifts by governments to armed militias and paramilitary organizations linked to the ruling party or the dominant ethnic group; . Black-market sales to the governments of "pariah" countries and to insurgent and separatist forces; . Theft of government and privately owned arms by insurgent, criminal and separatist forces; and . Exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations, whether for profit or in pursuit of common political objectives.

Practically every illegal small arm began as a legal small arm, whether in the hands of the state, non-state actors, or civilians. Worldwide there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians as in the hands of states. It is estimated that more than 500,000 of these are stolen each year330 and enter illegal markets. Indeed, in many regions of the world diversion from civilian supplies is the principal source of illegal SALW. There is a range of ways in which in civilian possession are diverted to illicit markets including through: illegal manufacture and modification; illegal sales and transfers (primary, secondary via brokers); illegal resale

330 Cfr.Philip J.C., Stephanie M, and Thomas B.C. (1995) Relating Gun Market, The Journals Criminal Law and Criminology 86, n°.1 pp.59-91.

81 and “straw purchases”; theft; diversion from surplus (illegal or unwanted weapons); and Falsification of documents and illegal importation (for example. concealment).331

In addition, experience shows clearly that if surplus SALW are not removed from uncontrolled circulation following conflict, levels of violence remain high, as interpersonal violence substitutes for violence between warring factions. The dimensions of illicit trafficking vary from region to region and only a fraction of incidents are detected. Relatively few countries systematically collect or analyze data on SALW which are recovered by law enforcement officials.

Illicit trafficking in weapons is understood to cover that international trade in conventional weapons, which is contrary to the laws of the states and/ or international laws. Illicit trafficking in such weapons plays a major role in the violence currently affecting some countries and regions, by supplying the instruments use to destabilize the societies and governments, encourage crimes and foster trans-border terrorism, drug trafficking, mercenaries’ activities and the violation of human right. Much of the supply and acquisition of SALW is legitimate trade which occurs among governments or among legal entities authorized by the governments.

During the Cold War, and in present times, states have secretly carried out transfer of SALW; such transfers are not necessarily illicit. Any transfer, not approved by competent authorities in recipient states could, however, be classified by that state as interference in its internal affairs and therefore, illegal. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, former executive secretary of ECOWAS, puts the estimated amount of SALW in West Africa at 8 million. The weapons are recycled between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and among belligerents and in other conflict Zones such as Casamance province and the rest of Southern , Northern Ghana, Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau.332

331 Cfr.Wendy C., Firearms/Small Arms finding Common Grounds, Canadian Foreign Policy, Fall Publishers, 6 (1), 1998. 332Cfr. Owere K. Eliminating Illegal Small Arms in West Africa, The Ghanaian Daily Graphics, wed. Feb. 9 2005.

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The intensification of hostilities along the Guinean-Liberian-Sierra Leone border heightened demand for arms in that already saturated area. Liberian dissidents operating across the Guinean border, allegedly received arms and ammunition delivered to the port of Conakry. Several reports have suggested that Liberian timber exports increasingly were used to finance and smuggle weapons, further facilitating Taylor's ability to evade UN sanctions directed against Liberia's exchange of conflict diamonds for arms.333

Some of these arms are manufactured locally, while others are imported into the sub- region. In 2002 and 2003, for example, Cote d’Ivoire allegedly received several deliveries of military equipment, while Liberia received forty nine deliveries in 2002, and twenty five deliveries in 2003. Also, some countries in the sub-region, especially Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone have flourishing industries of local arm.334

Domestic purchasing laws facilitated the entrance of small arms in Liberia via the illicit market. In Liberia, where there were no limits to how many guns a person might have legally own or bought at one time, the phenomenon of “straw purchasing” became common. Individuals bought several weapons at a time and then illegally resold them, often brought the weapons across international borders to sell guns where laws were less restrictive.

In Liberia, the illegal trading networks of illicit arms and extensive arms trafficking consisted of four major main transnational actors: the political authority (Liberian government), the natural resources (more so Timber and Diamond among others) and the arms suppliers. The heydays of this trade were under the regime of Charles Taylor. Liberia being among the weakest and most fragmented State in Africa characterized as a failed state and said to have become a de facto UNOIML trusteeship.335 As previously

333 Cfr.Mersie E. Post-Conflict Liberia; Environmental Security as Strategy for Sustainable Peace and Development, Working paper Number 3. Foundation Environmental Security and Sustainability USAID, 2006. 334Cfr. Eric G.B., Armed and Aimless; Armed Groups Guns and Human Security in ECOWAS Sub-Region, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005. 335 Cfr.The failed Liberian state sunk to a level of complete incapacity to function as state in most areas and has therefore been characterized by some to have become a de facto UNMIL trusteeship (Boas Morten 2005a).

83 mentioned, such a situation facilitated the existence of transnational networks. Risse- Kapen divided transnational actors into two groups according to motives. One economically and another ideologically/politically motivated. In the economic motivation it includes groups like Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Multi-national Corporation ( MNCs) that often form part of illegal transnational networks to the proliferation of SALW. The other group has a range of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs).336

The case of Charles Taylor is a clear example of economically motivated transnational actor although he has portrayed himself as mainly ideologically motivated. The political authority of Liberia is severely divided between different political actors and warlords.

1.5.1. Political authority

In terms political authority we shall focus mainly on Charles Taylor as protagonist of the time. We shall examine among other factors his coordination with external allies. Throughout the Liberian conflict, Taylor controlled about 90 percent of Liberia, including the natural resource wealth by focusing on commercial enterprises to assist with financing.

Taylor embraced relationships, which provided his armies with the necessary weapons to control Liberia. “The Liberian civil war which was launched from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso where the conduits for most of the weapons used by at least one of the rebel factions”.337 Additionally, “Charles Taylor helped found and train the RUF and let Sierra Leonean rebels use Liberia for its resupply routes”.338

These relationships provided important links that allowed Taylor’s criminal enterprise to flourish. The network was also crucial in providing entree to criminal elements from Liberia into other state structures. One of his closest confidants, Ibrahim Bah, played a big

336 Cfr.Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Cooperation among Democracies: The European influence on US foreign Policy, Zen Publishers, 1995, p.8. 337 Jett, op .cit, p.59 338 Farah Douglas, Blood from stones: The secret financial network of terror. New York; Broadway Books, 2004, p.17.

84 role in escorting diamond buyers and weapons merchants to Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere to do business.339

Through Taylor’s patronage, the RUF successfully kept Sierra Leone in conflict for ten years of destruction and brutality. “The RUF became infamous for maiming and killing by chopping off the arms, breasts, hands, legs, tongues, and heads of their victims, and it was responsible for the deaths of untold thousands of innocent people”.340

1.5.2. Transnational actors and arms suppliers

Besides neighboring countries, Taylor garnered relationships with different businesspersons throughout the world. Some of these businesspersons included Russian weapons dealer, , also known as the “Merchant of Death”. Bout had two important assets that set him apart from other traffickers: a private fleet of about fifty aging Russian-made aircraft, acquired as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and the ability to procure not only weapons, but advanced weapons systems (anti-aircraft, anti-tank systems, attack helicopters), on short notice.341

Taylor and Bout started working through Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan in Taylor’s inner circle, when Taylor decided he needed attack helicopters to challenge the newly formed rebel group, LURD.342 Besides working for years in West Africa, Bout also had connections to the Taliban in supplying weapons and also running and maintaining Ariana Airlines, the Taliban’s official airline.343

Under Taylor’s patronage, international arms dealers operated alongside al Qaeda operatives, Israeli mercenaries, Hezbollah diamond merchants, Russian and Balkan organized crime figures and South African mercenaries. Because he controlled the borders, Taylor and his security apparatus were able to guarantee that even wanted criminals could

339Cfr. Idem., p.6. 340 Rosen David M. Armies of the young: Child soldiers in war and Terrorism. New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005. 341 Cfr.CIJ, Following Taylor’s money: A path of war and destruction, May, 2005, 23 342 Cfr.Farah, op .cit., p.39. 343 Cfr .CIJ 2005, 24.

85 enter and exit with impunity.344 An aspect which first fell under the spotlight following the 1989 al-Qaeda bombings in Nairobi (Kenyan capital) and Dar -es- Salam (Tanzanian capital).

Other connections Taylor developed included Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-Israeli citizen who specialized in surplus weapons stock from Kiev; Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly, Lebanese diamond merchants with connections with former Israeli military officers and Russian merchants; Balkans’ weapons trader, Slobodan Teic; and Iranian weapons dealer Ali Kleilat345 but more important to note is Leonid Minin.

Leonid Minin liked he was a pilots from Eastern Europe made sorties for the rebel alliance from bases inside Liberia346 his anonymous stay in ‘Hotel Europa’, in Northern Italy just outside Milan , where $75 for a double room and the privacy of all kind, of which he was accommodating himself in until the wee hours of August 5, 2000, when police, acting on a tip, barged into Room 341 and found Minin surrounded by four naked prostitutes,347 58 grams of cocaine and half a million dollars worth of diamonds.348

According to FRONTLINE/World report showed that the Milan customs police had had Minin under surveillance since 1992 while investigating an international criminal organization involved in international laundering in drug and money through the foreign bank accounts of Italian businessmen. The report also says that in 1997 Italian intelligence services conducted a "complex investigation on a criminal group of Ukrainian origins associated with the so-called 'Russian Mafia' involved in international arms and drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion and other offenses. This group was headed by the Ukrainian businessman Leonid Minin”.349

344Crf Farah, op. cit., p.5. 345 Crf .CIJ 2005, 27. 346 Cfr.Herald Guardian, 1999. 347Cfr. Quartet of Russian, Albanian, Italian and Kenyan 348 Cfr.Comrades in arms article, Washington, January-February 2002. 349 Front Line World, Gunrunners, May, 2002, by Matthew Brunwasser is a freelance journalist based in Bulgaria. He worked as field producer on FRONTLINE/World's "Gunrunners" story.

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The most shocking finding was picked up by the Western media, that $32 billion in arms, equipment and military property were stolen from Ukrainian stocks within six years. In fact, this figure referred to the total value of all Ukrainian military property real estate, factories, planes, ships, tanks as well as stockpiles of small arms, ammunition, uniforms and other goods which declined from $89 billion in 1992 to $57 billion by 1998, due also to loss of market value and lack of maintenance.350

A further search turned up a green briefcase stuffed with some 1,500 documents in English, Russian, Dutch, and French. Months later, after translating and reviewing the documents, Italian law enforcement authorities discovered that they had stumbled upon an international arms dealer. Minin, they say, had been running guns from Eastern Europe to the regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia and to the RUF, a vicious guerrilla group in neighboring Sierra Leone both of which are banned from receiving weapons under a United Nations arms embargo. The paper trail seized by the police offers a rare glimpse into the new and usually opaque world of post-Cold-War international arms brokers. It shows how a new generation of black market suppliers have helped turn the former Soviet bloc into a weapons warehouse for outlaw regimes, insurgencies, and terrorist groups.351

The Key to the Italian government's case were the end-user certificates (EUC) found in his hotel room. Minin was charged with international gun smuggling and using a fake EUC to sell arms to Liberia and Sierra Leone. He was implicated for his role in two shipments: 113 tons of arms delivered to on July 12, 2000; and 68 tons to Burkina Faso on March 13, 1999. The smuggling charge is for violating a U.N. arms embargo adopted by the Italian parliament, thus becoming Italian law. It is the first such case which does not involve a national law separate from the embargo. Little is known about the fate of the sales Minin had proposals to broker at the time he was caught. Valery Cherny, Minin's partner from Avia trend who brokered the purchase of arms for the Ivory Coast deal, told U.N. investigators $750,000 worth of weapons were still waiting for delivery when Minin

350Cfr. Ibidem., 351 Crf. Ibidem.,

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"disappeared" in June 2001. The documents seized at Minin's arrest indicated a variety of other deals at various stages of completion.352

The Italians were not the only ones who were worried about the likes of Minin. U.S. officials and security experts were also worried as well saying that the small-arms trade fuels the growing instability that breeds and harbors terrorism. "The chaos that exists in parts of Africa has created a black hole where terrorists can come and go and conceal their activities," says an administration official who requested anonymity. His views are echoed by Republican. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee. At a hearing on Nov. 16, he charged that international terrorist cells are operating in several African countries. "U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust to the post-September 11 world," he said. "The general weakness of African governments makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations."

One of the hospitable parts of the continent that Royce had in mind is Liberia, where arms dealers, drug traffickers, Eastern European mobsters, and mercenaries have all found safe haven under Taylor. So, too, had Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, according to ‘The Washington Post’ which reported that al Qaeda set up shop in Liberia in 1998 and had earned millions of dollars by buying cheap diamonds from Taylor's government and selling them in Europe. In March 2002, the U.S. government backed a United Nations resolution that banned travel by senior Liberian officials and Monrovia's chief financial and military supporters, including Minin. Then, the Bush administration supported efforts to tighten sanctions in an effort to cut the flow of weapons to Liberia and the RUF, which was supported by Taylor's regime.

Lee Wolosky, a former National Security Council official, calls black-market dealers a new and significant security threat. "There can be no world order with these international criminal syndicates running amok," says Wolosky, who until July headed a little-known interagency working group charged with monitoring and controlling the small arms trade.

352 Cfr.Front Line World, Gunrunners, May, 2002.

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"They have significantly increased regional destabilization in Africa and threaten the transition to law-based democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe."

While Colonel Gadaffi Libyan offered training camps creating the most important link in the military preparations, access to connections in Abidjan, Danane and San Pedro, were for Taylor the key to his financial readiness. His ability to tap into powerful networks established in Cote D’Ivoire over decades by Liberia’s Americo-Liberian and business families was an important asset. Taylor’s ability to earn the confidence of the exiled True Party business aristocracy helped him to reach clients for Liberian commodities, the critical source of the foreign exchange he would need to finance his military campaign.353 But what earned Charles Taylor foreign exchange? This question drives us to a natural resource as one source of financial income for Taylor. Thus we shall analyze the following: Bong Iron ore mine, Timber Companies, Nimba Mining Company, Diamond Mines, Liberian Maritime registry system.

1.5.2.1. Financial income earning of Taylor

1.5.2.1.1. Bong Iron ore

The canalization of first major business deal under Taylor is abundant Bong Iron ore mine which had been once a German owned enterprise. Taylor arranged for the dismantling and resale abroad equipment from the disused mine, earning valuable foreign exchange in the process, with which he then effectively founded his future foreign exchange operations, via a financial entity known as ‘Bong Bank’.354 In NPFL controlled Buchanan, Taylor reportedly subcontracted out the handling of port operations to a Western owned operator, the Associated Development Corporation.355 Again the foreign management role provided an added measure of legitimacy as well as offering new business referrals, which included Lebanese and American concerns with an interest in

353Colin, op.cit p.121 354 Cfr.Ibidem.p.184. 355 Cfr.William Reno, Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor’s Liberia, Third World Quarterly, vol.16, n°.1, 1995.

89 using the port.356 This Business continued until ECOMOG finally captured and ransacked Buchanan in 1993, putting an end to iron ore shipments.357

It is estimated Taylor made between $105-450 million from 1992-2003.358 Focusing first on the sale of mining machinery from an abandoned German-operated ore company, Taylor then collaborated with Firestone Tire and Rubber to cooperate in rubber production and marketing, organizing rubber workers in exchange for communication facilities.359 Firestone provided both rubber revenue for the NPFL and when forward military base within striking distance of Monrovia from which the NPFL could attack the capital. The IGNU was particularly indignant over the role of Firestone in what it saw as its facilitation of the October 1992 ‘operation Octopus’ attack on Monrovia. Iron ore was historically the mainstay of the Liberian economy, accounting for 40 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975.360

1.5.2.1.2. Timber Companies.

Timber, and in particular the African hardwood so prized in the European furniture industry, found ready buyers operating through Cote d’Ivoire, and vast amounts of wood were hauled through Danane across the Ivorian border to the north or directly to San Pedro for shipment to Europe. Charles Taylor’s brother Bob played the key role handling forestry operations and managing timber exports from the Liberian side, while much of the wood thus exported was handled in Cote d’Ivoire by French and Lebanese businesses. Exiled Americo-Liberian businessman and former ministers from the Doe government were among those to set up business in San Pedro, British, Chinese and Russian interests also had commodity dealings with Taylor through Cote d’Ivoire.361

Taylor turned his attention to the timber trade, swapping arms for timber. Establishing a “Forestry Development Authority”, collected cash for timber licenses and rough log export

356Cfr. Ibidem., 357 Cfr.Ibidem., 358 Cfr.CIJ 2005, 19; Duffield 2000, 82. 359 Cfr.Reno, op .cit., p.114. 360 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy , op.cit., pp. 121; 124;183. 361 Cfr.Ibidem.,p.187.

90 taxes . Through the timber trade, he made an estimated $23 million from 1997-2003.362 The timber industry continued to be a vital source of funding for Liberia’s illegal arms shipments, with logging companies themselves serving as arms importers and weapons transporters. The private logging company militias fought alongside the AFL and the notorious ATU in their battles with the rebel group LURDs. The presence of several of these logging companies, and their close ties to international diamond and arms traffickers, became a serious threat to the peace and security of the region.363

Information obtained by Global Witness includes details of at least two shipments of arms imports in January 2002, and the involvement of Oriental Timber Corporation (OTC) personnel in delivering arms to government forces and their militias fighting in in lower Lofa. Furthermore, in logging company, militiamen perpetuated a reign of terror on ordinary people. Under the command of Guus Kouwenhoven , Personnel of the OTC militia harassed and intimidated civilians as well as illegally arresting and detaining those they considered a threat to their interests. The Liberian government converted most of the OTC and other logging companies’ militias into its own militia force under the command of General Cocoo Dennis, an executive of the Salami Molawi Incorporated logging company (by then known as the Mohammed Group of Companies ) and General Roland Duo, OTC chief of security.364

Another Timber company, Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman (DLH), from 2001-2003, it was a leading international timber wholesaler, bought timber from Liberian companies that were operating illegally and providing support to Charles Taylor’s regime during the civil war. DLH ignored repeated warnings from campaign groups over its handling of illegally obtained timber, and only acted when UN sanctions on Liberian timber came into force in 2003. In November 2009, Global Witness and partner NGOs lodged a criminal complaint

362 Cfr.CIJ 2005, 18. 363 Cfr.www.globalwitness.org/library/liberia%E2%80%99s-logs-war-key-actor-illegal-arms-trafficking-and- human-rights-abuses, (retrieved on 3 may, 2002). 364 The MGC is owned by Mohammed Salami, named last year in the UN Expert Panel Report as one of the facilitators of arms transfer to Liberia.

91 against the company before the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Nantes, in France, under the charge of ‘recel’ , essentially accusing them of handling illegally obtained goods.365

Thus far the United Nations had not taken actions on Liberia in order to address the problem of Liberia’s timber industry; the situation meant that any delays in action will further hamper prospects for peace in one of the most violent regions in the world. “Regional peace cannot be achieved without halting illicit arms trade which is largely dependent on the timber trade, a trade that is also actively involved in grave human rights abuses and which deprives the Liberian people of massive state revenues,” said Alice Blondel of Global Witness. “It is time for the International Community to stop stalling and take action. Failure to do so will undermine any peace that currently exists in the region”

1.5.2.1.3. Nimba Mining Company

Another major financial operation for Taylor was through a joint venture on the Liberia- Guinea border, the Nimba Mining Company (NIMCO), former jewel in the crown of Liberia’s mineral economy based at Yekepa, a consortium of North American, European and Japanese mining firms. Through partnerships with the Liberian American Swedish Minerals Company, the Liberian Mining Cooperation, and the African Mining Company of Liberia, railroad passage in the port city of Buchanan stayed open for shipments of iron ore, allegedly netting Taylor $10 million a month for the railroad services.366 Through these connections with transnational foreign companies, Taylor was able to exercise political authority, generating a “warlord economy” worth approximately $200-250 million a year. With this wealth, his “war effort did not suffer greatly from his inability to command sovereignty over the Liberian state because he was able to wield a commercial empire and insulate himself from his enemies”.367

365 On 18th November 2009, Global Witness and Sherpa, along with Greenpeace France, Amis de la Terre, and a prominent Liberian activist, lodged a complaint before the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Nantes against Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman (DLH), one of the world's leading international timber and wood products wholesalers. The organizations alleged that during the civil war in Liberia between 2001-2003, DLH bought timber from Liberian companies that provided support to Charles Taylor's brutal regime. 366Cfr. Reno, op cit., p.114 367Cfr. Ibidem.,p.191.

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One advantage of the international interest was construction of large projects such as the NIMCO operation was that it added to the de facto international recognition of Charles Taylor’s administration via commercial involvements of reputable international corporations. Indeed the former management of LAMCO368 readily provided consulting services to the new local iron ore operator, the Liberian Mining Corporation, seemingly without reticence over the identity of their new business partner.369

The French state-owned corporation Sollac participated in the NIMCO project which in March of 1991 bought 70,000 tons of iron ore, paying $ 80,000 per month to Taylor for its shipments. Accused by Paris media of using its state firm as a back-door method of funding the NPFL, France nevertheless continued to be proactive in both financial and diplomatic support of Taylor during his early years as the alternative government in Liberia. France also provided diplomatic help to the NPFL for its business activities, such as when in 1992, the UN tried to mount opposition to the Liberian mining operation on environmental grounds. This in turn helped him to underwrite RUF’s invasion into Sierra Leone and gain additional wealth through the Sierra Leone diamond mines.370

1.5.2.1.4. Diamond Mines

The commercial influence of Greater Liberia extended it territory and what had been historically established cross-border trade in diamonds with Sierra Leone, mostly conducted by small scale nomadic traders, now took on a new more strategic dimension. With diamonds flowing from Sierra Leone, as well as from Guinea and even as far as Angola, where Jona Savimbi’s The National Union for the Total Independence of

Angola (UNITA) rebels also sought a commercial route for the germs they extracted, Liberia became the official export source for many more times the quantity of diamonds than it actually produced. Helped by it US dollar-based economy, not to mention a regular flight schedule operated by SABENA, the Belgium national carrier, by 1994 Liberia was

368 Iron ore mining company operated in late 1970s by Liberian-American-Swedish Mineral Company. 369 Ibidem., 370 Cfr.Reno, op cit., p.115.

93 the third largest supplier of diamonds to Antwerp, and in the following years supplies from the country grew by 227 per cent in carat terms.371

Because of their diamond wealth, throughout most of the war carried out by the RUF was better armed than its adversaries. Diamonds bought Kalashnikovs by the hundreds, Browning 12.7-millimeter heavy machine guns by the dozens, and ammunition in million- block orders”.372 RUF rebels relied on Taylor to trade their diamonds for weapons and Taylor in turn sold the diamonds to merchants exporting diamonds to Belgium.373 From 1997-2003, it is estimated Taylor accumulated approximated $40 million per year from diamonds.374

1.5.2.1.5. Liberian Maritime registry system.

Additional wealth accumulated by Taylor came from the Liberian maritime registry system. The Lucrative Maritime Agency, which had been run by a United States company, International Registries Inc. (IRI), with over 3,000 ships internationally using its registration, previously accounted for around $24 million annually as much as half of all Liberian government’s official revenues. After Taylor was elected, the agency was transformed into ‘The Liberia International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR), and run by US associates of the Liberian president, chief among whom was Washington political fixer and legal counsel, Lester Hyman, who later became the Registry’s chairman. Crucially the change of meant that the revenue of the LISCR now began to go to non- government as well as government account, allowing Taylor option of directing the revenue of the LISCR’s revenue to purposes of his own choosing.375

The registry covered a third of the world’s shipping tonnage, more than 1,700 vessels. “The flag of convenience allowed American shippers to hire crews outside American wage and labor laws; the ships was reflagged and made available to the U.S military in times of

371 Cfr.Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, op cit.,121, 124, 183, 360. 372 Campbell, op. cit., p. 63 373 Ibidem., 374 Cfr.CIJ 2005, 17 375 Cfr. Colin, op.cit., p.246.

94 war”.376 In 1999, Taylor fired the Virginia company that ran the registry for 50 years and set up a new one generating a steady flow of income averaging about $18 million a year.

These resources garnered significant revenue for Liberia both during the civil war and under the Taylor administration. One scholar approximates the total value of “warlord trade” in Liberia from 1990 to 1994 at $100-150 million in diamonds; $121.6 million in timber; $81 million in rubber; and $95 million in iron ore. Following the 1997 elections, the trade was still highly lucrative, although official figures are likely lower than actual as a result of corruption, tax-evasive practices, and the trade’s underground nature. A 2001 U.N. report described the income generated by diamonds, rubber, and timber that in 1999, Liberia officially exported 8,500 carats of diamonds,377 an amount estimated to constitute only 10-15 percent of the actual exports.378 Timber production was valued at $46.2 million USD between January and June 2001, but estimates mark the actual value of exports to be 50 percent to 200 percent higher.379 The value of rubber totaled $33.3 million in 1999 and $53.2 million in 2000.380 While foreign companies generally exerted greater control over the rubber industry, the U.N. report acknowledged it was unclear how the Liberian government spent the profits once received.381

Ultimately, the trade in conflict resources led to U.N. sanctions against diamond and timber exports. On March 7, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution imposing sanctions on “the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia.”382 While it significantly reduced the flow of conflict diamonds out of Liberia, it failed to address a major gap in the industry by

376 Global Policy Forum 2003, para. 7 377Cfr. Letter Dated 2001/10/26 From the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) Concerning Liberia Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1015 (2001). 378 Cfr.Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Fact book 2008 (2008), www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the- world- fact book/geos/ li.html,( retrieved on 10.08.2014). 379Cfr. Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, op cit., pp. 71, 75- 78. 380 Cfr.Ibidem., 381 Cfr.Ibidem., 382 Cfr.U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (March 7, 2001). The resolution also included a ban on travel for senior government officials, which also went into effect. Cf. B(7)(a), B(8).

95 not providing for an international monitoring system.383 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a multilateral initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, did not enter into effect until 2003.384 U.N.-imposed sanctions against the export of Liberian timber came into effect on July 7, 2003.385 In October 2001, the United Nations contemplated sanctions on Liberia’s rubber industry, but U.S. lobbying on behalf of Firestone and the potential economic impact deterred the Security Council from taking further action.386

1.5.3. Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network

Taylor’s association with illicit weapons traders and diamond smugglers as well as the shadow economy within Liberia, demonstrated many policy implications, specifically with international trade and commerce. Unlike parallel trade in legal goods, war economies usually link into transcontinental smuggling and other gray commercial networks to satisfy

383 The flaws in the system lie in the difference between the terms “country of origin” and “country of provenance,” which are used in the exportation/ importation of diamonds. The term “country of provenance” is the “country from which diamonds were last imported,” while “country of origin” indicates “where they were mined.”. For example, at one time India claimed that it did not engage in the blood diamond trade and supported this assertion by noting that Belgium was the source of most of its rough diamond imports and that nearly none were directly from Africa. Commenting on this assertion, the Panel of Experts noted that: the operative word is ‘directly’. The lack of scrutiny throughout the delivery chain and the stops along the way allow most importing countries to say that they do not import anything from Africa, conflict or otherwise. These examples explain why it is so difficult to determine where diamonds still in their rough state and moving from one trading or polishing centre to another are actually mined. 384 Cfr. Background, Kimberly Process, www. kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 385 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1478 (2003). As early as January 2001, the United States urged the imposition of sanctions on timber from Liberia during discussions for a U.N. ban on weapons, diamonds, and travel. Other states, including France which imported large amounts of Liberian lumber objected to a ban on timber. Carola Hoyos, Liberian Timber in U.N. Spotlight, Financial Times, Jan. 27, 2001. Several ECOWAS states criticized the 2001 sanctions for being too harsh without offering any real incentives for Taylor to change his policies; Guinea and Sierra Leone, notably, did not join the critics. Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG , and Regional Security in West Africa 237 (2002). 386 Christine Cheng, The Rise of Extralegal Groups during Post-Conflict Transitions: Illegal Rubber Tapping in Liberia, (Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (Aug 31, 2006), www.allacademic.com/meta/p151191_index.html;( retrieved on 29 January 2014).For example, the security wing of the NPFL, “G-2,” was accused of finding workers for Firestone’s operations, receiving logistical support in return. Reno, Cfr. Kerper Dwanyen, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Community of Liberia 17 ( June 14, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (describing how NPFL rebels looted property from his father’s rubber and logging businesses, including a stockpile of rubber valued at c.a. $60,000 and sold to the Liberian Agricultural Company, a Pajero, jeep, a Pajoke (phonetic) 504, a Toyota truck used for transporting the rubber, and their logging equipment).

96 their special requirements. Today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally; but they have to think globally.

In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments assisted the development of war economies.387Taylor focused on global connections, using companies throughout the world to invest in Liberia’s natural resources and provided a market for illicit goods including drugs and weapons; however, Taylor also made sure he maintained financial control and profits of the government backed subsidies. “The absence of agencies that can enforce an autonomous notion of legality also generated opportunities for politicians to use more innovative means to control natural resources and translate them into political tools”.388

New crime groups, especially in conflict regions, such as Charles Taylor’s network in Liberia, have forged alliances with terrorist organizations due to inefficient, nonexistent or corrupt law enforcement agencies and governments.

Additionally, as Taylor controlled the borders, smuggling routes were able to remain intact and undetected. From the international commerce side, Liberia not only provided resources to be smuggled, but also provided Liberian corporate identities without the need to list officers, owners or shareholders.389 Liberia also provided a “safe harbor for anyone wishing to keep aircraft sheltered from scrutiny. Once an airplane is registered in Liberia, it can be based in another country and used anywhere in the world, often leaving little evident of its travels”.390 This proved extremely useful for Viktor Bout who owned many airlines and aircraft and was able to easily register them and thwart regulators.391

In Sierra Leone, then head of state, Valentine Strasser, sought foreigners representing state and non-state organizations to manage the shadow state’s global relations. International organizations sought to help Strasser to keep the RUF from obtaining power through

387 Cfr.Duffield , Political Economy of Civile War and Conflict Transformation, Berghof Research Centre for Conflict Management ,2000, p.84 388Cfr. Reno, op. cit.,p.58 389 Campbell, op. cit., p. 64. 390 Ibidem., 391 Ibidem.,p.65.

97 provisions of debt relief .392 Sierra Leone represented a wide range of formal and informal roles for external actors among them Strasser’s and Taylor’s foreign bankers that exploit changes in post-cold war global commerce.393

Most sanction against Liberia, specifically during Taylor’s regime did not occur until the end of the conflict. “The United Nations slapped bans on Liberian diamond exports in 2001 and on timber two years later, saying the resources were being used to fuel war in the region”.394 The sanctions on weapons were initially issued in 1992 and additional sanctions freezing assets and travel restrictions on those that posed threat to the peace process were introduced in 2003.395

Additional policy implications followed by lack of communication among U.S government agencies, the lack of research into terrorist financial group networks from regular commercial goods to illicit trade of weapons and drugs and the lack of resources to interconnect the financial networks. Douglas Farah, a journalist from the Washington Post, points out the lack of intergovernmental agency communication and coordination in his book “Blood From Stones” (2004).

While in West Africa in 2001, Farah discovered the links between conflict diamonds, Charles Taylor, Viktor Bout, the Taliban, al Qaeda and many others. While most of the U.S government focused on counterterrorism efforts before and after 9/11, al Qaeda was laying the groundwork of establishing foundations in the U.S to finance their efforts. “Al Qaeda’s resourcefulness allowed its financial structure to survive a near complete military defeat in Afghanistan. The size of al Qaeda’s bankroll after 9/11 remains a mystery. Estimates range from $30 million to $300 million”.396

However, the “terrorist-transnational crime relationship extends beyond the generation of profits or provisions of logistics, but goes to the heart of the relationship between crime

392Cfr. Reno, op. cit., p. 503. 393 Cfr. Ibidem., pp.504-505. 394 Global Policy Forum 2006, para. 2. 395 Ibidem., 396 Farah, op.cit., p. 7.

98 groups and the state”.397 In Liberia, Taylor’s regime was the crime group, exploiting legal norms and procedures and enhancing the only functioning economy, the shadow economy.398

In the aftermath of 9/11 and in recent years, more efforts have been made to “follow the money”, however there is a long way to go. “Still, knowledgeable sources say, more than two years after 9/11 the United States remains far behind in the race to cut off the flow of money, the lifeblood of terrorism, although cooperation among some government agencies has improved”.399

1.5.3.1. Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds

In 2001, the UN issued sanctions against diamond exporting in Liberia, as the international community recognized diamonds were fueling the conflict, providing goods for the trade for weapons. At this time, about thirty-five countries began meeting to discuss the economic impact of buying and selling conflict diamonds. Previously, “the practice of selling rough stones outside the boundaries of established taxes and exporting structures for the sake of funding insurgencies against legitimate African governments was well established and accepted by the diamond-producing and importing countries of the world, but it was never, discussed in public”.400

However due to the brutality seen in the West African countries, diamonds were being viewed in a different light, becoming “synonymous with death and mayhem”.401

As the conflicts and diamond trafficking in Liberia and Sierra Leone forged on, in December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing diamonds as a direct contribution to prolonged conflict and increased prosperity within the conflict zone and throughout the world. Resolution 55/56 that the international community developed detailed proposals for a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough

397 Cfr. Shelley,op.cit., p. 104. 398 Cfr.Ibidem., p.105. 399Cfr. Ibidem., p.198. 400 Greg Campbell, Tracing the Deadly Part of World’s Most Precious Stone, New York, 2004, pp.114 -15. 401 Ibidem., p.115.

99 diamonds based primarily on national certification schemes and on internationally agreed minimum standards.

Additionally, negative marketing within the diamond industry sprang to public attention as Amnesty International –France developed advertisements focused on Valentine’s Day and making sure people do not buy “blood diamonds”.402 The result from the negative marketing and the meeting of the thirty-five countries was the establishment of the Kimberley Process.

The Kimberley Process became the procedure for certifying diamonds as “clean” or not from conflict zones and also sought a plan to cut off the flow of diamonds from rebel group.403 In 2003, the group adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which developed the requirements for certification including country of origin, alpha code number, date of insurance, date of expiration, validation of certificate from exporting authority, among others.404 In 2006, the Kimberley Process conducted a review of the KPCS resulting in significant contributions to the end of diamond trafficking in certain post-conflict areas. Overall, the Kimberley Process has 49 members representing 75 countries, accounting for 99.8 percent of the world’s rough diamond production.405

Recent reviews of the KP demonstrated that while some countries have improved the certification process and government controls, most nations have a long way to go.

An analysis of the UN Commodity Trade Statistics (Com-trade) database reveals that an illegal trade in rough diamonds worth $10.2 million may be taking place between Kimberley Process participant and non-participant countries, allowing illicit diamonds to evade regulatory controls aimed at keeping out conflict diamonds.406

Several organizations called for stronger processes and controls for the Kimberley Process, including stronger government controls, regular cross checking of statistical data within different systems, better coordination between law enforcement and customs and border

402 International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) 2006, para. 6. 403 Ibidem., pp.115-16. 404 Cfr.Kimberley Process (KP), 2003, para. 2. 405Cfr. Ibidem., para. 3. 406 Global Witness 2007, 1.

100 control, and better requirements for diamond companies to track their data and have regular audits.407

With the call for more oversight, the Kimberley Process has implemented a few measures such as the expulsion of Congo-Brazzaville from the KP after the country could not account for millions of exported diamonds. However, the expulsion of a country from the process does not address the problem of illicit diamond trade, but may potentially increase diamond trafficking.

As of 2008, Cote d’Ivoire is the only country since the KP conception that it has addressed. “The KP has tried to address the issue through field visits and through additional recommendations to participants, but none of these measures have put an end to the illicit flow. There has been strong reluctance by governments and industry to meaningfully increase oversight and monitoring of the trade in Ivorian conflict diamonds”.408 KP members are not reporting infringements and are not auditing records as they should.409 Again, members of the KP need to focus efforts on enforcement and pushing for better government controls and legislation. Without the buy-in of the member state governments, the illicit diamond trade will continue to prosper.

1.6. Arms Transfer in Liberia

For reasons related to the dynamics of illegal arms flows, it is almost impossible to ascertain the exact extent of SALW proliferation in Liberia through Mano River410 conflict cluster. Nonetheless, it is clear that the region became a key market for SALW with UN estimates putting the number in circulation to seven million. An economic logic clearly exists behind proliferation of ‘recycled’ weapons, as the acute insecurity in the zone has also made it the centre for the greatest demand for weapons. It is awash with small arms that have exacerbated the culture of violence, heightened banditry and hostage taking, and acted as a cover for horrendous mutilations, particularly among children and youth.

407 Ibidem., 1-2. 408 Global Witness 2008, 2. 409 Ibidem., p. 4. 410 The Mano River is a river in west Africa, it originates in the Guinea Highlands in Liberia and forms part of the Liberia – Sierra Leone border

101

Women refugees and internally displaced persons have become victims of food-for-sex rackets. Among the rebels and local militia for example militia in the Sierra Leone conflict whom Taylor sponsored and supplied weapons like Kalashnikov rifle became a symbol of mob justice. For example ‘AK-47’ was interpreted as ‘out of every 7 captives, murder 4’, and AK-58 as ‘out of every 8 women, rape 5’. SALW diffusion within the region, as well as the exploitation and marketing of such resources as diamond, gold, timber and rubber, have followed a common pattern.411

Much as Libya served as a common source of training and weapons for the combatants,412 private brokers and rogue airlines fixed deals and ferried weapons and ammunitions from Eastern Europe and South Africa. The AK-47 assault rifles, grenades and mortars were airlifted from Libya to Burkina Faso, from where they were taken on a Fokker-28 owned by Burkina Faso to Man airport in western Cotè d’Ivoire for onward transfer by cargo trucks inside Liberia.413 This supplemented its stocks with illicit war material acquired through illegal trade in minerals. According to one observer, Ivorian officials ”arranged business meetings for Taylor and his commanders while gendarmes escorted them around and custom and immigration officials did not seem to pay attention to the goods that crossed the border”.414

The Partnership Africa Canada Report on ‘Conflict Diamonds’ accused the South Africa, Michau Huisamen, and his mining company AmCan Minerals of being ‘willing to go almost any length, including the provision of arms and mercenary armies, to get diamonds’.415

In Liberia several means were used to ferry and transfer arms in the country. The arms ferries included Ibis Air, Sorus Airlines, and two British companies, Sky and Occidental. According to London’s Sunday Time of 28 January, 1999, the last two reportedly shipped

411Cfr. Fuchs Alice E, (ed.), Private Military and Security Companies, Marburg University,2000, pp.105-120. 412 Cfr.Ibidem., 413 Cfr.Prkic F, “The Conflict” paper presented at the Conference on Defense Economics and Security in Mediterranean and Sub-Sahara Countries’ CEsA/IDN, Lisbon, 5-6 June, 1998. 414 Ibidem., 415 Mail and Guardian, 2000.

102 nearly 400 tons of arms and ammunition from Slovak Republic to supply to RUF through Liberia as the main agent.

Another important figure to note in arms transfer and smuggling in Liberia is Fred Rindel, a former Apartheid officer who led a group of South African freelancers in training, equipping and directing Charles Taylor’s forces in their destabilizing campaigns in Guinea and Sierra Leone. He and Nico Shafer (who worked for the former Colombian cocaine baron Pablo Escobar) were reported to have set up an international consortium with Charles and the RUF that involved the procurement of diamonds, narcotics, arms and mercenaries.416

According Human Right Watch, Guinea also vividly involved itself in arms trafficking in Liberia. It is argued that the Guinean Ministry of Defense had used a private Guinean mining and trading company, Katex Mine, as a broker for military procurement. These weapons are said to have ended up in the hands of LURD. Several flights, chartered by the Guinean Ministry of Defense, went from Teheran to Conakry in Guinea by a Ukrainian air company in 2002 and 2003. For instance, seven cargo flights from Iran arrived between the 5th and 17th of March 2003.417 The waybills of these flights stated that they included a total of 57,200 kg (1,040 pieces) of “technical equipment” and 13,000 kg (2,500 pieces) of “detergent” arriving in a twelve-day time period”. These flights preceded few weeks a major LURD offensive.418 It was loaded as well with 3,500 pieces of clothes and hats (7,500 kg), 1,500 pieces of “lighter” (1,500 kg), and 270 pieces of technical equipment (19,300 kg) to be delivered to Ministry of Defense, Guinea.419

The Flight of June 30, 2003, Ukraine-based LVIV Airlines, operating flight UKW 7612, delivered a consignment to Conakry. The aircraft departed empty from Ukraine on June 29 for Iran’s Tehran-Mehrabad airport. Leaving Iran laden with cargo, at 23:00 on June 29, it went next to Benghazi, Libya, where it arrived at 3:30 on June 30. From there, the aircraft

416Cfr. Reuters, 1999: Cf. Democracy Now, www.webactive.com/pacifica/demnow , (retrieved on 9 February 2001). 417 Cfr.Human Rights Watch, 2003. 418 Cfr. .Ibidem., 419 Air waybill, reviewed by Human Rights Watch.

103 made a brief stop in Tripoli, probably for refueling purposes (a “text stop”) before departing again, at 5:40, for Conakry-Gbessia, where it arrived at 12:20 on June 30. After unloading the cargo, the return flight operated as UR-7616 and flew back to Gostomel, Ukraine, at 22:25 on July 2.420 The actual cargo was described to Human Rights Watch by eyewitnesses as 7.62mm small arms ammunition and 60mm mortar rounds of Iranian manufacture.421 They said it was unloaded onto military trucks and taken to a Guinean Ministry of Defense weapons and ammunition depot at Doyama.422

The Flight of August 5, 2003, a second cargo flight from Tehran by LVIV Airlines arrived in Conakry in early August, again using flight number UKW 7612. This time the air waybill and cargo manifest, which Human Rights Watch has on file, indicated that the cargo consisted of thirty motorcycles (3,200kg), 500 pieces of detergent powder small size (1,000kg), 440 pieces of detergent powder 50kg (22,000kg) to be delivered to Ministry of Defense, Guinea.423

The U.N. panel of experts observed the unloading of cargo from this flight. It reported to the U.N. Sanctions Committee that it “saw green boxes with hand ropes being loaded by soldiers into military trucks. The Panel believes that military equipment was contained in the ‘detergent boxes’ mentioned in the manifest” (single ellipses added).424 The panel added that it confirmed, through diplomatic sources, “that transportation of weapons by truck have been made from Katex Mines Guinea to Koyama and Macenta” (near the Guinean border with Liberia), linking this information to its previous suspicions that arms delivered to Conakry on behalf of Katex were forwarded by truck (the panel did not specify by whom) to positions near the Liberia border for LURD.425

420Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with aviation sources. 421 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, by phone and via email, August and September 2003. 422 Cfr.Ibidem., 423 Air waybill and cargo manifests, copies on file with Human Rights Watch. 424 Cfr.October 2003 U.N. Liberia Panel of Experts Report. 425 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews by phone, August and September 2003.

104

1.6.1. Transfer from Guinea and Use in Liberia

LURD commanders and other eyewitnesses have told Human Rights Watch that the munitions delivered on the June 30 flight, 7.62mm small arms ammunition and 60mm mortar rounds, were quickly transported into Liberia for re-supply of LURD. The onward shipment, LURD sources said, was carried out with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense of Guinea426 which as noted above took possession of the ammunition at the airport for transport to its depot at Doyama.

Another interesting aspect of this is that Guinea was and had been for quiet sometime, a recipient of U.S military aid. Although knowing what was going on, the U.S did not stop the military aid to Guinea. According to US officials, they instead adopted the tactics of so called quiet diplomacy. Some have argued that, not only did the US ignore the actions of Guinea under disguise of quiet diplomacy, but they also silently supported it as a way of getting Charles Taylor out of Monrovia.427

Quiet diplomacy, including the demarches and meetings, failed to have an impact. At a minimum, the failure to publicly condemn Guinea’s misbehavior represents a missed opportunity for the U.S. to influence the behavior of the Guinean government. It also may have compounded the problem by giving the impression that the U.S. government was willing to overlook Guinea’s support for LURD, even though it clearly violated U.N. sanctions and came at a high cost in civilian lives. More broadly, U.S. military assistance and public support for Guinea under the circumstances could be read as endorsement of Guinea’s actions in support of LURD. For example, Charles Taylor accused the U.S. of supporting LURD: “This is an American war. LURD is a surrogate force... (The United States) caused this war. (…) They can call off their dogs now.”428

426 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with a LURD commander and other LURD interviews, August and September 2003. 427 Cfr.Ibidem., 428 “Charles Taylor’s farewell speech, August. 10, 2003: ‘God Willing, I Will Be Back, Says Taylor,’” All Africa, Lagos, August 12, 2003.

105

Human Rights Watch interviewed U.S. officials who stated that the munitions Guinea obtained from Iran were delivered to LURD and used in the fighting.429 Several sources indicated that the weapons were sent by sea on board a freighter and then unloaded by small boats that delivered the cargo to Robertsfield, from where it was driven to Bushrod Island in Monrovia.430 Numerous Iranian mortars were found in Monrovia.431 Human Rights Watch has inspected several sites in the Mamba Point area where there were remains of 81 and 60mm mortars used by LURD in its three offensives.432 Those that were identifiable carried markings indicating production in 2001 and 2002 and were mostly of Iranian provenance.433 Some sources reported that Iranian munitions also may have been used by Liberian government forces. According to diplomatic sources a flight on May 26, from Minsk, Belarus, to Robertsfield was routed via Tehran, where it picked up consignment that reportedly included Rocket Propelled Grenades-7s (RPGs).434

Again, this is an example of the contradictions in state actions, and not only on the side of Guinea, but also the U.S. According to Grant and Soderbaum argued that there were multiple actors in both the African state and society, which are linked together in hybrid networks and coalitions, together creating a whole range of complex regionalism processes. And the fact that they do so was a response to their political, economic and social needs.435 The U.S. government, whose Embassy in Monrovia had been under fire in the Monrovia fighting and received at least one mortar strike, was also keenly interested to learn where the mortar rounds came from. The U.S. Embassy inspected the sites of mortar impacts in Monrovia for that purpose.436 They identified one U.S manufactured 81mm mortar round among those expended in the fighting, which they attributed to the re-sale

429 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with U.S. officials, October 2003. 430Cfr. Human Rights Watch interviews with military analysts in Liberia in 2003. 431 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses interviewed by phone and email, August and September 2003. 432Cfr. Remnants of mortar rounds in central Monrovia were seen by a Human Rights Watch researcher, August 2003.Their caliber was indicated by markings on the tail fins. 433 Cfr.Human Rights Watch inspection and U.S. and U.N. military sources. 434 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with U.K. diplomatic sources. 435 Cfr.Grant, J. Andrew and Soderbaum, Fredrik, 2003,p.1. 436 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews; Tim Weiner, “U.S. Embassy in Liberia Searches for Missing American,” New York Times , September 2, 2003.

106 market in U.S. weapons.437 They also traced some of the mortar rounds to Guinea, including one that hit the U.S. Embassy building in Monrovia and resulted in a U.S. demarche to the government of Guinea.438 A U.S. State Department spokesperson publicly called on Guinea to halt any movement of arms or troops across its borders.439

1.6.1.1. The French Connection

Throughout the Cold War, French authorities made extensive use of business networks in the former French colonies to transfer arms secretly. As the only world power with a permanent military presence in several ‘independent’ African countries, successive governments in France kept a close eye on the arms supply and military support of its preferred heads of state. When discretion was needed in supplying political clients, the private networks of Jacques Foccart and the influential lobbies and private intelligence structures of oil companies or French commodity traders could be activated. They tried to make sure developments in the newly independent states would stay in line with the interests of the former colonial power Until his death in 1997, Foccart, the mysterious architect and broker of French Africa policy since de Gaulle, maintained an obscure web of former intelligence and military experts for this purpose. These were people, often recruited from the French Foreign Legion or veterans of the de-colonization war.440

In 2002, traffickers acquired 5,000 AK-47s from Yugoslavian army stocks and moved them from Serbia to Liberia under the guise of a legal transaction with Nigeria. One of the

437Cfr. Human Rights Watch interviews with U.S diplomatic sources. See also, Weiner, “U.S. Embassy in Liberia…,” New York Times . According to that article: “During the fighting in July, American-made M-81 mortars fired by the rebels fell on the embassy's grounds. The source of those missiles is now under investigation; they may have come from the armed forces of neighboring Guinea, which trained some of the rebels.” 438 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interview with a U.S. diplomatic source. 439 Cfr.“US condemns Liberian rebel shelling, urges halt to offensive on Monrovia,” AFP. The exact comment was: “We would also remind the leaders of Guinea and neighboring states of the international obligations and responsibilities to control their borders and prevent the flow of weapons and combatants into Liberia. 440 Cfr.Roger Faligot & Pascal Krop, La piscine: Les services secrets francais 1944-1984(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985); see also Antoine Glaser & Stephen Smith, Ces Messieurs Afrique, Vol. 1 & 2 (Paris: Calman- Lévy, 1992 for Vol. 1; 1997 for Vol. 2).

107 planes used in this shipment came from Ukraine and made a refueling stop in Libya while on its route.441

1.6.2. Trafficking Methods

In 2002, the Small Arms Survey gave a statistical approximated that some 638.9 million SALW were in circulation including roughly 241.6 million military firearms, 22 million shoulder-fired rocket launchers and about 781,000 mortars. And approximately 378 million of that total was believed to be in civilian hands.442 Although sometime SALW are traded through different channels, it was, is and will be a boom -rang business estimated to be around $ 5 billion a year- $4 billion in legal sales and $ 1billion in illicit sales. It is therefore not surprising that in such beneficial business, national governments can be transparent to publish statistics on the sale or transfer of light weapons or release information about the sales activities of private companies.

According to SAS, defines legal transfer as one that conforms to International Law and the national law of the importing and exporting states while an illicit transfer violates those laws. Although there so many doubts and ambiguities and its loopholes, it becomes more demanding to categorize a sale as legal or illicit. An example can be illustrated by some sales under national export law but violate international humanitarian or human rights law443. The trade of SALW takes the following trend: Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels, illicit and black-market channels of one sort or another.

1.6.2.1. Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels

In addition to legal sales and military assistance programs, SALW are disseminated through covert and "gray-market" channels (that is, channels that operate with government

441 Cfr.www.americanprogress.org , (retrieved on 20.02.2015). 442 Cfr. Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting Human Cost, London; Oxford University Press, 2002, p.104. 443 R.T. Naylor, ‘The structure and operation of the modern arms black market’, in Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Micheal T .Klare, and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Science, 1995, p.48; Graduate Institute of International Studies, SAS, 2003: Development Denied, London; Oxford University Press, 2003, p.13, SAS, 2002, pp.66, 109, and 111, Box 3.1.

108 support even though in violation of official government policy), most often by government intelligence agencies or private companies linked to such agencies.444 Another form of gray-market transfers entails the delivery of weapons from government stockpiles to political entities and ethnic militias associated with the ruling clan or party most often they ‘exploit the weakness of national and international laws or policy being put in place.

1.6.2.2. Illicit and Black-Market Channels

The third major category of light weapons transfers includes illegal sales through black- market channels, the supply of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal sanctions, and the theft of arms from government stocks or private citizens. In past years, there has been a striking growth in the operations of black-market dealers to satisfy the needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal conflicts. Because such actors are normally barred from purchases on the legal munitions market, they must acquire their weaponry from illicit sources. The growing number of UN arms embargoes has also produced an increased demand for black-market arms. Although it is impossible to estimate the value or scale of all such transactions.445

The general result of the combination of new arms dealers and the spread of underground economic activity is that covert arms deals are likely to take place within a matrix of black- market transactions. Weapons were sold for cash; countertraded for grain. The deals was also transacted by go-betweens who are equally at home in smuggling natural resources as mentioned above. The payments were done through a series of coded bank accounts in the name of a global network of ghost companies and are protected by the banking and corporate secrecy laws of one or several of the many financial havens around the world.446

The complexity of these networks makes it impossible not only to address the illicit trade in arms but also the varied networks operate in many different countries with an international cast of characters. Always staying one step ahead of the law, these networks

444Cfr. www.armscontrol.org, (retrieved 18.10.2014). 445 Cfr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, (eds.) The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, p. 9. 446 Cfr. Ibidem.

109 are conduits for a wide variety of goods and services. But who are these dealers and how do they operate? Through Arms Dealers. This include financiers, freight forwardness and corrupt government official who are well coordinated internationally and nationally. These brokers do carry out their missions in different forms and locations. Most of them taking advantage of the poor legislation in some countries. This has favored the manipulations of the law.

1.6.2.3. Arms Brokers

During the Cold War, governments utilized private arms brokers to facilitate covert arms deals. These arms traffickers, however, did not disappear when the Cold War ended, and the pipelines they developed remained operational to this day. The central orchestrator is the arms broker, or the middleman involved in “negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating the transfers of weapons.”447 Brokers can avoid capture and prosecution by performing their functions from within the confines of a house or hotel room in any country that does not legislate against brokering.448 So how can we define arms brokers?

Loretta Bondi and Elise Keppler defined arms brokers as ‘private individual(s) or Company (ies) that act as an intermediary between supplier and a recipient of weapons to facilitate an arms transaction in return for a fee.449

The arms trade in Liberia has been shaped by a number of factors, including historical events, a multitude of sources and networks, and a dearth of prosecutions. First, the demise of the Soviet Union provided a lucrative opportunity and an established infrastructure for arms brokers.450 Small arms and military transport aircraft became widely available as they

447 Arms Brokers: Brokering Controls, Int’l Action Network on Small Arms, www.iansa.org/ issues/arms_brokers.htm (retrieved on 5.Feb. 5, 2009). 448 Interview with Johan Peleman, Frontline, (PBS television broadcast May 2002) transcript at www.stimson.org/ fopo/?SN=FP20050314794 (Retrieved on 8. May 2015). 449 Cfr. Loretta Bondi and Elise Keppler, Costing the net: The implications of the US law on brokering’ (The Fund for Peace, January 8, 2001, p.48. 450 Cfr. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Security for a New Century: Study Group Report, 1, Oct. 19, 2007, Cfr: www.stimson.org/images/Merchant%20of%20 Death.doc (Retrieved on 13.May.2015).

110 were relatively unattended or not needed, thus ending up in the hands of profiteers willing to sell to the highest bidder.451

Arms brokers thus acquired “fully operational systems of clandestine transport, replete with money channels, people who understood how to use them, and, most important, established shipping pipelines”.452 The logistical pipelines once used by the Soviet bloc countries were transformed into tools for individual weapons brokers.453 These channels served specific purposes in the illegal arms trade, from supplying once legitimate weapons stockpiles to the grey and black markets, to providing government contacts willing to sell falsified end-user certificates454 that provided the cover of legitimacy to an illicit arms shipment455. These falsified documents facilitated the brokers’ acquisition of arms from sanctioned dealers, as well as their sale to a diverse customer base that spanned from governments to rebels.456

Second, the vast number of sources in the arms trade hinders effective control of the weapons trade in Africa generally and Liberia specifically. Many of the weapons are left over from the Cold War era, during this period large amounts of arms were sent to rebel movements; other states, seeking to further their position, the rebel groups and governments, continued to instigate such traffic.457 Most weapons have been likely traded from one hand to another many times over several decades, either through seizure or theft from owners, captured or killed soldiers, or the sale by individual soldiers to competing groups.458 Liberia specifically has experienced a flow of weapons from governments and armed rebel groups in surrounding countries that had a stake in arming one faction or

451 Cfr. Ibidem., 452 Herman J. Cohen, Former Asst. Secrecy of State for African Affairs, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the Truth & Reconciliation Community of Liberia 19 ( June 12, 2008, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A.) (transcript on file with the author). 453 Cfr. Loretta Bondi & Elise Keppler, pp. 18-19. 454 An End User Certificate is a “universally required document that permits a weapons manufacturer or a state to legally ship a specified number of weapons to a non-sanctioned state through a specified shipping firm.” (Cfr. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Security for a New Century: Study Group Report 1, Oct. 19, 2007). 455 Peter Landesman, Arms and the Man, N.Y. Times Magazine, August. 17, 2003. 456 Cfr. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Security for a New Century: Study Group Report 1, Oct. 19, 2007. 457 Cfr. Matt Schroeder & Guy Lamb, The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise, 1 African. Analyst Q. 70-7 (2006). 458 Cfr. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, op.cit., pp.71, 75-78.

111 another for political purposes. For example, there was an evidence of the transfer of Chinese arms to Liberia, including “Chinese-made AK-47s, machine guns and rocket- propelled grenade launchers”.459

1.6.2.3.1. China arms transfer

China has long been one of the world’s most significant exporters of SALW.460 It remains a key supplier for states seeking inexpensive SALW and is currently benefitting from a period in which many importing states are trying to diversify their sources of supply. It is also among the least transparent SALW exporters, as it provides official information on neither the volume nor the value of authorized SALW exports or deliveries. At the same time, China formally recognizes the destabilizing effects that SALW transfers can have on peace and security, economic development and social stability and has committed itself to preventing the illicit trade in SALW. However, some of China’s decisions on SALW exports and the level of care it shows in preventing illicit transfers have raised concerns regarding their potentially negative impact on peace, security and governance.461 From the mid-1990s the global community began to pay greater attention to SALW, and to regard them as the most destabilizing conventional weapons. A key step in this process was the 1997 report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on SALW.462

This led to the 2001 UN SALW Conference and the drafting of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (PoA). The POA was adopted at the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001.463 It outlines a set of measures for states to

459 Amnesty Int’l, People’s Republic of China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses – the Flow of Arms Accelerates 13, AI Index ASA 17/030/2006, June. 11, 2006,Cfr: www. asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA 170302006?open&of=ENG-390; , www.trial-ch.org/en/trial watch/profile/db/legal-procedures/guus_vankouwenhoven_ 289.html (Retrieved on 4. Feb. 2009). 460 Cfr. Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p.22. 461 Cfr. MARK BROMLEY, MATHIEU DUCHÂTEL AND PAUL HOLTOM, China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, SIPRI Policy Paper 38 October 2013. 462 Cfr. United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, Note by the Secretary-General, annex to A/52/298, 27 Aug. 1997. China was not represented on the panel. 463 Cfr. United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15, 20 July 2001.

112 implement at the international, regional and national levels in order to counter the illicit trade in SALW.464

During this decade attention began to focus on the appearance of Chinese SALW in conflict zones in sub-Saharan Africa. The Chinese Type-56 assault rifle coupled with the above (AK-47) were found in a number of conflicts in East, West and , although in many cases these items had been diverted from their initial end-use by African states or recycled between conflict areas.465 However, China was also a direct source of SALW supplies for conflicting parties.466 Attention has focused on the correlations between natural resources for China’s growing economy and its recipients of arms, with suggestions that China is targeting resource-rich states in the hope of securing access to energy and raw materials467 of which Liberia falls a victim as we have discussed above.

Another significant but less discussed source of weapons in Liberia, is unauthorized gunsmiths who had the capacity to manufacture an estimated 200,000 small arms annually.468 The 1996-97 disarmament reveals the high numbers of weapons present during the first conflict. The disarmament, which lasted from November 22, 1996, until February 9, 1997469, resulted in the registration of approximately 10,000 weapons and some 1.24 million rounds of ammunition. Subsequent disarmament activities resulted in the surrender

464 On the POA Cfr. Holtom, P. and Bromley, M., Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring from Existing Mechanisms, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 28 (SIPRI: Stockholm, July 2011), pp. 8–10. 465Cfr. Fruchart, D. et al., United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behavior, (SIPRI/Uppsala University: Stockholm/Uppsala, 2007). 466 Cfr. Wood, B. and Peleman, J., Brokering arms for genocide, (eds.) B. Wood and J. Peleman, The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents (PRIO: Oslo, 2000). 467 Cfr. Taylor, I., China’s oil diplomacy in Africa, International Affairs, vol. 82, n°. 5 (Sep. 2006), p. 949; and US Department of Defense (DOD), Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009 (DOD: Washington, DC, Mar. 2009), p.3; Cfr. also Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T. and Béraud-Sudreau, L., Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 30 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Dec. 2011), pp. 14–15. 468 Matt Schroeder & Guy Lamb, The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise, 1 Afr. Analyst Q. 70-71(2006). 469 Cfr. Liberia UNOMIL Background, August 1999, August 1993: ECOMOG deployment, United Nations actions on Liberia, Massacre of civilians, Cotonou Peace Agreement, www.un.org/ Dept s/dpko/dpko/co _mission/unomil F T. htm#AUGUST (last visited 5. Feb.2009)(An ECOMOG-headed committee, including UNOMIL and representatives of the transitional government and fighting factions, oversaw the disarmament planning).

113 of additional weapons. Of an estimated 33,000 combatants, the program demobilized 21,315, including 4,360 children and 250 women.470

Third, international efforts to stem the illicit arms trade to Liberia proved largely ineffective. U.N. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) established an embargo on all weapons and military equipment shipments to Liberia. The sanctions were relatively successful in blocking participation by the legitimate arms-selling market, such as the large U.S. and European weapons manufacturers. Overall, however, the embargo proved to be less effective as the demand for weapons in Liberia and surrounding nations increased while traditional supply channels were cut off. This economic reality caused the grey and black markets to be flooded with weapons from various sources.471 From 1989 to 2003, a number of countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Russia, Libya, and Nigeria, were involved along the chain of illicit arms trade to Liberia.472 Furthermore, not even one person has been successfully prosecuted as a culprit for violating the terms of the embargo.473

470 An additional 458 weapons and 25,000 ammunition pieces were surrendered at stations kept operational beyond February 9, and 3,759 weapons were handed in at places other than the official stations. Help Desk for Practical Disarmament—Stories—Liberia, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Cfr: www. bicc.de/helpdesk/stories/liberia.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). In the lead-up to the July 19 election, ECOMOG searches turned up approximately 3,750 weapons and 152,500 ammunition rounds. Human Rights Watch , World Report 1998, at 46 (1997), www.hrw.org/en/node/79288. 471 Cfr. Claudette Torbey, The Most Egregious Arms Broker: Prosecuting Arms Embargo Violators in the International Criminal Court, 25 Wis. Int’l L.J. 335, 336 (2007). The grey market is defined as the distribution of legal goods through streams of commerce that are unauthorized by the maker. Economicexpert.com, Grey Market, www.economicexpert.com/a/ Grey:market.html (last visited June 9, 2009). While many countries have laws governing the distribution and import of weapons by weapons manufacturers, only 40 countries have laws governing weapons brokering. Matt Schroeder & Rachel Stohl, Arms Control Association, Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse, June 2006, www.armscontrol.org/ act/2006_06/Small Arms Feature (citing Biting the Bullet, International Action on Small Arms 472 And Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (2003) [hereinafter Usual Suspects]; Int’l Crisis Group, Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, (2002),www. crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1533 (Retrieved on 11.May.2015); For examples Cfr. Emmanuel Kwesi, Aning, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia and West Africa 12 (Danish Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper 97. 4 Jun. 1997). 473 Interview with Tom Of Cansky, Frontline (PBS television broadcast May 2002), transcript at www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/ ofcansky.html, op.cit. In 2005, Dutch officials charged van Kouwenhoven with war crimes committed in Liberia and with violation of the U.N. Security Council arms sanctions under Resolution 1343. The trial court convicted and sentenced van Kouwenhoven to eight years’ imprisonment for breaching the U.N. embargo, but the conviction was overturned on appeal. The Dutch prosecution intends to appeal. The court found van Kouwenhoven not guilty of war crimes due to evidentiary

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Overall, few statements reference the role of economic actors in the conflict, and the majority of those that do so are primarily in the context of seeking refuge. One statement giver reflected on foreign companies’ general disregarded Liberia’s development. He stated that foreign investors in Liberia “keep all the desirable jobs for their own nationals, and give only menial work to the Liberians.”474 If given the opportunity, however, Liberians would quickly learn the technical aspects of the investment activities.475 He concluded by faulting the Liberian government for being so anxious to bring in foreign investment that it failed to impose conditions to bring about technology transfer to Liberian nationals. Other statements referring to economic actors focused on their connection to development rather than their role in the conflict. For example, one statement giver testified: Liberia was the largest producer of natural rubber in the world; yet the profit from the country’s resources were being stolen instead of reinvested in development, infrastructure and education…With a small population of 5.1 or 5.2 million, Liberia’s vast natural resources should be more than enough to support a small population and provide well for them. The way multinational companies treated Liberia made it into a sort of “American colony.”476

In addition, over the last fifteen years after the Cold War, the world’s black markets like the world’s legal markets have become increasingly globalized. And as the various methods of transporting goods have become more integrated, traffickers became quite adept at utilizing these networks for illicit means. Specialists in the arms trade have found that “cross-border mergers between airlines, marketing alliances, leasing, chartering, franchising and offshore registration of fleets, crews, and companies, all make it even more difficult to monitor and regulate the airspace and freighting industry.”477

In an effort to move their products without detection, brokers have come to rely primarily on counterfeit documents or legitimate documents acquired through bribery and on issues. Trial Watch Guus van Kouwenhoven, www.trial-ch.org/ en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal- procedures/guus van- kouwenhoven_289.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 474 TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1351. 475 Cfr. Ibidem., 476 Ibidem., 477 STOHL, Rachel. The tangled web of illicit arms trafficking. Terror in the Shadows: Trafficking in Money, Weapons, and People, (Washington DC) ,2004.

115 corruptible officials. They transport weapons using their false documents like bills of lading, fake end-use certificates, and incomplete manifests roundabout routes and “friendly” transshipment countries. They often disguise their weapons shipments as humanitarian aid or other supplies.478

Some Experts believe, moreover, that gone are the days when only veteran soldiers, former arms company executives, ex-intelligence operatives, or even war correspondents were arms brokers, after Cold War there is generation of arms dealers who spend their entire lives learning the intricacies of black-market methods and putting the newest technologies to use.479

Fortunately, it seems that arms brokers are finally getting the attention that they deserve from the international community. Approximately twenty three countries have passed anti- brokering legislation, and steps are being taken to address brokering at the international level through U.N. panels and processes. But such steps are late in coming. Arms brokers have been able to operate because many governments have thus far been unwilling to oversee the activities of arms brokers or arrest brokers and break up the existing trafficking networks. In addition to weak domestic controls of arms brokers by individual governments, arms brokers have benefited from poor border controls and lack of international cooperation.480 The whereabouts of several notorious arms brokers were well- known, but the lack of cooperation between countries had allowed these illegal actors to move freely around the countries in which they lived. Victor Bout, for example, lived in Moscow and was able to operate his clandestine businesses with impunity.

1.7. The Effects Of Arms Proliferation In Liberia

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law violations report about SALW proliferation effects. Before we tackle this issue, one question that we can pose is, where and what was the role of U.S in Liberia political turmoil more so from 1989-2003 yet Liberian constitution was based on US model?

478 Cfr. Ibidem., 479 Cfr. Ibidem., 480 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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The incursion of the NPFL in December 1989, the wheels of US diplomacy once again started whirring. The State Department finally had ‘a problem it could get it teeth into’, as Herman Cohen put it. Taylor kept in contact with USA about his progress and initially at least, his forces seemed to be treating US citizens and US property correctly. The key concern for the USA was to put the $400 million-plus worth of US strategic and communications assets at risk by pushing Doe too hard and too soon, while at the same time ensuring that his successor initially presumed to be Charles Taylor would be stable and reliable enough to maintain them after taking over. Also, there were about 5,000 US citizens in Liberia at the start of 1990, and, while initially only recommending and facilitating departures, the US embassy had not deemed it necessary or appropriate to order an evacuation.481 As the civil war raged on and the security of Monrovia and its large vulnerable civilian population was clearly threatened, the US embassy was still sufficiently interested in seeking a solution of some kind that it welcomed the Nigerian ECOWAS plan, which in effect took up the negotiations with Doe where the USA had left off a month before.482

Diplomatically, Washington was now a passive observer in Liberian diplomacy. It was in summer of 1990 and the USA was expending its diplomatic capital in securing UN security Council votes for invasion of Kuwait, following the Iraqi invasion of its smaller neighbor. Cote d’Ivoire, the principal opponent of the ECOMOG intervention plan among West African states, was one of the members of Security Council at the time and the USA wanted to be sure of its support. For the White House, there were “ bigger fish to fry” than Liberia and so the USA reverted to a neutral status in the Liberian discussions, whilst publicly supporting any moves towards a peaceful solution. Furthermore, there was the added bonus of being able to encourage ‘African-led solutions to African problems’, a concept which was already gaining popularity in Western circles at the time and which would become almost the mantra of the non-interventionists in future African catastrophes,

481 Cfr. Colin, op.cit, p.289. 482 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.292.

117 following the US debacle in Somalia in 1992 and the UN’s ignominious retreat in the face of genocide in Rwanda in 1994.483

In the case of Monrovia, the USA had its force on the ground, or just off the coast, and in position to send in its marines to end the bloodshed and starvation that racked the city. It forgot completely the Responsibility to Protect. What increased beyond doubt was that, with the Cold War mass suffering resulting from the civil conflict in Liberia were of minimal importance in America foreign policy. There was little incentive to intervene, except on humanitarian grounds and even then the USA preferred to play its part only as a supporter of others, not as a principal actor. But the USA had financed and condoned the rule of a brutal torturing, murderous dictator in Liberia for a decade and turned a blind eye to his gross human rights violations throughout the 1980s, so Liberians and international observers alike were justified in questioning the logic of US policy and its seeming inconsistency.484

The August 1990 war against Iraq ensured that US attention would irrevocably be turned away from West African allies towards striving for success in its new military adventure in the Middle East. Not unlike Saddam Hussein, who enjoyed US support during his long war in the 1980s against Iran,485 even up to within a year or two of the his invasion of Kuwait, official America turned from being an ally of Taylor to an enduring adversary in a relatively short period of time.

Understanding the effects of small arms in and on societies goes to the heart of the motivation for SALW: what harm is caused by the proliferation and misuse of these weapons, who are the most affected, and what are the circumstances under which they caused harm? Research goes beyond deaths and injuries to individuals to include the full range of impacts on societies.

483 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.293. 484 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.297. 485 Operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s..Regan/Bush administrations permitted and frequently encouraged the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq’. (Cfr. Ted Koppel, ABC Nightline, 1 July 1992).

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Human Rights Watch investigations (2002) on the Liberian government revealed that human rights violations were being perpetrated with impunity. As a result of Liberia’s proliferation of SALW that fuelled up the conflict, resulting into Human rights and humanitarian law violations among others include: Forced displacement, food as weapon for war, wide spread looting and pillaging, restriction of movement, collective punishment, Taking of hostages and Outrages upon personal dignity, Forced labor, Summary executions, Threats Attacks against civilians, Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and medical personnel, and Child soldiers.

1.7.1. Forced Displacement

Those living within Greater Liberia, particularly Nimba County, experienced particularly intense fighting and hardship as the NPFL pushed forward its offensive. The insurgency resulted in massive displacement, and it is estimated that approximately half of Liberia’s population was displaced in 1990s,486 an amorphous array of warlords and renegade combatants (estimated at about 33,000) succeeded in holding the Liberian population hostage, whilst perpetrating horrendous atrocities. As a consequence, an estimated 200,000 people were killed, while another 700,000 were forced to flee the country and seek refuge in neighboring states, leaving approximately 1.5 million internally displaced. In socio- political terms, the protracted conflict polarized Liberian society, reducing most to ferreting for survival or fleeing the country. This deepened the already strained ethnic fault lines of the society, leading to alliances such as that between the Mandingo and Krahn, against the Congo, Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Further societal fracturing characterized relations between political parties, which proliferated to over 13, all significantly based on ethnic lines.487

486 Cfr. Dep’t of State Country Reports 1990, op.cit., p. 193. 487 Cfr. Human Right Watch, Flight from Terror, May 1990.

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In some cases, rebels used forced displacement as a technique to clear the area for their occupation. Statements reveal how combatants displaced entire villages by forcing residents to march long distances from home.488

“1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.” Art. 17, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol II.

1.7.2. Food as a Weapon of War

The NPFL offensive resulted in food shortage, particularly in the early years of the war.489 One statement giver described how Taylor forced people to join the conflict by threatening to cut off food supplies if they did not participate490. He stated that Taylor told a group of displaced people that, if they joined him, they would “get food; if not, no food.”491. Another statement giver stated that child soldiers refused to let them harvest food because of their belief that the villagers, especially older women, would turn into feline spirits at night and harm the rebels.492

“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the

488 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 36. 489 Food shortages were at their worst levels in the first year of the war, with some improvement over subsequent years. (Cfr. Robert M. Press, In Rebel-Controlled Areas, Human Rights Abuses Persist, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 4, 1992, at 11). This was due largely to the fact that there were fewer mouths to feed in later years. However, disease became increasingly worse with each year. 490 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 1338 491 Ibidem., 492 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22.

120 survival of the civilian population such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” Art. 14, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.3. Widespread Looting

Rebel factions did not have central supplies and so pillaged basic necessities for sustenance.493 A statement giver reported that fighters regularly participated in organized raids against civilians called “food attacks” or “clothes attacks” whenever they found their supplies were getting low.494

Pillage and threats to commit pillage are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)(g)-(h), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ,and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.4. Restrictions on Movement

The NPFL subjected residents of Greater Liberia to a myriad of restrictions on their movement and privacy during the first few years of the war.495 Travel restrictions and checkpoints were prevalent in NPFL territory. NPFL fighters enjoyed wide freedom of movement and could visit Monrovia,496 civilians, by contrast, needed to obtain a pass from G-2 (Taylor’s intelligence and administrative center) to travel within NPFL territory.497

The “taking of hostages” and threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2) (c), Protocol Additional to

493 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22. 494 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 26. 495 Cfr. Countryside, for example, a person carrying letters through a checkpoint would be required to surrender them to soldiers. (Cfr. Human Rights Watch, The Cycle of Abuse: Human Rights Violations since the November Cease- Fire, Oct. 21, 1991 (hereinafter The Cycle of Abuse), www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/liberia/ (Retrieved on 22.Mar. 2015). 496Cfr. Ibidem., 497 Cfr. Edward Cody, Revenge Drives Liberian Rebels; Young Insurgents Rule by Gun in Chaotic Countryside, Wash. Post, July 14, 1990, at A1.

121 the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.5. Collective punishments

Collective punishments and threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)

(b), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Protected persons include those who are not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. Id. at Art. 4(1)

1.7.6. Taking of hostages and Outrages upon personal dignity

“Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault” and any threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.7. Forced labor

“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.” Art. 8(3)(a), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

498 1.7.8. Summary executions

“No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.” Art. 6(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva

498 A summary execution is a variety of execution in which a person is accused of a crime and then immediately killed without benefit of a full and fair trial. This includes show trials, but is usually understood to mean capture, accusation, and execution all conducted during a very short span of time relative to the severity of the punishment.

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Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.9. Threats Attacks against civilians

Protected persons include those not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. Art. 4(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

1.7.9.1. Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and medical personnel

“Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all available help for the performance of their duties…In the performance of their duties medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on medical grounds.”

Art. 9, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).

1.7.9.2. Child soldier

One of the heart wrenching consequences of the conflicts in Liberia included the use of child soldiers in conflicts. As per the United Nations, the definition of a child soldier includes: Any child - boy or girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried weapons.499

499 Cfr. UNICEF 1997, 8.

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In addition, Wessells “emphasizes war as a source of opportunities for children, who willingly join armed groups to obtain things like protection, a sense of family, education and training, power, money, or a sense of purpose, among others denied to them in civilian life”500. Children are vulnerable and easily malleable and in times of conflict, additional factors can contribute to their recruitment as soldiers including poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and ideology, and culture and tradition.501

Adolescence is a time of vulnerability with the uncertainties and turbulence of physical, mental and emotional development. It is also a time of opportunities with greater freedom, developing understanding of one’s own identity and place in the community and society, and a new capacity to make choices and to take on responsibilities.502

In 2005, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers reported 8,000 children were fighting as soldiers with 20,000 more estimated to be involved in Disarmament Developmental Rehabilitation (DDR) programs throughout West Africa.503 In Liberia, NPFL and the ULIMO consistently used children under the age of eighteen, including thousands of children, including thousands of children under fifteen.504

The estimate of child soldiers used in Liberia is between five and fifteen thousand with children making up anywhere between 25-75 percent of the fighting forces. In Liberia, “enterprising strongmen found that cultivating a personnel following among people exploited in the past, especially youth, offers them better prospects for personal gain than does loyalty to old patrons”.505 “Modern-day conflicts are particularly lethal for children because little or no practical distinction is made between combatants and civilians”. Taylor used child soldiers to form a special unit called the “Small Boys Unit”.

500 Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers from Violence to Protection, Harvard University Press, 2006, p.31. 501 Cfr. Brett and Specht Irma Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, n° 4, 2004. 502 Cfr. Ibidem., 503 Cfr. Coalition 2006, 1. 504 Cfr. Human Rights Watch 2004, 1. 505 Reno, op.cit., p.494.

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1.7.9.3. Policy Implications for Child Soldiers

In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989 CRC) resulting in legal and policy initiatives that cover child trafficking, labor, prostitution, abduction, imprisonment, health, education, discipline, family relations and freedom of expression.506

Art 3. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.

Besides the 1989 CRC, additional policies should consider International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Laws (IHRL), specifically the fundamental rules that protect civilians in situations of armed conflict (Art 23-24). While IHL and IHRL focus on all civilians, the 1989 CRC details guidelines for special treatment for children civilians, giving them additional protection and assistance against indecent assault, health, and family rights (Art, 35-37).

Additional provisions within the 1989 CRC focus on child combatants and ensuring they are not subject to the “death penalty for offences related to the conflict which were committed when they were under 18” (Art 47).

506 Cfr. www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx, (retrieved, on 12.10.2015).

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In 2000, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol on the Rights of Children, specifically Child Soldiers and children in armed conflict, designed to protect children from the recruitment into armed forces and labor trafficking (UNHCHR, Article 2). Besides highlighting children’s rights during and after conflict, the 1989 CRC also developed rules for the prevention of the use of child soldiers in conflict, specifically focused on recruitment. “Although strictly speaking, neither conscription nor deployment of children aged 15 to 17 is illegal (except in those countries that have ratified treaties such as the 2000 Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers), such activities could be in breach of the prohibition on employing children in work harmful to their health or dangerous to life” (Art 49).

On the first day the Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly, 61 countries signed the protocol. “Currently, 126 countries have ratified the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 130 States have ratified the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography” (HREA 2009, par. 12). With signing the Optional Protocol, nations agree to look at national legislation is guaranteed the rights as outlined in the protocol such as the right to life, education and special treatment (Ibid., par. 2-4).

Conclusion

It was not only the regime of Charles Taylor that exploited Liberia and its neighboring West African countries, people and their resources, for power and wealth. These countries did not suffer only tremendous loss of life, as many hundreds of thousands were killed throughout the region, but the countries also suffered from providing many basic human rights needs including shelter, security, healthcare, and education. Taylor retained his power and wealth through cultivated relationships with other heads of state and commercial organizations assisting in the exploitation of resources as we have discussed above in this chapter. The Inter relations provided not only resources to sell goods, but also provided weapons to different rebel groups.

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Most of the revenues from trade was used to buy and smuggle weapons that contributed to the devastating prolonged conflicts and hostilities to such an extent of destabilizing other governments across and within the region.

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CHAPTER FOUR

0.0 EFFORTS AND IMPACT TO CONTROL THE INFLUX OF SALW ( ARMS CONTROL) IN WEST AFRICA.

Originally, ‘arms control’ was meant to denote rules for limiting arms competition (mainly nuclear) rather than reversing it to SALW. The term had a distinct connotation from arms reduction or disarmament. Subsequently, however, a wide range of measures have come to be included under the rubric of arms control, in particular those intended to:

a) freeze, limit , reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons;

b) prevent certain military activities;

c) regulate the deployment of armed forces;

d) proscribe transfers of some military important items;

e) reduce the risk of accidental war;

f) constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war;

g) build up confidence among states through greater openness in military matters. Today the term ‘arms control’ is often used interchangeably with ‘arms regulation,’ ‘arms limitation’ and even ‘disarmament’.507

1.1 Agreements

Arms control can take various forms: it can be a cease fire or armistice arrangements following armed conflicts. It can also be imposed upon defeated countries by peace treaties. However, an ‘arms control agreement’ is an agreement among sovereign states freely arrived at a time of peace through a process of formal inter-governmental negotiations; it must provide for both mutual rights and mutual obligations. This agreement may also be bilateral or multilateral. In the latter category, several existing agreements are

507 Josef, Goldblat, Arms Control, a guide to Negotiations and Agreements, University Press, Great Britain,1994, p.3.

128 of a regional nature, valid for a specific geographical zone or continent. Agreements vary in form- from Treaties, Conventions, Protocols or Documents, to Guide lines, Memoranda, Declarations or Common Understandings, to Statutes, Charters and Binding decisions of International Bodies or Final acts of International Conferences, to joint or simultaneous statements by governments, exchanges of letters or notes among the concerned.508

1.2. Function of arms control

Arms control may: reduce the risk of war started by ‘accident’; slow down global and regional arms races; increase predictability in the relations among opposing parties, race or states and reduce fears of the intentions of a political adversary; minimize the disparities between heavily and lightly armed states and thus remove important source of instability; encourage worrying parties to resort to peaceful means in solving their disputes; save resources needed for economic and social development; mitigate the destruction and suffering in armed conflicts which may break out despite negotiated arms limitations; diminish the dangers to the environment; and promote trust and better understanding between or among the conflicting parties.509

In the conflict areas of Liberia, the above were not considered as important factors. This is because the armed state non-actors such as RUF and the many factions that fought in Liberia were often presented as lacking resemblance to any recognizable patterns of armed resistance or political conflict. This view, popularized in many media outlets such as CNN, also had its equivalent in the academic debate and particularly in the so- called “greed and grievance”510 literature that dominated the mainstream of this field at the beginning of twenty-first millennium. For scholars who took this position say that the two countries along Mano River Basin (Liberia and Sierra Leone), were resource war, fought not over political issues, but to gain access to profits.511

508 Cfr. Ibidem., 509 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.5. 510 Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone, (eds.), Greed and Grievances; Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 2000. 511 Cfr. Collier, Paul Economic Causes of Civil War, Washington , DC: World Bank, 2000.

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One of the factors that contributed substantially to the lethality and prolonged conflict in the sub-region (Mano River Basin) was uncontrolled proliferation and trafficking of SALW and the consequent "weaponization" of entire societies across the sub-region. From these two phenomena emerged another bleak reality in West Africa, in which children were combatants and the proliferation of rogue young combatants operating as regional mercenaries, for whom war had become both a "profession" and the most practical way of life as we saw in previous chapter.

Numerous international and regional programs aspired to reduce the flow of weapons into sub Saharan Africa. These initiatives had succeeded only in documenting the devastating impact that arms transfers have on Africa continent.

In terms of conceptualization and initiation, the UN, AU and ECOWAS have been front runners in the search for possible solution to the scourge of SALW proliferations. West African states, for have participated in arms control initiatives at regional level through ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP) and ECOWAS moratorium. Other initiatives are; the African Union and the Bamako Declaration, the UN firearms protocol and the UN action on the control of SALW, SADC Protocol on firearms, ammunition and other related materials, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) agreement and Nairobi protocol for the prevention, reduction and control of SALW.

The consequences of continued insecurity and strife, as well as the widespread proliferation and trafficking of SALW, made it impossible for the fifteen ECOWAS Member-States to show indifference. Even when they had declared and observed neutrality, friendly and unfriendly states alike came to terms with the droves of refugees, unacceptable numbers of civilian casualties, militarization of borders and cross-border crimes including arms trafficking. This effectively implies that a crisis in any one country necessarily affects the other, and that the collective security of the West African sub region can best be anchored on, and coordinated by, sub-regional mechanisms. The state of conflict in the sub-region had predictably negative consequences on the structural stability of states, human security and economic and social development. As a consequence, at

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International level, we shall examine the role of UN in its general and particular effort in SALW control.

1.3. The Un General Overview on SALW Control

As Arms transfers and trafficking continued to be a spiral, in part, the international community had not effectively enforced United Nations sanctions, criminalized embargo violations, penalized financial institutions that act as conduits for weapons purchases, failed to promote indigenous controls over African arms production and sales to countries under UN arms embargoes, or taken actions against countries that serve as arms transshipment points.512

The UN remained at the forefront of efforts to restrain the spread of SALW. Building on its earlier initiatives which called for action to combat illicit trade and the criminal misuse of SALW, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of 1991 “Creation of an Effective United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program”,513 adopted a number of resolutions over recent years calling for a range of actions at all levels.

Resolution 46/36 H of December 6, 1991 called on states to curb illicit trafficking in arms by insuring better control over stocks and transfers, and by encouraging work at all levels to harmonize relevant laws and procedures. This resolution contained a list of indicative measures to be implemented at the state, regional, and international level.

Resolution 50/70 B of December 12, 1995 “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN”,514 requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to prepare a report on the nature and causes of problems of small arms. The panel of 16 nations was established and first convened on June, 24, 1996, and met again in July of 1997. In October

512 Cfr. Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, DC, July 1, 2001. 513 This resolution calls on the UN Disarmament Commission to examine guidelines for the implementation of concrete measures aimed at preventing arms from reaching those who intend to use them to destabilize governments, foment violence and terrorism, and promote narco-trafficking, ordinary and organized crime and/or mercenary activity. 514 This resolution requested the Secretary General to seek the views of member states on the subject of international transfers of small arms and light weapons.

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1997, the panel issued a report that analyzed the nature and causes of small arms problems and provided a number of recommendations for voluntary action by states to address the problem.

Resolution 52/38 J of December 9 ,1997, Report of the Secretary-General. General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms”, “ established a second panel of 23 members, convened in 1998, to review the implementation of the recommendations of the first report, to suggest further measures, and to examine the feasibility of holding an international conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms in all its aspects.

Resolution 54/54V of December 15, 1999 called for an international conference on the “illicit trade in SALW and in all its aspects” during the summer of 2001. The resolution specified that the conference should produce a global action program as its primary output. The conference was scheduled to take place July 9-20, 2001. The first Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) met February 28-March 3, 2000; January 8-19, 2001; and March 20- 30, 2001.

The above reports led to the UNGA resolution on the convening in 2001 of a Conference on the illicit Trade in SALW. In the understanding of the governmental experts, the phrase ‘in all aspects’ included aspects of legal transfers insofar as they were directly related to illicit trafficking and manufacturing of the arms in question. These included: Report on and Firearms Protocol (April 1998) and on Ammunition515 and explosives (June 1999)516.

Before that, in December 1998, in an effort to combat destabilizing accumulations of small arms, EU countries also adopted a legally binding Joint Action on Small Arms. The Joint Action was designed to help stem the spread of small arms by supporting inventory reductions, regional registers, exchanges of information, enhancing national controls, improving education and awareness, and providing incentives to warring factions to

515 Ammunition (colloquially shortened to ammo) is propellant and projectile, or broadly anything that can be used in combat including bombs, missiles, warheads, landmines, naval mines, and anti-personnel mines. The word comes from the French “la munition” which is all material used for war. The collective term for all types of ammunition is munitions. 516 Cfr. Josef Goldblat, Arms Control, a guide to Negotiations and Agreements, op.cit., p.250.

132 surrender and destroy their arms517 this is because members states were more responsible in SALW proliferation among most African states.

To begin with, in the early 1990s, UN imposed arms embargoes against Liberia and Somalia and against various insurgent groups, including the Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and Hutu and ex-Far extremists in Central Africa. But for our particular study, we would like to look at Liberia.

1.4. Arms embargo on Liberia

In November 1992 UN Security Council Resolution 788, adopted unanimously, established an arms embargo on Liberia, though the sanctions committee under the Security Council to monitor its implementation was not formed until UN Security Council resolution 985 in April 1995. This was in reaction to the continued civil conflict in the country. This embargo was ended in March 2001 by UN Security Council resolution 1343. However, resolution 1343 established a new arms embargo that entered into force in May 2001 for a period of 12 months as well as imposing additional sanctions upon Liberia. The arms embargo and sanctions were extended in May 2002 by UN Security Council resolution 1408 for a period of 12 months and again in May 2003 by UN Security Council resolution 1478 for a further 12 months.518

Security Council Resolution 1343 prohibits all States from selling or supplying Liberia with arms and related material and from providing Liberia with technical training to manufacture, maintain, or use arms and related material. The resolution orders the government of Liberia to "immediately cease its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region" by expelling RUF members from its territory and halting financial and military backing to the RUF519.

517 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.253. 518 Cfr. UN Security Council, S/RES/1343, 7, March, 2001. 519 Cfr. UN Imposes Arms Embargo on Liberia Published on Arms Control Association - www.armscontrol.org, (retrieved on 15.03.2015).

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Under the resolution, Liberia would have stopped in trading rough diamonds from Sierra Leone that were not controlled through the ‘certificate of origin’ regime that was currently in place. Developed under a July 2000 Security Council resolution to curb illicit arms for diamonds trafficking, the regime formally certifies Sierra Leone diamonds mined in government-controlled areas and bars all States from importing Sierra Leone diamonds without official documentation.520

Following the resignation of President Charles Taylor, the cessation of the long-running civil war, and the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), the arms embargo was ended in December 2003 by UN Security Council resolution 1521. However, resolution 1521 established a new arms embargo on Liberia. This embargo does not apply to transfers to UNOMIL forces and 'supplies of arms and related material and technical training and assistance intended solely for support of or use in an international training and reform program for the Liberian armed forces and police'. Other prohibitions on transfers to militias and other armed groups remained in force. In December 2005 the embargo was extended for a period of 12 months by UN Security Council resolution 521 1647.

Beyond arms embargoes, the UN and some member States, notably Canada and Great Britain, had advocated a "name and shame" policy. According to UN Secretary by then, General Kofi Annan, the "public identification of international arms merchants" is the single most important tool in combating the arms trafficking problem. On September 24, 1999, the UN Security Council held its first ministerial meeting on small arms; this led to a Security Council presidential statement urging member States to curb arms trafficking. The

UN’s "name and shame" strategy has had no impact on weapons flows. Neither the UN nor any of its member states has focused on Africa’s role in arms trafficking. In particular, there has been no UN action against countries like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; all are major transshipment points for arms shipments to west, central, and eastern Africa. The UN Register of Conventional Arms, which has been in operation since 1993,

520 Cfr. www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_04/briefs, (retrieved on 13. June. 2015) 521 Cfr. UN Security Council, S/RES/1521, 22 December 2003.

134 has received data about weapons sales from 153 nations. However, the response by African states is among the lowest in the world522. This therefore called for reinforcement from African continental leaders and States that formed up what we called OAU by then now AU.

1.5 The African Union

In African continent and its institutions for a long period of time did not put much effort to curb State security and human security as well. The institutions were weak hence did not have quick and positive impact to avert the mentioned. During the Cold War era, traditional State-centered security concepts were obsessed with strategic interest; on the other hand, African institutions and governments rejected any form of conflict intervention for principle reasons: the main aims of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were to promote the Unity and solidarity of the member states and act as collective voice for the for the African continent.

At the end of the era, most Sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly marginalized in international relations, especially in the global economy estimated at the level of 2 percent with exception with some of the rich countries like Nigeria and South Africa. To reintegrate the continent into the global economy and to draw new attention (and aid) from Western countries, enlightened by African leaders launched the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and they replaced the OAU with AU in 2002. The African leaders argued that OAU was unable to deal with Africa’s most pressing issue such as internal wars and the erosion of States’ steering capacities leading in some cases to state failure. The new continent-wide cooperative institutions of the AU can be interpreted as ‘tool’ for the continent to face the “multifaceted challenges” posed by globalization523.

In July 1999, OAU by then, issued a declaration on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons that called for a coordinated African

522 Cfr. US department of State Archive, Information released online from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009. 523 Cfr. Hany Besada, (ed.), Crafting an African Security Architecture, addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in 21st Century, England, 2010, pp.16-7.

135 solution to the arms trafficking problem. In collaboration with the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, the OAU devised the Initiative on Small Arms Proliferation and Africa, designed to raise awareness of the small arms proliferation problem and to facilitate an in depth discussion of the menace it poses. Several sub-regional initiatives aimed to control arms trafficking but they lacked the investigative capabilities and legal authority to enforce strictures against arms trafficking. Among these initiatives is the Bamako declaration.

1.6 The Bamako Declaration

The Bamako Declaration is a continental initiative. It evolved out of the need for a common African approach at the UN Small Arm Conference of 2001. Following a ministerial conference in Bamako (capital city of Mali) held from 30th November to 1st December 2000, it was recommended that the following actions would be undertaken at the national level.524

I. Creation of national coordination agencies for small arms; II. Enhancement of the capacity of national law enforcement and security agencies and officials, including training and upgrading of equipment and resources; III. Destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons; IV. Development and implementation of public awareness programs; and Conclusion of bilateral arrangement for small arms control in common frontier zones.

In addition to the Bamako Declaration, the AU created on 9th July 2002, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union.

524 “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union” Cfr. www.africanunion.org. retrieved on 10th December, 2014; SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007 Yearbook, on Armaments, Disarmament and International security, Oxford University Press, p.14.

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1.6.1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The PSC was not part of the AU Constitutive Act (adopted in Lome´, Togo in July 2001). Rather, it grew out of an ad hoc process to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which had been adopted by the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1993. The Mechanism’s primary objective was the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. This focused on prevention that emerged after a series of intra-African debates in Kampala (1991), Dakar (1992) and Addis Ababa (early 1993), when then the AU members took a conscious decision not to involve the organization in peacekeeping operations. Rather optimistically, they hoped that a focus on preventive diplomacy would dramatically reduce the need for subsequent peacekeeping on the continent. The consensus proved short-lived, however. The mass killings in Burundi and Rwanda (1993–4) in particular caused the AU to revisit its self-imposed ban on peacekeeping.525

After mooting a range of alternative names, including Peace Council, African Security Council, and Council for Security, it was unanimously agreed at the second ‘brainstorming retreat’ in South Africa in March 2002 to refer to the new organ as the Peace and Security Council. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (hereafter PSC Protocol) in Durban on 9 July 2002 (AU 2002). The PSC Protocol came into force on 26 December 2003 (after ratification by twenty seven of the fifty-three AU members), and the Council officially began its work on 16 March 2004.526

The Council was created as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and the resolution of conflicts, and a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in

525 Cfr. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union : evaluating an embryonic international institution, in Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, 4 , pp. 603–626, 2009; Also Cfr. Muyangwa & Vogt 2000. 526 Cfr. The AU authorized the creation of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 before the PSC was formally established (AU, 2003).

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Africa. The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU reiterates the growing concern about the impacts of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW on Africa’s peace and security as well as its economic and infrastructural developments. It therefore, emphasizes the need for a well resolved coordinated and framework of corporation to tackle this problem. However, for the PSC to be formally established, required a minimum of 27 ratifications. By that period, only 15 countries had ratified it, out of which three were West African (Ghana, Mali and Sierra Leone)527 which were part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)- regional organization.

1.7. The ECOWAS.

ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos signed in May 28, 1975. The member countries of ECOWAS were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Cape Verde. Mauritania used to be a member but decided to withdraw in 2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union. One important thing to notice about the Treaty is that it did not lay the foundation for supranational body within the ECOWAS framework. This in future led to violation of the aim by some member countries.528

In the early 1990s, ECOWAS realized that the need for transforming the organization. This need was the result of minimal progress in economic and other areas of cooperation, a new global situation after the Cold War and the growing consensus that the security crisis needed to be dealt with therefore economic development could succeed. The main objective of ECOWAS was to promote cooperation and integration in the context of an economic union of West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, to maintain and increase economic stability, to strengthen relations among the Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent. If the initial objectives were essentially economic, the Community however took on political and

527 Cfr. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2005 Yearbook, on Armaments Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, p.12. 528 Cfr. The ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 (2005, 30 April) [online], URL www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ pdfs/ecowas/3ECOWASTreaty.pdf, (retrieved on 4. July. 2015).

138 security issues as well. In 1990, it established a peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to help 529 deal with various conflicts in the region.

Just as in Liberia, Nigeria’s force had been making a lot of sacrifices in the name of peace in Sierra Leone, at a considerable financial cost and, particularly in Liberia, with little gain in terms of diplomatic recognition or enhanced international prestige. On 25th March, 1997, African Liberation Day, a force in Sierra Leonean rebels from the newly formed Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Freetown blew down the gates of the Pademba Road Prison with mortars, freed their imprisoned rebel comrade Major John Paul Koroma mounting a successful coup d’état against Kabbah regime. The coup was a major affront to the peacekeeping efforts of the international community and underlined the fragility of the democratic process. This same year, Tony Blair stepped up its involvement un Sierra Leon on behalf of the ousted Kabbah. In June of that year, the AU met overwhelming approved a Nigerian military response under auspice of ECOWAS.530 The US supported the British in their desire to see the early negotiated end to the conflict. ECOWAS and the AU were also determined to see an end to the endless instability in the region and lent their support to the Anglo-American effort.531 This being a regional problem, it called for a renewal of moratorium by member states.

In October 1998, the 16 member states of ECOWAS, led by the President of the Republic of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, declared a three-year renewable moratorium532 on the production, import and export of light weapons in the West African region. This was the culmination of almost five years of intensive efforts on the part of the government of Mali, the U.N, and other governments, both in the region and beyond, to establish the first-ever moratorium on conventional arms. An organizational mechanism was established to implement and administer the moratorium, as a number of nations consider how best to contribute to its success hence calling for ECOWAS reform.

529 Cfr. Adeyemi Segun West African Leaders Agree on Deployment to Liberia, Jane's Defense Weekly, 6.August.2003. 530 Cfr. Colin, op.cit., pp.218-219. 531Cfr. Ibidem., p.221. 532 A moratorium is a delay or suspension of an activity or a Law. In a legal context, it may refer to the temporary suspension of a law to allow a legal challenge to be carried out.

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1.7.1. ECOWAS Reform

The status of ECOWAS integration after fifteen years was not encouraging. The main dilemma were largely overlapped by security concerns. The failure of success was due to lack of commitment of national governments to implement policies at the national level, their failure to agree on financial resources and the absence of national links with the Secretariat. It seemed by then most member countries wanted to solve their own economic and security problems instead of using ECOWAS.533 Although ECOMOG was formed to tighten security as noted above, this created as well more problem in the area of regional cooperation.

1.7.2. Problem Areas in ECOWAS Cooperation

The implementation problem of ECOWAS was in building regional integration. The member states failed to be faithful in implementing the protocols and the decisions of the organization.534 One of the main reasons being lack of political will. We can analyze political will: First, on the incentives and disincentives faced by a leader (s) who is contemplating a possible action, and those faced by other political actors who might support or oppose that action. Second, on the motives, thinking and feelings of a leader (s) and of other political actors to pursue those aims. This is exactly part of the concerns in the implementation of ECOWAS decisions between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries which existed ever since independence. This tension between the two major blocs in West Africa was increased by the language barrier master-minded by former colonizers. Most members states were ready to divulge their own security and their foreign policies535 due to the support from the latter.

In addition, the Anglophone countries saw ECOWAS as a means to hinder the extensive French influence. But it was not homogenous wish of all West African states. Nigeria was

533 Cfr. New Pattern of Africa’s Development, web page of 2004. 534 Cfr. Ojo, Olatunde B.J., Integration in ECOWAS Success and difficulties; In Regionalization in African Integration and Disintegration, 1999, p.123 535 Cfr. Dokken, Karin, ECOWAS in reshaping. Driving forces in the West African integration process, in International Politics (Trans,) 51 (2) (1994), pp.173 - 184.

140 the strongest force behind the process with support from other Anglophone countries. Francophone West Africa did not strongly see the need for a regional arrangement mainly because they had the Francophone cooperation. They also saw the possibility of Nigerian hegemony, which they strongly opposed. In short, the political divide between the Francophone and the Anglophone states, the clash of national interests and geopolitics was a big obstacle for the creation of ECOWAS.536

In 1997 Adedeji examined the pattern of cooperation, which he asserted, had been marked in a most remarkable manner by the mixture of colonial experiences among West African countries. He observed that the language barrier created by the pattern of colonialism and the perpetuation of the strong vertical link between former French colonies and France as opposed to the weak horizontal link between them and their British counterparts, discouraged meaningful relations across the Anglophone/Francophone divide. This situation, he said, was complicated by an ideological divide in which, Ghana, an Anglophone was on the radical left and Ivory Coast, a Francophone on the conservative right. He observed that, ECOWAS objectives were to provide a Pan West African economic organization to replace similar bodies of limited membership and to eliminate the distrust among the Anglophone and francophone states. He therefore concluded that, for West Africa, the problem is not lack of mechanism to create an effective body out of a multiplicity but the real issue is that of focal point for conflict resolution and political co- operation that requires a new approach.537

The fact that only five of the sixteen ECOWAS member states: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Gambia initially contributed the ECOMOG troops, created the Francophone’ perception that ECOMOG was designed to establish Anglophone, especially Nigeria’s dominance over sub-regional politics. Two Francophone countries, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso who openly undermined ECOWAS efforts, further weakened the situation. This attitude was a legacy of the Anglo-Francophone rivalry in Africa, which, dates back to the late nineteenth century. It thus becomes obvious that the history of ECOWAS

536 Cfr. Ibidem., 537 Cfr. Olu Adedeji, Mechanisms for conflict prevention in West Africa: Politics of harmonization, Occasional paper n°. 2/1997 of the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2 of 8.

141 member nations as off springs of historical rivalry was a commanding factor which affects consensus building in the sub-regional effort at managing and resolving conflicts.538

Another revelation of the review was the diverse colonial experience of the member nations of ECOWAS, this apart from resulting in cooperation along colonial lines, such as the formation of Francophone Accord on Non-Aggression and Defense (ANAD) and predominantly Anglophone of Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD), made common agreement difficult among the member nations. Joses, (1999) reinforced this position by asserting that the inability of ECOWAS to take bold steps to work out a merger of PMAD and the new ECOWAS mechanism together with ANAD was likely to reawaken the ‘cold war’ between the Francophone and Anglophone countries to the detriment of future efforts towards conflict resolution in the sub-region.539

Another important factor to note is, the overlapping intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s, there were about thirty IGOs in West Africa.540 They were not only overlapping but also at times they could confront each other. This led to poor collaboration due to different interests at the time.

1.7.3. Ideal birth plan of ECOWAS Moratorium

It is against the above backdrop that the ECOWAS Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in the sub-region was agreed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in October 1998, as an instrument for the promotion of collective and human security, including the fight against the proliferation and trafficking of SALW. The Moratorium then constituted a critical component of the wider provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention,

538 Cfr. KAYODE ABDULLAHI UMARU, MAJOR, B.Sc. (Hons.) Zoology, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, 1982 Advance Diploma in Telecommunications Engineering, OAU, Ile-Ife, 1994 B.Sc. (Hons.) Electronic and Electrical Engineering, OAU, Ile-Ife, 2000. 539 Cfr. Olu Adedeji, Mechanisms for conflict prevention in West Africa: Politics of harmonization. op.cit. 540 Cfr. Dokken, Karin, ECOWAS in reshaping, op.cit.

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Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security adopted in December 1999 to promote peace and security in the sub-region as a whole.541

This mechanism was based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the AU Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. It also embodies and reaffirms commitments undertaken by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in the Protocol on Non-aggression signed on 29 April 1978; the PMAD signed on 29 May 1981; and the provisions of the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS on Freedom, Peoples' Rights and Democratization, adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991.542

While allowing for 1egitimate national defense and security requirements and the requirements of international peace keeping missions, Article 50 on the Protocol Mechanism (in keeping with the provisions of the Moratorium) required Member States to put effective measures to: control import, export and manufacture of light weapons; register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stock; detect and destroy all illicit and surplus weapons; permit exemptions to the Moratorium only in accordance with strict criteria. In December 1999, the Heads of State and Government approved a Code of Conduct with 19 Articles, setting out roles, responsibilities and concrete actions to be undertaken by Member States and the ECOWAS Commission respectively.543

Article 4 of the Code of Conduct assigns the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Moratorium in individual Member-States to National Commissions, established to fight against the proliferation and trafficking of SALW in the sub-region. These Commissions include representatives of all major key players within and outside

541 Cfr. A supp1ementary protoco111SP 1/12/0 1 on Democracy and Good Governance was adopted on 21 December, 2001. 542 Cfr. www.eods.eu/library/ECOWAS_Declaration%20of%20Political%20Principles%20of%20the%20Economic %20 Community%20of%20West%20African%20States_1991_EN.pdf. (retrieved 5.03.2015). 543 Cfr. www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/MLI/00049988_Prodoc%20ECOSAP.pdf, (retrieved on 1.03.2015).

143 governments, and their membership status and functions are determined on the basis of principles agreed by Member-States.544

1.7.3.1. Background For And Making Of The Moratorium

Although most of the West Africa conflicts have been intra-state conflicts, they cannot be viewed only in light of domestic issues. It is important aspects are regional ethnic groups, regional armed groupings, cross border trade, historical ties across borders, management of natural resources and weapons that became what we term as regional security complex. Buzan defines this regional security complex as a group of states so closely connected that security consideration of one regime cannot be seen isolated from the security consideration of the other regime.545 Having said the above, the Moratorium can be viewed in the light of the following:

The initiative leading to the Moratorium came from President of Mali as stated above. The UN acted upon the initiative and established an advisory Mission, which during 1994-1995 visited several African countries. The conclusion was that the dissemination of SALW was a prerequisite for future development. In November 1996, UNDP and UNIDIR convened a conference in Bamako on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development in West Africa. Delegates from twelve West African countries participated along with ECOWAS delegates. The idea drew particular interest. During 1997, the respective governments of West African states, the AU, and also the Wassenaar Arrangement were informed and briefed. They all took to the idea. Two other subsequent conferences, one in Yamoussoukro in March 1998 and the other in Oslo in April confirmed the commitment by ECOWAS member states curbing the proliferation of SALW through declaring a Moratorium. The proposed Moratorium was debated and approved along with draft of the Code of Conduct in Banjul in 1998.546 The Moratorium was declared in Abuja on 31,

544 Cfr. Decision of the 22nd meeting of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, December 1999. 545 Cfr. Barry Buzan, New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century, in International Affairs, 67.3, New York (USA),1991, pp.432-433. 546 The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, Oslo: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in cooperation with Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI), 2000.

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October, 1998 by all ECOWAS member states.547 It came into force the next day, on 1, November, for a renewable period of three years. The signing of the Code of Conduct was delayed but it was signed on 10, December, 1998 in Lomé.548 The a Moratorium laid the foundation for a region-wide strategy on arms proliferation in particular and disarmament in general.549

1.7.3.2. Implementation of a Moratorium

The implementation of the Moratorium is the responsibility of the individual member state. But ECOWAS has a responsibility regarding coordination, guidance, monitoring and raising resources. Connected to the Moratorium, there are two important documents relating to the process of implementation. These are The Code of Conduct and The Plan of Action.

1.7.3.2.1. The Code of Conduct

Approved at the level of ECOWAS Heads of State, the Code of Conduct contains all the practical actions seen as necessary for the implementation of the Moratorium as well as concrete measures to be taken in order to reach the objectives laid out in the Moratorium.550 It consists of 17 articles. The most important of these are:

• Institutional Arrangements such as National Commissions (NatComs) (4) and the

ECOWAS Executive Secretary (5)

• Administrative Mechanisms such as Information Exchange (6), Harmonization of

legislature (7) and Exemptions (9)

547 Cfr. Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, 1998. 548 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit. 549 Cfr. Bah, Alhaji M S, ECOWAS and the dynamics of constructing a regional security regime in West Africa, PhD dissertation, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 2004. 550 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons: Evaluation Study, Presented by the ECOWAS/PCASED Technical committee ,2002, p.10.

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• Operational Aspects such as Intra- and Inter-state

Cooperation (11), Enhancing Border Controls (12) and Collection and Destruction

of Surplus Weapons (13)

• Promotion and Expansion measures such as Public Relations and Outreach (14), Resource Mobilizations (15), Dialogue with Suppliers and Producers (16) and Expansion of the Moratorium (17).551

1.7.3.2.2. The Plan of Action

Recognizing the limited capacity of ECOWAS to fulfill the task of implementing the Moratorium, the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was established by UNDP in March 1999 for an initial period of five years as an institutional arrangement meant to assist in the implementation process. It was, among other things, meant to temporarily replace and assist the National Commissions (NatComs), which was going to be established. There had been a mistaken general impression that PCASED is an implementing agency. However, PCASED was created to lend support to the implementation. The primary responsibility for implementing the Moratorium rested upon the NatComs.552

The establishment of NatComs has proceeded at a very slow pace. Many of them exist only on paper and therefore, the main responsibility for the implementation has been placed with PCASED even though that was not intended. The document presenting the guidelines for PCASED was the Plan of Action. It has nine priority areas:

• Establishing a culture of peace;

• Training programmes for military, security and police forces;

551 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., pp.50-53. Article number in parenthesis. 552 ECOWAS, Civil Society Consultation on the Review of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Exportation, Importation, and Manufacture of Small Arms, Dakar, Senegal, 27 January 2003: Summary Report (2005, 22 May), www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ecowas_dakar.htm, (retrieved on 28. Sept. 2014).

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• Enhancing weapons controls at border posts;

• Establishment of a database and regional arms register;

• Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons;

• Facilitating dialogue with producer/suppliers;

• Review and harmonization of national legislation and administrative Procedures;

• Mobilizing resources for PCASED objectives and activities;

• Enlarging membership of the Moratorium.553

1.7.3.2.3. Analysis of the implementation

Before we direct attention to the different motives regarding the effort to curb the proliferation of SALW we need to see how West African countries have been divided: they are categorized into three groups by their political situation. First, we have the politically stable countries such as Cape Verde and Ghana. They see SALW in relation to violent crimes and most significantly, domestically speaking, they want to stop the proliferation as a part of stopping crime. The second group, is post-conflict countries, which see the elimination of small arms as a key to avoiding renewed political violence.554The third group consist of countries currently in conflict. They see SALW as a prolonging and fuelling factor in a conflict they hope to end. But they also see SALW as an important means to win the war.

This is important to remember because the different the role played by SALW in West African societies and the different consequences of their proliferation influenced the motives, the will and the actions that each and every government took. While a post- conflict country may focus on disarmament, a politically stable country may focus on

553 Cfr. The making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., p.56. 554 Cfr. Nichols, Ryan, The Necessity and Feasibility of Small Arms Control in West Africa, Dissertation submitted to the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford ,2003, p.37.

147 policing555. Even though this is a problem for the whole region, there was need for new strategies apart from old methods and tactics, the impacts on the different countries varied and so also the goals and the actions taken to obtain them. One needed to supplement the regional focus with a national focus.

After nearly seven years it still seemed to be clear that the States that signed the Moratorium violated the outlined terms of the agreement and they took advantage of certain weaknesses. And these weaknesses were interesting. In the Code of Conduct they outlined some exemption criteria. These criteria were mainly meant for national security, peacekeeping operations and for hunting and sporting purposes.556

Although one was supposed to request permission from the Executive Secretariat, the loopholes have been widely misused. Member States, without seeking approval from ECOWAS, still imported weapons when they feel the need to do so. In the cases where exemptions have been granted (which in 2001 it applied to 10 cases) it has been for legitimate defense and security purposes.557 The major problem is all about importation. For instance, from 1999-2001 Ghana officially imported sporting and hunting shotguns for over US$ 5.8 million.558

Although there might be some game hunting going on in Ghana, or farmers acquiring shotguns for protection of their livestock and crops, it is doubtful whether all those shotguns have been used exclusively for “hunting and sporting purposes” or “national security”. Due to the price of imported guns compared to locally produced guns, it is likely that not many ordinary people can afford to buy imported guns of this kind knowing that artisan produced guns are significantly cheaper and in many cases, easier to obtain. And this is not an isolated incident. In the same period, Guinea imported shotgun cartridges for US$ 4.7 million.559 These numbers are only the official import. Just looking

555 Cfr. Ibidem., 556 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit. 557 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola , 2002. 558 Cfr. NISAT database of small arms transfers, www.nisat.org., (2005, 11 July) [online], URL: www.nisat.org 559 Cfr. NISAT database of small arms transfers, www.nisat.org. “ECOWAS Moratorium Report”, Oslo: PRIO, draft.

148 at the official statistics one can actually see that all 16 countries, which signed the Moratorium, had imported more weapons after the declaration was signed.560 We are not saying that all these weapons necessarily ended up as illegal weapons flowing around Africa and fuelling conflicts, but there is definitely a significant chance that some of them did so typical in Liberia.

As mentioned above, all West African countries have during the years of the Moratorium officially bought weapons. The top four suppliers to West Africa; USA, Britain, France and Spain,561 of which all are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.562

In December 2002 the 33 member States of Wassenaar approved a document setting out non-binding guidelines for exporting SALW. In this document, the arrangement calls upon the members to subject small arms to national export controls. One of the measures that the member States were encouraged to take when considering a possible export, is to consider the importing country’s compliance record with arms control and non-proliferation agreements. Other considerations included whether the potential buyer can afford the weaponry, whether it had a legitimate need for such arms, and its record concerning human rights. Further, exports should have been avoided if Wassenaar member States believed in a risk that these weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists or organized crime. The member States should also not approved exports if the arms could prolong or aggravate an ongoing conflict or if they could have been diverted to another country.563 In reality, not all

560 Cfr. Ibidem., 561 Cfr. Marsh, Nicholas, Presentation by Nicholas Marsh, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) at the New York Small Arms Forum, April 2005. 562 These four countries top the list of official imports. They are not necessarily on top of a list including unofficial Imports. The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion. Therefore, for specifics on Export Controls in Participating States contact the National Authorities in that country. 563 Cfr. Boese, Wade, Wassenaar Members Adopt Small Arms Initiative, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, Washington, February 2003 (2005, 21 May) [online], www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01 (retrieved on 23.Sept. 2014).

149 the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement had taken these encouragements into account when exporting SALW to West Africa.

1.7.3.2.4. A Theory and Implementation

In the implementation documents of the Moratorium there are mainly two areas where the central aspects are reflected. These are:

(1) the effort made in relation to (it might not be primarily aimed at this but can

potentially have an effect on) establishing a culture of peace and

(2) the measures taken to address the existence of transnational network in weak

States.

1.7.3.2.5. A Culture of Peace as a Goal of Formal Regionalism

There are mainly four ways of stopping illegal arms trade, you can either remove the traders’ will to trade, you can take measures to remove their possibility to trade, you can stop them by taking away their ability to trade or you can take measures to remove the demand for arms.

The first priority area of Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) addresses the traders’ will to trade and the demand for arms. That is establishing a culture of peace. PCASED states that “[…] appropriate programmes must be put in place to counter the growing culture of violence.564 This was done through education plan and enlightenment.565 But the establishment of a culture of peace is in line with the goal of formal regionalism, namely socio-economic development which again is preconditioned by regional peace and security.566

02/wassenaar_janfeb03.asp 564 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., p.56 565 Ibidem.,p,56. 566 Cfr. Dokken, Karin, Environmental, Security and Regional Integration in West Africa, Oslo Norway: Unipub, 1997, p.157.

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Other aspects of establishing a culture of peace includes for instance democratization, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, which would seriously reduce the demand for arms. These are also areas where ECOWAS was involved for instance with ECOMOG but also through AU and NEPAD567 and their plans and projects concerning democratization. One example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).568

ECOMOG as we saw in previous chapters was founded as a more or less ad hoc force meant to stop the civil war in Liberia but has since then been institutionalized as the Peacekeeping force of ECOWAS.569 The APRM had basically been hampered by lack of commitment570 and a review board where at least 6 out of 7 members have past links to non-democratic regimes and/or corruption charges.571 None of these other aspects of establishing a culture of peace are mentioned in preamble of the Moratorium. The Plan of Action was exclusively focusing on education and enlightenment as means to establishing a culture of peace as a revival of the transnational networks in weak states.

1.7.3.2.6. The Existence of Transnational Networks in Weak States

The area where the implementation of the Moratorium is most coherent with the theories is institution building. Even though the Moratorium was aimed at institution building it was important to remember that in their effort, ECOWAS had a tendency to presuppose a degree of transparency that did not exist. And transparency was needed if the institution building was going to succeed at a regional level. The lack of transparency was an issue that needed to be addressed because as long as there was no enough transparency among

567 For additional information on the AU and NEPAD, see African Union webpage: www.africaunion.org/home/Welcome.htm 568 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism. Its mandate is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments. (AU 2002) 569 Cfr. Khobe, Mitikishe Maxwell. February 2000, The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, Monograph No. 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Website. [retrieved on 23 Aug. 2004). 570 Cfr. Only 23 countries has signed so far (NEPAD, 2005). 571 Cfr. Dokken, Karin, The role and capacity of ECOWAS in regional conflict management in West Africa: The case of Liberia, Paper prepared for the Pan-European Conference: “Constructing Worlds Orders” in The Hague, Netherlands 9-11 September, 2004, p.5.

151 member States and in the West African region at large, the States would remain weak with a low degree of institutionalization. This is not to say that transparency alone would fix the problem of State weakness but it was one factor that needed to be solved alongside doubt among member countries of ECOWAS.

Dokken states that “the weakness of the State facilitates the growth of informal networks, and these networks are by nature trans-national”.572 Consistent with this, Bach argues that African regionalization has proceeded mainly from interactions initiated by non-state actors faced with decaying states, unable or unwilling to assert their sovereignty.573 It is a common belief that Africa is moving in the direction of increased formalization and institutionalization, but as Chabal and Daloz, advanced their argument that, it is more likely that Africa is moving towards increased informalisation.574 The African State are weak. Following the argumentation of the duo, the way to emerge out of this weakness and into a modern State is the emancipation of the institutions from society and then the constitution of autonomous political institutions. This will mean and lead to the end of patrimonialism.575 There are several steps taken to build stronger institutions emancipated from society in West Africa. Four out of nine PCASED. Even if this has been hinted on above, there is need for elaboration.

1.8 The Program of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development

(PCASED)- 1999 -2004

The PCASED, a regional project of UNDP, constituted the main implementation support mechanism of the Moratorium. Working in close collaboration with the ECOWAS Commission, its main program goals included stemming the flow of SALW into the sub- region; consolidating the gains of the Moratorium through conflict prevention and peace building initiatives; and, helping to create a secure environment in order to facilitate sustainable development within ECOWAS Member-States. A Plan of Action adopted by

572 Ibidem., 573 Cfr. Bach, Daniel (ed.), Regionalization in Africa: Integration and disintegration, Bloomington; Indian University Press, 1999, p.12. 574 Cfr. Chabal Patrick , Africa works, 1999; Jean-Pascal Daloz, The quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: is NEPAD the answer?, In International Affairs, 78 (3). 575 Cfr. Ibidem.,p.5.

152 the ECOWAS Council of Foreign Ministers with the following priorities below that guided the operations of PCASED: priority areas can be related to institution building and strengthening of the state. These include:

(1) training security forces;

(2) enhancing weapons controls at border posts;

(3) the establishment of arms registers and;

(4) reviewing and harmonizing national legislation and administrative procedures.576 This issues are also given in Code of Conduct under the presentation of Institutional Arrangements and Administrative Mechanisms.577

The first two of these four initiatives are directed at the illegal trade and smuggling and was aimed at decreasing the possibility of illegal cross-border arms trade. They were also directed to one of the most important groups of transnational actors in weapons trade, namely the illegal networks conducting large scale arms trafficking. The problem is that most African borders are not well demarcated , there are only a few border posts and many borders exist only as frontiers,578 not as “real” borders.579 Illegal traders have many other options than to pass over those few border posts. Even if security forces were better trained and arms controls at border posts are enhanced, it would only stop a part of the smuggling. It might make it a bit more difficult for the smugglers, but it will definitely not stop them.

In reference to our arguments of PCASED, Chabal and Daloz, continued to stress that this program must still be recognized as a step in the right direction towards building stronger institutions. The institutions can then possibly be emancipated from society and not be influenced by the private sphere to the same extent as they are today. Stronger institutions are necessary in order to fully succeed in implementing the Moratorium. The problem with

576 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons ,op.cit., pp.57-58. 577Cfr. Ibidem., op.cit., pp.50-51. 578 A frontier is the political and geographical areas near or beyond a boundary. The term came from French in the 15th century, with the meaning "borderland"—the region of a country that fronts on another country. 579 Cfr. Loisel, Sébastien (2004) The European Union and African Border Conflicts: Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation, www.uacesstudentforum.org/papers/Loisel.pdf, (Retrieved on 27.May.2015).

153 the institution building process is that it has continued at a very slow pace.580 There might also be a discrepancy between the stated goal and what is realistically obtainable and really wanted by those who are supposed to implement it. Due to very limited resources, both regarding finances and personnel, controlling tremendously long borders in an often inhospitable environment might not be a realistic goal for West African States today.

1.8.1. The border Frontier

In West Africa, the problem of border frontiers caused unrest situation in all spheres among States and continent as well. The various super actors: first being British West Africa which was the collective name for British Colonies in West Africa during the colonial period, either in the general geographical sense or more specifically those comprised in a formal colonial administrative entity. The United Kingdom colonized varying parts of these territories or the whole from the late 1780s until the 1960s. From west to east, the colonies became the independent countries Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria.

Another actor included French West Africa (French: Afrique occidentale française, AOF) which was a federation of eight French colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, Sengal, French Sudan (now Mali) , Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger. The capital of the federation was Dakar. The federation existed from 1895 until 1960. We should bear in mind that the colonial doctrine in these States remained so strong even after independence. The border Frontier was impossible to regain its geographical location as it was before during pre-colonial error. This obviously leads us to ask “what is independence or is possible to say that these African States are independent”? Lack of accurate answer is what we have seen in the regional conflict in the above ex -colonized states. Most of the countries maintained the line drawn by their colonial masters using the method of “divide and rule” through both direct and indirect rule. In the struggle to leave up to the promise to ex-colonial masters, conflicts in the border region (Mano River basin), was inevitable. We could say that The

580 Cfr. Vines, Alex, Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa, In International Affairs Vol. 81, Issue 2, March, 2005, pp.341-360.

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European responsibility rests in fact probably more with their perception and radicalization of ethnic differences, which have been further aggravated after the independence by the politicization of ethnicity and the creation of national identities. Most patterns of conflict are now simultaneously polarized over ethnic boundaries and national borders.

Much has been blamed in particular on the drawing of borders inherited from European powers during the colonization. Borders in Africa would be arbitrary and artificial, delineated by exogenous colonial powers with little knowledge of the local communities, dividing pre-existing and homogeneous ethnic groups and thereby stirring frustrations and conflicts. Primordialist (or essentialist) analysts have accordingly denounced the delimitation of territorial borders and the adoption of the nation-state as the root causes of African conflicts.581 This widespread perception partly relies on concrete evidence and common sense: some 87 percent of African borders in 1990 were inherited from colonial times. They were above all the product of continental and even global rivalries among European powers.582

Colonial borders cannot logically be pictured as utterly alien to African local cultures and causing ethnic conflicts altogether. As Paul Nugent puts it: “conventional wisdom has it that they (the borders) were imposed upon unwilling Africans who (…) have either suffered dearly from their consequences or merrily continued with life as if they did not exist.583

An issue not specifically mentioned in the Plan of Action, is the fact that a lot of weapons flow into West Africa from the sea.584 The majority of West African ports do not have a

581 Cfr. Davidson, Basil. The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, London; James Currey,1992. 582 Borders were drawn essentially according to the geopolitical, economic and administrative interests of the colonial powers, often taken into account at a global scale. The most often cited example is that of the division of the Hausa land, between today’s Niger and Nigeria. The Franco-British treaties of 1904 and 1906 redrew the border in favor of the French side, in exchange for France’s renunciation of fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland (Miles,1994: 68). 583 Cfr. Asiwaju A. I. 1985. Partitioned Africans: Ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries 1884-1984, London and Lagos; Christopher Hurst and University of Lagos Press. 584 Cfr. Global witness , 2003. ”The Usual Suspects”, (2005, 19 April) [online], URL: www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00026.html.

155 system for registering ships coming in and therefore no way of controlling the shipment.585 Also, there is no coast guard personnel to control those unloading at sea. It is not a difficult task along the West African coast to transport shipments close to shore, unload into smaller boats and then bring the goods to shore and transport it to their final destinations without being questioned by any official authority.

Progress on the last two of the four initiatives mentioned proceeded slowly. Establishing an arms register which was costly. Financing the project and finding an appropriate approach became problematic.586 Reviewing the legislation commenced in 2001 but it had been a problem to convince member States to adapt their national legislation to the proposed regional law.587 For PCASED’s credit, they had taken the issue of legislation seriously. In a document of 2003 were they stated that:

Many West African states are governed by laws that were elaborated during the colonial era, and operate under legal regimes that no longer reflect adequately the security situation and socio-political environment of these countries. Furthermore, what may exist by way of laws and regulations, do not often take into account light weapons possession and use by civilians, or small arms ammunition import and export. Consequently, the difference between legal and illegal transfers of small arms and light weapons is often hard to establish in the sub-region.588

The factor preventing reviewing and harmonization of legislation is first and foremost political Will as discussed above. There might be several motives for this lack of political Will. One likely reason is the overall reluctance shown by almost all African States to surrender any kind of sovereignty to a higher authority. Being told to review and implement laws on behalf of ECOWAS might have been perceived by some West African leaders as a “violation” of their national sovereignty although no supranational authority or the establishment of such is involved. One could also not overlook the fact that lack of administrative and economic resources was needed for such a review that might been an additionally important factor that slowed the process down.

585 Cfr. Ibidem., 586Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola (2002) 587 Cfr. Ibidem., 588 Cfr. PCASED, 2003, p.2.

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In addition to the four measures mentioned in the Plan of Action, the Code of Conduct presents the establishment of another institutional arrangement, the NatComs.589 They are made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and civil society.590 Including civil society in policy formation is an area where African states have fallen behind but it is also an area, which has been given quite a lot of attention lately. The number of NGOs in Africa was growing. One reason for this is that foreign aid was increasingly being channeled through NGOs instead of being given directly to governments.591 The problem regarding the NatComs was that their establishment proceeded very slowly. By 2001only 9 of the 16 countries had established NatComs.592 But by January 2005 all states except Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire had fulfilled this task.593 One country reluctant to establish a NatComs is Cape Verde.

Most of the member states preferred to use an already existing committee of security matters.594 The reason for this may be related to the fact that they do not have any significant small arms proliferation compared to the rest of West Africa. As mentioned, the situation of the single country would influence its political Will and the steps taken even though it is mainly a regional project. The reluctance shown by Cape Verde in this area illustrates that point. However, many of the commissions established suffered from weak capacity and lack of funds and political support.

The tasks fulfilled by PCASED was supposed to be transferred to the NatComs as soon as these were established but instead, the member States had used PCASED as an excuse for not forming NatComs. And even if established they were not capable of fulfilling the tasks they had been supposed to fulfill due to lack of resources and political support. The latest development in this area was that PCASED had been taken out of action as its five year period came to an end in 2004 and the successor, ECOSAP, had been established as a

589 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., p.50. 590 Cfr. The Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Moratorium. 591 Cfr. Chabal, Patrick & Daloz, Jean-Pascal ,1999, p.22. 592 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola, op.cit. 593 Cfr. Vines, Alex (2005). 594 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola, op.cit.

157 result of an UNDP proposal.595 The hope of the UNDP was that ECOSAP would provide the technical and financial support to the NatComs and strengthen the capacity for implementation in the ECOWAS secretariat, which PCASED had not managed.596

1.8.2. Areas where the Implementation does not reflect the Central Aspects

In the following we shall focus on four areas where the process of implementation did not properly reflect central aspects. These include:

(1) the operations of transnational networks;

(2) the handling of end-user certificates;

(3) artisan production and;

(4) the top-down strategies adopted by ECOWAS.

1.8.3. The Operations of Transnational Networks

There were several areas with a discrepancy between the insights presented the way in which the Moratorium was implemented. This was especially related to addressing the operations of the transnational networks. If the arms flow into West Africa was to be stopped, measures must had been taken against the transnational networks conducting the illegal trade. As the Small Arms Survey points out, “embargoed governments and insurgent movements were so numerous that they created a market for illicit weapons possibly rivaling the scale of legal demand”.597 West African governments were not only part of the demand side but also the supply side.

Although all governments certainly would deny being involved, they did contribute to the supply of SALW. Greene stated about the governments in general that “it is an open secret that many governments are deeply implicated in much of the illicit arms trade, either by facilitating covert supply to proxies and allies or by turning a “blind eye” to the diversion

595 Cfr. Vines, Alex, op.cit. 596 Cfr. Ibidem., 597 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey: Development Denied, Oxford University Press , 2003, p.117.

158 into the black market of legal arms transfers from or through their territory”.598 The ECOWAS Moratorium has had very limited effect on the criminal transnational arms networks operated and thrived in West Africa.599 There are different actors involved in these groups. At the top, there is a small group of individuals leading the transnational networks. These are people with extensive resources and with many contacts and intermediaries. They can be statesmen, businessmen and/or warlords.600

In West African, leaders like Taylor, the RUF leader a, Foday Sankoh and different ECOMOG generals and leading officers have also been heavily accused of supplying weapons to whoever was willing to pay the asking price or “give- away- price”. Common to all of them were their resources and their high position described in the hierarchical web of patron-client relationships, which gave them influence over large masses of people and political processes all over the region. These men cooperated with the arms brokers. The majority of weapons coming illegally into West Africa came through the dealings of Eastern European arms agents. They gained access to supply for instance surplus arms from the former Soviet Union, stolen weapons, arms bought from corrupt governments or actually also legal arms from legitimate producers.601 It is important to notice that arms brokering is in itself not an illegal act in most states. As IANSA had stated that:

Arms brokering may be understood as activities such as negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating the transfers of weapons that are neither necessarily in the ownership of the broker, nor necessarily originate in the country from which the broker operates. Such brokering activities are a legitimate and often integral part of the international arms trade. However, there is a significant lack of regulation on brokering activities which makes it very difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illicit activities. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have ruthlessly exploited the current

598 Greene, Owen, Examining International Response to illicit Arms Trafficking. Crime, Law and Social Change, vol.33, 2000,p.151. 599Cfr. Aning Kwesi , Regulating Illicit Trade in Natural Resources: The Role of Regional Actors in West Africa, In Review of African Political Economy, vol. 95, 2003. 600 Cfr. Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi (1999), Eliciting Compliance from Warlords: The ECOWAS Experience in Liberia, 1990–1997, in: Review of African Political Economy, 81, 1999, pp.335-348 601Cfr. IANSA, Arms Brokers, 2005, 11 July, [online], www.iansa.org/issues/arms_brokers.htm, (retrieved on 12.April. 2015)

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lack of controls to facilitate arms transfers to regions of instability and governments and rebel groups under international arms embargoes.602

These agents operating in the illegal market needed to be blocked. But by 2000, only six countries in the world had taken official measures targeted at controlling arms brokers.603 The last major group is the transportation agents, some transporting goods through air, some over land and some through sea. These people are not necessarily people who are dealing exclusively in arms trade, but rather agents to those who are willing to do business with whoever is willing to pay for it. Transporting arms is good business for them. Some do it for the good profits while others do it more out of necessity as a general survival strategy.

A wide range of different actors loosely organized is typical of transnational trafficking networks. And this makes it an enormous challenge for ECOWAS member states to try to unravel, control and stop them, even if they truly had wanted to. But still, it would be possible for ECOWAS and the West African States to launch actions aimed at limiting their dealings. At that period, there were no such actions mentioned in the implementation process of the Moratorium. The only measure taken was better policing and customs and border controls. Of course, that could help but it was not enough to have a serious impact on the trade conducted by these networks collaborators.

In the implementation of documents there were no measures focusing on the traders’ ability to trade. It was commonly known that the natural resources of the region was widely used to buy arms but the only step taken to avert this, was international embargoes, which had obviously not succeeded. Embargoes were rather a platform to build up incentives for the growth of illicit trading than stopping it as we saw above with Liberia and its allies.

Transnational networks were not only involved importing goods such as arms into West Africa but they were much involved in exporting natural resources out of the region as

602 Ibidem., 603 Cfr. Wood, Brian & Peleman, Johan, The Arms Fixers, Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, NISAT/PRIO/BASIC Report. Oslo (Norway), 2000.

160 well. As many other aspects of Transnationalism regarding arms trade, the issue of finances was completely ignored in the Moratorium. The main concern of many African rulers was regime security. The preservation of the regime is often the leading motive behind both domestic and foreign policy.604

One way of approaching the problem was to look at the way in which these networks finance the trade and then take measures to block their finances which in many instances they failed to address it. An example is the regime of Charles Taylor, the same person who willingly signed the Moratorium in October 1998, had several Payments from natural resources, money which he then used to buy weapons exclusively on the illicit market, because of an arms embargo. Often than not, he bought the weapons from contacts in Eastern Europe and imported them through a third country such as Libya and/or Nigeria.605 Nothing was done to freeze his account or his assets neither at International nor Regional or National level. This clearly showed wider interests by many parties that were engaged in the deal.

Although it might not be the case regarding only Charles Taylor, we do not doubt that most West African Heads of State who signed the Moratorium sincerely felt, and still feels, that stopping the arms proliferation in West Africa was a unique way towards achievement of peace and development at regional level and International as well, which they had all wanted for their respective countries. But this goal was too often sacrificed on the alternation of self preservation. West African politics can be contradictory, but it is in no way irrational in its own context.

When two or more interests or commitments contradict each other, history has shown that most African leaders would choose the path in line with regime security, almost regardless of the consequences for the people or the country as a whole. The notion of regime security is actually one of the most important contributions of non-positivist realism to the study of

604 Cfr. Kahl Colin H. (1998), Population Growth, Environmental Degradation and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93, In International Security vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 80-119. 605 Cfr. Global Witness, op.cit.

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African politics.606 This can also clearly be linked up to several theories about the African state. As Chabal and Daloz have stated; ideology has been of secondary importance for African rulers. The logic of politics has commonly been driven by the need to acquire the patrimonial means of one’s political legitimacy.607

In the case of arms purchases such as the ones committed by Charles Taylor, one could ask why ECOWAS did so little to control it. They must have known what was, and probably still was, going on, not only in Liberia but many other places in the region. In this case one had the Liberian state as a transnational actor not only deeply involved, but actually controlling and pushing a transnational network illegally importing weapons into West Africa. The illegal arms trading into Liberia was a typical example of Neo-patrimonialism. He used his position, his contacts and his government to fulfill his personal goals. State funds and State coffers were widely used for this purpose. This example shows the duality and the contradictions of the West African States and of the West African political leaders and how they present in theories of African State.

The Guinean State acted in the way they did exactly as a response to their needs without much consideration of its commitments regarding the Moratorium. It used even the End User’s Certificates. This trend which was so common in the African States because one has to realized that what was happening in Africa was not the absence of politics, as some have argued, but it was rather politics practiced in a complex way that might seem absurd to the ways of explaining political actions in traditional IR theory.608

1.8.4. End-User Certificates (EUCs)

There has been one institution building measure which had not been given much attention in the implementation process in the control of over arms flows that the state could obtain

606 For an elaborated discussion on this subject, Cfr. Clark, John F., op.cit. 607 Cfr. Chabal Patrick & Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999), p.37. 608 Cfr. Dunn, Kevin C. &Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.) The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in International Relations Theory, “Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory” , London; Palgrave, 2001, p.62.

162 by building a stronger and more comprehensive system of end-user certificates.609 The misuse of such certificates had been flourishing. As for the previously mentioned example from Guinea, while the Guinean Ministry of Defense maintained that Katex was the government agent for the import of agricultural supplies for the army’s rice plantations, Human Rights Watch obtained an EUC issued by the Ministry of Defense for Katex Mine to obtain weapons.610

EUCs, if not misused, were clearly an important issue in stopping the arms proliferation. They are supposed to guarantee the final destination of weapons but “in effect they were just weapons shopping lists on official letterhead”.611 EUCs had become merchandise that the issuing authority could provide for other countries under weapons embargoes such as Liberia, or for rebels, insurgents or warlords. It had been proven by the UN that in the summer of 2002, eight different EUCs, all from ECOWAS member states, were used to import over 210 tons of arms into Liberia.612 From where these certificates came from was not known, but they must have come directly from some state officials in several ECOWAS countries or they had been forged. This importation was of course in violation not only of the Moratorium but also the arms embargo on Liberia. And there were many more such examples of EUCs being misused.

When persons within the government circle bring such certificates onto the black market, it is a perfect example of the corruption vividly present in the neo-patrimonial system in Africa. This is not to say that corruption necessarily is an inherent part of a neo-patrimonial state but most cases show that it is present in such states. Chabal and Daloz describe it as a means through which patrimonialism is practiced.613When corruption became that

609 An EUC is a document issued by the authorities and it contains information such as a description of the goods being exported, a description of the end-use of the goods, information about final destination country, exporter’s details, end-user information, information on parties involved in the transaction and certification by the government. If you do not have an EUC, the supplier will not be given an arms export license (OSCE 2004). 610 Cfr. Human Rights Watch (2003), op.cit. 611 Vines present a list of examples of end-user certificates being misused in attempts to procure weapons since 2000. Due to this widespread practice and undermining of the EUC system Vines uses the term “weapons shopping lists on official letterhead” about EUCs. (Vines, Alex 2005). 612 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola, op.cit. 613 Cfr. Chabal, Patrick & Daloz, Jean-Pascal , op.cit.

163 common, it also gains a sort of legitimacy in the minds of people. Then the moral threshold for taking part in these illegal acts, becomes even lower. But not all misused EUCs come from unfaithful servants in the state system but there was currently no reliable international system to check the originality of these documents.614 This means that the likelihood of false documents being in circulation, in addition to the illegitimate documents, was definitely inevitable.

On the matter concerning the suppliers, there was a grey area in the process of granting exemptions from the Moratorium. The suppliers did not have to seek permission from ECOWAS in order to sell weapons to West African countries. This was an obvious flaw. As mentioned, ECOWAS did issue some exemptions when arms purchases were proved to be legitimate but those who had been given such permission did not have to show the documents when purchasing the weapons.615 This was also a flaw which might have lead to illegitimate purchases being disguised by the buyers as legitimate.

One could only speculate to what could be the reasons for these obvious flaws might be because it would not demand much coordination or funds to correct them. It might though, be fair to say that it is quite convenient for Western arms manufacturers to be made completely non-responsible if and when they supply weapons to West African states in a way that violates the Moratorium and the recommended considerations issued by the Wassenaar Arrangement. And that the system was also convenient for those transnational actors on the demand side who had access to political power. The weapons manufacturers are powerful actors both in business and in politics. There is huge profits to be made on weapons production and weapons sales. The interests vested in this business were enormous and those who stand to lose if the exports were to be cut, so they were doing what they could to avoid such losses. This applied as well to Local producers of arms. It was then clear that the producers and exporters were an important transnational actors in

614Cfr. Ibidem., 615 Cfr. Colin, op cit., p.612

164 the arms proliferation of West Africa. And with their resources they were able to influence state policies and by doing so, ensuring continued export to West Africa.616

1.9. Local (Artisan) Production of Arms

When working on the Moratorium, it was important to realize that not all arms in West Africa had been imported into the region. Production within the region and Africa at large was also a part of the Moratorium and local production is clearly part of the arms proliferation problem. Most small arms and ammunition that were used in, and recovered from, armed conflicts or crime on the continent originate not only from outside but also inside Africa. Indeed, 3 per cent of an estimated 1,200 companies producing components of SALW and their ammunition globally are reportedly located in Africa.617 The SAS also found that a lot of small arms and ammunition were not just locally sourced, but locally manufactured. It is important to acknowledge this underreported activity and to examine its role in the illicit trafficking of small arms and ammunition on the continent and in the region.

Sowatey estimated that about 100,000 guns were produced annually in Ghana alone618. Most of them are made by local blacksmiths or other competent people in the region trying to make the best possible living for themselves and their families in a harsh environment. Others were saying that artisan production of arms was largely insignificant due to the fact that the vast majority of the weapons in West Africa were imported.619 But still we need to include artisan production because the Moratorium declaration specifically stated that it was a Moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture.

Therefore, it is important to underline that all aspects of the Moratorium, including production, needed to be dealt with, not only the importation and exportation as part of the

616 This can be linked to the current discussion on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For more on this issue, Cfr. Ruud, Audun, 2002., www.mallenbaker.net/csr 617 Cfr. Small Arms Survey: Counting the Human Cost, 2002. 618 Cfr. Sowatey, Emmanuel Addo, Small arms proliferation and regional security in West Africa: The Ghanaian case, in News from the Nordic Africa Institute, n°. 1, January 2005. 619 Cfr. Fung, Ivor Richard, The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, Oslo: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in cooperation with NUPI, 2002.

165 problem. Although these weapons might not be a huge and important factor in most West African armed conflicts, they were without a doubt being used extensively in gun-related crimes, which significantly contributed to the general situation of insecurity inflicted upon ordinary people in the region. And if and when the importation of arms would decrease, the demand for locally produced arms would grow.

Artisan production of guns is not a new phenomenon in West Africa. Using the Ghanaian case as an example, Oppong argues that an iron specialist in former times produced weapons such as knives and spears and later guns and bullets for chiefs among certain ethnic groups.620 Under colonial rule, local gun production was banned. In order to protect themselves, the colonizers did not want the colonized to be armed in any way. This ban was carried over into the post-colonial period. But the tradition and skills of artisan production did not disappear.621The reasons for this are both cultural and economic. Long traditions and the status of owing a gun, are important to a large part of the rural population. It is also good business for the artisan because the demand for guns was much higher than the demand for other iron works such as agricultural tools. Some locally produced guns in Ghana were also being illegally exported through transnational trade to neighboring countries. There had been occasions where some manufacturers had been invited by groups with hidden motive in Côte d’Ivoire to produce guns. Knowing then the present situation of uncertainty in Côte d’Ivoire, one could easily imagine what these guns were planned to be used for.622

Artisan production in Ghana had increased over the last decade. Rising living costs and rising demands tempt more people into acquiring these skills and to produce as much as possible and also produce more sophisticated guns. These guns were at an increasing rate ending up in the hands of criminal networks and were then being used more frequently in violent conflicts all over West Africa. But still, there was no mentioning of artisan production in the implementation of the Moratorium. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) started an initiative called Small Arms

620 Cfr. Oppong, Christine, Growing Up in Dagbon, Accra; Ghana Publishing Press, 1973. 621 Cfr. Sowatey, Emmanuel Addo, op.cit. 622 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA).623 In this document, dealing with problems related to artisan production was mentioned. Their plan for dealing with the issue consisted of assisting states in conducting a survey and establishing an inventory of local SALW producers. It would have been natural for ECOWAS to get involved in this and to integrate it into the implementation of the Moratorium.

Sowatey continues to say that there were two mutually reinforcing options for dealing with artisan production of arms: the legalization of gun production as a way of marking and tracing; and diverting the gun making skills of the producers to the production of peaceful tools that the artisans already had the capacity to produce.624

As in most aspects of ECOWAS cooperation, a top-down approach had been adopted. Regarding the Moratorium, the lowest level of production was ignored. The implementation process had not directed any focus towards the processes of arms production from below. This lead to the next point, the top-down approach adopted by ECOWAS in their information strategies.

2.1. Regionalism from Below Related to ECOWAS Top-Down Information Strategies

Both the Plan of Action and the Code of Conduct mentioned information and promotion as areas of priority. The main rationale for this was to mobilize resources and enlarge the membership of the Moratorium. The fact that these motives formed the basis for the information strategies, it was reflected in the way in which information had been spread. ECOWAS had directed their main focus outwards towards possible donors in the Western world, towards possible partners such as IGOs or NGOs and towards other regional or continental organizations in Africa. This is by all means an understandable strategy due to the Moratorium’s complete dependency on external aid and support. The problem with this strategy was that it was almost exclusively directed outwards. No major information campaign has been directed within the people of West Africa.

623 Cfr. UNREC, “Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA)” (2005, 11 July) [online], URL: www.unrec.org/eng/SATCRA_projet%20document.htm. 624 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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A report of the Experts’ Meeting and Civil Society Meeting in March 1999 stated that although it was then five months since the Moratorium was signed, few people other than specialists were aware of its existence.625 It had been estimated that 79 percent of all small arms in Sub-Saharan Africa were in the hands of civilians, while only 2 percent were in the hands of insurgents (the remaining 19 percent were estimated to be in the hands of different state institutions such as police and military).626

Apart from Ghana, there is very little information on the main producers and exporters of small arms in Africa. Only a few African countries have the capacity to manufacture arms and ammunition with South Africa topping the list, followed by Nigeria. But other states, like Sudan (Khartoum), Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are also producers. In Western Africa the production capacity is smaller and based on imported technology. Some factories of ammunition exist in Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Guinea and RDC. Even the production capabilities of these countries are limited and are based on imported technology, machinery and basic components. There is little information on the final use of the small arms imported by these states. The difficulty to get this information is due to the fact that most of these states never reported their transfers and production to the UN Register, marking always NONE. But we shall consider the first four due to the quantity they produce although we shall not give real statistics because they didn’t register in UN excluding South Africa as a special case.

2.1.2. Sudan

Arms production in Sudan started in 1959 in a rifle ammunition plant supplied by British and West German companies.627 The current Sudanese arms industry is concentrated in the Military Industry Corporation (MIC), which was established in the early 1990s.628 Several reports suggest that MIC rebuilt or refurbished its ammunition-production facility in 1996-

625 Cfr. UNIDIR (1999) 626 Cfr. Gambia Daily News (2005), 10 January, Small Arms Survey, 2003. 627 Cfr. Deckert, R., Deutsches Kriegsgerät im Sudan (German military equipment in Sudan), Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft–Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen, ( Retrieved on, 30 June 2008) . 628 Cfr. Military Industry Corporation,. (Retrieved on 29.03.2015).

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97, possibly with the involvement of Bulgarian, Pakistani and Ukrainian firms.629 Currently, the small arms that MIC claims to produce are copies of the Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault rifle, the US-designed M-16 assault rifle, and the German-designed MG-3 machine gun, G-3 assault rifle and MP-5 sub-machine gun.630 The technology or components for these weapons are likely to come from China, Iran or Pakistan, which produce these weapons themselves and have had arms supply relations with Sudan in recent years.631 On its website, MIC advertises that it is involved in the upgrading of T-55 tanks and in the production of Chinese-designed WZ-501 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and Type-85-2 tanks and several Soviet-designed artillery pieces.632 The T-55 upgrade package was imported from Iran around 2006 and the artillery production is probably related to an import of materials and production equipment from Bulgaria in 1995–2002.633 MIC advertises that it assembles a light aircraft with Russian and Chinese assistance, AK1-3 light helicopters from Ukraine and UTVA-75 light aircraft from Serbia.634 MIC also has a maintenance centre for combat and transport aircraft and helicopters.635

2.1.3. Nigeria

The Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) was established in 1964, when Nigeria obtained production equipment for Italian-designed rifles and small arms ammunition from West Germany. In 1983 DICON started production of rifles, pistols and

629 Cfr. Lewis, M., Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Paper n°. 18 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Sep. 2009), pp. 24–28 630 Cfr. Assessment based on images shown on MIC’s website, , compared with information from Jane’s Infantry Weapons, retrieved on 27.03.2015. 631 Cfr. Jones, R. D. and Ness, L. S. (eds.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2008–2009 (Jane’s Information Group: Coulsdon, 2008) 632 These items are shown on the MIC website without reference to their origin. MIC, ‘Products’,.(Retrieved on 27.03.2015). 633 Cfr. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; and ‘Bulgaria court suspends judgment on arms embargo violation case, Sofia News Agency, 28.Feb.2008. 634 Cfr. Jackson, P., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2010–2011 (Jane’s Information Group: Coulsdon, 2010), p.581. 635 Cfr. Safat Aviaition Complex and Russian firm to maintain Sudanese helicopters, Sudan Tribune, 25 Aug. 2009.

169 machine guns with technology imported from Belgium.636 After a period of decline, in 2007 the Nigerian Government financed a project to revive DICON, which reportedly managed to restore a substantial part of its production capability.637 The project included the procurement from China of a production line for 7.62-mm ammunition.638 DICON also claims to have designed its own version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle (called the OBJ-006) and to have procured machinery from China to produce it.639 On several occasions in 2006–2009 DICON announced the start of production of the OBJ-006 rifle.640 It currently claims it can produce or assemble 81-mm mortars, Belgian-designed FAL and Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault rifles, Soviet-designed RPG-7 grenade launchers, Belgian-designed MAG light machine guns, Italian-designed M-12 sub-machine guns as well as hand grenades and small arms ammunition.641 Nigeria has porous borders on both its land and sea edges, allowing gun smuggling from a variety of countries. Many of these weapons come from war-torn countries in Africa. Many of the arms smuggling rings operate out of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. The smugglers use speed-boats to connect to the high seas, and then ferry the arms back to shore.

2.1.4. Kenya

The Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation started production in 1997 of small arms ammunition on a Belgian-supplied production. With assistance from FN Herstal of Belgium (1996), Kenya has domestic capacity to produce small arms and ammunition. The bullet factory’s capacity is 20,000-60,000 bullets per day, while local consumption is about two million bullets per year. Kenya refuses to open up its factories for independent verification of their facilities despite ratifying the UN Arms Trade Treaty. The factory

636 Cfr. Adewoye, O. O., Military technology and industrial base: key elements of national power, Paper presented to Course 15, National War College, Abuja, 14 Nov. 2006; and Deckert, R., ‘Deutsche Kleinwaffen: die Nigeria-Connection’ [German small arms: the Nigeria connection], Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic Security, Feb. 2008. 637 Cfr. Obateru, T., Obasanjo tasks DICON on arms production, Vanguard (Lagos), 11 May 2007. 638 Cfr. Mamah, E., ‘TRADOC, DICON to produce armoured personnel carrier’, Vanguard (Lagos), 15 Jan. 2009. 639 Cfr. Nigeria to mass-produce Nigerian version of AK-47 rifles’, Xinhua, 2 Oct. 2006. 640 Cfr. Ibidem., 641 Cfr. Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), . (Retrieved on 28.03.2015).

170 produces three types of bullets, namely, 9mm ammunition for the FN35 Browning pistol and the Sterling, Uzi or H&K MP5 submachine guns used by the armed forces; 7.62x51mm for the FNFAL and the G3, the main rifles used by the armed forces; and 5.56mm ammunition, used by the Kenya police. The factory does not have the capacity to manufacture ammunition for the AK-47.642

2.1.5. Uganda

Uganda also has small arms ammunition factories. It justifies it by the long-running war with rebels in the north and hostility with Sudan. Uganda refuses to open up its factories for independent verification of their facilities despite ratifying the UN Arms Trade Treaty just as Kenya. There are three weapons manufacturers in Uganda; the largest, Luwero- Nakasongola Arms Factory, is owned by Chinese (government and private sector) interests until late 1997. The Industries refurbishes Kalashnikov-type rifles and uses South African equipment and cartridge cases, propellant, primer caps and bullets imported from China to produce ammunition.643

2.1.6 Tanzania

It has small arms ammunition factories. Mzinga Corporation reportedly had an annual production capacity of 7 million rounds in 2005, using Chinese production equipment supplied in 1972. A 2005 effort to increase production capacity with Belgian equipment failed because the Belgian authorities did not authorize the deal.644

642 Cfr. Herssens, H., Handel in kennis en technologie (Trade in knowledge and technology), MO Mondiaal Nieuws, 1 June 2004; and Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation, . (Retrieved on 29.03.2015). 643 Cfr. Ugandan National Enterprise Corporation, ‘Luwero Industries Ltd’, 2008, ; Matsiko, G., ‘UPDF ammunition factory goes commercial’, New Vision (Kampala), 30 Sep. 2003; Rubin, C., ‘SA troops may face “local” ammo in DRC’, Sunday Independent (Cape Town), 17 June 2000 644 Cfr. Verbruggen, D. et al., Wapentrafieken in de regio van de grote meren: Tanzania [Arms trafficking in the Great Lakes region: Tanzania], International Peace Information Service (IPIS) Dossier no. 145 (IPIS: Antwerp, 16 June 2005); and Berghezan, G., Le Gouvernement wallon suspend la licence d’exportation vers la Tanzanie, [The Walloon Government suspends licence for export to Tanzania], Groupe de recherché et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), 25 Mar. 2005

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2.1.7 Zimbabwe

In 1985 ZANU (PF) government established the Zimbabwe Defense Industry (ZDI) which erected two arms production factories with a dual status of being both a private company and a state enterprise. In 1986 NORINCO of China was awarded the contract to build a small arms ammunition factory in Zimbabwe for the ZDI. By 1990, only the Explosives Filling Plant, the Small Arms Ammunition project were built. Zimbabwe Defense Industry (ZDI) started to produce ammunition for small arms, mortars and artillery in the early 1990s using equipment imported from France and China.645

Added to that a number of arms traffic networks operating from Tanzania, Burundi and DR Congo have been sending arms to the different rebel groups. The Somali had been under UN embargo since 2000, yet. the government of Djibouti had furnished arms and medicines to the Islamic Court Union, an opposition group. Darfur also had been for years under UN embargo but arms had been provided by the Chadian government.646

Governments and armed groups in neighboring or further states are also significant sources of illicit small arms. These governments, e.g. the case of Morocco, Algeria and Libya that bought arms that were likely aimed at providing material support to one or more of the parties to the conflict, in neighboring countries by transferring illicitly large numbers of small arms. Since 2000, UN investigators documented weapons transfers by neighboring governments to armed groups in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, all of which were under UN arms embargoes at the time of the transfers.647

As a strategy of survival, of enlargement of membership or of building a stronger arrangement, the ECOWAS information strategy was probably the right strategy but as a part of the implementation strategy it was absolutely incomplete. The ECOWAS Moratorium had, as many other initiatives over the last decade, been portrayed as an

645 Cfr. Mlambo, N., The Zimbabwe Defense Industry, 1980–1995, Defense Digest Working Paper n°. 2 (Southern African Centre for Defense Information: Cape Town, [1999]). 646 Cfr. Wezeman, Pieter D. Arms Flows to the Conflict in Chad, SIPRI. August 2009. 647 Cfr. Matt Schroeder Guy Lamb , The Illicit Arms Trade In Africa: Global Enterprise, 3rd Quarter 2006.

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African initiative to solve an African problem. The top-down approach adopted here was not unusual in the African context. As Clapham stated, “(...) the imposition of control from the top rather than the mobilization of support from below became the predominant relationship between African rulers and their subjects.648 ECOWAS is known for its liking of adopting top-down strategies. These strategies stretch from state-led projects to individual and informal cross-borders trade due to the nature of geopolitical settings.

To curb up this, the New Regional Approach (NRA) was adapted. It is a theory, which adopted a bottom-up profile to compliment the top-down approach usually adopted in traditional regionalist theory. But this insight was not reflected in the strategies adopted by ECOWAS concerning the implementation of the Moratorium but through third parties like civil societies.

2.2. Civil Society as an Actor in West African Regionalism

NRA focused on the diversity of actors in regionalization. Civil society649 is an important actor. There was a multiplicity of organizations dealing with small arms in West Africa. We will briefly mention some of the most important civil society organizations involved, these include: The IANSA650 an important organization which cooperated with Amnesty International. They had also formed a sub-organization called the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA).651 There was also Global Witness,652 and Human Rights Watch653 there are two other example an NGO like Safer Africa.654 One civil society actor that had been quite actively involved in the Moratorium is NISAT,655 which

648 Cfr. Clapham Christopher, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.56. 649 Civil society refers to the set of institutions, organizations and behavior situated between the state, the business world, and the family. Specifically, this includes voluntary and non-profit organizations of many different kinds, philanthropic institutions, social and political movements, other forms of social participation and engagement and the values and cultural patterns associated with them. (London School of Economics, 2003) 650 Cfr. www.iansa.org. 651 Cfr. www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm. retrieved on 24.02.2015. 652 Cfrr. www.globalwitness.org, retrieved on 24.02.2015. 653 Cfr. www.hrw.org, retrieved on 24.02.2015. 654 Cfr. www.saferafrica.org, retrieved on 24.02.2015. 655 Cfr. www.nisat.org, (Retrieved on 24.02.2015).

173 is a project under PRIO and is supported by the Norwegian government. The last NGO is Small Arms Survey.656

But NGOs were not the only group of civil society actors that was involved. The Church was one of the most influential civil society elements in Africa. Its position in society in general was very influential in trying to solve the SALW problem. We should also not forget the influence of women organizations in Africa. They are certainly a force to be recognized.

Civil society organizations had not been participating so directly in the actual implementation process. But they had been consulted before the signing of the different documents and they had also been consulted when discussing a possible restructuring of the Moratorium but that was about it when it comes to civil society participation. They were also present in the NatComs but as mentioned above, many of those NatComs established were suffering from weak capacity and lack of funds and political support.

When civil society organizations had been consulted, they gave an overall very positive critique. This raised two questions. Why had civil society not been more involved? And why had they been so positive to a project, which had almost no proven results to show so far? There many things that have been said about the practice and importance of civil society in Africa.

First of all, a working civil society held many functions. Among these were being a buffer or a broker between State and society, being representative of various interests or an agent of change. Chabal and Daloz have been quite critical of African civil society and concluded that there was no functional civil society in Africa at all.657 The main argument was that the African society was divided vertically. Therefore there were no social networks distinct from the State and capable of transcending communal or religious ties. Civil society in Africa do not hold the influence that the number of NGOs should imply but there are important societal forces capable of influencing society and governmental policy

656 Cfr. www.smallarmssurvey.org, (Retrieved on 24.02.2015). 657 Cfr. Chabal, Patrick & Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 1999, op.cit.

174 on the continent. So, the reason for the lack of a more influential civil society participation in the Moratorium must again, first and foremost, be ascribed to the top-down approach, which ECOWAS had been known to adopt.

Regarding second question, the reason for their enthusiasm then when knowing the poor record of accomplishment might be explained by their initial enthusiasm and support and therefore their unwillingness to admit being proved wrong.658 It could also be explained by a sort of realistic recognition that the Moratorium was not perfect. The fact still remained that civil society had not taken, or had not been allowed to take, part in the process as important as would be natural in a NRA approach. We are not saying that civil society was not concerned with the problem of SALW but it seemed that they operated outside the institutional arrangements envisioned in the Moratorium. They were more or less frequently consulted but they were not properly drawn into the actual implementation process. One example of an area where they could give immense contributions through for instance awareness campaigns was the first priority area of PCASED, establishing a culture of peace. This was mentioned in the Plan of Action: “Member States, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat (…) will seek the active collaboration of intergovernmental organizations ,UNESCO, civil society organizations, and women’s organizations”659 but due to other concerns as mentioned above coupled with distrust among member states, it could not favor the progress of this program. But before we analyze the distrust, we should consider briefly other African states that has played a crucial role in arms production as well.

2.2.1. Distrust among member states

It is commonly recognized that trust among the integrating countries was a precondition for a regionalist project to succeed. Trust among nations inside a region is intimately connected to the level of regional identity, financial and political ideology. This level of regional coherence and regional identity is what Hettne has referred to as the pursuit of

658 Cfr. March Nicholas interview, 4 April, 2005. 659 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., p.57.

175 regionness660 and lack of political identity could not circum to different players in the same time hence creating conflict among political players. In this sense, confidence among the West African countries would be strengthened by steps taken to build up a stronger regional identity. This regional identity is severely hampered by for instance the divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries as well as ex Portuguese colony, not only regarding language but also culture inherited from the colonial era, trading, and hegemonic aspirations. Other factor like different currencies, fiscal code and public administrative structures and practice were of paramount interest. Additionally, the relations between the countries are earmarked by long-standing territorial disputes and political rivalries. This caused frequent and violent changes in political leadership in the whole region of West Africa.

As Khobe has stated: “Healthy competition for development among States is what every seriously minded person desires, but deep rooted suspicion and rivalry between the ruling classes of the various member States instead created a platform for outside interest to undermine the elites of their own countries”.661 It would be safe to say that West Africa is today far from reaching the fifth and highest level of regionness defined by Hettne to be a regional institutionalized polity where the region is an “acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making.”662 One of the measures that would address the distrust is transparency. The Code of Conduct advocated for transparency by increasing information exchange in the area of arms ordering. ECOWAS was then supposed to use this information given to them by the member states and make an arms register as a confidence building measure.663

As long as the states are contradicting themselves by operating in the manner for instance Charles Taylor or the government of Guinea, no confidence would ever be present among

660 Cfr. Hettne, Bjørn, Neo-Mercantilism: The Pursuit of Regionness, Cooperation & Conflict, Vol. 28, n° 3, 1993. 661 Khobe Mitikishe Maxwell, The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, Monograph n° 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February, 2000. 662 Hettne, Bjørn, The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace, in Hettne, B.; Inotai, A. (eds.), The New Regionalism – Implications for Global Development and International Security”, Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research ,1994. 663 Cfr. The Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Moratorium.

176 the West African countries. The lack of confidence was not an irrational act of political paranoia but rather a well founded fear of interference in domestic politics by neighboring States like we have seen in the cases when the government of Guinea was supplying LURD with weapons because it was offering possibilities for the Guinean government to obtain certain domestic and/or foreign policy objectives. There was definitely a political interest in not solving the problem of SALW in West Africa, but there was lack of enough motive force. Motive force is defined as “the compelling factors of high politics character that bring a process of integration forward”.664

Pushing such an extensive process as the implementation of the Moratorium required a stronger force than mere political interest. It required the presence of motive force. The member states needed to see the solution to the SALW problem as a compulsion, not as an interest in their modus operandi. What decided the faith of the process was how those in involved with the Moratorium perceived the threat of SALW proliferation.665

For the Guinean government the objectives were perceived as so important that they were given preference over the political commitments laid down in the Moratorium. Transparency in official arms import would not deal with this issue of distrust as long as governments were importing huge amounts of weapons through illegal transnational networks. Distrust was a feature of the region, which severely restricted the possibilities for cooperation because it made transparency and information sharing almost impossible. The UN Small Arms Panel had addressed this issue:

Accumulation of weapons by means of illicit trafficking is facilitated by a lack of coordination and cooperation among the states involved. In the case of both the re- circulation and supply of weapons from outside the region or sub-region, efforts to diminish the negative effects of such weapons are hampered by states that will not or cannot cooperate in such basic functions as sharing information regarding illicit

664 Dokken, Karin “Environment, Security and Regional Integration in West Africa”, Dissertation submitted to the Dept of Political Science, University of Oslo, 1997, p.179. 665 Cfr. Ibidem.,

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trafficking in weapons and coordinating the cross-border seizure and collection of weapons.666

The fact that West African countries differ in their willingness to handle the problem of SALW proliferation, is a critical issue, whether the reasons for the lack of Will was financial, political or ideological,667 Bøås and Dokken argues that in order for Africa to achieve successful regional integration, they needed to begin with areas where they are mutually dependant on each other668 as could be the case of West African States.

The importance of perception and different identities could be linked up to so called “constructivism”. A constructivist approach to the problem of motive force would highlight that it was the collective identity and meaning which constituted the structure organizing of actions. And the structure holds no logic by itself. The logic was created by the states and other actors. States, as humans, held a certain number of identities.669 These identities are applied in different circumstances. And it was these identities that lead led to the control of their actions.670

While the establishment of the Small Arms Unit (SAU) had been a step in the right direction, it is crucial that the ECOWAS Commission moved quickly to develop a viable structure, staffing arrangement and internal procedures in order to make the SAU operational. For example, capacity for the effective management and monitoring of Member States' compliance with the exemption process, (in accordance with Articles 5 and 9 of the Code of Conduct) needs urgent attention if the ECOWAS Commission wished to prove it is capable of ensuring the legality of arms purchases and use. Without this, the

666 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298, 27,August, 1997, p.18. 667 Cfr. Nichols, Ryan, op.cit., p.41. 668 Cfr. Bøås Morten & Dokken, Karin, International Politics and Foreign Policy in Africa South of the Sahara , (trans.) Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2002, p.120. 669 States can be seen as the unit of analysis in Constructivism even though constructivists often use other actors than states as their unit of analysis. The main difference between Realism and Constructivism is not the choice of unit of analysis but rather that constructivism sees the actors and the structure as mutually constituting. 670 Cfr. Wendt, Alexander, Collective Identity Formation and International State, American Political Science Review, vol. 88, 384-396, 1994; Cfr. Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999.

178 fight against illicit proliferation and trafficking would remain a daunting and deadly challenge to States and citizens alike.671

3.1. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP)

ECOSAP was being conceived under the Conflict Prevention, Peace building and Disaster management Strategic area of support of the Second Regional Cooperation Framework of UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. Under this, the Bureau seeks to assist Africa in collectively addressing the challenges of peace and security within a regional framework under the African Union and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADC among others. This support was built around three key strategies:

a) developing, and implementing, regional strategies for conflict prevention,

b) strengthening regional peace building and post conflict recovery and,

c) improving disaster preparedness and management in Africa. The overall

objectives of the support are to:

i) reduce the incidence and recurrence of conflict

ii) secure increased effectiveness in regional peace-building and recovery process and improving disaster preparedness and management capacities of vulnerable countries as well as improved regional support.672

3.1.1. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Firearms,

Ammunition and Other Related Materials.

The SADC Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials is a regional and legally binding instrument to increase control over the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa. It was adopted in August 2001 and entered into force in November 2004.

671 Cfr. Ibidem., 672 Cfr. ECOSAP, ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme; Annual Report 2010, www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/450~v~ECOWASSmallArmsControlProgrammeAnnual Report.pdf (retrieved on 11.July.2015).

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Its main objectives were to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, to promote legal uniformity and minimum standards in the manufacture, control, possession, import, export and transfer of firearms, and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, and experience on SALW issues in the Region, so as to ensure the standardized marking of firearms at the time of manufacture.

However, Progress in implementing the protocol has been disappointing. The mere fact that it took more than three years for two-thirds of the 14 member states organization to ratify it for it to enter force after adoption, is proof of the lack of Will on the part of the involved governments pointed out the lack of up-to-date legislation for the long term.

3.1.2. Economic Community of Central African States (Agreements)

Although there is no declaration, moratorium or convention governing the production, purchase, distribution and use of SALW for the central African sub-region, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) agreed within the framework of a regional consultative seminar in May 2003, to establish an effective licensing system for international importation, exportation and transiting of SALW and to control the activities of SALW intermediaries and brokers. In September 2003, a high level training of trainers workshop was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on the control of arms proliferation in Central Africa in line with the implementation of the 2001 UN Program of Action.673

A substantial weakness that can be found in almost all of the above efforts is the fact that their major focus is on illicit arms proliferation and not the arms trade itself. As long as laws and policies governing the arms trade per se are not reviewed, the difficulties to effectively tackle SALW proliferation will continue to exist. The examples of South Africa, Nigeria and even Sudan have shown that what later became illicit weapons often had a legal origin. It is therefore of utmost importance to look at better ways of controlling the legal trade in firearms to make sure that weapons that are traded legally are not diverted

673 Cfr. SIPRI, 2005 Yearbook, on Armaments Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, , pp.17-18.

180 into the illegal market. It is also important to target the problem of arms proliferation looking at its root causes by implementing measures which address both demand and supply side issue.674

In addition to tailored individual country needs and responses in consolidating the gains of PCASED, ECOSAP will constitute an instrument for the formulation and implementation of joint initiatives that are in the common interest of countries within a particularly cluster, and that have also been jointly endorsed by their respective National Commissions. On this regard, two initiatives are worthy of mentioning: First, the joint decision taken by the National Commissions of Nigeria, Benin and Niger during the third Networking Meeting of National Commissions in Banjul, in June 2003, culminating in the First International Conference on Border Security between the three countries in Sokoto, Nigeria, in November 2003. Secondly, the UNDP Preparatory Assistance project for a Small Arms Control Program in the Mano River Basin would be implemented as a pilot cluster initiative on small arms control in the sub-region. It will be integrated in the larger ECOSAP program once is fully operational. The experience and lesson learnt in the preparatory assistance stage of this initiative would form future strategies for addressing other Cluster initiatives in the sub-region.

3.1.3. Linkages with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)

The NEPAD initiative highlights peace, security and good governance as conditions for sustainable development. The key activities leading towards these goals include building the capacity of African institutions for early warning of conflicts; enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; and, institutionalizing commitment to the core values of African leadership. Among the priorities for the sub-committee on Peace and Security agreed upon in the second meeting of NEPAD's Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) in Abuja in March 2002, is to "Support efforts to curb the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons in Africa". Already, UNDP/RBA has signed a project document in support of the

674 Cfr. Chandre G. and Guy, L. (eds.) Hide and Seek: Taking account of Small Arms in Southern Africa, Pretoria, 2003, p.203.

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AU/NEPAD common peace and security agenda that recognizes the role of the Sub- regional Organizations such as ECOWAS in promoting peace within the common continental security architecture under the AU Peace and Security Council.675

According to the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW; the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW676 and such sub-regional initiatives as the ECOWAS Moratorium, African leaders have committed themselves to resolutely combat the scourge of small arms, light weapons and land mines at the sub-regional and continental levels in a comprehensive, integrated, sustainable and efficient manner.

3.1.4. Linking the development of ECOSAP to existing African and international SALW

control initiatives

Efforts to control the licit and illicit flows of SALW within the ECOWAS region, through the development of a regional moratorium, code of conduct, National Commissions and PCASED, were an early inspiration and model for action in other parts of Africa. Subsequent initiatives such as the Nairobi Declaration and Regional Focal Point, the development of national plans of action in East and Southern Africa and substantial African and international civil society capacity building efforts have, in recent years, shown the way forward.

The process that lead into the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA) was a landmark effort to acknowledge and address the illicit proliferation of SALW globally, and provided an internationally agreed framework for cooperation between states in a number of key areas. These key areas include support for the establishment of national focal points, information exchanges, legislation, regulations, law enforcement, marking and tracing, stockpile management and other technical and policy measures to address small arms proliferation. The adoption of the UNPoA was followed, in 2002, by the All

675 Cfr. www.issafrica.org/. (retrieved on 14.March.2015). 676 Cfr. www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/MLI/00049988_Prodoc%20ECOSAP.pdf (retrieved on 14.March 2015).

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Africa Conference between African and OECD member states on the needs, requirements and partnerships necessary to fulfill the UNPoA.

3.1.5. UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Proliferation of

Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

This UN Program of action (UNPoA) was unanimously adopted at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. It is not legally binding but identifies; National, Regional and Global measures including legislation on illegal production, possession, stockpiling and trade in small arms; Stockpile management and destruction of weapons confiscated or collected; Identification and tracking of illicit arms; International cooperation and assistance to states to strengthen their ability to identify and trace the illicit weapons; and Public awareness campaigns.

Though, it had noble goals, the UNPoA was bound to be weak and not very successful first of all, because it was only a program of action, that is, politically but not legally binding, and secondly, because influential powers like the USA and other major weapons producers like China, India, Israel, Russia, Egypt etc approached it with a lukewarm attitude. The subsequent biennial meetings of July 2003 and July 2005 and particularly the UNPoA review conference of July 2006 in New York did not bring any ground-breaking results and concluded without agreement on a final document as countries continued to disagree on several issues like ammunition possession, prohibition of transfers to non-state actors and global guidelines for SALW transfers. The 2006 review conference eventually failed to provide a mandate for a follow-up review conference in five years and guidance on future implementation.677

The UN is formally committed to cooperating with ECOWAS on policy development relating to security and cross-border issues, as framed by the March 2003 UN Security Council Resolution 1467 on the Proliferation of SALW and mercenary activities: threats to peace and security in West Africa and the March 2004 Report of the Secretary General on

677 Cfr. SIPRI , 2007 Yearbook, on Armaments Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, p.14.

183 ways to combat sub-regional and cross-border problems in West Africa. The Secretary General's report is explicit in its recommendations for cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS and on specifies actions to advance a small arms control agenda in the sub- region. These reports have also reinforced the need to build the capacity of the ECOWAS Commission and National Small Arms Commissions.678

The new AU/NEPAD peace and security agenda in its small arms trafficking component and the accompanying G8-NEPAD partnership agenda for action on peace and security development in Africa have also placed considerable emphasis on the need to build both strong national and regional capacity.679

Any new regional small arms initiatives should also seek to complement existing legally binding protocols to address transnational organized crime, as well as regional African initiatives and Protocols for the control of firearms and ammunition such as the SADC Protocol and the EARPCCO Protocol. The institutionalization of regional police chiefs committees and the increasing programming of the Regional Interpol Bureau will also increase the effectiveness and coordination of continental and international law enforcement efforts to address illicit trafficking.

Other initiative about arms control include Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The Nairobi Protocol is legally binding, was adopted in April 2004 and entered into force in May 2005. It requires member states to outlaw the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and misuse of SALW and obliges them to address the problem of internal conflict, which makes the flow of light weapons into Central and attractive. In June 2005, the Best Practice Guidelines, a non binding document was adopted to implement it. Institution building to oversee the implementation of the protocol has been very positive but success

678 Cfr. Ibidem. 679 Cfr. Ibidem.

184 will depend on the sustained Political Will and commitment of all governments in the region.680

NB. This initiative comes outside our period of research but it is as a result of constant trial on the improvement regarding the control of influx of SALW within the continent and region.

Conclusion

The adoption of a peace and security mandate by ECOWAS, (and within it the Moratorium), continued to pose significant challenges for the organization at all levels. The establishment of the new ECOWAS Department for Defense, Security and Political Affairs had been a timely measure towards the provision of the requisite human resources and operational procedures to enable the Secretariat to fulfill the then critical role, as prescribed not just in the Moratorium proposals but the wider Protocol Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

National interests might have been articulated and pursued with calculable degrees of effectiveness through other means: diplomatic, political, economic, mediation, sanctions, peacekeeping, and peace-building, the use of military force, pre-emptive, preventive or intervention, being the last resort. Thus, Liberia’s national security should not have continued to be at the expense of any of its regional neighbors, immediate or distant. Beyond the confines of the Mano River Basin, there was considerable scope for peace- building intervention by ECOWAS, which also had a moral right and obligation for substantive contributions towards durable peace in Liberia, in order to secure the gains of its previous peacekeeping and peace-building interventions by preventing a relapse into conflict.

The Liberian conflict is convincing evidence that because intra-state conflict may not necessarily be contained within state borders and may be exported as an active deliberate

680 SIPRI, 2005 Yearbook, on Armaments Disarmament and International Security, op.cit., p.12.

185 policy of regional destabilization and regional organizations that constituted key stakeholders in not only resolving the conflicts, but also preventing their future recurrence.

It is therefore necessary in this context that in the next chapter, we shall focus on security reform, general conclusion and recommendation about our research on SALW in Liberia after the Cold War.

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CHAPTER FIVE

0.0 SECURITY REFORM IN LIBERIA.

Seeing the genesis of problems in Liberia and West Africa at large, there has been a need of security reform. Clearly, the unchecked flow of SALW to areas of conflict represented a significant threat to world peace and security. While it cannot be said that such weapons are a primary cause of conflict, their worldwide availability, low cost and ease of operation made it relatively easy for potential belligerents of all kinds to initiate and sustain deadly conflict. Accordingly, policy-makers began to highlight the need for new international controls in this area. In a January 1998 message to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "With regard to conventional weapons, there is a growing awareness among member-states of the urgent need to adopt measures to reduce the transfer of SALW. It is now incumbent on all of us to translate this shared awareness into decisive action."

Interest in the trade in light weapons has also been spurred by a growing number of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), many of which played a key role in the international campaign and lobbying. Along with UN officials and leaders of interested governments, these groups led the search for new policy prescriptions

1.1 International Efforts

In line with the increased attention being focused by the international community on the dangers posed by SALW, the United Nations has been engaged in a wide variety of activities to both publicize the problem and initiate steps toward policy controls. The two major efforts undertaken so far by the United Nations were the study conducted by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1996 and 1997, which analyzed the types of weapons used in contemporary conflicts and the nature and causes of their excessive accumulation and the parallel study of member-states' firearm regulations

187 conducted by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the same two-year period.681

Operationally, the United Nations sought to monitor the effectiveness of various international embargoes on the transfer of weaponry into areas of conflict. In 1996, a UN International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the implementation of the UN arms embargo, paying particular attention to specific allegations of embargo violations. In their report, members of the commission noted that "we could not fail to note the absence of an effective, proactive mechanism to monitor or implement the arms embargo the Security Council it had imposed path-breaking efforts to collect and destroy firearms internally and to promote a regional moratorium on the trade in SALW.682

Other international organizations also became involved in the light weapons issue, particularly as it relates to issues of economic and human development. The World Bank devoted resources to issues of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in regard to the demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into civil society. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), through its task force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, put greater emphasis on the need for "timely prevention measures" (such as limiting arms flows in areas of potential conflict) in order to forestall armed violence.683

1.2. Regional Efforts

In West African governments worked hand in hand with the United Nations to assess the regional implications of light weapons diffusion and to craft a regional moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of such arms. In Central Africa, the United Nations established a trust fund with which to remove SALW from the region. Similarly, the Southern Africa Development Community recommended the establishment of a regional

681 Cfr. www.armscontrol.org/treaties, (Retrieved on 14.04.2015). 682 Cfr. Ibidem., 683 Cfr. Controlling the Real Instruments of War, In Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org/print/391 (Retrieved on 30.05. 2013).

188 database on stolen firearms and the implementation of multilateral police operations to recover such weapons to avoid its misuse.

Among European countries, there was increased pressures for controlling both legal and illegal shipments of weapons, particularly to countries experiencing civil strife and human rights abuses. In June 1997, the European Union (EU) agreed to a Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. In June 1998, the EU formally adopted a "code of conduct" on arms transfers with the goal of preventing such transfers to areas of conflict and internal repression. While useful steps, both measures will require Political Will in constraining arms transfers and dedicated resources to help affected countries monitor arms shipments and remove excess weaponry.

The impact of this development has been as a result of increased internal insecurity to ordinary peoples, effectively undermining their ability to engage in productive and economic activities as well as active politics. It is therefore on this milieu, that a major tool that emerged, motivated by the International Community, the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN), the implementation of comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the immediate post-conflict peace-building process.

In this context, SSR attempted to facilitate the disarmament of all belligerent groups, strengthening policing and border control measures, while at the same time motivating for an adequate, economically sustainable and legitimate ‘core’ armed force. In other words, comprehensive SSR engaged at the strategic level, providing a conducive political environment, but also offering constructive guidelines at tactical/technical and operational levels.

Conducting SSR and enhancing law enforcement as part of a comprehensive post-conflict peace-building exercise in Liberia threw up immense challenges for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The framework for the process in Liberia had initially been launched in the 1990s by ECOMOG but was not fully implemented. As a result of the resumption of the conflict in 2002/03, a second attempt was set in motion in 2004, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana, on 18th August, 2003. These

189 included: the Government of the Republic of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL and other Political parties as highlighted in chapter one of this work. The main concern to address the issue of civil war that had engulfed Liberia and all its effects.684

The intimidating task faced by UNOMIL had revealed serious dysfunctions and deserved serious attention, to identify the challenges confronting a successful SSR in Liberia, and suggest suitable policy options. Another factor uniquely related to the challenges of SSR in Liberia concerns smuggling of SALW in the Mano River basin and by extension Côte d’Ivoire. According to the HRW the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire “forced thousands of young men and boys to become mercenaries”.685

This scenario created a challenge that went beyond the capacity of many of the small and weak states to confront and reflect the absence of political ethos in the youthful rebel movements that characterized in the region by the presence of the hired gangs,686 had to be seriously considered as part of the national dynamics of insecurity.

Therefore we shall make evaluation on the dynamics of the implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the national transitional government of Liberia (NTGL) with the support of UNOMIL. Basing on this, we shall focus on the frame work of SSR and then highlight the rule of Law deficit in Liberia as a platform of post conflict security sector.

There is a need also to focus on the restructuring and retraining of the Liberian National Police (LNP), Correctional Services, or Prisons, and other allied security institutions, such as Intelligence and Border Police, as well as the core force, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).

684 Cfr. GNA, Liberians fail to sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 17 July 2003, www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel, (Retrieved on 11.04.2015). 685 BBC News, Mercenaries fuel West African wars, 13 April 2005. Also HR report on Youth, poverty and blood: the legacy of West Africa’s regional warriors, March 2005, Vol 17, No 5 (A) 686 Gangs are considered to be part of organized crime that provide a level of organization and resources that support much larger and more complex criminal transactions than an individual criminal could achieve

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The scrutiny will focus on the activities of the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) or the International Police Service (IPS), as well as mutual partners in reforming the country’s security services. Much attention is paid to Liberia’s security versatile that made the case for contextualizing Liberia’s security sector reform within the framework of a reincarnated Mano River Union.

1.3. The concept of security sector reform

Security sector reform can be defined as being “concerned with the ‘provision of security within the state’” although the final word, ‘reform’, denotes the provision of security in a preferred manner or way. Accepting the normative implication in the definition, security sector reform relates to “the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner and within the framework of civilian democratic control”.687

This rests on the notion of propagating a democratic framework in which elected civilians in charge of the security sector reign supreme. It also accepts contribution in the process of reforming the security sector by the ‘international community’ and also imbibing related ideas about values, standards and guidelines. These created the entry points for structures within the international security system and the UN, as well as regional organizations, to engage at local and national level in reforming national components of the security sector.

1.4. Background to Security Sector Reform Assisted by UNOMIL in Liberia

While the methods used by the protagonists in the Liberian conflict and their effects on Liberian society had horrified the world community, our task has been up to now based on some of the more significant contours not only to provide clarity, but also to demonstrate the level of degeneration during the year between 1989-2003. But we can summarize it in

687 Timothy Edwards, Security Sector reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Criteria for success and failure, presented at the Security Sector Reform; Concepts and Implementation conference held by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 22-23 November 2001, p 2, (Retrieved on 12 April 2005); an attempt to integrate the loose security sector conceptual framework with perspectives from Africa by M Rupiya, An African perspective of the reform of the security sector since the 1990s, in Len le Roux et al (eds.), Guarding the guardians: Parliamentary oversight and civil-military relations: The challenges for SADC, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004, pp 3–16.

191 the following ways: In socio-political terms, the protracted conflict polarized Liberian society, reduced most to ferreting for survival or immigration, in economic terms, the war wrecked the already fragile lines of production and left the treasury bare,688 this led to economic war based on looting; criminal activities, armed violence; petty trading with capital clandestinely obtained from the ongoing disarmament, demobilization reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) voluntary refugee repatriation packages; food handouts in IDP camps; and an artificial temporal injection of peacekeeping funds, as the backbone of a rather temporal alternative economy. As well, Liberian society became burdened under the weight of the social costs of the war, which included the breakdown of social morals and prostitution on a scale hitherto unseen in the small country. The phenomenon of broken homes, single parent homes and, of course, the attendant increase in the incidence of HIV/AIDS became commonplace.689 Finally, the Liberian conflict precipitated regional conflicts into the rest of the Mano River Union (MRU) comprising Guinea, Sierra Leone (1991–1998), and Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2003).

Many believed that even though the CPA (2003) made provision for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), the lack of substantive provisions for a criminal tribunal to deal with human rights abuses and , coupled with the fact that the CPA had allowed Taylor and other key players in the conflict to escape justice, made it doubtful whether these crucial ideals would be achieved.

Within the context of this chapter, however, although the regional peace initiative was disposed towards a blanket amnesty for perpetrators of human rights abuse,690 the UN

688 Cfr. UNDP HDI 2003,

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System has come out strongly against the regional political expediency. The UN Security Council, in its preamble to Resolution 1509, has:

… deplored the violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread sexual violence against women and children(…) mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law.

This therefore threw down the gauntlet to the region and, indeed, to the regional lead nation, Nigeria, to review its decision to grant asylum to former president Taylor an indicted war criminal. Although some might argue that the decision was politically expedient at the time, it runs the risk of robbing the victims of the conflict in the sub-region of their principal culprit. Of course this could not be justified because later on Taylor was handed over to the ICC.

1.5. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Reforms in Liberia. what should be the real focus of reform of the rule of law in Liberia? As a minimum, it has to entail two critical dimensions. One of these relates to the restoration of the rule of law during the transitional period by promoting law and order, preventing crime and, devoid of corruption, ensuring due process for offenders. However, these measures would not suffice, unless they were accompanied by reform of security sector organizations and institutions.

The second dimension relates to human rights abuses and impunity (discussed in chapter Three), it being the considered view again that, whether then or later, the ends of the rule of law would be better served by ensuring that the transitional justice would include mechanisms to bring persons suspected of gross abuse of human rights to trial. Unless this was done, the cycle of impunity that had become endemic in Liberia and the MRU area would be more difficult to penetrate. If arms brokers, the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity who escaped justice in the 1990s would walk away again in the 2000s, it would sent the wrong signal to aspiring warlords and make the next generation of warlords deadlier, with no restraints on the means and methods that would apply for attainment of their objectives.

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Having said this, the vital importance and symbiotic linkages between the rule of law and security of the state were duly recognized in the CPA (2003), as well as in UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), which established the UNOMIL. The CPA called for the establishment of the TRC that would provide a forum for truth-telling and national healing, but not for punishing those who had committed crimes against the people, outside the norms of the laws of armed conflict.691

Liberia’s transitional legislature codified this agreement in May 2005 (TRC Act, 2005). The deployment of the joint ECOWAS and UNOMIL had sustained the resultant peace and security in Liberia through a two-year transitional government and nationwide elections of a new government in late 2005 to the present.

These national reconciliation processes, while all distinctive in some ways, often typically include four overlapping phases:

(1) public truth telling;

(2) a redefinition of the identities of the belligerents and the roles and relationships

of important social groups and institutions;

(3) limited justice (i.e., justice short of full retribution for all harms); and

(4) an explicit call to break with the past and dedicate to a new relationship and a

new social and moral order.692

A public, officially sanctioned truth and reconciliation commission is often one of the first and most indispensable elements of a successful national reconciliation. Implementation of a TRC was practical because the alternative to a truth and reconciliation approach to settlement a war crimes tribunal that would put all the warlords on trial was unacceptable to the warring factions engaged in the peace negotiations, and the legal mechanisms

691 Cfr. CPA, op.cit., p 12. 692 Cfr. William .J Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, p.121.

194 needed to address accountability through formal judicial proceedings were unavailable in Liberia after fourteen years of civil war.693

1.6. The Roles of Truth in the Reconciliation Process

Truth telling is not synonymous with reconciliation. Rather, it opens up a public space for reconciliation by allowing a formerly taboo like cannibalism as we discussed in chapter three as well, subject to become amenable to the action of political bodies and future policies. Truth telling is “one part of a broader process . . . [to] help spark a longer-term process of national healing and reconciliation”.694 It plays a critical, perhaps indispensable, role in the process of national reconciliation and contributes directly and indirectly to the requirements for justice and redefinition of personal and institutional identities essential to complete the process of reconciliation.

Public truth telling goes beyond merely knowing the truth. In a small, densely populated society like Liberia, few were untouched by the violence and many know what abuses occurred and who carried them out. Thus the importance of truth telling in the context of a truth commission is not only about uncovering the truth, but also in acknowledging it. Aryeh Neier wrote, “Knowledge that is officially sanctioned” becomes “part of the public cognitive scene that is not there when it is merely ‘the truth’.” Official acknowledgement of what has long been denied can psychologically begin to heal societal wounds because it unmasks an official lie and strips away impunity. The truth is especially potent in these respects when it is promulgated so as to be quantifiable to a large swath of the public.695

693 It should be noted that the resort to a TRC as the more appropriate mechanism did not represent a choice of blanket amnesty or an abdication of justice, however. The Liberian TRC’s role is to secure the truth and ensure accountability by making recommendations both as to the need for future prosecutions and for amnesty (but only for lesser offenses and only if certain prerequisites have been fulfilled by the individual requesting amnesty). Section 26, partg, of the TRC Act (2005) provides that the Commission’s powers shall include: Recommending amnesty under terms and conditions established by the TRC upon application of individual persons making full disclosure or their wrongs and thereby expressing remorse for their acts and/or omissions, whether as an accomplice or a perpetrator, provided that the amnesty or exoneration shall not apply to violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity in conformity with international law and standards. (Author emphasis added.) The italicized clause makes clear that not all violations are pardonable, and, based on precedent, it would prohibit the TRC from recommending amnesty for most serious crimes committed during the period of the Commission’s investigation (1979-2003). 694 Hayner Priscilla, The Past as Predator, draft manuscript, Boston Beacon Press, 1998, p.2. 695 Cfr. Neier Aryeh, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, New York Review of Books, 1990, pp.32-34.

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According to Jon Sobrino Truth telling also facilitates the pursuit of justice. The findings of a truth commission provide the evidentiary foundation and a pool of possible witnesses for the pursuit of formal justice against those named in the report.696

The TRC and Liberia have several obstacles on the path to reconciliation and the consolidation of peace, however. First, the TRC itself must adhere to a demanding schedule of hearings, data analysis, and reports. Following the Report, Liberia must stand up an Independent National Human Rights Commission with the responsibility of seeing that the TRC recommendations are scrupulously implemented. Liberia’s governing institutions would have to demonstrate political Will and skill in meeting their reporting requirements and enacting the recommendations. Some achievements are registered through TRC, like democratic elections, testimonies and reconciliation but other social services still remained a hindrance as we saw in the recent breakout of Ebola in 2014 among other issues.

It is significant therefore, that the CPA (2003) provided the mandate for the reestablishment of the rule of law by the LNTG, composed of members of all the warring factions, in conjunction with other international partners. The second provision was also informed by the nature of the war and foot-soldiers employed in the conflict, most of whom were children and needed special efforts for their urgent and effective rehabilitation.697

We may therefore argue that:

 The regional peace instruments providing for a TRC alone were flawed and amount to a miscarriage of justice that was detrimental to sustainable peace-building in Liberia and West Africa. As a result, the regional peace initiative needed to realign itself with the stated opposition of the UN System to the blanket amnesty.

696 Cfr. Sobrino Jon, Theological Reflections on the Report of the Truth Commission, In Charles Harper, ed., Impunity: An Ethical Perspective. Geneva: World Council of Churches Publication, 1996. 697 Cfr. UN, Fifth Progress Report of the UN Secretary General (S/2004/972) dated 17 December 2004. Following the first meeting held on 28 July 2004 to work out the relevant framework, the UNMIL Human Rights Unit has collaborated with the NTGL and a wide range of civil society organizations to operationalise the TRC.

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 The desirability of a criminal court notwithstanding, the establishment of such a court would have to be carefully timed so that it does not compromise the effectiveness of the TRC or the peace process.  In addition, there was a need for mechanisms to build on the strengths of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), in order to make such a court process for Liberia more effective.

To support the institutionalization of human rights and the rule of law in Liberia, Resolution 1509 mandated UNOMIL to focus assistance by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to the promotion of human rights monitoring activities in Liberia, through UNOMIL’s presence, capacity and expertise. In addition, the Resolution enjoined the missions to restructure the security sector, particularly the police, and to consolidate its legal framework, coupled with the reform of judicial and correctional institutions.698

Among a range of measures to fulfill its mandate, UNOMIL established the Human Rights and Protection Unit, comprising child protection, rule of law, transitional justice, gender and trafficking advisors, for advocacy on human rights, as well as the institutionalization and operationalization of the TRC and INCHR, in pursuance of the CPA (2003). By focusing on a constant assessment of the implementation and application of the law, the rule of law advisory group has contributed to:

 plugging legal gaps in laws relating to detention and trial;  improving legal procedures relating to access to justice, including the realignment of traditional practices contravening or impeding human rights;  supporting the retraining and education of law enforcement officers at the LNP academy, focusing strongly on human rights;  building the capacity of civil society organizations by involving the media and a legal resource base in the implementation of the law;  advocating, with the NTGL, INCHR and other institutions, the

698 Cfr. CPA, op. cit., p.11. Cfr. also UNSC Resolution 1509 (2003), op. cit, p .4.

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ratification of international agreements relating to human rights.699

Liberia’s constitution, statutory and customary laws, coupled with the international laws acceded to by the country,700 constituted only the software of the rule of law. The courts and law enforcement agencies, notably the police, criminal investigation and intelligence, constitute the hardware that is indispensable to the rule of law in Liberia, etc, as well as correctional institutions.

1.7 The security sector reform in Liberia

Institutions such as the AFL, LNP, the Prisons Services, the Liberian National Coast Guard (LNCG) and related agencies, including intelligence services in their conduct and relationship with the society, reflected decades of interference by the ruling elite. UNOMIL was mandated to train and restructure the LNP and other security services the National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Services (SSS), custom security guards and other statutory security units adopting a professional orientation that emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, among others.701 This intervention was grafted into the security sinews of the regional organization, ECOWAS, as well as the international community.

In the implementation of the restructuring of the LNP, the UNMIL-IPS, working through the Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee (whose Reform and Restructuring Unit is co-located with LNP Headquarters), formulated major policy decisions relating to the reform and restructuring of the LNP. A memorandum of understanding, which provides the operational framework for implementing reform and restructuring measures, was signed by

699 UN Security Council, Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary General, op cit. Annex II indicates that Liberia has signed the following five treaties: (a) the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (b) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; (c) the Optional Protocol to the Convention the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; and (e) the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of ALL Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. 700 Cfr. Ibidem., 701 Cfr. CPA , op. cit., p.10.

198 the parties.702 The NTGL and UNMIL have undertaken a number of reform measures, including the screening, vetting, registration, training and deployment of old and new personnel of the LNP. The LNP academy was refurbished through bilateral US assistance. Similarly, improvements have been made to the standard operating procedures (SOP) to guide security measures around vital installations in the country.703 The UNMIL Correctional Advisory Unit, guided by the Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP), handled the reform of Liberia’s Correctional Service. The unit provides for a revision and improvement in penal legislation, policies and procedures to international standards of prison administration. At the core of the international norm for correctional service is its adherence to human rights as well as motivation for suitable correctional facilities design.704

The presence of a retrained police was expected to generate confidence between the population and the security force. The CIVPOL/IPS, as well as civil society organizations and other stakeholders, from the beginning had incorporated human rights, gender and the protection of vulnerable groups into the training program. What appears to be deficient, however, is gender balancing in the LNP.705

The success story, however, is different if we consider progress in the Judiciary and Correctional Service, despite the efforts of the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL)/IPS and judicial units. Preliminary evidence revealed deficits and the need for improvements in the

702 The Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee comprises the UNMIL Rule of Law Unit and the Liberian Ministry of Justice, the National Security Advisor and the Director of the LNP. See UNMIL Press Release, UNMIL/PIO/ PR/120, 30 September 2004, titled: UNMIL and Transitional Government sign memorandum of understanding on security sector reform. 703 The screening and vetting measures are aiming to get rid of persons recruited by Taylor after 1997, to prevent persons with criminal records from recruitment, as well as to provide a database of human rights abuses, for use during a future criminal tribunal. 704 Cfr. Aboagye and Bah, op. cit, p 11. The unit comprises the Correctional Service Advisory and Mentoring Group and the Correctional Service Training and Development Group. In addition, the CIVPOL/IPS provides collaborative assistance to the Corrections Advisory Unit in the development and implementation of correctional training, as well as operational coordination on juvenile issues, custody and detention. 705 This type of training focuses on radio communications, motorcycle operation and safety, management, forensics, county commanders training, basic safety and security for Roberts International Airport screeners and customs officers, defensive tactics for Freeport police, crowd control and incident management training.

199 area of justice delivery. Part of the explanation lies in the lack of capacity on the part of the NTGL, including inadequate correctional facilities.706

It appears that rather than tackling the challenge head on, UNOMIL chose the softer niche area of police reforms, given its lack of resources and capacity, but also given the UN Charter position that tends to ‘preclude’ UN peace operations from the reform of national armed forces and leaves that task to coalition or bilateral arrangements. With ECOMIL subsumed and unable to complete ECOMOG’s task, the responsibility for the reform of the AFL therefore devolves on bilateral technical arrangements, substantively the US, which had indicated its interest in undertaking the task. However, by mid-2004, the US policy from unofficial sources for the reform of the AFL was still ambiguous.707

Among other reasons, the delay is owing to the debate in some sections of the UN System, particularly the UNOMIL, Jacques Paul Klein, had argued that Liberia should totally abolish its army and make do with a “decent police force and a well-trained border security force of between 600–700 men”.708

Between October 2004 and February 2005 it has gradually become clearer that the US would outsource the restructuring, recruitment and retraining of the new AFL to DynCorp International, a private military company (PMC), on a budget of US$ 35 million, as an implementing partner. In contrast, the entire Liberian security sector program had received pledges amounting to US$ 200 million.709 Against the background of the United States’ preference for support to PMCs, the UN had submitted a further funding proposal to continue its efforts with the police, in a process that we have argued was imperfect. After receiving critical comments from the field on its policy focus, the UN sought to address this by seeking the assistance of the US, towards undertaking the reform of the AFL within

706 Cfr. Aboagye and Bah, op. cit, p.11. Liberia’s three prisons are Belle Yalla (Lofa County) Prison for condemned convicts; Post Stockade (Montserrado County) for political prisoners; and the Central Prison Compound (Monrovia City) serving as the general prison. 707 Cfr. Aboagye and Bah, op. cit, p.17. The unofficial policy seemed to be to wait for the establishment of a more functional government in Liberia. 708 www.CorpWatch Liberia, 15 February 2005, for an outline of the plan. It is indicated that the US-based PMC specializes in security and aircraft maintenance and has been involved in the contract training of new police forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia. 709 Cfr. www. CorpWatch Liberia, op cit.

200 the framework of the UNOMIL ‘Blue Paper’. This provided for a new “defense policy outline, aimed at securing the territorial integrity of the Liberian state. Sensitive to its geographical location, the new policy threat assessment and response included setting up a new coastguard to provide maritime patrols.”710

The involvement of a PMC in the reform of Liberia’s security sector therefore aroused concern because functional democratic civil-military relations devolved on the principles of transparency and accountability to the civil authority. These were principles to which some PMCs and private security companies (PSCs) had not lived up, or had not 711 demonstrated sufficient commitment.

1.8. Liberia’s Security Complex and Concerns: The Way Forward For Security Sector Reform

The security sector in Liberia and elsewhere in post-conflict Africa cannot slough off its colonial character. Whether post-conflict or otherwise, the process of security sector, transformation had to be part of, if not the result of, a similar drive to transform and modernize the state in Africa.712

As a result of this dilemma, the Liberian security complex devolved on a number of issues and dynamics. These include:

 social, political and economic tensions between the settler and indigenous societies, as well as among some of the ethnic groups;  national fratricide and its impact on professionalism of the security forces;  the dislocation and disorientation of the AFL and militia and their role in threatening human security in Liberia;

710 UNSG Fifth Report (2004), op. cit, p.7. 711 Cfr. Global Peace Forum, www.globalpeaceforum.org, for pieces on PMCs. In one of such articles by Leslie Wayne, New York Times, 13 October 2002, PMCs Pentagon prefer not to be seen, etc. Cfr. aspects of the debate by Geoff Harris, Civilianizing military functions, in Geoff Harris (ed.), Achieving security in sub- Saharan Africa: Cost effective alternatives to the military, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004, pp.35–36. 712 Cfr. Adedeji, op. cit, p.16, citing Rocky Williams, in Africa and the challenges of security sector reform, ISS Monograph 46, February 2000, p.7; Cfr. also: www. iss.org.za/pubs/monographs/No46/Africa.html (retrieved 11.Sept.2014).

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 the involvement and role of non-state actors in undermining human security in Liberia;  the proliferation of SALW;  the calculated exportation of the conflict into neighboring states and its fuelling through a network of regional warlords;  the endemic presence of regional mercenaries;  the illegal exploitation of natural resources through the force of arms and cross- border criminal networks  the new paradigm of civil society involvement and engagement in influencing and shaping the processes and ends of peace-building, including constitutional, socio- political, judicial and security reforms; and  the disconnect between the UNOMIL’s DD and RR components informed by the funding deficit for effective sustainable reintegration and rehabilitation.

Security sector reform in Liberia was therefore underscored by these dynamics and issues that had seriously eroded the monopoly of the state over the use of coercive instruments of violence, which had been traditionally exercised through statutory security forces. Liberia’s security sector, as in many other countries afflicted by conflict, was characterized by state (statutory) and non-state (non-statutory) actors, who had demonstrated paradoxical selective security agenda and objectives, sometimes to protect civilian populations, but at other times, to threaten other civilian populations.713

To be able to restore a modicum of the authority of the state over the use of coercive force in Liberia, the state should have first appreciated the broad spectrum of these statutory and non-statutory actors.714 In consideration of the complicity of the state in abusing the

713 Ibidem., p.6. 714 Ibidem, pp.3–5. A narrower definition of the security sector includes those institutions entrusted with the protection of the state and its citizens, based on a monopoly of the use (or threat of use) of coercive force, that is, military, paramilitary, intelligence, police and penal forces, but also includes the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these agencies (ministries of defence, finance, interior, national security agencies, judiciary and parliament). He further cites the UNDP (HDI, 2002, and OECD, Paris, 2000), for a broader definition that includes non-statutory security forces (such as liberation armies, private security companies, guerrilla armies) and civil society groups. (Cfr. Martin Rupiya, An African perspective of the

202 human rights of the very people it was established to protect,715 the post-conflict state in Liberia is confronted with the challenge of regaining the trust of the people after successive governments compromised their side of the social contract. The reform of the security sector should therefore be informed by a number of requisites, including but not necessarily limited to the following:

 A security policy paper that provides a clear assessment and definition of what constitutes the national interests of Liberia, the relevant threats to such interests, and the best means of addressing these threats, in order to safeguard those interests716;  Appropriate quantitative levels of manpower, coupled with a qualitative goal of achieving ethno-regional balance and professionalism;  A measurable program to rid the society of the illicit weapons in circulation, coupled with gainful programmes to absorb the disarmed, displaced and returned refugees; and  Regional and international community engagement to deepen the process of sustainable peace-building.

The collapse of the state should provide Liberia and its people, as partners in peace- building, with a new opportunity to undo the legacies of their colonial past by transforming reconstructing the entire national security landscape.717

As espoused by the AU in its Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), security in Renaissance Africa means more than the security of regimes, it means:

… ensuring the common security of Africans involves working on the basis of a definition which encompasses both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival

reform of the security sector since the 1990s, Cfr. also Len le Roux et al, op cit, p.6; www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/ guardiansaug04/Rupiya, (retrieved on 9.Aug.2014). 715 Cfr. Adedeji, op cit, p.4, citing I Williams, Why Africa needs security sector reform, in A Lala and A Fitzgerald (eds.), Providing security for people: Security sector reform in Africa, GFN-SSR, Shrivenham, 2003. 716 Cfr. Eric Bonnemaison, Security sector planning in Africa: Military force as a public good, In African Security Review 11(2), 2002. 717 Cfr. Adedeji, op cit, p.7.

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of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflicts. The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well.

According to this approach:

This newer, multidimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human right; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation.

As a layered approach, it also means that:

At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic, political and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental level, the principle would be underscored that the security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole.718

Liberia does not need convincing that this is not the with its strategic doctrinal emphasis on the absoluteness of the military instrument of state power,719 but ought to be based on a ‘non-offensive defense (NOD)’ framework that emphasizes a national defense posture involving such simple, but effective confidence building mechanisms as exchange of defense attachés, military students and directing staff, as well as joint training exercises and observation.720 In general, the transformation ought to focus on efforts and mechanisms to realign those internal and external dynamics that have shaped its national security in the past. A similar view is expressed by Rupiya:

718 AU Common African Defense and Security Policy, Sirte, February 2004. 719 Cfr. Michael Howard, Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p.35. 720 Cfr. Bjion Moller, Defensive restructuring of the military in sub-Saharan Africa, in Geoff Harris, (ed.), op.cit., p 18 and pp.26-27. In terms of professionalism, Moller emphasizes Huntington’s (1957) view of the officer corps, and cites the Burundi model of power-sharing arrangements in the Arusha Agreement (2000)- The view here is that this is a model that cannot be adopted for all situations.

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… reforming the security sector is basically part of a process designed to fit the bureaucracy within states, especially those structures that have/ had the role of exercising monopoly of violence on behalf of ‘one-party’ or such like, in line with the new liberal democratic dispensation and subordinated to the existing international security system.721

Against the background of the country’s history and the objective performance of the security forces, Liberia’s security forces should exist for one purpose only, to provide and guarantee the security of its citizens, where human security becomes a public good722.

The reforms should transcend the notions of regime security to instill a culture of democratic civil-military relations, based on respect for human rights that is influenced by professional leadership. In this context, it was essential to aim at achieving a balance among the various ethnic groups723, in order to ensure a fair representation in the reformed armed forces.

2.0. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

2.1. Recommendation

From all that has been learned about the international trade in SALW in our discussion, it is evident that no single set of policy initiatives will suffice to deal with this problem. National governments especially will have to go beyond their support for cracking down on the illegal trade in light weapons and examine their own role in the legal weapons trade. The following initiatives represent a rough menu of the sort of steps that will be needed to subject light weapons transfers to greater international scrutiny and to reduce the flow of such munitions to areas of conflict.

721 Rupiya, , op cit., p 6. 722 Cfr. Harris, Geoff, Civilianizing military functions, op. cit, p.33. As a commodity, the author categorizes military security as a public good because it constitutes a service that benefits ‘one and all’ with funded from public taxes. 723 Cfr. Moller, op. cit., pp.27–28. In terms of professionalism, Moller emphasizes Huntington’s (1957) view of the officer corps, and cites the Burundi model of power-sharing arrangements in the Arusha Agreement (2000). The view here is that this is a model that cannot be adopted for all situations.

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2.2. Establish International Norms

The first, and perhaps most important, step is to adopt international norms against the uncontrolled and destabilizing transfer of SALW to areas of tension and conflict. Although deference must be made to the traditional right of sovereign states to arm themselves, it must be made clear that this right has natural limits and does not extend to the acquisition of arms for the purpose of engaging in genocide or the suppression of opposition political or religious movements. It must become axiomatic, moreover, that the right to acquire arms for self-defense entails an obligation to maintain such weapons under effective government control at all times and to preclude their diversion to illicit purposes.

While it may take some time to clarify and win support for such norms, the basic groundwork has been provided by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In its 1997 report, the panel concludes: "The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of SALW is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence," and is, therefore, "an issue of legitimate concern for the international community”. With this in mind, the report calls on UN member-states to "exercise restraint" with respect to the transfer of such weapons and to take all necessary steps to prevent the diversion of government arms supplies into illegitimate hands.

Undoubtedly, much work is needed to strengthen these norms and to promote their acceptance by governments. As in the worldwide campaign against SALW, the media can focus public attention on the dangers posed by such weapons, especially to civilians and children. The issue is admittedly complicated by the fact that, national governments and military and police forces can demonstrate a far greater legitimate need for light weapons for purposes of self-defense and national security. Nonetheless, the frequency with which such weapons are used against civilians and children points to a humanitarian aspect. International norms could also be developed along the lines of the Geneva Conventions, where states-parties would be prohibited from supplying light weapons to any government, group or entity that does not have the resources to treat its wounded or those of the enemy, or has not trained its own personnel in the laws of war. In addition, public sentiment could

206 be mobilized to support constraints on the inhumane or indiscriminate effects of light weapons, in the same way that blinding laser weapons have been banned by the recently adopted protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

2.3. Increase International Transparency

At present, efforts to monitor and control the diffusion of SALW are hampered by a lack of detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions. Few governments provide detailed data on imports and exports of light weapons, and the UN Conventional Arms Register covers major weapons only. To ensure effective international oversight of the legal trade in light weapons, efforts at increased transparency must be made at the national, regional and international level. National governments should be required to publish detailed annual tallies of weapons imports and exports, while regional arms registers covering light weapons should also be encouraged. Finally, at the international level, the UN arms register should be gradually extended to cover all types of munitions, including SALW.

Enhanced international transparency is also necessary to curb the illicit trade in light weapons. In the absence of an effective transparency regime, it is relatively easy for illicit dealers to conceal their operations; as information on legal trade becomes more widely available, it will become more difficult to do this. Increased transparency will also facilitate joint efforts by law enforcement agencies to identify, track and apprehend black- market dealers.

2.4. Increase State Accountability

In the current international milieu, control over the import and export of SALW rests with national governments; thus, efforts to better regulate the trade in such munitions will be most effective at the national level. Increased governmental accountability is needed in two key areas: first, the establishment of effective oversight over all military-type firearms found within the national territory, so as to prevent their diversion to criminal elements and black-market dealers; and second, strict controls over the import and export of such

207 weapons, so as to preclude their use for any purpose other than legitimate self-defense as sanctioned by the UN Charter.

Efforts to accomplish the first of these objectives should be guided by the draft proposals of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Particularly effective measures would include a licensing system for manufacturers and gun owners, more effective identification systems to track firearms, more effective record keeping of firearms, and safe-storage measures. An additional measure called for, is the promotion of amnesty and weapons turn-in programs that encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe, unwanted and excess weapons.

In the same way, efforts to better control the import and export of SALW should be guided by the recommendations found in the report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These include the collection and destruction of weapons once conflict has ended; the destruction of surplus weapons no longer needed by a country's military or police forces (as opposed to selling or giving them away); and the exercise of restraint in exporting military and police weapons from one country to another. States should also be encouraged to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers such as those being considered at the regional (EU) and international levels. Such codes would bar the sale or transfer of SALW to any state that is ruled by a military dictatorship, that fails to respect the human rights of its citizens, that violates UN arms embargoes, or that cannot ensure the security of the weapons already in its possession.

2.5 Regional and International Efforts

While priority should be given to the development of effective controls at the national level, efforts should also be made to establish systems of oversight and control at the regional and international levels. Action at the regional level is particularly important because light weapons are often circulated by regional networks of illicit dealers, insurgents and permissive government agencies. Moreover, experience suggests that it may be easier to mobilize political support for control systems at the regional level than at the international level. At the regional level, policy initiatives could include agreements for the

208 strengthening of import and export regulations, tougher enforcement of laws against illicit trafficking and joint operations against black-market dealers.

At the international level, emphasis should be placed on the adoption of measures needed to strengthen the implementation of weapons embargoes agreed to by the United Nations and associated bodies. While such embargoes may never be entirely leak-proof, evidence has shown that even a modest number of international observers at airfields, seaports and other points of entry for weapons to an area of conflict can make a difference. When supplemented by stricter national export controls, embargoes can make it far more difficult to deliver significant quantities of modern weapons to areas of conflict.

The major arms-supplying countries should also establish a mechanism (possibly as part of the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms control) for consultation on arms flows to areas of current and potential conflict, along with provisions for the imposition of a moratorium on weapons transfers to any state or region deemed to be at risk of ethnic slaughter, state failure or genocide. International inspectors should be sent to the region to ensure compliance with these measures and to suggest any other actions that might be taken to reduce the flow of arms.

2.6 Reducing Surplus Weapons

Addressing the problem of surplus weaponry generated by decades of Cold War competition was especially important because many states particularly former Eastern bloc countries were eager to sell arms for hard currency with few or no questions asked. Because export controls on surplus arms were generally less strict than those for newly manufactured weapons, black-market dealers found it easier to obtain and sell surplus arms than newly made weapons. The problem of surplus arms was acute in areas just recovering from armed conflict, where impoverished ex-combatants tried to sell their weapons for cash rather than turn them over to UN peace-keepers or other designated authorities.

Measures to reduce global stockpiles of surplus munitions a critical component of any international effort to constrain the flow of light weapons can take several forms. States

209 that can afford to do so should agree to destroy the surplus arms and ammunition in their possession and to take all the necessary steps to prevent the leakage of weaponry from government depots and warehouses.

2.7. Role of CSO

We shall not really ignore the participation of different bodies an CSO that has tried to cross- check SALW and its ammunition and other related materials as has been discussed above, against illicit proliferation in Liberia, at regional level and so how at International level through the UN and EU. Coupled to this, it tried also to address other indirectly related problems like state security in the country, region and in sub-regions. Problems like human trafficking and trans-border drug dealing, money laundering, smuggling armed robberies, and trans-border terrorisms, all linked to proliferation of SALW.

In order to tackle the above at length and in a more detailed way, we would recommend the following:

 The Mano River area should have a pressure group non- partisan which would well trained and animated to sensitize the population within about the risks of proliferation of SALW. This could be through initiative like seminars, symposium, group participation.  Field research officers who can man the border professionally should also be as well established. This will help in joint cooperation of arms control at the border point.  Infrastructural and social services to the area as well as the regional level becomes a necessary step to be taken. This will serve as an alternative to those involved in arms smuggling across the border for survival. Then follow up should be made in order to see the progress.  There should be also proper border demarcation in terms of control in order for effective management. This could as well help to control various insurrection and large scale armed violence across the region and in Mano River basin. The effective

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implementation of the convention will go a long way towards enhancing physical safety, socioeconomic security and political stability.

Although we have discussed the effort made by Liberian government, there is more need to pursue a robust strategy that takes three broad dimensions of interventions: Governance, Security and Diplomacy (GSD). Some of the specific intervention mechanisms would include;

2.7.1. Governance

The Liberian government should strengthen institutions and processes of good governance to enhance social provisioning for its citizens, who had increasingly frustrated poor governance and general inefficiency, thereby resorting to violent crimes that increase demand for SALWs as means of survival in what we had termed in as demand and supply theory in our discussion.

Government should start at grass root campaigns and to partner with the locals, state and private sector to undertake a progressive job creation program for the youths. This could give another option and renewal of life. For example those who could surrender SALW peacefully they could be taken to rehabilitation centre, trained and then given some capital or getting employed.

There is more need for interventions at the national, state and local levels to be strengthened to promote peaceful coexistence amongst the diverse ethnic and political groups in Liberia. This would help minimize the outbreak and persistence of violent conflicts caused by SALW proliferation.

The government leader should partner with credible civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media to mount enlightenment and orientation programs on the practice of security situation awareness or security consciousness critical to crime prevention. This will enable people to appreciate the importance of monitoring developments around them and to report unwholesome activities (arms trafficking) to security agencies.

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2.7.2. Security

The proposed establishment of a National Commission on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NatComs) should be fast-tracked to lead this effort, involving collaboration with CSOs and other share holders. Implementation of effective collaborative mechanisms between security agencies and border communities to enhance information- sharing on activities along the borders through different networks.

The strengthening of border security arrangements through enhanced intra and interstate collaboration among security and intelligence agencies in maritime and along the coast, to ensure effective tracking and interdiction of SALWs traffickers.

Robust funding and provision of equipment for security agencies, including security posts at the nation’s entry points: land, sea and airports. This should well established with proper infrastructure like armory.

Conduct of regular and comprehensive verification exercises to ensure that government arms are not being stolen. This exercise could be easy if all government weapons are well marked and have EUCs.

2.7.3. Diplomacy

The government should deepen its commitments with other states at regional, continental and international levels to strengthen its call for a legally binding international instrument that will regulate, control and monitor illicit trade in SALWs: an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

It should also boost it working network within the African Union, by creating a continent- wide body to regulate arms trade in Africa. The Liberian government, and governments at the west African sub-region must Work as a team at various levels and ensure the citizens have more trust and confidence in government projects and as such would be committed to their plight, this would create a sense of belonging and solidarity for the governments at national levels and would or, probably help to repress any acts of insurgencies, rebellion,

212 or disloyalty that would require the use of arms for insecurity again both within and outside the borders.

3.1. General Conclusion

By considering adequate measures and identifying them with the emerging international and regional anti-proliferation of small arms and light weapons regimes, the Liberian government must set standard for building an effective security community in the country that would be devoid of corruption, violence, disloyalty to the National government and general insecurity. The is need for more increased attention to the lethal effects of easily available SALW on the part of humanitarian relief agencies, national governments, international organizations and the media is translating into a greater public appreciation of the need to better control the production, supply and diffusion of these weapons.

The government should, however, act with prudence to do its utmost to roll back the danger of illicit small arms flow that gives vent to the threats of armed rebellion or the so called militia, subversive activities and violent crimes in the polity through promotion of good governance, elevating culture for peace and of law and order, social justice, poverty reduction, equal opportunities for all citizens and creating a sustainable environment for those even Diaspora and for future citizens in the making. Admittedly, the problem is incredibly complex and policies to control and regulate these weapons will not come easily. Nonetheless, the scale of death and injury caused by light weapons is such that the international community must continue to search for effective means of controlling and reducing the lethal commerce of SALW around the world.

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-Wood, B. and Peleman, J., ‘Brokering arms for genocide’, (eds.) B. Wood and J. Peleman, The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents (PRIO: Oslo, 2000).

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