Legal Pluralism and the Decentralization of Judicial Power
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University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2019 States And Group Rights: Legal Pluralism And The Decentralization Of Judicial Power Emma Hayward University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Law Commons, Near Eastern Languages and Societies Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Hayward, Emma, "States And Group Rights: Legal Pluralism And The Decentralization Of Judicial Power" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3426. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3426 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3426 For more information, please contact [email protected]. States And Group Rights: Legal Pluralism And The Decentralization Of Judicial Power Abstract When do states decentralize judicial power to ethnic and religious minority groups? This dissertation presents a theory to explain why states are willing to undertake significant transfers of power by lending their support to ascriptive, group-based law. It begins with a literature review of scholarship in comparative politics and public law, both of which argue, for different reasons, that because the judiciary is vital to the state’s coercive apparatus, property rights regime, and governing functions, we should not expect states to decentralize judicial power. Yet over half of the world’s states choose to officially engage with legal pluralism by delegating power to group-based law; so the remainder of this work builds a theory to explain under what conditions states devolve or share judicial power with ethnic or religious minority groups, and what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial decentralization. To do this, it uses process tracing methods and an institutional choice approach. It offers a test of this theory through three full case studies and three shadow cases: Lebanon, Egypt, and Tanzania (full cases); and the United Kingdom, France, and Malawi (shadow cases). The data that it draws upon consists of 21 months of fieldwork in all 6 countries in which the author conducted approximately 450 interviews, as well as local newspapers, archives, and secondary source materials. Using this data, the dissertation creates a typology that maps the concept of judicial decentralization according to two characteristics: the unity or plurality of the national court structure and the state’s legal doctrine, with a resulting six types of judicial decentralization. Through a study of one case of each type, it finds that judicial decentralization is in significant measure the outcome of bargaining between state leaders and minority group elites, in which the capacities of the state’s leaders and the capacities of group elites, both shaped by multiple factors, are decisive in determining the degree of decentralization. It concludes with a summary of findings, sample court cases from each case study country, and suggestions as to possible avenues for further research. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Political Science First Advisor Rogers Smith Keywords Egypt, Group Rights, Judicial Decentralization, Lebanon, Legal Pluralism, Tanzania Subject Categories Law | Near Eastern Languages and Societies | Other International and Area Studies | Political Science This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3426 STATES AND GROUP RIGHTS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER Emma Hayward A DISSERTATION In Political Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 Supervisor of Dissertation __________________________________ Rogers Smith Professor of Political Science Graduate Group Chairperson __________________________________ Alex Weisiger Associate Professor of Political Science Dissertation Committee Tulia Falleti, Associate Professor of Political Science Ian Lustick, Professor of Political Science ii Dedication For my family iii Acknowledgements Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of a great many people and institutions. I would like to thank my committee chair, Rogers Smith, for his unwavering support through the last several years, and for his insightful comments on the many drafts he was kind enough to read. Thanks, too, to Tulia Falleti and Ian Lustick, whose deep knowledge of and enthusiasm for comparative politics inspired my choice of topic and approach to its study. I would also like to acknowledge the support I received from The United States Institute of Peace’s Jennings Randolph Dissertation Fellowship, the Penn Center for Africana Studies’ Foreign Language and Areas Studies Fellowship, and the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism’s Dissertation Fellowship. Thanks also to the Browne Center for International Politics, Department of State Critical Language program, and the Penn Graduate School of Arts and Sciences for further financial support. I would also like to thank Stanford’s Center for International Conflict and Negotiation and Berkeley’s Center for African Studies for welcoming me as a graduate fellow and a visiting researcher, respectively. This limited space does not permit me to individually name all of the people who aided me with my research by agreeing to be interviewed for this project, but I owe them the deepest debt of gratitude imaginable. I was astonished by how generous otherwise busy and often under resourced people were with their time and interest. To the court clerks in Dar es Salaam, Sharia arbitrators in Birmingham, traditional authorities outside Lilongwe, ulama in Paris, church leaders in Cairo, activists in Beirut, and everyone else who gave me hours of their time, thank you. My memories of our conversations are perhaps the most valuable thing I take away from this project. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my friends and family for their encouragement, patience, and love. I owe a debt of gratitude to Jeremy Hayward, Anthony Hayward, Philippa Hayward, Cole Swensen, Kerry Walk, Ian Hartshorn, Adi Greif, Christine Cuk, Maria Darwish, Jon Argaman, Mwai Sandram, and Emmerich Davies. I will never be able to thank them enough for seeing me through this project, every step of the way. Above all, I want to thank my wonderful husband, Matthew Gold, whose faith in me and love for me seem to grow with every new challenge I face. I am a very lucky partner. iv ABSTRACT STATES AND GROUP RIGHTS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER Emma Hayward When do states decentralize judicial power to ethnic and religious minority groups? This dissertation presents a theory to explain why states are willing to undertake significant transfers of power by lending their support to ascriptive, group-based law. It begins with a literature review of scholarship in comparative politics and public law, both of which argue, for different reasons, that because the judiciary is vital to the state’s coercive apparatus, property rights regime, and governing functions, we should not expect states to decentralize judicial power. Yet over half of the world’s states choose to officially engage with legal pluralism by delegating power to group-based law; so the remainder of this work builds a theory to explain under what conditions states devolve or share judicial power with ethnic or religious minority groups, and what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial decentralization. To do this, it uses process tracing methods and an institutional choice approach. It offers a test of this theory through three full case studies and three shadow cases: Lebanon, Egypt, and Tanzania (full cases); and the United Kingdom, France, and Malawi (shadow cases). The data that it draws upon consists of 21 months of fieldwork in all 6 countries in which the author conducted approximately 450 interviews, as well as local newspapers, archives, and secondary source materials. Using this data, the dissertation creates a typology that maps the concept of judicial decentralization according to two characteristics: the unity or plurality of the national court structure and the state’s legal doctrine, with a resulting six types of judicial decentralization. Through a study of one case of each type, it finds that judicial decentralization is in significant measure the outcome of bargaining between state leaders and minority group elites, in which the capacities of the state’s leaders and the capacities of group elites, both shaped by multiple factors, are decisive in determining the degree of decentralization. It concludes with a summary of findings, sample court cases from each case study country, and suggestions as to possible avenues for further research. v Table of Contents Dedication………………………………………………………………………..………..ii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………iii Abstract……………………………………………………………………….…………..iv List of Tables…………………………...………………………………….…….………vii List of Illustrations………………………………………………….………….……….viii CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY, THEORY, AND CAUSAL ARGUMENT Introduction……………………………………………………….…………………….…1 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………...4 Conceptualization of Judicial Decentralization………………………………………….14 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………..29 Research Design and Data…………………………………………………………….....37