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Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech and the Prelude to War 1953 GDR Uprising to 1956 Hungarian Crisis 22 by Philip Brenner and James G

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Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech and the Prelude to War 1953 GDR Uprising to 1956 Hungarian Crisis 22 by Philip Brenner and James G COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 COLD WAR CRISES POLAND, 1956 POLAND, 1980-81 Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October" Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis by L.W. Gluchowski by Mark Kramer Eastern Europe was central to Soviet foreign and defence policy The prolonged crisis in Poland in 1980-81 was one of the most throughout the Cold War. After World War II, and especially from intriguing episodes of the Cold War, but until very recently almost 1947 onward, the Soviet military and security forces, together with no primary sources relating to the crisis were available. That local communist elites, constructed the most integrated alliance problem has greatly diminished over the past few years. This article system of the Cold War period. Soviet state institutions of control will draw on new archival materials and memoirs from Russia, also helped to reconstruct the mili­ ...----------------------, Poland, Germany, and Czechoslova- tary and security forces ofstates dev­ HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956 kia to provide a reassessment of the astated by World War II. Their aim Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting Soviet Union's role in the Polish cri­ was to secure communist regimes in on East European Crises, 24 October 1956 sis. The article will begin with a brief postwar Eastern Europe dedicated to review of some of the most important defend the Soviet Union's western Introduction, Translation, and Annotation new sources, and will then analyze the frontier. To ensure loyalty, unifor­ by Mark Kramer decision-making calculus in Moscow mity, and quality, Soviet military in 1980-81. The third part will take up and security officers were recruited The document below has been translated from a 19­ the controversial question ofwhether, to staff or to advise the East Euro­ page Czech manuscript entitled "Zprava 0 jednani na UV and under what circumstances, the pean military and security forces.! KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku" Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact This pattern applied in particular to ("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October allies might have invaded Poland in continued Dr, page 38 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary"). The December 1981. manuscript, which is stored in Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, at The discussion here is based in the Central State Archive in Prague (Statni ustredni part on a longer chapter about the SUDOPLATOV RESPONDS: Polish crisis in my forthcoming book Tasks archiv, or SUA), is one of many items in the Czech The Authors of Special on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, Reply to Critics- see page 155 archives that shed valuable new light on the Soviet Union's response to the crises in Poland and Hungary in 1945-1991. Further coverage of the continued on page 50 continued on page 1/6 KOREA, 1949-50 CUBA, 1962 To Attack, or Not to Attack? The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Stalin, Kim II Sung, 1:\ TillS Issu: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech and the Prelude to War 1953 GDR Uprising to 1956 Hungarian Crisis 22 by Philip Brenner and James G. Blight by Kathryn Weathersby The YeItsin Dossier 22 Imre Nagy Reassessed 23 On 25 and 26 January 1968, Cuban leader The historical record ofthe Korean Warhas 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 58 Fidel Castro gave an extraordinary 12-hour recently been greatly enriched by Russian Presi­ KGB Documents 58 speech before the Central Committee of the dent Boris Yeltsin' s presentation to President Diplomatic Cahles 58 Cuban CommunistParty on the history ofCuba's Soviet-Cuban Talks 59 Kim Young-Sam of South Korea, during the relationship with the Soviet Union. It is well \Varsaw Pact "Lessons" 59 latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994, of 216 1980-81 Polish Crisis 116 known that the relationship in the six years after previously classified high level Soviet docu­ Soviet Documents 116 the Cuban Missile Crisis was turbulent. But the ments on the war from Russian archives. The Honecker's Appeal 124 disclosure of this speech, kept secret at the time, collection totals 548 pages and includes docu­ Carter-Brezhnev helps clarify how important the Missile Crisis ments from the period 1949-1953. Most of the Correspondence 14() was in setting the stage for the turbulence. documents are ciphered telegrams between Response 155 The Cuban government recently declassified continued on page 2 continued on page 81 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 81 CASTRO'S SPEECH munity be prepared to go to war to be the Soviet's sophisticated knowledge of continued from page 1 defend any socialist country, then we military matters. Still, he quarreled with the a portion of the speech, and made it avail­ had absolutely no right to raise any Soviet leaders over the political aspects of able to us for publication. I That portion questions about something that could Operation Anadyr (the Soviet code name for concerns the Missile Crisis, which Cubans represent a potential danger. the missile emplacement). He sought a call the October Crisis. The statement not public announcement ofthe decision priorto only constitutes President Castro's most Subsequently (and earlier, in his meetings the completed installation of missiles for extensive remarks about the 1962 confron­ with Mikoyan), the Cuban leader has said two reasons. First, he judged that such a tation, but also provides his reflection on the that he understood the missiles also could be statement would itself have a deterrent ef­ episode only five years after it occurred.2 an immediate deterrent to a U.S. invasion. fect against a U.S. invasion, by effectively This document is usefully read in conjunc­ But here he presented the idea that Cuba committing the Soviet Union to Cuba's de­ tion with notes taken by the Soviet ambas­ would be on the front line of the struggle fense. Second, publication of the Cuban­ sador to Cuba, Aleksandr Alekseev, during between East and West.4 Soviet agreement would strengthen Cuba's meetings immediately after the crisis be­ Prior to 1962, Cuba had sought admis­ "moral" defense in the United Nations and in tween Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas sion to the Warsaw Pact, but had been re­ the forum of international public opinion. Mikoyan and Cuba's principal leaders. buffed. Castro's rationale for accepting the Keeping the operation secret, he argued in Translated excerpts from both documents missiles provided a formulation that would 1968, required are printed below. Taken together, the docu­ enable Cuba to claim de facto membership ments provide adeeperunderstanding ofthe in the Pact. It was placing itself in harm's the resort to lies which in effect meant to nature and roots of the Cuban-Soviet rela­ way forthe benefit ofsocialist countries, and waive a basic right and a principle.... tionship between the crisis and the August so it had the right to expect reciprocal pro­ Cuba is a sovereign. independent coun­ 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. tection from the Pact in the event of an try, and has a right to own the weapons Those six years were the defining mo­ attack. that it deems necessary, and the USSR ments of both the Cuban revolution and the By May 1962, Cuba expected and feared to send them there, in the same light that remaining 23 years of the Cuban-Soviet a U.S. military invasion. Cuban leaders rea­ the United States has felt that it has the relationship. It is notable, then, that just soned first that the Kennedy Administration right to make agreements with dozens of eight months prior to the 1968 invasion, would not be content to accept blithely the countries and to send them weapons that Castro provided his party's leadership with outcome of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs they see fit, without the Soviet Union such an extensive review of Cuban-Soviet invasion. They viewed Cuba's January 1962 ever considering that it had a right to ties, starting with the Missile Crisis. To suspension from the Organization ofAmeri­ intercede. From the very outset it was a appreciate the significance ofthis speech, it can States as a justification for and prelude capitulation, an erosion of our sover­ is necessary first to review Cuba's perspec­ to an invasion.s Importantly, their fears elgnty. ....9 tive on the Missile Crisis. were reinforced by the development of a major U.S. covert action, codenamed Op­ While the world breathed a sigh ofrelief Cuba's Perspective on the Crisis eration Mongoose, and other American mili­ when Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced tary preparations.6 Approved by President on 28 October 1962 that the Soviets would Until recent years, Cuba had been John Kennedy at the end ofNovember 1961, dismantle and remove the missiles in ex­ largely excluded from or marginalized in Operation Mongoose became the largest CIA change for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba, analyses ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis. It was operation until Afghanistan. Though the Castro was enraged. "We were profoundly seen as no more than the stage on which the program was never fully implemented, the incensed," he reported to the Central Com­ U.S.-Soviet confrontation brought the world United States did train and support thou­ mittee in 1968. The basis and acuteness of to the brink of nuclear war. But new infor­ sands of Cuban exiles, many of whom en­ Cuba's anger are evident in the conversa­ mation about Cuba's role indicates that a gaged in repeated acts of sabotage on the tions Castro had with Mikoyan in early No­ full appreciation of the event can only be island, including the destruction of facto­ vember 1962, immediately after gained by examining Cuba's goals and fears ries, the burning offields, the contamination Khrushchev's decision.
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