Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's 1974 Visit to Cuba
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¡Viva el camarada Leonid Ilich Brézhnev!: Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s 1974 Visit to Cuba William Zang A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Curriculum in Russian and East European Studies at the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Donald J. Raleigh Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Michael Cotey Morgan Ó 2019 William Zang ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT William Zang: ¡Viva el camarada Leonid Ilich Brézhnev!: Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s 1974 Visit to Cuba (Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) This essay on General Secretary Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba from January 28 to February 3, 1974, examines the influence of détente on the Soviet-Cuban alliance using Brezhnev’s Cuban tour as a case study. I argue that Brezhnev, recognizing Cuba’s importance in maintaining détente with the United States, traveled to Cuba to ensure the success of this policy by strengthening the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Brezhnev consolidated détente by using his time in Cuba to allay Cuban fears that a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations took precedent over Cuban security from American intervention. I show that Brezhnev succeeded in extracting a cautious public endorsement of détente from Havana and in doing so found the limits of Soviet influence on Cuban behavior. I also determine that the vicissitudes of détente ultimately served to reinforce the improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations that began in 1968. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 Brezhnev in Cuba .....................................................................................................................16 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................39 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................43 iv INTRODUCTION “Long live the eternal friendship between Cuba and the USSR! Long live the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live comrade Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev! Fatherland or death! We will triumph!”1 Cuban leader Fidel Castro thus ended his speech on January 29, 1974, in front of one-million flag waving Cubans in the Plaza of the Revolution in central Havana. He made this address on the occasion of Soviet General Secretary Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba from January 28 to February 3 that year. One day before Castro declared these words before a fired-up crowd of Cuban citizens, Brezhnev’s arrival in Havana made him the first Soviet general secretary to visit the “island of freedom,” as Soviet newspapers and publications referred to Cuba, and indeed all of Latin America. Cuba had become the first Latin American nation to host a Soviet leader because of the island’s close relationship with the Soviet Union that began shortly after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when a mass movement led by Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and Che Guevara, among others, toppled the U.S. supported dictator Fulgencio Batista. After quickly incurring Washington’s ire by fulfilling the promises of the Revolution through nationalizing foreign owned corporations and redistributing land, Havana formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, Washington’s sole superpower antagonist in the ideological war for the hearts and minds of people throughout the world that was the Cold War. Translations from Russian and Spanish are my own, unless otherwise specified. For Russian transliterations I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system. 1 En aras del triunfo de la paz y el socialismo: materiales y documentos referentes a la visita oficial y amistosa a la Republica de Cuba de Leonid Brezhnev, Secretario General Del CC de PCUS (28 de enero-3 de febrero de 1974) (Moscú: Editorial de la Agencia de Prensa Novosti, 1974), 31. Fidel Castro usually used the phrase “Fatherland or death! We will triumph!” to end his political speeches. The 1960s proved to be a turbulent period in Soviet-Cuban relations. Ties between Moscow and Havana were chilly at best between 1962 and 1968, initially caused by Soviet Premier Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev’s decision to negotiate an end to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis directly with U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Fidel Castro had felt as though Khrushchev had gone over his head in ending the crisis and relations spiraled downward.2 Ideological disagreements on how best to propagate revolution in Latin America widened the rift, with Havana favoring its Foco theory3 and Moscow advocating for slower democratic transitions to power incentivized by states, such as Cuba, that had achieved a high level of development utilizing the communist model.4 By 1968 Cuba’s ailing economy and failure to incite other revolutions in Latin America along with Soviet economic disengagement left Havana with no choice but to patch things up with Moscow.5 Brezhnev’s visit marked a new high point in Soviet- 2 Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991 (London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 55. 3 Inspired by the strategies of the guerilla fighters in the Cuban Revolutionary War (1956-1959), the Foco theory of revolution asserted that small groups of guerilla fighters based in mountainous terrain could successfully inspire the populace of a given country to rise up against the government. The Soviets disliked this theory because the Communist Party did not have a role in it. Mark N. Katz, “The Soviet-Cuban Connection,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 88–112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538487. 4 Interview with Yuri Pavlov, February 21, 1999, Tape 10841, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-18/pavlov1.html. 5 In October 1969, Orlando Castro Hidalgo (of no relation to Fidel Castro), a former Cuban intelligence officer in France, testified to a U.S. Senate committee on the state of Soviet-Cuban relations. Once a committed revolutionary who dropped out of high school to fight in the Cuban Revolutionary War against Batista, Castro defected earlier that same year because he felt as though Cuba was becoming a Soviet satellite. In his testimony he relates that in the winter of 1968 all of the high-ranking members of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia, the General Intelligence Directorate) were recalled to Havana in order to have Cuba’s new relationship with the Soviet Union explained to them. On its part, Moscow agreed to increase greatly Soviet technical assistance to Cuba in the areas of the armed forces, mineralogy, industry, agriculture, and intelligence, as well as increase shipments of raw materials, machinery and purchases of Cuban goods. Havana agreed to stop all public anti-Soviet pronouncements and to recognize the leadership of the CPSU in the world Communist movement. The information was not widely distributed and kept in strict secrecy, as Castro was not even allowed to tell his wife. Castro’s testimony is the only knowledge that exists of this agreement. Orlando Castro Hidalgo, “Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: The Communist Threat to the United States and The Caribbean,” § Committee of the Judiciary (1970). 2 Cuban relations as by 1974 Moscow and Havana had resolved almost all of their differences. One significant disagreement, however, remained and transcended the improvement in relations: the issue of U.S.-Soviet détente. A relaxation in tensions between the socialist East and capitalist West, détente sought to improve cooperation and communication between Moscow and Washington, but in the end assumed that ongoing competition between the two superpowers would continue through more peaceful means, at least in Europe.6 Neither side, however, ceased to believe that it had the moral high ground or that it would eventually triumph.7 Because of Cuba’s history of U.S. neocolonial domination, Havana strongly disapproved of any rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. Worried about how independent minded Cuba might negatively impact a policy in which he had invested so much time and effort, Brezhnev visited Cuba to try to ensure détente’s success by reaffirming the Soviet-Cuban alliance and encouraging Castro to improve relations with the United States. On the penultimate day of the general secretary’s time on the “island of freedom,” Castro and Brezhnev signed the Joint Declaration, a document that endorsed détente. In this essay on Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba from January 28 to February 3, 1974, I aim to examine how détente affected the Soviet-Cuban relationship using the general secretary’s Cuban tour as a case study. I argue that Brezhnev, recognizing Cuba’s importance in maintaining détente with the United States, traveled to Cuba to ensure the success of this policy by strengthening the Soviet-Cuban alliance and assuaging Cuban fears of an American intervention. In fortifying the Soviet-Cuban alliance, Brezhnev further consolidated détente. I show that 6 Adam Bromke and Derry Novak, “Introduction,” in The Communist States in the Era of Détente: 1971-1977, ed. Adam Bromke and Derry Novak (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), 227-28. 7 Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Brezhnev Reconsidered, ed. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (New