June 16, 1969

MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO FOREIGN-COUNTRIES

High School Debate Issue

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE------v CHAPTER !--UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY COMMITMENTS------�---- 1 I. Introducticn------1 II. Origins of the Cold War--A Failure of Cooperation------1

III. Latin A merica------4 IV. United States Military Policy in Europe------8 V. United States Military Policy in the Middle East------12 VI. United States Military Policy in the Far East------16

A. The L egacy of World War II------16 B. The Korean W ar------19 C. The War in Indo-China------20 D. Geneva Conference------21 E. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization------22 F. The Present Dilemma------22 . . D•1 scuss1on Quest1on s------24

CHAPTER !!--UNILATERAL INTERVENTION------25 I. Introduction------25 II. Definitions------25 A. " ...Militar y Intervention ... "------2 11: •• 5 B. Unilateral. .. "------29 C. "Congress Should Prohibit ... "------31

-i- CHAPTER II (Cont'd.) III. Is Unilateral Intervention Necessary?------44 A. The Impact of Nationalism: An Affirmative View----- 44 B. The Impact of Nationalism: A Negative View------47 C. Nationalism: Some Affirmative Rejoinders------53 D. Intervention and America's Vital Interests------55 E. Intervention and the Protection of American Citizens 58 F. A Summary Note------59 IV. The Possible Advantages of Eliminating Unilateral Intervention------60

A. Saving Lives and Conserving Resources------60 B. The Danger of Escalation------63 c. Is Intervention Self-Defeating?------6p D. Intervention and Detente------�------67 E. Intervention and Regional Security Blocs------68 v. The Consequences of Eliminating Unilateral Intervention-- 70 A. A Preliminary Note------70 B. Non-Intervention and Future Wars of National Liberation------70 c. Credibility and Proliferation------71 D. Non-Intervention and the Loss of Flexibility------72 E. The Danger to Development Efforts------73 F. The Human Costs of Non-Intervention------74 G. Problems with Multilateral Approval------75 I VI. Intervention and Covert Operations------76

A. Introduction------76 B. The Alleged Harms of Covert Military Intervention-- 76 C. Plan Problems------78

VII. A Review of Major Interventions------79 A. Guatemala------80 B. Lebanon------81 C. Cuba------·-----·------82 D. The Dominican Republic--1961------82 E. Vietnam------�------83 F. The Dominican Republic--1965------86 VIII. A Concluding Note------88 Discussion Questions------89

J - - I ii CHAPTER III--MULTILATERAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS AND NATO------91

I. Introduction------�------91 II. Definitions------91 A. " ...Multi lateral Defense Organizations ... "------91 B. " ...Withdraw ... "------93 III. The Need For Multilateral Defense Organizations------96

A. The Need to Act in a Rapid and Coordinated Manner--- 96 B. The Need for Alliance Organizations in Less Devel- oped Areas------98 c. The Need for NATO------99 IV. The Advantages of Withdrawal------104

A. A Preliminary Note------·- 104 B. Conserving Resources------105 c. Preventing Overcommitment--or Creating Dangerous Uncertainty?------106 D. Encouraging Detente--or Encouraging Aggression?----- 108 E. Improving Relations With Our European Allies------113 V. The Alleged Disadvantages of Withdrawal from NATO------116 A. The Damage to Nuclear Credibility------116 B. The Danger of Ending America's Symbolic Role------117 C. The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation------117 D. The Problem of a Resurgent and Independent Germany-- 118 E. The Possibility of Economic Retaliation------119

VI. The Alleged D1sadvantages of Withdrawal from Multilateral Organizations------120

A. The Special Problem of the United Nations------120 B. Withdrawing from SEATO------122 C. Withdrawing from ANZUS------124 D. Withdrawing from the OAS------125

VII. Conclusion------126 Discussion Questions------128 Bibliography------131

-iii- PREFACE

TI1is Special Analysis is concerned with the issues presented by the 1969-70 high school debate problem area: What Should be the United States Military Commitment to Foreign Countries? It is being published by the American Enterprise Institute in response to many re­ quests from high school debaters and coaches for background materials and references on the subject of the debate propositions. This analysis was prepared by Professor John A. Lynch, Director of Debate, St. Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire, and Professor Robert M. Shrum, Direc­ tor of Debate, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. Both authors come to this project with extensive backgrounds as debaters and debate coaches. This analysis should not be construed as reflecting any policy position on the part of the Arneri�an Enterprise Institute. The authors wish to stress at the outset that they are not experts in the subject matter of the resolution. They have, however, tried to assemble, organize, and present authoritative material in such a way as to assist debaters to delineate and explore the central issues raised by the national debate propositions. This analysis is not in­ tended to end the debater's research but is designed rather to serve as a guide to the start or research and a stimulus to its continuation. To this end, a bibliography has been included, listing many more references than those which have been directly quoted or cited in the footnotes.

The American Enterprise Institute and the authors wish to ex­ press a special note of appreciation to Mr. David White, Assistant Direc­ tor of Debate, Georgetown University, who assisted in the preparation of this manuscript and to the following persons who have read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions in its final preparation: Mi. Paul A. Dowd, Director of Public Relations, St. Anselm's College; Professor Char­ ley A. Leistner, Department of Speech, University of Oregon; Professor William M. Reynolds, Department of Speech, The George Washington Univer­ sity; and Professor James J. Unger, Director of Debate, Georgetown Uni­ versity.

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-v- --- CIIJ\PTER I

UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY COMMITMENTS

I. Introduction

This chapter will trace the history of United States military commitments to foreign countries. Generally, there are two types of mil­ itary commitments: bilateral, such as United States commitments to some other foreign country, like Japan, and multilateral pacts involving the United States and more than one other nation--pacts like the North Atlan­ tic Treaty. Because two of the debate propositions suggest that the United States withdraw from multi.lateral defense organizations, this chap­ ter will direct most of its attention to a chronology of these arrange­ ments.

Since most of our current military commitments are a response to the cold war, our analysis begins with the end of World War II.

II. Origins of the Cold War--A Failure of Cooperation

In the closing days of World War II, the representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francis cc. The date was June 26, 1945. The charter was predicated on the belief that the Grand Alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, which had cooperated in the defeat of the Axis powers, would now cooperate to keep the peace. The fundamental purpose of the United Nations was the prevention of acts of aggression, whether these acts were accomplished by force or threats of force. Its chief function was to act as a polici�g agency. For this purpose, a Security Council was created, and empowered, if efforts at peaceful settlement of a controversy failed, to call upon members of the United Nations to sever diplomatic relations and apply economic sanctions against an aggressor. If such measures proved inade­ quate, the Security Council was to have at its disposal armed contingents made available to it in advance by the members. The Security Council ; 1 might use these as it saw fit against the offender. Immediate direction i of such forces was supposed to be vested in a Military Staff Committee, t l made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security $ Council (United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, France, and China). But all actions by the Security Council on any but procedural matters de­ pended on the agreement of the five permanent members; enforcement measures were subject to veto by any one of them. As it turned out, the intended military contingents were never made available to the United Na­ tions; as was the case with other objectives at the time, the project fell victim to the differences which developed between the Communist and non­ Communist worlds.

The assumptions on which the United Nations was constructed were challenged immediately by the Soviet Union. The close relationship

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between the United States and Great Britain was not matched by a similar relationship wjth the Soviet Union. In retrospect, it seems that it would have been difficult to create a set of circumstances that·would have pro­ vided the cooperation expected by some of the founders of the United Na­ tions. Indeed, some observers contend that the Grand Alliance could not keep the peace because it never existed in the first place . .!f It is ar­ gued that there was no real collaboration even during the war itself.

The rift between the Soviet Union, backed by its satellites, and the United States, generally supported by the other democracies, began even before the United Nations started its operations. With two decades of hindsight, many Western observers accept the premise that the Soviet leaders had never really given up their aim of world revolution. They used the alliance with the West for the destruction of Hitlerism. Once this was accomplished, the alliance lost its value to them and they quick­ ly abandoned their wartime cooperation. Consequently, in many respects United States foreign policy operates in a far different world today than it did in 1945.

The period between the final defeat of the Axis (August, 1945) and the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine (March, 1947) is generally described as the time when the cold war began. During this per1od, there was a growing antagonism between Communist and non-Communist worlds--an ·antagonism that extended to issues that arose in every part of the globe. Yet some important questions were resolved by political conferences be­ tween the wartime allies, especially the peace treaties involving Italy and the so-called "Axis satellites." Perhaps the best cooperation was achieved at the trial of the Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. Beyond these, w:1ether in deliberations in the United Nations or in specific dis­ putes related to Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, there was little if any cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the first meeting of the Security Council in January, 1946, nearly every ques­ tion submitted to it found the United States and the Soviet Union taking opposite sides.2/ And from the beginning the Soviet Union, which usual­ ly was in the m1nority, used its Security Council veto power freely to block action contrary to its wishes. The United States offer to give up its nuclear monopoly and internationalize control of all nuclear develop­ 1 ment under the United Nations was repeatedly rejected by the Russians. l l The Security Council was able, nevertheless, in its early meet­ J ings, to accomplish something merely by publicity. When Soviet troops , remained in Iran after the war contrary to treaty obligations, the is­ sue was brought before the Security Council and the troops were eventual­ ly withdrawn. On balance, Soviet actions in the United Nat.ions and else­ where convinced the United States Government and a growing number of l .!.I See especially John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Vik­ I ing Press, 1947). Y Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Engle­ I wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 705.

-2- I. 1. Americans by 1946 and early 1947 that a "get tough" policy was needed to counter Soviet policy. We do know that the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, marked the beginning of an active policy by the United States de­ signed to "contain" the Soviet Union--to hold.the U.S.S.R. and its Com­ munist satellites inside their existing boundaries, in the hope that time and internal strains would eventually sap the strength and will of the expansionist Soviet empire.

The Truman Doctrine was announced in March, 1947, when President Truman, in an address to the Congress, asked for an appropriation of $400 million to provide economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. Since 1945, the Greek government had been engaged in an internal struggle against Communist forces aided by heavy infiltrations from three neighboring countries, all Soviet satellites. In 1946, Turkey was pressed by the Soviet Union to allow the establishment of a naval base in the Dar­ danelles. There were also demands for territorial concessions at the eastern end of the Black Sea. The British, who had been giving financial assistance to Greece and Turkey, notified Washington in 1947 that they could no longer support this burden. The situation appeared ripe for a Soviet drive to make both Greece and Turkey Commun.ist satellites, thus ex­ tending Soviet power into the Mediterranean.

President Truman asked for an appropriation for military aid to strengthen Greek and Turkish armed forces to continue the assistance sus­ pended by the British, and for economic aid for the reconstruction of Greece. In a declaration that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the President stated that "the foreign policy and the national security" of the United States were involved in the plight of Greece and Turkey, and· "that it must be the foreign.policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." In May, 1947, Congress in addition to appropriat­ ing the funds the President had requested, also authorized the sending of military equipment and American technical and military advisers.

The Greek-Turkish military assistance program is regarded as a successful application of the containment policy; Greece and Turkey did not become Soviet satellites. The commitment of American support implied in the Truman Doctrine, and the gradual improvement of Turkish military forces, enabled the Turks to take a firmer stand toward Soviet pres­ sures. The modern American weapons, training, and technical guidance given to the Greek army contributed to the defeat of the Red-led guer­ rillas in Greece by late 1949. At least as important a factor, however, was Communist Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, one re­ sult of which was curtailment of important aid to the Greek guerrillas which had been channeled through Yugoslavia.

Having taken the first step by assisting Greece and Turkey, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations moved toward a more general and ambitious program of assistance and military alliances on three sepa­ ,rate continents. In examining our military alliances, we will pursue a somewhat arbitrary arrangement. We shall begin closest to home in Latin

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America·, move on to Europe and the Middle East, and conclude with the· Far East.

III. Latin America 1. The Monroe Doctrine. Compared with the cold war military arrangements which have developed within the past decades, our concern about the security of the Latin American states is far older. One of the traditional cornerstones of American foreign policy has been the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, President Monroe warned the European powers, including Russia, which then was active in the Alaska area, to keep out of Latin America and to forego further colonization in North America, primarily because their presence would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.I/ During the past century, the United States has invoked the Monroe Doctrine whenever it felt that European nations either threatened the security of Latin American states or in­ tended to establish new colonies. Perhaps the two most notable examples were our protests against Louis Napoleon's efforts to establish Maximi­ lian on the Mexican throne in the 1860s (officially,protests were suf­ ficient to bring France's withdrawal) and the policy of United States military intervention in Latin American countries inaugurated by Presi­ dent Theodore Roosevelt (The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doc­ trine). The latter policy was justified by President Theodore Roosevelt on the assumption that "chronic wrongdoing" may, in the Americas as else­ where, require the intervention of a civilized nation, and the United States' right to assume this international police power was said to in­ here within the Monroe Doctrine.2/ The United· States formally renounced the right to intervene in 1933 in response to pressures from the Latin Americans themselves. This renunciation became part of the "Good Neigh­ bor Policy" under President Franklin Roosevelt. 2. The Act of Chapultepec. When World War II began, two fac­ tors drew the United States and its Latin American neighbors together: the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s and the fear that the war in Europe would endanger, in one way or another the security of the Western l} Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 183. Most American his­ torians contend that the Monroe Doctrine did not become an American policy with serious purpose until the late 1840s or early 1850s. See especially Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 34. 2/ Bailey, op. cit., p. 505. American military intervention in Latin American nations occurred in every presidential administration from Theodore Roosevelt to Calvin Coolidge. The argument that this pol­ icy inhered within the Monroe Doctrine won little acceptance in Latin America or even among some scholars in this country. See Perkins, op. cit., p. 83.

-4- Hemisphere. The security threat led to a series of defense arrangements between the United St.ates and Latin American states. After Pearl Harbor, the Latin American Republics, with the exception of Argentina, either de­ clared war or broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.I/ The high point in inter-American cooperation during World War II came I"n an Inter-American Conference held in Mexico City in February and March, 1945. The Conference reaffirmed the solidarity of the American Republics and their devotion to the principles of democracy, non-intervention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In its most important contribution, the Act of Chapultepec, the Conference declared that until the end of the war, any act or threat of aggression against an American state would be con­ sidered an act or a threat against all, and would be dealt with by what­ ever measures might prove necessary, ranging from the severance of dip­ lomatic relations with the aggressor to the use of armed force.2/ For meeting such threats after the end of World War II, the signatories pro­ posed the conclusion of a treaty defining the measures to be used and the procedures for instituting them. The Act of Chapultepec was responsible for United States insistence, with Latin American support, on Article 51, which was added to the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. This re­ served to member nations "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," until the Security Council should have taken "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The United Na­ tions' recognition of the right of "collective self-defense" served to reconcile the Charter not only with the alliance of Western Hemisphere states but later with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South­ east Asia Treaty Organization and other multilateral groupings for mu­ tual security to which the United States became a party. 3. The Rio Treaty. The Rio Conference (August-September, 1947) was an important step in the development of regional security ar­ rangements as provided in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Certain South American states sought the treaty for protection as much against possible aggression by Argentina as against threats from outside the hemisphere. The earlier Act of Chapultepec contemplated only outside attack.3/ The Conference rejected an Argentine proposal that the treaty provide only for action against aggression by non-American states. As agreed upon, the treaty made it the duty of every American state to assist in meeting

!/ Argentina, perhaps the most powerful Latin nation, resented U.S. influence and, even more, the quarantine restrictions which the U.S. imposed on meat imports from Argentina. On our side, we were aware of the pro-Axis sympathies in Argentina and the fact that Axis agents operated there. Shortly before Nazi Germany surrendere4, Argentina declared war on Germany to qualify for entry into the United Nations at San Francisco. 2/ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., March 15, 1950, p. 417. 3/ Pratt, op. cit., p. 767.

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an armed attack upon another American state, until the U.N. Security Council should have taken effective measures to repel the aggression. The nature of the action to be taken against aggress.ion was to be deter­ mined by a two-thirds vote of a meeting ·of American foreign ministers, called for the occasion (parties to the dispute not voting), with the exception that no state should be required to use it� armed forces with­ out its consent. Thus, the United States might be required, by a two­ thirds vote of the American foreign ministers, to suspend diplomatic re­ lations, trade, and communications with an aggressor state, but it could not agains� its will be required to use its armed forces. The treaty was left open to signature by Canada, which had riot joined in former inter-American agreements, and which did not accept the opportunity in this instance or the one provided by the foundation of the Organization of American States. Canada has received hemispheric advances politely but coolly. That she felt more akin to Europe than Latin America was apparent in the active part she took in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,.!/

4 .. Organization of American States. The next step in a for­ mal coordination of these United States-Latin defense agreements, and many other previous Latin American arrangements as well, came at Bogota, Colombia, in 1948. The Conference was notable for establishing what now is called the Organization of American States (OAS) and for drawing up an elaborate charter or constitution. In addition to the OAS Charter itself, the Conference also incorporated a number of previously·estab­ lished inter-American councils, such as a Council of Jurists, a Cultural Council, and an Economic and Social Council. The old Pan American Union became the Secretariat of the new organization.

5. Rifts Between Good Neighbors. The drafting and the adop­ tion of the OAS Charter at Bogota in 1948 ironically came at a time when the spirit of inter-American harmony began to break down. Several fac­ tors contributed to the deterioration and, in this section, we shall deal with the problems only in a general way. Symptomatic of the trend was the temporary disruption of the Bogota Conference in its second week by a violent outbreak of rioting in the Colombian capital. Whether or not Communist-inspired, as many charged, the riots were indicative of the breakdown of the orderly democratic process in some parts of Latin Amer­ ica. Between 1948 and 1952, revolution followed revolution. Govern­ ments were seldom changed except by violence.2/ Several of these up­ heavals resulted in establishment of the dictator�president type of re­ gime, of which Argentina under Juan Peron was the best-known type. Some of these .Latin strong men, like Peron, were narrowly nationalistic, ready to join hands with Communists in denouncing "Yankee imperialism" and in working to counteract North American influence. Others were strongly anti-Communist and even pro-American, but sometimes embarrassed

..!/ Ibid., p. 773.

2/ Ibid., p. 769.

-6- Washington by using repressive measures to govern._!/ But �ven groups basically friendly to the United States were unhappy over Latin America's small share in the U.S. foreign aid program, much of which initially went to Europe and later shifted to Asia. What Latin America did get was often military assistance, which critics al-. Ieged either sustained repressive military regimes or encourage� the mil­ itary to overthrow constitutionally elected governments.� L�tin �er­ ica, where wartime prosperity (created to a large extent by high prices paid by the United States for raw materials) had been succeeded by a postwar economic slump, often did not accept the Ameri�an view that.it should have a lower priority in receiving aid because it was not, like Europe and the Far East a war-devastated region, directly exposed to pressures from a militant Soviet Union. This distinction, which to the United States seemed reasonable enough, made many Latin Americans feel slighted and unappreciated.

The rise of Communist influence within several Latin American countries created a growing uneasiness in the United States, particularly during the late 1950s. The principal indicators of this were the brief establishment of a Communist-leaning government in Guatemala; the rough treatment which Vice President Richard Nixon received from anti-American mobs in Peru and Venezuela; and, perhaps most important, the conversion of Cuba under Fidel Castro into a creature of the Soviet Union. These episodes were taken as a signal to many in this country that we had taken our southern neighbors for granted and that Communist influence was growing in the United States' own backyard. Additional measures were considered necessary .if the Communists were not to move in, as they had in Cuba. The Eisenhower Administration did manage tq secure con­ gressional authorization for stepped-up Latin American aid and the Al­ liance for Progress program of expanded economic assistance was launched at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration.

6. Security in the 1960s. Most Americans in the early '60s probably regarded Castro's Cuba as the principal threat to American secur­ ity. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 vividly demonstrated the serious danger posed by a Communist nation permitting establishment of a Soviet presence on the island. Castro, of course, still remains a problem. The American government has embargoed almost all forms of trade with Cuba and has put many obstacles in the way of Cuban trade with other nations. It has secured increasing support from other Latin American states, which in 1962 expelled Cuba from the OAS and agreed to an embargo on exports to Cuba. By 1966, all the Latin American states except Mexico had severed diplomatic relations with Havana.

!/ The United States presented the Legion of Merit to dictators Odria of Peru and Jimenez of Venezuel-a in the 1950s.

� See generally Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 233-34.

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The military problem in most Latin American countries is viewed primarily as a problem of internal Communist subversion. Our military assistance programs, multilateral or bilateral, are attempting to pro­ vide the weapons and military training necessary to combat this threat. The long-standing question of how our military assistance will ultimately be employed remains, however. Will this aid be used as some have charged in the past, to create or sustain military dictatorships? It has been said that the old-fashioned military dictatorship seems to be less severe in Latin America than it was a decade ago,1/ but that recent events in Argentina and Brazil indicate that it has not disappeared.

IV. United States Military Policy In Europe

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 represented an initial step in the policy of containing Soviet-led communism. In the following year, the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in a bloodless coup. Washington and the other Western capitals were contemplating measures to prevent the cold war from becoming a hot war. If the Soviet Union could be warned that an act of aggression against any free nation would mean a conflict with all the free nations, it might be deterred from such acts and thus be contained within its sphere of dominance. It was, of course, to dis­ courage such acts of aggression that the United Nations had been created, but the veto within the Security Council immunized the Soviet Union from effective United Nations action. Article 51 of the Charter, however, legalized "collective defense" by groups within the U.N. and it was to this article that the Western world now turned. As we indicated in the previous section, the Rio Pact (1947) had already invoked Article 51 in an inter-American defense arrangement. In Europe a beginning was made in March, 1948, when Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) signed the Brussels Pact--a SO-year collective defense pact. It soon be­ came apparent that in order to constitute an impressive warning, such a pact needed the backing of the United States.2/ The way cleared when the Senate, in the Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948, voiced the opinion that the United States should associate itself with such regional defense arrangements when these arrangements served our own security l interests. I l The Vandenberg resolution was the prelude to the North Atlantic j Treaty, an important and ambitious adventure in search of collective l security. The treaty was signed April 4, 1949, by twelve nations of the North Atlantic and Western European areas, a number increased to fourteen f!

lf Perkins, op. cit., pp. 144-45.

2/ Bailey, op. cit., p. 808.

-8- in 1952 when Greece and Turkey were added.I/ The parties agreed to set­ tle all disputes between themselves peacefully and to develop their capa· city to resist armed attack "by means of continuous and effective self­ help and mutual aid." The heart of the pact was Article 5, which de­ clared that an attack upon one was an attack upon all and pledged each member in case of such an attack to assist the party attacked "by such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed. force." This pledge did not flatly commit the United States to war or remove congres­ sional power to declare war.2/ It was, however, a moral commitment to assist the pact members against aggression for at least twenty years. And the advent of nuclear-missile war made ponderous multilateral and legislative consultation virtually obsolete. Although the North Atlan­ tic Treaty was subsequently approved by an 89 to 13 vote in the Senate, the pact's implications were clearly drawn out in Senate debate. Op­ ponents made a determined effort to relieve the United States of any ob­ ligation to rearm Western Europe but such proposed amendments were de­ feated.3/

To implement the treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. Its directing body was the North Atlantic Coun­ cil, made up of the foreign, defense, and finance ministers of the mem­ ber states. Early in 1951, NATO set up military headquarters, known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), near Paris, with General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. Its purpose was to build a de­ fense force in Western Europe, not equal to the huge army maintained by the Soviet Union (roughly 175 Russian divisions plus sixty or more satel­ lite divisions), but strong enough to make the Soviet Union think twice about going to war; and, if war should come anyway, strong enough to hold the Russian armies in check until (it was hoped) the strategic air­ power of the United States could destroy the Soviet centers of strength.

1. Defense of Europe. By 1951, the American foreign aid pro­ gram in Europe, which had previously emphasized economic assistance, had shifted to a concentration on military aid. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 established a Mutual Security Agency to supervise the program of military assistance to NATO. From 1949 to 1953, the United States sup­ plied nearly $6 billion worth of arms and military equipment to its NATO allies.4/ The European allies in the same period spent over $35 billion for their own defense. The result was an increase in active armv divi­ sions available for NATO duty from fifteen to forty-eight, with

1/ The twelve original members were the United States, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Italy. y Bailey, loc. cit.

3/ Ibid. 4/ Pratt, op. cit., p. 725.

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corresponding increases in air and naval strength. In 1969, NATO strength was usually said to be about thirty divisions. Outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 increased European fears about the possibility of a future Soviet attack in Western Europe and also stimulated the American government to build greater strength among the NATO nations to meet this threat. In what was described at the time as "the great debate," the Senate approved an administration request to increase United States troop strength in Western Europe from two to six divisions. Obtaining approval by Congress of sending so many American troops to Europe perhaps on a permanent basis, required_ all the influence of President Truman and the great prestige of Generals Eisenhower and Mar­ shall.I/ During the past eighteen years., the American troop commitment to Western Europe has remained almost constant--approximately 200,000 men at present.

2. German Rearmament. Postwar Germany, of course, has been deeply involved .in the cold war. At the war's end, Germany was divided into occupation zones ruled by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. When it became apparent that the Western powers could not work with the Soviet Union toward a solution of German problems, the Western occupiers decided to coordinate their own efforts. Since the Soviets seemed determined to create a puppet state in East Germany, the Western powers encouraged the establishment of the West German Federal Republic at Bonn in 1949. In the same year, the United States accepted West Germany as a full-fledged member of the Marshall Plan and the allies discontinued their dismantling of the German war­ making industry. The United States soon took the lead in pressing for a German role in the defense of Western Europe. In Washington's view, German man­ power and rising economic strength seemed critically necessary to counter­ act Communist non-nuclear strength. Yet German guns that shot eastward against the Communists could also shoot westward against the democracies. The prospect of a rearmed Germany was as alarming to France and the Bene­ lux countries as the Russian danger.

A promising scheme for a controlled German army, originally proposed by the French, was the European Defense Community (EDC). The Germans would merge their troop quota with a six-nation EDC force within NATO and thus eliminate the threat of a national German army. The other nations concerned, including the United States, approved the plan, but the French National Assembly rejected it.

After the demise of EDC, new negotiations were instituted. Out of these meetings emerged the Western European Union as a substitute for EDC. French misgivings were partially quieted by a British commitment

1/ Ruhl Bartlett, Policy and Power (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 255.

-10- to maintain four divisions of troops on the Continent. Under this plan, West Germany was permitted to rearm, though pledging itself to manufacture no atomic, chemical, or biological weapons.. United States, British, and French forces were to remain in Germany. West Germany was invited to be­ come a member of NATO (which she did in 1955), and all .the Western Euro­ pean Union armed contingents, including West Germany's were subject to the NATO Supreme Command. This proposal succeeded in gaining approval by a slender margin in the French National Assembly in late 1954. 3. NATO in the 1960s. Today the North Atlantic Alliance op­ erates in a different setting than it did in 1949. Perhaps the most constant characteristic of the Alliance has been the fact that the United States, with its huge nuclear arsenal, was far stronger than any of its allies. In fact, the Alliance has always depended upon the overwhelming strength of the United States. As it developed, NATO never achieved its full conventional strength--this is even more true today, now that France has withdrawn its military forces from NATO control. Some observers con­ tend that the entire Alliance is in serious trouble. Even those who still strongly support the Alliance admit that there are problems. Here we shall review some of them.

First, during the past fifteen years, most of our European al­ lies have become economically stronger and more prosperous and, in many ways, they are no longer as dependent upon the United States. One mea­ sure of this strength is the fact that they no longer receive any Ameri­ can foreign aid--even military aid has been phased out. Secondly, the spread of nuclear weapons has raised political and strategic problems within the Alliance. The Alliance began in a period when the United States and Britain were the only nuclear powers, the United States much the stronger. The Soviet Union quickly acquired its own nuclear arsenal, but also the ability, through an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to attack the United States directly from its own territory. This development caused some Europeans to reassess their own national security position within the Alliance. They feared over-dependence upon the United States for nuclear protection. Some Europeans (France's de Gaulle was the most notable example) ques�ioned whether the United States would really risk it� own, nuclear destruction (Soviet retaliation against the United States) in the event of American nuclear defense against a Communist at­ tack in Europe. The fear that the United States might leave them in the lurch during a purely European showdown was one factor in the decision of the French to seek a nuclear deterrent of their own. It also sus­ tained the British, hard-pressed to find economic support for its own nuclear forces. To Americans this duplication of nuclear programs seemed wasteful. The Alliance did not require more nuclear weapons; their programs could never begin to match the United States--or Soviet-­ supply. There was still a need for adequate ground forces, which the Europeans could and should provide, in the official American view. But Europe never reached its own ground-force goals. From the American point of view, the ideal program would include a common nuclear deterrent

-11- within NATO rather than a fragmented one with many nervous fingers on many different triggers. But NATO forces should remain under a United States commander, Washington insisted, because of its preponderant con­ tribution through nuclear weaponry. With the advent of tactical nuclear weapons in 1954, the United States created a stockpile of nuclear weapons in NATO. We have worked out a series of bilateral agreements with host countries establishing machinery for dual agreement on their use.1/ United States nuclear weapons cannot be used, however, unless the President of the United States approves. This is a provision insisted upon by Congres.s, and a fact of life for the United States' NATO-allies. Europeans continued to seek a greater voice in control of nuclear weapons. The United States initially responded by proposing the Multilateral Force Program (MLF). This program proposed a missile-equipped seaborne multinational force within NATO capable of striking Soviet territory. The United States pledged close consultation on firing the nuclear missiles, but still in­ sisted on retaining ultimate control. The Europeans were not enthusias­ tic about this proposal 2/ and it was eventually dropped. Recently, the British have indicated that they are willing to work with the United States in seeking some workable nuclear weapons-sharing program within NATO, but the French under de Gaulle pushed resolutely on with their own nuclear testing program, interrupted occasionally by economic crises which forced stretch-outs in the extremely costly venture. Finally, there has been the problem of partial French with­ drawal from NATO. Under de Gaulle, France has withdrawn her forces from NATO control, while continuing to pledge support for NATO objectives, but with French forces under French command. In 1966, France demanded control of all foreign troops stationed on French soil, one aspect of de Gaulle's assertion of French nationalism. This led not only to with­ drawal from France of all NATO forces, but also to the transfer of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. What effect the de Gaulle resigna­ tion as French President would have on French policy toward NATO remained to be seen. The issues which have been raised in this historical sec­ tion will be considered in Chapter III, when we examine possibilities of American withdrawal from NATO.

V. United States Military Policy in the Middle East 1. The Cold War. In this section, we use the term "the Mid­ dle East" in the full knowledge that it is an elastic definition of an undetermined area. We use the term to include the following countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Israel,

Y Irving Heymont, "The NATO Nuclear Bilateral Forces," Orbis, IX (Winter, 1966), pp. 1025-41. 2/ The Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 1966.

-12- - Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the various sheikdoms of the Arabian peninsula. On the eastern edge of the area is Pakistan, often grouped with South Asian countries. Pakistan, however, is a member of the Central Treaty Organization and, as such, has played a role in United States defense plans in the Middle East. In recent times Americans have come to appre­ ciate the significance of this area. Strategically located astride land, water and air communications linking Western Europe and Southern Asia, it is also a treasure house of petroleum reserves important to the free world. The whole area lies within easy striking distance of the Soviet Union, and, for centuries, has been a kind of land buffer restricting Russian access to the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and much of South Asia. The United States has not been active in the Middle East until very recent years. Great Britain, France, and Russia, however, have had long-standing interests there that began well before the advent of the twentieth century. One of the Middle East's first periods of real sig­ nificance for the United States emerged during World War II, when part of the Lend-Lease supplies to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union were funneled through the Middle East and when troops and materiel were trans­ ferred between war theaters through the Suez Canal. American oil com­ panies had begun operations in the Middle East before World War II, but on a smaller scale than the postwar period. If the area was important during World War II, it would become no less so in a war, whether hot or cold, with the Soviet Union. Soviet domination of the Middle East would cut the free world in two and deprive it of control over sources of petroleum essential to the peacetime economy and to the war-making potential of Western Europe. Soviet intentions in this area became apparent to the Western world early in the cold war. First, Soviet troops had remained in northern Iran after the war and had been withdrawn only after pressure was applied by the Western govern­ ments, principally the United States, in the United Nations,!/ Secondly, as we have previously noted, Soviet pressure for concessions from Turkey and the Communist-supported rebellion in Greece were responsible for the Truman Doctrine and the first step in our policy of containment. These Communist pressures, and Great Britain's confessed inability to give further aid to resist them, led to the first major U.S. commitments in the Middle East. 2. The Baghdad Pact. From the start the American path in the Middle East has not been an easy one. By 1948, the British had decided to withdraw from their protectorate in Palestine and this touched off a conflict between the Jews and Arabs over the future of Palestine. At the outset of this struggle, the Jews proclaimed the state of Israel, a step to which the United States gave almost instant recognition. The Arab-Israeli conflict is too complex to deal with here, except to note that the support which the United States gave to Israel has always, in

1/ Pratt, op. cit., p. 758.

-13- ., dtri

one way or another, hampered our relations with other Arab states. As it has developed, American policy in the Middle East has had three objectives: (1) to compose the disputes within the area, nota­ bly the dispute between Israel and its neighbors; (2) to raise standards of living through assistance in developing the region's unused resources; and (3) to preserve U.S. strategic and economic interests in the area. Toward settling the Arab-Israeli dispute, little real progress has been made. The United States has tried to remain friends with all nations in the area and to prevent whatever conflicts have erupted from involving outside powers, especially the Soviet Union and the United States. The Eisenhower Administration undertook in 1953 the reexamina­ tion of all existing policies for national security, both in the strictly military field and in foreign relations generally. The existing regional security pacts which we had in Latin America and NATO provided models that might be applied elsewhere. In the Middle East, it was discovered, no multilateral position of strength to guard against Communist expansion had been built.I/ Soviet attempts to infiltrate states in the area were increasing, notably in Iran, Syria, and Egypt. After much preliminary personal diplomacy by the American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the United States urged the creation of a Middle East Treaty Organization. The northern tier states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan with Great Britain added) joined in the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The United States, unwilling to be drawn too far into the clashing ambitions of the Middle Eastern nations, did not formally join the alliance, although it cooperated in the new arrangements in most other respects.2/ The Soviet Union was now confronted with a solid block of anti-Communist territory, on paper at least, all the way from the:Mediterranean Sea to India. The northern tier powers seemed to offer the best opportunity for such an alliance. The other Middle East states were either unwilling to associate in such an arrangement or were involved in such troublesome problems as Palestine and the approaching Suez crisis. As to the Pales­ tine problem, an uneasy truce arranged through the United Nations in 1949 continued to worry Washington. Initially the United States was reluctant to send or sell arms to either side in the hope that some sort of balance of power could be achieved which would discourage attack. President Nas­ ser of Egypt finally undermined the American position in 1955, when he arranged to exchange Egyptian cotton for Communist arms from Czechoslova­ kia. This step by Nasser provoked secretary Dulles to withdraw promi5ed American aid for building Egypt's huge Aswan Dam across the Nile. Nasser reacted by seizing the Suez Canal, which had been under European control, mainly British and French. When Britain and France joined Israel in an attack on the Suez zone, the United States led the drive in the United

"}_/ John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1960), p. 49. 2/ Bailey, op. cit., p. 840.

-14- Nations--and on the scene--which forced the invaders to withdraw. One important consequence of the Suez crisis for our account is that its aftermath disclosed an Anglo-French weakness before the eyes of the world. A power vacuum developed in the Middle East, and if the United States did not move in, it was felt that the Soviet Union would. .!J 3. The Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Administration's response to what appeared to be an emergency situation in the Middle East was the proposal that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. In January, 1957, President Eisenhower requested congressional authority to provide U.S. economic aid and armed support to any Communist­ threatened nation in the Middle East that requested it. Congress sub­ sequently authorized the President to use $200 million for economic and military aid in the Middle East and, if the President determined that it was necessary, "to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting such assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism." Powers to be assisted -would be determined by the President.

The United States thus was ready to intervene in any Middle East situation where Commun.ist power threatened. No power--friend, potential enemy, or neutralist Arab state--could now assume that the United States would not fight for the Middle East.2/ In its broader context, the Eisenhower Doctrine was another link in the worldwide chain of regional alliances and treaties which the United States was constructing in an effort to contain communism. Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, the northern tier states of the Baghdad Pact, endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine� but among the other Arab nations, only Lebanon formally welcomed it. Even Arab states friendly to the United States would not publicly align themselves on the American side against the Soviet Union. Israel officially approved the doctrine. The United States noted that approval but would not promise Israel assistance, fearing that to aid Israel would jeopardize relations with the Arab world.3/ Egypt and Syria, which were becoming unique in the Arab world by their closer ties with the Soviet Union, denouriced the doctrine. 4. Continuing Middle East Crisis. Despite these American ef­ forts, the Communists continued their political penetration into the Mid­ dle East. During 1957, the Soviet Union was supplying planes, tanks, and other weapons to Egypt and Syria. In December, 1957, the Soviet

ij Ibid., p. 844.

� Alexander De Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 756. 3/ Ibid., pp. 756-57.

-15-

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Union agreed to help Egypt finance the high dam at Aswan with interest on the huge loan at 2.5 percent annually, a lower rate than that usually charged by the United States. Soviet technicians would plan and super­ vise the construction of the dam. In July, 1958, the Baghdad Pact re­ ceived a severe jolt when a group of anny officers in Iraq overthrew the monarchy and announced the founding of the Republic of Iraq. The new regime, headed by General Abdel Karim Kassim quickly signed a defensive alliance with the United Arab Republic. The following year, March, 1959, Iraq fonnally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact--the northern tier was thus left with a gaping hole. After the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, the alli­ ance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and its head­ quarters was moved from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. The role of the United States remains the same in CENTO as before; we encourage and support the arrangement, but we have not formally joined the organization. CENTO, already weakened by the withdrawal of Iraq, continued to suffer its stresses and strains. The Pakistani, angered over the shipment of American anns to India during the China-invasion crisis of 1962, gave disquieting signs of wanting to pull out and to seek better relations with Communist China. More recently, in the aftennath of the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965, Pakistan began to receive military hard­ ware from Communist China. This present drift toward Communist China raised serious questions as to the future reliability of Pakistan's al­ liances with the United States and other pro-Western countries. Currently, the Middle East remains a problem area for Ameri­ can policy. The rivalries which exist among the nations within the area compound the difficulties. Besides the external Soviet threat, there re­ mains the problem of internal Communist subversion. Persistent strife between Israel and her Arab neighbors makes the area a potential powder keg. The United States has tried to damp down these and other potential conflicts, by exercising care in distributing military assistance so as to preserve the status quo. At best this is a difficult policy which has to take into account the fact that the Communist nations also con­ tinue to supply anns.

VI. United States Military Policy in the Far East A. The Legacy of World War II As World War II drew to a close, American military commitments in the Far East were primarily concerned with three countries: China, Japan, and Korea. Our roles in these three countries were natural out­ growths of the leadership we exercised in the defeat of Japan. At this point, let us briefly examine what these roles were. 1. China. China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, fought on the side of the United States in the defeat of Japan. Even

-16-: before the war in Asia ended, one major American objective was to estab­ lish a role for China among the maJor powers of the world. The fact that the United States assisted China in becoming one of the five permanent members of the Security Council within the United Nations was one indica­ tion of this support. A second major American objective was to prevent the impending civil war between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces following the defeat of Japan. Despite American efforts to the con­ trary, this struggle did begin in late 1945 and, even more tragic for the American position in China, led to a Communist victory on the main­ land of China in 1949. The surviving Chinese Nationalists, still led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan where a rival regime was estab­ lished. Despite the frustration of Americans at the collapse of the Nationalist rule on the mainland, the first impulse of the Truman Admin­ istration was to "wait for the dus.t to settle." The United States re­ fused to recognize the new Communist government in Peiping and, initial­ ly, did not intend to extend any further material support to the Nation­ alists on Taiwan. But within a year, a new series of events resulted in new commitments in the Far East that were to last for many years. Before we consider those events, let us briefly turn to Japan and Korea. 2. Japan. The immediate objectives of postwar American pol­ icy in Japan were to uproot and destroy what remained of Japanese mili­ tary power. In the process the United States hoped to reform and edu­ cate the Japanese people so that Japan would become a peaceful and demo­ cratic nation. Unlike that of Germany, the occupation of Japan was al­ most wholly American. General Douglas MacArthur became the instrument of American policy and hence, of allied policy in Japan, under the title of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). American occupation of Japan, on the whole, ran smoothly. The Americans directed, sometimes encouraged, a wide range of sweeping r�­ forms that harmonized unusually well with the contrasting culture of the Japanese nation. In addition to assisting the Japanese to draw up a new constitution based upon democratic concepts, the United States en­ couraged the Japanese to add an unusual provision to the new constitu­ tion which stated, "the Japanese people forever renounce war as-a sovereign right of the nation." This provision, along with disarmament and other reforms, was intended to create a Japan which could exist in peace with her Asian neighbors. All these steps reflected an early American approach to a future Japan that soon was subject to reevalua­ tion.

By the end of 1948, another phase of American policy began to emerge, and in the following year, with the Communist victory in China, it became clear. The United States would help Japan regain her prewar industrial (not military) supremacy in Asia with the idea of making a future "bastion against Communism" there.y As in Germany, the cold

!/ Ibid., p. 701.

-17- . war had thus forced a significant reversal of American policy toward Japan. Since Japan was now weak and had been stripped of her armed forces, she could contribute little to the containment policy, but Ameri­ can policy during this period did not intend to use Japan against Russia, it merely wanted to keep the Soviet Union out. American planners con­ cluded that the Japanese Islands were essential to defense in the Far East, particularly as bases in the event of war. American policymakers, despite the antiwar provisions of the Japanese Constitution, had also begun to think of encouraging Japan in a modest rearmament program. In addition, the United States began working toward a Japanese peace treaty, with or without Communist cooperation, if pro-Western allies would go along. Thus, as the cold war erupted into a hot war in Korea dur�ng the summer of 1950, Japan was changing from a conquered enemy to an in­ formal ally of the United States. In 1950, the United States decided to appoint .a presidential commission to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan with or without the concurrence of the Soviet Union. The commission was headed by John Fos_ter Dulles, and the negoti�tions were conducted on a basis of a "peace of reconciliation," under which Japan would be accorded full sovereignty without being subject to further punishment or discrimina­ tion. After almost a year of intensive discussions, a treaty emerged and was signed by forty-nine nations, including the United States and Japan, but not the Soviet Union or its satellites, on September 8, 1951. Aside from the treaty itself, there were a series of treaties, agreements, and policy statements that contributed to a far larger peace settlement. Here we will consider only those which had military or security impli­ cations. As far as the Asian and Pacific nations were concerned, aside from the Communists, the main hindrances to a Japanese peace treaty' arose from the fear of future Japanese military resurgence. The treaty itself permitted the United States to maintain military bases in Japan for as long as the United States desired. Beyond this, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia were reconciled to the peace treaty by the willingness of the United States to conclude security treaties with them. The bilateral mutual security pact with the Philippines and the trilateral security treaty with New Zealand and Australia (the ANZUS Pact) had virtually the same provisions. Each party recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area against any of the other parties would be a danger to its own security, and declared each "would meet the com­ mon danger in accordance with its'constitutional processes." The same provisions were incorporated into a mutual security treaty with the Re­ public of Korea in 1953, after the Korean armistice. In this treaty, as 'well as in a separate treaty between the United States and Japan, the United States secured·the right to establish military bases in these countries. 3. Korea. Prior to the close of World War II, participants in the Cairo Conference, of which the United States was a party, promised that Korea would be granted independence "in due course." The country

-18- of Korea, at the close of the war, had been placed under Russian and American administration, the Russians occupying the area north of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States the area south of that line. It was hoped that this arrangement would be temporary; but the Russians set up a Communist regime in the north, while frustrating United States efforts to unify the na.tion under one government through United Nations' supervised free elections. After the Soviet Union demonstrated it would not allow unification except under a Communist system, the Americans helped cstablish--by United Nations-approved free elections--a govern­ ment in the south under President Syngman Rhee. In 1948 and 1949, respec­ tively, the Russians and the Americans withdrew; but the Russians left a strong military government in the north, while the Americans had neglected to build a similar strength in the south. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the border in bold aggression against the Rhee government.

B. The Korean War

At this moment, as it happened, the Russians were boycotting the Security Council of the United Nations, in protest because Communist China had not been invited to replace the Nationalist Chinese represen­ tative. With American urging, and freed from the possibility of a Soviet veto, the Security Council met at once, unanimously adopted a resolution branding the North Koreans as aggressors, and called upon the members of the United Nations to "render every assistance in bringing about a res­ toration of peace." The immediate and ultimate burden of supporting the resolution fell in large measure upon the military forces of the United States and those of South Korea.

We shall not describe the actual course of the Korean struggle here, but we shall deal, instead, with its effects upon United States Far Eastern policy.

The Korean armistice agreement concluded in 1953 established boundaries between the north and south at approximately what they had been before the fighting began. In 1954, the United States and the Re­ public of Korea concluded a mutual security pact which committed the United States to supply long-term economic and military aid. Since then, in addition to this assistance, the United States has continually main­ tained from 40,000 to 60,000 of its own·military forces in South Korea. ... Some observers conclude that the Korean War revealed weakness in the doctrine of collective security, as laid down in the United Na­ tions charter.I/ Though some fourteen other nations collaborated with the United States in the war, 90 percent of the burden was borne by the Americans and South Ko.reans. Furthermore, the course of events made it clear that, had it not been for Russian absence from the Security Coun­ cil, no United Nations action would have been possible at all.

1/ Pe�kins, op. cit., p. 118.

-19- •d e:C:rTM w..-. eo o· ".:cclr:rSr<-a,.,.., re, · :1:-,,;1vrttt1,...... ,....,., t/:±i

In addition there was the difficulty of winning a land war on the continent of Asia. Whether the United States could or should fight such a war was· and stil 1 is the subject of considerable d_ebate. It is theoretically true that atomic and other weapons might have been used in Korea. But it still remains to be proven whether such a course of action would have brought the Communists to terms- under which the coun­ try could have been unified.

The Korean War also resulted in a new commitment to National­ ist China. After the Nationalist collapse on the mainland, the disposi­ tion of the Truman Administration initially, as we have seen, was to wait for the dust to settle. But the outbreak of the Korean conflict changed the course of events. The Truman Administration; at the outset of the fighting, declared that it would not permit the Chinese Communist regime to carry out one of its declared intentions, to liberate Taiwan. The United States Seventh Fleet was interposed between Taiwan and the mainland to prevent not only Chinese Communist invasion but also a Nationalist Chinese assault on mainland China. This marked the beginning of an American defense conunitment in Asia that was revised and expanded by the Eisenhower Administration. The Truman commitment to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's forces from attempting a return to the mainland was lifted and, in 1954, the United States and the Nationalist government concluded a mutual security treaty similar to that between the United States and South Korea. In addition to the continued presence of the Seventh Fleet, the United States supplied large-scale military and eco­ nomic assistance to the Nationalist regime.

Finally, and most important in view of the current fighting in South Vietnam, the Korean War led to a more active American interest in the war in Indo-China. In Washington, after the outbreak of fighting in Korea, the Indo-Chinese conflict, involving resistance led by Ho Chi Minh against French efforts to reestablish their rule there, was looked upon as another effort by Communists to expand at the expense of the free world.

C. The War in Indo-China

After 1950, the United States supplied large-scale military aid to French forces in Indo-China. Even with this equipment, the French were unable to make much headway against the Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh.

In the spring of 1954 the war took a disastrous turn for the French and also touched off a crisis for American policymakers. The Viet Minh trapped some 20,000 French and loyal Vietnamese troops in a remote fortress in Northern Vietnam called Dien Bien Phu . In despera­ tion the French finally appealed for American military intervention, primarily a massive air strike from carriers, to relieve the besieged fortress. Despite some official American support for this course, President Eisenhower finally decided against it because of British

-20- opposition and congressional wariness.I/ Dien Bien Phu eventually fell to the Viet Minh. on May 7, 1954, while-an international conference was assembled at Geneva.

D. Geneva Conference On April 26, 1954, the five strongest powers to emerge from World War II--the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Com­ munist China--had met together for the first time, with a number of less­ er states, at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles participated in the discussions on Korea, and after they failed, he withdrew, leaving France and Great Britain as the principal Western nations to deal with the Communist powers on the issue of Indo-China. The Eisenhower Administration, aware of the weak­ ness of the Western position due to the deteriorating French military position in the fighting, withheld approval of the cease-fire terms agreed upon, but announced it would not upset them by force.'!J

The settlement on Indo-China, consisting of three cease-fire agreements, recognized the independence of the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia and divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel. The land to the north of th«t line, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, went to Ho Chi Minh's regime and the territory to the south, the state of Vietnam, remained under the control of a rival government then under Emperor Bao Dai. French military power was withdrawn from the North immediately and from the South a little later. On balance, the Geneva agreement was a triumph for the Viet Minh and a setback for American prestige. Yet it denied the Communist-supported Ho Chi Minh the southern part of the Viet­ nam peninsula which he might have conquered, and for a while at least brought uneasy peace to Southeast Asia.

Later, President Eisenhower expressed distaste for the results of the diplomacy at Geneva but said the United States, which had not joined the settlement, accepted it and would make the best of a bad bar­ gain.y

After the armistice, the state of Vietnam overcame internal strife, resisted Communist penetration, and with American military and economic aid, amounting to $150 million annually, gained strength. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Bao Dai and established the Republic of Vietnam, which the United States quickly recognized.

y Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams--A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1966, rev. ed.), pp. 227-29. y Ibid., pp. 230-31. y De Conde, OE· cit., pp. 824-25.

-21- E. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,·a1armed over the situa­ tion which the Inda-Chinese crisis had created, worked to bring about a plan to block further Communist gains in Asia .. At Manila, on September 6, 1954, he met with the representatives of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. Although invited, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia declined to attend the conference, preferring to follow their policy of non-alignment in the cold war. Only three Asian nations, therefore, participated.

Under Du.lles' leadership, the delegates signed 'an alliance called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the "Manila Pact." The treaty, more cautiously drawn than the North Atlantic Pact, did not specifically provide for military action; in case of aggression in the area, the signatories agreed to meet the connnon danger in accordance with their constitutional practices and to "confer in order to agree upon measures for their common defense."!/

·If threats to independence developed from internal, meaning Communist, subversion, the signatories agreed to consult immediately through a council that formed another regional arrangement, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO. Ultimately, the organization estab­ lished headquarters and a secretariat at Bangkok, the capital of Thai­ land. The treaty also called for economic cooperation and technical aid among the members. Since the Geneva armistice prevented Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from joining an alliance, the Manila Pact offered protec­ tion to those countries through a separate protocol.

SEATO, along with separate bilateral mutual security pacts signed between the United States and a number of other countries in 1954: Korea, Nationalist China, Turkey, and Pakistan, was part of a design by Dulles to forge a stronger front against Communist aggression. A year later, as we indicated in the previous section, the Baghdad Pact repre­ sented a similar effort in the Middle East. As a result of all these agreements, the United States supplied economic and military assistance to strengthen these allies. Thus, as had been the case earlier in Europe under NATO, the United States found itself heavily committed in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

F. The Present Dilemma

Our present role in Vietnam and elsewhere, and the changes which·have occurred throughout the world in the past twenty years, have led some observers to challenge the rationale which underlies much of the military-alliance system whose development has just been described. The major thrust of the United States' policy has been to contain Commu­ nist expansionism, first Moscow-directed, later "poly-central." From an

l./ Perkins, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

-22- initial effort _to help Europe ward �ff communism, the United States moved to construct a series of.bilateral and multilateral military arrange­ ments that touched all major continents of the world.

-23- DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

l ll 1. What is the difference between multilateral and bilateral military j1 i pacts? How many examples can you cite of each? I 2. Why did the United States Government decide·in 1946-47 that a "get tough" policy was needed vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? What was the first formal step in this policy?

3. What is the significance of the Rio Treaty (1947)? How .does this treaty differ from the Act of Ch�pultepec?

4. What factors have contributed to a deterioration in relations be­ tween the United States and some Latin American nations? Why is Castro's Cuba perhaps the central problem in U.S.-Latin American relations?

5. What was the relationship between the B�ussels Pact and the Van­ denberg resolution? What is the relationship between the North ' Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? 6. Why has German rearmament created problems in Europe? How has NATO approached this problem? How large are West Germany's mili­ tary forces?

7. llow has the nuclear issue created problems within NATO? How has France attempted to resolve this problem? i 8. What are United States' interests in the Middle East? Why have most of these interests developed since World War II? What part does the Soviet Union play in these problems?

9. Why has the Arab-Israeli conflict hampered United States' rela­ tions among Arab countries?

10. What is the purpose of CENTO? What is the Eisenhower Doctrine?

11. What effects did the Japanese Peace Treaty have on American mili­ �ary security policy? What military pacts are related to the treaty?

12. Why did the United States Government push for the creation of SEATO? How does SEATO differ from NATO? J.· 1:•

-24- CHAPTER II

UNILATERAL INTERVENTION

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we will deal with the third of the suggested topics, "Resolved: That the Congress should prohibit unilateral United States military intervention in foreign countries." Specifically, we will l • •: t I first attempt to define some imprecise and ambiguous terms; and then, on f l the basis of our definit1ons, we will proceed to explore the issues that fl. , the resolution raises. Both sides should be aware that the controversy !! about the American use of armed forces abroad has antecedents throughout our history. American troops have been sent to foreign soil far more I l often than the Congress has formally declared war.!( How many of these I ! were "interventions" in the popular sense is a matter of dispute. How­ ever, there is no question that armed actions which many call "interven­ tions" have increased in recent years. Theodore Draper has written:

In four short years from April 1961 to April 1965, the United States resorted to some form of military force in three major crises-­ in Cuba, in the Dominican Republic, and in Viet Nam... so much use of armed forces in so many countries in such a short time had never occurred before in all American history.2/

II. Definitions

A. " ...Military Intervention... "

1. _The Two Meanings of Military Intervention. The term "mili­ tary intervention" has both a legal and a popularly understood sense. The legal meaning can be discovered by an examination of the relevant documents of international law. Michigan University legal scholar William W. �is�op, Jr., �rites: ."The term 'intervention' ... is... usually employed to indicate forcible action of some type taken in interference with the a�f�irs of a state by another state, by several states, or by a collec­ tivity of states.3/ Intervention in this sense is prohibited by a number

]! James Grafton Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945).

� Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power (New York: Viking Books, 1966), p. 3.

William W. Bishop, Jr., International Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962), pp. 751-52.

-25- .··�-----�

of international treaties to which the United States is a party.I/ One critical dispute involves the legal content of the word "intervention." Does an invitation to intervene, from a beleaguered government, "legalize" the interjection of troops from another country?

The Soviet Union arranged an invitation to justify its armed intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968. The United States and most other Western countries condemned Soviet and other Warsaw Pact powers' armed intervention as illegal interference in the affairs of an inde­ pendent state; in effect, the West considered the Czech invitation to have been extorted and phony. The Soviet Union in turn has condemned the United States for interventions in the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam, regarding those governments' invitations to the United States as trumped up. On one occasion the United States officially contended that invitation excuses the use of armed force; the Soviet Union insisted that it did not.2/ The dispute was brought to the United Nations in 1951, when the Soviet Union charged that the Mutual Security Act consti­ tuted aggression and intervention. The First Committee of the General Assembly rejected the Russian view.3/ Thus, in a formal and legal sense, intervention may be defined as the use of armed forces to interfere in the internal affairs of another state without the invitation of the legitimate government of that state. Given this definition, American authorities might argue that the United States has not intervened in the situations where it has been accused of doing so. Vietnam, for example, need not be seen as a case of intervention because we are there at the invitation of the Saigon regime to repel alleged aggression from the North. Aggression against a nation may also justify armed action by that nation against the aggressor. The United States' 1961 Cuban in­ vasion attempt was at least partially justified in a United States' State Department White Paper by accusing the Castro regime of being an aggressive threat to the rest of the hemisphere.4/

The legal definition of military intervention might call into question in every debate whether or not the United States has militarily intervened at all in the postwar period. Such a meaning clearly was not what the topic intended. Instead, it uses "intervention" in the less technical, popular sense.

lf 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 4 Malloy (Trenwith), Treaties 4087; United Nations Charter, Art. 2, par. 7.

2/ Bishop, op. cit., p. 753.

3/ 12 U.N. Bulletin, 1952, pp. 59-62,

4/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 245-46.

-26- Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1967) makes no mention of invitation in its definition of intervene: ... to interfere usu. by force or th re.at of force in another nation's internal affairs esp. to compel or prevent an action or to maintain or alter a condi­ tion.

Webster's New School and Office Dictionary (1961) defines intervention simply as: ... interference of one state or.government with the affairs of another on the grounds of humanitarian principles. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1967) de­ fines "intervene" as:

...to interfere with force or a threat of force. and "intervention" as ... interposition or interference of one state in the affairs of another.

Intervention, in the popular sense, may be judged good or bad. Those supporting a given United States "intervention" usually judge the costs in blood and treasure to be worth the returns, such as prevention of conquest of people and resources by a potentially hostile power. Those criticizing U.S. military "intervention" frequently mean that the United States interferes in foreign disputes of less than major conse­ quence to its interests. In most of these, it is charged that there is an element of civil war. Admittedly, these definitions are n'ot precise. In his May 14 proposal for settlement in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon characterized United States actions there as "intervening."1/ The President probably would not concede that United States participa­ tion in the Vietnam war is interference in the affairs of another state, or in a civil war, though he does agree that some of the characteristics of a civil war are present.2/ In any case, the President, like many others, has used the term "intervention" in its popular sense. In that sense. it is surely different from the legal meaning. Despite invita­ tion or the presence of aggression, an armed action in some cases may

Y Richard M.. Nixon, "Text of May 14. 1969, Speech," Boston Globe, May 15, 1969. The word "intervene" is used in a similar sense in John F. Kennedy. "Report to the American People on the Vienna Meeting," June 6, 1961. 'l:..f Nixon, loc. cit.

-27- ��,___ ... ______... , .• ..,..,.._. ___ ·>"-"---' __ ,.,.__ _

be denominated "military intervention," if it is more like participation in a civil war or dispute than a formal conflict between two states. Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies, in his book Interven­ tion and Revolution, catalogues American action in Lebanon, the Domini­ can Republic, and Vietnam as interventions. For him, intervention means "the suppression of insurgent movements."!_/ For debaters dealing with this year's topic, it may not mean that; but it appears that the term "military intervention" as used in the topic should be defined in a popu­ lar sense. Otherwise, there may be nothing to debate.

Unilateral intervention in a legal sense connotes violation of the international legal obligation to respect the sovereignty of in­ dependent nations. Intervention need not have such implications. Thus the term "military intervention" may be regarded as merely descriptive of a situation which debaters will discuss in order to determine the rightness or wrongness of a specific action· or policy. In this chapter, the words "military intervention" will recur time and again. They are used here in the popular sense and are not intended to convey any of the pejorative connotations carried by the legal, technical sense.

2. What Actions Does Military Intervention Include? As we have already noted, "military intervention" clearly includes the direct and open use of regular forces. Does it also include covert military actions? There seems to be no logical reason to exclude them. In Cuba in 1961 and in Guatemala in 1954, CIA recruited, trained, and supervised forces which launched armed invasions. Such actions were military in nature, involved the use of forces controlled by the American govern­ ment, and appeared to meet the other requirements for intervention. Moreover, popular usage treated them as "military interven:tions." In one example of popular usage, Barnet equates the Cuban and Guatemalan incidents with intervention in the Dominican Republic.2/ The question of whether foreign military aid constitutes intervention is more diffi­ cult to determine. The Soviet Union has unsuccessfully charged that it does, according to the formal meaning of intervention.3/ In any case, the situation is unclear. Most of the time, references to "military intervention" are not meant to include the provision of military as­ sistance, but rather the use of American, or American-controlled, armed forces--men and materiel. On the other hand, it could be argued that it is difficult to distinguish between the CIA forces at the Bay of Pigs and some of the armies the United States aids around the world. Some would contend along with the Soviet Union that the latter are es­ sentially American-controlled. Such analysis may not help very much. "Intervention" is a term whose content is governed more by popular y Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 9. 2/ Ibid., p. 17.

3/ Bishop, op. cit., pp. 753-54.

-28- usage than by semantic analysis. Popular usage--as exemplified in re­ cent articles by John Plank and Hans Morgentha�]} implies that inter­ vention is distinguished from regular military aid by the fact that the fonner involves the movement of forces from an external location into a country for purposes of preventing or engaging in conflict, while the latter simply supplies materiel and instruction on a more or less regu­ lar basis to the existing armed forces of a legitimate government. None­ the.less, the distinction is not always clear and some usages tend to deny it.2/ This chapter.will assume that military aid is not construed as military intervention.

B. "··.Unilateral •.. " In a technical sense, it could be argued that the term "uni­ lateral" in the debate resolution means nothing more than that the af­ firmative side's plan must require the United States to obtain prior ap­ proval for intervention from another nation or group of nations. This definition might mean that the plan might have no impact at all, since in many--if not most--cases an American president could probably procure the required consent from some compliant source. Such an approach, it seems, is not what the topic intended. The topic probably does not de­ mand merely that the source of the decision to intervene should be multi­ lateral; it apparently intends that the implementation of that decision have a multilateral character. The dispute that inspired the resolution is the controversy over America's role in the world. Should we bear the burdens virtually alone? And, if others will not contribute, should we bear the burdens at all? Thus, the topic appears to be concerned with proscribing interventions that are unilateral in fact, no matter what trappings of multinationality they possess. The crucial factor in determining whether an intervention by the United States is unilateral in fact is the share of the total foreign effort contributed by the United States. If this country is responsible for the vast bulk of the outside assistance represented by the interven­ tion, then it probably is unilateral in the sense of this debate topic. The tenn "unilateral" is used here in a way that recalls the use of the tenn "monopoly" in the antitrust act; it seems to convey an idea and the meanings connoted by the idea, rather than precisely describing an easily apprehended concept. The idea of "monopoly" was not defined on a percentage scale; it was developed by constant judicial interpreta­ tions and re-interpretations. Like "monopoly," "unilateral" is a word that seems simple on the surface but is elusive in attempts at precise definition. It is best understood by reference to some of its synonyms:

See John N. Plank, "The Caribbean: Intervention, When and How," Y Foreign Affairs, October, 1965; Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs, April, 1967.

2/ Barnet, op. cit., pp. 97-131.

-29- , ••. -•• ,,..• _ _., .,...,,,.....;i,;·,.r..{$t1L""ftl"..ii.i.'.rn*'·+6tA"'I· . ..,-._.4e ... ·cc:°"'<=""· -==-.._·...,. frt...,·· t...,t....ee,'*1"_< ...,nr.. ·· -�·---·-� .....,,1.,--. .r-.,�-·--- ··-=------.:.!�, ...... ·,-��-·-·-

"vast bulk," "preponderance," "one-sided.".!! Take the last of these; the term "one-sided" probably does not mean "exclusive"--it may mean that one party is doing far too much in relation to the efforts put forth by others involved. By this standard, an intervention in which the United States is responsible for 80 or 90 percent of the foreign effort probably would be considered unilateral. Wh�n the American ef­ fort falls below 60 percent, it probably would not be. In between there is an arguable "gray zone." Indeed, the percentages and the "gray zone" may be different for di.fferent individuals, whose reactions to what "one­ sided" means may vary greatly. Despite the difficulties of precise definition, the affirma­ tive plan must attempt one. It would be impossible to debate the topic if there were not some logical way to predict the consequences of enact­ ing the plan. Advantages could not be claimed and disadvantages could not be presented. One possible solution is to permit a judicial agency to define what "unilateral" means in each particular situation, a process similar to the one the courts have adopted in interpreting the antitrust law. However, this does not really solve the difficulty. The conse­ quences of adopting the proposal are as unclear as if the plan consisted of the mere injunction not to intervene unilaterally. Perhaps the only viable solution is for the affirmative to indicate in its plan a reason­ able maximum percentage of foreign men and materiel the United States may employ before an intervention asslUlles the proscribed character of a unilateral action. That approach seemingly would require at least two steps be­ fore intervention could occur. First, the intervening government would have to draw up plans for intervention and receive from another nation or nations assent to undertake at least the minimum' required level of non-American participation. Thus, intervention could be planned in co­ operation with an individual state, an ad hoc group of states, a multi­ lateral defense organization like SEATO, or the United Nations. After reaching agreement with one of these, the government might be required to submit the agreement to some sort of independent judicial agency which would determine whether the proposed intervention satisfies the law. Presmnably the agency would also have to monitor the progress of an intervention to guarantee that it would be terminated if it suddenly or slowly assmned a unilateral character. Any plan that requires the �ind of multilateral implementa­ tion suggested above might end all but the most minor military inter­ ventions. Moreover, most other nations probably are not willing to en­ gage in a major way in the difficult task of fighting subversion Qr propping up legitimate governments under attack, though there is some evidence to the contrary (see Section IV [f] of this chapter). The

I/ Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (3rd. ed.,St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1933), p. 1781.

-30- relatively minor contributions of the United States' allies in Vietnam might no longer suffice to erase the unilateral caste of the American participation .. The nations already helping us there might have to raise their investments or more nations might have to volunteer·help. Such an occurrence seems unlikely. In meeting with President Eisenhower the day be­ fore taking office, ... President [Kennedy] ..• listened to his predecessor describe the mount­ ing guerrilla activity in Laos, which, he said, was the key to all Southeast Asia. If the United States could not get its allies to act with her-­ and once again Britain and France were against ... intervention--the United States... should "inter­ vene unilaterally.".!/ Many of America's allies, then, are not willing to make substantial con­ tributions to an intervention effort. Whatever reluctance previously existed probably has been reinforced by the American experience in Viet­ nam. In summary, this resolution seems far more concerned about the problems posed by the unilateral implementation of intervention than by the difficulties created by the fact that it may have a unilateral source. Thus, an affirmative debating this topic can interpret "unilateral" to require that any intervention be carried out by a substantially multi­ lateral effort. The affirmative, then, will argue two kinds of advan­ tages: if other nations will not help often, or at all, the advantages of reduced or eliminated mi�itary intervention; and, if others will as­ sist the United States, the ·advantages of a shared effort. Because the latter seems uncertain, the following sections will not pay detailed attention to it. Instead, this chapter will concentrate on a discussion of the problems and consequences of diminished intervention and non­ intervention. Can we afford to reduce or stop intervention? Would there be advantages in doing so? Disadvantages? What other implica­ tions does such a course have? C. "Congress Should Prohibit... " 1. Is the Resolution the Status Quo? This phrase in the reso­ lution raises a number of difficulties for the affirmative. The first is that it may call upon the affirmative to present a plan for congres­ sional action that has in effect already been implemented. Some schol­ ars are convinced and we have already noted· their conviction, that present agreements already approved by the Congress proscribe unilateral United States intervention. For example, Article 17 of the Senate­ passed treaty establishing the Organization of American States contains

.!/ Barnet, op. cit., p. 209.

' J

'i -31- the fo.llowing prohibition:."... the territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measur�s of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on ·any grounds whatsoever .... "!/ The United States' move into the Dominican Republic in April, 1965, is considered by some to be in conflict with this treaty, approved by the Senate and having the force of law. The language of Article 17 would appear to be compatible with the intent of the debate resolution.2/ The United States' 1961 invasion of Cuba, some have argued, may violate the same treaty.3/ Moreover, as the preceding section indicated, other treaties to which the United States has adhered also prohibit intervention. For example, the United Nations Charter may do so--as we shall see, the situation is confused--and it, too, was approved by the Senate. Re­ peated interventions do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of prohibitions against them. Wolfgang Friedman of the Columbia Law School states a severe charge which has been on the minds of many:

The real significance of the United States' ac- 'tions in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic ... is that [the United States] may have come to the conclusion that it can no longer afford to abide by international law .... 4/ Of course, a debate proposition seldom if ever calls for the status quo; a proposition of policy asks the affirmative to advocate and defend a change. Therefore, if several definitions of a proposition are reasonable on its wording alone, the affirmative probably should opt for a definition that calls for a change. It can hardly use a definition that demands only a defense of the present system. And here is one key to solve the alleged problem just outlined. The word "prohibit" can be taken in one of two senses--a formal prohibition or a formal and effec­ tive prohibition. "Blue laws" in many states and localities may formally outlaw certain perfectly sensible activities; they do not in reality prohibit them .. Thus, the affirmative can argue that present restric­ tions on unilateral intervention are not prohibitions, since they have left the United States relatively free to act if it wishes to do so. Restrictions already written into law may be simply unobserved for­ mulae--not the stuff of which prohibitions are made.

lJ Robert Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 70. 2/ Ibid., p. 71.

3/ Bartlett, op. cit., p. 270. y Wolfgang Friedman, "The Crisis of International Law," American Journal of International Law (Oc�ober, 1965), 870.

-32- The affinnative could also argue that the restrictions on uni­ lateral intervention embodied in treaties do not meet the resolution be­ cause they were passed only by the Senate. The resolution calls for congressional action, which may be taken to mean action by both the .. Senate and the House of Representatives. If the affinnative includes covert military action in its definition of military intervention, the problem is not so tractable. There is a law on the books forbidding covert military operations in the absence of a declaration of war or I state of war: Whoever, within the United States, knowingly-be- gins or... takes part in any military or naval ex- pedition ...to be carried on from thence [the United States] against any state,' ..district or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3000 or imprisoned for not more than three years, or both. [18 U.S. Code, section 960]lj The precise ambit of this enactment is unclear. Obviously, it cannot apply to the President acting as Commander-in-Chief; but may it apply against his subordinates, if they carry out any order contrary to it? As far as we have been able to detennine, that question has never been settled. Private individuals working independently to overthrow the Castro regime have been indicted, and some have wondered whether other individuals engaged in the same effort with government approval could suffer the same fate.2/ If they could, then the affinnative can hardly dismiss the law as not meeting the resolution, as it did·with treaties. The statute was enacted by the whole Congress. The best solution is to focus on the definition of "prohibition" and insist that it be resolutely enforced. The affirmative probably should argue that present treaties and enactments do not satisfy the proposition because, as the preceding sec­ tion makes clear, they do not forbid what has been described by popular sources as intervention. At best it is unclear what presently enacted prohibitions on intervention actually prohibit. Professor Friedman finds that the United States claims its intervention in Vietnam does not con­ travene the United Nations Charter for three reasons: because " .•• its assistance was a response to a request by the government of South Viet Nam"; because North Viet Nam aggressed against the South; and because the United States was exercising its right under the Charter of "in­ dividual or collective" self-defense. 3/ The range of legal y Seymour Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy (Cam­ bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 243. y Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer, The Cuban Invasion (New York: Bal­ lantine Books, 1962), p. 108. Friedman, op. cit., pp. 865-66.

-33- legerdemain is very wide; almost every postwar armed action by almost every nation has been accompanied by a legal just;ification. The British, French and Israelis claimed that the 1956 Suez war was in accord with the United Nations Charter, because Israel had not received adequate pro­ tection against Egyptian commando raids and British and French rights in the Suez Canal dispute had not been honored.I/ Some scholars contended, in vindication of the 1962 United States blockade of Cuba, that advances in technology had expanded the United Nations Charter's asserted right to self-defense in the event of armed attack to include anticipatory de­ fensive action.2/ With the status of enacted prohibitions so unclear, if they are prohibitions at all, the affirmative may be justified in not worrying about whether the present system renders the resolution super­ fluous. 2. Congressional Power: The Appropriations Process. Once it has solved the initial problem of assuring that its definitions do not describe the status quo, the affirmative faces several other problems in defining the phrase "Congress should prohibit." Initially, the af­ firmative will have to survey what the Congress can and does do now to restrict American military intervention. This is important not only to decide how the affirmative plan should operate, but also to locate the defects in the present system that disable it in dealing with the prob­ lems the affirmative identifies. Congress is not without influence in controlling intervention by the United States. Congressional doubts, apprehensions, and unwill­ ingness led the Eisenhower Administration to scrap a plan for involve­ ment in Indo-China in 1954.3/- But since 1955 Congress has been reluc- tant to assert itself. There was a gradual routinization of national security policy from about 1955 to 1965 that markedly reduced the administration's need to enlist Congressional participation in major new departures. By the first month of Eisenhower's second administration the Cold War treaty structure had virtually been completed; almost all major instruments of America's international involvement had been authorized and institution­ alized. A pattern of appropriations had been established to which all participants were becom­ ing accustomed.4/

1/ Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 1514-15. 2/ Ibid.

3/ James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policymaking (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 54. H. Bradford Westerfield, "Congress and Closed Politics in National Y Security Affairs," Orbis, Fall, 1966, p. 54.

-34- The recent role of Congress in international affairs may be illustrated by the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt 1 the Cuban missile crisis, and the dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic. Senate Foreign Relations Committee �hairman J. William Fulbright testified that only he was con­ sulted, and then on an informal basis, before the April, 1961, invasion of Cuba. He and other congressional leaders were informed of the deci­ sion to quarantine Cuba in October, 1962; their advice was not asked and what they tendered was ignored. A similar minimum of consultation characterized the Dominican action of 1965. .!_I The affirmative must be cognizant, as the negative surely will, of the major potential control the Congres� can exercise over the use of armed forces by the United States. It can refuse to appropriate money for actions or policies it disapproves. The negative may advance this argument in a number of forms--and the affirmative must be prepared to meet it on each level. The first indictment of the appropriations process the affirma­ tive can level is that it may not be an effective check in those cases in which armed force can be used to accomplish a mission quickly. Ac­ tion in a Caribbean country, for example, might be financed from appro­ priations already made. By the time the Congress denies the use of ap­ propriations for such a mission the action may be completed. Further­ more, some uses of armed force, like the guerrilla action in Guatemala in 1954 and the Cuban operation in 1961, do not directly employ a sig­ nificant number of American nationals and may be financed out of the CIA budget, which is not subject to the normal restraints of the appropria­ tions process.

The appropriations control (even if a previous appropriation is rescinded) may not be effective, the affirmative may also contend, because it is a post-problem procedure. The Congress frequently has been able to review the correctness of a presidential decision only after the decision has been made and implemented. In those circum­ stances, the House and the Senate have found it difficult to withhold approval. The Harvard Law Review labels this fait accompli problem.� The difficulty ...is that since such appropriations must generally come after hostilities have already begun, the effective choice remaining to Congress is likely to be severely limited. The "approval" which is expressed by the fact of such appropria­ tions (in order not to "desert our fighting boys") is not unlike the approval of President Theodore

]} J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 47-49. Y "Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat," Note, Harvard Law Review, June, 1968, pp. 1792-93 fn.

-35- Roosevelt's actions expressed by Congress appro­ priating the money to bring back the fleet he sent half way around the world. The more blatant the fait accompli which forces Congress' hand, the less should exercise of its power over appropria­ tion be taken as "consent" to the action.I/. - Indeed, when President Johnson presented his request for supplemental Vietnam appropriations in May, 1965, he asked for them on two grounds: that the administration's Vietnam policy was correct and that there was a need to protect "our men and supplies."2/ · It would have been dif­ ficult for a senator or representative to-vote against such a request. In fact, few did, even among those opposed to the war.

The appropriations argument raises an issue interesting from a theoretical as well as a practical point of view. The negative might argue that the Congress under the present system could use the appropria­ tions power to prevent any future unilateral interventions. For example, if the details could be worked out, Congress could provide that no ap­ propriations be made available to finance such ventures. The affirma­ tive, confronted with this "argument," must insist that the fact the Congress could employ the appropriations process to do this does not mean that actually doing so is an inherent part of the present system. En­ acting a law, or refusing to continue a law like an appropriation, is instead a legitimate way for the affirmative to implement a proposition. For example, under the guaranteed-annual-income topic, most affirmative plans contemplated implementation by congressional enactment. Plans under the topic calling for reductions in foreign policy commitments could have been realized by congressional inaction--by a failure to ap­ propriate additional funds for NATO troops or for the maintenance of forces in Vietnam. While debating the foreign policy topic, no negative suggested that the present system could take care of the problem because cutting off funds would in effect reduce commitments. The negative would have been advocating the resolution. On this year's topic, negative pro­ posals to utllize the appropriations process to prohibit intervention would adopt the resolution through a change in policy by the agency des­ ignated by the proposition, the Congress. The negative may insist that appropriations controls are part of the present system. But what is the present system? Can it be the ability simply to enact or refuse to en­ act a law? As we have just seen, that may be the means for putting the affirmative proposal into effect. Thus, the negative use of appeals to the status quo is limited to those actions which do not fulfill a reso­ lution.

. 3. _Congressional Power to Implement the Resolution. The prop- osition requires that Congress act as the prohibiting agent. The y Ibid., p. 1801. 2/ Ibid., pp. 1804-5.

-36- lnegative may qu�stion whether Congress has the power to do so by legisl�­ tive enactment in view of the broad constitutional grant of power in na­ tional security and foreign affairs to the President. Perhaps one could not resolve· the ques�ion unless Congress acted--and we waited to see what would happen. The tasks in foreign affairs the Constitution assigns specifically to Congress are to appropriate necessary funds, to approve diplomatic appointments, and to declare war.1/ Most scholars appear to believe that the President on his own initiative can deploy troops abroad;2/ many others ·think the President's power in this respect could be curtailed only by constitutional amendment. Professor Bernard Schwartz disagrees: In the absence of Congressional action, the Presi­ dent has independent power to use the armed forces beyond our borders. But where the Congress pre­ scribes specific procedures to deal with a threat .•• the President must follow those procedures•••• 3/ Professor Schwartz cites an 1804 Supreme Court case, in which the Court upheld the power of C_ongress to limit the President's authority to seize vessels on the high seas.4/ Although the passage of a simple declarative statute may not suffice to prohibit unilateral intervention, there are perhaps other de­ vices to accomplish the same end. We have already seen how the appro­ priations process might be used for this purpose. Professor Arthur Schlesinger has noted the increasing influence the power of the purse has given Congress.SI Of course, an affirmative has to be careful here. The President has contingency funds and, in some cases, the power to reallocate resources within the budget. Those powers would have to be withdrawn. Moreover, if the President ordered unilateral intervention, how would the resulting constitutional crisis be resolved? How does the formal cut-off of funds guarantee an actual cessation of objectionable activities?

!/ William Schurz, American Foreign Affairs (New York: William E. Dutton and Company, 1959), p. 154. 2/ Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1967), p. 119. Bernard Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), Vol. II, Part 1, p. 168. Ibid. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Alfred de Grazia, Congress and the Presidency: ·Their Role in Modern Times (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, 1967), p. 27.

-37- 11,.e Congress could be empowered to prohibit unilateral inter­ vention by an enabling constitutional amendment, if this is necessary. An interesting problem then arises: do the affirmative's advantages flow from the proposition (congressional prohibition) or from an extra­ propositional plan provision (constitutional change)? Advantages de­ rived from extra-propositional plan provisions can-hardly justify adopting the resolution. Since it would be impossible for Congress to pass a constitutional amendment on its own (without ratification by three-fourths of the states), the affirmative cannot incorporate a finally adopted amendment in its plan. Instead, it must restrict the operation of its plan to that portion of the amendment process which is formally reserved to Congress--drafting, initial approval, and submis­ sion to state legislatures. Yet clearly, since the affirmative advan­ tages result from final adoption of the amendment and no less, the af­ firmative must stand ready to show that on balance the amendment is more likely than not to be approved by the state legislatures. It is important to note that the benefits of the term "should" cannot apply to state ratification of the amendment, since the term in the proposi­ tion applies only to "Congress." The result: an added affirmative burden of pro� This burden introduces another question. In deciding whether the states would probably adopt the affirmative's amendment, where does the presumption lie, with the affirmative or the negative? It lies with the affirmative initially, because, at the conclusion of the affirma­ tive's constructive case, the amendment has been proven desirable and there are, as yet, no reasons why the state legislatures should reject it. 'I11.us, the strength of the affirmative's need and/or advantages es­ tablishes a presumption that the state legislatures, acting rationally, will take the steps required to complete the plan.

'I11.e negative can overcome the presumption for ratification of the amendment in one of three ways. It can defeat the need or destroy its significance, in which case the negative wins the debate anyway and the whole question of probable ratification is moot. It can defeat the presumption in fact, by demonstrating that a sufficient number of legis­ latures would probably reject the amendment. Finally, the negative might attempt to show by historical analysis that the states are some­ what unwilling to follow the congressional lead in adopting amendments to the Constitution. For example, despite what many thought a pressing need, the states declined to ratify the amendment outlawing child labor. Each approach has its own ramifications and raises particular difficulties. Strong proof that the states would not in fact ratify an amendment prohibiting unilateral intervention would require in-depth re­ search into the attitudes and opinions dominating state legislatures. Would less than this suffice? Could the negative overturn the presump­ tion simply by arguing that the state legislatures have known the facts in the affirmative case for a while and have not acted? Such questions are difficult to resolve. After all, governments have sometimes re­ sponded quickly and even unexpectedly, especially in crisis situations.

-38.,- Perhaps the affirmative could argue that the Vietnam experience is just such a crisis situation; that in its aftermath the state legislatures on balance are likely to act in favor of a congressionally initiated proposal to prevent future Vietnams, just as Congress unexpectedly acted swiftly to prevent future depressions in the 1930s. Thus, the stronger the perceived need, the affirmative can contend, the more likely the states will be to take the requisite action to perfect the affirmative proposal. If the negative chooses to prove the historieal unwillingness of the states to follow Congress in amending the Constitution, what kind of proof will suffice? What frequency of state rejection of congres­ sional initiatives is required to substantiate the negative position? Does it matter whether the amendments submitted and rejected dealt with issues that can be differentiated from the issues dealt with in amend­ ments submitted and ratified? The answers to these questions are unclear; debating about them may occupy a large part of the discussion on this year's topic, if affirmatives implement their plans by constitutional amendment. The introduction of the problems connected with constitu­ tional change creates other complications. In determining who won the debate, judges now weigh a probability of plan adoption (rather than a certainty) against whatever damage has been done to the affirmative need and whatever disadvantages have been established. This makes sig­ nificance even more important to the affirmative than usual; if there is substantial doubt about both the significance of the need and the probability of plan approval, the affirmative is unlikely to prevail. Moreover, this situation provides the negative with a powerful oppor­ tunity to make psychological factors work for it in the debate. The negative can introduce disadvantages to the initiation of the amendment by Congress, as well as to its adoption. If the disadvantages carry, the judge at the end will be weighing certain harms (the disadvantages) against the advantages of a plan that will possibly or probably, but not surely, be adopted. Thus, the question of whether unilateral intervention can be prohibited only by constitutional amendment could be a crucial one. There are arguments on both sides. The issue may be difficult to re­ solve in a debate. If the affirmative seeks to implement its plan by a simple statutory enactment, the end of the debate may see a substan­ tial doubt about the constitutionality and thus the viability of the affirmative plan. .!_/ If, on the other hand, the affirmative opts for

y The claim that "constitutionality is not an issue in debate" can be questioned. When the proposition reads: "The United States should... ," the term "should" frees the affirmative of any obliga­ tion to demonstrate that whatever the United States does in pursuance of the resolution is in accord with the Constitution. The Constitution is one part of the status quo that may be changed. However, a resolution that asks that a particular part of the United States Government act applies the "should" presumption (continued on following page)

-39- � ..� -., . .., ··-i--,.� ·-·- '��-� ···-· ' .. � -

constitutional change, it takes on an additional burden and the doubt stil 1 remains.

4. Enforcement Problems. The affirmative also has to be aware of several problems with the enforcement of the plan's prohibi­ tion against unilateral intervention. The President may simply dis­ obey the congressional enactment of the constitutional amendment imple­ menting the plan. Presidents, some authorities claim, have disobeyed the law in the past. Political scientist Joseph Kallenbach writes: Indeed, Presidents have on occasion even dared to challenge or to ignore judicial pronouncements on matters touching their official powers and duties. Andrew Jackson in his famous Bank Bill Veto Mes­ sage insisted that his own views, and not the Supreme Court's, were controlling... on the question of the validity of legislation establishing a United States Bank. Lincoln instructed a military officer ,holding a civilian in custody by executive directive to ignore an order for a return on a habeas corpus writ issued by Chief Justice Taney ..!f More recently, presidents have been accused of violating treaties, which constitutionally, are clearly part of the "law of the land."2/ Former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin ind1cates that in his view the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic was "... at least contrary to the spirit of the OAS Charter," since that docu­ ment forbids "unilateral intervention."3/ In short, the negative can

(continuation of footnote from preceding page) only to the designated governmental unit. There is no presumption that other governmental units or structures should also change. Thus, this year's topic calls for the Congress to use the power it possesses now to change policy by prohibiting unilateral interven­ tion. The policy change called for affects the conduct of foreign affairs, not the ordered relationship among governmental units. The Constitution, as it is, is one context in which the affirmative plan operates; if constitutional alteration is required for a more effective plan, the affirmative plan must demonstrate that the constitutional context will probably change. , :!f Joseph E. Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 245-46. '!:./ Schwartz, 0£, cit., p. 124.

� John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken By Events (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­ day and Company, 1966), p. 705.

-40- argue, the President can do what he wants, despite any congressional ac­ tion; and the plan, therefore, makes no difference. It does not effec­ tively change anything.

The affirmative has a number of possible replies to this argu- ment.

(1) The affirmative might contend that the issue is illegiti­ mate; the President should obey the law. Yet, as we have already noted, the presumption granted by the term "should" applies only to the agencies designated by the proposition. The affirmative has the obligation to demonstrate that its plan is practical by proving that it can be en­ forced--that, once adopted, it will work successfully and attain its ob­ jectives. This is particularly true if the affirmative deprecates present prohibitions on the unilateral intervention, e.g., the OAS as ineffective and unenforceable. After all, the affirmative proposal must cure the inherent defects of the status quo.

(2) The affirmative might argue that respect for law will lead to presidential adherence to it; that President Nixon's emphasis on "strict construction" of the law and adherence to legal principles sup­ port this view. However, as we have just pointed out, it can be argued that presidents on occasion have disobeyed the law. The crucial ques­ tion from a president's point of view may be whether disobedience will arouse and anger the public. With popular support or apathy, transgres­ sion may seem neither difficult nor impolitic. Of course, the affirma­ tive may wish to take on the burden of proving that its plan is likely to evoke considerable support in the national community. It could claim the existence of a new national mood which seems typified by the slogan "No More Vietnams." Harvard government professor Stanley Hoffman pre­ dicts that the policy embodied in that slogan is likely to guide American action "for the foreseeable future."!/ Other experts feel the American people will not tolerate another involvement like Vietnam 2/ and conse­ quently national leaders will be careful to avoid it.3/ The positions of the major presidential candidates in 1968 have been cited to support this view.4/

!/ Richard M. Pfeffer, No More Vietnams (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 189, quoted by Samuel P. Huntington.

2/ Robert E. Hunter and Philip Windsor, "Vietnam and United States Pol­ icy in Asia," International Affairs, April, 1968, p. 212.

3/ Lincoln P. B.loomfield et. al. , The Control of Local Conflict (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol. II, p. 158.

4/ The Christian Science Monitor ! July 22, 1968.

-41- The argument just outlined might very well enable the affirma­ tive to win the enforcement issue; but it might mean that they would lose the debate. The negative could reply that if there were to be no more major unilateral interventions, then there was no need for the affirma­ tive plan. _Indeed, the negative is likely to raise the "No More Viet­ nams" issue to prove precisely that. Instead of relying on public opinion and leadership to assure presidential compliance with law, the affirmative may contend that such factors are too uncertain and fickle to guarantee a future forbearance from unilateral intervention. There is support for such a contention. Political scientists have observed that American public opinion in foreign affairs is notor­ iously changeable.I/ After the Korean War many observers thought that public intolerance-for limited war ruled out another Korea; yet just ten years after the armistice, Morton Halperin observed that public bitter­ ness had dissipated. "... The Korean War," he concluded, "does not seem to have had a major or lasting impact on popular political attitudes."2/ Moreover, presidents and their advisers may be unable to avoid prolonged involvements even if they try. Without intending it, national leaders may end up in a new Korea or Vietnam. Herman Kahn recently observed:

The ...costs have been so high that I tend to be­ lieve that neither President Kennedy nor Presi­ dent Johnson would have intervened [in Viet Nam] had they foreseen them, just as President Truman might not have gone into Korea if he had realized in June, 1950, the difficulties he would experience over the next two years.� Thus, meeting the enforcement issue by arguing that public op1n1on will lead the president to respect the law may not be a wise course for the affirmative to take. The affirmative--to establish the need for a statutory or constitutional check--may move in the other direction and maintain that estimates of public opinion and leadership are an inherently unrealistic substitute for formal change. (3) The affirmative could attempt to show that the plan's prohibitions can be enforced by use of the appropriations mechanism. The complications and difficulties of this possibility have already been discussed. ...

Y Howard Zinn, Vietnam: The Logic of Wi �hdrawal (Bos.ton: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 117.

� Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 47.

� Frank E. Armbruster et. al., Can We Win in Vietnam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1968), p. 168, quoted by Herman Kahn.

-42- "lj i (4) The affirmative might urge direct controls on the military as a means of enforcement. For example, it could advocate another com­ mand level between the military establishment and the Co�ander-in-Chief. Only with the consent of the new agency would the military be permitted to use force abroad. The agency could be given judicial powers over mil­ itary personnel and control over promotions to compel military obedience to its directives. In addition, the affirmative could argue that a suf­ ficiently coordinated attempt by the armed forces to follow the presi­ dent and disregard the control agency is unlikely. There are too many internal policy conflicts within the military itself.1/ General Matthew Ridgway has testified that the Army disagreed with the other services over the question of intervention in Indo-China in 1954 and helped to persuade the president to stay out of the conflict.2/ Thus, the affirma­ tive can argue, powers over promotions and courts martial, policy divi­ sions within the armed services themselves, and the never seriously chal­ lenged tradition of civilian control� all indicate that an agency with command powers could prevent a presi ential breach of the prohibition against unilateral intervention. It is advisable to note at this point that the use of an agency to insure enforcement can apply if enforcement mechanisms other than direct control of the military are utilized by the affirmative. Such an agency could also be granted control over expenditures to see to it that the uses to which federal funds are put conform to the re­ s_trictions on intervention contained in appropriations bills. It also might have the power to invoke the automatic penalties on the president discussed in the next section. (5) When a topic similar to this was debated in the colleges, some teams opted to enforce their plan through the imposition of auto­ • matic penalties when a designated agency or board ruled that the presi­ i dent had disobeyed. It was suggested that a transgression might merit immediate impeachment or ten years in prison without possibility of parole. Before adopting such a strategy, affirmative debaters should reflect on its chances for success in a real world context. If a presi­ dent with popular support intervened unilaterally, all the pressures would militate against any punitive action. Who, for example, would be willing to take physical action to arrest or "jail" the President of the United States? Would the vice-president agree to take over in an impossible situation? Moreover, would the designated agency be in­ clined to rule that the president's action was, in fact, "unilateral military intervention," if :that determination led directly to the

1/ Davis B. Bobrow (ed.), Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), pp. 111-12, quoted by Gene M. Lyons.

'l:.f Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 275-77.

!!_/ Lyons in Bobrow, loc. cit.

-43- application of fantastic and almost inconceivable penalties? It is true that the arguments heard in a debate often assume possibilities that are clearly improbable in the "outside" world. Con­ cepts like inherency imply a willingness to act in the manner indicated by rationality--a willingness that may not really exist in a practical situation. The establishment and maintenance of such ground rules are requisites for academic debate. However, it can be argued that in demon­ strating the practicality of its plan (which, in this case, consists in showing that it can be enforced), the affirmative has an obligation to convince the judge that if the plan is adopted, reasonable men in the "real" world will use its mechanisms to accomplish its purposes. Would the imposition of severe automatic penalties on a popular president require a fundamental change in the attitudes and conduct of citizens and public officials? Americans, the negative could maintain, would support rather than condemn a president who broke a law to serve what he and his constituents considered a vital national interest. The charge that President Johnson violated the OAS Treaty by his actions in the Dominican Republic crisis sparked no widespread public outcry. Some questioned his wisdom; few among the general public seemed to be worried about "legalisms."

III. Is Unilateral Intervention Necessary? A. The Impact of Nationalism: An Affirmative View The affirmative may contend that American intervention is un­ necessary because nationalism is a sufficient counter to communism. Historian Arthur Schlesinger maintains:

The reason for the failure of Communism in the developing world is the same as the reason for the expulsion of .colonialism from that world: what the new nations want more than anything else is the assurance of their national freedom of decision.y One scholar believes that ·11 •••nationalism has not only survived Communism, but has actually triumphed over it."2/ This view is reinforced by the testimony of Columbia political scientist Donald S. Zagoria, who cl�ims that Communist forces do not have in any underdeveloped nation the y Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Vietnam and the End of the Age of the Superpowers," Harper's, March, 1969, p. 46. 2/ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Perspective," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January, 1964, p. 13.

-44- r,.. :�.·� i

. popular support necessary for a successful subversive movement. .!} This i' is true, he concludes, even where tribalism and factionalism rend the I fabric of the new societies.2/ In short, there is evidence that Latin America,3/ most of Asia,4/ and Africa,5/ are insulated from Communist takeover-by the force of-nationalism, now and in the foreseeable future. 11 il!J The nationalism-triumphant thesis rests upon the assumption ):.\ that popular support is the crucial factor in the victory of a subver­ r: sive movement. Communism, it is contended, cannot gain such support be­ t:t' cause the new nations do not wish to trade a colonial past for a Com­ i munist future. They resist enslavement to "any brand of orthodoxy. 116/ }r ;-. How crucial is this resistance? Many scholars believe that without the ,,r backing of the indigenous population, guerrillas cannot survive or pros­ t�< per. The subversive force depends on the people not only for food, .r i. clothing, shelter, and recruits, but also--and even more importantly-­ '�· for intelligence.7/ A lack of information is crippling; without it, "· .. the guerrilla-is like a blind man."8/ He does not know where the government regulars are, what their strength is, or how best to attack them. All authorities agree that some kind of symbiotic relationship between the guerrillas and the population is a prerequisite for success. One reports: "Military analysts today estimate that guerrillas need the active support of 15 to 25% or more of the population and some believe that the sympathy of another 40% is essential.� Wherever subversive

"};.! Donald Zagoria, China, Vietnam, and the United States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966), p. 96.

� Ibid., pp. 97-98.

� Pfeffer, op. cit., p. 217, quoted by Luigi Einaudi. 4/ Zagoria, loc. cit.

§..! Theodore Geiger, The Conflicted Relationship (New York: McGraw­ Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 145.

� Barnet, op. cit., p. 7. 7J Henry Kissinger, Problems of National Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1965), pp. 346-47, quoted by Franklin A. Lindsay.

8/ Edgar O'Ballance, Malaysia: The Communist Insurgent War (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), p. 169.

9/ Ralph Sanders, "Mass Support and Communist Insurrection," Orbis, Spring, 1965, p. 220.

-45- forces have failed to achieve some substantial degree of support and sym­ pathy--for example, in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines--revolution has failed ..!J A corollary of the doctrine that popular support is essential is another doctrine--that it cannot be stimulated and stirred up by ex­ ternal forces. According to John Schrecker and Michael Waltzer, no Com­ munist success in the Third World can be traced to external subversion.2/ Harvard's Edwin Reischau�r insists that " ... As.ian countries cannot be - controlled from abroad, even through Communism or any other ideology."3/ Finally, the failure of Che Guevara's Bolivian advent�re is cited as em­ pirical proof that revolutions are born of internal discontent rather than external agitation.!,! Afficianados of the r1s1ng nationalism contend that if all else fails--if nationalism is captured by communism, if subversion at­ tracts sufficient support, if outside forces successfully foment unrest-­ American intervention is still unjustified because it cannot succeed in any meaningful sense. Some say that victory is then completely unattain­ able; they believe that there is no known method of countering a guer­ rilla war effectively once it achieves popular support. George Kennan supports this view. He has written that an American triumph may be "physically" impossible in an underdeveloped nation if our efforts lack popular support.SI On the other hand, other authorities, while conced­ ing that United States arms can prevail ultimately, argue that the price of success is so high that the meaning of any victory is negated. Reischauer told the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in 1968: We cannot at a tolerable cost to ourselves or the nation involved, meet this sort of internal threat successfully with our own military power. In other words, if an Asian government is not capable of main­ taining itself against internal subversion or revo­ lution, we cannot give it the support it needs.6/ y Ibid., p. 221.

2/ John Schrecker and Michael Waltzer, "American Intervention and the Cold War," Dissent, Autumn, 1965, p. 442.

Edwin Reischauer, "Trans-Pacific Relations," Agenda for the Nation, ed. Kermit Gordon (Washington: The Brookings Institution), p. 409.

4/ Richard Barnet paraphrased in New York Times Book Review, November 28, 1968, p. 20. Klaus Knorr, The Uses of Military Power in a Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 145, quoted0 by George Kennan.

Testimony of Edwin Reischauer in House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, February 29, 1968,p. 4.·

-46- The costs of an intervention determ�ned to succeed without popular sup­ port may include not only devastation of the threatened nation, but also substantial human and monetary costs and the threat of escalation,.!Jwhich will be discussed at greater length later.

An affirmative intent on arguing the futility of unpopular in­ tervention should be aware, therefore, that the proposition has two re­ lated, but distinct meanings: either success is impossible or it can be purchased only at an unreasonable cost. The second interpretation is probably more defensible. After all, if it were ever necessary, the United States could clearly obliterate the country it aimed to save. The second interpretation decries the possible use of that option. In the words of Senator Eugene McCarthy:

World War I and World War II were justifiable ... on the basis of proportion, since the good we could anticipate from victory outran the harm and the cost of achieving that victory....

. ..we should hesitate to waste our strength-­ economic, military, and moral--in so highly ques­ tionable a course [as Viet Nam],;'

B. The Impact of Nationalism: A Negative View

A negative can counter affirmative arguments against interven­ tion that depend on the force of nationalism in a variety of ways. There is plenty of ammunition for the position that nationalism is only a fragile and brittle shield against communism. Seven arguments merit major attention.

. (1) Nationalism is a weak and sometimes virtually nonexistent force in the less developed countries. Nationalism, many think, is not a general phenomenon in the underdeveloped nations. It is often typical of only the elite portions of society; for the rest of society it is only a "goal."3/ Underdeveloped nations are usually heavily rural; yet it is in the rural area among the peasants that nationalism has had the least impact. " ...the rural masses have been indifferent or... at the best. .. passive adherents to the nationalist creed. "4/ In many "nations," l/ Geiger, op. cit., p. 261. Y Eugene J. McCarthy, "Address on Vietnam," in Irving J. Rein, The Relevant Rhetoric (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 122,---ri"S.

� Robert A. Scalapino, "Nationalism in Asia: Myth and Reality," Orbis, Winter, 1967, p. 1180.

� Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 195.

-47- tribal and regional rivalries, especially in Africa, render the country little more than an artificial inheritance from a colonial past,.!/

Divided and ephemeral nationalisms may pave the way for Com­ munist takeover. There is a potentially strong Communist residue in Singapore, which could spring into action if economic or political crisis were to erupt.2/ Nationalism was of no avail in Cuba, either because it was nonexistent for all intents and purposes or because it was captured by communism 3/--a possibility which wi 11 be investigated in the next sec­ tion. Argentina has endured constant instability and crisis since the 1955 overthrow of President Juan Peron.4/ Its "competing nationalisms"5/ are not the healthy counterweights that-frustrate Communist attempts at­ subversion.

(2) Communism can exploit nationalism as a vehicle to gain power. Institute for Defense Analysis member Seymour Deitchman warns: "The newly emerging nations ...are in many cases ripe for Communist pene­ tration by unconventional warfare or for Communist capture of revolu­ tionary and nationalistic movements.6/ One scholar sees this as a dis­ tinct threat in Latin America and cites Bolivia and Cuba as examples.7/ In Cuba,'the Communists consciously and effectively identified their ef­ fort with nationalistic impulses and forces.8/ Moreover, popular sup­ port may gravitate increasingly to subversive forces if they initially appear successful. This adds to the strength of the Communists--as it did in South Vietnam.9/ Thus, nationalism may not be a force to stop

1/ Bartlett, op. cit., p. 264.

2/ Frances L. Starner, "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle," The Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. Robert Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 251.

3/ Gerhard Masur, Nationalism in Latin America (New York: The Mac­ millan co··., 1966), p. 225. ii Arthur Whitaker and David Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 72.

5/ Ibid.

6/ Deitchman, op. cit., p. 59.

7/ Masur, op. cit., p. 250.

§__/ Whitaker and Jordan, op. cit., p. 155. 2/ Sanders, op. cit., p. 222.

-48- communism, but a force to promote it. We may not be able to substitute a hope in nationalism for. intervention if we are intent on defending the less developed n·ations.

(3) The Communists can use terrorism to convert nationalism into support for subversion. Rebel forces, it is maintained, can convert an apathetic population into a favorable one and a hostile population into an apathetic one by the use of terrorist methods.I/ The true feel­ ings of the people may no longer matter; concern for the survival and safety of the family group may dictate adherence to a despised cause.2/ Terrorist techniques for gaining support include assassination campaigns, the disruption of communications, forced tax levies, and "drafting" sol­ diers from the local population.3/ The Algerian experience is a case in point: The Algerian rebels' strength increased from less than 3,000 in 1954 to 20,000 full-time troops and even more part-time combatants in 1958. This growth in rebel strength can be attributed primarily to the widespread use by the rebel leadership of terrorist methods against the Moslem population, compelling their tactical support.4/

Thus, terrorism may in effect nullify the· force of national­ ism. By intervening and placing a substantial and effective force be­ tween the rebels and the population, another nation may be able to pro­ vide security from terrorism. In a secure atmosphere, and perhaps only in a secure atmosphere, nationalism's alleged opposition to communism would have a better opportunity to function effectively.

(4) Guerrilla forces "... can operate with relatively little popular support."5/ One authority estimates that the "decisive figure"-­ the amount of support essential for success--can be as low as 15 per­ cent and need be no higher than 25 percent.6/ In the Philippines, prob­ ably, no more than five percent of the population supported the ij Ibid.

Franz Michael, "The Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare," Orbis, Summer, Y 1965, p. 423.

3/ Owen Harries, "Should the U.S. Withdraw from Asia?", Foreign Af­ fairs, October, 1968, p. 22. .. 4/ Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy," in Modern Guer­ rilla Warfare, Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press, 1962) , p. 33.

?..f Sanders, op. cit., p. 220,

� Samuel Griffith, "Introduction," in On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao Tse­ tung (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1961), p. 27.

-49- --···---��e

Communist Huk rebels and yet they came very close to toppling the 'gov­ ernment.I/ The same thing·happened in Malaya.2/ Confronted with this problem,-intervention may be the only way to assure that a combination of military subversion and minority_ support does not impose its will on the majority, which may prefer a non-Communist regime.

(5) Trends toward reforrn in the Third World countries may create an instability on which subversion can thrive. Indeed, a popu- 1.ar government embarked upon a program of social change can become a prime target for Communist revolution.3/ This is probably a short-terrn phenomenon;4/ but there may be no long�erm if the government is not initially protected and preserved. Several factors contribute to this difficulty. First, social change may create an atmosphere of hope and expectation in which impatience at the relatively slow pace of reform may lead to revolt.SI The hopeful are more apt to demand quick success than those in whom reform has not yet created hope. Secondly, reform can often be a disruptive process--"a destabilizing factor" in favor of the guerrillas.6/ Finally, increasing literacy due to improved educa­ tion "·· .may cause large demands on the productive system, leading to inflation, frustration, and radicalism."7/ There is empirical evidence for the thesis that reform can lead to revolution. Though it may seem difficult to believe, a study in South Vietnam indicates that Viet Cong

1/ Sanders, op. cit., pp. 217, 221. y Ibid., p. 221. y Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," in Ameri­ can Defense Policy, Associates in Political Science, United States Air Force Academy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 389.

ii Willard Barber and C. Neil Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 39. y Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Future Small Wars: Must the United States Intervene?", Orbis, Fall, 1968, p. 671.

� G. C. AlRoy, "Insurgency in the Countryside of Underdeveloped Coun­ tries," Antioch Review, Summer, 1966, p. 156.

7J Herman Kahn, "A Short Essay on Foreign Policy in Latin America," Texas Quarterly, Winter, 1966, p. 20.

-50- strength in the provinces in the 1950s was greatest where there had been substantial land reform and least where there had been almost no land reform.y

(6) Nationalistic forces may be irrelevant in the case of threatened Communist GOUps, which may call for external intervention. Coups do not need significant popular support to succeed--just correct "political perception and timing."2/ Between 1958 and 1966, coups were responsible for half the political-violence in the underdeveloped world; they represent a serious threat to stability.3/ The question is: are coups likely to lead to Communist rather than-right-wing takeovers? If not, there may be no reason for inteTVention, presuming that the aim of intervention is to contain communism. One authority indicates that coups are increasingly assuming a progressive or revolutionary character.4/ The younger officers in the military forces of underdeveloped nations often have "collectivist orientations." As older right-wing generals die or retire, the threat of Communist coups may increase.Sf In the Mid­ dle East, for example, some officers are now open Communists.6/ The Soviet Union's military assistance program in the Third World-may re­ inforce and spread whatever Communist tendencies exist in the armed forces, which are often the principal coup-making agents.7/

Indonesia allegedly was almost captured by a Communist coup. If the rebels had succeeded in assassinating Generals Nasutfon and Su­ harto, President Sukarno could have appointed a pro-Communist army com­ mand;Y the bureaucrats might have acceded to a Communist govern­ ment;9/- and the country might well have fallen.10/- A Communist

y Huntington in Pfeffer, op. cit., p. 222. Y Paul F. Gorman, "Internal Defense and the L.ess Developed Country," Issues of National Security in the 1970's, ed. Amos A. Jordan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 141. � Ibid., p. 130. Ibid., p. 132.

Morris Janowitz, The Military in·the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 65. .. §} Ibid., p. 64. 2/ Ibid., p. 97. Y Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies (February, 1967), 249. 'ij Ibid., p. 245 . .!QI Ibid., p. 249.

-51- takeover may have been averted only by luck. Thus, the negative can answer an affirmative claim that nationalism is sufficient by pointing to the possibility of coups, which may not need popular support and can be effective instruments for seizing power. The United States acted in 1965 against a coup attempt in the Dominican Republic, claiming that the uprising in Santo Domingo threatened to result in a Communist takeover. We acted not against a revolution spread across an entire island, but against a disruption centered in its main city.

(7) Intervention can preserve the status quo in a country-­ and has done so in the past. Hudson Institute analyst Frank Armbruster provides an example. The current "nationalist" Malaysian government is in existence today because tens of thousands of foreign [British and Nepalese] troops stepped in and rescued a formative native government from certain and imminent defeat by a native Communist revolutionary force. .!/ The result was an "apparently permanent solution" to the guerrilla prob­ lem in Malaysia.2/ Intervention, it is claimed has also proved success­ ful elsewhere. For example, the 1958 dispatch of Marines to Lebanon may have deterred Egyptian intervention, preserved the Lebanese Republic, established stability in the Middle East, and halted the spread of Com­ munist influence there.3/ After the assassination of President Trujillo and the establishment of an interim government in the Dominican Republic, the United States made a naval show of force that reportedly broke the back of a threatened right-wing coup.4/ Finally, President Kennedy's " ... quiet but hard military preparations... halt[ed] the imminent Communi­ zation of Laos... " in 1962.5/ The President sent Marine helicopter forces into neighboring Tha1land and ordered the Seventh Fleet into the South China Sea; ultimately, a conference in Geneva agreed to the neu­ tralization of Laos.6/ Perhaps the preceding actions were not the un­ qualified successes their admirers claim; however, they appear to be strong evidence to counter the thesis that nationalism makes interven­ tion irrelevant and futile. At the end of this chapter we will describe major military actions in some detail and present the arguments for and

..!/ Armbruster in Armbruster, et. al., op. cit., p. 124. 'lJ Ibid., p. 114.

� The New York Times, July 16, 1958; October 27, 1958; August 31, 1959.

� Tad Szulc, The New York Times, November 26, 1961. 5/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 340. !:./ Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., p. 210.

-52- against them. For every American armed action abroad, there are at least two sides to the story; determining who is right and who is wrong is a matter for resolution--albeit temporary--in debates.

C. Nationalism: Some Affirmative Rejoinders

As we have just noted, the question of nationalism's effective­ ness is essentially open-ended; if debates had an indefinite duration, both affirmatives and negatives could continue to cite theoretical and \ empirical evidence to back up their positions. It is not our aim to ex­ ' haust controversy in this volume; it is to suggest useful lines of anal­ ysis and areas of research. Almost invariably additional support can be obtained for either position. At this point we will examine two examples of how an alert affirmative may deal with the negative reasoning just discussed.

(1) Terrorism may not be an adequate substitute for popular sup­ port. It perhaps cannot short-circuit nationalist resistance to Commu­ nist insurgency. Berkeley political scientist Chalmers Johnson insists on an important distinction between the types of terrorism by guerrilla movements. Selective terrorism directed against certain despised classes or economic groups can aid a revolution. However, indiscriminate terrorism, "·· .designed to compel popular support of an otherwise unpopu­ lar movement ...," may be counter-productive.I/ Widespread indiscrimi­ nate terrorism by the Corrununists in Malaya alienated the population and destroyed the essential base for successful insurgency. The 1952 deci­ sion to utilize extreme terror marked the beginning of the end for the Malaya guerrillas.2/ Much the same scenario was played out in Greece; intense terrorism alienated the people, "... sealing the military doom of the Communist guerrilla campaign."3/ Moreover, a government under at­ tack can provide sufficient security from terrorism if there is initially a basically loyal population, willing to transmit information about guer­ rilla activities and movements to government agents.4/ Institute for Policy Studies co-director Richard Barnet sums up the position the af­ firmative may -wish to adopt with respect to terrorism. He writes: . i ... as men who have been through a guerrilla war testify, terror has very definite limitations as . '1 y Chalmers Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," in American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 397.

'}} Donald Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1965), p. 179.

� Edward Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-1949: A Case Study," in Osanka, op. cit., p. 227. ±I Daniel Wit, Thailand: Another Vietnam? (New York: Charles Scrib­ ner's Sons, 1968), p. 16.

-53- a political instrument. Che Guevara, the theorist of the.Cuban revolution and adviser to many insurgent movements in Latin America, noted that terrorism "is.a negative weapon which produces in no way the desired effects which can turn a people against a given revo­ lutionary movement.... .!_/ Turn the tables on Guevara, and the affirmative can conclude that ter­ rorism cannot persuade the people to support a given revolution. (2) The affirmative can counter the negative coup argument by maintaining that coups are not a promising route to Communist success. First, the military, which will be for the foreseeable future the prin­ cipal perpetrators of coups, remains in most (not all) underdeveloped countries strongly nationalistic.2/ Thus, the nationalistic aversion to outside domination may be a crucial factor in preventing Communist take­ over through coups. Secondly, coups, like revolutions, seem to require popular support.3/ Most contemporary coups have been " .•.popularly ac­ claimed; few ... can be attributed to the depravity or ambition of a mili­ tary officer or clique. "4/ Finally, Communist coup attempts are likely to inspire strongly anti:-communist reactions. The 1965 Communist coup attempt in Indonesia led to massive executions and repressions of sus­ pected Communist elements in that country.Sf The reason was that the coup aroused fundamental·nationalistic fears. Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin 0. Reischauer testifies: ...one of the reasons why the Indonesians crushed the Communists with such thoroughness may have been just because there was at that time no important American presence in Indonesia and therefore, Chinese influence over the local Communists loomed all the more as the greatest threat of outside domi­ nation.6/

.!_/ Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., p. 42.

'!:} Janowitz, op. cit., p. 63.

� Andrew Janos, The Seizure of Power (Princeton, N.J.: The Center for International Studies, 1965), p. 85. 4/ Gorman in Jordan, loc. cit.

� The New York Times, August 23, 1966. 6/ Edwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 84.

-:-,54- Thus,an affir,native may counter negative attacks on the effec­ tiveness of nationalism; a negative can do the same with affir,native re­ joinders. In dealing with a subject as complex as this topic, there is always something more to be said for either side.

D. Intervention and America's Vital Interests

The affir,native may contend that even if nationalism fails to halt communism in some countries or areas, there is still no need for American military intervention. The areas may not be economically, po­ litically or strategically vital. For,ner presidential assistant Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., observes:

It must be argued ...that the conception of the United States as an Asian power violates the logic of our own history. For history provides two tables of priorities for the United States-­ one based on strategic significance, the other on cultural accessibility. And by both standards we could survive the subjection of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or Polynesia by a hostile power or ideology. .!J

Those who agree with Schlesinger's argument to one degree or another offer a number of different defenses for their position. Some. maintain that even if the Communists captured some countries, the newly subjugated states would tend over a period of time to follow independent courses in foreign affairs, deviating more or less significantly from the· policy guidelines of Moscow or.Peking.2/ The late Senator Robert F. Ken­ nedy pointed to North Korea, Rtunania, and Yugoslavia as nations " ••• no longer ... the automatically obedient instrument[s] of·expanding Russian or Chinese power." North Vietnam, he thought, also could be encouraged to follow a more independent course.3/ Ambassador Reischauer believes that future Communist regimes would "evolve"--their domestic and foreign ac­ tions might prove ultimately quite different from what the proponents of intervention fear and suggest.4/

If new Communist states did adhere to expansionist policies generated by Moscow or Peking, they still might not threaten American .. .!I Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 77.

2/ Geiger, op. cit., pp. 144-45.

3/ U.S.,Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., March 2, 1967, p. 5283.

4/ Testimony of Edwin Reischauer in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Asia, The Pacific, and the U.S., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., January 31, 1967, p. 73.

-SS- security.interests, at least in a direct military way. The Communists could not deploy the resources or populations of such nations against the United States: " ...the addition of [ev_en] hundreds of millions of citi­ zens to the potential armies of Communism would mean nothing when there was no way of deploying them against us."1/ Reischauer indicates that the acquisition of underdeveloped nations-in fact might " ...weaken, rather than strengthen the controller."2/ Thus, the affirmative could argue that in purely military terms there is little or no danger from Communist expansion. Even the establishment of Russian or Chinese bases in newly acquired areas--a threat made visible by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis--seems unlikely; nationalistic feelings would probably prevent it, unless there were severe pressure fr9m Peking or Moscow._;y

The affirmative could also maintain there is no economic rationale for rescuing underdeveloped nations from communization. One authority concludes that "... there are few imports from Asian and African countries for which the West could not find other sources of supply or substitute or synthetic materials."4/ Moreover, the American need for the particular economic resources of any one nation must be weighed against the cost of keeping that nation non-Communist or neutral. For ex­ ample, the affirmative might question whether any conceivable economic gains in the future justify the present expenditures of lives and resources in South Vietnam. Finally, to the extent the United States might wish to acquire the products of a newly Communist nation, it might be able to trade for them. In the past several years Communist trade with the West has been steadily rising.�

Negatives can counter such affirmative arguments in a variety of ways. On the general level, they can cite the warning of former de­ fense secretary Robert S. McNamara.

Without dependable friends or allies we surely would have to maintain a larger military estab­ listment than at present. We would also have to reorient our industry and commerce to achieve

1/ Robert Heilbroner, "The Revolution of Rising Expectations: Rhetoric and Reality," Struggle Against History, ed. Neil D. Houghton (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), p. 119.

2/ Reischauer in Gordon, loc. cit.

_;y Schrecker and Waltzer, op. cit., p. 444. if Geiger, op.cit., p. 257.

5/ U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Crisis in NATO, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., September 21, 1966, pp. 11-13 ..

-56- ;,&1:re,--, - m m J&::ttc

a maximum �egree of economic self-sufficiency, with a lower standard of living for our people and considerably less economic freedom. .!J Thus, although America might survive in a world significantly more Commu­ nist, it would not prosper. Survival can be seen as a minimum condition; there is much more the United States might hope for and seek to attain.

Increased communization could threaten vital security interests of the United States. Military analyst Hanson Baldwin has denominated some of the "disastrous" results of a Soviet takeover in the Middle East, including the "outflanking" of India and Pakistan and.the establishment of a base for "political and economic conquest of Africa."2/ Malaysia's Prime Minister has pointed out that the geography of Southern Asia makes his nation an economic and military key to control of the whole area.3/ And if North Africa were to fall, South Atlantic shipping lanes would-be endangered; the defense of Europe--particularly its conventional defense-­ would be much more difficult.4/ The negative must be careful in advanc­ ing some of these arguments. -If an affirmative is willing to agree to the loss of anything or everything but the United States with the possible exception of Canada and Mexico, the arguments are irrelevant unless they include a strong demonstration that, for example, India is critical or Western Europe cannot be permitted to fall. The negative has an obliga­ tion to demonstrate that the ultimate strategic consequence it cites is in fact unacceptable. Decrying the loss of Africa due to the loss of the Middle East is meaningless when the affirmative claims that Africa can be safely lost.

One way--pe.rhaps the best--to counter such a claim is to prove that Africa and other areas in the Third World are economically important to the United States. Harvard government professor Rupert Emerson wrote in 1963:

Africa's riches in strategic and other minerals are impressive. In ...cobalt, chromium and beryllium, Africa either heads the list of world producers or stands close to the top. The uranium of the Congo anc South Africa has contributed to the unfolding

1/ Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 7. '!:./ Hanson Baldwin, The New York Times, August 5, 1958. 3/ Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs, July, 1965, p. 659. if Rupert Emerson; "American Interests in Africa," The United States and Africa, ed. Walter Goldschmidt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1963), p. 28.

-57- of the atomic age... the United States has a very direct interest in many of these products ..!)

For example, half of the world's cobalt comes from the Congo.2/ Cobalt is important in the production of jet engines, rockets·, guided missiles, electronic equipment, and machine tools. It promises to become even more essential in the future. Of course, American economic dependence overseas is not confined to Africa. Japan is the major industrial power in Asia and, except for Canada, our second major source of foreign trade.3/ Similar evidence concerning other nations and areas is available to any - negative team which looks for it. E. Intervention and the Protection of American Citizens

Americans are increasingly not just citizens of their own coun­ try, but travelers across the world and residents of a hundred nations. Investments abroad, programs like the Peace Corps, and rising private af­ fluence are responsible for the worldwide distribution of Americans not in military service. One authority estimates that United States citizens living and working in Latin America number in the tens of thousands.4/ When local wars or indigenous revolutions break out, our citizens abroad can be placed in danger. Armed action may seem necessary. In such a sit­ uation, the United States--to use the technical term--has practiced "in­ terposition," which in the legal sense is distinguished from intervention. Limited American armed action in the Congo may have saved 70,000 whites, including 1,700 Americans from racial attack.Sf One of the reasons Presi­ dent Eisenhower cited for landing Marines in Lebanon was to " •.•afford an increased measure of security to the thousands of Americans who reside [there] ..•.11 6/ The Dominican Republic's 1965 turmoil is the major recent example in which the United pointed to Americans endangered to justify intervention. It is also highly controversial. John Bartlow Martin, once ambassador to the Dominican Republic, later a major participant in the events of the spring of 1965, insists

.!) Ibid., p. 29. 2/ Gilbert Dehuff, "Cobalt," The Mineral's Yearbook (Washington: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1967), p. 385. 3/ Testimony of Reischauer in The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 5. 4/ Robert Kingsley, "The Public Diplomacy of Business Abroad," Journal of Interamerican Studies (April, 1967), 413. 5/ The New York Times, December 11, 1967. 6/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lebanese Crisis, 1958, ed. Mohammed S. P.gwani (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 233.

-58- that the lives of Americans were threatened by the almost complete break­ down of law and order in the early stages of the revolution.I/ The rightist military group informed the American Embassy that it could not assure the continued safety of American citizens and asked for interven­ tion.2/ After reviewing the circumstances, President Johnson complied. His actions aroused the anger of a number of critics, including the chair­ man of the Senate Foreign Relations Conunittee, J. William Fulbright. He contended that " ... no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels .... Reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives [were] ... exaggerated."3/ The fact that 1,100 of the 2,000 United States civilians in the Dominican Republic had been evacuated by the time of the landing has been cited to support Fulbright's view. Some saw the claimed purpose of saving civilian lives as "essentially a subterfuge to conceal the real purpose"--the repression of an allegedly Conununist revolt.4/

F. A Summary Note The affirmative may present any of a number of reasons why mili­ tary intervention is not necessary. These reasons exemplify what debate theoreticians call a "no need need." Essentially, the affirmative is pre­ empting plan objections; if it did not present a "no need need," the nega­ tive would introduce many of the same issues in the form of plan objec­ tions. For example, the contention that nationalism stops communism, if it carries, answers the disadvantage that the plan will result in the loss of certain crucial nations. It is important to note that the no need need does not justify by itself the adoption of the resolution. It merely dis­ poses of the obvious objections to doing so. There is a presumption in favor of the present system; we do not change unless we are given a signif­ icant reason to do so. We know the present system works, whatever its faults and difficulties. Gambling on something new, which at best is predictably workable, is warranted only if there are worthwhile gains in prospect. There is no need to discard that which is unnecessary, even if there is no need to retain it. The affirmative has the burden of proof. In dealing with the no need issue on this topic, the affirma­ tive and the negative should both be aware that to carry the issue, the affirmative need not carry all the reasons it presents. If nationalism will stop communism, it is irrelevant whether we can afford to lose lJ Martin, loc. cit.

'l:.f The Center for Strategic Studies, Dominican Action--1965: Interven­ tion or Cooperation (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University, 1966), pp. 33-34.

� Fulbright, op. cit., p. 90. Frank Johnson, "Intervention: Pro and Con," National Review, Y November, 1968, p. 1179.

-59- the underdeveloped nations. If we can afford to lose the underdeveloped nations, then it is irrelevant whether nationalism stops communism. Af­ firmative proof of either proposition is logically sufficient to prove the general point. The negative must carry both. The use of interven­ tion to protect American citizens, if won by the affirmative, does not carry the general point. If won by the negative, it perhaps establishes a strong reason to reject the resolution, unless ·the affirmative can es­ tablish that multilateral intervention would probably rescue citizens in danger. An affirmative may well be advised to ignore the issue and reply to it only if the negative presents it as a disadvantage.

In this section,then, we have reviewed the possible reasons for claiming that there is no need for intervention. But the affirma­ tive cannot stop here. It must demonstrate a need to stop intervening unilaterally, or an advantage from doing so. That is the subject of the next section.

IV. The Possible Advantages of Eliminating Unilateral Intervention

A. Saving Lives and Conserving Resources

The affirmative can contend that its plan, by reducing the American role in armed intervention, will result in a substantial saving of human life. In Vietnam, some 35,000 American soldiers have been killed; approximately 200,000 have been wounded. One authority estimates that winning the war would �ake six more years and more than 100,000 addition­ al American lives.I/ Moreover, Senator Fulbright charges that at one point massive American bombing raids were killing as many or more South I Vietnamese civilians than the Viet Cong.2/ Senator Edward M. Kennedy adds that the number of civilian casualties in South Vietnam has reached 100,000 a year, the majority caused by allied operations.3/ Three­ quarters of a million new refugees have been added to the-two million in the existing refugee population.4/

Opponents of intervention do not stop after citing the human costs of.the Vietnam war; they point to similar costs in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Theodore Draper believes that if the United States had remained completely uninvolved in the crisis, there might well have been "an early Boschist victory" (Left-wing victory) without a "bloody

1f Seymour J. Deitchman quoted in Newsweek, August 22, 1966, p. 67.

� Fulbright, op. cit., p. 180. 3/ Edward M. Kennedy quoted in The New York Times, May 8, 1967.

4/ Robert F. Kennedy, "Statement by Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series, Kansas State University," March 18, 1968 (Press Release), p. 4.

-60- civil-war."1/ Juan Bosch, one-time "reform" president of the Dominican Republic, and.in 1965 the man the.rebels wished to restore to power, has testified that without United States intervention, the entire Dominican crisis would have been resolved very swiftly.2/ Twenty-five hundred Dominicans died due to the fighting between rebel and right-wing forces.3/ A shorter conflict, the affirmative could argue, would have avoided many of the casualties. The United States, it could conclude, should not have intervened; the cost in lives was too high. Obviously, the negative cannot deny that conflicts like those in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic have a cost in human suffering. All wars do. The negative may contend, however, that the loss is justified when there are substantial prospective benefits to be derived from the war or substantial harms that would be caused by withdrawing from the war. Thus, the negative may in effect concede the "lives" issue and insist that the loss of life is a relevant and persuasive reason to adopt the resolu­ tion only if the affirmative carries its "no need" by demonstrating that intervention is unnecessary and futile. There is a balancing process here; the loss of life is weighed against the need for armed action. The affirmative can find conclusionary evidence to support' its position on this issue. Professors John Schrecker and Michael Waltzer write:

... the exercise of our power sometimes leads to armed clashes in which American forces fight against local insurgents.... The human cost of such "little wars" is terrible, far out of proportion to the actual vic- tories gained.4/

Similar evidence advancing the opposite conclusion is available to the negative team, which can also point to some of the beneficial effects of particular interventions. The United States presence in Vietnam,for instance, was said to have given confidence to the Indonesian generals led by Suharto that decisive action against Red military men would not draw a sharp Red Chinese or Soviet reaction. The affirmative that complains of the loss of life occasioned by American intervention will also complain about its financial costs. Vietnam has already cost $100 billion and continues to cost nearly $30 billion a year. While the war goes on, " ...budgetary priorities

Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," Commentary, December, 1965, Y p. 41. !./ Newsweek, May 17, 1965, p. 50.

3/ The New York Times, August 31, 1965. 4/ Schrecker and Waltzer, op. cit., p. 437.

-61- cannot be greatly.chan·ged... ";1/ substantially more resources cannot be allocated to domestic conc0rns-:- Former Senator Ernest Gruening believed that the neglect of domestic needs due to the Vietnam war would weaken the future social and economic health of the nation.2/ If the war ended, one authority has estimated that in the first year and a half after, an additional $10 billion would be available in the federal budget. In the year after that, $20 billion more could be allocated to alternative uses.3/ Thus, the affirmative could argue that prohibiting unilateral military interventions would conserve fiscal resources for vital domestic purposes. If the resolution's terms are defined so that the proscribed intervention includes Vietnam, the affirmative can claim a large and im­ mediate saving. Negatives can challenge such a claim in at least three ways. First, they can contend that "... [a] substantial part [of our spending in Vietnam] represents spending that could not be cut back even if the war ended and ... [the] troops ...were removed."4/ Second, to the extent that budgetary resources can be reallocated, they may have to be devoted to other military needs. The United States needs to "catch up in the development of sophisticated weaponry."5/ President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird at this point are having difficulty finding the funds to meet what they believe to be the need.6/ If new funds are made avail­ able, they may be spent in this area rather than to improve domestic economic and social conditions. Finally, even if there were no compet­ ing military needs, there is no assurance that Congress would be will­ ing to allocate additional resources to domestic problems. Senator Gale McGee warns:

... I have noted from time to time that even when all is quiet, funds that might otherwise have been free are not put to good causes. I believe we really miss the issue when we argue that the money we save in defense posture would automatically be turned over to education.7/

1/ The Washington Post, March 12, 1969.

2/ Ernest Gruening and Herbert Wilton Beaser, Vietnam Folly (Washington: The National Press, 1968), p. 334. ... 3/ Edwin L. Dale, New York Times Magazine, February 16, 1969, p. 64. 4/ Wall Street Journal, November 23, 1966.

� The New York Times, March 6, 1968. 6/ Time, November 20, 1968, p. 13. 7/ Gale McGee, Congressional Record, March 2, 1967, p. 5284.

-62- Of course, the affirmative cannot claim an advantage simply from saving money; if the funds are devoted to Ila grand prosperity spree"l/ and domes­ tic needs are ignored, the financial case for limiting or stopping American intervention probably would be considered weak.

The negative may attack the affirmative "lives" and "resources" arguments in yet another way. The United States could pursue unilater­ ally a policy of selective intervention, acting only when the need is clear, the force levels required relatively small, and the duration of the commitment limited. The cost in resources and lives would be very much less than in an action like Vietnam. For example, properly trained anti-guerrilla forces do not have to exceed substantially in size the guerrilla forces they are designed to combat.2/ Even in Vietnam new high­ mobility tactics enable a unit of given size to accomplish more than it previously could.3/ A negative that opts for unilateral selective in­ tervention should-be aware that it runs two risks. First, the affirma­ tive mechanism for proscribing unilateral military intervention may func­ tion in such a way that it permits selective intervention. The affirma­ tive may be able to demonstrate that the nations whose support and as­ sistance are required under the plan will participate in low-cost, limi­ ted actions for important gains. Secondly, the affirmative is likely to challenge any negative advocating selective intervention to present standards by which officials can determine when they should or should not intervene. How can one know when to act and when to refrain from acting? The negative can reply by attempting to establish a number of standards. Intervention may be justified against a Communist coup, which can be handled without major forces, as it was in the Dominican Republic.4/ Or it may be needed to rescue United States citizens stranded in a war zone. Carefully defined and circumscribed rationales can be suggested. The affirmative may deny .their workability--claiming that no standards can assure an accurate prediction of the course of an armed intervention. Thus, selective intervention may not work because escalation may always be a danger; we simply may not have the ability to tell in advance whether minimal forces can do the job.

B. The Danger of Escalation

As we have just noted, the affirmative may argue that every intervention--even one tailored to limited ends and initially confined to a limited troop commitment--threatens escalation. Harvard law pro­ fessor and one time defense department "whiz kid" Adam Yarmolinsky

1/ The Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 1968.

'!:../ Lindsay in Kissinger, op. cit., p. 351. 3/ Time, March 28, 1969, p. 20; The New York Times, November 4, 1968..

4/ John S. Tompkins, The Weapons of World War III (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 7.

-63- indicates that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a "reasonable guess" about the.impact of intervention on a nation's ability to resist subversion.I/ The United States may act in the belief that limited help in men and materials is sufficient and later find that the conflict is escalating to major proportions, as happened in Vietnam. Past predic­ tions about American intervention have proven faulty. President Kennedy was assured by secretary McNamara and General Taylor that all United States advisory forces could be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of 1965.2/ Arthur Schlesinger recalls: "At every point along the way, the generals promised that one more step of military escalation would at last bring the victory so long sought and steadily denied."3/ Other pre­ dictions seem to have been equally inaccurate; General MacArthur, in the fall of 1950, reportedly foresaw an impending victory in Korea and sug­ gested the transfer of the Second Dividion from Korea to Europe in 1951.4/ Nineteen fifty-one saw not peace, but escalation, as the United States - and the United Nations responded to Chinese intervention in the war. The affirmative can find proof of a danger of escalation in al­ most every American military intervention. In the Lebanese crisis, Presi­ dent Eisenhower recognized that serious consequences might follow the landing of the Marines in July, 1958, although no escalation resulted in that case. The opposition had threatened a violent reaction to any inter­ vention; ships from the United States Atlantic and Pacific fleets were alerted and a striking force from the tactical command of the defense department was dispatched to an undisclosed destination overseas.Sf The abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba could have turned into a "protracted civil conflict," if the invaders had gained a foothold at the Bay of Pigs.6/ A successful invasion might have provoked Soviet reprisals in other areas, perhaps against West Berlin.7/ The 1961 and 1962 Laotian crises could have led to a "massive military involvement,"8/ while the landing of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965 might have resulted in another 1/ Adam Yarmolinsky, United States Military Power and Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967), p. 16. y Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 207.

Schlesinger, "Vietnam and the End of the Age of the Superpowers," op. cit. , p. 43. 4/ Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General �and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), pp. 132-33. 5/ The New York Times, July 16, 1958. 6/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 254. 7J Ibid., p. 253.

8/ Edward M. Kennedy, Decisions for a Decade (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1968), pp. 152-53.

-64- Vietnam.I/ Even an action as small at the outset as America's 1967 rescue operation in the Congo, warned Senator Richard Russell, could es­ calate into a major undertaking.2/ The negative cannot deny that in some inte.rventions there is a substantial risk of escalation. Once again, the questJon is whether the effort is worth it--whether the risk involved is justified by the at­ tainable goals of the intervention. The negative can contend that in many interventions it is. The negative can also argue that intervention is unlikely to result in escalation to intensified conflict because the great powers will seek to avoid it. Princeton i s Klaus Knorr points out: Past behavior exhibits the painstaking care that two superpowers take in avoiding a direct military confrontation even of a highly localized and lim­ ited sort. When one of them intervenes abroad militarily, the other will rigorously castigate such action but refrain from military counterinter­ vention.3/ There are some situations where escalation seems most unlikely. Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia were no more likely to escalate than the Amer­ ican action in Guatemala in 1954. If escalation threatens, the negative can argue, the United States could probably withdraw. Escalation is not inevitable. President Kennedy accepted defeat in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, be­ cause he feared the results of increased American11 commitment.4/ Arthur Schlesinger quotes Kennedy as feeling that •••defeat •.• would-be an in­ cident, not a disaster."5/ The President also proved more willing to set­ tle for half a loaf in Laos than to commit American troops there.

Finally, a sophisticated negative can attempt to differentiate between situations likely to escalate and those which are not. For ex­ ample, the negative can suggest that " ..• Communist subversion tends to become particularly virulent in •.•countries having a common boundary with a Communist state, as in Southeast Asia."6/ The most obvious situation

!/ Draper in Pfeffer, op. cit., p. 35. 2/ Congressional Quarterly, July 21, 1967. 3/ Knorr, .op. cit., p. 115.

4/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 287. 5/ Ibid., p. 277. 6/ Knorr, op. cit., p. 152.

-65- of protracted conflict with Conununist insurgency--the American effort in Vietnam--makes clear the advantage for insurgents of a conunon boundary with a Conununist state. Reinforcements and supplies can be infiltrated into the battle zone with relative ease. Increased pressure by Western forces can be met by increased pressure from guerrilla forces in a con­ tinuing cycle of escalation. Perhaps intervention in countries isolated from a Communist base is less prone to intensification. However, it is well to remember that the British effort in Malaya, which does not share a border with a Conununist state, lasted approximately a decade before victory was achieved. C. Is Intervention Self-Defeating? The affirmative can cite a number of authorities who believe one of intervention's most substantial harms is that it is self-defeating. Intervention has this impact, its opponents agree, because there is in the underdeveloped world a strong aversion to Western military action, which is reminiscent of a despised colonial past. When Western intervention occurs, the forces against which it is directed capture the active or la­ tent nationalistic support of the local population.li Intervention may even diminish the beneficial effects of government social reform pro­ grams--the populace may be no longer as ready to adhere to the government, no matter how progressi v·e its policies are. 2/ Arthur Gardiner, former chief of the United States AID mission in South Vietnam, thinks the Amer­ icans may have lost the political struggle in that country by driving neutral Vietnamese into the arms of the Viet Cong and converting former allies into benevolent neutrals.3/ Repeated armed action in Latin Amer­ ica may have had a similar impact there.4/ One authority. believes that Castro was not originally a Conununist, but became one " ..• to obtain Soviet protection against [the threat of] American attack."5/

There is a group of experts and a fair amount of empirical evi­ dence the negative can introduce to refute the self-defeating thesis. Some say that a Conununist victory in South Vietnam would " ...undermine

1/ Testimony of Reischauer in The Future United States Role in Asia and the Pacific, op. cit., p. 4. 2/ Gregory Clark, In Fear of China (Melbourne, Australia: Lansdowne Press, 1967), p. 150.

3/ Arthur Gardiner quoted in "Statement by Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series ...," op. cit., p. 3. 4/ J. William Fulbright, Congressional Record, March 25, 1966, p. 6420.

� Testimony of Donald Zagoria in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., March 21, 1966, p. 372.

-66- all of the small non-Communist Asian states ..•"; 1/ thus, an American presence is the crucial element in stopping Communist expansion. In South Vietnam itself, the U.S. effort has staved off a Viet Cong victory. Now many who were formerly "reluctant or middle-grounded" are supporting the government cause.2/ New Mexico professor Edwin Lieuwen indicates that it was not the threat of U.S. intervention, but a determination to alienate the United States that led Castro to communism.3/ The Lebanese population did not find the 1958 American intervention unacceptable;4/ and the Dominicans welcomed the 1961 U.S. show of force, which apparently prevented the return to power of the political allies of General Trujil­ lo.Sf In short, though some interventions may encounter adverse popular reactions, not all necessarily do so. Intervention, in fact, may pro­ vide the shield beh-ind which the government forces can work to rally popu­ lar support.

D. Intervention and Detente

Opponents of intervention perceive the damage it does to pros­ pects for detente as perhaps its most serious consequence. Cornell scholars George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis wrote in 1967:

One of the major casual ties of the. present Viet Nam policy has been America's relationship with the Soviet Union. The promising rapprochement•.• begun by President Eisenhower and continued by President Kennedy has deteriorated under the pressures of the Viet Nam war and will be further undermined by the continuation of the conflict.6/

Former ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia George F. Kennan argues that our preoccupation with Vietnam has distracted us from other more crucial concerns and has led us to waste promising possibilities for peace.7/ The Johnson Administration itself apparently concluded that the '.

I II Y Robert Scalapino, "The Vietnam War--Pro and Con," New Leader, 'i February 28, 1968, p. 15. The Christian Science Monitor, J�ly 20, 1968. '. ... Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 274.

� The New York Times, July 16, 1958. 5/ Ibid., November 25, 1961. 6/ George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Viet Nam (New York: Delta Books, 1967), p. 297. 2/ Testimony of George F. Kennan in U.S. Senate, Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966--Vietnam, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 333.

-67- Vietnam war might prevent the 5oviet Union from joining with the United States in agreements on matters of mutual concern.I/ The Soviet Union might find it difficult to support North Vietnam and parlay with the United States at the same time. Moreover, the Russians also are now en­ gaged in developing a substantial capacity for intervening in limited wars; some believe this policy has been adopted in response to American involvement in small conflicts in the developing world. The danger of a direct clash some time in the future, the affirmative may contend, grows as American intervention continues. The negative can flatly deny the assumption that detent.e is im­ possible without non-intervention. Despite·American armed action in Vietnam, Lebanon, Laos, and Cuba, the United States concluded the Antarctic Treaty, the "hot line" agreement, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union.2/ During intense phases of the Vietnam war, the two superpowers agreed to a Consular Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Arms limitations talks are now pending. Fur­ thermore, a U.S. loss in Vietnam or a permanent withdrawal from the under­ developed world might validate the Chinese thesis that the United States is a "paper tiger" best dealt with by firmness.3/ The final effect might be the opposite of detente. After the Bay of Pigs, the Russians felt confident that President Kennedy would not resist Soviet advances; the result was the most serious crisis in the postwar era, when Khrushchev installed Soviet missiles in Cuba.4/ So a prohibition of armed action in the Third World might lead to crisis rather than detente. And detente, the negative should maintain, can be achieved without non-intervention. E. Intervention and Regional Security Blocs

Edwin Reischauer told the House Subcommittee on Asian and Paci­ fic Affairs in February, 1968: Our overly eager response to the problem of in­ stability in Asia has tended to inhibit the de­ velopment of a truly international response, which in the long run will probably prove to be the only successful way to approach the prob­ lem.SI

1/ Dean Rusk, Department of State Bulletin, August 2, 1965, p. 190; November 29, 1965, p. 861; December 13, 1965, p. 934; February 7, 1966, p. 193.

'!:./ Wright, op. cit., p. 1510. Henry Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, January, I 1969, pp. 219-20. J I Pierre Gallois, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study in Military Strength ! and Diplomatic Weakness," Orbis, Summer, 1965, p. 352. Testimony of Reischauer in The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 6.

-68- I Thus, the unilateral character of American involvement in Asia--our will­ ingness to defend a country in that area without the participation of other nations there--may have proved a real roadblock to multilateral defense action. The affirmative could exploit this in drawing up its plan and constructing its advantages. There is evidence that pressures exist in Asia for regional cooperation.I/ One Indonesian leader has al­ ready suggested "a Southeast Asian defense format for cooperation."2/ The force envisioned might be feasible in light of the kinds of defense problems confronting Southeast Asia.3/ Of course, there is sometimes a vast difference between what seems possible and what will happen. If the United States refrained from unilateral intervention anq.a viable multilateral defense s·hield .did not take its place, threatened nations might end up helpless in the face of .subversion. The prospects for a multilateral response in Latin America are not as bright as in Asia. Though the Organization of American States ultimately voted to act in the Dominican Republic, it did so only after the United States had moved in unilaterally.4/ OAS reluctance was grounded in the Latins' traditional opposition to intervention in the Western Hemisphere.5/ That opposition has been hardened by the Domini­ can episode. President Johnson called for the establishment of an OAS hemispheric force in the aftermath of the crisis. The call met with a cold response from many major Latin American states. Venezuela refused to attend the conference called to consider it. Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela all announced that they would not participate in such a force. Only military regimes in states like Brazil tentatively sup­ ported the proposal. "As a result of such opposition, the United States could make no headway toward... a collective defense policy •..in the Western hemisphere."6/ The Latins are opposed even to a multilateral force "... staffed largely by Latin American troops, but armed and financed largely by the United States .... " They fear that the force might someday be used for purposes they strongly disapprove.7/

1/ Ibid. 2/ Ibid., p. 107, Testimony of Bernard Gordon.

3/ Ibid. 4/ Martin, op. cit., p. 699.

� Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 76. 6/ Ibid., p. 80.

7/ Plank, op. cit., p. 44.

-69- V. The Consc-qucnces of Eliminating Unilateral Intervention

A. A Preliminary Note

The disadvantages of reduced or eliminated intervention will depend on the particular contours of the affirmative plan. In this sec­ tion, we will assume the affirmative has adopted the broad definition of "unilateral"; using that definition, an affirmative could require with­ drawal from Vietnam as part of its proposal. On the other hand, even us­ ing the broad definition, the affirmative might forbid future Vietnams without requiring an end to the present effort. Either variant will proscribe military interventions in which the United States is respon­ sible for the bulk of the effort. Presuming that such a plan would sig­ nificantly diminish--if not eliminate.:.-American military interventions, this section will focus on the possible harmful consequences of a with­ drawal from Vietnam and/or a proscription of future Vietnams.

B. Non-Intervention and Future Wars of National Liberation

�roponents of present American policy argue that we must remain in Vietnam and intervene in similar situations if we hope to discourage Communist revolution elsewhere. Faltering now, it is said, will encourage outbreaks in other troublesome areas, exacting from the future a much higher price than our present commitment demands. In Herman Kahn's view, we must dispel the two illusions that " ... radical terrorists almost always win ... and that radical regimes can subvert and intervene in a neighbor­ ing area with little risk."1/ The "test case" argument has been a power­ ful one for present policy;-"doves" deny it dire.ctly. They cite former ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer's testimony that local conditions are the critical factors in determining whether wars of national libera­ tion will start, or whether they will succeed. Burma believes that it can best protect itself by relying on its own nationalism and abjuring any connections with the United States. However, Reischauer does warn that a precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam, accompanied by a statement that we would never again undertake a similar venture or even grant economic aid in that area would promote the onset of new guerrilla conflicts.2/ He adds another warning--that the United States should not and cann'ot defend underdeveloped nations whose nationalism is not a strong enough force to counter internal subversion or revolution.3/

We have demonstrated that Viet Nam alone can so enmesh us militarily that we could not easily meet

Y Herman Kahn, "What Should We Do Now?", Look, August 9, 1966, p. 24. 2/ Testimony of Reischauer in The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 26.

3/ Ibid., p. 4.

-70- additional threats of this nature if they broke out now. Another reasonable conclusion for Asians to draw woµld be that Americans have found Viet Nam so painful that they would not be willing to repeat the experience again elsewhere. In other words, advocates of wars of national liberation have probably been encouraged ... by the Viet Nam war.y C. Credibility and Proliferation

Advocates of continued intervention, particularly in Southeast Asia also argue that a withdrawal from Vietnam or an end to unilateral intervention would deal a serious and perhaps irreparable blow to the credibility in America's commitments in other areas. Presidential ad­ viser Henry Kissinger recounts the consequences to credibility in these words: The long term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willing­ ness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confi­ dence in American support against Chinese nuclear i blackmail. A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of I. American pledges in other fields.�

! Nuclear proliferation is cited as one of the most serious harms of damaged ! t credibility; Kissinger pointed to it in the preceding quote. At least I six nations--India, Brazil, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Japan-­ have the technological ability to produce nuclear weapons for their own arsenals or for sale in a relatively short period of time.3/ Already dissatisfied with the security guarantees of the Non-Proliferation t.� Treaty,4/ they might abandon nuclear abstention altogether as American credibility deteriorated after withdrawal from Vietnam or after the proscription of unilateral intervention. Just as opponents argue that the United States' Vietnam involve­ ment encourages wars of national liberation, they also believe that ij Ibid., p. 3.

2/ Kissinger, 11What Should We Do Now?", loc. cit. 3/ The New York Times, September 29, 1968. 4/ Ibid.

-71- continued involvement there or in similar situations damages, rather than aids, credibility. Do nations that rely on us want us to remain in Viet­ nam to reassure their reliance? India, Indonesia and Japan do not support our effort ..!_/ India positively rejects it. The French government has thought us wrong for years and there is little enthusiasm in Britain for the position we have taken. If these nations do not make intervention the talisman of credibility, why should we? On the other hand, some ob­ servers speculate that such opposition is for public consumption; pri­ vately there is support for the American view. Singapore's Prime Mini­ ster Lee Kwan Yew stated in the fall of 1967: "It is our neck if you lose in Viet Nam."2/ Finally, some scholars do not worry excessively about the proble.ms-of proliferation oc.casioned by non-intervention. One authority believes that proliferation might have a beneficial impact in containing China:3/ Another thinks that for Japan at least American credibility is irrelevant; Japan probably will develop nuclear weapons in any case.4/ D. Non-Intervention and the Loss of Flexibility

To the extent the affirmative plan deprives the United States of the ability to intervene, the negative may charge that it will result in a loss of vital flexibility. Harvard government professor and Sinolo­ gist Morton Halperin contends that the American ability to intervene is a crucial element in Asian leaders' resistance to Communist takeover.SI It may also constitute a significant deterrent to Communist "overt mili­ tary aid" to subversive forces.6/ The United States, it is argued, can­ not afford to sacrifice the policy options the possibility of unilateral intervention preserves.7/ For example, President Eisenhower threatened to use Marines to rescue Vice-President Nixon from Communist mobs in

.!_/ Herbert Coursen, Jr., "Why Are We in Vietnam?", Vital Speeches, March 1, 1968, p. 307. 2/ The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 102, Testimony of Kenneth Young.

3/ Robert Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 149. 4/ Herman Kahn, Foreign Service Journal (January 15, 1969), p. 6. 5/ Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1966), p. 20.

6/ David Tarr, "The American Military Presence Abroad," Orbis, Fall, 1965, pp. 649-50.

2/ Yarmolinsky, op. cit., p. 21.

-72- Venezuela in 1958.1/ Four years later, President Kennedy's similar threat to move Marines ended a Communist offensive in Laos and led to the estab­ lishment of a coalition government there.2/ Situations may occur in which intervention is clearly in the national interest and the best tool for achieving an important goal at a minimum cost. Forbidding intervention, or pennitting only� multilateral organization or other nations to decide when the United States can act may render the world's most powerful nation impotent jn a moment of crisis. E. The Danger to Development Efforts

The belief that the United States would not act to save a threatened country could cripple attempts at economic development. The threat of Communist takeover frightens private foreign investors, who are a major source of crucial development capital. The Cuban revolution's success resulted in a flight of investors from Central America.3/ Invest­ ment in Southeast Asia did not expand until potential investors-were con­ vinced that the United States would not abandon South Vietnam to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.4/ Thus, to proscribe intervention or limit it severely might undennine or-destroy the underdeveloped countries' hopes for economic progress. Foreign investment is important to them. Without it there are insufficient funds to finance development efforts. The nec­ essary capital cannot be raised domestically.5/ The need for private capital in Latin America is now acute and will remain so -for at least two more decades.6/ Southeast Asia is largely dependent on infusions of outside resources-:7/ An affinnative intent on limiting intervention can answer the investment argument in three ways. First, economic development, the lJ Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 207-8. 2/ Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 233-34. Antonin Basch, Financing Economic Development (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 295. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., pp. 16-17. ..

Basch, op. cit., p. 247.

Miguel S. Wionczek,"A Latin American View," in How Latin America Views the U.S. Investor, Raymond Vernon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1965), p. 3. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Random House, 1968), Vol. 1, pp. 612, 624.

-73- affirmative can maintain, should not be purchased by intermittent inter­ ventions and wars. It would be far better to search for another more peaceful way to attain the same goal. Secondly, foreign aid from public sources could take the place of private investment in threatened nations. In addition to the substantial expenditure increase this would entail, the negative could object that it ignores the real role of foreign as­ sistance, which may be to "... create more favorable conditions for pri­ vate business to come in. "1/ Finally, the affirmative could claim that even without the threat of-intervention, investment could be protected through an investment guarantee program by which the federal government would insure foreign investors against political and military risks. There already is a guarantee program that insures against commercial risks.2/

F. The Human Costs of Non-Intervention If an affirmative plan includes a provision requiring withdraw­ al from Vietnam, the affirmative can argue that it will buy American com­ fort at the price of Vietnamese blood and repression. Herman Kahn has stated the case for this position in forceful terms.

But what would happen if we were to let South Viet­ nam fall into the hands of the National Liberation Front? It is not likely that a victorious NLF would treat with restraint: the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hoa, the Catholics (each a community of about one million hu­ man beings); the 500,000 South Vietnamese soldiers; the many other groups that have demonstrated that they are anti-Communists; the tens of thousands �hat would probably be labeled enemies of the Communist state. Those who dismiss this likelihood need only look at how the Chinese Communists and the Indonesian Army treated their opponents, and might ask them­ selves if the NLF is likely to be more restrained. Nor should the West view with equanimity fifteen million people passing behind the Iron Curtain.3/ Those who disagree with Kahn make three arguments. Initially, they point to the enormous suffering and loss of life, not only military but also civilian, caused by the continuation of the war. This has already been discussed in se·ction IV (A). Furthermore, some authorities insist that ... reprisals will occur no matter who triumphs in Vietnam; and that NLF y Ibid., p. 624. 2/ The New York Times, February 16, 1969. 3/ Kahn, "What Should We Do Now?", loc. cit.

-74- reprisals would affect only a few marked men--perhaps a hundred in num­ ber--at the top echelons of ·the Saigon regime.I/ Finally there is support for the view that on the whole "... some countries are probably better off under Communist rule than they were under preceding regimes."2/ This view is buttressed by reference to the industrial and educational progress al­ legedly made by Communist regimes in China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, and Cuba.3/

G. Problems with Multilateral Approval The disadvantages described previously may be mitigated or erased when other states are willing to contribute to interventions the United States previously would have undertaken unilaterally. Of course, there may be a corresponding diminution in the significance of the af­ firmative advantages. Human beings will still die; escalation may remain an ominous threat; foreign intervention may continue to drive nationalist forces into the arms of the Communists. An affirmative that recognizes such difficulties but wishes to avoid the consequences of non-intervention probably will have to derive its advantages specifically from a reduction in the American role in armed actions abroad. This affirmative approach depends almost totally upon an ability to prove that somehow the United States can persuade other nations to take up a substantial portion of the burden of intervention. As we have previously seen, it may be difficult to prove this would happen in Latin America. France and England are not eager to help. The evidence in other areas is ambiguous and contradic­ tory. Thus, an affirmative plan that permitted intervention only when other nations contributed substantial forces might, in effect, place the affirmative in the position of arguing in favor of non-intervention--a position that from a tactical and strategic point of view may be the strongest the affirmative can adopt on this topic. If an affirmative team does advocate a plan that envisions multilateral action frequently leading to intervention, it may run into another problem. In many situations there may be little or no time for organizational debate and decision. The cold war has been described as a succession of top priority crises demanding immediate action. In the event of nuclear-missile war, the time factor for decision may be as small as fifteen minutes; a multilateral organization could hardly be consulted. But few propose that it should be. The cataclysm of nuclear war would mean that all bets were off. However, most major foreign policy decisions about the use of force, it is argued, do not require short decision time. There is some evidence that there would have been time to present even

1/ Richard Falk, "A Vietnam Settlement: The View From Hanoi, War/Peace Report, November, 1968, p. 3. 2/ Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, op. cit., p. 81,

� Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., p. 8.

-75- the Korean crisis of 1950 to the House and Senate before acting.I/ The Dominican action of 1965 is sometimes seen as an incident where speed was imperative. American lives were in danger. Debate in Washington would not save them.2/ On the other hand, it has been said that the administra­ tion had evidence some days in advance of moving into Santo Domingo that a Communist takeover of the rebellion was a real threat.3/ In any case, there may be situations in which speed is essentia"l; requiring the par­ ticipation of a multilateral organization could make the attainment of the necessary swiftness of action impossible.

VI. Intervention and Covert Operations

A. Introduction

As noted in Section II, the term "military intervention" in­ cludes covert operations designed to overthrow an existing government by military means. Many of the arguments that apply to overt military in­ tervention also apply to its covert counterpart. For example, the af­ firmative may argue that there is no need for covert military interven­ tion. However, covert intervention also introduces some disputes and disagreements not previously discussed. They will be taken up here.

B. The Alleged Harms of Covert Military Intervention

Edwin Reischauer has written: "It is a mistake ..• to engage in clandestine operations ... [which] do serious damage to the good faith and honesty of the United States elsewhere in the world ...." 4/ Such activi­ ties, it is thought, can have a strong adverse impact on-American pres­ tige, not only when they are first discovered, but also over the long term.SI Former assistant secretary of state Roger Hilsman indicates that covert intervention and secret operations undermine our major asset-­ belief in American "intentions and integrity"--and, therefore, are, to an extent at least, counterproductive.6/

y "Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Com­ bat," op. cit., p. 1791.

2/ Plank, op. cit., p. 45.

3/ Phillip L. Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1966), p. 245.

4/ Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam... , op.cit., p. 221. � Ibid.

6/ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 86-87.

-76- The prime example of a covert operation that deeply damaged United States prestige is, of course, the Bay of Pigs. In his study of the Kennedy Administration, A Thousand Days, Arthur Schlesinger re­ views the worldwide reaction to the April, 1961 invasion of Cutia. Polit­ ical leaders in foreign nations and newsp.aper comment in major cities expressed shock and disbelief at the ineptitude and bumbling of the opera­ tion. Milan's Corriere della Sera exclaimed: "In one day, American pres­ tige collapsed lower than in eight years of Eisenhower." The Labor Party in Britain felt compelled to shift leftward to satisfy its constituency, which was angered and embittered by the invasion. Schlesinger concludes: "... In Western Europe I found great disenchantment."lf

Charges of prestige loss due to the CIA's Cuban fiasco have been matched by similar charges concerning other operations. CIA opera­ tions in Burma in the 1950s, when the agency allegedly supported and en­ couraged an armed rebel group, supposedly alienated the government, which rejected further foreign aid, threatened to quit the United Nations, and moved closer to Peking.2/ African leaders have been said to be pre­ pared to believe any accusation about the CIA; its past activities may have made the Africans credulous to the point of naivete.3/ Similar sus­ picions, according to the New York Times, prevail in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.4/ In the eyes of CIA critics, all of this adds up to a serious prestige loss for the United States and a compelling reason to control further or to abolish covert military intervention.

Negatives confronted with such an analysis will want to exer­ cise several options in replying. First, they can deny that the loss of prestige is a significant or measurable harm. Consid�rations of prestige may be irrelevant to real foreign policy gains or reverses. For example, in 1956 the Soviet Union gained permanent Arab allies--a goal she had long sought--by supporting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli War, despite the prestige loss occasioned by the brutal repression of Hungarian freedom. Any prestige lost by the United States at the Bay of Pigs was more than regained when the Soviets were obliged to remove their missiles from Cuba. Latin America, at last truly alarmed by the Castro threat, voted in the OAS to approve military action against Cuba.5/ It would appear that the loss of prestige due to a U.S. blunder can be made up on the occasion of a later blunder by the Soviet Union, as .mistakes are produced by the pressures of cold war competition. Furthermore, loss of prestige or alienation may not last for a long time. The supposedly alienated Burmese

Y Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit .. , p. 291.

� The New York Times, April 25, 1966. 'Y Ibid.

if Ibid.

?./ Masur, op. cit., p. 217.

-77- seemed to have attained "... a heightened awareness of the dangers of neo­ impcrialism as practiced by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Re­ public."!/ Finally, many other factors contribute to' American prestige difficulties; it would be impossible to assign any definite portion of the blame to the CIA covert interventions.2/ For instance, last November, when Saigon initially spurned the Paris negotiations, .the North Vietnamese had a "propaganda field day."3/

Even if the United States stopped all covert interventions, prestige losses might not be prevented. Foreigners might well think we were still intervening. Prestige means nothing more than what the out­ side world thinks of us. And, no matter what we did, unfortunate.and un­ welcome events might still cause loss of prestige for the United States, whether or not they were attributed to the hidden hand of the CIA. Greeks, for example, are convinced that the United States played a major role in the coup that installed the military government.4/ Though the accusation was vigorously denied by all �nerican officials, the aliena­ tion and diminution in American prestige are nonetheless as real as if it were true.

C. Plan Problems

A plan that requires some kind of multilateral participation in covert military interventions almost certainly means the end of such op­ erations. Covert interventions are covert because considerations of na­ tional security or foreign policy require secrecy about a specific opera­ tion. To force disclosure to the representatives of several nations destroys whatever advantages covertness possesses. The United States might have to reveal sources of information to obtain help in a covert military operation; this it could not do, without endangering the entire American intelligence network and drying up virtually all clandestine , sources of information.5/ Thus, prohibition of unilateral military in­ tervention--in any affirmative plan, not just one dealing directly with the CIA--formally abolishes covert military intervention.

y John Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma," in Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, op. cit., p. 306.

2/ Testimony of Henry Steele Commager in Senate Foreign Relations Com­ mittee, Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., February 20, 1967, p. 26.

3/ The New York Times, November 5, 1968.

4/ The Christian Science Monitor, August 5, 1968.

5/ Richard Russell, Congressional Record, July 14, 1966, p. 14934.

-78- Such intervention, some-authorities argue, has been a crucial and valuable tool of American foreign policy.I/ Moreover, whatever prob­ lems it once had are far less likely to recur-now or in the future. David Wise and Thomas Ross explain why: After the Bay of Pigs, the CIA was limited to opera­ tions requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than sidearms. In other words, the CIA was never again to direct operations involving aircraft, tanks, or amphibious ships .... [It] was henceforth... \ restricted to paramilitary operations that would be 113.! "plausibly deniable. Thus,the affirmative may be destroying covert military operations after l a mechanism to control their consequences has been established. There apparently has been no Bay of Pigs during the last eight years.

An affirmative that wishes to abolish covert military opera­ tions may have real problems in proving that its plan effectively does so. Other mechanisms might be employed to do the CIA' s work. Military attachfs in U.S. embassies on occasion have supplied the crucial encourage­ ment for a military revolt or coup. Countries in which attaches reportedly were involved are Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic.3/ In Honduras, the ambassador and his military staff allegedly were at odds, with the former working to save the civilian president and the latter openly supporting a coup to overthrow him.4/ Charges of such incidents have aroused popular ire abroad and it is d1fficult to see how any affirmative plan could prevent them.

VII. A Review of Major Interventions As our last task in this chapter, we will examine individually some of the major armed actions of the United States that have on occa­ l. sion been called interventions. In each case, we will look at both sides I' of the controversy and attempt to assess two things: whether there was a sufficient reason to justify intervention and whether the problem could have been resolved without intervention.

Charles E. Jacob, Policy and Bureaucracy (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand and C_ompany, 1966), p. 172. ,l y David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: ! Random House, 1964), p. 204.

� Barber and Ronning, op. cit., p. 219. 4/ "Diplo_mats in Uniform," New Republic, November 2, 1963, p. 13.

-79- A. Guatemala In 1954 a tiny CIA-organized and supplied force reportedly Guatemalan, invaded Guatemala, which was then ruled by a gov'ernment described as left-wing._!/ Subsequently, the regime of President Arbenz was replaced by a pro-American junta. The United States claimed that the Arbenz regime was heavily infiltrated and influenced by Communist forces. That view is supported by Pennsylvania political scientist Ronald M. Schneider, who writes that the Communists intended to use Guatemala " ... to disrupt hemispheric unity, ... as a base for Communist operations in the Central American area, and... as· a model for..• other Latin American[s] .... "2/ In May, 1954, the Guatemalans meddled om­ inously in a banana workers' strike in Honduras and were preparing to receive a submarine-carried shipment of Soviet arms that was " ... clearly excessive as far as Guatemala's domestic requirements were concerned."-3/ Washington was convinced that there was a real Communist threat and Washington acted.

In recent years critics of the Guatemalan intervention have argued that the country represented no threat to the United States. Guatemala had done nothing to damage American vital interests and seemed incapable of inflicting such damage at any point in the future. Critics also argue that the Arbenz regime was not Communist dominated--that it was the recipient of no Soviet foreign aid and simply "used" Communists domestically to implement a xelatively moderate reform program.4/ Finally, some contend that even if there were a Communist threat, in­ tervention was unnecessary. The liberation army was not responsible for the overthrow of Arbenz; it penetrated only about twenty miles into Guatemala before it was stymied by forces loyal to the government.Sf The fundamental cause for the regime's downfall, claims historian Dex- ter Perkins, "... was the refusal of [most of] the army to march against the insurgents.... "6/ It is conceivable, however, that the invasion was the trigger which led ultimately to Arbenz' defeat.

.!_I Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­ day and Co. , 1963), pp. 424-27.

'!:) Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1959), p. 274.

� Dexter Perkins, The Diplomacy of a New Age (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1967), pp .. 128-29. if Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., p. 232. 5/ Schneider, op. cit., p. 311.

6/ Perkins, op. cit., p. 129.

-80- B. Lebanon

On July 14-15, ·1958, at the specific request of Lebanon's Presi­ dent Chamoun, the United States landed 14,000· Marines in Lebanon and charged them with the task of restoring order and protecting the beseiged government.I/ The events leading up to President Eisenhower's decision to ·act established a pattern cited to justify intervention. More than 15,000 Syrians, Communists reportedly among their leaders, had supposedly infiltrated Lebanon with the aim of bringing the government down by violence.2/ The United Arab Republic was " ... [broadcasting] all kinds of violent anti-Western propaganda." President Chamoun's support appeared to be crumbling and one observer predicted the "..• disintegration of [the present] pro-Western government."3/ The. Marin.es moved in; an American diplomat mediated between the opposing forces; a new government was in­ stalled; and, as U.S. forces withdrew some months later, peace had been restored in Lebanon.4/

The official version of events is hotly disputed. Senator Ful­ bright has questioned whether there was any Communist involvement in the crisis; the administration produced no evidence that there was.Sf Respectable Lebanese leaders were said to be allied with the rebels.6/ The United Nations' Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold indicated that the U.N. could find no evidence of large-scale infiltration from foreign countries.7/ And some critics believe that the Lebanese army was capable of controlling the situation without American assistance.8/ The most harm­ ful effect of the intervention, its opponents charge, was-that it further alienated the Arabs from the United States and cemented their alliance with the Soviet Union.y This happened not only with Nas·ser. but also y Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit .., p. 132. '!:.! Under Secretary of State Christian Herter quoted in U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 79. 11 11 3/ John Law, in ibid., July 4, 1958, p. 25; July 11, 1958, p. 62. 1::I 4/ Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, loc. cit. \i!i Ibid., p. 148. I, � 1:•I !l y Ibid., p. 143. il Ii .I 7.J The New York Times, July 4, 1958. ·1 '§_/ Ibid., July 11, 1958. Harrison Salisbury in ibid., July 18, 1958; C. L. Sulzberger in ibid., Y July 19, 1958.

-81- a,mmwmq·2.__ 2?!. r-:rmrrw TWTJ"IEF :::ZFIE ,; �

with Lebanon, which switched to a neutralist foreign policy after American withdrawal,.!./ Despite some of its alleged consequences, however, at the time Britain, France, and Turkey all felt that American intervention in Lebanon was wise.2/ C. Cuba

The ill-fated American invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, was based upon the conviction that Castro represented a Communist threat to the Western Hemisphere. Professor Hans Morgenthau writes: The United States had an interest in elimi­ nating the political and military power of the Soviet Union, which used Cuba as a base to threaten the security interests of the United States in the Western hemisphere.3/ The Castro menace lay in his reported efforts to aid subversion in other Latin American countries.4/ History, of course, records that the American attempt to dislodge Castro was a dismal failure. Some feel the attempt should never have been made. They offer two reasons. First, they argue that Castro was not a Communist originally and that he became one· oply in response to the threat of American intervention (see Section IV [C]). Secondly, the intervention was doomed from the beginning in one official's view, by the refusal of the American people to back a revolt against Castro.SI Others insist that the provision of adequate air cover would have enabled the exile forces to overcome whatever nationalistic support Castro had. D. The Dominican Republic--1961

In November, 1961, a coup threatened in the Dominican Republic. It was aimed at aiding the return to power to the Trujillo family, which had been deposed in the events following the May 30, 1961, assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, who had ruled the country with an iron hand since 1930.6/ To .discourage the coup planners, the United States posi­ tioned eight ships carrying 1,800 Marines just outside the Santo Domingo

C. L. Sulzberger in ibid., December 13, 1958. (News summary pre- .. pared during newspaper strike.) 2/ U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 1958, pp. 21, 27. 3/ Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," op. cit., p. 431. 4/ Plank, op. cit., p. 38. 5/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 276. 6/ Ibid., pp. 769-71.

-82- harbor. A participant in the decision to act described the subsequent events this way:

We waited with some apprehension until sur­ prising and heartening word came in from Santo Domingo .... The presence of the fleet encouraged General Echacarria of the air force to rise.... The Trujillos quickly fled... and Kennedy's ac­ tion won commendation throughout Latin America ..!f At the time, the New York Times commented that the u.s� had no choice but to assist the democratic forces in the Dominican Republic.2/ Even today there seems to be little dissent from that view. Perhaps the only real complaint against our action is that it solved nothing--the Dominican Republic exploded in 1965 and the United States felt compelled to launch a major new intervention.

E. Vietnam

Instead of reciting the long and tortured history of American involvement in Vietnam, which stretches back to the end of the Second World War, we will attempt at this point to present in summary form some of the major arguments proponents and opponents of the war raise to sup­ port their positions. Not all of the major arguments will be repeated here; many of them are specifically reviewed in other parts of this chap­ ter. Vietnam in 1969 was central to an American's consciousness of in­ tervention; it exemplified more of the implications and consequences of intervention than any other episode in the postwar period.

Those who have defended American involvement in Vietnam argue that it is supported in international and domestic law. Frank Trager justifies our involvement by pointing to the invitation of the South Vietnamese government and to the SEATO Treaty.3/ The Congress passed the Tonkin Resolution supporting involvement by an 88 to 2 vote in the Senate. The resolution authorized the President to " ... take all neces­ sary steps, including the use of armed force .... " in Southeast Asia.4/ When the President requested the resolution, secretary of state Dean­ Rusk was careful to note the administration's belief that the resolution was not 'necessary to the President's actions in Vietnam, but was simply .. .!/ Ibid. , p. 771 . : I' i The New York Times, November 21, 1961. !

Frank Trager, Why Viet Nam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co.,· 1966), p. 203. if Kallenbach, op. cit., pp. 516-17.

-83- supportive of them. .!J In any case, the Tonkin Resolution imparted a legislative stamp of approval to administration polici_es in Southeast Asia. In 1966, the Senate refused, by a 92 to 5 vote, to repeal the resolution.2/ In addition to relying on congressional sanction, South Vietnamese Invitation, and the SEATO treaty, supporters of America's Vietnam policy were quick to deny that it violated the .American protocol to the 1954 Geneva Agreement. The United States did not sign the Agree­ ment, which ended the Indochinese War and provided for a temporary par­ titioning of Vietnam. Washington issued a separate declaration pledg­ ing to observe the Agreement, if there were no renewed aggression in violation of it.3/ In the American view, that cond'ition was not met; North Vietnam aggressed.4/- Captured Viet Cong documents are cited to prove the point.SI i Proponents of the Vietnam war also contend that our effort in that beleaguered nation is justified because the people of South Vietnam do not want to live under a Communist regime. Professor Robert Scalapino writes: "The Communists don't really believe they could win elections in South Viet Nam--they're not even structured for elections."6/ Another source indicates that whenever American and South Vietnamese control of the countryside is extended, support for the Saigon regime increases.7/ If the people are given security, the argument goes, they can express­ their true preference, which is decidedly anti-Communist or non-Communist. Furthermore, in 1969 the United States may have moved within sight of achieving its objective in Vietnam--a peace that would permit a free choice by the South Vietnamese of the regime that would govern them.8/ Opponents of the war disagree with almpst every particular of the defenders' case. Among the many arguments t'hey present, three may be most.in point for this section .

.!/ Testimony of Dean Rusk in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Committee on Armed Services, Southeast Asia Resolution Hear­ ings, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., August 6, 1964,p. 1. 2/ Congressional Quarterly, March 4, 1966, p. 485.

3/ Trager, op. cit., p. 91. if Scalapino, "The Vietnam War--Pro and Con," op. cit., p. 8. 5/ Ibid. 6/ Ibid., p. 14. 7/ The Manchester Guardian quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 1968. 8/ Dale, op. cit., p. 32.

-84- mtM i-1?tWfWZWTZWt:r:wztmWif ?Be:iidRtSit.JllM w-:mwmmsse2r av

(1) TI1e Vietnam war is l�gally unjustifiable. Professor Francis Wormuth concludes that there is no legal basis for armed action abroad without congressional approval.1/ Other observers believe that meaningful congressional approval was never extended to the American ef­ fort in Vietnam. In their view, the Tonkin Resolution did not intend to sanction presidential decisions to expand the scope of American involve­ ment in Vietnam. They cite as evidence an exchange between Senator Gaylord Nelson and Senator Fulbright on the Senate floor during the Ton­ kin debate in 1964, six months before escalation. "I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission," Nelson declared, and Fulbright responded: "I do not interpret the joint resolution in that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolu­ tion is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last ten years. 112/

(2) The Vietnam war is politically senseless. If we had sim­ ply allowed the development of a unified Communist Vietnam, it is con­ tended, it " ...would have served as a more effective bar to the expan­ sion of Chinese power than the present war-torn country."3/ The forces allied with North Vietnam are seen as genuine nationalists, who have the support of the population, while the Saigon regime is regarded as "an American puppet."4/ Thus, according to the critics, the Communists in Vietnam are both the popular and sensible choice to govern. The people want them and they will resist China. Fighting them, it is ar­ gued, is foolish and futile, as the French found out between 1946 and 1954.5/

(3) The Vietnam War is unwinnable. A long war will so exhaust the country as to render any ultimate victory meaningless. An economi­ cally and physically battered South Vietnam very well might be incapable of sustaining itself; no matter what the terms of the settlement, it might fall into Communist hands. Indeed, one Vietnamese thinks that is likely.

1/ Francis D. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President vs. the Consti­ tution (Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of Demo­ cratic Institutions, 1968), p. 37. Professor Wormuth's view is not widely accepted. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, National Commitments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 12.

2/ Geyelin, op. cit., p. 192.

· I Reischauer in Gordon, o�. cit., p. 412. I I Richard Rovere, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), p. 12.

5/ Franklin Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Affairs, January, 1962, p. 265.

-85- ... North Vietnam and the Viet Cong cadres would stay on, bury their anns, and bide their time. South Vietnam, which has had little experience in self-rule and has been disrupted through the long years of war, undoubtedly would not be able to sustain its people against subversion.... .!_/

Obviously there are other arguments both for and against the war. Some perhaps are of greater moment than the ones outlined here. Hopefully, they are found elsewhere in this chapter, as we have indicated they can be. But reading this analysis is not enough. In discussing Vietnam, debaters should remember how complex it is; it is perhaps the most written about, thought about, fought about, and televised war in hu­ man history. There is always new infonnation available on it--and the infonnation often can be used either to support it or to decry it. Vietnam probably has been the crucial issue of the 1960s; it may also prove a crucial issue in many debates. It deserves substantial time and attention.

F. The Dominican Republic--1965

In late April, 1965, a bloody civil war in the Dominican Repub­ lic between the ruling military junta and left-wing forces led to American intervention in force. Initially, the American rationale was that the ex­ pedition was designed to rescue American citizens (see Section III [f]). Later it shifted to the argument that American action was necessitated be­ cause a democratic revolution had been taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for and had carefully planned the operation. Dexter Perkins supports this thesis by pointing to the fact that many of the orig­ in�! revolutionary leaders, adherents of ex-President Juan Bosch, had to flee to refuge in foreign embassies, when the Communists pushed them out of positions of influence in the revolutionary movement.2/ In the after­ math of the intervention, peaceful elections were· held and Joaquin Balaguer, a moderate fonner president, defeated Bosch.3/ The Communists were kept from power in the Dominican Republic; and, though there are probably more Communists there now than before the intervention, they are--according to one source--a fragmented and ineffectual force and do not present a real threat.if

.!_/ N·. Khac Huyen, "Vietnam ... A Proposed Solution," America, May 11, 1968, p. 644.

'.!:./ Perkins, op. cit., pp. 142-43. � Ibid., p. 144.

4/ The Washington Post, March 27, 1969.

-86- Critics of the Dominican intervention are convinced that there was no Communist threat in the Dominican Republic. Richard Barnet contends "the threat was not that the Communists had taken over.•. but that events were out of control and might lead to a nationalist, anti­ U.S. regime that could look to Castro or Moscow for help."Y Such a regime, in Barnet's view, might be a nuisance at times, but never a real threat. He also denounces the list prepared and issued by the State Department that enumerated the alleged Communists pro�inent in the revolt. It was, he charges, highly inaccurate, listing individuals in jail or out of the Dominican Republic at the time of the uprising. More­ over, "... the individuals named had nothing to do with the start of the revolt and very little prospect of taking it over."2/ In addition to stifling a democratic revolt, Barnet concludes, the-United States also prevented a truly free election in 1966. The military and the American government both clearly preferred Balaguer; "intimidated" by the events of the past and the possibilities of the future, the Dominicans allegedly opted for a safe but not a free choice.3/ Some have also argued that our

actions in the Dominican Republic sorely injured U.S. prestige in Latin :[ America. Brookings staffer John Plank has written:

The President's decision to intervene, applauded by most North Americans, caused consternation in other parts of the hemisphere. Many Dominicans were of­ fended by this latent affront to their national dig­ nity, seeing in it a dramatic demonstration that the United States had no confidence in their ability to resolve their own problems and little respect for their position as citizens of a sovereign and inde­ pendent state, jurisdictionally the equal of the United States itself. Many other Latin Americans were deeply disturbed, both because of the massive breach of the non-intervention principle and because of the way in which the United States took to itself responsibility for defining the character of the developing Domini­ can situation and responding to it.if The rejoinder here is that, as with CIA cases, whatever harm was done to prestige does not appear to have had any lasting or concrete impact. Former ambassador to Argentina and assistant secretary of State Richard Rubottom surmises that "... American influence has not diminished as a re­ sult of the intervention [in the Dominican Republic] .•.•" 5/ lf Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, op. cit., p. 174. y Ibid., p. 172.

3/ Ibid., p. 178'.

·if Plank, op. cit., p. 37.

5/ Richard Rubottom, "An Assessment of Current American Influence in Latin America," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1966, p. 123.

-87- ,---• •••• !.. • •• � ··/, ,=._·: s .•. ,., .. ,.:..". ·.··.�·\-�-�:tt.;·.� ... �·-MftrftH1it::tn ' .

VIII. A Concluding Note

This year's resolution and particularly the controversy about the employment of anned forces abroad are obviously inspired by the dif­ ficulties and dangers of the American role in Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's comment that the United States is fonnally committed to the defense of at least forty countries prompted Senator John Sten­ nis to ask for long-range planning on when, where, and how the United States should carry out its role.I/ Should America bear most of the burden of intervention? The answers are not easy. What has been pre­ sented here only begins to explore them. It is offered in the hope that it will stimulate the debater to further thinking and research about one of the central controversies of our time.

!/ John Stennis quoted by Stuart Symington, Congressional Record, August 31, 1966, p. 20552.

-88- DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Distinguish between the legal and popularly understood meanings of intervention. What is the legal status of unilateral military in­ tervention? Does intervention in the popular sense include covert military operations? Does it include foreign military aid? Explain your answers.

2. What does the term "unilateral" probably mean in this debate topic? What is the difference between the source and the implementation of an intervention? What percentage of the total foreign effort by the United States seems required to make an intervention unilateral? De­ fend your answers. If the United States is responsible for 50 per­ cent of the foreign effort in an intervention, is it unilateral? Why or why not?

3. Can Congress prohibit unilateral intervention by a simple statutory enactment? By the use of the appropriations power? If a constitu­ tional amendment is necessary, what special problems must the affir­ mative face? How does the term "should" operate in a debate resolu­ tion? To what governmental units does it apply in this topic?

4. What role does nationalism play in protecting underdeveloped countries from Communist takeover? Is it an effective force? Can its impact be nullified by terrorism or coups? Can the United States success­ fully rescue a government on the verge of defeat by subversive forces? What factors determine the success or failure of American intervention?

5. What is interposition? Has it been utilized recently? Discuss the circumstances.

6. Is a "no need" sufficient by itself to justify the adoption of the resolution? Should the nation continue policies that are no longer necessary? Should it change policy if there is not a significant advantage traceable to the change? If a "no need" were all an af­ firmative had to carry would the negative have a more difficult job? Explain.

7. Would an end to the Vietnam conflict create substantial additional resources to meet domestic needs? Is there any guarantee that such resources would be devoted to solving domestic problems? If the savings were not put to good use, could the affirmative claim a sig­ . i' nificant advantage simply because the plan saved 1ooney?

8. If escalation threatens, can the United States just withdraw from a conflict situation? Has it done so? Would it be likely to do so in the future? Can policy planners predict before untertaking an inter­ vention whether or not it is likely to escalate? What factors make prediction easier?

-89- 9. Is intervention self-defeating? Does intervention damage the pros­ pects for detente? Define detente. What concrete advantages does d·etente have? Is it desirable even if it produces no tangible gains? Why or why.not? Have periods of detente coincided with periods of intervention? Explain.

10. How might an end to unilateral intervention damage credibility? What are the harms of diminished credibility? Is nuclear proliferation harmful? Is it likely if the United States ends unilateral interven­ tion? What presently non-nuclear countries are capable of producing a bomb? What distinguishes them from the states not presently capa­ ble of doing so?

11. What is selective intervention? Is it likely to work? Is it Arneri- · can policy now? Is selective intervention likely to be American pol­ icy in the future? Why might the option of intervening be important? Does permitting multilateral intervention preserve the option? ,.....� 12. What problems are sometimes attributed to covert military interven- tion? What benefits? Is a prestige loss really meaningful or is it simply on some occasions the unfortunate and inevitable fate of a great power? How does a prestige loss hurt American foreign policy? Does it?

13. Why would revealing sources of information damage the effectiveness of American intelligence? Are covert military operations crucial? If they were abolished, what might take their place? Could an af­ firmative plan prevent this? ' 14. Defend or deny the wisdom of the 1954 intervention in Guatemala and the 1958 intervention in Lebanon. What would have happened if the United States had not acted? Describe the situation in those na­ tions today·.

15. Have recent interventions in Latin America been justified? Why wasn't the 1961 invasion of Cuba successful? Distinguish between the 1961 intervention in the Dominican Republic and the 1965 inter­ vention. What reactions in Latin America did the two interventions produce?

16. Would a repeal of the Tonkin Resolution and disbanding SEATO necessarily terminate American efforts in Vietnam? What are the arguments advanced in favor of withdrawing American forces from Vietnam? Against withdrawal? Is standing in Vietnam necessary to containing communism in other areas?

-90- I CHAPTER III

MULTILATERAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS AND NATO

I. Introduction

This chapter will review the definitions and ramifications of both of the two remaining debate propositions: "Resolved: That the United States should withdraw from all multi lateral defense organizations," and "Resolved: That the United States should withdraw from the North At­ lantic Treaty Organization." The topics are so closely related--the is­ sues they raise are so similar--that separate treatments would be either redundant or incomplete. The second topic is a part of the first. They will be examined here as merely different expressions of the same concept.

II. Definitions

The affirmative will have to define two terms: "multilateral defense organizations" (including the "North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ tion") and "withdraw."

A. "... Multilateral Defense Organizations... "

A multilateral defense organization is distinguished both from a unilateral pledge to defend another state and a bilateral agreement for mutual defense. Though the word "multilateral" in a literal sense may appear to encompass the concept expresse·d in the word "bilateral," the normal usage of the whole phrase "multilateral defense organizations" does not include formal arrangements for military protection between only two states. The authoritative Kiesing's Treaties and Alliances of the World discriminates between "bilateral treaties" and "multilateral treaties" in l both cataloging and explanation.1/ A multilateral treaty involves more than two signatures, while a bilateral one involves no more than two.2/ Thus, an affirmative may claim that withdrawing from multilateral organi­ zations will not preclude entering into bilateral pacts that serve es­ sentially the same purpose, without incurring the alleged hanns of the former. However, harms traceable solely to the method of forming organi­ zational structures probably will prove difficult to define. Indeed, ob­ taining affirmative advantages may depend on ending American participa­ ... tion altogether. More about this later. I th • ' I I In light of e preceding definitional distinction, a multi­ i lateral defense organization may be defined as the structural and I I l lf Treaties and Alliances of the World (New York: Charles Scribner's !. Sons, 1968), pp. 162-67. (Hereafter cited as Treaties.) i

3J Ibid. l

! -91-

'ft WMrirA + ;g__ee.:a s administrative components designed to implement alliance or treaty agree­ ments pledging mutual cooperation and help from all in the event of an attack on any member state or states. The organization must count more than two· nations among its participating members. By the terms of this definition, the United States belongs to four, and arguably five, multi­ lateral defense organizations. In chronological order according to date of establishment they are: the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the ANZUS Pact, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and possibly the Central Treaty Organization. We will examine each of these.

(1) The Organization of American States was founded in 1948 as a regional alliance in accord with the provisions of the United Nations 1 Charter. It provided an enforcement structure to carry out the principles previously enunciated by treaties that provided somewhat vague defense arrangements among the states of the Western Hemisphere. The structure of the OAS has a large number of organizational components. The ones most directly concerned with defense are the Inter-American Conference, which meets only once every five years or at the request of two-thirds of the members; the intermittent Foreign Ministers meetings, which do not have any direct authority; and the Council, composed of ambassadors from member states, which acts when a charge of aggression is raised.I/ Of these, the latter is clearly the most important in military activities. It made OAS decisions during the Cuban missile crisis, for example. The Foreign Mini­ sters, on the other hand, approved the January, 1962, condemnation of Cuba's Castro regime and its expulsion from participation in the OAS,2/ but not from membership. Twenty-three independent states of the Western Hemisphere, including Cuba, are members of the OAS. Canada is not a mem­ ber.

(2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in con­ junction with the North Atlantic Treaty, a mutual defense pact now with fifteen participants: the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Britain, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Germany.3/ The treaty itself provides for some of the organization's features, such as the North Atlantic Council and ministerial meetings. The heart of the military organization of NATO is the agreement for an integrated defense structure and command announced in December, 1951. The agreement was implemented with the es­ tablishment of the Supreme Allied Command in April, 1951.4/

1/ Ibid., PP· 145, 148. y Ibid., pp. 150, 151. y Ibid., p. 99. y , Ibid., p. 102.

-92-

·'- (3) The ANZUS Pact is a " ... tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, ...signed on September 1, 1951.... "l/ The pact has only two organizational components: the Pacific Council, which brings the foreign ministers of the countries together at least once a year; and the military organization, which meets when cir­ cumstances require " ...to advise the Council on military co-operation in the Pacific. "Y (4) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, whose members ini­ tially included Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, was born with the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in May, 1954. The members agreed " .•.to consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense... " in the event of aggression (Article 4(2) of the Treaty). The administration of the organization is entrusted to a Council and Secretary-General, who are advised on military matters by the Military Advisers Group and the SEATO Military Planning Office, which is composed of planners from the armed forces of every mem­ ber·state.3/ (5) The Central Treaty Organization is a creation of the Baghdad Pact of 1955. The United States is.an associate member, while Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran are full members. The United States participates as an observer at Council meetings and in the Military Committee and parti­ cipates in the Combined Military Planning Staff. The U.S. seems more fully a member of the organization than the Pact; for example, its military · personnel take part in drawing up contingency plans dealing with intelli­ gence, plans and operations, and logistics.!f B. · " ... Withdraw... "

(1) The timing of withdrawal is important. An examination of the '\ question of timing with respect to NATO also exemplifies the problems with ,I other alliances though they probably are less serious in the latter cases. 111, August 24, 1969, marks the twentieth anniversary of the coming into force ,, of the North Atlantic Treaty and Articles 12 and 13 provide for revision � ,,,1 or withdrawal from the treaty on that date.Sf After the treaty was in I• Ii force for ten years, the parties could agree to revise it. After twenty 'I years any party may put an end to its own participation, g1v1ng one year's ,, notice of withdrawal. As we will indicate later in this section, a .. .. ·1 ' ' . j t y Ibid., p. 186. 1 y Ibid., p. 187. l y Ibid., PP· 187-89. !I Ibid., pp. 174-75. � NATO: Facts and Figures (Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 26.

-93- United States·--withdrawal from NATO may not necessarily mean that the United States intends to renounce the pledge that was made when the treaty was signed i� 1949, which called Upon the signatories to defend Europe, but did not specify how this must be done. At the present time the United States or any other NATO member (France is considered a possibility) can withdraw from the treaty after one year's notice. Indeed, if it is so desired, the United States could probably withdraw from the organization immediately. In the real world, however, immediate United States withdrawal from NATO is unlikely. The United States is the only member which has fully met its troop commitments to the NATO command during the past eighteen years. If American troops were swiftly withdrawn from the organization, the impact might be cata­ strophic on our European allies, who are deeply conscious of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces' presence n�arby and of their ability to move rap­ idly, as they did into Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Those who propose either United States withdrawal or significant reductions of American forces in Europe usually recognize that withdrawal would probably have to be accomplished in stages, with a target date for eventual complete with­ drawal.

Our' other multilateral defense treaties, like NATO, contain specific provisions for withdrawing from the alliance. And, as in the case of NATO, United States presumably could abandon abruptly the organi­ zations set up by some of these treaties. A peremptory end to American participation in ANZUS or CENTO would not have the discernible effect it would in Europe, where large numbers of U.S. troops are presently inte­ grated into the organization. Withdrawal from SEATO, on the other hand, with its implications for Vietnam, could have profound effects. Removing a half million men from Vietnam with their equipment could not be accom­ plished quickly, even if it were considered desirable. (2) Does the "multilateral organizations" proposition require a permanent withdrawal from multilateral defense organizations, even to the extent of prohibiting formation of new organizations? Moreover, does the NATO question permit subsequent American adherence to a new European defense organization? The answer to the first question is probably yes; the word "withdraw" in this topic seems at least to imply and perhaps to command an end to participation in all proscribed organizations, now and for the indefinite future. The topic is meaningless if the United States can withdraw one day and rejoin the next. The second question is more difficult. Clearly, the NATO resolution does not forbid continued Ameri­ can membership in other multilateral defense organizations, to which present NATO members like Britain and France belong or have belonged (e.g., SEATO). Thus, if a new European defense organization, composed, for example, of the six member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) were formed, the wording of the topic apparently would sanction American membership. The new organization might have many of the same goals as NATO and obviously would function in the same part of the globe; however, the difference in membership and perhaps arrangements might dis­ tinguish participation in it from the permanently proscribed participation in NATO.

-94- (3) There is a difference between renunciation of a defense treaty and withdrawal from a defense organization. Once �gain NATO pro­ vides an example. NATO is an organization which combines three military elements: an integrated military command, common planning through the military command, and military forces in being. The treaty is the agree­ ment which was signed by twelve nations in Washington in 1949 (Greece, Turkey, and West Germany joined later). The heart of the treaty is Ar­ ticle 5, which states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an at­ tack against them all ... " The article then goes on to define the obliga­ tions of members in the event of armed attack. They must at once, indi­ vidually and in concert with the other members, take such action, includ­ _ing the use of armed force, as _each deems necessary. Each country is free, therefore, to follow its own constitutional processes and to do as much or as little as it wishes. Thus, when France withdrew its armed forces from the NATO command, President de Gaulle pledged that France would continue to honor the pledge it had made in the North Atlantic Treaty.1/ Maurice Couve de Murville, French foreign minister at the time of France's nearly total withdrawal from military affairs in 1966, took great care to point out that the Atlantic Alliance and NATO were two dif­ ferent things.2/ He declared that membership in NATO had never been a condition of the alliance. NATO was created in 1956 after the Treaty of 1949, in an atmosphere of crisis generated by the Korean War, a condition which the French argued no longer existed in 1966. Thus, France withdrew from the organization, while remaining in the alliance ready to make an independent military contribution to NATO in time of need. The NATO topic apparently asks the affirmative to justify similar American action. The multilateral organizations topic contains the same distinc­ tion. The affirmative plan can provide only for cessation of membership in organizations, not for an end to membership in the alliances. This may make the affirmative task very difficult. As a careful reading of Section II of this chapter will rev�al, the organizational structures of alliances like SEATO and ANZUS do not amount to a great deal. It is difficult to conceive of p9ssible advantages due to withdrawing from them. For the most part, they have no forces in being and little or no unified command struc­ ture. They place--at least for the present--no major strain on American resources or manpower; whatever future efforts are required probably would occur anyway, since such organizations as do exist exert no greater formal pressure for action in the event of aggression than the treaties do. Per­ I haps the best chance for the affirmative to argue a significant reason for change is to concentrate on the consequences of organizational withdrawal, maintaining that such consequences are an intermediate step to beneficial results. For example, the affirmative could contend that an end to American

1/ U.S.,Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, United States Policy Toward Europe, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 423. (Hereafter cited as U.S. Policy Toward Europe.) y Ibid., p. 435.

-95- membership in alliance organizations would weaken the alliances. The prospect of an end.to multilateral alliances provides at least an oppor­ tunity to present and defend significant advantages. Some suggested ones will be discussed later.

III. The Need for Multilateral Defense Organizations

Much of the argumentation for a United States withdrawal from NATO or other multilateral organizations centers around the general propo­ sition that there is no longer a need for such organizations. Here we turn to an examination of some of the spec.ific arguments used to support or deny that proposition. A. The Need to Act in a Rapid and Coordinated Manner

Unless one demonstrates that the aims of multilateral organiza­ tions need not be fulfilled, there is a question whether these aims can be achieved without the organizations themselves (or, more exactly, with­ out U.S. participation in them). The goal of multilateral defense organi­ zations may be described as "collective security." Clearly, the "security" is the goal, the "collective" a means toward that goal. The question, then, is whether United States and/or other NATO members' security can be maintained as well or maintained at all without U.S. participation in formal collective groupings. Some would argue that the degree of org�nization and integration which multilateral agreements embody is a necessary condition for the main­ tenance of the peace. The speed with which important decisions must be made in crisis is frequently cited as the basis for this position. .•. France apparently wishes to return to the ancient sys­ tem of separate national forces held together only by in­ ternational staff coordination--subject to final national approval--a system that broke down in preparing for two world wars and that could not be expected to function in a future conflict in which those not ready to fight at H­ hour on D-Day probably will not get to fight. .!J Others question the need for the speed of decision-making which multi­ lateral organizations supposedly assure. When one member of the alliance (the United States) is clearly dominant in a certain area and/or type of defense, it may be considered questionable whether, on military grounds, coordination with allies is particularly important or even desirable. Prior agreement on responses to possible threats perhaps could dispense with H-hour consultations. NATO provides opportunities for consultation y R. J. Wood, "Security of the North Atlantic Alliance," Issues of National Security in the 1970's, ed. Amos Jordan (Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 81.

-96- on nuclear matters.I/ But so long as the U.S. nuclear capability is suf­ ficient by itself to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S.S.R., it is difficult to see the significant military advantage to consultation. It may, however, be true that the psychological impact of consultation on our allies would make them more willing to cooperate in other areas where their cooperation may be more important.

A second area where speed in decision-making (and therefore, possibly, multilateral organization) might be irrelevant is in fighting guerrilla wars. Unlike direct attacks, which can capture large areas in a matter of days, guerrilla wars take much longer to get started, and even more time to ripen and wither away. Communist successes like Cuba and failures like the Philippines and Malaya had one thing in common-­ the fighting dragged on for years. In such situations, it is arguable that ready, highly organized, and integrated forces are not essential. The war in Vietnam, for example, is fought by armies from six allied countries, but three members of the SEATO pact have no troops there at all and SEATO itself has no unified military command active in the Viet­ nam war.2/ Coordination between the United States, Korean, Australian and South Vietnamese forces, on the other hand, is extremely close and decision-making can be fast. Helicopter-equipped American divisions in Vietnam may provide a telling counter to the theory that fast decision-making is not essen­ tial in guerrilla wars. The Army's greatest pride is its swiftly strik­ ing air envelopment tactic. The Air Force (and Navy carrier-based planes are also proud of their communications net which can call in air strikes within minutes against enemy positions--in support not only of American, but of Korean, Australian, or South Vietnamese troops. One recent crisis indicates that the existence of an alliance organization may not in fact provide rapid decision-making, even where it is necessary. Following the assassination of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo in 1961, the political scene in the Dominican Republic was un­ stable. The difficulties were increased by the possibility that the relatives of the late dictator might reestablish the family's control over the island. President Kennedy dispatched U.S. destroyers and Marines to the Dominican coast and the implication was clear: a return of the Trujillos might prompt U.S. intervention to dislodge them. The Trujillos were frightened off and the moderate regime was preserved.3/ The incident is of interest for three reasons. First, according to at least some authorities, time did not permit the activation of the OAS y Arthur C. Turner, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization," The Americana Annual, 1968 (Americana Corporation, 1968), p. 500-.-- y Boston Globe, May 26, 1969, p. 40. y Tad Szulc, The New York Times, November 26, 1961.

-97- machinery designed to deal with such situations.I/ Secondly, even in the presence of multilateral commitments, integration can be lacking to such a degree that the required speed could not be obtained if multilateral action were required. This situation may be typical of the OAS, which has no permanent peacekeeping force due largely to Latin American opposi­ tion.2/ (See Chapter II) Finally, the power of the United States was sufficient in the Dominican case to succeed in its military mission with­ out contributions from the other members of the OAS. This particular case seems also to have been a political success for the United States,3/ but this does not indicate that unilateral action will always prove politically successful.

B. The Need for Alliance Organizations in Less Developed Areas

Chapter II indicates that the force of nationalism may be more effective than American participation in multilateral alliance organiza­ tions in the Third World, rendering such participation unnecessary. If countries can defend themselves without unilateral American intervention, the affirmative can contend, they surely can defend themselves without American participation in multilateral organizations. Indeed, the United States now seems to be drawing back from the involvements membership in alliance organizations like SEATO may bring about. The latest SEATO meet­ ing in Bangkok has been described as " ... anything but enthusiastic." The American determination to undertake "no more Vietnams" was an unspoken but reportedly a powerful influence on the mood of the conference. There was a feeling that the United States, despite its participation in the organization, might allow the area to fend for itself in questions of de­ fense once Vietnam was settled. Richard Weintraub describes a typical moment:

... when Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said the U.S. was committed not only to the defense of Thailand in case of open warfare but also in case of guerrilla attacks, observers at the meetings reported some ob­ vious wincing at the U.S. portion of the conference table.4/

In any case, participation in the organization may not be a critical factor in deciding whether or not the United States or any other

];/ The New York Times, November 21, 1961.

2/ Robert Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 13.

3/ The New York Times, November 25, 1961. 4/ Richard Weintraub, Boston Globe, May 26, 1969.

-98- nation fights in defense-of a particular country. Three members of SEATO are not participants in the Southeast Asian war raging in Vietnam; Korea, i which is not a member state but a mutuaf-security ally of the United States, i is participating.I/ Indeed, the organizational components of alliances in the Third World may 9e meaningless in terms of military defense. As we have already noted, the OAS was not a major factor in the 1961 United States action to deter the return of the Trujillos; and the 1965 OAS re­ sponse to the Dominican crisis was tardy. The ANZUS organization has only been on standby since its inception.2/ And SEATO is so rent by internal disagreements over the wisdom of the-Vietnam war that two of its founding members, France and Pakistan, have virtually ceased participation in the organization's activities.3/ Other members do maintain a military organi­ zation which holds annual maneuvers in the South China Sea area mainly. What reason can the negative offer for continued American asso­ ciation with such groups? They are at least, the negative might suggest, useful instruments for validating before world opinion American actions taken in defense of the free world. The OAS on October 19, 1962, endorsed the blockade of Cuba aimed at forcing the Soviet Union to remove its mis­ siles and requested that other American nations cooperate with the United States in an attempt to achieve that objective.4/ United Nations ambassa­ dor Adlai Stevenson reflected on the crucial role OAS approbation played: ... [there might be] no hope of mustering enough votes in the U.N. to authorize action against Cuba, but ·the OAS offered an opportunity for multilateral support, and OAS approval could provide some protection in law and a great deal in public opinion.� Thus, American membership in multilateral defense organizations may offer advantages the United States would not wish to sacrifice lightly. The advantages in some sense may be ancillary to the stated purpose of the organization but. they may nonetheless be real.

C. The Need for NATO It is argued that though NATO has served us well in the past and was an institution in which we and our allies could take a good deal of pride, it has now outlived its usefulness.6/ It was a specific response

1/ Ibid. 2/ Treaties, op. cit., pp. 186-87.

3/ Ibid., pp. 189-90. ii Ibid., p. 151.

5/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 810. §! Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1967), pp. 69-7

-99-

&r:---- -�·-· rn

to a specific situation; the situation (Soviet menace in Europe) has changed and.the response is no longer appropriate so the argument goes. Today our European allies have recovered economically and are no longer dependent on the lhited States. Some see a chastened Russia, now con­ fronted with challenges within the Communist world and within its own . boundaries that did not exist fifteen years ago. The fact that the United States is no longer invulnerable to nuclear attack from the Soviet Union raises European doubts about America's willingness to risk nuclear destruction to save a continent an ocean away. The organization, which was added to the Atlantic Alliance as a military afterthought, has now largely served its purpose, in the view of some. It is breaking down-­ witness the partial withdrawal of France and the reluctance of European nations to meet military goals--because the members themselves no longer agree that it is a necessity. For example, former French Foreign Mini­ ster Couve de Murville argues that NATO is prepared for the wrong war.I/ In his view, if war comes to Europe, it will be a nuclear war--nothing­ less. But, he adds, the nuclear weapons to defend Europe remain under national control. The American government has never been willing to transfer control of its European nuclear stockpile to the alliance. The weapons are under American conunand, at the disposal only of the President of the United States; and he alone in time of war will decide whether and how they are to be used. Thus, nuclear defense, which some say is the only relevant one in Europe, is largely independent of NATO. On the other hand, General Harold K. Johnson, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, rejects the idea that a future European war will automa­ tically be nuclear. General Johnson maintains: "I think the events of the last seventeen years tend to reinforce my po�ition. We had the nu­ clear weapons at the time of Korea. We did not employ them."2/ General Johnson cites several other instances since Korea, when nuclear weapons were available but were not used, and concludes that a conventional war in Europe is as possible as it has proved to be elsewhere. The affirmative may also argue that NATO is unnecessary because Russia will not attack Western Europe. Generally three reasons are of­ fered to support this view. (1) The Sino-Soviet Split. Some believe that the Sino-Soviet dispute will increasingly absorb Russia's attention. This argument points to the increasing difficulties the Russians are experiencing with the Chinese. As a partly European.partly Asian nation.possessed of enormous and sparsely populated territories around the rim of China, the Soviet Union, by virtue of history and geography, may be doomed to a long con­ flict with China over the vast frontier they share--an area on which Pe­ king is already beginning to stake its claim.If The more the Russians

1/ U.S. Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., ·p. 430.

� U.S., Congress, Senate, Conunittee on Armed Services, Hearings, World­ wide Military Commitments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., February-March, 1967, Part 2, p. 166. (Testimony of General Harold K. Johnson.) lf Harrison E. Salisbury (ed.), The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years (New York: Signet Books, 1968), pp. 62-63.

-100- 1,j . + I become involved with the Chinese the less inclined they will be to cause i.t could not handle a I trouble in Europe, it is suggested; the Soviet Union i I two-front conflict which China might precipitate if there were a Soviet involvement with Western Europe.

r1l ! (2) Internal Pressures. A second argument stresses the internal Ii pressures with which the current Soviet leadership must contend. The Soviet de­ Union is run by mert who now may be more concerned with internal economic !! ; velopment and with mounting· consumer demand than with territorial expan­ sion. According to Thomas W. Wolfe, former air attache at the American Embassy in Moscow:

+:ii The last year and a half has been a critical and i: trying period for the leaders of the Soviet Union. They have been confronted by serious internal difficulties in agriculture and the economy. These difficulties have sharpened the problems facing the Soviet leadership in the strategic field, including the central problem of the allocation of resources between competing economic and defense requirements. The developments of this period also have left their imprint on Soviet strategic thought, which shows an awareness of the need to adjust policy to changes in the character of the strategic en­ vironment.y Ii David T. Cattell, professor of political science at UCLA, indicates that the new leadership sees the core of its foreign policy as defensive.2/ The Soviet Union may need a period of relative international tranquillity to solve its serious internal difficulties. Thus, it may seek to avoid provocative acts in Western Europe. Moreover, Soviet· leaders now want entree into the councils of Europe; though they will not try to force their way in, as Khrushchev did, they are judged unlikely to destroy by military threats or actions the possibility of an advantageous political situation that might facilitate their entry.3/

Despite the pressures of the Sino-Soviet split and the apparent need for internal Soviet development, former secretary of state Dean Ache­ son, one of the American architects of the North Atlantic Treaty, is not convinced that the Russian threat to Western Europe has undergone any es­ sential change. Acheson argues:

Y Thomas W. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," Foreign Af­ fairs, April, 1964, p. 476.

2/ David T. Cattell, "The U.S.S.R. and the West," Current History, October, 1966; p. 193-94.

·3/ "Ibid., p. 195.

. .-1-

-101- I think" that the potential for Russian trouble­ making is almost unlimited. I doubt very much whether it has changed at all in the last fifteen years. The opportunity for it to exercise this trouble-making has been greatly diminished. And this leads people to say ah, you see the tiger is lying there perfectly quietly and purring. It isn't doing anything. But if you took those bars away I wouldn't want to be out in front. The bars are NATO.I/ Another former secretary of state, Dean Rusk, concurs with Acheson. Rusk warns. If the threat against Western Europe has diminished in the last seventeen years, it is diminished because NATO has stood as a firm barrier to Soviet ambitions. We should not. forget that as late as.1961-1962 we were in the midst of a major crisis over Berlin that threatened war. The fact that the darn has contained the flood waters over the years is no reason for dismantling it.2/ (3) The Threat of Nuclear War. Finally Russia is aware that if she does attack Western Europe, the result may be a nuclear war in which she would risk heavy nuclear destruction. Because Russia would gain nothing from such a conflict, some observers maintain, she will not attack. Several factors may make it inevitable that the Western defense of Europe will be nuclear.3/ Our NATO allies apparently have no real faith in the American-sponsored plan of flexible response.4/ Despite American prodding, they have failed to build their ground forces to rec­ ommended levels. The withdrawal of French forces from NATO, the reduc­ tion of British forces in Germany, and recent debate in the United States Senate calling for reductions of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, have convinced many Europeans that any Russian attack would have to be met with a nuclear response. Flexible response still remains a possible official policy, but nuclear retaliation may be a more likely one. Hans Morgenthau, professor of political science and modern history at the University of Chicago, explains:

]J U.S. Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., p. 457. 2/ "NATO: Backbone of the ·Alliance," Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin, May, 1966, pp. 8-9. ' 3/ Steel, op. cit., pp. 55-57. ii In the early 1960s, the United States pushed the doctrine of flex­ ible response--sufficient conventional forces to provide the option of a non-nuclear defense rather than massive retaliation or the threat of all-out nuclear war.

-102-

ffltil .ZJL "1

The European members of the Alliance have no interest in fighting a conventional or limited nu­ clear war which would destroy them almost as thor­ oughly as an all-out nuclear war. Knowing that they will be doomed if war should break out, they ·l have a vital interest in avoiding any kind of war. ' For this reason they advocate the strategy of "mas­ ,t.I sive retaliation•• which seeks to prevent the out­ I break of war by threatening an all-out nuclear re­ ri sponse against any kind of military provocation. i; If the strategy succeeds, it will save both the European members of the Alliance and the United States; if it fails, it will doom both ..!) \1 Faced with the threat of nuclear retaliation, Europeans gamble that the rl Russians would never risk even a conventional probe. �

On the other hand, there is still strong support for the propo­ L � r, sition that NATO forces are necessary in Europe. Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, 1; Ii fonner undersecretary of state, indicated in 1966: p 11tf � l ... Our nuclear guarantee to Europe is essential. But ti I believe it can be effective only if we are willing to alloy our nuclear steel with sufficient conventional I! forces. If we do not, we compel ourselves to engage in a frightful game of "chicken," to practice brinkmanship i,t' at every crisis. To eliminate the flexible response-- t· to narrow the choices open to the President and to our i allies--is to invite fearsome tests of otir credibility.2/ I·l: li The same view is expressed by James E. Moore: 11 {'. .... The so-called "shield forces" have always been ;; !,·, ti a requirement to give flexibility to NATO response and (! provide credibility to the overall nuclear deterrent. d Without these forces, reaction to attack would be on [!1' an all or nothing basis and NATO would be faced with i! a choice of extreme alternatives: accepting defeat or i1I' initiating general war.3/ !i I· It dil 1/ Hans J. Morgenthau, · A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New ., .. !t York: Frederick A. Praeger and Co., 1969), pp. 168-69. I•,. !l i: � U.S., Congress, Senate, Anned Services Committee, Hearings on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., April, 1967, p. 44. (Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach.)

� James E. Moore, NATO: In Quest of Cohesion (Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, 1965), pp. 172-73.

-103- Thus, NATO's defenders conclude that the dissolution of NATO's conven­ tional force structure would preclude all options to defend Europe except the nuclear one: Make nuclear war more likely. A credible defense should include several possible military responses, and these can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. Flexible response depends on two principles. The first is that any aggression should be met with a direct defense of approximately the same level; the second is that escala­ tion should be deterred. If an attack cannot be contained, NATO's response must at least be sufficient to convince the enemy of NATO's determination to continue resistance and to force a pause during which the risks of es­ calation can be considered. It is argued that the key to NATO's strategy is that an aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons, if necessary; but at the same time, he must be uncertain regard­ ing the timing or the circumstances--or the power level--in which they will be used.

IV. The Advantages of Withdrawal A. A Preliminary Note As we have already noted, the phrase "multilateral treaty or­ ganizations" does not include unilateral defense or bilateral defense ar­ rangements. Thus, the multilateral organizations topic does not proscribe them; after the adoption of the resolution, the United States would still be permitted to enter into such arrangements. The NATO topic obviously embodies the same permission. This could create very serious problems for the affirmative. The United States, in effect, might recreate by bi­ lateral arrangements many of the situations the affirmative may wish to end. The affirmative's alleged advantages would be nullified. For ex­ ample, the negative could suggest that the United States would retain its troops in Europe by negotiating agreements with each country. (Nuclear bilaterals for tactical weapons' use already exist.) This might result in a situation where none of the supposed advantages of troop withdrawal from the continent are realized, while the counterbalancing advantages of a multilateral coordination of the forces there are lost. Or--if the affirmative argues, for instance, that SEATO's multilateral organization leads to tension with China--the negative could reply that substituting bilateral arrangements will not reduce tension. The question here is: Who is obliged to carry the burden of" proof? Must the affirmative demonstrate that bilateral defense arrange­ ments will not follow in the wake of its proposal? The fact that bilateral arrangements exist now and that more could be established does not create a presumption for the negative position. Just as the negative has the obligation to prove the probability of its disadvantages (no negative, for example, simply argues on an economic topic that inflation is merely a possibility), it also has the burden of demonstrating that new bilateral arrangements are probable consequences of the proposal. It must show that nations probably would be willing to substitute such agreements for mem­ bership in a multilateral organization of which the U.S. is a part.

-104- After all, the affinnative plan cannot be rejected simply because an un­ likely and distant possibility might undennine its efficacy. There must be more than that--and the negative must supply it. There is some excellent evidence for the negative position here. from NATO was accompanied by an offer "... to For example, French withdrawal 't conclude bilateral arrangements for liaison between French and NATO --, forces ...."1/ However, it is unlikely that France would be willing to ac­ .l cept foreign troops on her soil even by bilateral agreement. Other Euro­ ! pean states might be more willing to do so. Before the foundation of NATO .\ and since, Britain has agreed bilaterally with the United States to pennit the establishment of various American troop, air, and naval facilities in Britain.2/ Spain,·not even a member of NATO, has entered into similar agreements authorizing "... the U.S. government to develop, maintain and utilize for military purposes ...certain areas and facilities in territories ,f under Spanish jurisdiction."3/ The U.S. defense agreements with South Viet­ i nam, negotiated completely outside the SEATO structure, to which South Viet­ I nam does not belong, have proved significantly more far-reaching and vital in·tenns of implications for the United States than membership in the SEATO organization. Other Southeast Asian states would apparently prefer simi­ lar bilateral arrangements to SEATO. A third element is the widespread preference for bi­ ! lateral security pacts with the United States, rather 1 than collective arrangements, as a means of defend­ t ing national interests in Southern Asia. There is little reason to expect any change in this situation and it seem� to judge from official announcements, critical of SEATO, that some of the countries who are members of multilateral pacts would prefer more pri­ vate arrangements.4/ In discussing possible affinnative advantages, this section will assume that the affinnative can overcome the preceding argument, so that the plan will riot merely substitute bilateral pacts for multilateral or­ ganizations. There are few conceivable advantages to such an occurrence. B. Conserving Resources

Advocates of eliminating the United States commitment to multi­ lateral organizations sometimes argue that such a course would result in significant savings in money and manpower. Withdrawing troops from NATO,

]j Treaties, op. cit., p. 108. 2/ Ibid., p. 114. '# Ibid., p. 166.

� Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., p. 20.

-105- for example, might improve the prospects for consistently achieving equilibrium or surplus in the balance of payments. Senator Russell Long claims that the portion of the dollar outflow attributable to supporting American forces and dependents in Europe runs at a rate of "several bil­ lion dollars annually."!/ Some estimates of troop costs are lower--per­ haps an average of $1.5-billion per year.'!J At the same time it is ar­ gued that United States manpower tied down in Europe could be employed elsewhere or could facilitate an overall force reduction. Of course, it is difficult to deny that U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe would make a substantial dent in the payments def_icit. On the other hand, it can be argued that the money and manpower gains would not balance the harm to American prestige� In the past, President de Gaulle has sought to eliminate all American presence in Europe and Soviet propa­ ganda has aimed at the same thing. American withdrawal might not only destroy NATO, but would also raise new doubts about American determination to assist in the defense of Europe. It is difficult to conceive how withdrawal from other multilat­ eral organizations would result in significant resource savings. The United States simply does not have troops stationed abroad with the OAS, ANZUS, or SEATO. The operating budgets of those organizations are--relative to the American defense budget, for example--very small. ANZUS has no permanent staff and no budget at all.3/ Moreover, the United States might agree to preserve some of the nonmi iItary organs of these organizations and that would continue to cost money. Both NATO and the OAS are encrusted with a raft of cultural, economic, and social agencies. C. Preventing OVercommitment--or Creating Dangerous Uncertainty?

As the analysis has already indicated, the war in Vietnam has cost many lives and billions of dollars and caused much bitterness here at home. What if, in response to its actual or presumed burdens in the pur­ suit of collective defense, the United States were to become involved in two or three more Vietnams? The cost might well be too great to allow effec­ tive prosecution of the several wars. Adoptingthe resolution,by withdraw­ ing from multilateral organizations, may make it less likely that multi­ lateral commitments will involve America in debilitating local conflicts. (Whether this would lead to more significant disadvantages is not the is­ sue here.) To claim the advantage of a reduced chance of war, the af­ firmative should be prepared to defend its position from the attack that United States involvement in such ventures under bilateral pacts or by unilateral action will occur anyway. The affirmative must offer a

!/ Congressional Record, August 31, 1966, p. 20599. '!:./ The Washington Post, May 21, 1966. 3/ Treaties, op. cit., p. 187.

-106- probability of fewer wars, not merely a different mechanism for involve­ ment in the same wars. Secondly, the affirmative would have to offer more than "anything is possible" proof of the probability of involvement in conflicts due to membership in multilateral organizations. (NATO sup­ porters claim its existence has prevented war in Europe.) This require­ ment to prove higher probability of involvement would be fulfilled either by: (1) showing that our multilateral connections may prolong the Viet­ nam war and that withdrawal would shorten it; and/or (2) showing a proba­ bility of costly future involvement in conflict directly traceable to mem­ bership in a multilateral organization. One multilateral organization-­ ANZUS--has in the past raised the second possibility. Institute for Strategic Studies scholar Donald Kennedy explains:

The ANZUS treaty... is not restricted to a Communist threat or attack on its members' territories; it also covers attacks upon the members' forces. Dur­ ing 1964, Australian troops engaged in operations against Indonesian guerrillas in Malaya.... Austra­ lia's Minister for External Affairs ... was quoted as stating that any Indonesian attacks upon Aus­ tralian troops... would lead to action in support of Australia by the United States under ... ANZUS.. .. The United States has accepted this interpretation ....!J Of course, unless the affirmative can indicate that American withdrawal from the ANZUS organization--such as it is--would lead to an end of the alliance, the negative can. argue that the same obligation remains in the treaty, from which the United States will not wi�hdraw under the topic. To the overcommitment argument, a negative team can make several responses. First, it is not clear that present force levels in Vietnam are the result of multilateral defense commitments. While the United States does have a large contingent of forces, and other countries in SEATO have conmitted forces to the war, three members of SEATO--France, Britain and Pakistan--have no troops fighting in Vietnam, and the lan­ guage of the Manila Pact, spelling out SEATO obligations, is sufficiently vague that, in effect, "no nation is required to do anything."2/ Thus, as long as bilateral pacts remain or unilateral actions continue, the possibility of overcommitment remains. Secondly, the harms of the Viet­ nam war or other similar engagements already deter any chief executive from overcommitment; witness the cry of "No more Vietnams" at the present time and the American position at the latest SEATO conference.3/ Finally, the negative can argue that the affirmative plan will dangerously disturb

Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., p. 211. . l I � Boston Globe, May 26, 1969, p. 40. ,Y Ibid.

-107- the perceptions of other countries as to the United States' degree of conunitment. Friend and foe alike might doubt that we would act virtually anywhere. Withdrawal from organizations might be interpreted mistakenly-· as a new isolationism, withdrawal from concern for the fate of the world. The conduct of the Soviet Union is often a result of her perception of our determination; international stability may depend _on the Soviet lea­ dership's realization that we will stand firm.!f If the status of our commitment is ill-defined or ambiguous, the Soviet Union is more likely to expect us to make a graceful exit than to stand.firm.� In any case, these critics point out, history indicates that when the Soviet Union doubts the American will to resist, world peace is threatened. For ex­ ample, one expert contends that the decision to place missiles in Cuba was based on the belief that we would be intimidated--a belief based largely on American irresolution at the Bay of Pigs and American toler­ ance of the building of the Berlin wall.3/ The missile crisis also makes clear the irrelevance of what we say or do before the crunch. The judg­ ment that the United States could be intimidated may have triumphed in Soviet minds over Moscow's heeding of repeated Washington declarations that it would not tolerate missiles in Cuba.4/ Would an abandonment of multilateral commitments lead the Soviet Union to think that the United States no longer "meant business"? One cannot be sure before the fact. But a weakening of the vigor with which the West defended its present interests might lead Soviet leaders to believe that the West would yield in the face of determined.pressure. They might then be encouraged to reinforce their commitment to the goal of a Communist world and to em­ ploy more violent means to that end. Finally, the abolition of multi­ lateral defense commitments might be perceived by the countries involved as a weakening of our resolve to defend them; and their attempts to de­ fend themselves could increase the danger of nuclear proliferation, a problem discussed in Chapter II, Section V (C). D. Encouraging Detente--or Encouraging Aggression? 1. Detente with Russia. Russian leaders have frequently in­ dicated an interest in detente, and have suggested abolition o� or with­ drawal from,existing alliances as a step in that direction. Consider, for example, this statement on NATO from Leonid Brezhnev: This organization, specifically created to battle the socialist countries, which has forced on its members thousands of bans and limitations.of every

!/ Robert Conquest, "The Limits of Detente," Foreign Affairs,. July, 1968, p. 742.

2/ Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 48.

Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1965), pp. 35-37. 4/ Ibid.

-108- kind on the development of economic trade re­ lations with the Socialist states, is called upon,· it now appears, to tie the instrument of peaceful relations and cooperations between East and West. Who will believe this?l/ Brezhnev indicates that the Warsaw Pact would cease some of its operations in return for a similar concession from the NATO countries. He appears to have no objections to European multilateral defense, even suggesting an all-European force.2/ Whatever the military aspect of such trade, it could be a valuable first step toward reducing tensions between East and West. One political scientist has cqncluded that tangible steps toward peace, even if not per se significant, can set the psychological climate for more substantial progress.3/ Thus, the affirmative could claim, the resolution would be both an important step toward peace by itself, and could lead to further advances. Some authorities, for example, believe that United States withdrawal from NATO would encourage mutual disengage­ ment in Europe. Disengagement, the possibility of reciprocal withdrawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from advanced positions in Central Europe, has been advocated by several prominent spokesmen of West and East.4/ The Warsaw Pact has made similar proposals in the past. The latest Warsaw Pact proposal, the so-called "Budapest appeal," was made on March 15, 1969. This appeal, while not specifically mentioning disengagement, called for a European security conference between East and West.SI It may be argued that the reason we are in Europe is not to fortify NATO but to contain the Soviet Union. If this can be accomplished without our physical pres­ ence, then we can withdraw our troops. We can continue to provide nuclear protection so long as our allies may require it. Critics of such arguments disagree on several grounds. First, the benefit to be derived from detente, should it occur, is open to serious question. Past detentes have, in the view of one expert, made negligible contributions to the cause of peace:

In retrospect, we see that even in the periods when 'detente' was on everyone's lips, as in 1959, and again in 1963-64, the word had at best a qualified application, since the reduction of tension was accom­ panied by strenuous Soviet efforts to gain political

1/ Leonid Brezhnev, "The Soviet View of NATO," Vital Speeches, June 15, 1967, p. 518. y Ibid. 3/ Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," Western Political Quarterly, 1967, pp. 361-80. � This list includes Churchill, Eden, Field Marshall Montgomery, and George Kennan, who is often called the father of the American policy of co.ntainrnent, as well as former Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. � Washington Star, April 10, 1969.

-109- and military advantages. It seems probable, for example, that the Soviet decision to increase pro­ duction of intercontinental ballistic missiles was made during the post-Cuban 'detente' of 1963-64. !/ Secondly, abrogating our NATO participation is probably not enough in it­ self to permit a significant easing of tensions with the Soviet Union: there are fundamental differences on the German question, which is re­ lated to, but transcends, the United States commitment to multilateral defense. Brezhnev himself has noted: "A very important prerequisite for security in Europe is recognition of two Germ.an states with different so­ cial systems."2/ Rival positions on the German question probably are so mutually exclusive at the present time as to preclude its resolution, even in an atmosphere of limited detente,3/ but without such a settlement the depth of detente (and hence the gain from encouraging it) would be minimal. On the other hand the affirmative could argue, as long as NATO remains, the present situation in Europe is probably frozen. An American withdrawal and the probable subsequent collapse of NATO as an Atlantic security organization might be an important step toward resolving the German issue. So long as the two Germanies remain integral parts of ri­ val allian·ces, the United States and the Soviet Union must remain at odds in Central Europe. They are prisoners of their own alliances. The per­ petuation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact means the continued partition of Europe. If we want to further the cause of peace and a settlement in Europe, we may have to be prepared to leave NATO. Opponents of .American withdrawal from NATO argue that it is not only senseless because it will do no good, but that it also might weaken the chances for a meaningful de.tente and endanger peace. Symbolic measures designed to reduce tensions, but having nothing to do with the substance of our con­ flicting concerns, may prove worse than useless, for they lead to self-deception and miscalculation.4/ Some experts argue that weakening NATO would bring the return of the cold war,5/ while enhancing the cohesion of NATO would, in the long run, pro­ vide-a better chance for real detente. 6/ Moreover, the prospect of in­ creased detente due to a weakened NATO-is not seen as an unmixed blessing 1/ Marshall D. Shulman, "'Europe' vs. 'Detente'?" • Foreign Affairs, April, 1967, p. 398. Brezhnev, loc. cit. Snulrnan, loc. cit. Ibid., p. 388. U.S., Congress, Senate, International Organizations Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on Atlantic Union Resolu­ tions, 89th Cong.• 2d Sess.,March 23, 1966, p. 60. (Testimony of Robert Strausz-Hup�.) Ibid., March 24, 1966, p. 69. (Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State John M. Leddy.)

-110- by our European allies. American attempts to solidify detente with Rus­ sia have already raised apprehension among some allies, particularly the Germans, who fear that Russia and the United States may choose to keep Germany divided in the interests of European stability. Our allies fear that together the United States and the Soviet Union may bargain away European powers' vital interests without their having any real voice. American presence in NATO, it is argued, offers Europeans the necessary assurance that the United States will not bargain over their heads with their national security.

Finally, critics of United States troop withdrawal from Europe believe that withdrawal would not necessarily induce the Soviet Union to do likewise. American troops stationed in West Germany are there by in­ vitation as part of an integrated defense force against a threat previ­ ously posed by the Soviet Union.I/ The twenty Soviet divisions in East Germany are under quite different auspices. They are there partly as a defense against NATO, but their presence preceded NATO and the Warsaw ii Pact, and one of their major purposes is to backstop an unpopular regime in East Germany. It is highly misleading to compare the two situations. Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs- Henry Kissinger has suggested that Soviet satellites such as Poland and Czechoslovakia prob­ ,.: ; . ably want American forces to remain in'West Germany.2/ As long as these I: forces remain, they place restraints on German policy and, as such, act i: as a stabilizing force in Central Europe. These countries are probably not anxious to be confronted by a resurgent Germany whose energies are not channeled into a cooperative NATO-like defense system.

2. Detente with China. Some have maintained that ringing of China with alliances is responsible for much of the tension between the Chinese People's Republic and the United States. Political scientist M. Ladd Thomas warned soon after the founding of SEATO:

SEATO is not in the U.S. national interest. We get nothing, yet alienate several important states (who) certainly regard SEATO as being opposed to their national interest.3/

Sinologist A. Doak Barnett has indicated that "... there is certainly no doubt that the Ch�nese do regard the buildup around China as••• undesir­ able •.• it..• creates a real sense of· apprehension.•. about our intentions."4/

1/ The Washington Post, May 21, 1966.

U.S. Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., p. 152.

M. Ladd Thomas, "A Critical Appraisal of SEATO," Western Political Quarterly, Winter, 1967, p. 936.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy !,IL I With Respect to Mainland China, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., March, 1966, p. 37. (Testimony of A. Doak Barnett.)

-111- Such apprehension may make it difficult even to initiate conversations aimed at resolving major Sino-American disputes and disagreements. One historian has wondered how the United States would react, if an inimical China had bases in Hawaii and Mexico and on Vancouver Island.I/ Thus, the affirmative may argue that, to the extent American withdrawal-from Asian multilateral organizations constitutes a partial dismantling of the ring around China, it will contribute to the creation of conditions for de­ tente. In a world where Chinese power is thought by some to grow more menacing year by year, the reduction of hostilities between the U.S. and China might constitute a significant advantage. The negative can respond to this analysis in three ways.

(1) The important consideration is not Chinese intentions but Chinese capability. Communist nations have undertaken unexpected and un­ predicted adventures time and again. The American command in Korea, for example, was confident that China would not enter the Korean conflict. She did--and in force. If Chinese capabilities are the standard, then the United States cannot afford to relax its guard in Asia. The strength of Communist China far exceeds that of any of its neighbors.

(2) Chinese intentions are fundamentally hostile and justify continued vigilance by the United States. Many believe that what China is seeking is dominance in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.2/ Still others worry that her aim is the destruction of the democratic states and the establishment of world communism. In any case, withdrawal is likely to invite miscalculation �nd aggression rather than detente.

(3) Other American actions not encompassed by the multilateral organizations resolution also may breed Sino-American hostility. Since they will not be erased or ameliorated by the affirmative plan, no real progress toward peace will result. For example, Morton Halperin indicates that one of China's major concerns is her vulnerability to Western air and naval power stationed at bases · along her periphery.3/ Adopting the proposition will not remove those bases.. The base rights are in many cases granted by bilateral agreements,4/ which the proposition permits. As we have noted, more bilateral agreements could be arrived at after the adoption of the affirmative plan. Thus, all in all, it is difficult to see how withdrawing from multilateral defense organizations would lead to detente with China; other factors in the present system--factors the affirmative cannot realistically hope to change--are a barrier.

D.F. Fleming, "Can Pax Americana Succeed?" Struggle Against History, ed. Neal D. Houghton (New York: Washington Square Press,1968), p. 283.

2/ Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., p. 131. 3/ Halperin, China and the Bomb, op. cit., p. 10. cft., y Treaties, op. pp. 190-92.

-112- E. Improving Relations With Our European Allies

1. Renewed Cooperation With France. There are serious divi­ sions within the NATO alliance. These have largely been the result of basic differences between the United States and France over mi Ii tary practices and specifically the integration of.forces within NATO. United States doctrine calls for the ability to meet non-nuclear aggression with­ � I out the use of nuclear weapons. Though actual commitments have fallen short of such a capability,!/ it remains a goal toward which United States policy aims. Sizable, integrated forces are considered part of this

strategy. France, on the other hand, prefers that conventional forces ' be prepared to deal only with small-scale aggression;2/ the Kennedy strat­ t egy of "flexible response" was never accepted by several of our allies, as the shortfalls in commitment of their troops to a NATO force level suggest. . r. French opposition to capability for a "limited response" by in­ t: tegrated NATO forces centers around three arguments. First, it was argued i; that such a force made the deterrent less credible. An attack from the � ; East need not employ nuclear weapons to jeopardize the vital interests of .�.. ; the European members; a major conventional attack could be regarded as nothing less than a direct threat. The strategy of limited response in­ dicated a hesitancy to use the nuclear deterrent if necessary,3/ perhaps inviting the Russians to launch an attack without substantial danger to the Russian homeland. A strategy of massive retaliation, on the other \ i 1· hand, implied a willingness to use nuclear arsenals, thereby enhancing i the credibility of the overall deterrent. Secondly, the French claimed to fear that integration of forces could involve them in a war in which ii they had no interest. As the French Foreign Minister stated: 11i! Who does not see the hazards of such a system for n Ii,. t· France's security in the event of a major conflict ,!

in which America would be involved, without France 'I., herself being so? Is that not, moreover, what our ti public opinion has been feeling ever since crises !1 have been appearing, no longer in our regions, but llii in the distant confines of the Asian continent?4/ i• !t !\ ii :!f Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw­ 1· Hill, 1965), p. 108. ,,., ., ii y "Why Europe is Pulling Away From the United States," U.S. News and :i,, World Report, December 21, 1966, p. 60. :I i! ,j Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. cit., p. 119. � i Maurice Couve de Murville, "France and Her Destiny." (A speech be­ fore the French National Assembly, April 14, 1966.) Excerpted in The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 1966, p. 515.

-113-

liiih&l&t&&JZ££££&&&££EW&Z.itui!l!li.iiiiiiiiiii ' One noted French analyst asserts that French opposition to integrated forces on this ground is illogical and may well be a pose to strengthen opposition on other grounds. French involvement in an American war, he argues, would result in any case, due to France's alliance with the United States.I/ The third and final objection to integrated forces is the be­ lief that they reduce the sovereignty and prestige of France. Henry Kis­ singer outlined the reason for French opposition in these words: Integration would lead to an abdication of respon­ sibility and a sense of impotence. Ultimately this would demoralize French foreign policy. It would oblige France and Europe to accept the tute­ lage of the United States forever.2/

One might well ask (and negative teams perhaps should ask) what integrated forces necessarily have to do with United States participation in multilateral defense under NATO·. Can there be a defense organization without integration of forces? The examples of SEATO, ANZUS, and the OAS suggest that there can.3/ Thus, the negative might contend, the United States can do away with-integrated forces, achieve the affirmative's claimed advantages, and still remain in NATO. The affirmative can reply tha� for NATO at least, the integration of forces is the essence �f the organization. For almost twenty years, the two have been virtually syn­ onymous. If integration is ended, as France recognized, there is in reality an end to the organization. Indicating that integrated forces are not universally supported does not constitute a significantly beneficial reason for destroying them by American withdrawal from NATO. The affirmative would be obliged to show some significant advantage to resolving the current controversy in favor of the French position. It is arguable, for example, that France's withdrawal and the consequent intra-alliance dissension jeopardize the NATO deterrent. French approval might make better defense possible. At the time of the withdrawal, France's allies were apprehensive about the impact on NATO defense planning. Their fears have not been bor.ne out. Professor Arthur Turner of the University of California at Riverside indicates that the results of the French withdrawal from NATO were far less gloomy than had been forecast: ...the results were not at all negative. For several .. years, French foot-dragging in the alliance and the apprehension about the intentions of the President

Raymond Aron, "Alone at Last," Le Figaro, April 2, 1966, in The At­ lantic Community Quarterly, 1966, p. 210. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. cit., p. 52. See the descriptions of SEATO, ANZUS, and the OAS in Section II of this Chapter and in Treaties,· loc. cit.

-114- .

of France t.oward it·, had a paralyzing effect on the organization. By the beginning of 1967, how­ , ever, th.e apprehension and waiting were over and the absence of French participation in policy plan­ ning (actually) proved beneficial.!f The recent resignation of General de Gaulle further endangers this af­ firmative approach.· Even if the affirmative could _prove that opposition to integrated forces was a French rather than a Gaullist policy, it would be required to go one step further--to prove that the tactics which the new government employs would be seriously harmful. Presumably, French disapproval is not per se harmful or undesirable, but is dangerous only if its manifestations somehow endanger the interests of the member na­ tions. Until the new government makes its positions clear, predictions as to exactly how it will show its displeasure probably would have a credibility problem of their own. 2. .British Entry into the Common Market. American withdrawal from NATO might pave the way for British entry into the European Economic ·community. One of the biggest obstacles to Britain's application, some observers feel, is France's belief that England is a political Trojan Horse for American influence in Europe. The Skybolt incident may have been the key evidence that convinced de Gaulle of this. Almost a decade ago, Britain won American assurances of assistance in deploying the Sky­ bolt missile, a two-stage ballistic missile launched from an airplane. As an improvement in Britain's nuclear deterrent, it represented to many a symbol of British independence from the United States' defense policy. Tests during development indicated that Skybolt was not only unreliable but also inordinately expensive.2/ In a conference at Nassau in Decem­ ber, 1962, President Kennedy and-secretary of defense McNamara persuaded British Prime Minister MacMillan that United States sales of the Polaris missile should replace the Skybolt. The French saw the incident as in­ dicative of Britain's essentially American-oriented outlook. French Premier Georges Pompidou viewed the abandonment of Skybolt as a demonstra­ tion that Britain had chosen· the United States over France and Western Europe.3/ Subsequently, British membership in the European Common Market was vetoed by de Gaulle. There is evidence that de Gaulle attached poli­ tical conditions to his acceptance of the British bid. As the London Economist observed just before the French rejection:

1/ Turner, op. cit., p. 501. ... 2/ William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 219. Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967) , p. 261.

-115-

::;_;u:;z:::a, wz:.. .iz:w &2U[JiMC&Ji& = i&ZIJ4&4lJ £& ••• Skybolt or no Skybolt, no British government has ever challenged the principle of American leader­ ship of the Western Alliance. To challenge this principle, on the other hand, has been one of the mainsprings of Gaullist foreign policy, since 1958 ..!f Thus, the affirmative might argue that United States withdrawal from NATO would cut Britain loose and remove the occasion for Britain's pro­ United States policy, in turn removing a major barrier to British admis­ sion to the European Economic Community.

It is questionable, however, whether a change in Britain's foreign policy orientation would be sufficient to insure her admission. EEC import control policy has been directed toward making the Common Mar­ ket self-sufficient with respect to food, with production of each crop determined by the comparative advantages of the six members. Britain, on the other hand, imports foodstuffs, making the high food-tariff policy unacceptable.2/ Prime Minister MacMillan himself attributed the difficul­ ties on the EEC question to agricultural policy rather than the Skybolt incident.3/ In addition, American withdrawal might not alter British pol­ icy orientation. A large number of bilateral defense agreements would still exist with the United States.4/ They would still bind the two nations to­ gether in an alliance that would arouse French ire. Finally, this approach runs into the same problem the preceding one does. It is difficult to pre­ dict the new French government's attitude. Britain may be able to enter the EEC despite American defense policy. Or she may not be permitted entry no matter how much the American relationship to NATO and Britain changes.

V. The Alleged Disadvantages of Withdrawal ·from NATO A. The Damage to Nuclear Credibility United States withdrawal from NATO is opposed by some who believe it would undermine belief in NATO's nuclear deterrence. Professor Morgen­ thau stresses this point: The organic connection between the American con­ ventional presence on the European continent and its nuclear commitments is a matter of historic lf The Economist, January 5, 1963, p. 31. 2/ Charles de Gaulle, "The European Common Market," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1967, pp. 495-96.

3/ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 864.

4/ Treaties, op. cit., p. 114.

-116- fact, and one's rational doubts as to the quanti­ tative and organizational aspects of that presence must yield to one's awareness of the effects that drastic changes in those aspects might have upon the credibility of the nuclear commitment. It is obvious that this credibility must be maintained vis-I-vis the Soviet Union since the deterrent ac­ function of our nuclear commitment depends on it.!.f Thus, American soldiers stationed in Europe insure, in a way that no promise or treaty commitment ever could by itself, that America will be involved in any European war from the first shot. They are a human trip­ wire which, if broken by a Russian attack, would trigger the American nuclear deterrent. Thus, the presence of these soldiers on the continent has seemed essential to the Europeans, for they make the American nuclear guarantee more believa�le. The troops are, in this sense, hostages.

B. The Danger of Ending America's Symbolic Role

Advocates of a troop presence in Europe also believe that Ameri­ can forces play a vital symbolic role. An American withdrawal might be interpreted as a reduction of American interest in Europe. Nicholas Katzen­ bach warns:

The first and most obvious risk is that of aggression. I do not necessari'ly mean military involvement. Rather I refer to the more subtle political leverage which mili­ tary imbalance would allow the Soviet Union to apply to the security concerns and the loyalties of nations in Western Europe.

Even continued American guarantees against outright at­ tack could not serve as an impenetrable shield against erosion of confidence in us and in infiltration of fears of the East.

Europe's freedom could be lost without overt Soviet mili­ tary action or without any Western European nation becom­ ing overtly Communist. A process of political coercion, stimulated by a sense of Western Europe's weakness and isolation could be just as dangerous.2/

C. The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Many observers are concerned that American withdrawal from Europe would increase the problem of nuclear proliferation. Concern about the

!.f Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 177. '!:./ United States Troops in Europe, loc. cit.

-117- spread of independent nuclear capabilities has been a central theme of United States policy within NATO. The chief fear is that the United States would be dragged into a nuclear war over a minor issue by the in­ dependent action of a single, aggrieved NATO nation. Thus, the United States has consistently opposed both the spread of nuclear weapons and national control over such arms.1/ The American opposition has not been entirely successful. The French-nuclear capability is real and growing. Despite the increasing dependence of Britain's nuclear force on United States delivery systems, it is still a nationally controlled deterrent. The creation of a nuclear capability, even though modest, is within the resources of a number of other NATO nations. Professor Robert Strausz­ Hupe feels that if the United States were to withdraw its troops from Europe, the Western European countries might think it necessary to allo­ cate more resources to the creation of nuclear arms in order to compen­ sate for their doubt about the American guarantee.2/ D. The Problem of a Resurgent and Independent Germany United States withdrawal from NATO might permit and indeed en­ courage independent German efforts to resolve the problem of a divided and territorially limited Germany. NATO has been the vehicle through which West German rearmament was initiated and controlled. Since 1955 ) German forces, now twelve divisions, Western Europe's largest army ) have been subject to NATO command. If this command were terminated by United States withdrawal, German armed forces would revert to nati9nal control. From the very outset, one of the major purposes of the military integra­ tion in NATO was to limit the freedom of the West German government. It may be argued that any f ore·seeable German government J regardless of party, will have as a major objective the reunification bf the German people.3/ Some fear that without the restraints which NATO now provides over German policy, the Germans might seek their own solution--for example, the use of force to reunify East and West Germany or to satisfy Germany's Eastern boundary claims against Poland. Thus both the Soviet Union and most of the rest of Europe share a deep apprehension about a fully independent West Germany; they fear the use of force or the threat of its use to satisfy German territorial claims. As we indicated earlier in this chap­ ter, Poland and Czechoslovakia may actually look with favor upon the presence of American forces in Germany because they act as a stabilizing influence. It may be useful to recall that two world wars and a host of minor conflicts have broken out in the cockpit of ambition and balkaniza­ tion called Central Europe.

y Irving Heymont, "The NATO Nuclear Bilateral Force," Orbis J Winter, 1966, p. 1040. ,,,, 2/ Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The World Without NATO," Orbis, Summer, 1966, p. 193.

U.S. Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., p. 132.

-118- \.� E. The Possibility of Economic Retaliation Even though our allies are powerless, in a military sense, to · 1 prevent the elimination of our commitment to NATO, doing so might lead to '1·.I' ' economic pressures against the United States to "persuade" us to change our course. Such an offensive did occur recently. Angered by certain ' l I military and economic policies of the United States, France tried to alter f- 1 American policy by attempting to destroy the ability of the United States Ir \i to run a balance-of-payments deficit. The French employed two tactics: ! ! redemption of dollars for gold and a demand that international currency reform take certain directions. ! I In 1962, President de Gaulle announced that he would convert all i the surplus dollars which his country owned into gold.1/ The result was I a reduction in the size of America's gold reserves. Such reductions could not continue forever, since American gold reserves, though large, were also limited; if other countries feared that the United States would not I be· able at a later time to redeem dollars for gold, they would redeem them as soon as possible, in advance of the feared cut-off. Meanwhile, the i United States, France and other countries were engaged in negotiations I to create some type of additional international currency reserves. At •' these negotiations France made reduction in the American balance-of­ :I . payments deficit a prerequisite to agreement.2/ Since the United States ii was committed to the creation of a new reserve unit,3/the French hoped f I I: that their hold-out would force the United States to-reduce its deficit I• substantially. French economic power seems to have succeeded. The Vice­ t' Chairman of the Federal Reserve System noted in 1966: " ... (the) improve­ i I ment (in our balance of payments) has taken place despite the difficulties l ! caused by massive conversions of our dollars into gold by one of our Euro­ I: pean allies."4/ Thus, a negative team could argue, our allies could use ; ; their economic power to show their distaste for withdrawal from NATO. I: I!l ! ;1 Affirmative teams have several arguments which they could ad­ ji vance in response to this line of attack. First, it is questionable ii whether some of our allies would disagree strongly with the adoption of \. the resolution. The French balance-of-payments offensive was in response I' to American investment and the question in that case was one of too much

1/ U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Finance, Hearings, Balance i: of Payments: 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 167. (Testimony of Congressman Henry S. Reuss.) 'i \' y Economic Research Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank, World Busi­ �· November, 1966, p. 8.

� Lyndon B. Johnson, "Message to the Congress on the Balance of Payments," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, June, 1965, p. 125. Y J. L. Robertson, "Toward a Balance in Our International Payments," speech before the Bankers Club of Chicago, May 4, 1966, p. 8.

-119- #Ff

rather than too little American presence in Europe.I/ Secondly, allies who agree with our policies might be able to offset the-impact of retaliation by allies who disagree. At the time of the Fre�ch move, Germany and other allies acted to reduce the strain on the American balance-of-payments deficit .y

Outside NATO most of the United States.allies are probably in­ capable of inflicting serious economic harm on the United States. For ex­ ample, with respect to the Third World, one analyst cites (1) the dependence of many of these countries on one crop, (2) the dominant voice of the United States in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, (3} the extent of Unit�d States investment and reliance on United States machinery, all as evidence of the enormous economic power of the United States in the under­ developed areas.3/ Third World countries almost certainly would not start an economic war with the United States, whatever their feelings about its military policies. The ability of even the European countries to wage a sustained economic conflict with the United States is open to question. The French offensive ended about 1966, not out of a new-found love for American policies, but because France ran into balance-of-payments difficulties of her own.4/

VI. The Alleged Disadvantages of Withdrawal from Multilateral Organizations

A. The Special Problem of the United Nations The definitions and discussions in this chapter may appear to re­ quire an affirmative to call for American withdrawal from the United Na­ tions. The U.N. seems to meet the definitional standards for a multilateral defense organization. It acted in such a capacity in Korea during the Korean War; in the Congo in the early 1960s, when Moise Tshombe tried to split his copper-rich Katanga from the Congolese Republic; and in other trouble spots, like the Middle East and Cyprus, where crises have evoked an international peace-keeping response. The Security Council functions as the decision­ making agency when the U.N. intervenes. The United States participates in the decision as a permanent member of the Council. Indeed, "··· [the] United Nations was directed by its Charter to undertake trouble-inhibiting

1/ See, for example, Senator William Proxmire, in Hearings, Balance of Payments: 1965, op. cit., p. 50; Economic Research Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank, loc. cit.; Alfred Hayes, "Our International Pay­ ments Deficit: A Continuing Challenge," Federal Reserve Bank of New .York Monthly Review, February, 1965, p. 21. Y The New York Times, March 4, 1967. 3/ Barnet, op. cit., p. 261. 4/ Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1967; The New York Times, January 6, 1967.

-120- activity at ... [every] stage ...."1/ It was, if necessary, to act multi­ laterally to prevent aggression and preserve peace.2/

Withdrawing from the U.N.--at least its defense components like the Security Council--might damage American foreign policy seriously. The negative could suggest, for example, that U.N. military operations have brought stability and headed off Communist revolution in a number of dangerous areas. The affirmative can reply in two ways. First, it can argue that such U.N. operations have only a marginal value, if any at all. Secondly, and perhaps more successfully, the affirmative could con­ tend that the term "multilateral defense organizations" does not include the United Nations. The U.N., whatever its original aims, no longer seems primarily a defense organization. The great-power deadlock in the Secur­ ity Council has rendered the peace-keeping function peripheral at best. Instead, the U.N. now appears to fulfill two principal functions: to pro­ vide a forum for the discussion and mediation of international disputes, and to conduct a host of relatively non-controversial international opera­ tions in economic and social fields.3/ Thus, the affirmative might con­ clude, the United Nations--despite the intentions of a quarter century ago--is, by virtue of its role in the world, not really a multilateral defense organization. One authority has observed: However significant the ideological residue of the doctrine of collective security may be, the crucial fact is that, apart from the Korean experience, the United Nations shows few signs of becoming a means ... capable of mobilizing collective [armed] force. .• against ... any attacker. Such a system might be de­ sirable, but it does not exist and I �ee no prospect of its coming into existence.4/ According to this analysis, the topic neither calls for nor commands United States withdrawal from the United Nations.

1/ Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Containment and Resolution of Disputes," in Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 101. 2/ See Jules Davids, America and "the World of Our Time (New York: Random House, 1960); United Nations Charter. ... 3/ See Claude in Wilcox and Haviland, loc. cit. 4/ Ibid., p 115.

-121- B. Withdrawing from SEATO 1. Foreclosing the Possibility for Stronger Collective Defense. Opponents of withdrawing from SEATO contend that such a move would prevent that organization from growing into a stronger, more co­ ordinated, and more useful defense force. That possibility is not neces­ sarily far-fetched. One assumption that appears in NATO-SEATO comparisons is that the Chinese have not been doing all they can to spread their influence into Southern Asia, and that as a consequence it is necessary to develop SEATO •.. to meet the potentials of Chinese expansionism. There has been... "a waiting for the other shoe to drop" in dis­ cussions of how ...the military strength ... in Southern Asia should be aligned,.!/

Thus, if the Chinese appeared more bellicose, SEATO might respond by re­ organizing and invigorating itself. An American withdrawal, the negative could argue, would end all hope for such an eventuality.

The hope may not be realistic in any case. Two barriers stand in the way of effective reorganization. First, the geography of the area "with its chequerboard of neutral states" is not conducive to such a de­ velopment. Secondly, there is no tradition of truly collective defense alliances in the SEATO area--and that tradition seems to have been the in­ dispensible requisite for NATO's success.2/

2. Loss of Flexible Response to Chinese Aggression. As we have already noted, the SEATO treaty does not specifically provide for the kinds of action member states are bound to take in the event of aggression. The ambiguity inherent in an alliance with indefinite obligations may serve a useful purpose. It " ... complicates Peking's risk and response calculus... " and keeps a maximum number of channels open for discussion with the Chi­ nese.3/ Thus··china cannot predict in advance how the organization or its member states will react to a hostile Chinese action. This uncertainty may by itself sometimes deter aggression. Some observers believe that Chi­ nese inability to know for sure whether or not the United States would de­ fend the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu has prevented an invasion from the mainland. With the United States absent from the organization the Chinese might no longer fear a SEATO response, since American withdrawal would substantially diminish SEATO's power. lf Kennedy, The Security of Southern Aisa, op. cit., p. 16. 2/ Ibid., pp. 15-16. 3/ Ibid., p. 13.

-122- The affirmative could reply that SEATO is not all that important to deterring China. American bilat�ral commitments and unilateral pledges probably create· the same beneficial uncertainty about the results of aggres­ sion that SEATO does. Moreover, the events of recent years may have re­ duced whatever Chinese apprehensions did exist about SEATO. The virtual secession of France and Pakistan from the organization, the wide range of internal disagreements within it, and the almost incredible array of prob­ lems confronting it 1/--all this, the negative could argue, assures that SEATO has the shadow-of power rather than its substance. American with­ drawal would make little difference in Chinese perceptions of probable scenarios in Far Eastern conflicts.

3. Loss of a Valuable Tooi for Discussing Mutual Defense. SEATO, it is also argued, is a valuable forum for discussing contingencies and preparing defense plans for coordinated action to meet an aggression to which all or most of the member states decide to respond. If the United States withdrew from the organization, such planning and preparation would probably no longer be possible. Donald Kennedy warns:

... (substituting bilateral pacts for SEATO would) make it difficult in a time of emergency to improvise all the necessary defense measures, which in general involve more than just the United States and the indigenous country.2/ Thus, the loss of a SEATO forum might mean that the Unit�d States and an ally would have to meet 'an attack with less than the maximally efficient and effective response. More lives might be lost; more expenditures might be necessary; and a longer and less conclusive conflict might be the final result. That may be too high a price to pay for any gains the affirmative can claim from withdrawal. The rejoinder to such analysis is fairly obvious. Due to the discord surrounding SEATO, it has not proved recently an adequate, let alone essential, organ for consultation and planning. None of the curr�nt planning and cooperation for the non-Conununist effort in Southeast Asia has really been done in SEATO. Bilateral negotiations and ad hoc multi­ national structures have assumed the hurden.3/ Moreover, for the future it is difficult to conceive of a more active-planning role for SEATO. There is simply too much disagreement about what the organization and its membership should do. Thailand wants a stronger American defense shield against subversion. The United States is reluctant to provide if.4/ France wants a more quiescent and unobtrusive American role in Southeast

!/ Treaties, op. cit., pp. 189-90.

� Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., p. 21. � Richard Weintraub, Boston Globe, May 26, 1969.

-123- Asia, particularly in Vietnam.· Pakistan seems more concerned with her border disputes with India than with the shared purposes of SEATO and is cozying up to Communist China, one of the major powers against which SEATO plans. The remaining members do not possess significant military or po­ litical power.

4. How Vital is SEATO? One defender of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization sums up its contributions in these words:

The system of collective security devised by the West and its Southern Asian allies during the 1950's exists now as part of the equation. It is believed to provide the force which holds shut the door against China, which otherwise would be wrenched open .... It cannot be summarily abolished .... lf The affirmative can counter this view in a number of ways. First it can argue that the door against China--or at least against communism--has not been kept shut by SEATO. Since the organization's founding in 1954, half of Laos has fallen; a war rages in South Vietnam, and Cambodia and Thai­ land are increasingly threatened. SEATO, the affirmative may conclude, has not been sufficiently successful to justify its retention. Secondly, bilateral agreements probably would be able to perform the containment functions supposedly assigned to SEATO. That is how the United States ended up defending South Vietnam; the SEATO agreement was only a "... be­ lated discovery... as the basis for United States action in Vietnam."2/ C. Withdrawing from ANZUS There is not a great deal of evidence on the consequences of an American withdrawal from the ANZUS organization. As noted previously, there barely is a formal organization. To the extent one exists, it may be most important to Australia's role in combatting aggression in Asia. Australian leaders have made it clear that they regard ANZUS as their na­ tion's most important multilateral alliance membership. They have or­ ganized their army in accord with the ANZUS objective of cooperation with the United States. They have introduced conscription.3/ And Australia is contributing fighting men to the effort in Vietnam.- In light of all this, were the United States to withdraw from the ANZUS organization, Australia might feel obliged to react by, in essence, withdrawing from the effort to protect Southern Asia. The United States, still bound by a number of bilateral agreements in Asia, might in effect be telling the most advanced nation in the area that Washington no longer wanted lf Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., p. 19.

�/ Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 140.

'}_/ Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, op. cit., pp.115-16.

-124- Fl rem .�

1 Australia's help. Or, at least, that is- how the Australians might in­ ··1t. I terpret it. I •: ':. . The affirmative can reply that no matter how upset Australia ' !.; i would be by an American withdrawal from ANZUS, she would still have no . choice but to cooperate with the United States. Her geographic position i makes her too vulnerable; American protection is a necessity. In return '

for that protection, the United States can continue to seek Australian ir: aid in conflicts and crises in the southeastern area of the Pacific, just . I as it has in the past. America already has a number of bilateral de­ '' fense agreements with Australia.I/ They presumably would not be affected by withdrawal from ANZUS. If necessary, new agreements could be reached.

D. Withdrawing from the OAS 1. The Loss of a Useful Mediating Agent in Intra-American Dis­ putes. Were the United States to withdraw from the OAS, it might lose the services of the organization in the event of a dispute with another Ameri­ can nation. This has been one of the OAS' most consistently successful activities since its founding in 1948. For example, the OAS mediated the 1963-64 crisis between the United States and Panama over the Canal Zone.2/ Riots had broken out in the Canal Zone area, assertedly to protest the - flying of an American flag at Balboa High School. The ensuing violence led to a rupture of U.S.-Panamanian diplomatic relations and an impasse on how to resolve some outstanding problems connected with the Canal. Though the OAS. mediators' proposed settlement was initially rejected by the United States, it provided a basis for the ultimate resolution of the crisis.3/ It is not clear that the United States would lose the benefits of such mediation merely by withdrawing from the OAS. The remaining mem­ bers might still be willing to see the organization continue. Moreover, the mediation function could be transferred out of the OAS into a non­ defense multilateral organization, which the topic would allow the United States to join. The same sort of transfer could be employed to preserve American membership in OAS agencies dealing with the economic and social problems of Latin Arnerica.4/ 2. The Loss of a Sounding Board. Another benefit of the OAS is the supposed fact that it acts as a sounding board; it permits the United

!/ Treaties, op. cit., p. 162. 2/ Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 68-69.

3/ For a full account of the crisis, see Geyelin, op. cit., pp. 100-12. 4/ Burr, op. cit., p. 69.

-125- States to test Latin American op1n1ons and views and measure proposed courses of conduct against Latin American expectations. .!f If this bene­ fit is substantial, the affirmative can argue, it can still be obtained under the affirmative proposal. Consultation on an informal and unstruc­ tured basis or through regular diplomatic channels offers opportunities similar to those which are supposed to justify continued American adherence to the OAS. 3. A Decline in American Influence. There have been noises in the past about the formation of an OAS-like force that would exclude the United States. In 1963... a noted Bolivian, Fernando Diez de Medina ... proposed a unification confined to South America. [He dismissed] the Organization of American States [because] it not only suffers from "bureaucratic paralysis" but also "reflects the thinking in Washington rather than in Latin America"... y American withdrawal might automatically mean a long step toward a Latin American-oriented multilateral defense organization. Such a development might not be in America's best interests. There are conflicts and ten­ �ions between the United States and its neighbors to the South; an4 South America's exclusive possession of an independent and collective military organization could someday be turned against the United States. The Latin Americans' resistance to an OAS peace force might dissipate or weaken if it were clear that the United States would not control it. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine any Latin American combination that could threaten American power. Moreover, United States actions in the Dominican crisis of 1965 indicate that it can act prior to and without Latin Ameri­ can sanction, if necessary.3/ What an OAS without American participation would think of such actions-very well might be irrelevant. The United States would remain the unchallenged and dominant power in the hemisphere. Finally, the affirmative might welcome the development of an all Latin American OAS, perhaps able to carry some of the burdens of hemispheric de­ fense now borne by the United States.

VII. Conclus.ion The world has changed substantially, generally has taken a more relaxed view of the Communist threat, since those not too distant days when the United States forged a chain of alliances around the Communist world. The threat of aggression probably is still there, but has become more lj Ibid. y Whittaker and Jordan, op. cit. , p. 168. 3/ Burr, op. cit., p. 71.

-126- - � !.·... familiar, sometimes more subtle and more heavily reliant on the techniques of subversion. There is more doubt now about the ability of arms, or willingness of those who possess them, to control revolution. France has withdrawn from NATO and SEATO and there is a full-fledged Communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Such circumstances create a climate for re­ appraisal. Harvard professor Stanley Hoffman writes: ...we must not maintain or extend structures that have become increasingly unwieldy, nor must we accept the highly debatable thesis that all alliances should be dismantled..•. What is needed is the recognition of zones of common interests and zones of tolerable ...in­ deed, necessary... disa greement. ..!J Thus, the NATO and multilateral organizations topics deal with areas of immediate and important concern for national security policymakers. Un­ fortunately, their wording requires some concentration on technical is­ sues peripheral to the main point. For example, the existence and pos­ sible creation of bilateral arrangements can result in very difficult problems for the affirmative, as can the fact that .the propositions call for withdrawal only from the organization, not from the alliance. This chapter has attempted to outline and discuss these problems and others, as well as the more substantive issues raised by the resolutions.

..

1/ Hoffman, op. cit., p. 378.

-127- DXSCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What is the difference between a multilateral defense organization and a bilateral defense arrangement? Name the multilateral organiza tions of which the United States is a member. Is NATO different in major respects from the others?

2. Under the resolutions as formulated, could the United States join a new multilateral defense organization after withdrawing from NATO? Why or why not? How does such a possibility affect claimed affirma­ tive advantages? Does the negative have any obligation to show that the possibility is also a probability? Explain.

3. What is the difference between a "multilateral defense organization" and a multilateral defense treaty? How has the distinction affected. the French decision to withdraw from NATO? What is the difference between the obligations imposed by a defense organization and those imposed by a treaty? Do there have to be such differences?

4. What are the reasons cited to support the proposition that NATO is no longer necessary? Assess them. Are multilateral defense organiza­ tions still required to assure coordinated action? Is coordination necessary? Are coordination and speed sometimes at odds? Why?

5. What impact will the existence of bilateral defense arrangements and the possibility of forming more have in a debate? Who has the "pre­ sumption" in arguing this particular issue? What do we mean by the term "presumption" in relation to the bilateral arrangements issue?

6. What is a balance-of-payments deficit? Why does the American troop presence in Europe cause a payments outflow? Why doesn't American membership in other multilateral organizations contribute signifi­ cantly to the balance-of-payments problem?

7. When is the United States over-committed? Suggest some standards. How might the Soviet Union react to a contraction of American com­ mitments? Communist China? What are the two different views of their probable reactions?

8. What are the French objections to NATO? Would American withdrawal remove the objections? Might it remove the barriers to British entry into the European Economic Community? Why or why not?

9. Could the negative suggest remaining in NATO while ending the inte­ gration of forces? Why should the affirmative worry about this possibility? How should the affirmative reply to it? Suggest a number of different replies.

-128- l em ·------·· �- · .° "' 1. 1 10. Assess the disaqvantages·of withdrawing from NATO. How should they be answered? What are the disadvantages of withdrawing from other \ multilateral organizations? Are they as significant as the problems that can be ascribed to withdrawing from NATO? 11. What complications are created by the wording of the NATO and multi­ lateral organizations topics? How does the wording make the affinna­ tive's task more difficult? How can the negative exploit the word­ ing problems?

...

I'

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Waskow, Arthur. The Limits of Defense. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1962.

Westerfield, H. Bradford. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. 448 p.

The Instruments of American Foreign Policy. New York: Crowell, 1963.

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu. New York: Macmillan Company, 1960. Wilcox, F.O., and Haviland, H.F., Jr. The Atlantic Community. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

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Department of State Bulletin, 51, December 22, 1964, pp. 866-69. r:f. ; i . "Our View of NATO," Department of State Bulletin, 54, April 11, 1966, pp. 554-56. Johnson, M. S. "Military Man Sizes Up European Defenses," U.S. News & World Report, November 14, 1966� pp. 60-62. Kahn, H. and Pfaff, William. "Our Alternatives in Europe," Foreign Af­ t fairs, July, 1966, pp. 587-600. t •. I. . Kalb, Marvin. "Doves, Hawks and Flutterers in the Foreign Relations Committee," New York Times Magazine, November 19, 1967, pp. 56ff. Katzenbach, Nicholas de B. "The Challenges of ·our Changing Atlantic Partnership," Department of State Bulletin, 58, February 8, 1968, pp. 168-72.

"U.S. Arms for the Developing World: Dilemmas of Foreign I, Policy," Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1967. . i Kohl, Wilfred L. "Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force," t Political Science Quarterly, 80, March, 1965, pp. 88-109. t Kolcum, E. H. "Czech Invasion Bares NATO's Atrophy," Aviation Weekly, i March 10, 1969, pp. 81+. i •.iwest Faces Rising Mediterranean Threat," Aviation Weekly, February 3, 1969, pp. 20-21. Kristo!, Irving. "We Can't Resign as 'Policeman of the World,"' New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, pp. 25-27. Lall, B. G .. "Nonintervention vs. Containment," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May, 1966. Leddy, John M. "NATO on the Eve of its 20th Anniversary," Department of State Bulletin, 57, December 4, 1967, pp. 759-62. LeMay, Curtis E. "Our Allies Should Have the Bomb," Saturday Evening Post, October 19, 1968, pp. 18, 24. Lemnitzer, Lyman L. "Collective Defense--The Basis of Military Security," NATO Letter, 16, January,1968, pp. 3-7.

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Miller, Roger J. "rs SEATO Obsolete?", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 94, November, 1968, pp. 56-63.

Morgenthau, H. J. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs, April, 1967. Murphy, C.J.V. "Is the Defense Budget Big Enough?", Fortune, LX, Novem­ ber, 1959, pp. 114-47; 281-86. "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, LXIV, September, 1961, pp. 92-97; 223-36. "The NATO Alliance Goes Nuclear," Fortune, LVII, February, 1958, pp. 98-102; 234-36. Nairn, Ronald C. "SEATO: A Critique," Pacific Affairs, 41, Spring, 1968, pp. 5-18. "Nato Unraveling, Communist Split Key Issues in International Affairs," Armed Forces Management, 13, April, 1967, pp. SS, 59, 62. Nation. "What Double Standard? Vietnam and Israel," June 19, 1967. National Review. "Should We Bomb Red China's Bomb," January 12, 1965, pp. 8-10.

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Ii I

-166- GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

The Brookings Institution. The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy, study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Print­ ing Office, January 13, 1960).

Bundy, Harvey, H. and Rogers, James Grafton. The Organization of the Gov­ ernment Conduct of Foreign Affairs: A Report with Recommendations, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch t of the Government (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, i January, 1949). ! i rt 'I Case, Clifford P. The United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma, Report to the i: Senate Committee o.n Foreign Relations, April, 1967. 90th Cong., tI 1st Sess., 1967. f Clark, Joseph S. Indonesia, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 2, 1968. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968. Stalemate in Vietnam, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February, 1968. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968. War or Peace in the Middle East?, Report to the Senate Com­ mittee on Foreign Relations, April 10, 1967. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (The Randall Commission). Report to the President and the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954). The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference). Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, two vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.) Glasstone, Samuel (ed.). The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). (Prepared by the Department of Defense and published by the Atomic Energy Commission.) Goldberg, Arthur J. "The United States as a World Power--What Are Its ... Responsibilities and Limits?", Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 113, March 22, 1967, pp. H3263-65. (In remarks of Jonathan B. Bingham.) Komer, R. W. The Other War in etnam--A Progress Report. (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1966.) Mansfield, Mike; Muskie, Edmund; Inouye_, Daniel; Aiken, George and Boggs, J. Caleb, The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow. Re­ port to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 6, 1966, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966.

i 1· ! t Orleans, L .A. Professional MaDpower and Education in Communist China, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).

Pell, Claiborne. Czechoslovakia 1968. Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July, 1968. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968.

Public Papers of the President of the United States, The, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book II. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.)

Scaff, Alvin. The Philippine Answer to Communism. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955 .)

U.S. Congress, House. D�partment of Defense Appropriations for 1967, Part I. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966.

Committee on Armed Services. Report of Special Subcommittee l : Visiting American Military Installations and NATO Bases in France. Report No. 85. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., September 12, 1966. Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture. Review of i a Systems Analysis Evaluation of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Conventional I Forces. Report pursuant to House Resolution No. 124. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings, Investigation of National Defense Missiles. 85th Cong., 2d Sess:, 1958.

Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings, The Crisis in NATO, March 17, 22, 23; April 6, 28; May 3, 5, 12, 17, 25; June 1, 7, 13, 1966. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966.

Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings, The Foreign Pol­ icy Aspects of the Kennedy Round, Part II, February 15, 16; March 7, 8; April 4 ,- 5, 1967. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967..

Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings, The Future United States Role in Asia and in the Pacific, February 29; March 4, 7, 13, 15, 19, 20; April 4, 1968. 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968. Our Changing Partnership with Europe. House Report No. 26. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967.

Subcommittee on Europe of Conunittee on Foreign Affairs. Hear­ ings, Recent Developments in East-West Relations, October 18, 196� 89th ·Cong., 2d Sess., 1966. United States Defense Policies in 1959. House Document No: 432. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960.

-168- United States Defense Policies in 1960. House Document No. 207. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. , 1961.

United States Defense Policies in 1961. House Document No. 502. 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962.

United States Defense Policies in 1963. House Document No. 335. 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964.

Committee on Government Operations. Civ1l Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning. Report No. 2069. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. i Committee on Government Operations. An Investigation of U.S. Participation in the NATO Common Infrastructure Program. Report No. 2323. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966.

U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. National Security and the Ameri­ can Economy in the 1960's, Study Paper No. 18. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., January 30, 1960. u·.S. Congress, Senate. Report""' of the Subcommittee_,_ on,c- ,--the Air,.,...... ,,-- Force of the Committee on Arm-ed___ S_e_r_v�i-c_e_s-.--D-o_c_ um_e_n_t_No-.-29. -8-5th .,,,C-on-g-.-,-lst Sess., February 20, 1957.

Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services. Hearings, Part II. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956.

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