Death in the Line of Duty... Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
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2010 05 Death in the line of duty... Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation June, 2010 Captain Dies After Extremely Heavy Physical Exertion at Building Fire from Complications of Mitral Valve Surgery– Kansas Executive Summary On December 13, 2009, a 51-year-old male career NIOSH investigators offer the following Captain responded to a fire in a condominium recommendations to address general safety and complex clubhouse. On scene while wearing full health issues. However, it is unlikely that any of turnout gear, he stretched a 2 1/2- and a 3-inch these recommendations could have prevented the hoseline and cut a hole in the building exterior Captain’s death. to access the crawl space. While in rehabilitation (rehab), the Captain experienced persistent Provide annual medical evaluations to all shortness of breath and palpitations/tachycardia. fire fighters consistent with National Fire These symptoms progressed over the next few Protection Association (NFPA) 1582, Standard days resulting in a subsequent diagnosis of mitral on Comprehensive Occupational Medical valve insufficiency/regurgitation. The Captain Program for Fire Departments. underwent surgery to repair his mitral valve on December 29, but suffered an intra-operative Discontinue routine pre-employment/ myocardial infarction (heart attack) from which preplacement exercise stress tests for he died 4 days later. The death certificate, applicants. completed by the pathologist, listed the cause of death as “massive acute myocardial infarction Ensure fire fighters are cleared for return to duty due to complications from mitral valve annulus by a physician knowledgeable about the physical placement due to severe mitral regurgitation demands of fire fighting, the personal protective aggravated by smoke/chemical inhalation.” The equipment used by fire fighters, and the various autopsy, completed by the pathologist, listed components of NFPA 1582. “massive acute myocardial infarction secondary to kinking and obstruction of the circumflex Phase in a comprehensive wellness and fitness coronary artery resulting from the mitral valve program for fire fighters. annulus placement during mitral valve surgery” as the cause of death. NIOSH investigators agree Perform an annual physical performance with these conclusions. In addition, NIOSH (physical ability) evaluation. investigators believe that the Captain’s acute mitral value insufficiency/regurgitation was due Provide fire fighters with medical clearance to a partial tear/rupture of his chordae tendineae. to wear self-contained breathing apparatus as This tear/detachment was probably triggered by part of the Fire Department’s annual medical the heavy physical exertion expended during fire evaluation program. suppression activities on December 13, 2009. A Summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation Report #2010-05 Captain Dies After Extremely Heavy Physical Exertion at Building Fire from Complications of Mitral Valve Surgery– Kansas The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations are intended to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement and inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations. The NIOSH summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further information, visit the program website at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636). Page 2 A Summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation Report #2010-05 Captain Dies After Extremely Heavy Physical Exertion at Building Fire from Complications of Mitral Valve Surgery– Kansas Introduction & Methods Investigative Results On December 13, 2009, a 51-year-old male career Incident. On December 13, 2009, the Captain Captain had persistent palpitations and shortness of arrived for his 24-hour shift at Station 11 (Engine breath in rehab at a structure fire. Subsequent test- 11) at 0700 hours. Two fire fighters were assigned ing revealed mitral valve insufficiency/regurgitation. with the Captain. At 0903 hours, the FD was dis- The Captain underwent surgery to repair the mitral patched to a fire in a condominium clubhouse. The valve insufficiency/regurgitation on December 29, 5,000-square-foot clubhouse was a single story 2009. The Captain died 4 days later. The U.S. Fire wood frame structure with a basement. Engine 9, Administration notified NIOSH of this fatality on Engine 20, Aerial Platform 9, Quint 15, Squad 11, January 4, 2010. NIOSH contacted the affected fire Squad 14, Battalion 9, Safety Officer, and Medi- department (FD) to gather additional information on cal Officer responded on the first alarm. Units January 5, 2010, and on February 4, 2010, to initiate began arriving on scene at 0909 hours and found the investigation. On February 22, 2010, a Safety and heavy smoke conditions. Fire fighters entered the Occupational Health Specialist from the NIOSH Fire structure to find moderate heat conditions, zero Fighter Fatality Investigation Team traveled to Kansas visibility, and a collapsed floor. They began fire to conduct an on-site investigation of the incident. extinguishment without success and backed out of the structure. Aerial 9 ventilated the roof. Weather During the investigation, NIOSH personnel inter- conditions at an airport 2 miles away included fog, viewed the following people: light drizzle, a temperature of 41 degrees Fahren- • Fire Chief heit, 100% relative humidity, and south-southeast • Fire Marshal winds at 14 miles per hour [NOAA 2009]. • Deputy Fire Chief • Safety/Training Chief A second alarm dispatched the following units at • International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) 0918 hours: Engine 6, Engine 10, Engine 11 (the • Local President Captain and two fire fighters), Engine 5, Engine • IAFF local secretary 12, Quint 14, Quint 4, Quint 18, Squad 5, Squad • The Captain’s family representative 19, and Squad 36. Engine 11 arrived into staging • Crew members and then was assigned to turn off the natural gas to the building. The crew arrived at the building NIOSH personnel reviewed the following documents: wearing their self-contained breathing apparatus • FD policies and operating guidelines (SCBA) and carrying tools. After the gas was • FD training records turned off, Incident Command declared a defen- • FD annual report for 2009 sive operation, and hoselines were moved to begin • FD incident reports this phase. The Incident Safety Officer noticed the • Witness statements Captain’s “color not being so great” and the Cap- • Hospital emergency department (ED) records tain seemed to be “winded.” • Hospital inpatient records • Death certificate Engine 11 was assigned to the C/D division with • Autopsy report the Captain in command. Using a chain saw, the • Primary care physician records Engine 11 crew cut a hole in the side of the build- Page 3 A Summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation Report #2010-05 Captain Dies After Extremely Heavy Physical Exertion at Building Fire from Complications of Mitral Valve Surgery– Kansas Investigative Results (cont.) ing to access the fire using a 1¾-inch hoseline. arrangements were made for mitral valve surgery Unable to reach the fire, command advised crews on December 29, 2009. The next day, however, to prepare for “master stream” application. Crews the Captain was admitted to the hospital for mild used two preconnected hoselines to protect the congestive heart failure secondary to mitral valve C/D side until a 3-inch hoseline with monitor was regurgitation/ insufficiency. A transesophageal set up. After approximately 1 hour on scene, En- echocardiogram (TEE) confirmed the previous gine 11 entered rehab for rest and hydration (1022 echocardiology findings and a cardiac catheter- hours). ization revealed no evidence of coronary artery disease with a normal left ventricular ejection In rehab, the Captain’s pulse rate was fast (114 fraction. He was treated with diuretics and dis- beats per minute). Despite removing his turnout charged on December 22 to return on December gear and resting for 5 minutes, his tachycardia 28 for his mitral valve repair/replacement surgery remained. After 30-45 minutes in rehab, the Cap- on December 29, 2009. tain’s pulse returned to the upper threshold limits and he was released (1052 hours). The fire was On December 29, 2009, an intraoperative TEE declared under control at 1100 hours, and crews showed an enlarged left atrium and mild concen- began to gather equipment. The Captain assisted tric LVH with normal cardiac output. Anterior and in rolling hoselines and moving heavy equipment posterior leaflets