A Metaphilosophical Reading of Plato's Phaedo Seferoglu, Tonguc
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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ A Metaphilosophical Reading of Plato’s Phaedo Seferoglu, Tonguc Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 23. Sep. 2021 A Metaphilosophical Reading of Plato’s Phaedo Tonguc Seferoglu Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy King’s College London June 2018 Supervisors: Dr Joachim Aufderheide Professor Raphael Woolf 1 Abstract Although many of Plato’s dialogues contain reflections on the correct method of philosophical argument, scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the Phaedo in this regard. This thesis explores Plato’s Phaedo from an overlooked perspective, namely its metaphilosophical component and its prescriptions on the correct philosophical practice. The findings presented in this thesis thus help to better understand Plato’s thoughts on philosophical argument and the possibility of human knowledge. In Chapter 1 and 2, I present a theoretical framework of the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing the correct philosophical conversation and argument. I claim that metaphilosophy is a significant component of the Phaedo and the epistemic norms rely on the idea of philosophical humility. Chapter 3 examines Socrates’ so-called defence speech at the Phaedo 63-69. I argue that the content of the defence partially shapes the epistemic norms that are developed and put into practice in the Phaedo. I suggest that Socrates’ defence speech specifies the limits of human cognition and that the concept of philosophical humility should arise out of the recognition of these limits. In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the argument against misology presented at Phaedo 88-91. I argue that the misology argument is metaphilosophical in the sense that it stresses the danger of putting all our trust in arguments before possessing expertise in argument; hence the misology argument adds to the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry. Chapter 5 investigates Socrates’ autobiography portrayed in the Phaedo 96-101, with special emphasis on the meaning of second-sailing. I offer a novel interpretation of the second-sailing according to which the distinction is not simply between the best and the second-best method, but another contrast stems from the purpose-relative aspect of Socrates’ choice. 2 Plato’s Works Cited by Abbreviations Ap. = Apology Crt. = Crito Gorg. = Gorgias Parm. = Parmenides Phd. = Phaedo Prot. = Protagoras Rep. = Republic Soph. = Sophist Ti. = Timaeus Theae. = Theaetetus 3 Note on Translations and Greek Texts All translations of the Phaedo are from Long & Sedley (2011). The translations of Plato’s other dialogues are taken from Cooper & Hutchinson (ed.) (1993). All Greek texts are retrieved from Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library. Ed. Maria C. Pantelia. University of California, Irvine. http://www.tlg.uci.edu. 4 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Joachim Aufderheide, Raphael Woolf, and Shaul Tor for their guidance and supervision during my studies. I thank my friends at KCL and UCL, especially Sahan and Margaret, who have made significant contributions not only to my dissertation but also to my academic life. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Samet Bagce who aroused my interest in ancient Greek philosophy. I am grateful to my examiners, Anne Sheppard and David Sedley, for their valuable contribution towards the improvement of this work. I would also like to thank Fazil, Okan, and Bilge for their encouragement and support. I would like to acknowledge the unwavering care of my family, especially my parents Fikriye and Kenan, which extends far beyond my doctoral studies. I am grateful to Irem who has always been amicable, gentle and cheerful. If it were not for her, not only would my work be less fruitful but also my life would be tedious. I should like to acknowledge the generous financial support received from the Turkish Ministry of Education. 5 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 9 CHAPTER 1: A TERMINOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR READING PLATO’S PHAEDO 17 1.1 INTRODUCTION 17 1.2 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE METAPHILOSOPHICAL READING 18 1.2.1 THE SCOPE OF METAPHILOSOPHICAL READING 19 1.2.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENTS 19 1.2.3 THE PHAEDO ON DISAGREEMENTS 20 1.2.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCRATES’ DEFENCE SPEECH 21 1.3 THE NORMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL HUMILITY 24 1.3.1 THE EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW 24 1.3.2 THE CONCILIATORY APPROACH 29 1.3.3 PESSIMIST EPISTEMOLOGY 31 1.3.4 EDUCATIONAL V. SCIENTIFIC REASONS 33 1.4 CONCLUSION 35 CHAPTER 2: THE EPISTEMIC NORMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT IN THE PHAEDO 36 2.1 INTRODUCTION 36 2.2 PLATO ON PERSUASION AND AGREEMENT IN THE PROTAGORAS 36 2.2.1 WHY THE PROTAGORAS? 36 2.2.2 AGREEMENT AND THE GOAL OF CONVERSATION 38 2.2.3 THE INTERVENTION OF LISTENERS 41 2.2.4 CASE I: THE EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW 43 2.2.5 CASE II: CAREFUL CHECKING 45 2.2.6 INTERIM CONCLUSION 47 2.3 THE PHAEDO’S METAPHILOSOPHICAL COMPONENT 48 2.3.1 SOCRATES’ SECOND DEFENCE SPEECH 49 2.3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL HUMILITY AND PERSUASION 50 2.3.3 THE FIRST DISAGREEMENT 53 2.3.4 THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE 54 2.3.5 THE SECOND DISAGREEMENT 56 2.3.6 CEBES AND SIMMIAS 58 2.4 CONCLUSION 60 CHAPTER 3: THE PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHERS 63 3.1 INTRODUCTION 63 3.2 BECOMING A PHILOSOPHER 64 3.2.1 TRUE PHILOSOPHERS 64 3.2.2 THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHOS 66 6 3.2.3 THE PRACTICE OF TRUE PHILOSOPHERS 68 3.2.4 THE PROHIBITION OF SUICIDE 69 3.3 PURIFICATION, DYING AND BEING DEAD 71 3.4.1 DYING V. BEING DEAD 72 3.4.2 THE PRACTICE OF DYING AND BEING DEAD 75 3.4.3 THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SOUL 77 3.4.4 WISDOM IN HADES 78 3.4.5 TRUE PHILOSOPHERS’ OBJECT OF DESIRE 80 3.4.6. PURIFICATION, PURIFICATORY RITES AND VIRTUES 81 3.4.7. SHADOW-PAINTING AND PURIFICATION 86 3.4 CONCLUSION 89 CHAPTER 4: HATRED OF ARGUMENTS 91 4.1 INTRODUCTION 91 4.2 THE ORIGIN OF MISOLOGY 93 4.2.1 EPISTEMIC FEAR 95 4.2.2 THE ROLE OF THE MISOLOGY ARGUMENT 98 4.2.3 PHAEDO’S FEAR 99 4.2.4 SOCRATES’ ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS FRIENDS AND INTERLOCUTORS 101 4.2.5 THE CURE OF MISOLOGY 105 4.3 THE MEANING OF TECHNE 107 4.3.1. THE MISCHIEF OF ANTILOGICIANS 107 4.3.2 ANTILOGIC IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC 108 4.3.3 THE YOUNG LADS OF THE PHAEDO 110 4.3.4 THE NOTION OF EXPERTISE 112 4.3.5 THE INTELLECTUAL VICE OF ANTILOGICIANS 115 4.3.6 EPISTEMIC BLAME, ARROGANCE AND MODESTY 116 4.4 CONCLUSION 118 CHAPTER 5: SOCRATES’ SECOND-SAILING 124 5.1 INTRODUCTION 124 5.2 THE MEANING OF ΔΕΎΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟῦΣ 126 5.2.1 SOME ANCIENT TESTIMONIES ON ΔΕΎΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟῦΣ 127 5.2.2 A POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF THE STRONG (TRADITIONAL) SECOND-BEST READING 133 5.3 ΔΕΎΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟῦΣ IN THE PHAEDO 136 5.3.1 THE PRE-SECOND-SAILING PERIOD 136 5.3.2 ANAXAGORAS’ NOUS 139 5.3.3 THE SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL EXPLANATION 141 5.3.4 SOCRATES’ REFUGE 144 5.4 THE MEANING OF SOCRATES’ LOGOI 146 5.4.1 INQUIRY IN THE SECOND-SAILING 146 5.4.2 THE NATURE OF SOCRATES’ LOGOS 148 5.4.3 THE METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS 151 5.4.4. THE FORM-AITIA HYPOTHESIS (THE THEORY OF FORMS) 160 5.5. CONCLUSION 163 7 EPILOGUE 166 BIBLIOGRAPHY 175 8 Introduction For Plato, establishing the correct epistemic (or intellectual) norms of philosophical argument is a precondition for attaining knowledge and the truth. Plato deals with this task in many dialogues such as the Apology, Republic, Sophist, and Phaedo. Plato even promised to write a dialogue called the Philosopher, as anticipated in the Sophist and Statesman, but he never wrote it. The purpose of my study is to shine new light on the discourse concerning Plato’s view about the correct method of philosophical argument. To this end, I focus on the metaphilosophical and meta-dialogical components of the Phaedo, although analytical studies, such as the works of Gallop (1975) and Bostock (1986), interpreting the dialogue’s individual arguments have their own merits. Among the dialogues mentioned above, the Phaedo is the least studied with respect to Plato’s thoughts on the correct method of philosophical conversation and inquiry. The relative paucity of criticism concerning the metaphilosophical component of the Phaedo seems to be a result of scholars focusing more on the proofs of the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms, which are ‘the twin pillars of Platonism’ for Cornford (1935).