UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Disease and Difference in Three Platonic Dialogues: Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/90s0h7r8 Author Ricciardone, Chiara T. Publication Date 2017 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Disease and Difference in Three Platonic Dialogues: Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus by Chiara Teresa Ricciardone A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge: Professor G.R.F. Ferrari, Co-chair Professor Ramona Naddaff, Co-chair Professor David Bates Professor Daniel Boyarin Professor Marianne Constable Professor Hans Sluga Summer 2017 Abstract Difference and Disease in Three Platonic Dialogues: Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus by Chiara Teresa Ricciardone Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric with the designated emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Berkeley Professors G.R.F. Ferrari and Ramona Naddaff, Co-chairs This study traces a persistent connection between the image of disease and the concept of difference in Plato’s Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus. Whether the disease occurs in the body, soul, city, or cosmos, it always signals an unassimilated difference that is critical to the argument. I argue that Plato represents—and induces—diseases of difference in order to produce philosophers, skilled in the art of differentiation. Because his dialogues intensify rather than cure difference, his philosophy is better characterized as a “higher pathology” than a form of therapy. An introductory section on Sophist lays out the main features of the concept of difference- in-itself and concisely presents its connection to disease. The main chapters examine the relationship in different realms. In the first chapter, the problem is moral and political: in the Gorgias, rhetoric is a corrupting force, while philosophy purifies the city and soul by drawing distinctions. In the second chapter on Phaedo, the problem is epistemological: if we correctly interpret the illness of misology, as the despair caused by the inability to consistently distinguish truth and falsity, we can resolve the mystery of Socrates’ cryptic last words (“We owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and do not neglect it”). In the third chapter on Timaeus, Plato treats diseases of the soul, the body, and the cosmos itself. There, the correlation between disease and difference actually helps humans situate themselves in the vast universe—for in both cases, proper differentiation is the key to a healthy, well- constructed life. My emphasis on Plato’s theory of difference counters the traditional focus on his theory of Forms. Elucidating the link between the concept of difference and the experience of disease has broader impact for the ageless question of how we should live our lives. In Plato’s system, neither disease nor difference is a wholly negative element to be eradicated. Instead, difference and disease, in their proper proportions, are responsible for the fullness of the world and the emergence of the philosophical subject. 1 CONTENTS Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................. ii Note on Translations and Transliterations ............................................................................................... iii Introduction: Rhetorical and Philosophical Perspectives ..................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: The Politics of Care in Gorgias .................................................................................................... 9 Bridge: From Gorgias to Phaedo ................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 2: The Illness of Contradiction in Phaedo ................................................................................. 33 Bridge: From Phaedo to Timaeus ................................................................................................................. 59 Chapter 3: Disease as the Expression of Difference in Timaeus ........................................................ 62 Conclusion: Plato’s Philosophy as ‘Higher Pathology’ .......................................................................... 89 Appendix A: Classification of Diseases in Plato’s Timaeus .................................................................. 93 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................... 95 i Acknowledgements Illness in Plato often suggests or incurs some debt, and my debts are greater than the dissertation itself might suggest. I owe the successful completion of the work most of all to my exceptionally generous mentors and advisors, John Ferrari and Ramona Naddaff. Both were unstinting from early on with their time and intelligence, saving me from many embarrassing errors and spurring me toward much better arguments. At Berkeley, I was also fortunate to have Tony Long as a perceptive and adept interlocutor. David Bates, Daniel Boyarin, and Hans Sluga, too, offered valuable comments at various stages of the work. I thank Marianne Constable for her irreplaceable mentorship. From my years at SUNY Binghamton, Bob Guay proved an enduring ally and sounding board. Long before the drafts were ready for professorial eyes, I relied on the diverse questions from the women of my virtual dissertation working group: Katie Kadue, Chlöe Kitzinger, Nicole Lindahl, Emily O’Rourke, and Genevieve Painter. In the nick of time, Dan-el Padilla Peralta gave a revivifying reading of Chapter 1. I was lucky to meet Ragini Tharoor Srinivasan in my Berkeley cohort, who became that rare Aristotelian friend who truly wants the best for you. Among the institutions and organizations that contributed to the completion of this work, I count my home department of Rhetoric for numerous grants over the years, including crucial support for my enrollment in Berkeley’s summer Greek Workshop. Early on, a Mellon Discovery Fellowship from Berkeley’s Townsend Center for Humanities provided the right mix of reflective summers off and stimulating monthly dinners. The faculty and students at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Città di Castello, Italy, were the perfect crucible for transforming my initial ideas into a feasible project. In particular I am grateful to Peter Hanly, who several years later tracked down a critical and elusive quote. The Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory Disseration Fellowship enabled a crucial year of writing. The generous Frank E. Ratliffe Fellowship supported me in the final stretch and helped me to present my research at Berkeley and Stanford. Those closest to me had the greatest impact on the day-to-day writing. I am grateful to my mother, for leading the way with her own PhD, and to my father, for his example of interdisciplinarity in action. Above all, I thank my husband Micah, who believes in me and also makes dinner. I dedicate this work to our son, Zia, who began life as this work neared its close. You have already brought me more wisdom than all my years of graduate school. ii Note on Translations and Transliterations Greek translations of Plato are my own unless otherwise noted. I provide the Greek original and also transliterate Greek words which are commonly introduced into the English lexicon or which are an object of significant analysis. iii Introduction: Rhetorical and Philosophical Perspectives Will we have any way of winning him over and gently persuading him, if we conceal how unhealthy he is? ἕξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἠρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει; -- Socrates, Republic 476e My inquiry into Plato’s diseases began with an ordinary cold. It was early spring in Berkeley, and I was reading the Gorgias for the first time. A volley of sneezes forced my attention to Plato’s language of disease. In that dialogue, Socrates condemns rhetoric for corrupting the city and the soul, and offers philosophy as a cure for both. But there was something very troubling about the way that Socrates denounces rhetoric while using it himself. I was lured by the dialogue’s promise of a philosophical therapeutics, but repelled by its threat of philosophical authority. And I was uncertain whether one could be disassociated from the other. No matter how I interpreted the dialogue’s ambiguity, I found myself positioned as the diseased patient. Long after my body vanquished that cold, I remained infected with the germ of the dialogue’s questions. What disease does Plato’s philosophy cure—and at what cost? Nearly everyone wants to be healthy: as Glaucon points out in Republic, health is good both in itself and for the rewards it brings (Book II, 357c). Good health is the prize that Plato’s philosophy offers; it has long been recognized that medicine is fundamental to his formulation of an authoritative ethical and political “science.”1 If Plato’s philosophical therapeutics has any relevance today, I reasoned, it will be for those who suffer from the same problems he addresses. In this study, I combine rhetorical and philosophical approaches to Plato’s Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus to demonstrate that the concept