Sacred Heart University DigitalCommons@SHU Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Publications 12-2011 Logos and Psyche in Plato's Phaedo Jesse I. Bailey Sacred Heart University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/rel_fac Part of the Ancient Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Bailey, Jesse I. "Logos and Psyche in Plato's Phaedo." Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University, 2011. Web. https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/paper/12631/ This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts Logos and Psyche in Plato’s Phaedo A Dissertation in Philosophy by Jesse I. Bailey © 2011 Jesse I. Bailey Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2011 The dissertation of Jesse I. Bailey was reviewed and approved* by the following: Dennis Schmidt Liberal Arts Research Professor of Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and German Dissertation Adviser Chair of Committee Chris Long Associate Professor of Philosophy and Classics Shannon Sullivan Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head Mark Munn Professor of Ancient Greek History, Greek Archaeology, and Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School. ii ABSTRACT In this dissertation I argue that, according to the Phaedo, the ψυχή should not be understood as a reified, quasi-physical entity which can travel to another τόπος upon separation from the body; that is, the soul should not be understood as what came to be called a “spiritual substance.” Rather, I will show that the Phaedo presents the proper ontology of the soul to be based in an understanding of its characteristic activity. I will argue that this activity is revealed to be the gathering of multiplicities (‘parts’) into the intelligible unities (‘wholes’) which we experience. This gathering occurs in accord with the λόγοι in which the soul has been educated; that is, it is on the basis of our παιδεία that we gather the ‘many’ of bare perceptual experience into the meaningful ‘ones’ of our world. Attention to this characteristic ἔργον constitutes the root of virtue. Attending to this activity will reveal that, initially and for the most part, humans find themselves in a state of internal multiplicity, conflict, and cognitive dissonance. This internal dissent is not to be ultimately explained with reference to ‘parts’ of the soul. I will argue that the Phaedo reveals this internal multiplicity to be far greater than a ‘tri- partite’ theory can explain. Rather, we need to attend to the disharmonious nature of the λόγοι to which we adhere, and through which we gather the world into an intelligible order such that we are called to act. Ethical responsiveness to the world will be shown to be rooted in ontology. That is, it is in light of the way the world appears to us as a meaningful environment that we are called to act and respond ethically. When this world is fractured by internal dissent – that is, specifically, by conflicting opinions within the soul as to what is best – ethical action becomes difficult, and self-mastery is necessary. This self-mastery, however, is only necessary in the absence of internal harmony; when the self has undergone a process of gathering itself to itself – into a unified whole oriented toward the good – the soul as a unity is drawn toward the good, akrasia appears impossible, and the violence of self-mastery becomes unnecessary. The first step in the development of this harmony is a recognition of the essential, defining activity of the ψυχή. Only on this basis is it possible to ‘care for the soul.’ This basic ontology of the ψυχή must first be understood; the centrality of the condition of the soul to the way we experience the world must be recognized. On this basis we can begin to examine the λόγοι through which we gather the world, and our own selves, into intelligible unity; only then can we begin the difficult process of developing a harmony in these λόγοι which can give rise to unified, ethically and rationally directed actions and responsiveness to the world. The initial step in the development of the defining human ἀρετή is turning the soul toward itself. The development of this ontology, self-knowledge, and harmony of the self is the essential defining work of the philosopher; it is only on the basis of this proper ontology of the soul, and subsequent development of self-understanding, that care of the self can be grounded. That is: In order to know the self, it is essential to understand the nature of the ψυχή; to understand the nature of the ψυχή, it is essential to understand its defining activity. The development of excellence (ἀρετή) of the soul is rooted in a proper understanding of this ἔργον. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………...…………………………………………….. 1 Chapter 1. Questions of the Self……………………………….………………………. 20 Chapter 2. Λόγος and the Minotaur…………………………….……………………. 54 Chapter 3. Arguments for Immortality…………….…………………………………. 91 Chapter 4. Perception, Unity, and the Activity of the Soul “Itself Through Itself”. 151 Chapter 5. Recollection and the Activity of the Soul……………………………….. 184 Chapter 6. Aρμονία ………………………………………………………………….. 235 Chapter 7. The Turn to the Λόγος…………………………………….…………….. 289 Chapter 8. Forms and Participation…………………………………….…………… 355 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………... 388 iv Introduction 1.1 The Twin Pillars of Platonism The connection between the separation of the soul from the body and the transcendence of the forms is well attested. The Phaedo has often been taken as a locus classicus for these “Twin Pillars” of traditional Platonism. In the introduction to his translation of the dialogue, R. S. Bluck writes: “. the theory of the Forms and the theory of the immortality of the soul are mutually interdependent; and we may take it that Plato was anxious to justify his belief [in both] before going on to apply his Forms to a wide range of problems in the Republic and later works.”1 However, in this dissertation, I will offer a reading of the text which shows that Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul are intentionally inconclusive. Further, I will argue that the presentation of the hypothesis of the existence of the forms is intentionally incomplete. This reading will open the question for us: If the goal of the Phaedo is not to prove these twin pillars, what is at work in the arguments and actions depicted in the Phaedo? Before turning to a preliminary account of how I will answer this question, it is necessary to describe what I take to be the character of the work of interpreting a Platonic dialogue. 1 1955, p 2 1 1.2 Reading Plato In the second paragraph of the introduction to their edition of the Phaedo, Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem write: . we would do well to pay close attention to the Phaedo in our pursuit of the question, “Who is Socrates, and was he blessed or happy?” In the Phaedo the philosopher Socrates “meets his end.” He does so in the double sense of the phrase: He reaches the termination of his deathbound life, and he reflects, in the company of his friends, on the deathless intellectual vision to which his life has been devoted. To pay serious attention to the Phaedo, then, is to do more than investigate what Socrates talked about and did on the day he died. It is to pursue the question that underlies and pervades all the dialogues of Plato: Who is the true philosopher, and is he really the most blessed and happiest of men?2 But how should we read the dialogue in order to discover the answer to this question? What does it mean to attend to a dialogue in a way that does more than investigate what Socrates and his interlocutors talk about? In this dissertation, I intend to perform an answer to this question by reading the dialogue closely; however, in preface, I will try to make my “method” of reading more explicit. I will do this in part by showing how this method is in accord with trends in recent scholarship, in which it has been argued repeatedly that we must attend not only to the arguments, but also to the “dramatic elements” of the texts.3 Further, I will also follow the Straussian concept of “logographic necessity,” assuming that Plato wrote nothing by chance; we will assume that Plato chose everything we find there, every example and every seemingly-off-hand comment, carefully and with conscious intent. 2 Brann, Kalkavage, Salem 1998, pg 1, emphasis added. 3 On the importance of attention to the dramatic elements to proper interpretation of the dialogues, see especially Sallis 1996, Burger 1984, Brann 2004, Davis 1980, Gonzalez 1995, 1998, and 2009, Miller 1980, 1991, Gordon 1999, Hyland 2004, Klein 1965, and Dorter 1982, as well as the works of Seth Benardete, Leo Strauss, Harold Bloom, and the “Straussian” school of interpretation. 2 In order to initially approach the Phaedo, we have to become clear about the nature of a Platonic dialogue. As a student of Socrates, who refused to put his “philosophy” in writing, Plato was suspicious of written texts. Plato chose the dialogue form in order to attempt to avoid the problems that he and Socrates perceived in communicating philosophical ideas through text. By looking at what those problems are, we can develop an approach to the dialogues which might be more in accord with Plato’s reasons for using the dialogue form.