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Relationships Between Officers and Other Ranks in the Australian Army in the Second World War

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Relationships Between Officers and Other Ranks in the Australian Army in the Second World War Relationships between Officers and Other Ranks in the Australian Army in the Second World War by Michael John Pyne Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of The degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2016 University of Western Sydney i Abstract This thesis argues that the relationship between officers and other ranks in the Australian army in the Second World War were not the relationships that many rank-and-file soldiers had expected when they enlisted between 1939 and 1945. These expectations were formed in great part by the Anzac Legend, created between the First and Second World Wars, with the men expecting an army that was egalitarian in spirit, where officers used informal discipline rather than formal military discipline. They expected a certain sense of ‘civilianism’ when not in active combat. This thesis points to an army with class consciousness and elitism in the officer culture, with increasing officer privilege and control. This control and privilege developed as the war progressed. One of the major reasons for the development of this culture was the different emphasis this army would need to place on the provision of home and forward logistics and support, thus creating an army with a large rear line culture, without the equality of sacrifice of front line service that the army of the First World War experienced. As a result, relations between officers and other ranks were often strained and many men serving behind the lines felt disappointed and embittered and at times redundant in their contribution to the war effort. ii The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution. ____________________________ Michael Pyne iii Acknowledgements Writing a doctoral thesis is a long, protracted process and there are many people who have given me support and shown patience throughout this process. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the help and assistance of my principal supervisor, Tim Rowse. His expertise and encouragement have always been there for me to draw upon. He has been generous in giving his time and guidance and steering me in the right direction. Doctor Elizabeth Roberts-Pedersen, associate supervisor, has been always encouraging and positive and has given excellent guidance, advice and positive reinforcement. Doctor Drew Cottle, has been both an associate supervisor and, for a time, my principal supervisor. I would like to thank him for his historical perspectives and for the fine and invaluable editing he has done, as well as his positive encouragement and guidance. Several people, in particular, have read and made constructive comment on each chapter, showing a sense of perspective for the whole work and leading me in directions I may have not observed. My brothers Geoff and Rod Pyne and sister, Judy Tenzing, have for decades, shared ideas and evidence about Australian and world history and this has given me an excellent broad background on which to base this study. In the writing of this thesis, Geoff has given me instant feedback as each chapter was written and the perspective that comes from his own personal childhood memories of this period, which have been particularly useful in writing the chapter ‘The Idle Army’. The fifth person who has assisted in a direct way is my friend, Andreʹ Legosz, who has done detailed editing and proof reading for each chapter, as well as given knowledgeable feedback on ideas and arguments. He has his own broad knowledge of the topic and being able to share ideas with him has been invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Dianne, who has shown endless patience with me and with this project. She has been the first person to be ‘informed’ of an idea or strand of thinking iv and her personal support and reflection have been there always. Her intelligent and incisive responses have been invaluable. Without these people, a task like this would be impossible v Most people, in fact, will not take the trouble in finding out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the first story they hear. Thucydides1 They had no idea that the equality they claimed and thought they had already achieved would be like this. 2 David Malouf 1 Thucydides, The history of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, Chapter 1, verse 20. Translated by Rex Warner, Melbourne, Penguin, 1952. 2 David Malouf, The Great World, London, Chatto and Windus, 1990, p 141. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements iv Abbreviations vii Tables – Table 1: Typical battalion makeup, Australian Military Force, Second World War. 10 Table 2: 2/6th Battalion strength, April 14, 1940 11 Table 3: Average age of Junior Officers in the 39th Militia 104 and 2/14th AIF Battalions 1942 Table 4: Australian POW Mortality in Ambon and Hainan, 185 Ranks Compared Introduction 9 Chapter 1 - The First World War and the Rise of the Anzac Legend 27 Chapter 2 – Soldiers at the frontline: 1939-1942 47 Chapter 3 – Soldiers at the frontline: 1943-1945 94 Chapter 4 – The rear lines 128 Chapter 5 – The prisoner of war experience 159 Chapter 6 – An idle army 200 Conclusion 246 Bibliography 249 vii ABBREVIATIONS AIF: Australian Imperial Force ALP: Australian Labor Party AMF: Australian Military Forces AWL: Absent Without Leave AWAS: Australian Women’s Army Service CB: Confined to Barracks CMF: Citizen Military Forces CO: Commanding Officer CP: Country Party CPA: Communist Party of Australia GOC: General Officer Commanding Lt: Lieutenant MO: Medical Officer NCO: Non Commissioned Officer NSW: New South Wales OCTU: Officer Cadet Training Unit OTU: Officer Training Unit POW: Prisoner of War RAAF: Royal Australian Airforce RSL: Returned Servicemen’s League RSM: Regimental Sergeant Major RSSILA: The Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia UAP: United Australia Party WO: Warrant Officer viii INTRODUCTION In 1965 the Australian historian Geoffrey Serle, himself a veteran of the Second World War, wrote, ‘All armies are abominations: army life is purgatory to any civilised man. The AIF was anything but a democratic institution, but there is a good case for arguing that it was far more democratic than most…’1 Serle was writing about the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) of the First World War as well as his own experience in the Second World War and this sense of democracy has been an integral part of the Anzac Legend since it was created by C.E.W. Bean2 and others during and after the First World War. It led to an expectation of soldiers in the Second AIF and also to soldiers of the Citizen Military Forces, who were commonly known in the Second World war as the ‘Militia”, that they, too, would be members of a more democratic and more egalitarian army than many others and that their experiences, especially behind the front line, would be similar to their fathers’ experiences. They expected that the relationships between officers and other ranks would be based on informal, rather than formal authority. These characteristics of egalitarianism and democracy were developed by the Anzac Legend out of the First World War and have been a popularly perceived feature of Australian society since. It is Australia’s armed forces who, according to this belief, epitomise these characteristics through the continuation of the Anzac tradition. Whether or not these were characteristics of the First AIF, according to the Anzac Legend, this thesis argues that they were of diminishing presence in the Australian army of the Second World War. If an officer stood up to the ideals of the Anzac Legend, as the men would have expected, he was loved and respected. If he fell short, he was criticised and shunned. The waning of the Anzac ethos was not necessarily because the soldiers were lesser men but because society had changed and the conditions of fighting and serving were greatly different. The purpose of this thesis is to study the experiences of soldiers in the Australian army in the Second World War and see, firstly, if these experiences lived up to 1 G. Serle, ‘The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism’, Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1965, p 153. 2 Bean was the Official War Correspondent and later Chief Military Historian for the Australian forces in the First World War. He wrote the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Vols. 1-6, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1924-1941, as well as well his single volume From Anzac to Amiens, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1946 9 this aspect of the Anzac Legend, and secondly, where their experience varied from the Legend, how this affected the relationships between officers and other ranks. ‘Egalitarianism’ has many meanings in the context of the Australian army of the First and Second World Wars. John Hirst differentiates between two types of egalitarianism, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity.3 An egalitarianism of outcome is impossible, given the different backgrounds of people, some born into advantage and others born into poverty and social dysfunction. It is doubtful if the Australian armies of either world war could have provided this egalitarianism. It is a high ideal for a democratic society; in a hierarchical military organisation, it is definitely not possible. Egalitarianism of opportunity existed technically in that after January, 1915, all men in the First AIF had to enlist as privates and promotion was open to all. However, as with egalitarianism of outcome, a soldier’s social and genetic advantage dictated how far these opportunities could be explored. We can also add egalitarianism of respect and egalitarianism of pretence.
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