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What Drives Armed Groups in Peace Processes? a Case Study of Collective Demobilization in Colombia Between 1982-2016

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What Drives Armed Groups in Peace Processes? a Case Study of Collective Demobilization in Colombia Between 1982-2016 What drives armed groups in peace processes? A case study of collective demobilization in Colombia between 1982-2016 Name: Paco Mens Student ID: 10672052 Supervisor: Dr. Abbey Steele Second reader: Dr. Ursula Daxecker Date: June 2018 Program: Master Thesis Political Science, International Relations Track University: University of Amsterdam 1 Abstract Since 1964, Colombia has been experiencing a violent internal conflict with a number of armed groups. Unfortunately, the countless initiatives that have been started over the years in attempts to secure peace have seen limited success. These many failed negotiations together with the duration of the conflict reveal the difficulty of determining the precise conditions necessary for the leadership of an armed group to sign a peace agreement with the government and to collectively demobilize. Previous work on the Colombian Conflict has failed to structurally compare the peace processes of different armed groups in order to determine what the decisive factors are in their decision to lay down their arms. In this thesis, I have examined the role of a number of factors in these peace processes: the goals of an armed group, commitment problems, the security dilemma, conflict intensity, and prospects for reintegration. I argue that a close examination of these factors combined can adequately explain why an armed group decides to collectively demobilize. Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of a number of people, to whom I want to express my gratitude: Dr. Abbey Steele, who challenged me to improve the academic quality of this work and who provided me with the insights I needed to make this a good thesis. My parents, for supporting me throughout my whole education. They cheered for me when I learned how to count, and they motivated me to get the most out of my education. Jerome Mies, whose wise advice from the other side of the world made me choose this master’s programme in the first place. Wendeline van Seventer, who motivated me week after week to keep up with my schedule. Carolin Vahar-Matiar and Sarah van Veller, whose support throughout the thesis and intelligent comments were indispensable. 2 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4 Chapter 2. Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Civil war literature ........................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Negotiation theory ............................................................................................................ 8 2.3 Mechanisms affecting the peace process ......................................................................... 9 Chapter 3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 14 Chapter 4. Research strategy .................................................................................................... 16 4.1 General Strategy ............................................................................................................. 16 4.2 Operationalization .......................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 5. Background ............................................................................................................ 21 5.1 Origins ............................................................................................................................ 21 5.2 Development .................................................................................................................. 22 Chapter 6. Analysis .................................................................................................................. 26 6.1 M-19 ............................................................................................................................... 28 6.2 PRT, MAQL, and EPL ................................................................................................... 34 6.3 AUC ............................................................................................................................... 40 6.4 FARC ............................................................................................................................. 46 6.5 ELN ................................................................................................................................ 54 6.6 Overview ........................................................................................................................ 61 6.7 Alternative arguments .................................................................................................... 67 Chapter 7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 70 Chapter 8. Sources ................................................................................................................... 73 Chapter 9. Appendix ................................................................................................................ 81 3 Chapter 1. Introduction At the end of 2016, the government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) finally signed a peace agreement in which the FARC agreed to lay down its weapons and attempt reintegration into Colombian society. Although one armed group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), remained active at that stage, the agreement was seen as a huge step towards at last bringing the Colombian conflict that started in 1964 to an end. By the time of the 2016 agreement, the conflict had led to the displacement of about 7 million people and had caused over 220,000 casualties (Miroff 2016). The Colombian conflict has been characterised by the multiplicity of armed actors and almost continuous attempts by the government to reach peace agreements with these actors. In the course of the conflict, some of these armed groups have negotiated peace deals in which they agreed to collectively demobilize. These collective demobilizations have taken place at various points in time and under different conditions. As such, the Colombian conflict allows for a comparison between the varying instances of collective demobilization. For the purposes of this research, demobilisation will be defined as the disarmament and dissolution of force structures and the transition of combatants into civilian status (Tanner 1996 in Knight & Özerdem 2004). It is the second step in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework that has been applied extensively in modern peace-building efforts. As such, it forms the bridge between the associated processes of disarmament and reintegration. Collective demobilization then, refers to the demobilization of an entire armed group (Norman 2017). The goal of this thesis is to establish which factors have influenced the likelihood of collective demobilization of armed groups in the Colombian civil conflict. In the early 1990s, four armed groups decided to accept the latest conditions offered by the government and demobilize collectively, while other groups refused. Amongst the latter was the FARC, which engaged in countless rounds of negotiation with the Colombian state prior to signing the 2016 peace agreement. Another group, the ELN, has to this day been unable to reach an agreement with the government despite extensive efforts on both sides. This leads one to wonder what accounts for the differences in the decision-making process of these armed groups. In searching for an adequate explanation of these differences, this thesis will address the following research 4 question: what factors have influenced the probability of collective demobilization in the Colombian civil conflict between 1982 and 2016? Existing research on collective demobilisation, or at least literature using this terminology, is limited. However, the concept is closely related to well-studied concepts such as peace agreements, conflict resolution, negotiation theory, and peace processes, since it is the desired outcome of peace processes with armed groups This thesis will build upon and adapt existing concepts from these strands of literature to shed light on the determinants of collective demobilization. Important concepts include theories about ‘ripeness’ and the ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ as proposed by Zartman (2000), spoiler problems in peace processes as identified by Stedman (1997), the respective roles of greed and grievance (Collier & Hoeffler 2004), and the security dilemma (Sambanis 2002). These concepts will be used to analyse the different peace processes that have developed between the Colombian government and the armed actors within the conflict. This topic has received much scholarly attention. Notable contributions include Nasi (2009), Chernick (1988, 1999 & 2009), Rampf & Navarro (2014), and Bouvier (2009). Despite the wealth of research on the Colombian peace process, few systematic analyses have been conducted attempting to explain why an armed group chooses to lay down its arms at a specific point in time. Some authors have analysed the peace process of one specific armed group, but to the best of my knowledge there exists only one article that systematically compares the varying factors that have caused armed groups to
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