Annual Report 2001
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The Russia You Never Met
The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya. -
The Case of Ukraine
LAPPEENRANTA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Northern Dimension Research Centre Publication 6 Tauno Tiusanen, Oksana Ivanova, Daria Podmetina EU’S NEW NEIGHBOURS: THE CASE OF UKRAINE Lappeenranta University of Technology Northern Dimension Research Centre P.O.Box 20, FIN-53851 Lappeenranta, Finland Telephone: +358-5-621 11 Telefax: +358-5-621 2644 URL: www.lut.fi/nordi Lappeenranta 2004 ISBN 951-764-896-0 (paperback) ISBN 951-764-897-9 (PDF) ISSN 1459-6679 EU’s New Neighbours: The Case of Ukraine Tauno Tiusanen Oksana Ivanova Daria Podmetina 1 Contents LIST OF TABLES 2 FOREWORD 4 1. INTRODUCTION 5 2. UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC TRENDS 2.1. Economic Growth and Stability in the Early Period of Transition 6 2.2. Investment and Productivity 9 2.3. Living Standard 11 2.4. Current Economic Trends 15 2.5. Distribution of Incomes and Household Expenditures 16 3. UKRAINE: HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND POLITICS 3.1. Geographic Location, Climate and Natural Resources 20 3.2. Political System and Regions 22 3.3. History of Ukraine 24 3.4. Economic History and Reforms 26 4. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN UKRAINE 4.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine 34 4.2. Motives and Obstacles for FDI in Ukraine 37 4.3. Ukraine in International Ratings 40 4.4. The Legal Framework for FDIs 43 4.5. Special Economic Zones 45 5. THE INVESTMENT RATING OF UKRAINIAN REGIONS 5.1. FDIs by Regions 49 5.2. The Investment Rating of Ukrainian Regions 50 5.3. Description of Ukrainian Regions 52 6. FDI SCENE IN UKRAINE: BUSINESS EXAMPLES 6.1. FDI Strategies 72 6.2. -
PROVISIONALLY APPROVED by the Board of Directors of OJSC Rostelecom May 19, 2014 Minutes No 01 Dated May 22, 2014
PROVISIONALLY APPROVED by the Board of Directors of OJSC Rostelecom May 19, 2014 Minutes No 01 dated May 22, 2014 APPROVED by the Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting of OJSC Rostelecom June 30, 2014 Minutes No___ dated June __, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY LONG-DISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ROSTELECOM BASED ON YEAR 2013 RESULTS President of OJSC Rostelecom s/s S.B. Kalugin Acting Chief Accountant of OJSC Rostelecom s/s N.V. Lukashin May 22, 2014 Moscow, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS CAUTIONARY STATEMENT REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS ....................................... 3 INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS ANNUAL REPORT .............................................................................. 4 ROSTELECOM AT A GLANCE ......................................................................................................................... 5 THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE ......................................................................................................................... 6 2013 HIGHLIGHTS ............................................................................................................................................ 8 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 10 COMPANY’S POSITION IN THE INDUSTRY ................................................................................................. 12 COMPANIES IN ROSTELECOM GROUP ...................................................................................................... -
Privatization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite
PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: CATALYST FOR THE ELITE VIRGINIE COULLOUDON During the fall of 1997, the Russian press exposed a corruption scandal in- volving First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais, and several other high- ranking officials of the Russian government.' In a familiar scenario, news organizations run by several bankers involved in the privatization process published compromising material that prompted the dismissal of the politi- 2 cians on bribery charges. The main significance of the so-called "Chubais affair" is not that it pro- vides further evidence of corruption in Russia. Rather, it underscores the im- portance of the scandal's timing in light of the prevailing economic environment and privatization policy. It shows how deliberate this political campaign was in removing a rival on the eve of the privatization of Rosneft, Russia's only remaining state-owned oil and gas company. The history of privatization in Russia is riddled with scandals, revealing the critical nature of the struggle for state funding in Russia today. At stake is influence over defining the rules of the political game. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how privatization in Russia gave birth to an oligarchic re- gime and how, paradoxically, it would eventually destroy that very oligar- chy. This article intends to study how privatization influenced the creation of the present elite structure and how it may further transform Russian decision making in the foreseeable future. Privatization is generally seen as a prerequisite to a market economy, which in turn is considered a sine qua non to establishing a democratic regime. But some Russian analysts and political leaders disagree with this approach. -
Peterstar?” the Story Seemed Curious Since Just the Day Before It Was Announced in the Media That Mr
1 SUCCEEDING IN THE RUSSIAN TELECOMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT The Feb 27, 2001 (p. 11) edition of the St. Petersburg Times included a startling story titled “End of the Road for PeterStar?” The story seemed curious since just the day before it was announced in the media that Mr. Sergei Kuznetsov, general director of PeterStar had been made the acting general director of Rostelecom pending almost certain share approval from the shareholders at their meeting scheduled for March 11, 2001. ZAO PeterStar was founded in October 1992 at the dawn of the emergence of the free markets and Perestroika in Russia. PeterStar was formed with the participation of Leningrad City Telephone Network2. Before 1992 all communication services in Russia were controlled directly by the Ministry of Communications without making any distinction between postal services, TV and radio broadcasting and telecommunications. In 1992, the government split up these three sectors while the whole telecommunications sector was restructured, 79 regional telephone companies which provide local services, six local trunk network operators which provide toll switching and one long-distance and international services provider Rostelecom were created. In 1992-93, more than 4000 licenses were granted to private operators. These operators have primarily focused on value added services such as digital overlay networks (Sovintel, Comstar, Combellga, PeterStar), cellular services (Moscow Cellular Communications, Mobile TeleSystems, Vympelcom, Delta Telecom, Northwest GSM etc.) and paging services. These licenses were meant to be the pillars on which the new Russian telecommunication industry was to be built. All these players have been helped by the fact that the existing networks did not posses the necessary technical, human and financial resources to satisfy the growing demand for value added services. -
NW ICT Cluster
Sarja B 199 Series ______________________________________________________ Andrey Averin – Grigory Dudarev BUSY LINES, HECTIC PROGRAMMING A Competitive Analysis of the Northwest Russian ICT Cluster ETLA, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy Publisher: Taloustieto Oy Helsinki 2003 Cover: Mainos MayDay, Vantaa 2003 ISBN 951-628-381-0 ISSN 0356-7443 Printed in: Tummavuoren Kirjapaino Oy, Vantaa 2003 AVERIN, Andrey – DUDAREV, Grigory, BUSY LINES, HECTIC PROGRAM- MING: Competitive Analysis of the Northwest Russian ICT Cluster. Helsinki: ETLA, Elinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, 2003, 161 p. (B, ISSN 0356-7443; No. 199). ISBN 951-628-381-0. ABSTRACT: Northwest Russia and particularly St. Petersburg were a globally im- portant development center for information and communication technologies (ICT) during 1850-1950. The region’s position of strength deteriorated after this period as a consequence of the choices made about technology and Soviet secrecy. However, the region and its ICT industries still enjoy the benefits of education provision, the re- search-oriented tradition and inherited human and industrial capital. The transition to the market economy opened up many opportunities but also resulted in the evapora- tion of uncompetitive producers like giant electronics manufacturers. It also reduced financing and changed the priorities for R&D and education. At the same time, breakthroughs in telecom technologies and the overwhelming success of mobile communications greatly influenced the ICT industries in Russia. Understanding the major changes and trends is crucial for industrial policy and business strategy deci- sion makers. In this study, we identify the Northwest Russian ICT cluster and the key matters related to its competitiveness and growth prospects in the new environment. -
Trubnikov Competitive 29-01-2018
Tilburg University The competitive order for the new economy Trubnikov, Dmitrii Publication date: 2018 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Trubnikov, D. (2018). The competitive order for the new economy: Lessons from the telecommunications experience. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 25. sep. 2021 Dmitrii Trubnikov The Competitive Order for the New Economy: Lessons from the Telecommunications Experience Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna in collaborazione con LAST-JD Consortium Università degli studi di Torino Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Mykolas Romeris University Tilburg University DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN Erasmus Mundus Joint International Doctoral Degree in Law, Science and Technology Ciclo 30 – A.Y. 2014/2015 Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 12H3 Settore Scientifico disciplinare: IUS20 TITOLO TESI The Competitive Order for the New Economy: Lessons from the Telecommunications Experience Presentata da: DMITRII TRUBNIKOV Coordinatore Relatore Prof. -
Investor Presentation
Investor Presentation May 2012 www.rt.ru Disclaimer By attending any meeting where this presentation is made, or by reading any part of this presentation, you acknowledge and agree to be bound by the following: This presentation has been prepared by OJSC Rostelecom (the “Company”). This presentation is strictly confidential to the recipient, may not be distributed to the press or any other person, and may not be reproduced in any form, in whole or in part. The Company has included its own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments in preparing certain market information herein, which have not been verified by an independent third party. Market information included herein is, therefore, unless otherwise attributed exclusively to a third party source, to a certain degree subjective. While the Company believes that its own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments are reasonable and that the market information prepared by the Company appropriately reflects the industry and the markets in which it operates, there is no assurance that the Company’s own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments are the most appropriate for making determinations relating to market information. Neither the Company nor any of its affiliates, advisors or representatives shall have any liability whatsoever (in negligence or otherwise) for any loss howsoever arising from any use of this presentation or its contents or otherwise arising in connection with this presentation. This presentation is confidential and does not constitute or form part of, and should not be construed as, an offer to sell or issue or the solicitation of an offer to buy or acquire securities of the Company or any of its subsidiaries in any jurisdiction or an inducement to enter into investment activity in any jurisdiction. -
Who Governs the Russian Economy? a Cross-Section of Russia's Largest Corporations
Kari Liuhto & Peeter Vahtra Who governs the Russian economy? A cross-section of Russia's largest corporations Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 12/2009 ISSN 1795 - 5076 Who governs the Russian economy? A cross-section of Russia's largest corporations 1 Kari Liuhto2 and Peeter Vahtra3 12/2009 Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute http://www.tse.fi/pei 1 We wish to thank the following Finnish research foundations which have made it possible to conduct this report and numerous earlier studies linked with the theme; Emil Aaltonen Foundation, Foundation for Economic Education, Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, The Marcus Wallenberg Economic Foundation and The Paulo Foundation. 2 Kari Liuhto is Professor in International Business and Director of the Pan-European Institute at the Turku School of Economics. His research interests include EU-Russia economic relations, energy relations in particular, foreign investments into Russia and the investments of Russian firms abroad, and economic policy measures of strategic significance. Liuhto has worked as an expert in several Russia-related projects funded by both Finnish institutions and foreign ones, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the United Nations, and the World Bank. 3 Peeter Vahtra is a Research Fellow at the Pan-European Institute at the Turku School of Economics. His areas of research expertise include Russia’s energy policy, FDI to and from Russia and Russia’s economic policy. Kari Liuhto and Peeter Vahtra PEI Electronic Publications 12/2009 www.tse.fi/pei __________________________________________________________________________________________ Contents 1. The state has increased its ownership in big business, but left small and medium-sized companies untouched 2 2. -
Annual Report 2016 About This Report
Annual Report 2016 About this Report This Annual Report was pre-approved by Rostelecom’s Board of Directors on 15 May 2017, Minutes No. 19 dated 15 May 2017. This Report has been prepared by PJSC Rostelecom (“Rostelecom” or the “Company”) and its subsidiaries (jointly, the “Group”), in line with Note 9 Subsidiaries to the Company’s consolidated financial statements prepared under the International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) for the year ended 31 December 2016. DISCLAIMER This Report contains certain “forward- » plans to improve the Company’s corporate » risks associated with changes in looking statements regarding future events”, governance practices; the political, economic and social as defined by the US federal securities laws, » the Company’s future position in environment in Russia and macroeconomic which are, therefore, regulated by these the telecommunications market and changes; laws, which provide for no liability for any act the outlook for the market segments in » risks associated with Russian laws, done or omitted in good faith. Such forward- which the Company operates; legislative reforms and taxation, including looking statements regarding future events » economic outlook and industry trends; laws, regulations, decrees and resolutions include (but are not limited to) the following: » potential regulatory changes and governing the Russian telecommunications assessments of the impact any laws or industry, activities related to placement » estimates of future operational and financial regulations may have on the -
Annual Report Centertelecom OJSC Worldreginfo - B3f15fb4-Cd51-422F-8506-19C091b96d1e Contents
2008 Annual Report CenterTelecom OJSC WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e Contents Key Performance Figures ............................................................................................................... 4 Company Profile .............................................................................................................................. 8 Mission and Strategy ....................................................................................................................10 Address to Shareholders ..............................................................................................................12 Key 2008 – 2009 Events ................................................................................................................16 Event of the Year: Implementation of Universal Service Mechanism ..................................22 Key Results of 2008 and Objectives for 2009-2013 .................................................................24 Key Business Directions of the Company .................................................................................25 › Short Summary of Telecommunications Industry Development in Russia ................................................................. 26 › The Company's Position in the Telecommunications Services Market of the Central Federal District of Russia ..... 27 › Core Development Trends of the Company ........................................................................................................................... 29 -
Political Risk for Foreign Firms in Russia1
POLITICAL RISK FOR FOREIGN FIRMS 9. IN RUSSIA1 Kari LIUHTO* Abstract In this article the author discusses the political risks of foreign firms in Russia. Risks vary a great deal between the industries. Telecommunications is the most risky industry for a foreign firm at the moment. State consolidation in the oil and gas business has continued. When Russia experiences difficult times, foreign oil companies enjoy good times in Russia, and vice versa, and therefore, the latest crisis gives, at least, a temporary relief for foreign oil firms. I predict that the metal industry will also see its national champion. The production of electrical energy is a strategic sector, though it was not explicitly named in the law of strategic sectors, and foreign electricity firms operating in Russia may face surprises, if the Russian Government turns more nationalistic in the next decade. Keywords: Investment climate, political risks, foreign direct investment in Russia JEL classification: F21, F23 1. Russia’s foreign investment paradox: foreign investments have grown though political risks have increased in the 2000’s Russia is notoriously corrupt, and hence by definition, the state is an inefficient governor of any property. Despite this well-known fact state ownership in big business has widened (Troika Dialog 2008).”State-owned enterprises are found across a wide range of sectors and often occupy a dominant position in their industry. Furthermore, there is a pervasive blurring of the line between the public and private sectors, arising not only from the extensive role of state-owned enterprises but also by close ties between government (at all levels) and major private firms” (OECD 2009, 17).