DOCSLIB.ORG

Annual Report Centertelecom OJSC Worldreginfo - B3f15fb4-Cd51-422F-8506-19C091b96d1e Contents

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Annual Report Centertelecom OJSC Worldreginfo - B3f15fb4-Cd51-422F-8506-19C091b96d1e Contents 2008 Annual Report CenterTelecom OJSC WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e Contents Key Performance Figures ............................................................................................................... 4 Company Profile .............................................................................................................................. 8 Mission and Strategy ....................................................................................................................10 Address to Shareholders ..............................................................................................................12 Key 2008 – 2009 Events ................................................................................................................16 Event of the Year: Implementation of Universal Service Mechanism ..................................22 Key Results of 2008 and Objectives for 2009-2013 .................................................................24 Key Business Directions of the Company .................................................................................25 › Short Summary of Telecommunications Industry Development in Russia ................................................................. 26 › The Company's Position in the Telecommunications Services Market of the Central Federal District of Russia ..... 27 › Core Development Trends of the Company ........................................................................................................................... 29 › Prospects for Development ......................................................................................................................................................... 30 Results of the Company's Operations in 2008 .........................................................................33 › Key Economic Figures ..................................................................................................................................................................... 34 › Revenues Structure from Telecommunications Services for 2008 ................................................................................. 39 › Financial Activities ............................................................................................................................................................................ 44 › Investment Activities ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45 › Tariff Policy .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 46 Equity Capital and Securities ......................................................................................................47 › Charter Capital ................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 › Shares.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 50 › Market Capitalization ...................................................................................................................................................................... 53 › American Depository Receipts .................................................................................................................................................... 53 › Corporate Bonds ............................................................................................................................................................................... 56 Social Responsibility .....................................................................................................................57 › Personnel and HR Policy ................................................................................................................................................................ 58 › Personnel Development ................................................................................................................................................................ 60 › Social Responsibility and Charity ................................................................................................................................................ 62 WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e Corporate Governance .................................................................................................................63 › Board of Directors ............................................................................................................................................................................. 64 › Management Board ......................................................................................................................................................................... 64 › Audit Commission ............................................................................................................................................................................ 65 › Corporate Governance System .................................................................................................................................................... 65 › Dividend Policy.................................................................................................................................................................................. 66 › Subsidiaries and Affiliates .............................................................................................................................................................. 67 › Public and Investor Relations ....................................................................................................................................................... 68 › Ratings .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 69 › Improvement of Corporate Governance Practices ............................................................................................................... 70 Information for Shareholders .....................................................................................................72 Risk Management ..........................................................................................................................75 Glossary ...........................................................................................................................................77 Forward-Looking Statements .....................................................................................................79 Information about the Company ...............................................................................................80 WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e Key Performance Figures WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e 4 Key Performance Figures Key Economic Figures 2008 2007 Change, % Revenues from core operations, RUR million 33,715 32,409 +4.03 Expenses on core operations 26,351 23,974 +9.91 EBITDA* 12,207 11,704 +4.29 CAPEX 6,807 5,266 +29.26 Depreciation 4,278 3,834 +11.58 Sales profit 7,364 8,435 -12.70 Net profit 2,585 3,635 -28.89 Basic earnings per share, RUR 1.475 2.073 -28.85 EBITDA margin 36.21% 36.11% - Profitability on sales profit 21.84% 26.04% - Profitability on net profit 7.37% 11.22% - Net debt/EBITDA 2.04 1.96 - Share price at year end, USD 0.13 0.87 -85.06% * EBITDA is calculated as earnings before taxes plus interest payable plus depreciation plus leasing payment minus interest receivable Revenues, RUR Billion 2008 33.72 2007 32.41 2006 28.4 2005 27.59 2004 24.96 0 5101520253035 WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e 5 EBITDA, RUR Billion 2008 12.21 2007 11.7 2006 9.78 2005 7.19 2004 5.38 036912 15 Net Profit, RUR Billion 2008 2,585 2007 3,635 2006 2,047.9 2005 654.9 2004 397.7 0 5001,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 Key Operating Indicators 2008 2007 Change, % Number of employees 31,517 46,637 -32.40 Number of lines 6,842,992 6,739,610 +1.53 Number of lines per employee** 185 132 +39.90 Installed capacity of telephone network including 7,233,510 7,102,574 +1.84 city telephone network, numbers 6,198,059 6,080,502 +1.93 rural telephone network, numbers 1,035,451 1,022,072 +1.31 Activated capacity of local telephone network including 6,763,530 6,711,392 +0.87 city telephone network, numbers 5,866,901 5,807,488 +1.02 rural telephone network, numbers 896,629 903,904 -0.81 Level of digitalization of local telephone network including 66.0% 57.7% - city telephone network 70.2% 62.4% - rural telephone network 40.6% 29.7% - Number of automatic telephone exchanges 8,358 8,400 -0.5 Number of ADSL Internet users 705,075 304,000 +131.93 Length of fiber optic intra-zone telecommunications lines, km 19,009.5 16,613.7 +14.41 ** The indicator is calculated using the figure «average number of employees» which reached 37,026 and 51,019 people for 2008 and 2007 respectively WorldReginfo - b3f15fb4-cd51-422f-8506-19c091b96d1e 6 Average Personnel Number, thousand people 2008 31.5 2007 46.6 2006 56.3 2005 65.2 2004
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Annual Report 2011
    possibilities ANNUAL REPORT 2011 CONTENTS About the company ............................................................................... 2 Key financial & operational highlights ............................................. 12 Key events of 2011 & early 2012 ...................................................... 14 Bright upside potential from the reorganization ............................. 18 Strong market position ................................................................... 20 Up in the “Clouds” ........................................................................... 22 Chairman’s statement ........................................................................ 24 Letter from the President ................................................................... 26 Strategy .............................................................................................. 28 M&A activity ........................................................................................ 31 Corporate governance ........................................................................ 34 Board of Directors & committees .................................................... 34 Management Board & committees ................................................. 37 Internal Audit Commission ............................................................. 40 Remuneration of members of the Board of Directors and the Management Board ............................................................. 40 Dividend policy ................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Russia You Never Met
    The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Privatization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite
    PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: CATALYST FOR THE ELITE VIRGINIE COULLOUDON During the fall of 1997, the Russian press exposed a corruption scandal in- volving First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais, and several other high- ranking officials of the Russian government.' In a familiar scenario, news organizations run by several bankers involved in the privatization process published compromising material that prompted the dismissal of the politi- 2 cians on bribery charges. The main significance of the so-called "Chubais affair" is not that it pro- vides further evidence of corruption in Russia. Rather, it underscores the im- portance of the scandal's timing in light of the prevailing economic environment and privatization policy. It shows how deliberate this political campaign was in removing a rival on the eve of the privatization of Rosneft, Russia's only remaining state-owned oil and gas company. The history of privatization in Russia is riddled with scandals, revealing the critical nature of the struggle for state funding in Russia today. At stake is influence over defining the rules of the political game. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how privatization in Russia gave birth to an oligarchic re- gime and how, paradoxically, it would eventually destroy that very oligar- chy. This article intends to study how privatization influenced the creation of the present elite structure and how it may further transform Russian decision making in the foreseeable future. Privatization is generally seen as a prerequisite to a market economy, which in turn is considered a sine qua non to establishing a democratic regime. But some Russian analysts and political leaders disagree with this approach.
    [Show full text]
  • OJSC Centertelecom
    OJSC CenterTelecom Audit Report on Financial Statements for the Year Ending December 31, 2007 March 2008 TRANSLATION OF ORIGINAL RUSSIAN VERSION Central Telecommunication Company OJSC Explanatory Notes to Financial Statements for 2007 Comparative data (RUR thousand unless otherwise stated) AUDIT REPORT - OJSC CENTERTELECOM CONTENTS PAGE Independent auditor's report on financial statements of OJSC CenterTelecom 3 Appendices 1. Financial statements of OJSC CenterTelecom for the period from 1 January, 5 2007 through December 31, 2007, including: Balance Sheet Profit and Loss Statement Statement of Changes in the Shareholders' Equity Statement of Cash Flows Appendix to Balance Sheet Explanatory Notes to Financial Statements TRANSLATION OF ORIGINAL RUSSIAN VERSION 2 Central Telecommunication Company OJSC Explanatory Notes to Financial Statements for 2007 Comparative data (RUR thousand unless otherwise stated) INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CENTERTELECOM OJSC To the shareholders of OJSC CenterTelecom DETAILS OF THE AUDITING FIRM Name: ERNST AND YOUNG LLC Address: Russia 115035, Moscow, Sadovnicheskaya naberezhnaya, 77, building 1 Certificate of an entry made to the Uniform State Register of Legal Entities Concerning a Legal Entity Registered Before July 1, 2002; date of entry: December 05, 2002, series 77, No. 007367150, registered by the Moscow Registration Chamber State Institution on June 20, 2002, No. 108.877, Main Registration No. 1027739707203. Audit License No. E002138, approved by Order No. 223of the Russian Ministry of Finance dated September 30, 2002 for a term of five years, prolonged by Order No.573 of the Russian Ministry of Finance dated September 17, 2007 until September 30, 2012. Membership of an accredited professional auditors' association - ERNST & YOUNG LLC is a member of Non-profit Partnership «The Institute of Professional Accountants of Russia» («IPAR»).
    [Show full text]
  • Peterstar?” the Story Seemed Curious Since Just the Day Before It Was Announced in the Media That Mr
    1 SUCCEEDING IN THE RUSSIAN TELECOMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT The Feb 27, 2001 (p. 11) edition of the St. Petersburg Times included a startling story titled “End of the Road for PeterStar?” The story seemed curious since just the day before it was announced in the media that Mr. Sergei Kuznetsov, general director of PeterStar had been made the acting general director of Rostelecom pending almost certain share approval from the shareholders at their meeting scheduled for March 11, 2001. ZAO PeterStar was founded in October 1992 at the dawn of the emergence of the free markets and Perestroika in Russia. PeterStar was formed with the participation of Leningrad City Telephone Network2. Before 1992 all communication services in Russia were controlled directly by the Ministry of Communications without making any distinction between postal services, TV and radio broadcasting and telecommunications. In 1992, the government split up these three sectors while the whole telecommunications sector was restructured, 79 regional telephone companies which provide local services, six local trunk network operators which provide toll switching and one long-distance and international services provider Rostelecom were created. In 1992-93, more than 4000 licenses were granted to private operators. These operators have primarily focused on value added services such as digital overlay networks (Sovintel, Comstar, Combellga, PeterStar), cellular services (Moscow Cellular Communications, Mobile TeleSystems, Vympelcom, Delta Telecom, Northwest GSM etc.) and paging services. These licenses were meant to be the pillars on which the new Russian telecommunication industry was to be built. All these players have been helped by the fact that the existing networks did not posses the necessary technical, human and financial resources to satisfy the growing demand for value added services.
    [Show full text]
  • Investor Presentation
    Investor Presentation May 2012 www.rt.ru Disclaimer By attending any meeting where this presentation is made, or by reading any part of this presentation, you acknowledge and agree to be bound by the following: This presentation has been prepared by OJSC Rostelecom (the “Company”). This presentation is strictly confidential to the recipient, may not be distributed to the press or any other person, and may not be reproduced in any form, in whole or in part. The Company has included its own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments in preparing certain market information herein, which have not been verified by an independent third party. Market information included herein is, therefore, unless otherwise attributed exclusively to a third party source, to a certain degree subjective. While the Company believes that its own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments are reasonable and that the market information prepared by the Company appropriately reflects the industry and the markets in which it operates, there is no assurance that the Company’s own estimates, assessments, adjustments and judgments are the most appropriate for making determinations relating to market information. Neither the Company nor any of its affiliates, advisors or representatives shall have any liability whatsoever (in negligence or otherwise) for any loss howsoever arising from any use of this presentation or its contents or otherwise arising in connection with this presentation. This presentation is confidential and does not constitute or form part of, and should not be construed as, an offer to sell or issue or the solicitation of an offer to buy or acquire securities of the Company or any of its subsidiaries in any jurisdiction or an inducement to enter into investment activity in any jurisdiction.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Governs the Russian Economy? a Cross-Section of Russia's Largest Corporations
    Kari Liuhto & Peeter Vahtra Who governs the Russian economy? A cross-section of Russia's largest corporations Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 12/2009 ISSN 1795 - 5076 Who governs the Russian economy? A cross-section of Russia's largest corporations 1 Kari Liuhto2 and Peeter Vahtra3 12/2009 Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute http://www.tse.fi/pei 1 We wish to thank the following Finnish research foundations which have made it possible to conduct this report and numerous earlier studies linked with the theme; Emil Aaltonen Foundation, Foundation for Economic Education, Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, The Marcus Wallenberg Economic Foundation and The Paulo Foundation. 2 Kari Liuhto is Professor in International Business and Director of the Pan-European Institute at the Turku School of Economics. His research interests include EU-Russia economic relations, energy relations in particular, foreign investments into Russia and the investments of Russian firms abroad, and economic policy measures of strategic significance. Liuhto has worked as an expert in several Russia-related projects funded by both Finnish institutions and foreign ones, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the United Nations, and the World Bank. 3 Peeter Vahtra is a Research Fellow at the Pan-European Institute at the Turku School of Economics. His areas of research expertise include Russia’s energy policy, FDI to and from Russia and Russia’s economic policy. Kari Liuhto and Peeter Vahtra PEI Electronic Publications 12/2009 www.tse.fi/pei __________________________________________________________________________________________ Contents 1. The state has increased its ownership in big business, but left small and medium-sized companies untouched 2 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Joint-Stock Company Issuer’S Code: 10214-A
    QUARTERLY REPORT "Interregional Distribution Grid Company of Centre", Public Joint-Stock Company Issuer’s code: 10214-A for Quarter 1, 2016 Location of the issuer: 2nd Yamskaya, 4, Moscow, Russian Federation, 127018 The information containing in this quarterly report is subject to disclosure in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on securities ____________ O.Y. Isaev General Director signature Date: 13 May 2016 Chief Accountant - Head of Financial and Tax Accounting and ____________ L.A. Sklyarova signature Reporting Department Date: 13 May 2016 Contact person: Principal Specialist of Corporate Office of the Department for Corporate Governance and Interaction with Shareholders, Yulia Dmitrievna Naumova Phone: (495) 747-9292 #3286 Fax: (495) 747-9295 E-mail: [email protected] Internet site used by the issuer for the information disclosure, containing in this quarterly report: http://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/company.aspx?id=7985; http://www.mrsk-1.ru/ru/information/. 1 Table of contents Table of contents .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 Section I. Data on bank accounts, on the auditor, appraiser and financial adviser of the issuer, and also persons, who signed the quarterly report ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Corporate Governance and Control in Russian Banks
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive Corporate governance and control in Russian banks Vernikov, Andrei Higher School of Economics April 2007 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10028/ MPRA Paper No. 10028, posted 14 Aug 2008 23:59 UTC A. Vernikov CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL IN RUSSIAN BANKS Препринт WP1/2007/02 Серия WP1 Институциональные проблемы российской экономики Москва ГУ ВШЭ 2007 УДК 6.7.078. 1. Introduction ББК 65.262. V46 In this paper we look at the evolving model of corporate governance (herein- after “CG”) in Russian commercial banks. It is an attempt of empirical analysis applied to a specific sector of the economy, with the help of methodology and in- struments of institutional economics. Having to choose from many concepts and definitions of CG2, for the purposes of this study we stick to the ‘narrow’ defini- Редактор серии WP tion of CG as a set of instruments and institutional mechanisms for protecting the «Институциональные проблемы российской экономики» rights of shareholders and company owners. А.А. Яковлев Issues of CG in Russian banks have come to the fore of researchers’ and prac- titioners’ agenda in the middle of this decade in connection with the practical Vernikov A. Corporate governance and control in Russian banks. Working paper V46 WP/2007/02. – Moscow: State University – Higher School of Economics, 2007. – steps of both major banks – Sberbank and VTB – towards equity markets, as well 40 p. as many other banks’ plans to place shares on the market. CG is no longer the do- main of interest of large international players and leading private banks with glo- The Working Paper employs the paradigm of new institutional economics to examine peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector.
    [Show full text]
  • UNITED STATES SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION Form 20-F MOBILE TELESYSTEMS OJSC
    MERRILL CORPORATION LPALLES//18-APR-13 11:34 DISK135:[12ZDM1.12ZDM79201]BA79201A.;7 mrll_1111.fmt Free: 42DM/0D Foot: 0D/ 0D VJ Seq: 1 Clr: 0 DISK024:[PAGER.PSTYLES]UNIVERSAL.BST;102 3 C Cs: 2075 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 Form 20-F អ Registration Statement pursuant to Section 12(b) or (g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or ፤ Annual report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012 or អ Transition report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or អ Shell company report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Date of event requiring this shell company report Commission file number 333-12032 15JUN201106100788 MOBILE TELESYSTEMS OJSC (Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter) Not Applicable (Translation of Registrant’s name into English) RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) 4 Marksistskaya Street, Moscow 109147 Russian Federation (Address of Principal Executive Offices) Joshua B. Tulgan Director, Investor Relations Mobile TeleSystems OJSC 5 Vorontsovskaya Street, bldg. 2, 109147 Moscow Russian Federation Phone: +7 495 223 20 25, Fax: +7 495 911 65 67 E-mail: [email protected] (Name, Telephone, E-mail and/or Facsimile number and Address of Company Contact Person) Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of Each Class Name of Each Exchange on which Registered AMERICAN DEPOSITARY SHARES,
    [Show full text]
  • Political Risk for Foreign Firms in Russia1
    POLITICAL RISK FOR FOREIGN FIRMS 9. IN RUSSIA1 Kari LIUHTO* Abstract In this article the author discusses the political risks of foreign firms in Russia. Risks vary a great deal between the industries. Telecommunications is the most risky industry for a foreign firm at the moment. State consolidation in the oil and gas business has continued. When Russia experiences difficult times, foreign oil companies enjoy good times in Russia, and vice versa, and therefore, the latest crisis gives, at least, a temporary relief for foreign oil firms. I predict that the metal industry will also see its national champion. The production of electrical energy is a strategic sector, though it was not explicitly named in the law of strategic sectors, and foreign electricity firms operating in Russia may face surprises, if the Russian Government turns more nationalistic in the next decade. Keywords: Investment climate, political risks, foreign direct investment in Russia JEL classification: F21, F23 1. Russia’s foreign investment paradox: foreign investments have grown though political risks have increased in the 2000’s Russia is notoriously corrupt, and hence by definition, the state is an inefficient governor of any property. Despite this well-known fact state ownership in big business has widened (Troika Dialog 2008).”State-owned enterprises are found across a wide range of sectors and often occupy a dominant position in their industry. Furthermore, there is a pervasive blurring of the line between the public and private sectors, arising not only from the extensive role of state-owned enterprises but also by close ties between government (at all levels) and major private firms” (OECD 2009, 17).
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Political and Business Interests on the Contemporary
    THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS ON THE CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN MEDIA. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN RUSSIAN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY BY GREGORY J. SIMONS University of Canterbury 2001 CONTENTS LIST OF GRAPHS v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi LIST OF WORDS vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS viii ABSTRACT ix 0.0 Chapter Objectives 1 0.1 Introduction 1 0.2 Principal Theories for the Thesis 5 CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN MEDIA 1.0 Media Theory 8 1.0.1 The Significance of the Mass Media 8 1.0.2 Social Functions of the Media 8 1.0.3 Requirements for the Freedom of the Press 9 1.1 Theories for the Press 10 1.2 Political Communication 18 1.3 Media Baron Profiles 20 1.3.1 Vladimir Gusinsky 20 1.3.2 Boris Berezovsky 21 1.3.3 Vladimir Potanin 22 1.4 Mass Media During Soviet Times 22 1.5 Late Soviet Media 25 1.6 Chapter Findings 28 CHAPTER II: BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE MEDIA 2.0 Chapter Objectives 30 2.1 Russian Politics 30 2.2 The Political Struggle 33 2.3 The Information War 33 2.4 Putin's Rise to Power 35 2.5 Berezovsky's Challenge 38 2.6 Chapter Findings 41 CHAPTER Ill: THE INFLUENCE OF CORRUPTION ON THE MEDIA 3.0 Chapter Objectives 44 3.1 Blat 44 3.2 Definition of Corruption 46 3.3 Corruption in the Soviet Union 48 3.4 A History of Corruption in Contemporary Russia 50 3.5 Government Campaigns Against Corruption 52 3.6 The Russian Privatisation Process 54 3.7 Media Involvement in Reporting on Corruption 56 3.8 Use of Corruption in Politics 58 3.9 Chapter
    [Show full text]