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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 76 - 17,985 GQMBERT, Dennis N., 1945- ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976 Political Science, international law and relations
Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
© Copyright by Dennis N. Gombert .. 1976 ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Dennis N. Gombert, B.S,, M,A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1976
Reading Committee: Approved By
Charles F. Hermann James E. Harf Randall B. Ripley Advlirer Department of Political Science To Helen ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the numerous individuals that have contributed to this study as well as my development as a political scientist.
My initial interest in the field of international politics was stimulated by Mohamed El-Behairy who also received his graduate degree from The Ohio State University. Arthur E. Dowell furthered my interest in American foreign policy, and patiently supervised my first scholarly undertaking. I am indebted to both of these individuals for their time and understanding at a very early stage in my professional development.
Philip M. Burgess, my adviser throughout most of my graduate work at Ohio State, has had a profound impact on my development as a student of international politics and as a professional political scientist. The scope of this study was initially his suggestion, and he was a guiding force in getting it off the ground. I grate fully acknowledge the time and efforts that Phil Burgess has made on my behalf since I came to this University.
I am most indebted to Charles F. Hermann for the contribution he has made to my professional development and the completion of this study. As my dissertation adviser, he has given more of himself than I can ever repay. Without his willingness to contri
bute a substantial amount of time, patience, constructive criticism,
and encouragement, this study would not have been completed. I
will always value the commitment he made to me at a most critical
time in my career.
Professors James E. Harf and Randall B. Ripley have been most
helpful in their capacity as members of my dissertation committee.
Their comments and suggestions assisted in clarifying issues and
increased the quality of this study. Moreover, both Professor
Harf and Professor Ripley have always given freely of their time
to discuss problems that I encountered during my course of study
at Ohio State. I have definitely benefited from having the
opportunity to associate and work with both of them.
Numerous individuals have assisted in a variety of ways through out this study. The librarian staffs of The Ohio State University,
Columbus Public Library, and the Library of Congress effectively
responded to all my requests. Ms. Betsy A. White and Mr. Stanley
Stack were most helpful in servicing my requests to the Defense
Security Assistance Agency. Mr. Edward Feingold and Mr. Richard
Wilcox at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency graciously took time from their busy schedules to discuss arms transfer issues and
current Government policy. Likewise, Colonel Max Nunnekamp and
Colonel James Naled assisted in clarifying my perspective for comparing various aircraft weapon systems. My colleagues at Ohio State have provided numerous suggestions throughout this study and were readily available to discuss the various dimensions of arms
transfers. Also, I wish to acknowledge the continual contributions
that Mr. James Ludwig has made to my research efforts at Ohio
State. Jim Ludwig has been an invaluable source of knowledge in
the field of computer programming and applications to research problems. His assistance and friendship will always be appreciated by me and others that he has assisted in the Department of Political
Science.
Sandy Wood has patiently and skillfully typed the final draft of this study. Too often secretaries are not given full credit for the essential services that they provide in the academic community.
Sandy's skill as a typist and her knowledge of University require ments have made the preparation of this study a less painful process. Her contribution will always be deeply appreciated.
I am most grateful for the financial support that the Depart ment of Political Science has provided me during my course of study at Ohio State. The Polimetrics Laboratory provided a substantial amount of support in preparing my data for analysis, and the
Instruction and Research Computer Center provided the facilities and computer time for analyzing the data. Without such support, this study could not have been completed.
I have also greatly benefited from having the opportunity to associate with the faculty of the Department of Political Science.
v In each individual's way, they have contributed to my overall development. My thanks to them as a whole for always being avail- able when it counted. A special acknowledgement is in order for
Dr. C. Richard Hofstetter who has been both an adviser and a good friend at Ohio State. I am most fortunate to have had the opportunity to work for and with Dick Hofstetter.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife Helen for her love, patience, sacrifices, and strength during our years together. I am exception ally fortunate to have such a wonderful person to share my life with, and it is to her that I dedicate this study.
Of course, only I alone am responsible for the content of this study and its conclusions. VITA
August 19, 1945 Born - North Tonawanda, New York
1967 B.S., State University of New York, College at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York
1967-1969 Research Assistant, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana
1969 M.A., Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana
1969-1972 Archivist, Polimetrics Laboratory The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1972 M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1972-1973 Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1973-1974 Lecturer, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University Newark, Ohio Columbus, Ohio Marion, Ohio
Research Associate, American Political Science Association Education Project, Mershon Center, The Ohio State Univer sity, Columbus, Ohio
1974-1975 Consultant, Survey Research Service, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1975- Foreign Affairs Specialist, United States Information Agency, Washington, D.C.
vii FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: International Relations
Comparative Foreign Policy. Professor Philip M. Burgess and Professor James N. Roseau
International Systems and Processes. Professor James E. Harf
Cross-National Topic - Elites. Professor Giacomo Sani
Area Speciality - Japan. Professor Bradley M. Richardson
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii
VITA ...... vii
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... xi
LIST OF FIGURES...... xiv
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
Role of Congress...... 4 Assessment...... 8 Framework for the Model ...... 14 Units of Analysis...... 22 Summation...... 28
II. THE TRANSFER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS...... 37
Introduction...... 37 Arms Control and Weapons Transfers...... 45 Air Weapon System Suppliers ...... 50 Extent of United States Aircraft Sales...... 56 Arms Transfers and Congressional Considerations . . 60 Operational Environment of Air Weapon Systems . . . 69 National Air Force Structures ...... 75
III. ARMS TRANSFER M O D E L ...... 130
Design Perspective...... 130 Arms Transfer M o d e l ...... 133 Military Expenditure Indicator...... 140 Attitude Indicator...... 147 National Interaction Indicator...... 152 Force Structure Analysis...... 160 Indicator Review...... 172 Override Considerations ...... 178
ix Page IV. ARMS TRANSFER EVALUATIONS...... 268
Regional Review ...... 270 Evaluations...... 285 Summary...... 333
V. ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS...... 339
Model Refinements...... 351 Quality versus Quantity ...... 357 Issues...... 360 Conclusion...... 365
APPENDIX A ...... 370
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 479
x LIST OF TABLES
Page 1. World Arms Trade, Recipient Countries by Major Suppliers, Cumulative 1964-1973 ...... 40
2. Weapon Systems Transferred Under United States Foreign Military Sales and the Military Assistance Program...... 41
3. Imports of Aircraft, Recipient Regions by Major Suppliers, 1967-1971...... 52
4. Annual Summary of Foreign Military Sales by Category...... 57
5. Annual Summary of Military Assistance Programs by Category...... 58
6. Preferred Systems and Characterisitcs for Counter Insurgency Attack Missions...... 72
7. Preferred Systems and Characteristics for External Attack Missions ...... 73
8. Preferred Systems and Characteristics for Air Defense Missions...... 74
9. Air Force Structures 1970-1971...... 90
10. Air Force Structures 1971-1972 . 93
11. Air Force Structures 1972-1973...... 96
12. Air Force Structures 1973-1974...... 99
13. Air Force Structures 1974-1975......
14. Statistical Criteria Values ...... 78
15. North and Latin American Force Structures...... -*-^5
xi Page 16. Western European Force Structures ...... 109
17. Eastern European Force Structures ...... 114
18. Middle East Force Structures...... 117
19. African Force Structures...... 120
20. Asian Force Structures...... 125
21. National Military Expenditure, 1963-1973...... 188
22. Latin American Defense Spending Correlations. . . . 191
23. European Defense Spending Correlations...... 194
24. African Defense Spending Correlations ...... 199
25. Middle East Defense Spending Correlations ...... 206
26. Asian Defense Spending Correlations ...... 208
27. National Tension Scores at the System Level .... 211
28. Latin American Tension Scores ...... 214
29. Western European Tension Scores ...... 215
30. African Tension Scores...... 216
31. Middle East Tension Scores...... 217
32. Asian Tension Scores...... 218
33. Azar-Sloan 15-Point Scale for Inter-nationEvents . 219
34. Weighted Value of Scale Points...... 221
35. Dimension of Interactions in the Middle East. . . . 222
36. Dimension of Interactions for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus...... 230
37. Nation A Actions Toward Nation B ......
xii Page 38. Bomber Performance Statistics......
39. Type I Aircraft Performance Statistics...... 232
40. Type II Aircraft Performance Statistics ...... 234
41. Type III Aircraft Performance Statistics...... 235
42. Attack/Counter-Insurgency Performance Statistics. . 237
43. Trainer Performance Statistics...... 239
44. Force Structure Capability Statistics Illustrated For Egypt & Israel, 1970-1975 ...... 167
45. National Force Structure Capability - Latin America...... 242
46. National Force Structure Capability - Africa. . . . 249
47. National Force Structure Capability - The Middle East...... 256
48. National Force Structure Capability - Asia...... 260
49. United States Combat Aircraft Transfers ...... 286
50. Summary of Recommendations on United States Transfers...... 341
xiii LIST OF FIGURES
Page 1. A Weapons Transfer Framework...... 15
2. Air Force Structures...... 18
3. A Table of Units for Micro Analytic Design ...... 23
4. Outline of Designed Arms Transfer Model...... 27
5. United States Arms Exports...... 45
6. Arms Transfer Decision Model ...... 137
xiv CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
The military capability and military policies of a nation contain numerous dimensions and may be viewed from a variety of perspectives. Analysts have focused on such aspects of military capability as arms races (Richardson, 1960; Noel-Baker, 1958;
Miksche, 1968; Gray, 1971), the impact of armaments on national influence (Schelling, 1966) and small wars (Bloomfield and Leiss,
1969), arms control and disarmament (Singer, 1962; Schelling and
Halperin, 1961; Bloomfield, 1964; Edwards, 1969), and arms aid or arms trade (Frank, 1969; Gilbert, 1970; Hovey, 1965; Hoagland,
1970; Kemp, 1966, 1970, 1970a, 1971; Leiss, 1970; Leiss, et al.,
1970; SIPRI, 1971). This study will expand upon past efforts in the arms trade/aid area, and focus on United States arms transfer decisions. The focus is important due to the increase flow of weapons to developing nations, and increasing small scale conflicts between these nations. Poor, small nations have been either a participant or the stage for 93 per cent of the hostilities occurring in the international system between 1945 and 1970 (Azar,
1973). Furthermore, between 1950 and 1969, the annual increase in flow of major weapons to these nations has averaged approximately 2
9 per cent excluding Vietnam (SIPRI, 1971), The United States has
been one of the major suppliers of weapons to developing countries.
This fact should not lead to the conclusion that the United States
is responsible for conflict occurring in or between small, develop
ing nations. However, a major supplier must make decisions on when
to sell or transfer arms to another nation. This dissertation will
investigate the area of arms transfer decisions and suggest the
applicability of social science techniques^ as an aid for making
decisions on when to transfer arms to a requesting nation.
Congress has legislated a number of requirements to be con
sidered when evaluating an arms request. The purpose of this
dissertation is to design a model that will yield information on
two specific considerations established by Congress in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971. Having designed the model, past arms
transfers will be evaluated to assess whether or not the decisions
to transfer weapons conformed to the spirit of the Congressional
considerations. This effort will yield a systematic set of procedures for evaluating arms requests on the basis of the legislation. The broader implication for this study is that once the model has been established, it may be expanded to include other factors or modified as new restrictions are legislated. Thus, an initial model will be developed, and systematic procedures established for dealing with arms requests. 3
An arms transfer is defined as the supplying of any military
weapon by the United States Government or U.S. weapons manufacturing
corporation to another nation. All arms transfers must be approved
by the Government of the United States. Transfers may take the
form of sales, grants-in-aid, or supplying weapons as the result
of excess stock. An arms transfer may contain a variety of weapons
and supporting equipment, or be limited to one weapon system.
This study will focus on the transfer of combat aircraft from 1969
through the first quarter of 1975. Due to the availability of data,
the analysis will be limited to United States Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Still, the procedures developed in this initial effort may be applied to other categories of transfers as well as types of weapon systems.
The policy implications for this study are twofold. First, a systematic set of procedures will be designed for the evaluation of arms requests. The end product can be used by those individuals charged with the responsibility of evaluating and approving requests for weapon systems. Also, the Congress can use the designed model as an aid in evaluating whether or not the Executive Branch is following Congressional directives in the supply of weapon systems.
The designed process provides information, on the political and military situation of the requesting nation and its region, that can be used by those individuals involved in arms transfer decisions. Secondly, this study displays the potential applications 4 of social science techniques in this policy area. Currently, various experts provide information used in reaching a decision.
The designed evaluation process does not eliminate the need for experts, but structures the types of information that should be gathered in making an arms transfer decision. Social science techniques can assist in supplying information for the decision process, but the final policy action must be decided by decision makers in the Executive Branch and Congress.
Role of Congress. Over the years, Congress has periodically legislated requirements for arms transfers. In the Mutual
Security Act of 1954, it was stipulated that no assistance should be furnished by the United States unless the recipient nation agreed to:
(1) join in promoting international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace;
(2) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
(3) fulfill the military obligations, if any, which it assumed under multilateral or bilateral agreements of treaties to which the United States is a party;
(4) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
(5) take all reasonable measure which may be needed to develop its defense capacities; 5
(6) take appropriate 'steps to insure the effective utiliza tion of the assistance furnished under this title in further ance of the policies and purpose of this title;
(7) impose appropriate restrictions against transfer of title to or possession of any equipment and materials, information or services furnished under chapter 1 of this title, without the consent of the President;
(8) maintain the security of any article, service, or information furnished under chapter 1 of this title;
(9) furnish equipment and materials, services or other assistance consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the United States or to and among other nations to further the policies and purposes of chapter 1 of this title;
(10) permit continuous observation and review by the United States representatives of programs of assistance authorized under this title, including utilization of any such assistance, or provide the United States with full and complete informa tion with respect to these matters, as the President may require; and
(11) in cases where any commodity is furnished on a grant basis under any provision of this Act other than chapter 1 of title I under arrangements which will result in the accrual of proceeds to the recipient nation from the import or sale thereof, establish a Special Account, and— . . . . (United States Statutes at Large, 1954, pp. 839-840).
These provisions formed the basis for the President to control the transfer of armaments and related war materials. Yet, Congress has continued to refine the conditions for transfer as is evidenced in the Foreign Assistance Acts of 1961 and 1971, and the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (PL 87-195) stipulates that military assistance to any country is to be furnished only to insure internal security, for self defense, and for participation in United Nations or regional arrangement action to maintain peach
(United States Statutes at Large, 1961). This Act further reaffirms
the earlier stipulations found in the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (PL 90-629) instructs the
President that cash and credit sales on a government-to-government
basis must "strengthen the security of the United States and promote
world peace (United States Statutes at Large, 1969, p. 1322)."
The intent of Congress is clear in each of these legislative measures.
Armaments are to be sold or transferred for internal and defensive
purposes rather than external, nationalistic activities.
The broadening concern of Congress to the multifaceted
dimensions of arms transfers in further reflected in more recent
legislation. In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (PL 92-226),
Congress established that decisions to furnish military assistance
shall take into account whether such assistance will:
(1) contribute to an arms race;
(2) increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict; or
(3) prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements (United States Statutes at Large, 1972, p. 25).
In addition to the above considerations, the Congress legislated that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency "with the cooperation and assistance of other relevant Government agencies including the Department of State and the Department of Defense, shall 7
prepare and submit to the Congress a comprehensive report on the
international transfer of conventional arms based upon existing and
new work in this area (Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972)."2
The seriousness of intent on the part of Congress in recent years
is best exemplified by the recent debates and legislation dealing
with aid to Greece and Turkey.3 Congress has become involved, and
the trend of that involvement indicates that such activity will
continue in the future.
In a report to Congress (The International Transfer of
Conventional Arms), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reviewed
Executive Branch policy. The Executive Branch is responsible for
approving any transfer of armaments. This report indicated that arms transfers are reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis
taking into account Congressional legislation and a number of additional criteria.^ These criteria include: (1) broad consider ations of the transfer to American foreign policy; (2) the impact of the transfer on the recipient and its geographic region; and (3) the effect the transfer will have on the United States balance of payments situation. Although the report presented additional factors that are considered in reaching a decision on whether or not to transfer arms, it did not clearly indicate the importance of these factors in relation to each other or to the
Congressional legislation. Still, the reader is presented with a a number of components present in the decision-making process. 8
Thus the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President,
considers these various factors in formulating assistance and sales
policy. The Secretary of States does consult with other related
agencies including the Department of Defense, Department of
Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Limitations have been placed on arms transfers. It is the
responsibility of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
to make recommendations concerning arms transfers that will comply
with the law. Therefore, this study will not focus on Congress.
Instead, it will deal with the nature of the legislation and its
implementation for arms transfer decisions. The problem that
ACDA faces is to develop and apply assessment routines that will'
provide information concerning the impact a particular weapons
transfer will have on the recipient and its geographical region.
This dissertation will develop the usefulness of social science
techniques for assessing the impact of an arms transfer, and providing information to government decision-makers.
Assessment. In its report to Congress, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency related the problems of assessing the effects of arms transfers on regional and international stability. The presentation indicated that difficulties exist in accurately evaluating the potential impact of a particular transfer bn regional stability. With respect to transfers influencing arms races, it 9 was noted that "countries within regions may respond in a variety of ways to the acquisition of foreign arms by their neighbors
(ACDA, 1974, p. 59)." Nations may view the further acquisition of arms as a normal process to replace aging inventories or as a resultant from domestic pressures. Another type of response would be for a particular nation to also acquire arms in order to maintain a certain balance with its neighbor. Such a reaction could potentially create an arms race withint the region.5 Similar difficulties exist in determining the effects of a transfer on the likelihood of armed conflict occurring. In some instances a transfer will increase the tension within an area; in others, it may have the opposite effect.^ The ACDA report wavers on the ability to make conclusive assessments. Yet, the fact remains that assess ments and recommendations are being made in these areas where
Congressional considerations have been established. It is in this assessment phase that social science techniques will prove useful.
In essence, the purpose here is to develop a model that will supplement the mental model^ used by decision-makers when dealing with the question of arms transfers. Mental models are not unique to political decision-makers. Whether they realize it or not, everyone uses some form of mental model(s) to make daily decisions.
Forrester (1971) observes that:
The mental model is fuzzy. It is incomplete. It is imprecisely stated. Furthermore, within one individual, a mental model changes with time and even during the flow of a single conversation (p. 54). 10
Currently, some form of mental model is employed when deciding whether or not, and 'how much', military weapons should be sold or transferred to a particular nation. Last year it was reported that Jordan's King Hussein was in Washington to discuss an increase in United States military aid to Jordan and the need to further
Q modernize Jordan's armed forces. The King's request included
Hawk surface-to-air missiles, squadrons of jets, armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, and radar equipment. It was reported that he had been asked to reduce has request once and would likely be asked to reduce it again. Government officials have a normative conceptualization of how much and what type of military equipment can be sent to Jordan. The basis for their decisions is a mental model of Jordan's needs, Jordan's capabilities, the situation in the Middle East, and the situation in the United States. Mental models are constantly used in governmental decision-making. Still, the social sciences can develop empirical models which will yeild reliable information for the decision-making process.
The problem is essentially one of developing an integrated design for arms transfers. Such a design would provide substantive information on the effects of a weapons transfer by developing indicators that measure the political and military situation present within the nation and its region. An integrated design, for any area of inquiry, "attempts to take into consideration all the factors and modulations necessary to a decision-making process 11
(Papaneck, 1971, p. 288)." Consequently, in order to develop a
design for arms transfers decisions, it will first be necessary to
identify and operationalize those variables that directly relate
to arms transfers and the legislation passed by Congress. Having
accomplished this, the variables must then be developed in a
viable design (model) that will yield the desired information.
In this study, the information will concern whether an arms
transfer will contribute to an arms race or increase the possi bility of outbreak or escalation of conflict. The purpose is one of information for the evaluation of future contemplated action.9
This study can be viewed from two different perspectives.
One viewpoint is that the design will yield information which will permit one to determine whether or not a specific transfer should take place. The underlying assumption is that the legislation is broad but specific as to the restrictions on transferring arms.
Thus, one need only to develop a model which on the basis of the legislation will produce information for action. The second per spective is that the information produced by the design will be considered as only another piece of information for the decision maker. In terms of Harold Lasswell's (1956) seven functions in the decision process, the design would most appropriately relate to the intelligence and recommendation functions; with the decision-maker choosing the final course of action. ^ This per
spective would contend that there are advantages to mental models,H
and that in the end, it is an individual decision-maker who makes
a choice; perhaps even against the constraints of the legislation.
Each perspective is a valid way of viewing the situation. However,
this study adopts the second perspective of providing information for input into the decision-making process. The legislation does exist, and a valuable contribution can be made by developing a model that assists in the evaluation of arms requests.
Thus, a model will be developed and then applied to past arms transfer decision in order to display its usefulness in decision situation, and to ascertain whether or not past transfers complied with the intent of the legislation. The purpose is to demonstrate the applicability of social science techniques for decision-making by developing a set of systematic procedures for evaluating arms requests. This initial model will be somewhat simplified in nature since it is based mainly on the legislation. This model may contain a margin of error because its development is based on the author's interpretation of the arms transfer literature and past arms transfer policy. However, these idiosyncracies from the author's observations of the public literature do not negate the overall effort since any viable model must have the flexibility to be adaptable to new values formulated within the decision-making community. 13
In constructing the model, it will be necessary to develop several effects indicators that reflect the political and military constraints identified in the Foreign Assistance Acts. These indicators will then be applied to the types of weapons systems and the types of nations which they are transferred to. The arms literature suggests that both of these areas are fundamental to arms transfers. The type of weapon system is important because the possession of a sophisticated system does not automatically enhance the military capability of a developing nation (SIPRI,
1971). A weapon system may possess little utility to a particular nation given its military environment. The point is that "differ ent environments usually require different types of military forces with the corollary that different defense requirements require different types of armaments (Kemp, 1970a, p. 30)." Likewise, different types of nations possess different capacities to support a particular weapon system. There is marginal utility in trans ferring a weapon system that is incogruous with a nation's current weapon systems, and that cannot be supported by the existing tech nical competence of the recipient.-^ Both of these dimensions are related to the nations ability to maintain and effectively use a weapon system in any given situation.
It would be desirable to focus on all types of weapon systems.
Yet, this demonstration study will be limited to air force systems to keep the topic manageable. It will be argued, however, that 14 the techniques used in this analysis may be applied across a variety of weapon systems. In looking at air systems, attention will be focused on the sale or transfer of combat aircraft from
1969 to 1975. This time frame has been selected due to the limitations of available data. The time frame is realistic in that the legislation was not formally passed until the beginning of
1972; with the first ACDA report to Congress published in April of 1974. Thus, arms sales or transfers will be evaluated prior to the legislation and immediately after its passage. Once the model proves useful during this time frame, it will be readily applicable for the future given the availability of appropriate data.
Framework For The Model. The model will be designed around a frame work developed by Frank (1969). Figure 1 dipicts this framework in its entirety. Lewis Frank contends that one needs to look at six areas when analyzing arms transfers. The first of these components relates to the various dimensions of supplying a weapon.
Supply factors are defined as "those elements that relate to the conditions of supply of a weapon, including actual transfer. This can include any conditions— political, military, financial, diploma tic, or other— plus the means by which the recipient country is informed of these conditions (Frank, 1969, p. 252)."-*-3 One of the most central supply factors is which nations have arms avail able either for sale or in the form of aid. Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in various regions of the 15 international system best exemplifies one dimension of supply.
It is interesting to note that supply factors are not central to
the Congressional legislation except to the extent of restricting the total monetary value of aid to a particular nation or region.
Supply factors will be discussed later as to their impact on strict adherence to the legislation.
Demand factors "are the elements that relate to the conditions of demand for a weapon prior to the actual transfer (Frank, 1969, p. 254)." These factors are similar in nature to supply factors but relate to the consumer and the dimensions of his d e m a n d s . 15
As with supply factors, there are numerous dimensions that could be the focus for another dissertation. In this study, demand factors will be analyzed in relation to their likelihood in causing an arms race.
Military Effects Supply Factors Operational Future Environmental Development Factors Options
Demand Factors
Political Effects
Figure 1. A Weapons Transfer Framework 16
South America is a relevant example in this area; where the demands by one nation for a particular weapon system stimulates similar demands from other nations in the r e g i o n . -*-6 Demand factors will be discussed in terms of their effects on arms transfer decisions, but will not specifically be built into the model. These factors can most easily be handled in terms of analyzing the political effects of a transfer. Although Frank was very broad in developing his framework, this study will take a narrow view of demands and analyze then as a resultant from the occurrence of an arms trans fer. This perspective does not ignore the fact that demands can occur due to domestic factors or a combination of external and domestic factors. Still, boundaries need to be drawn and therefore, demand factors will be viewed as they relate to the occurrence of an arms race.
Operational-Environmental factors pertain to the conditions under which the weapon is used. This would include such dimensions as the type of nation, its geography, climate, and quality of personnel training for maintenance and use. These factors directly relate to the effectiveness of the weapon system. Implicit in the notion of operational-environmental factors is the type of conflict (e.g. industrialized or guerrilla) in which the arms will be deployed. ^ The level of warfare is a determining factor in whether sophisticated arms with a high degree of lethal power per man or less sophisticated arms need to be supplied (SIPRI, 1971). 17
In terms of air systems, the performance characteristics of the
aircraft is of prime importance. The key factor is the aircraft's
ability to accomplish the intended types of missions it will be
involved in, given the local operational and environmental
factors.
A dimension of operational factors that will be included in
the model, but not developed by Frank, is the air force system
structure present within the region. This study will fully
develop the notion of force structures and their importance in analyzing arms transfers. Roberts and Golder (1971) have developed naval force structures, relating them to the attributes of nations. Nevertheless, literally nothing has been done in the field of air force structures. A force structure may be defined as the scope of complexity of weapon systems present within the nation.
Figure 2 depicts the various types of air force structures in terms of a Guttman Scale. Analyses will be presented which demon strate that national air force systems scale in terms of scope of complexity as indicated in Figure 2. The importance of this finding will be fully developed in the next chapter. For the present, it seems sufficient to identify this concept and place it within the framework.
Political effects and military effects of an arms transfer are the central concern of the legislation and this dissertation.
Frank (1969) characterizes military effects as including those At*' rorce Tvres Tanker Reconais Bomber Interceptor Ftghter-Bombor Trainer He!lconter Transport
I. Tanker X X X X X X X X
11. Reconaissance 0 X X X X X X X
III. Bomber 0 0 X X X X X X
IV. Interceptor 0 0 O X X X X X
V. Flghter-Bomber 0 0 0 0 X X X X
VI. Trainer 0 0 0 0 0 X X X
VII. Helicopter 0 0 0 0 0 O X X
VIII. Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
(X » present and 0 ■absent)
Figure 2. Air Force Structures "elements that relate to changes in the balance of forces, internal,
regional, or worldwide, or changes in the internal force structure
of the recipient as a result of the introduction of the weapon, whether it be in wartime, crisis bargaining, or postwar periods
(p. 255)." In comparison, political effects are characterized as
"changes in the balance of political power concerning the objective relating to actual or potential conflict between (a) supplier nations,
(b) recipient nations, or (c) a combination of suppliers and recipients (pp. 255-256)." Frank is exceptionally vague in this area and concludes by stipulating that the key question is "What is the political impact of the weapons transfer? (p. 256)" Mili tary effects are more self-evident than political effects because changes in force structures can be clearly identified across time. Political effects have the potential to be more subtle and less distinguishable, therefore, they need to be discussed further.
Political effects have several dimensions, one of which is most relevant to this study. With respect to supplier nations, these effects can be characterized in terms of the amount of
influence' one supplier may have over another in a geographic region. The best example of this phenomena is the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.-*-9
A second dimension deals with the relationship betweeil the supplier and recipients. Depending on the sophistication of the weapon system, it is possible for a change in political power to occur 20 because the supplier controls access to obtaining replacement parts.20 Thus, conflict may occur between the supplier and recip ient if the supplier begins to dictate the arenas in which the weapon system may be deployed (e.g., internal arenas only, rather than in external conflict situations). The third and most relevant dimension is the effects a transfer may have on the recipient and its contiguous neighbors.
The legislation is most specific in this third dimension.
Careful consideration should be given to arms transfers that will increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict.
Measures will be developed to assess the political impact of trans fers. One specific area of concentration will be whether a parti cular transfer presents the recipient with new capabilities and policy options that it did not have in the pre-transfer period.
One cannot accurately predict whether or not a nation will engage in external conflict and when such conflict will occur. However, changes in force capabilities could increase the possibilitiy of conflict occurring. Therefore, political effects will be assessed in terms of changes in force designs which present new and different policy alternatives to the recipient.21
Military effects will be analyzed in terms of whether or not a particular transfer will increase the likelihood or cause an arms race to occur. A dyadic comparison of air force structures and past acquisition patterns will be undertaken in order to ascertain 21
potential effects from a transfer. The parallel acquisition
patterns of naval and aircraft in South America, as well as similar
behavior among the major participants in the Middle East, suggest
the appropriateness of this approach. Although it is difficult
to accurately assess how a particular nation will perceive the
transfer of an air weapon system to its neighbor; it is feasible
to assess the situation that is created by the transfer and the
relations which have been occuring between the two nations in the
recent past. With this knowledge, short-range conjectures may be made about the impact of a transfer.22 jn using this procedure,
the author intends to display the usefulness of social science techniques for arms transfer decisions.
The final area, future deployment options, deals with the alternatives open to the recipient after having received a particular weapon or weapons. Frank (1969) states that this portion of the analysis "is based on a current evaluation of the situation as seen by the principal decision-makers involved and conditioned by the combined peace-time or wartime effects of weapons introduc tion in the past (p. 256)." While Frank focuses on analyzing the options open to the recipient, this study will analyze the decision options of the supplier; namely, the United States. Given the focus of this dissertation, the basic question at this stage in the framework should be: 'In light of the potential political and military effects, should the arms be transferred?' The design will 22 yield indicators which permit at minimum, a 'Yes or No' recommenda tion. Therefore, while Frank finds it useful to look at the options open to the recipient, this study will produce estimated effects indicators that permit a recommendation to be reached on supplying a specific type of aircraft.
Units of Analysis.' In order to produce these recommendations for arms transfers, the basic unit of analysis will be the nation s t a t e . ^ One might contend that the basic unit of analysis should be the weapon (aircraft) system since the Foreign Assistance Act restrictions deal specifically with the transfer of arms. However, these restrictions on arms transfers deal with inter-state inter actions and the effects of introducing a weapon system into a particular nation. Consequently, one must deal with the three dimensions of the basic arms transfer question. That is, given a nation's request for an air system, what are the effects of supplying this system on the requesting nation, its interactions with neighboring or contiguous nations, and the nation's region as a whole? More specifically, what are the overall effects of changing the air system force structure of a nation? In order to answer these questions, the nation-state must be the basic unit of analysis.
This analysis can best be characterized in terms of the diagram presented in Figure 3. The principal distinction is made between object units and subject units. An object unit is the OBJECT UNITS
Unit of Analysis GLOBAL REGION THE Weapon Weapon Unit of ^ POLITY NATION System Costs, Observation etc.
GLOBAL POLITY CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS
REGION
SUBJECT UNITS THE NATION
Weapon System
Weapon Costs etc.
FIGURE 3: A TABLE OF UNITS FOR MICRO ANALYTIC DESIGNS 25 24 unit whose behavior is to be explained. A subject unit is the unit whose behavior is observed in order to explain the behavior of the object unit. An object unit’s behavior may be investigated at its own level (i.e., explaining nation behavior by studying the nation itself) or at a lower or higher level of aggregation depend ing on one's interest. In this instance, the object unit is the nation and the purpose is to assess the structural effects of transferring various air systems while taking into account the con textual effects of the region.^ Hence, we are not interested in explaining national behavior or foreign policy per se, instead, we are interested in evaluating the political and military effects of an arms transfer to the nation.
In order to accomplish this evaluation, the model will be developed around two components. One is the composition of national force structures and the impact of changes in such structures. The second component consists of contextual indicators that measure national policy actions and regional trends with respect to these actions. The first component has already been briefly introduced and, as indicated earlier, will be fully developed in the next chapter. One crucial dimension to this component, however, is the ability to develop comparability of aircraft weapon systems.
It will be assumed that the variance in performance characteristics of different national aircraft weapon systems are evenly distri buted across the different types of weapon systems. This 25
assumption makes it possible to summarize the numerical strength
of a force structure and compare it to other force structures
even though both force structures consist of a variety of different
national aircraft. Given this assumption, it will be possible to
analyze the impact of a transfer in terms of changes in force
capability, and such changes as they relate to other nations
within the region.
The second component will deal with indicators that measure
both political and military actions. Included in this group of
indicators will be indicators relating to dimensions of tension.
The measure of tension both nationally and regionally is important
since it has direct influence on arms transfers and is dealt with
in the legislation. Holsti (1963) observes that measuring tension is somewhat analogous to the clinical thermometer. "Like the
thermometer, it will provide clues to the presence of danger within the system, although it may not be able to pinpoint the nature of the danger (p. 613)," The Congressional legislation is specifically directed at this area, because the existence of high tension increases the potential for an arms race or conflict to occur.
Thus, by developing a model that relates force structures with dyadic and regional tension it should be possible to conjecture about the potential effects of an arms transfer.
Tension indictors will be developed along three dimensions explicated by Holsti (1963). These dimensions are: (1) attitude; 26
(2) capabilities; and (3) behavior. Capabilities will be
operationalized in terms of military expenditures, and air force
system structures. Attitudes and behavior will have to be
operationalized by substantively aggregating policy actions.
Events data will be used in order to measure the direction of
relations (cooperative or conflictual) taking place within a
region.^6 other indicators such as Alan Newcombe's inter-nation tensionmeter score (1969), and past arms acquisition patterns will be developed and included in the model. These indicators will complement the information gained from the analysis of the events data interaction patterns and present the analyst with the ability to conjecture about the effects of fulfilling a specific arms request.
Without going into great detail, it is possible to character ize the candidate arms transfer decision model that will be fully developed in Chapter Three. Having received an air system request, an analysis of both the nation's contextual indicators and its current force structure must be undertaken as displayed in
Figure 4. These indicators have been identified above. The results from the analysis stage are reviewed, lo’oking for trends that indicate either the potential for an arms race or conflict to occur. A recommendation is reached on the basis of five decision rules.27 It is possible that a negative recommendation Analysis of
Contextual Indicators
Air System T > Analysis Recommendation Request Review
Analysis of National and Regional Force Over-ride Structures Considerations I Decision
Figure 4. Outline of Designed Arms Transfer Model 28
could still result in a decision to transfer arms because of
certain over-riding considerations deemed to be more important,
by the decision-maker, than complying with the Congressional con
siderations. The analyses presented in Chapter Four, compare the
recommendations, based on the information developed from applying
the model, with past decisions to transfer weapon systems. It
was found that a majority of past arms transfers did conform to
the legislation. However, transfers to fourteen different nations
did not conform to the legislation and the issues that they present will be discussed later in this study.
Summation. The outline displayed in Figure 4 represents an
initial effort at systematizing the arms request evaluation
process. In the end, the finished product from this effort will display the usefulness of the- social sciences for one area of governmental policy. Indicators for arms transfers will be developed, operationalized, and placed in a design that will yield recommendations on whether or not to transfer a weapons system. The social sciences have utility for governmental decision-makers by providing new approaches to analyze policy situations. This model will be dynamic in nature, permitting changes to occur as new and better indicators are developed or decision-maker's values change.28 The important first step, how ever, is to construct a dynamic model that initially deals with 29 the transfer of a weapon on the basis of the Congressional legislation.
Several implications for this effort may be identified.
First, it demonstrates the ability to routinely and efficiently evaluate arms requests. One of the central purposes in develop ing this model is to suggest procedures that provide information to be inputed into the decision-making process. If this designed evaluation process or some form of it were eventually adopted, it would require the creation of a policy group responsible for constantly monitoring and updating the various indicators in order to provide the necessary information upon receiving an arms request. Such a group may already exist within the Department of State, but its existence is not visible in the current public information. Although some might argue that each request represents a unique case and must be evaluated on its merits, the designed process contends that all requests should be evaluated in the same manner in order to maintain a consistent arms transfer policy.
Any uniqueness for a request would be evaluated in terms of the over-riding considerations. These considerations and the final decision to transfer ultimately are the responsibility of the
Secretary of State as representative of the President.
A second implication for this study is that it will permit an evaluation of the usefulness of the legislated considerations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Thirty-nine national combat air system transfers will be evaluated in Chapter Four,
The results from these analyses will indicate how closely the
Executive Branch is complying with the Congressional directives
on the basis of the designed model. Furthermore, the results
should identify current arms transfer issues that need to be
considered when making future decisions. In the final analysis,
a conclusion will be reached on how useful the legislation is in
its current form, and whether or not it needs to be rewritten in
order to be more responsive to current political situations in
the international system.
Finally, this study will demonstrate that an evaluation pro cess does exist to deal with the Congressional considerations if
they are going to be seriously applied in making arms transfer decisions. Refinements in the model will be suggested as a result of applying the model to past arms transfers. The majority of the refinements will be based on the availability of intelli gence information that is not available to members of the academic community. Although it is not feasible to accurately predict the total impact of every transfer, it is possible to assess the current political-military situation in a nation and its geographic region. On the basis of this information, conjectures can be made about the potential effects of a transfer. Availability of this information should ease the task of the decision-maker.
Decisions must be made daily on the basis of available information. The designed evaluation process assists in decision-making by providing information and a recommendation relating to the legislated considerations.
The previous pages have briefly outlined the involvement of Congress in the area of arms transfers and have presented background information related to the model that will be con structed. In the following chapter, an extensive discussion of aircraft systems, the resulting force structures, and problems involved in transferring such weapon systems will be presented.
Chapter Three is devoted to the development of the various indi cators and the construction of the model. Once the model is developed, combat aircraft transfers from 1969 through 1975 will be analyzed in Chapter Four. The final chapter will include observations about past transfers, a discussion of issues involved in transferring weapon systems, and conjectures about the import ance of the legislation in the future. Although arms transfer decisions are multi-dimensional, the following discussion will provide insight into the problem and present a set of procedures that can be applied in the decision-making process. Notes to Chapter 1
•*•500X31 science techniques may be defined as the various con ceptual approaches and analytic procedures used by those individuals undertaking scientific research. For a discussion of these pro cedures and approaches see Blalock (1970), Braithwaite (1968), Burgess and Harf (1976), Garson (1971), Lastrucci (1967), and Phillips (1968).
^The legislation states that the report shall include the following topics: (1) the quantity and nature of the international transfer of conventional arms, including the identification of the major supplying and recipient countries; (2) the policies of the major exporters of conventional arms toward transfer, including the terms on which conventional arms are made available for trans fers, whether by credit, grant, or cash-and-carry basis; (3) the effects of conventional arms transfer on international stability and regional balances of power; (4) the impact of conventional arms transfer on the economies of supplying and recipient countries; (5) the history of any negotiations on conventional arms transfer, including past policies adopted by the United States and other suppliers of conventional arms; (6) the major obstacles to negoti ations on conventional arms transfer; (7) the possibilities of limiting conventional arms transfer, including potentialities for international agreements, step-by-step approaches on particular weapons systems, and regional arms limitations; and (8) recommenda tions for future United States policy on conventional arms transfers.
^For reports, see the following items in the New York Times: (a) "House Approves Measure To Halt Arms Aid To Turkey" (Sept. 25, 1974); (b) "Senate, 57 to 20, Votes To Cut Off U.S. Aid To Turkey" (Oct. 1, 1974); (c) "House Again Acts To Ban Deliveries Of Arms To Turks" (Oct. 8, 1974); (d) "Senate, Faced With a Veto Avoids Turkey Aid Cutoff" (Oct. 10, 1974); and (e) "Accord Reached on Aid To Turkey" (Oct. 18, 1974). Also, see the following sections of the Congressional Record, Vol. 120: (a) H9475 to H9491; (b) S18041 to S18Q45; (c) H10606 to H10625; (d) S19310 to S19313; and (e) S19416 to S19417.
32 33
^The identified criteria include: (1) An arms transfer must be consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. (2) An arms transfer should be designed to counter or deter an external mili tary threat or assist in maintaining internal security. (3) A transfer should not represent a marked quantitative increase from past patterns of arms acquisitions that might trigger similar requests from other countries, contribute to an arms race, or create a real or perceived threat to neighboring countries with which the U.S. has friendly relations. (4) The recipient nation must have the capability to absorb and effectively utilize the equipment being transferred. (5) Arms transfers may be made to obtain direct military benefits to the United States such as base rights or a trade-off for U.S. forces. (6) In cases where an arms transfer is being made primarily for political benefits, these benefits should be clearly identifiable. (7) Where an arms transfer is intended to preempt a similar transfer by a Communist or other sources, consideration should be given to the effect on the recipient and neighboring countries if the U.S. does or does not approve of the transfer. (8) The proposed transfer should not place an unwarranted burden on a recipient nation's foreign exchange resources, create excessive claims on future budgets, or interfere with its development. (9) The value of arms purchases from other nations should be considered in evaluating a proposed arms transfer. (10) For any major arms transfer, the effect on the U.S. balance of payments should be considered (ACDA, 1974, p.31).
^This type of 'numbers game' is not solely a regional phenomena. The United States and the Soviet Union are a prime example of two non-regional nations which have been involved in a series of arms races since the end of World War II.
^For a substantive discussion of this problem see ACDA report (1974), pages 60 to 62.
mental model may be defined as the images a person has with respect to a particular decision-making situation. The rational decision-maker best exemplifies the use of the mental model. For a discussion of rational decision-making, see Coplin (1971).
®See "Jordan's King Buying Arms," Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 12, 1974, p. 1. 34
^Bellman (1968) states that the objectives of control or design theory is "to make a system— any kind of system-— operate in a more desirable way: to make it more reliable, more convenient, or more economical."
lOLasswell's (1956) seven functions in the decision process include: (1) Intelligence— information, prediction, planning; (2) Recommendation— promotion of policy alternatives; (3) Prescrip tion— the enactment of general rules; (4) Invocation— provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescription, including demand for application; (5) Application— the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions; (6) Appraisal— the assess ment of the success and failure of policy; and (7) Termination— the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework (p. 2).
H-Some advantages to mental models for decision-making are that they may be particularistic and deal with short time periods. Also, that value changes may be immediately incorporated into the model.
!2lt should be noted that the introduction of new weapon systems to a nation almost always requires personnel training for operation and maintenance of the weapon system.
■^Frank (1969) contends that "in enumerating these factors, the analyst should ask: ’What are the prevalent modes of trans fer?' : 'Who negotiates for the supplier?'; 'What are the terms of the trade (including delivery time)?': and ’Who supplies the maintenance for the weapons and how are they maintained?1 (P- 253)."
-^For example, the interaction of the United States-Soviet Union arms shipments to the Middle East has greatly affected not only the level of armament within the region, but also the level of sophistication of the various weapons.
■^Several questions related to demand factors include: 'What is demanded and Why?'; TWho negotiates for the consumer?'; 'How willing is the consumer or its purchasing agent to pay the price, not only of the weapon, but the political price as well— of the transaction?'; 'What is the consumer putting up for security or collateral, if not cash?'; and 'Who is really demanding the weapons?' (Frank, 1969, p. 254)."
■^For a recent example see: "U.S. To Sell Jets To Latins," New York Times, May 17, 1970, p. 16. 35
-^An industrialized war is one in which the participants have a high destructive capability per combatant. "The sophis ticated weapons necessary are therefore rather complex, such as supersonic combat aircraft, missiles, tanks, and various kinds of electronic equipment." In a guerrilla war, "weapons more sophisticated than rifles or machine guns are unlikely to be required— although rockets and small missiles may be of use against an industrial opponent (SIPRI, 1971, p. 74)."
l^Some examples of types of missions are: (1) close ground- attack and support role; (2) defense of industrialized centers and airfields; and (3) external attack role against enemy strategic targets.
l^Degree or amount of influence is very debatable given the nature of the concept. With respect to the Middle East, it could be argued that weapon systems are now being sold to these nations to offset currency outflows caused by the high price of oil. Activity in supplying arms to Middle East nations most certainly demonstrates the multiple dimensions in arms transfers.
20A somewhat analogous situation has occurred recently in the case ofthe OPEC countries pricing and marketing practices of oil. The eventual influence in this instance is the large accumulation of capital from oil sales.
2lAn assumption in this instance is that nations are more likely to engage in conflict when they have the effective capability to do so. It should be noted, however, that nations may engage in conflict even if they do not have a superior capability over their adversary. See Zinnes, North and Koch (1961) for a dis cussion of this point. Also, the 1973 Middle East conflict is an example where one participant (Egypt) had an effective but not superior capability to engage in conflict with Israel.
22]?or a discussion of short and long range conjectures see Knorr and Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning (1968).
23p0r a discussion of units of analysis see Burgess (1975).
24contextual effects would include such factors as the amount of tension or conflict in the region, the existence of past or current arms races, arid also the force structures present within the region. 36
^Adapted from Philip M. Burgess, "'Watch the Canary!' And Other Admonitions," in Edward Azar and Joseph Ben-Dak (eds.), Theory and Practice of Events Research, New York: Gordon and Breach, 1975.
26pue to the availability of data, events data can only be applied to the Middle East and Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.
27For a discussion of the decision rules, see Chapter III, page 174 and 175.
28in one sense, a design system is being constructed in this dissertation because the system incorporates feedback to the decision-maker and is not static but dynamic in nature due to the changing environment of the region. The effects indicators must be periodically updated since other nations are acquiring arma ments from various sources and interacting with other nations in the region. For a discussion of problems in design, see Esherick (1963). CHAPTER II: THE TRANSFER OF WEAPON SYSTEMS
Introduction. The transfer of weapons is not particularly unique
to the time period selected for this analysis, nor is the regu
lation of arms transfers. Although weapons transfers have been
reviewed elsewhere^, some general observations will be presented
before considering the transfer of air weapon systems. Atwater
(1941) has identified the following three historical eras in
the regulation of United States arms:
(1) Non-regulation of the Private Export of Arms— 1793 to 1917;
(2) Regulation of Arms Exports to Promote Stability and Discourage Revolution in Latin America and China— incon spicuously in 1905 and openly in 1912; and
(3) Regulation of Arms Exports to Discourage Foreign Wars and to Keep the United States Out of War— 1934 to 1939 (p. 2-3).
Furthermore, he observes that arms exports have been regulated in
the past to: (1) maintain the strength of United States national
defense; (2) control conflict in areas vital to American national
O interest; and (3) as an instrument of American foreign policy.
Arms regulation has continued since World War II, but national policy goals have been modified and expanded from those which characterize the period from 1917 to 1939.
37 38
Since the end of World War II, arms transfers have become
a key ingredient in the foreign policy of the United States. In
addition to Atwater's reasons, arms have been transferred to
assist nations in maintaining their national sovereignty. This
theme can be seen not only during the Cold War years, but also in
the extensive assistance given to South Vietnam and Israel, among
others, from the later 1960's to the present. During President
Nixon's terms of office, arms transfers were further viewed as a
means of assisting in establishing peace within the international
system.3 This perspective is further seen in the justification
of security assistance for 1975 by the Department of Defense:
Security assistance is an instrument of national policy which, put to full use, can effectively expedite the trans ition from the Cold War confrontations of the past to the generation of peace established by the United States as its goal for the future. The programs through which security assistance supports the defense efforts of other free world nations are essential elements of U.S. foreign policy and make a significant and substantial contribution to the successful implementation of that p o l i c y . 4
The problem with the national policy is that it may be periodically
in conflict with Congressional considerations for arms transfers.
Then the question becomes which perspective takes precedence over the other. At this point, the reader need only be aware of
the national policy and its potential consequences.
The United States is a major supplier of weapons in the international system. In analyzing arms transfers to less developed nations, Leiss (1970-1) noted that "in all categories of aircraft, 39 in tanks, in warships, and in amphibious vessels, the United States is a major supplier— contributing roughly one-third to one-half of the systems currently in the inventories of the less developed countries in the sample (p. 54)." Table 1 presents a summary of the total value of arms transfers from 1964 to 1973. The data in Table 1 clearly indicates the leading role played by the United
States, since U.S. transfers ($29,688 billion) account for 51.2 per cent of the world total.5 Table 1 also displays the prominent role of the United States ($20,208 billion or 53 per cent of the total value) and Soviet Union ($10,895 billion or 28.57 per cent of the total value) in supplying arms to developing nations.6
Even though it is difficult to translate the dollar value of arms transferred into number and different types of weapon systems, the data presented in Table 1 reinforces the impact that the two major super-powers have on nations and regions in the international system.
The diverseness of United States arms transfer can be seen in the following table. Table 2 presents a detailed list of major weapons that have been sold or given to other nations from 1950 to 1973. Due to military classification procedures, the items are aggregated rather than itemized by recipient. Still, the listing presents the extent of major weapon systems transferred since 1950.
The list would be even more extensive and impressive if it contained entries for small arms and munitions used for each of the major weapon systems transferred. Table 1. World Arms Trade— Recipient Regions by Major Suppliers, Cumulative 1966-1973b
(millions of current dollars) Federal People's Republic United Soviet United Crecho- Republic of All Total States Union France Kinedora slovakia of China Poland Canada Germany Others
World Total 57,936 29,688 15,678 2.409 1,770 1,261 1,608 1,378 1,144 1,184 1,816
Developed 19,812 9,480 4,783 788 714 770 5 1,288 902 567 515 Developing 38,124 20,208 10,895 1,621 1,056 491 1,603 90 242 617 1,301
NATO 13,109 9,806 675 431 ___ 892 829 476 Warsaw Pact 7,121 - 4,989 -- 809 5 1,278 - - 40 OPEC Nations11 3,330 1,993 1,760 439 446 128 - 3 41 68 452
Latin America 2,323 983 309 364 186 2 -- 166 84 229
:;ATO European 10,974 9,130 - 577 66 - - - 120 730 351
Uarsau Pact 7,121 - 4,989 -- 809 5 1,278 - - 40
Other European 1,925 896 589 128 65 4 85 8 15 40 95
Africa 2,259 394 621 597 240 55 81 - 17 58 196
Near East 9,447 3,251 4,738 273 433 276 2 31 7 122 314
East Asia 17,837 13,261 2,858 54 176 24 1,118 10 26 15 295
South Asia 2,864 256 1,574 262 104 125 317 17 11 36 162
Oceania 1,051 841 - 56 135 - - - 10 - 9
aOPEC nations include: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Enirates. bTable adapted from United States Anna Control and Disarmament Agency (1975), pp.67-71. Table 2. Weapon System Transferred Under United States Foreign Military Sales and the Military Assistance Trograma
FMS______MAP FMS______MAP Iteo Ordered Delivered Ord*;red Delivered Ordered Pelivered Ordered Delivered Cura FY 74 Cura FY 74 Cura FY 74 Cura FY 74 Cura FY 74 Cum FY 74 Cura FY 74 Cura FY 74
Aircraft Fighter F-8E 42 . 42 Anti-Sub S-2 61 13 42 160 160 8 Fighter F-9F 24 - 24 - Attack A-l --- - 178 _ 178 • Fighter F-14A SO 80 -- • . _ Attack A-4 663 82 523 97 ._. • Fighter F-47 57 - 57 . 525 - 525 Attack A-7 60 60 - -- . _ Fighter F-51 118 - 118 - 335 335 6 - ._ Attack A-37 59 8 . . Fighter F-80 - - - . 113 . 113 Berber B-17 19 - 19 - 5 • 5 Fighter F-S4 - - - - 3936 - 3936 Bobber B-25 80 - 80 - 6 . 6 Fighter F-86 375 - 375 - 2804 - 2804 _ Bonber B-26 109 - 109 - 173 - 173 • Fighter F-100 31 14 17 - 505 12 488 33 Bomber B-29 --- . 87 - 87 • Fighter F-102 --- - 73 - 73 Bcrr.ber B-57 --- - 25 - 25 . Fighter F-104 144 - 144 - 391 - 391 Cargo C-7 -- -• 2 - 2 - Fighter F-lll 24 - 24 15 - • _ Cargo C-45 78 - 78 - 94 - 94 _ Helicopter AH-1 206 - -. 4 - 4 _ Cargo C-46 24 - 24 - 84 - 84 • Helicopter HU-1 6 6 - - - . _ Cargo C-47 123 20 103 - 554 11 544 16 Helicopter UH-1 316 51 248 25 293 24 260 46 Cargo C-54 10 1 10 1 65 - 65 - Helicopter SH-3 11 - 7 1 2 . 2 1 Cargo C-82 12 - 12 - -.- • Helicopter OH-6 ---- 23 - 23 . 7 Cargo C-97 - 5 - - - - - Helicopter OH-13 130 - 129 - 211 - 211 . Cargo C-118 2 - 2 - 4 . 4 - Helicopter TH-13 12 - 12 - 14 2 12 _ Cargo C-119 137 - 137 - 258 - 258 5 Helicopter UH-13 - - - - 3 - 3 Cargo C-121 ---- 1 . 1 . Helicopter CH-19 - - - - 19 - 19 Cargo C-123 24 - 24 - 62 - 55 42 Helicopter HH-19 - - - - 4 - 4 . Cargo C-130 172 17 167 14 20 - 19 2 Helicopter UH-19 13 - 13 - 164 - 164 . Cargo C-135 12 - 22 ----- Helicopter CH-21 14 - 14 - 16 - 16 _ Cargo C-140 3 - 3 - -.- - Helicopter UH-21 - --- 12 - 12 • Fighter F-1C ---- 10 - 10 - Helicopter OH-23 4 - 4 - 168 - 168 _ Fighter F-2C 39 - 39 - - • -. Helicopter l'H-25 -- - • 19 - 19 . Fighter F-4D 32 - 32 . 18 . 18 . Helicopter CH-34 89 - 89 - 115 2 113 . Fighter F-4E 466 120 272 117 . • ._ Helicopter SH-34 22 - 22 . 24 - 24 Fighter F-4F 175 - 60 58 --- - Helicopter UH-34 -- - - 128 - 128 . Fighter F-4K 52 - 52 -- . .- Helicopter L'H-41 - --- 11 . 11 • Fighter F-4M 118 - 118 ----- Helicopter HH-43 12 6 12 6 58 - 58 - Fighter F-5A 110 - 110 - 459 - 459 6 Helicopter CH-46 2 - 2 -- - -- Fighter F-5B 62 13 35 2 91 3 86 12 Helicopter CH-47 20 • 12 12 - . . Fighter F-5E 203 18 33 33 67 37 .- Helicopter HH-52 1 - 1 1 • -.. Fighter F-5F 28 28 ------Helicopter CH-53 8 8 8 8 - -- - Table 2. Cont’d
FMS MAP Item Ordered Delivered Programmed Delivered Item Ordered Delivered Programmed Delivered Cum FY 74 Cun FY 74 Cun FY 74 Cun FY 74 Cum FY 74 Cun FY 74 Cum FY 74 Cum F':t 74 Helicopter RH-53 6 6 Rescue Boat 259 . 259 14 29 Helicopter TH-55 - --- . 29 25 25 Seaplane Tender 2 . 2 3 _ 3 Helicopter OH-58 98 12 80 - -. . 3 Ship Oiler 1 i - 1 1 _ Observation 0-1 10 - 10 - 1094 6 « 1086 Submarine 50 17 43 19 24 _ 24 _ Patrol P-2 72 - 72 - _ _ 186 186 Submarine Rescue 1 - 1 1 1 1 _ Patrol P-3 33 - 27 _ 3 Submarine Tender i _ 1 1 1 Recon RB-57 --- 4 _ 4 Torpedo Boat - - - - 26 • 26 _ Recon RF-4 138 12 126 _ •• Transport 20 - 20 _ 20 20 Recon F.F-5 18 . 18 . 57 _ _ 57 Water Barge 1 - 1 - 6 6 Recon RF-84 19 - 19 - 449 . 449 Misc Boats/Craft 1257 144 1120 44 9528 21 9436 86 Recon RF-86 ---- 17 17 Recon RF-100 •-- . 4 « 4 Guided Missiles Recon RF-101 --_ . 8 8 Bullpup 2503 900 1686 83 3768 3768 Recon RF-104 .-. . 24 24 Corporal - --- 113 Recon RT-33 - .. 113 87 87 Entac 820 - 820 - _ . _ Trainer T-2 52 40 - • _ Falcon 100 - 100 3 1181 - 1181 89 Trainer T-6 691 - 691 . . 1099 1099 Hawk 2600 100 2048 1038 1820 1820 Trainer T-7 -. - _ _ 28 28 Jupiter -- - . 57 - 57 _ Trainer T-ll - _ 12 12 Lance 153 _- _ _ Trainer T-13 - . _. .. 2 2 Matador 24 - 24 _ Trainer T-28 310 - - 310 478 24 461 35 Maverick 3691 853 1437 1437 _ Trainer T-33 334 - 334 . _ 1305 1305 13 Nike 1766 . 1766 . 3050 3050 Trainer T-34 10 - . . 10 71 71 Pershing 154 - 144 11 . . _ - •«_ Trainer T-35 10 10 Phoenix 150 150 . _ Trainer T-37 149 _ 8 133 191 177 3 Polaris 113 11 102 _ _ .. Trainer T-38 46 _ _ •. _ 46 Redeye 2904 - 2661 353 _ _ Trainer T-41 46 16 39 13 195 6 189 10 Rockeye 4278 2500 4060 3346 _ . Trainer T-42 --- 5 5 Sergeant 195 - 195 - 19 19 Utility U-l . . . 2 2 34 34 Shrike 560 460 400 300 _ _ Utility U-3 --- . 6 6 Sidewinder 11887 958 10274 580 13633 _ 13633 Utility U-6 - -- - - • 144 144 Sparrow 3561 180 3173 897 16 16 Utility U-7 - - ~ - • _ 603 603 Standard 778 240 148 1 _ . Utility U-8 - -- - . . 1 1 Tartar 653 1 649 16 100 - 100 . Utility U-10 - . . . « 12 12 Terrier 194 - 192 20 114 _ 114 Utility HU-16 37 - - • . 37 96 96 Thor - --- 72 . 72 • Utility U-17 3 - - 3 416 7 409 10 Tow 21961 3780 11118 10397 1428 1028 336 336 Utility U-18 - - •• • 2 2 Walleye 204 100 104 - . . . Utility U-19 • -.. 48 48 Misc Missiles 350 140 250 63 7107 - 7107 20 Utility U-20 ---- 2 - 2 - I
Table 2. Cont'd
FMS______MAP ______FMS______MAP______Item Ordered Delivered Programed Delivered Item Ordered Delivered Programmed Delivered Cum FY Cun FY 74 74 Cum FY 74 Cum FY 74 ______Cum FY 74 Cum FY 74 Cum FY 74 Cum FY 74
Utility AU-23 20 20 14 1 13 Combat Vehicles Utility AU-24 --- - 15 1 15 1 Armored Pera Carr 13931 3453 10130 1210 5582 157 5459 567 Vtol AV-8 6 6 -- _ Armored Cgo Csrr 861 321 481 216 177 139 60 Vtol 0V-10 66 . 50 34 _ _ _ Armored Car 310 - 309 - 102 _ 102 Misc Aircraft 518 - 225 2 4079 4079 - 1 Tank 5910 1177 5086 676 23568 2 23512 416 Tank Recovery Veh 876 14 686 7 1390 Shies and Craft 4 1390 12 Misc Combat Veh 462 250 366 134 15012 3 14954 124 Aircraft Carrier 2 • 2 . 3 _ 3 .. Cruiser 6 - 6 __ _ Artlllerv Carj:o Ship -- -- 4 _ 4 _ Anti-Aircraft ---_ 176 _ 110 18 Des trcyer 97 31 79 29 41 - 39 1 Anti-Aircraft, SP 347 93 299 56 607 549 144 Destroyer Escort 26 3 20 3 62 - 62 Anti-tank, SP 3 - 3 - 92 _ 92 Floating Drydock 8 - 8 . 5 5 _ Gun, 75mm 58 - 58 - 6225 _ 6225 _ Fuel Oil Barge 2 - 2 - . _ 11 11 Gun, 90mm 441 - 441 - 2630 _ 2630 Gasoline Barge - _ _ 1 1 2 2 Gun, 105mm Towed 109 - 109 ___ Gasoline Tanker - -_ - _ 2 2 Gun, 155mm Towed 60 19 42 7 801 _ 801 _ Harbor Tug 3 2 1 . 44 50 1 1 Gun, 175mm SP 390 60 345 24 97 _ 97 _ Landing Craft 91 4 85 1 1523 15 1503 10 Gun, 175mra Toved 24 - 24 -- Landing Ship 45 5 40 - _ 129 123 How, 75mm Towed 73 - 73 _ 66 _ 66 Minelayer 1 - 1 - 17 _ 17 _ How, 105mm SP 321 - 321 45 1659 60 1621 57 Minesweeper 50 6 44 21 364 . 362 How, 105mm Towed 579 16 506 23 5617 57 3507 77 Net Laying Ship 3 - 3 - 12 . 12 _ How, 155mm SP 1892 216 1521 79 157 . 151 6 Ocean Tug 16 3 14 1 6 ■ 6 How, 155mm Towed 110 - 110 5 3350 12 3346 12 Patrol Craft 39 15 4 - 254 13 180 5 How, 8 inch SP 197 28 155 - 115 _ 86 Patrol Frigate 5 - 4 1 21 _ 21 How, 8 inch Towed 74 - 74 - 307 _ 307 _ Patrol Gunboat 11 9 2 . 57 57 3 Mlac Artillery 555 121 407 - 512 48 374 84 Repair Ship 5 2 4 1 7 - 7
^Adapted from Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Journal. FY 1974 Washington, D.C.: DSAA, 1974. ------P' W 44
Several important observations can be made from reviewing
the aircraft section of Table 2. First, over seven times as many
combat aircraft (12,003) were transferred in comparison to trans
port aircraft (1703). Secondly, almost three times as many
trainers (4922) were transferred in comparison to to transports.?
Although it is not feasible to estimate how many of these aircraft
have since been phased out or lost in combat, the figures display
a willingness by the United States to transfer weapon systems that
have a high firepower ratio per man. This point is underlined by
the fact that close to 36,000 aircraft associated missiles have
been transferred; including the sophisicated Maverick guided missile
and Walleys guided glide bomb. The resulting force structures
created from these transfers and similar transfers by other air
craft producing nations will be analyzed.
United States transfers also may be viewed in terms of their total dollar value.® A number of problems exist in using this a p p r o a c h , 9 but the distribution of transfers permits one to observe which regional areas are important to the United States.
Figure 5 presents a pictoral distribution of United States exports to various areas in the international system. Within these areas, the following six nations were the most important recipients from
1961 to 1971: the Republic of Vietnam, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, the Republic of China, and the United Kingdom (ACDA, 1974). It is interesting to note that 45
BILLION DOLLARS 4----
TOTAL
OTHER EAST ASIA:
:,^.;///7‘SX \ > O n VVV\ /mmmk^rnrnM
NATO
1961 1962 1964 19651963 1966 1967 1968 1969 19711970
Figure 5. United States Arms Exports (ACDA, 1974) Constant (1961) Prices the areas of major export concentration have also experienced the most conflict in the last decade. This should not be surprising, however, in light of the national policy discussed earlier.
Arms Control and Weapons Transfers. Conventional arms control is one area that will not be dealt with in this study. The legisla tion states that decisions to furnish military assistance "shall take into account whether such assistance will. . . prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements
(U.S. Statutes at Large, 1972, p. 25)." This statement is vacuous for the contemporary international system because suppliers and 46
recipients are more interested in transferring non-nuclear weapons
than controlling their transfer. Hedley Bull’s observation on
arms control in 1965 best describes the situation. He wrote:
However desirable it may be, arms control can occur only if the circumstances are such that governments both want it and can agree on its terms. In this sense, that it is brought about and maintained by the policies of sovereign govern ments, the conditions of arms control are political (p. 65).
The problem is that little interest exists in this area, and what
does exist is overshadowed by nations arming themselves.10 A
number of reasons may be cited for this lack of concern in
controlling conventional arms.
Arms control arrangements require cooperation on the part of
either the producers or the consumers of weapons.H Such coopera
tion has been lacking in the international system. The producers
of weapon systems have a number of reasons for not cooperating in
limiting the supply of weapons. One obvious reason is the poli
tical aspects of supplying weapons. The United States and the
Soviet Union, and in recent years the People's Republic of China, have transferred weapons to nations of similar political orienta
tion. Southeast Asia represents a prime example of the result from such a policy. The conflict in that area could not have occurred on such a destructive scale if it were not for the weapons each side was receiving from the major powers. An obvious solution was for all suppliers to withdraw their support from the area.
But who was to take the initiative in this action? What would 47
have been the political consequences of such an action on the
foreign policy of the supplier? These were difficult questions
for both sides to deal with, and so the conflict continued.
A second reason for inaction on the part of producers is that
of economy of scale in weapons production. Some weapons industries
depend on foreign exports for their survival. This is not such
a severe problem for highly developed nations that have a large
military complex and also give a sizeable amount of aid to their
allies. It is a problem, however, for smaller nations that do not
internally consume a large portion of the output from their defense
industries.^ The aircraft industry is a prime example of the
problem of economy of scale. A good deal of research and develop
ment is needed to produce high performance air systems. If only a
limited number of aircraft are eventually produced, the cost per
unit is very high. The cost per unit is lowered though, as more planes roll off the assembly line. Thus, the export of armaments makes it possible for some defense industries to continue developing new weapons without government support or with very limited support
from the national government. For others, exports may be the only way to remain viable organizations. The overall consequence is
that some nations do not favor arms control because of the economic consequences for their defense industries.
A third and final reason for producers is the problem of national balance of payments deficits.13 This reason is increasing 48
in importance because of the rising cost of oil and the resulting negative payments balance occurring in developed countries due to
their large foreign oil consumption. One policy to counteract
this situation is to sell costly armaments; espacially aircraft weapon systems.14 Stanley and Pearton (1972) observe that:
weapon systems are high value items and a few, judiciously placed, can make a big impact in alleviating or reversing an adverse balance. The monetary return to a nation from the sale of 100 jet fighters valued at $2 million each equals that of about 100,000 motor cars (p. 124).
Furthermore, the benefits derived from a sale are not "one time only" in nature. The supplier is guaranteed further income be cause of the need for spare parts to maintain the aircraft.-*-5
As a result, an aircraft is "broadly worth its market value in spares over 10-15 years (Stanley and Pearton, 1972, p. 124)."
Given these reasons, it is not surprising that little progress has been made in conventional arms control.-^
The situation is not very promising either when considering the consumer side of the issue. Here, the problem revolves around what is an acceptable level of armament among nations within a region, be they contiguous or not. For arms control to be viable, agreement must be reached by the consumers on what force structures will be maintained within the region. The actions by nations in the Middle East and Latin America demonstrate that agreement is difficult, if not impossible. Even when discussions are proposed, as in the case of the mutual and balanced force reductions proposal 49
in Western Europe, a mutual interest may not exist. The MBFR
discussions were first proposed by the Western allied nations in
1967, but the Soviet Union failed to indicate an interest until
1972, MBFR discussions are now being held, but little progress has
been made in reducing forces within the region. ^ Until consumers
place less of a premium on national armaments, little progress
will be made in controlling arms.
Progress has been made in controlling chemical and biological
weapons, as well as nuclear armaments maintained by the United
States and the Soviet Union. Also, a sizeable number of nations
have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty for nuclear weapons.
But the conventional arms area remains an area of relatively
little activity. Former Secretary of State William P. Rogers
observed in 1973 that:
. . .there continues to be little progress in the search for sound and effective measures affecting conventional weapons. Yet these are the weapons which the 50 odd wars which have taken place since World War II have been fought. Despite the pace at which conventional arms are being developed, there is as yet no serious worldwide effort to deal with conventional arms races or even to achieve an understanding of what limitations ight be practical and desirable (p. 89-90).
This study will not deal further with the topic since there has been and continues to be, little active national interest in arms control among nations in the international system. Although Congress legislated restrictions on arms transfers affecting arms control agreements, the restrictions are of little importance given the above reasons. 50
Air Weapon System Suppliers. The suppliers of air weapon systems have an impact on the Congressional considerations in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971. Their impact is related to the national
arms policy described earlier in this chapter.Difficulties
exist in areas where sales will occur regardless of whether or not the acquisition will encourage an arms race or increase the likelihood of conflict occurring. It is in these cases where an active or passive policy must be decided by the United States.
A key question in such situations is whether or not it would be more favorable to have a nation purchase the arms from the United
States rather than one of its competitors? Furthermore, should the purchase be approved even though it is in conflict with the legislated considerations? This question will be discussed further in chapter four. It is introduced at this time because suppliers do have an impact on United States transfers. But who are these competitors, and how extensive are their transfers?
John Hoagland (1970) has reviewed the major trends in air craft production since 1950. Be observes that:
the number of major aircraft, civilian and military, in series production throughout the world at any one time has risen steadily since World War II. In 1950, there were 63 such production programs in eight countries, of which 30 were combat aircraft (eight of them powered by piston engines). By 1960, about 85 different types of major aircraft were being series-produced in 17 countries, of which 40 were military combat aircraft (all jet-powered, 15 of them supersonic). In 1970, there will be about 110 major aircraft production programs underway in 20 countries, of which 45 will be military combat aircraft (about 30 of them supersonic). By 1975, corresponding increases are likely to have occurred. 51
Although there are an increasing number of producers, nine major producers need to be identified. Table 3 presents a summary of their aircraft transfers, from 1967 to 1971, to various regions of the international system. The four major producers out of the nine identified in Table 3 are: (1) the United States; (2) Soviet
Union; (3) France; and (4) the United Kingdom.20 As in Table 2, the data are presented in aggregated form because of military classification procedures.
Appendix A presents a detailed summary of national air force structures based on the yearly descriptions published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.21 The Appendix permits observations to be made on changes in the composition of a nation's air force. Furthermore, the expansion of different suppliers into a nation or a region as a whole may be observed as national air force structures change across time. Two regions of particular interest are South America and the Near (Middle) East.
In these two regions, the expansion of British and French transfers is most evident. The Near East continues to be dominated by
Soviet and United States transfers, but Western European suppliers are beginning to have more of an impact since 1972. In contrast, combat aircraft transfers to South America have become dominated by British and French acquisitions. Although the numbers have been relatively small (under 20 aircraft) for each transfer, Western
European aircraft are supplementing or replacing United States Table 3. Imports of Aircraft, Recipient Regions, by Major Suppliers, 1967—197la
______(Uni ts)______Federal People's Republic United Soviet United Czecho- Republic of All Total States Union France Kingdom Slovakia of China Poland Canada Germany Others
NORTH AMERICA
Combat aircraft, supersonic Combat aircraft, subsonic 36 8 30 Other aircraft** Helicopters 22 22
Surface-to-air missiles - Surfacc-to surface missiles 293 20 275
EUROPE (NATO)
Combat aircraft. supersonic 630 480 20 100 30 Combat aircraft. subsonic 220 130 90 Other aircraft** 230 50 30 150 50 Helicopters 260 110 70 10 70
Surface-to-air missiles 100C 100 c Surface-to-surface missiles 6310 310 6000
WARSAW PACT
Combat aircraft, supersonic 1200 - 1200 - - Combat aircraft, subsonic 60 - 30 - 30 Other aircraft** 1700 - 100 - - 900 - 700 Helicopters 350 - 100 - - - 250
Surface-to-air missiles 3200 - 3200 - - Surface-to-surface missiles 14000 - 14000 - - -
Ln N5 Table 3. Cont'd
Federal People's Republic United Soviet United Czecho- Republic of All Total States Union France Kingdom Slovakia of China Poland Canada Germany Others
OTHER EUROPE
Combat aircraft, supersonic 70 50 Combat aircraft, subsonic Other aircraft1' 85 10 15 5 - - - 15 - 40 Helicopters 170 10 40 35 - - - 25 60
Surface-to-air missiles 340 20 170 150 Surface-to-surface missiles 10 10
LATIN AMERICA
Combat aircraft, supersonic 55 40 15 ------Combat aircraft, subsonic 140 10 50 - - - - 70 10 Other aircraft*1 360 60 50 120 20 - - - 60 50 Helicopters 63 40 5 15 3 - - - - -
Surface-to-air missiles 90 10 80 Surface-to-surface missiles 1100 100 1000
SOUTH ASIA
Combat aircraft, supersonic 370 280 20 - - 70 Combat aircraft, subsonic 20 10 ----- 1 0 - Other aircraft*1 105 20 20 15 - 10 - - 35 5 Helicopters 150 60 70 10 10
Surface-to-air missiles 10 10 Surface-to-surface missiles 1600 600 1000
CoLn Table 3. Cont'd
Federal People's Republic United Soviet United Czecho- Republic of All Total States Union France Rlnijdom Slovakia of China Poland Canada Germany Others
NfAR EAST
Combat aircraft, supersonic S60 300 600 10 50 Combat aircraft, subsonic 370 10 300 5 50 - - - - - 5 Other aircraft'5 465 20 150 40 60 160 - - - 30 5 Helicopters 385 10 175 30 10 - - - - - 160
Surface-to-air missiles 3280 630 2000 650 Surface-to-surface missiles 15260 - 250 10 15000
EAST ASIA
Combat aircraft, supersonic 500 260 240 Combat aircraft, subsonic 400 280 90 20 10 Other aircraft'5 1220 1100 10 10 50 30 10 10 Helicopters 1105 1085 10 10
Surfact-to-alr missiles 76000 600 70008 Surface-to-surface missiles
AFRICA
Combat aircraft, supersonic 130 30 80 20 Combat aircraft, subsonic 210 20 130 50 10 Other aircraft'5 490 20 40 150 90 30 20 40 100 Helicopters 195 - 60 100 10 5 20
Surface-to-air missiles 30? - 30 Surface-to-surface missiles 60- - 60
Ln •fc- Table 3. Coat'd
Federal People's Republic United Soviet United Czerho- Republic of All Total States Union France Klngdom Slovakia of China Poland Canada Germany Others
OCEANIA
Combat aircraft, supersonic 29 24 _ 5 _ . __ - _ Combat aircraft, subsonic 18 18 - - - ■ ------Other aircraft^ 45 -- 3 12 - --- - 30 Helicopters 21 21 ------
Surface-to-air missiles . -_ _ ___ - Surface-to-surfacc missiles
a Adapted from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, Iy74
k Other aircraft: reconalssance aircraft, trainers, transports, and utility aircraft.
c Totals are incomplete.
d Data on Soviet shipments are tentative rough estimates and should only be regarded as approximate orders of magnituJe.
e Indicates that deliveries are known to have occurred, but no reliable data arc available on actual numbers involved. It Is believed, however, that these omissions account for only a small proportion of total world shipments in each of these categories.
Ui Ln 56 aircraft in South American inventories, Hoagland concluded in
1970 that Western European suppliers must "export a combined total of several hundred jet fighters and armed trainers per year" in order to economically survive (p. 25). The patterns established in Appendix A indicate that Western Euorpean supplier are actively pursuing a strong sales policy in the international system, and competing with other suppliers in the aircraft industry.
Extent of United States Aircraft Sales. It has been demonstrated that the United States is one of the major suppliers of aircraft weapon systems in the international system. Furthermore, cumulative item transfers have been presented in order that some conceptual ization may be formed as to the type of aircraft systems that have been transferred. Yet, how do aircraft transfers compare with other weapon systems being transferred across time? Tables 4 and 5 present a categorized listing of the value of various systems that have been transferred from 1950 through 1972. Although the value placed upon particular weapons at the time of transfer may only approximate their true value, the data presented in these tables provides a rough comparison of transfers that have taken place. The importance of aircraft transfers, especially sales, in comparison to other types of weapons transferred, is under scored in these two tables. Table 4. Annuel Suaxr.ary of Foreign Military Sales by Category^ (Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1950- FY 1950- CATEGORIES FY 1906 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 FY 1972 FY 1972
FMS Grand Total 8,137.519 1,107,575 995,268 1,409,508 910,801 2,123,449 3,462,426 18,146,546
Aircraft 2,906,371 337,425 621,873 623,332 259,483 833,042 1,607,434 7,188,960
Ships 375,516 129,297 5,794 16,325 37,653 44,798 45,657 655,040
Vehicles and Weapons 1,156,547 101,419 114,687 105,499 76,411 163,560 272,318 1,990,441
Ammunition 556,986 44,287 81,821 64,565 72,195 105,919 180,744 1,106,517
Missiles 1,234,583 73,322 113.462 241,794 65,883 118,734 173,658 2,021,436
Communication Equipment 355,532 57,716 51,171 77,686 98,810 73,364 76,848 791,127
Other Equip. A Supplies 546,656 155,584 61,362 121,483 90,252 65,772 183,938 1,225,047
Construction 1,760 1,344 62 ---- 3,166
Repair and Rehabilitation 149,219 17,940 13,409 25,309 78,707 50,904 107,974 443,462
Supply Operatlona 244,950 34,423 45,429 41,073 58,869 149,041 88,917 662,702
Training 233,306 70,568 68,696 47,696 80,811 56,088 111,124 668,289
Technical Assistance and Other Services 188,228 32,889 13,035 31,972 90,287 45,513 201,579 603,503
Commercial Sales 21,880 84,626 11,738 82,214 27,901 72,579 103,732 404,670
Adjustments a/ 165,985 (33,265) (207,271) (69,440) (126,461) 344,135 308,503 382,186
a/ Adjnstments: This table, showing the distribution of FMS activities by category, must be adjusted to bring it in line with the cable shoving the distribution of FMS activities by fiscal year. The reasons for the differences are: (1) cases may not be fully definlticed on the date of the report; and (2) credit agreements are recorded in the year of completion of negotiations. Each agreement may cover several cases which may be implemented in different years and the category information is recorded as of the year of case implementation.
b This table was adapted from Mill tar*/ Asalatar.ee and Foreign Military Sales Facts, May 1973 published by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Table 5. Annual Summary of Military Assistance Programs by Category3 (Dollars In Thousands)
FY 1950- FY 1950- CATEGORIES FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 FY 1972 FY 1972
MAP Grand Total 32,670,619 723,619 576,867 665,626 387,268 771,316 569,892 36,126,985
Aircraft 6,606,651 117,816 117,913 56,010 57,716 96,287 67,632 7,119,623
Shlpa 1,751,789 66,716 26,758 10,597 9,636 35,366 37,611 1,916,273
Vehicles and Weapons 7,612,660 98,682 85,038 76,263 73,672 210,610 130,730 8,086,935
Ammunition 6,230,069 76,369 66,527 31,656 23,997 109,573 95,606 6,611,395
Missiles 1,311.987 13,619 6,802 6,192 6,761 6,988 5,696 1,353,865
Communication Equipment 1,975,511 62,576 66,099 26,620 20,261 57,725 26,081 2,190,871
Other Equipment and Suppllea 2,681,818 106,106 87,267 76,870 61,930 93,109 67,265 2,956,363
Construction 506,159 1,956 1,695 166 - 275 3,779 515,828
Repair and Rehabilitation 662,702 9,506 8,839 11,855 16,053 27,005 16,737 752,697
Supply Operations 2,150,760 81,962 63,192 65,900 59,156 71,209 62,037 2,556,196
Technical Assistance and Special Services 2,282,960 80,196 52,266 67,256 25,591 32,255 25,336 2,565,888
Training 1,297,793 50,521 38,671 36,265 32,699 33,362 33,952 1,523,063
a This Cable vas adapted from Military Assistance and Forei/.n Military Sales Facts. May 1973 published by the Defense Security Assistance Agency.
Ln 00 59
The data in Table 4 indicate that aircraft sales of
$7,188,960,000 accounted for 39 per cent of the Foreign Military
Sales grand total of $18,146,546,000 for the years 1950 through
1972. Missile sales ranked second with 11.1 per cent of the total, while Vehicles and Weapons sales ranked a close third with 10.96 per cent of the grand total. Table 4 presents a clear trend of the importance of air weapon systems in United States Foreign
Military S a l e s . 22 The importance of such sales would be further underscored if several of the other categories were disaggregated into respective weapon systems. This would provide information such as the amount of training that was air system related, or the value of missiles sold that were designed for air weapon systems. Still, the trend is clear with aircraft sales ranked first in every time period.
Looking at the Military Assistance Programs (MAP), the value of aircraft transfers ($7,119,623,000) and vehicles and weapons transfers ($8,086,985,000) were relatively even. Table 5 indicates that the former category accounted for 19.7 per cent of the total value ($36,124,985,000) of military assistance, while the latter accounted for 22.4 per cent of the total. The recent trend for military assistance has been to supply more vehicles and weapons for ground operations than air systems. Another striking feature of this table is the large amount of ammunition that has been provided under MAP programs. Unfortunately, the data for this 60
category are not further disaggregated into subcategories by weapon
system. If subcategorization was available, observations could
O O be made on the support of various weapon systems being transferred.
Overall, however, the tables indicate the extent of aircraft
transfers in comparison to other systems.
Arms Transfers and Congressional Considerations. Several factors
have been identified that have an impact on United States arms
transfers. First, the national policy of assisting allies and
nations struggling to maintain their sovereignity presents a
problem in areas engaged in conflict. Secondly, the political
competition that exists between the United States and the Soviet
Union in various regions of the international system has an
effect on transfers. The policy of detente has had an impact in a number of a r e a s , 24 but little success has occurred in controlling
conventional arms transfers. Competition has also been identified with recipients; both politically and in the composition of their force structures. The legislation is specific in dealing with transfers related to arms races. However, it is difficult to find references or past behavior that indicate that arms should not be supplied to nations faced with a contiguous nation that is arming itself. The recent United States decision to lift its arms embargo on Pakistan is a case in point. Secretary of State Kissinger (1975) 61
responded with the following remark when asked about this decision
and the ensuing criticism from India:
.... Now, with respect ot the relationship between India and the United States: In a speech in New Delhi last October, I pointed out that India, because of its size and its position, has a special role in South Asia which the United States recognizes. I have also pointed out that the United States has no interest and will not support or engage in an arms race in South Asia. We maintain both of these statements. It seemed to us, however, that to maintain an embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship, while its neighbor was producing and acquiring nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a year, was morally, politically, and symbolically improper. I repeat: The decision to lift the arms embargo does not mean that the United States will engage in a massive supply of arms to Pakistan or that the United States will engage in arms deliveries that can affect the underlying strategic balance. But it seemed to us an anomaly to embargo one country in the area— to be the only country in the world to be embargoing this country— when its neighbor was not exercising a comparable restraint. But, even with this, we will not engage in massive deliveries of arms.
In view of the legislation, the Secretary of State's statement
illustrates that it is difficult to balance the realities present
in various regional areas with the spirit of the legislation.
Preemptive sales on the part of the United States are related to political competition. A preemptive sale may be defined
as the selling of weapons systems to nations in order to avoid
their purchasing the weapon systems from a competitor. Two
identified preemptive sales that have occurred were the sale of
F-104 Starfighters to Jordan and the sale of F-4 Phantoms to Iran 62 in 1966. John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, testified before a Senate sub committee in 1967 that:
So-called 'preemptive selling1 . . . is necessary in certain cases to safeguard U.S. security interests. .... In two of the three examples just cited (Jordan and Iran), the U.S. sale was made fundamentally to avoid the serious danger of a radical shift in the orientation of the recipient country through the introduction of Soviet arms, training missions and other instruments of influence. And in the third example (Israel), our action was prompted by a heavy infusion of Soviet equipment to neighboring states (U.S. Armament and Disarmament Problems, p. 69).
Again, difficulties can arise where the results of a preemptive sale may be in direct conflict with the restraints enacted by
Congress on arms transfers. Preemptive selling is one more dimension that students of arms transfers must consider when analyzing United States decisions to supply weapons to another nation.
Economic competition is a factor that has been identified as having an impact on both arms transfers and efforts at conventional arms control. The results of economy of scale in producing air craft have been cited as being influential in both of these areas.
Secretary of State Kissinger's remark that the United States was the only nation embargoing arms to Pakistan points out the economic as well as the political reality of the situation. Furthermore, the fierce competition in recent months between the French and
United States supersonic fighter producers underscores the enormous economic benefits realized in selling combat aircraft.25 63
Publicly available data also indicate how arms transfers can off set the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. For example, the defense expenditure of $2.7 billion dollars for maintaining
United States troops abroad was a part of the U.S. balance of payments outfolow in 1968. In the same year, receipts from arms sales abroad totaled $1.2 billion dollars or 44 per cent of the payments made to other countries in maintaining U.S. armed f o r c e s . 26 Thus, almost one-half of troop maintenance abroad could be thought to be offset by receipts from United States arms sales. These figures and related data led Stanley and Pearton
(1972) to conflude that it is hardly surprising that "in a major arms-manufacturing country the Treasury may advocate arms exports as vigorously as the Defense Ministry (p. 81)." Consequently, there are several dimensions to the economic aspects of arms transfers.
The political and economic dimensions relating to arms trans fers are numerous. These dimensions deal with basic foreign policy considerations of the supplier. One often overlooked area that has an impact on arms transfer decisions is the control which the supplier will have over the use of the weapons by the recipient. Although this study is focusing on two considerations stipulated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Congress has also legislated that weapons transferred are to be used for internal security and national defense. The difficulty with this 64
restriction is in eforcing it once the arms have been transferred.
Past history has proven this restriction virtually impossible to
enforce. Leiss, et. al. (1967) have made the following observation
on this problem:
The 1965 Kashmir hostilities serve as a prime example to the weapons suppliers involved of how little control they have over weapons that have been handed over to another country. In this case, agreement by both India and Pakistan that they would not use the weapons supplied by the United States against one another was disregarded when the fighting broke out (p. 331).
The Israeli preemptive attack against Egypt in the 1967 Six Day
War in another example where arms supplied by the United States were deployed in an offensive manner. It could be suggested that the preemptive strike was a justifiable defensive measure by
Israel. Still, Egyptian sovereignty was violated in the air attack initiated by Israel. The use of United States weapons in such a situation was a violation of Congressional legislation.
Turkish actions in Cyprus provide the most recent example of this problem. In this situation, Turkey extensively used
United States weapons in securing its position on the island.
Congressional reaction to the Turkish actions has already been documented earlier in this study. ^ The irony of the crisis is that both combatants are members of the same alliance (NATO), and used United States supplied weapon systems during the conflict.
This recent situation underscores the difficulty in controlling the use of weapon systems once they have been transferred to another nation. 65
Three immediate courses of action to deal with these situa
tions are open to the United States. First, diplomacy may be used in order to shift the recipient's use of the weapon systems to comply with the legislation. Secondly, restrictions may be imposed on the supply of spare parts in order to decrease the number of operational weapons over time. Finally, a total arms embargo may be levied against the recipient in an attempt to alter its deployment policies. The difficulty with the latter two courses of action is that arms sales may be affected, as well as the overall credibility of the United States to supply arma ments at crucial points in time.^S
The problem of control could be dealt with easier if clear- cut distinctions could be made between defensive and offensive weapon systems. Unfortunately, it is difficult to specify that a particular weapon system may be used only for defensive p u r p o s e s . 29
Most weapon systems, and especially air weapon systems, are multi purpose in nature. That is, they may be utilized in both offensive as well as defensive situations. Let us consider for the moment, the role of a jet interceptor. Its military mission is to protect national airspace from foreign penetration. However, this same aircraft can fly escort for larger bomber aircraft, and can be fitted with armaments for a ground attack mission. Furthermore, interceptors may also be designed for reconaissance work by installing cameras into the fuselage. Thus, the transfer of a 66 multi-purpose aircraft gives the recipient a wide range of
options in deployment.
This dimension of weapon systems is not limited solely to jet combat aircraft. The helicopter provides another example of
an aircraft that has multiple missions. Small observation heli
copters may be outfitted with gun-pods to increase their combat
capbility. Larger helicopters may be deployed to move cargo or ammunition, evacuate wounded combatants, airlift troops into an area, or be armed as a gunship to provide troop ground support.
The multi-purpose roles for helicopters were exemplified by the
United States usage in South Vietnam. Technology has progressed in the point where helicopters can be armed with anti-tank missiles and lend support to combat troops engaged in fighting mechanized weapon systems. These observations should suggest that transfers that were made for defensive purposes may eventually be used in offensive situations by the recipient.
The above dimensions all have an impact on the Congressional considerations. Some might question the usefulness of the legis lation which states that "decisions to furnish military assistance shall take into account whether such assistance will—
(1) contribute to an arms race; (2) increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict; or (3) prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements (United States Statutes at Large, 1972, p. 25)." 67
It has already been noted that this study will not deal with the
third consideration since there is little interest among weapon
producers and consumers in arms control arrangements. However the
first two considerations exemplify Congressional concern over
United States activities abroad, and the impact of United States
arms transfers.
Congressional concern of United States arms transfers has
increased in recent years, especially since the debate over the
appropriate role for the United States in Southeast Asia. The
first two Congressional considerations directly relate to the
impact of any arms transfer. First, the acquisition of any weapon
system always has the potential of causing an arms race between
the recipient nation and its neighbors. Disproportionate increases
in the force structure capability of one nation, as a result of an arms transfer, is viewed as being one of the causes of arms races,
Thus, the United States Congress broadly legislated that all
United States arms transfers must take into account whether or not the transfer will in fact contribute to the occurrence of an arms race.
Secondly, arms transfers must be reviewed as to their impact on influencing conflictual situations. The perspective of
Congress is very clear on this aspect of the legislation. That is, certain arms transfers are determining factors in influencing the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Consequently, the United 68
States should carefully take into account the potential impact
of transfers to areas of high tension or ongoing conflict. One
question left unanswered by this point of the legislation deals
with transfers to allies of the United States that are currently
involved in a conflict. In such situations it is a matter of
which factor takes precedence over the other. Past U.S. transfer
behavior indicates that friends and allies of the United States
will receive arms even if they are involved in an on-going conflict.
The difficulty with the legislated considerations is that they
lack direction. Should arms be transferred if they will cause an
arms race or conflict to occur? What does the phrase "shall take
into account" really mean? Are there certain cases where the
legislation should be strictly applied and others where the con
siderations are not very important? These are important questions
that have been left unanswered. The perspective for this study
is to strictly view the considerations and conclude that arms should not be transferred if they will cause an arms race or have, an inflamatory impact on a tense or conflictual situation.
This past section has identified factors that have an impact on the legislation and arms transfer decisions, and discussed the meaning of the legislation as viewed in the context of this study. Up to this point, however, nothing has been said about the operational environment of the weapon system, or the related force structures formed due to past national acquisitions. Before 69
proceeding to the identification of force structures, the opera
tional environment of air weapon systems will be briefly reviewed.
The review will provide a background for the model and the analysis
to follow in the succeeding chapters.
Operational Environment of Air Weapon Systems. Peck and Scherer
(1962) have observed that the military value of a weapon system
is related to the weapons possessed by the enemy. "Defensive weapons must obviously be able to counter enemy offensive weapons
and offensive weapons must capitalize upon weaknesses in the enemy's defenses (p. 48)." This perspective was presented for evaluating all types of weapon systems, but it is especially relevant when
considering air weapon systems. The operational environment of an air system includes the air systems possessed by other members of the region, as well as the topographical and geological characteristics of the nation and region as a whole. In terras of
the legislation, the operational environment will be viewed as the air weapon systems possessed by the requesting nation, and the other nations within the region. The logic here is that changes in the air weapon system force structures are related to the occurrence of arms races and conflict.
Geoffrey Kemp (1970) has developed a framework for classify ing combat aircraft into several general' combat environments. 70
This framework enables one to gain a more comprehensive under
standing of the scope of operational environments. The combat
environments identified are:
Permissive Counter-Insurgency. The military environment in which the counter-insurgent is operating is "permissive," that is to say, the insurgent has no anti-air systems, apart from small arms; friendly airfields are secure; and airfield facilities are moderate to good. The sort of situation in mind could approximate the conditions in a normal counter-insurgency operation during Mao's Stage 1 (South Vietnam 1941-64; Bolivia 1967; Angola 1962; Nigeria vs. Biafra 1968; Iraq vs. Kurds 1960-62).
Permissive External. The military enviornment is in enemy airspace, but the enemy has no major passive or active air defense capability apart from a few antiquated anti-aircraft guns and small arms. Enemy has no serious detection capa bility. Examples of this environment would be Rhodesia vs. Zambia 1968-1969; Israel vs. Jordan 1968; Egypt vs. Yemeni Royalists 1965-67.
Hostile Counter-Insurgency. The military environment in which the counter-insurgent is operating is "hostile"; that is to say, the enemy has considerable control of ground communications; friendly forward airfields are not secure; and enemy has some anti-aircraft capability. Examples could be the U.S. vs. North Vietnamese Forces and the N.L.F. in the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone.
Hostile External. The military environment is in enemy airspace. The enemy has major passive and active air defense, e.g., SAMs, interceptors, radar, etc. Examples would be U.S. vs. North Vietnam; Israel vs. Egypt.
Air Defense. Since the air defense environment differs so markedly from the strike environments it was necessary to treat it separately. However, under the rubric of "air defense" many contingencies can be imagined. It was necessary to limit the choice of options and focus on one particular type of air defense environment, namely one that assumed the offense had good strike aircraft (Mach 1.0+). Examples would be North Vietnam vs. U.S.; Egypt vs. Israel (Kemp, 1970, pp. 81-82). 71
Having identified these operational environments, Kemp designed
ten different air missions and asked a panel of air force experts
to rate the ability of different air weapon systems to success
fully complete the m i s s i o n s . 30 The evaluations from the panel
also yielded preferred characteristics of aircraft for strike
and defense missions. Tables 6, 7, and 8 have been adapted from
Kemp to present a summary of the findings. The reader should note
that the preferred characteristics vary somewhat between missions, however, three characteristics predominate. These characteristics are; high total payload, high speed capability, and multiple armament. On the basis of this panel data, one could proceed to look at national air force systems and assess their overall capability to accomplish these missions.31
Kemp concludes that one general lesson from this effort can be identified in the area of planning. If a planner did not have to worry about a hostile environment, characteristics such as high speed and all-weather capability could be sacrified for high payload and low speed capabilities (1970', p. 93). This approach by Kemp is innovative and permits mission oriented planning to be undertaken. It also permits evaluation and air weapon system classification in terms of specified air missions.
But the approach is of limited use for evaluating national air force structures in comparison to each other. Structural evaluation must be based on the weapons systems present, and not 72
Table 6. Preferred Systems and Characteristics for Counter-Insurgency Attacks Missiono
PERMISSIVE COIN
ISOLATED AIR STRIKE TACTICAL SUPPORT Mission 1 Mission 2
1st 2 Squadrons B-26K 1st 1 1/2 Squadrons B-57
2nd 1 1/2 Squadrons B-57 2nd 1 Squadron A-37B Preferred Systems 3rd 1 Squadron A-4F 3rd 2 Squadrons B-26K
4th 2 Squadrons A-J7B 4th 1 Squadron A-4K
1st High Total Payload 1st High Total Payload Characteristics Influencing 2nd Multiple Aroaocnt 2nd Multiple Armament Selection of 1st Choice 3rd Cood Loiter Capability 3rd Cood Loiter Capability
4th Combat Well Tested 4th (;•»*»! Low Altitude Performance
HOSTILE COIN
ISOLATED AIR STRIKE TACTICAL SUPPORT Mission 5 Mission 6
1st 1 Squadron A-4F 1st 1 Squadron A-4F
2nd 1/2 Oft.ii'hnonr F-4C 2nd I 1/2 Squadrons B-57 Preferred Systems 3rd 1 1/2 Squadrons B-57 3rd 2 Squadrons A-37B
4th 1 Squadron F-5A 4th 1/2 Detachment F-4C
1st High Total Payload 1st High Total Payload Characteristics Influencing 2nd High Speed Capability 2nd Multiple Armament Selection of 1st Choice 3rd Multiple Armament 3rd Cood Loiter Capability
4th High Combat Radius 4th High Speed Capability
Package (1 Squadron * approx. 12 aircraft; 1 Detachment » approx. 6 aircraft)
2 SQUADRONS A-37ii 1 SQUADRON F-5A Choices of 1 1/2 SQUADRONS CANBERRA (B-57) Systems Offered 1 SQUADRON A-4F for All Attack 1 SQUADRON SU-7 Missions 2 SQUADRONS 0V-10A (BRONCO) 1 SQUADRON MIG-2 ID 2 SQUADRONS B-26IC 1 1/2 SQUADRONS HUNTER OR F-8o 1 DETACHMENT LIGHTNING 1 DETACHMENT MIRAGE III 1/2 DETACHMENT F-4C Table 7. Preferred Systems and Characteristics For External Attack Missions
PERMISSIVE EXTERNAL
ISOLATED AIR STRIKE TAC SUPPORT MISSION 3 MISSION 4
1st 11/2 Squadrons B-57 1st 1 1/2 Squadrons B-57
2nd 2 Squadrons B-26K 2nd 1 Squadron A-4F Preferred Systems 3rd 1 Squadron A-4F 3rd 2 Squadrons B-26K
4th 2 Squadrons A-37B 4th 2 Squadrons A-37B
1st Hiy,h Total Pavload 1st High Total Payload* Characteristics Inf iuom* 1 nr 2nd Multiple Armament 2nd Multiple Armament ScJiM t Inn uf 1st Choice 3rd Cood Loiter Capability 3rd Fast-turn Round Time
4th Cood Low Altitude Performance 4th Good Altitude Performance East* of Maintenance
HOSTILE EXTERNAL
ISOLATED AIR STRIKE TAC SUPPORT MISSION 7 MISSION 8
1st 1 Squadron A-4F 1st 1 Squadron A-4T
2nd 1/2 Detachment F-4C 2nd 1/2 Detachment F-4G Preferred Systems 3rd 1 Detachment Mirage III 3rd 1 Detachment Mirage III
4th 1 Squadron F-5A 4th Squadron F-5A
1st High Total Payload 1st High Total Pavload Characteristics Inf lucnc ing 2nd Multiple Armament 2nd Multiple Armament Selection of 1st Choice 3rd High Speed Capability 3rd Cood Loiter Capability
4th Good Low Altitude Performance 4th High Speed Capability 74
Table 8. Preferred Systems and Characteristics For Air Defense Missions
DEFEND AIRFIELDS DEFEND CITIES MISSION 9 MISSION 10
1st 1 Squadron MIG-21D 1st 1 Squadron MIG-21D
2nd 1 Detachment Lightning 2nd 1 Squadron F-5A
3rd 1/2 Detachment F-4C 3rd 1/2 Detachment F-4C
4th 1 Squadron F-5A 4th 1 Detachment Lightning
1st High Sepped Capability 1st High Speed Capability All-Weather Capability All-Weather Capability
3rd Short Runway Requirements 3rd High Total Payload
4th High Total Payload 4th Multiple Armament
CHOICES OF SYSTEMS OFFERED FOR AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS
PACKAGE (1 Squadron = Approx. 12 aircraft 1 Detachment = Approx. 6 aircraft)
1 SQUADRON F-5A
1 SQUADRON MIG-21D
11/2 SQUADRONS HUNTER/F-86
1 DETACHMENT LIGHTNING
1 DETACHMENT MIRAGE III
1 SQUADRON F-100D
1 SQUADRON MIG-19
1/2 DETACHMENT F-4C 75
mission oriented tasks. National air weapons systems are called
upon to perform a variety of missions, especially in under
developed nations whose economy can only minimally support an air
force. Although all nations may prefer the characteristics identi
fied in Tables 6, 7, and 8, they also must cope with reality and
the air weapon systems that are obtainable at a reasonable cost.
Therefore, this study will evaluate air force structures in terms
of the types of air weapon systems present with the nation, and
their capabilities.
National Air Force Structures. Air force structures are directly
related to the operational environment and the missions identified
by Geoffrey Kemp. The extent of the force structure determines
the nation's ability to effectively operate in its environment.
In the Introduction, Figure 2 (p. 18) presented eight types of
air force structures. The force structure types are presented in
descending order. That is a nation having a Type II force structure has a greater capacity to deal with different missions that a nation possessing a Type IV structure. The logic here is that a nation possessing reconaissance aircraft, also has in its aircraft inventory, bombers, interceptors, fighter-bombers, trainers, helicopters and transports, and thus has a greater mission capacity because of the various a i r c r a f t . 32
Ordering of the various air systems has been based on the aircraft's mission flexibility. As one moves from right to left 76
across the "types" of air systems, the aircraft become more
mission specific.33 por example, a tanker is used for refueling
other aircraft in flight while a reconaissance aircraft is used
for taking ground photographs. Similarly, fighter bombers may
be utilized for ground support, interdiction, and/or reconaissance
missions. Although a transport aircraft is designed for moving
troops or material, it may also be refitted for ground support or
reconaissance missions. Obviously, certain air systems are
designed to perform different missions better than other air
systems. At this time the questions is, to what extent are these
force structures present in the international system.
Tables 9 through 13 present the force structures identified in the international system from 1970 to 1975.34 These tables are based on available public information found in The Military
Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. The data presented here and throughout the remainder of this study should be viewed as close approximations of the real world. It is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to verify the accuracy of military related data because of the scarcity of sources. This caveat, however, does not negate the overall effort because the main purpose here is to develop the application of social science techniques.
In tables 9 through 13, an "x" in a row indicates the presence of that particular type of air weapon system in the nation’s 77 aircraft inventory, and a blank indicates an absence of the weapon system. These tables are Guttman s c a l e s 3 5 an(j demonstrate the existence of force structures in the international system. But, the tables do not indicate in any way the total strength of a particular force structure. Their purpose is to identify that force structures exist, and are the result from a nation producing or acquiring air weapon systems.
Guttman scaling is a statistical technique used for inferring unidimensionality. The purpose here is to demonstrate the level of complexity of air forces and the corresponding presence of air force structures. In a perfect scale situation, the presence of one characteristic (in this case air system) indicates that the unit under observation possesses every characteristic below the one initially identified. Translating this into air systems, a nation that has fighter-bombers in its aircraft inventory would also have trainer, helicopter, and transport air systems. Like wise, nations that have Type I tanker force structures would also have all the other air systems in their air force inventory.
Tables 9 through 13 display that national air forces scale according to the conceptualized force structure pattern.
Five tables have been presented, but how good are the
Guttman scales in demonstrating that force structures exist? The presence of the identified air weapon systems could have occurred by chance. A number of different statistics may be applied to test 78
the scalability of the data in a Guttman scale. Table 14 presents
two statistics— the coefficient of reproducibility-^ and the
coefficient of scalability37 — for judging how representative the
tables are for the existence of force structures. In terms of the
first statistic, a good scale will have a coefficient of reproduci bility of .90 or higher. In comparison, a scale is judged "good enough" if its coefficient of scalability is .60 or better (Garson,
1971). All five tables have values above the minimum required on each of the criteria, and thus are judged representative of force structures. National air force structures do exist, and the statistical technique used here permits the assertion that these force structures do not occur by chance.
Table 14. Statistical Criteria Values
Table Coefficient of Coefficient of ______Reproducibility______Scalability
8 .966 .827 9 .951 .713 10 .948 .739 11 .950 .747 12 .958 .785
The presence of national force structures is even more identifiable when the data are broken down into six regions of the international system. Tables 15 through 20 present force structures at the regional level. The data provide insight into the use of weapon systems in different regions, and the similiarity of force structures within regions. For example, in Tables 9 through 13 a number of countries possessed reconaissance planes but not bomber aircraft as would be expected. These nations would be expected to have bomber aircraft because they have a Type II force structure.
The regional tables indicate that this force structure composition is most prevalent in Western Europe (Table 16) as well as South
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Table 20). In Western Europe, there is little need for bomber attack aircraft because of the NATO alli ance and the United States bomber and missile force guaranteeing member security. If the positions of the two weapon systems were reversed in regional Table 15, an almost perfect scale would occur. Similarly, one can explain the absence of bomber aircraft for the three Asian nations. In all three nations, the national emphasis is on a defensive position. Bomber aircraft are more offensive in nature. Furthermore, the majority of these nation's combat air systems are supplied by the United-States. Thus, it is not surprising to find an absence of bombers even though all three nations have sophisticated reconaissance planes in their force structures.
The ordering of the various air systems in the tables suggest that as a nation develops its air force structure it will add new types of air systems to perform specific missions.38 This is true for both developing and developed nations. Table 19 presents three examples of force structure changes occurring with the addition of 80
new air weapon systems. Cameroon and the Ivory Coast added trainer
aircraft to their small air forces, while Tanzania increased its
force structure capability by acquiring old Soviet fighter-bombers.
The first two examples represent a modest force structure change
with the addition of a minimum number of trainer aircraft in each
case. Tanzania's acquisition, on the other hand, represents a
more signigicant force structure change because of its increased
ordance capability with a Type V force structure. But force
structure changes are not only found in developing nations. Table
18 displays changes occurring in Israel's and Iran's force struc
tures. Iran moved from a Type III force structure to a Type II
by acquiring sophisticated U.S. reconaissance aircraft. Israel
also made a force structure change by acquiring both reconaissance
and tanker air systems, thus increasing its overall capability.
Similarlity of force structures can also be identified in
several regions. Eastern Europe has had similar force structures
across time, and the influence of the Soviet Union in supplying
aircraft to these nations in evidenced in Table 17. Arms competi
tion in South America has been noted earlier in this study. Table 15
reinforces this observation for the major nations in South America.
The table displays that major South American powers (e.g., Argentina,
Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile) have relatively identical force
structures across time. Middle East nations also display a continuity of force sturctures among most of the nations in Table 18. However, 81 changes in force structures among the major combatants in the
Middle East can also be identified from 1970 to 1975. The most notable changes have occurred in the Israeli, Libyan, Iranian, and
Syrian force sturctures. The table displays how their force structures have been expanded through the acquisition of different air weapon systems.
Finally, Table 19 displays the force structures present in
Africa. These nations have been characterized as poor, emerging, and underdeveloped. Their force structures are representative of the economic development present in the region. The bulk of the nations have Type V force structures or less, with a minimum of five nations having no air force structure whatsoever. Only five nations (Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Rhodesia) have a Type III force structure, and two nations (Libya and South
Africa) have a Type II force structure. By focusing on the regional level, it is possible to more positively identify the presence of force structures in Africa and other regions. Further more, observations can be made about similarities and changes in force structures as they occur across time.
Until now, only descriptive statements have been presented about force structures. The tables indicate their presence and the concept has been substantially developed. The obvious next question is how does one compare the capabilities of the various types of force structures? This question will be fully answered in Chapter 3. For the present, it is sufficient to say that 82 force structure capabilities will be analyzed in terms of the wea pon systems present in the structure (i.e., its component parts), and their ordnance delivery capabilities. Force structures are a major component of the model for arms transfer decisions. The content of these structures and their comparability will be presented in the next chapter.
This chapter has attempted to provide a background for the transfer of weapon systems. It has briefly noted historical regu lations on arms transfers, and the United States policies behind transferring weapon systems. The difficulty of achieving conven tional arms control has been presented, as well as the reasons for the continuance of this problem. In addition, themajor suppliers of air weapon systems have been identified, and the extent of their transfers summarized in Table 3. A portion of this chapter was devoted to a discussion of the problems with the Congressional restrictions in order to sensitize the reader to issues that will be discussed in the analysis section of this study. Finally, the concept of force structures and their presence in the international system was developed.
The concept of national air force structures is a key component in the arms transfer evaluation process. This concept is relatively new in the public literature dealing with weapon systems. The
M.I.T. group (Bloomfield, Leiss, Hoagland, Kemp, and Refson) uses this concept broadly to encompass ground, naval, and air systems. 83
In contrast, Roberts and Golder (1971) have characterized the
existence of six types of naval force structures. This study has built upon past efforts in developing and identifying the existence of national air force structures in the international system.
Furthermore, force structure capability analysis has been developed in the following chapter. These conceptualizations are important because they assist in providing information needed to answer macro questions on when to transfer weapon systems. Leiss, et al. (1970) concerned themselves with more micro questions such as what type of force configuration is needed to best accomplish specific missions. Although micro questions are certainly a part of the arms transfer evaluation process, the decision-maker must deal with the broader implications of a specific transfer or series of transfers. The concepts of air force structures and force structure capabilities assist in looking at the broader impact questions of a combat air system transfer. Applications of these concepts will become more clear when they are presented within the context of the decision model. With this background, it is now possible to consider in depth the proposed model for arms transfer decisions. NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
■^See Elton Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports, Washington: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1941.
^Atwater (1941) more precisely states these reasons as follows: "to strengthen the national defense by the conserva tion of essential supplies for domestic use in case of war; to prevent disorder and revolution in areas where American inter ests were felt to be vitally affected; to bring pressure to bear against certain governments to adopt policies more favor able to American interests; to shorten or terminate foreign wars; to keep the United States out of war; and to discourage certain objectionable actions of other states such as the bombing of civilian populations (p. 3)."
3ln a report to Congress, President Nixon (1973) stated: "A stable international system requires that small countries be secure and independent, and that they be able to protect their security and independence mainly by their own efforts. For this reason, American support of other nation’s defense efforts has always been a vital component of our secuity policy and an essential element in maintaining international stability (p. 109)."
^Some examples identified by the Department of Defense include:
-Security assistance helps to maintain a military balance in the Middle East conducive to restraint and important as a condition favorable to success of U.S. efforts to bring about a lasting peace in the area.
- Similarly, security assistance is the essential element in U.S. efforts to create conditions requisite for a turce and ultimate settlement in Cambodia.
- In the case of Latin America, security assistance is an important factor in the development of a new spirit of coopera- tionand partnership with this region.
84 85
-Security assistance also serves a purpose of considerable importance in other selected countries in helping local leaders in their attempts to meet the needs associated with nation building and economic development (Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1974, p. 1).
^It should be noted that the data in Table 1 provides only rough approximations of arms trade, since it is impossible to obtain extensive data for other arms suppliers as it is for the areas accounted for in U.S. transfers.
^Developing nations were defined by ACDA as those countries whose 1972 GNP per capita was below $1500. Exceptions were made on the basis of factors such as national literacy and mortality rates, levels of industrialization and terms of trade (relative export and import prices). These factors overrode the simplistic GNP per capita criteria in only a few cases.
7 The reader should be aware that the majority of trainers are equipped with some armaments and can be used in a combat capacity.
®See Tables 4 and 5 for a detailed breakdown of United States foreign military sales and military assistance programs.
90ne of the main problems is the value attached to the weapon system at the time of the sale. Surplus items present the best example of this problem in that they may be sold for as little as one-fourth the original procurement cost or less, and still be brand new. A second problem is that of inflation. This is especially true in recent years. Fewer items may be added to inventories for a higher cost.
l^George Thayer (1969) Observes that "it is a fact of life...that no one wants to control the trade in conventional arms— rifles, pistols, machine guns, tanks,, artillery, fighter planes and bombers,warships, tactical missiles, and convention al explosives. No organization, either national or international, has created any machinery to cope specifically with this problem (p. 364) '. 86
^Stanley and Pearton (1972) support this observation. They noted that "the effective disintegration of regional arms control in Latin America, the area of the world that is least caught up in global power politics and most under the influence of the United States, argurs poorly for the success of a similar policy elsewhere. The Latin American story suggests that the essential prerequisite for success is either an agreement on arms policy subscribed to by all the potential suppliers as has occurred transitionally in the Middle East, or alternatively, a self-denying ordinance with regard to particular weapons subscribed to by the developing countries themselves (p. 221)."
l^France, Canada and Great Britain could be identified in this category. Hoagland (1970) notes that "Britain and France must normally export well over half of their aircraft production in order to attain production runs long enough to keep unit costs at an acceptable level (p. 25)."
-^For a discussion of economic pressures on arms trade, see John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms, Great Britain: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1972, pp. 122-160.
l^The United States' 1973 trade balance was greatly affected by trade in aerospace products. In 1973, the U.S. moved from a $6.3 billion deficit to a $1.6 billion surplus; with aerospace products increasing $1.1 billion over 1972 to a total of $4.4 billion. For a further discussion of U.S. foreign trade in this area, see Aerospace Facts and Figures 1974/75.
15In 1973, spares alone accounted for approximately 31 per cent of total U.S. military sales (Aerospace Facts and Figures 1974/75, p. 102).
16For a review of international efforts to control conventional arms transfers since World War II see Annex C of The International Transfers of Conventional Arms (ACDA, 1974).
-^President Nixon (1973) has identified some of the complexi ties involved in the MBFR process in U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970's, p. 205.
l^The legislation passed by Congress could be viewed as a unilateral arms control policy. That is, in an arms race or con flict situation the United States would control the flow of weapon systems it produces regardless of the activity by other major suppliers. It is suggested, however, that national unilateral arms control policies are the "exception rather than the rule" in the contemporary international system. 87
•^His study, World Combat Aircraft Inventories and Production: 1970-1975, not only reviews the producers, but also the air systems they produce and aircraft that will begin production in the 1970’s.
^For a discussion of the combat aircraft produced by these four nations see Hoagland (1970), pp. 15-31.
2-*-The Military Balance has been published yearly since 1969. This publication is one of the most extensive public documents reviewing national military structures.
n o One statistic not available is the value of loans or grants- in-aid made available to purchase weapon systems in each category. 23 In order to accomplish such an analysis, the ammunition category would have to be broken down into subgroupings such as: (1) small arms, (2) mortars, tanks, artillery, and (3) aircraft ammunition, bombs, and missiles.
^Examples of past successes include: (1) limitations on nuclear strike forces, (2) cultural exchanges, (3) the upcoming joint space effort in July, 1975, and (4) the exchange of en dangered species.
^^For example, see the following New York Times' articles: (1) "U.S. and France Vie For Warplane Market," (July 21, 1974, p. 3); (2) "France Pushes Campaign to Sell New Jets to NATO," (August 31, 1974, p. 3); (3) "Europeans Seek Warplane Sales," (February 9, 1975, p. 8); (4) "U.S. Seeks to Clinch Belgium F-16 Feal," (June 5, 1975, p. 16); and (5) "French Criticize Belgians of F-16," (August 8, 1975, p. 10).
26xhe resulting offset was much higher in the previous year. In 1967, it cost 2.6 billion dollars for troop maintenance while arms sales totaled 1.8 billion dollars. Consequently, it could be considered that 64 per cent of the outflow of money for troop maintenance was offset by the receipts from arms sales. See Stanley and Pearton (1972) for a complete discussion of the balance of payments situation.
27see footnote 3 of Chapter 1.
2®A similar problem has occurred with the recent Ethiopian request for armaments to combat the Eritrean rebellion. Secretary of State Kissinger has made the following observation of the situation at a recent news conference: "The problem that we have to decide is whether a country, whose military establishment has been based on American arras, should be cut off from support at 88
the precise moment that it most need it. It is a difficult decision for us, and have not come close to making it (1975, p. 4)."
o n ^An excellent example of this problem is surface-to-air missiles. Although these missiles may be viewed as solely defensive systems, they do possess offensive capabilities. In the October 1973 Middle East War, the Egyptians effectively used mobile SAM missiles to supplement their fighter capability for protection as they crossed the Suez Canal. Consequently, mobile surface-to- air missile systems may be used in offensive military operations. For a discussion of the 1973 Middle East War see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1973, pp. L2-55.
30The different missions were as follows: (1) For the two Counter-insurgency environments: (a) Isolated air strike against enemy personnel and headquarters; (b) Tactical support of friendly ground forces operating in the vicinity.; (2) For the External environment: (a) Air strike against enemy ground forces and bases within 100 miles of home base; (b) Tactical support of own forces in enemy air space within 100 miles of base; and (3) For the Air Defense environment: (a) Defense of own airfields against enemy air strikes; and (b) Defense of urban and industrial targets against enemy bombing.
Similar assessments based on performance characteristics are made in evaluating missile capabilities. In evaluating missile force effectiveness, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger (1975) noted that "we cannot allow major asymmetries to develop in the combined characteristics of throw-weight, accuracy, yield-to-weight ratios, reliability, and other such factors that contribute to the effective ness of strategic weapons and to the perceptions of other nations as to the state of the strategic balance (p. 7)."
32Note that nothing has been said about the nation’s effective capability. Air force structure capability will be discussed in Chapter 3.
33i wish to thank my colleagues, Dr. William Buckingham, Jr., Mr. William Dixon, and Mr. Matt Filipic for their time and sug gestions in handling this issue and other conceptual problems encountered in doing this study.
^^These tables and Tables 14 through 19 have been placed at the end of this chapter because of their length. The reader is encouraged to-review the tables and the trends occurring in each region of the international system. 89
3 5 For an excellent discussion of Guttman scales and scaling in general see, R. J. Moken, A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1971.
36xhe coefficient of reproducibility has been a standard test for assessing the appropriateness of the developed scale. It is equal to 1 minus the number of errors in the table (i.e., blanks where there should be an "X") divided by the number of choices: Cr = 1 - e/n.
37The coefficient of scalability is another statistic for assessing the appropriateness of the developed scale. It is equal to 1 minus the number of errors divided by the number of errors expected by chance: Cs = 1 - e/x. See Garson (1971), pages 123 to 126, for a discussion of testing a Guttman scale.
38it should be noted that, in general, the level of sophisti cation of the air system normally increases from a transport to a tanker. However, some recent multi-purpose combat air systems such as the F-4 and F-lll are highly sophisticated with on-board computers. Table 9. Air Force Structures 1970-1971
Country Tanker Reconalseance Bomber Interceptor Flghter-boaber Trainer Helicopter Transpi United States X X X X X XX X United Kingdom X X X X X XX X France X X X X X X X X Soviet Union X X X X X X X X Canada X X X XX X Dominican Republic XX X X XX X Colombia X X X X X X X Ecuador XX X X X X X Peru X X X X XX X Brazil X X X X X X X Chile * XX X X X X X Portugal i X X X X XX X Netherlands X X X X X X Belgium X X X X X X Switzerland X X X X X X V Spain X X X X X We6t Germany X X X X X X Italy X X X X X X Yugoslavia X X X X X X Greece X X X X X X Bulgaria X X XX XX X Norway X X X X X X Denmark X X X X X X Union of South Africa X X X X X X X Turkey X X X XX X Republic of China X X X X X X South Korea X X X X X X Japin X X X X X X Indonesia X X X X X X X South Vietnam X X X X X X X Australia XX X X XX X New Zealand X X X X X X Guatemala X XX XX X Honduras X XX XX X Nicaragua X X X X X X Venezuela X X X X X X Argentina X X X XX X Poland X X X X X X Hungary X X X XX X Czechoslovakia X X X XX X Rumania X >: X X XX Nigeria X X X X X Zaire X X XX X Table 9. Cont'd
Country Tanker ncconalesance Bomber Interceptor Fip.htcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transpo K X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Ethiopia X X X X Hhedesia X X X X Morocco X X X X Algeria X X X X Iraq X X X X Egypt X X X X Israel X X X X Saudi Arabia X X X X Yemen X X X X Afghanistan X X X X People's Republic of Chirm X X X X North Korea X A X X Pakistan X X X X Thailand X X X X North Vietnam X X X X
Indonesia xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx X X X X Cuba X X XX East Germany X X XX Finland X X X Sweden X X X X Somalia X X X Libya XX XX Sudan XX X Iren XX X X Syria X X XX Lebanon XX X X Jordan XX X X Philippines X X X X Haiti X X X Mexico X , X X X El Salvador XX X Bolivia X X X X Uruguay X X X X Austria X X X X Albania X X XX Kali X X XX Guinea XX X Togo X X Uganda XX X X Tunisia XX X X Kuwait XX X X Mongolia XX XX Burma X X XX Cambodia XX X X Table 9• Cont'd
Country Tanker Rsconalssancc Bomber Interceptor Fighter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
7,008 X X X X Malaysia X X X X Paraguay XX X Trelund X X X Nauritanla X X Ghana X X X Kenya X X Tanzania X X Zambia XX X Ceylon X X X Jamaica X X Senegal X X Ivory Coast X X Cdmcrnun X X Central African Republic X X Chad X X Congo, People's Republic X X Malagasy Republic X X Dahomey X Niger X Gabon X Nepal X Costa Rica No Air Force Panama No Air Force Trinidad & Tobago No Air Force Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Air Force Iceland No Air Force Muscat. & Oman No Air Force Upper Volta No Air Force Liberia No Air Force Sierrc Leone No Air Force Burundi No Air Force Rwanda No Air Force
VO ho Table 10. Air Force Structures 1971-1972
Country Tanker i Issancc Bomber Interceptor Fightcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transpo United States X X X X X X X United Kingdom X X X X X X X France X X X X X X X Soviet Union X X X X X X X Israel X X X X X X X Canada X X X X X X Portugal X X X X X X X Netherlands X X X X X X Belgium X X X a X X Switzerland X X X a X X Spain X X X a X X West Germany X X X X X Italy a X X X a X X Creece X X X X Norway a X X X X X X Denmark a X X X a X X Turkey X X X a X Sweden X X X a X X Bulgaria X b X X a X X Poland X X X X a X X Czechoslovakia X X X X X X Rumania a X b X a X X South Africa X X X X X X X Republic of China X X X X X X South Korea X X X a X X Japan X X X X X X India X X X X a X X Pakistan X X X X X X X South Vietnam X X X X X X Australia X X X X X X X New Zealand X X a X X Nigeria X X X X X Ethiopia X X X X X X Rhodesia X X X X X X Algeria X X X X X X Iraq X X X X X X Egypt X X X X X X Afghanistan X X X a X X People’s Republic of China X X X a X X North Korea X X X X X X North Vietnam X X X a X X Indonesia X XX a X X COVO Table 10. Conc'd
Country Tanker Rcconalasancc Bomber Int o m -ptor Fiphter-bo:nber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Albania X X a X X Yugoslavia X X X X X Austria X X X X xxx x x x x :< xx x x x x Finland X X X East Germany a X X Hungary X a X X Morocco X X X X Saudi Arabia X X X X Libya X X X Sudan X X X X Iran X X X X Syria X a X X Lebanon X a X X Jordan X a X X Tunisia X X X Thailand X X X X Philippines X X X X Guinea X X X Zaire X X X X Uganda X X X X Kenya X X X X Somalia X X X Zambia X X X X Malaysia X X X X Ghana X X X Tanzania X X Mongolia X X X Burma X X X Cambodia X X X Laos X X X Senegal X X Ivory Coasc X X Malagasy Republic X Colombia No Information Ecuador No Information Peru No Information Brazil No Information Chile No Information Venezuela No Information Argentina No Information Bolivia No Information Uruguay No Information VO Table 10. Cont'd
Countrv Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fightcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Paraguay No Information Ireland No Information Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information Yemen No Information Kuwait No Information Cameroon No Information Central African Republic No Information Chad No Information Congo, People's Republic No Information Mali No Information Dahomey No Information Mauritania No Information Niger No Informat ion Upper Volta No Air Force Liberia No Information Sierra Leone No Information Burundi No Information Togo No Information Gabon No Information Rwanda No Information Ceylon No Information Nepal No Information
aIt Is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft In its Inventory.
^ IL-28 designated as a reconalssance plane but designed to be • light bomber. Table 11. Air Force Structures 1972-1973
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bonhcr Interceptor Flghtcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
United States XXXXXX X X United Kingdom X XXX XX X X France X X X X X X XX Soviet Union XXX X X X X X Israel X XX X X X X X Dominican Republic XXXX X X Colombia XXX X X X Ecuador XXX XX X X Peru X X X XX X Brazil X X XX X X Portugal XXX XX X X Netherlands X X XX X X Belgium XXX a X X Switzerland XX X a X X Spain X X X a X X West Germany X XX a X X Italy XX X a X X Greece X X X a X X Norway X X X a X X Denmark X X X a X X Turkey XX X a X Sweden X X XX X X Bulgaria X b X X a X X Poland XX X X a X X Czechoslovakia X V* X X a X X Rumania X b X a X X South Africa XX X X X X X Republic of China X X X X X X South Korea X X X a X X Japan X X X X X X India XX X X a X X Pakistan X X X X X X X South Vietnam X X X XX X Australia X XX X X X X New Zealand X X 1 a X X Nicaragua X X X X Chile X X X X X X Venezuela XX X X X X Argentina X X X X X X Rhodesia XX X X X X Nigeria X X X X X X Ethiopia X X X X X VO Table 11. Cont'd
Country Tanker Roconalssnnce Bonbvr Interceptor Flghter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Algeria xxxxxxxx X X X X Iraq x a X X Egypt X X X X Afghanistan X a X X People's Republic of China X a X X North Korea X X X X North Vietnam X X X X Indonesia Canada X a X X X X X X Cuba X X X X Bolivia XX X East Germany a X X Hungary a X X Albania X X X Yugoslavia X X X X Finland X X X Morocco X X X X Saudi Arabia X X X X Libya XX X Sudan X X X X Iran X X X X Syria x a X X Lebanon X a X X Jordan X a X X Tunisia XX X Kuwait X X X X Thai land X XX X Philippines XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X X X Ceylon X XX Ma luysia X X X X Guatemala x XX Honduras X X X X Haiti X X Mexico X XX X El Salvador X X Austria X X X X Kill X X X Guinea XX. X Zaira X XX X Uganda X XX X Kenya X X X Somalia X X X ^1VO Table 11. Cont’d
Country Tnnker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flp.hter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transpo
Zambia X XX Uruguay X X Paraguay X X Ireland X X Ghana X X Tanzania X Mongolia X X Burma X X Cambodia X X Laos X X Senegal X Ivory Coast X Cameroon X Chad X Congo. People's Republic X Malagasy Republic X Duhomey X Rwanda X Niger
Liberia xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Jamaica No Information Costa Rica No Information Panama No Information Trlnidad-Tobago No Information Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Inforcuition Yemen No Information Mauritania No Information Upper Volta No Air Force Sierra Leone No Air Force Togo No Information Gabon No Information Central African Republic No Information Burundi No Air Force Nepal No Information
ao It is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory, IL-2S designated as a reconalssance plan but designed to bo a light bomber, c IL-28 shifted from bomber to reconalssance role. Table 1 Air Force Structures 1973-1974
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fightor-homber Trainer Helicopter United States X X X United Kingdom X X X France X X X Spain X X Soviet Union X X X Israel X X X XX XX XXX Dominican Republic X X rxuador X X Fcru X X Brfisil X X Portugal X X Netherlands X Belgium X Switzerland X West Germany X Italy X Greece X Norway X Denmark X Turkey X Sweden X Bulgaria X b Poland X X Chechoslovakia X c Rumania X b South Africa X X Republic of China X South Korea X Japan X India X X Pakistan X X South Vietnam x Australia X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Now Zealand X Guatemala X Nicaragua X Chile X Venezuela X Argentina X Nigeria X Somalia X Ethiopia X vO VO Table 12. Cont'd
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flghter-bonber Trainer Helicopter Transport xxxxxxxxxx Rhodesia X X X X Algeria X X X X Iraq X a X X Fgypt X X X X Syria X a X X Afghanistan X a X X People's Republic of China X a X X North Korea X X X X North Vietnam X X X X Indonesia X a X X Canada X X X X Cuba X X X X CoLombla X X X Bolivia X X X East Germany X X Hungary X X Albania X X X Yugoslavia X X X X Finland X X X Morocco X X X X Tunisia X X X Libya X X X Sudan X X X X Iran X X X X Lebanon X X X Jordan X X X Saudi Arabia X X X X Kuwait X X X X Thailand X X X X Philippines xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx X X X X Honduras X X X X Mexico X X X X FI Salvador X X X Austria X X X X Mali X X X Guinea X X X Zaire X X X X Uganda X X X X Kenya X X X X Zambia X X X X Yemen
X X X X 100 Mongolia X X X X Ceylon X X X Table 12. Cont'd
Country Tanker Rcconalosance Bomber Interceptor Klp.htcr-hunhcr Trainer Helicopter Transport
Malaysia X Uruguay X Faraguay X Ireland X Ghana X Tanzania Burma X Cambodia X Laos X Senegal X Ivory CoastCameroon X Chad X Congo, People's Republic X Malagasy Republic X Dahomey X Rwanda X Haiti Niger
Liberia xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Jamaica No Information Costa Rica No Information Panama No Information Trinidad-Tobago Nc Information Luxenbourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information Miuritania No Information Upper Volta No Air Force Sierra Leone No Air Force Togo No Information Gabon No Information Central African Republc No Information Burundi No Air Force Nepal No Information
a It is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory. k 2L-28 designated as a reconalssance plan bue designed to be a light bomber. c IL-23 shifted from bomber to reconalssance role. j—» O Table 13. Atr Force Structure* 1974-1975
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fighter-borp.ber Trainer Helicopter Transpf
United States X X X X X . X XX United Kingdom X XXX X X XX France X XXX X X XX Spain X XX X X X Soviet Union X XXXXX XX Israel X X XXXXX X Dominican Republic X XXX XX P.eru X XX XXX Brazil X V X X XX Chile X XX d X XX Venezuela XX XXX XX Argentina X XX XX XX Portugal XX XX XX X Netherlands X XX XX X Belgium X XX .1 XX Switzerland X XX a X X West Germany X X X a X X Italy X XX a X X Greece X X A X XX Norway X X X a XX Denmark X X X a X X Turkey X X X a X X Sweden X X X a XX Bulgaria X b X X a XX Poland X X X X a X X Czechoslovakia X c X X XX X Rumania X b XX a XX South Africa X X X X XX X Libya X X XXX Iran X X X X XX Republic of China X X X XX X South Korea X X X a X X Japan X X X XX X India X XX X X X X South Vietnam X X X X X X Australia X X X X X X X New Zealand X X X X X Pakistan X X X X X X X Ecuador XX X X X X Nigeria X X X X X Somalia X X XX X 102 Ethiopia XX X X X X Table 13. Cont'd
Country Tanker Rcconajasance Bomber •rceptor Fighter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport Rhodesia X X X X X Algeria X X X X Iraq X X X X X X Egypt X X X X X Syria X X a X X Afghanistan X X a X X People's Republic of China X X a X X North Korea X X X X X North Vietnam X X X X X Indonee la xxxxxxxxxx X X X X X Canada X X X X X Cuba X X X X Colombia X X X X X Polivia X X X X Earr Germany X X a X X Albania X X a X X Yugoslavia X X X X X Finland X X X X Hungary X X a X X Morocco X X X X X Tunisia X X X X Sudan X X X X X Lebanon X X a X X Jordan X X a X X baud! Arabia X X X X X Kuwait X X X X X Philippines X X X X Mexico X X X X Uruguay X X X X Austria X X X X Mali X X X Guinea X X X 7o ire X X X X Uganda XX X X Kenya X X X X Topeanla X X X X Zambia X X X X Yemen X X X X Ceylon X X X X Thailand X X X X Cambodia X X X X Malaysia X X X X O u> Tsolo 13. Cont'd
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bcm^er Interceptor Flghter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Paraguay X X Ireland X X Ivory Coast X X Sierra Leone X X Chana X X Cameroun X X Mongolia X X Burma X! X Laos X X Togo X Congo, People’s Republic X Malagasy Republic X Nepal X Dahomey Mauritania Ni.-.er Upper Volta Liberia
Chad XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Haiti No Information El Salvador No Information Jamaica No Information Cosra Rica No Information Panama No Information Trinidad U Tobago No Information Guatemala No Information Honduras No Information Nicaragua No Information Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information Gabon No Information Central African Republic No Information Burundi No Information
a It is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its Inventory.
^11-28 designated as a reconalssance plane but designed to be a light bomber. c11-28 shifted from bomber to reconalssance role. ^F-80C shifted to trainer status. Tabic 13. North and Latin American Force Structures
1970-1971
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomhor Interceptor Fi ght cr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
United States X X X X X X X Canada X X X X X Dominican Republic X X X X X X Colombia X X X X X X Ecuador X X X X X X Peru X X X X X X Brazil X X X X X X Chile X X X X X X Guatemala X X X X X Honduras X X X X X Nicaragua X X X X X Venezuela X X X X X Argentina X X X X X Cuba X X X X Haiti X X Mexico X X X El Salvador X X Bolivia X X X Uruguay X X X Jamaica X
Paraguay X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Costa Rica No Air Force Panama No Air Force Trinidad-Tobago No Air Force
o L n Table 19. Cor.c’d
1972-19733
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bor,her Interceptor Flghtcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
United States x x x x x x x x x x XXX XX Dominican Republic X XXX Colombia X X XX Ecuador XX XXX Peru XXX X Brazil XXXX NJ caragua X XX Chile XXXX X Venezuela XXX XX Argentina X XX X X Canada XX X X X Cuba XX XXX Bolivia X XXX Guatemala XX X Honduras XXX X Haiti X X Mexico XXX X El Salvador X X Uruguay X XX Faraguay Jamaica Ho Information Costa Rica No Information Panama No Information Trinidad-Tobago No Information
^ata was not available for the 1971-72 time period. 106 Table 15. Cont’d
1973-1974
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fl^hter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
United States X X X X X Dominican Republic X X X X X Ecuador X X X X X Peru X X X X X Brazil X X X X X Guatemala X X X X Nicaragua X X X Chile X X X X X Venezuela X X X X X
Argentina xxxxxxxxxx X X X X X Canada X X X X X Cuba X X X X X Colombia X X X X Bolivia X X X X Honduras X X X X Mexico X X X X El Salvador X X X Uruguay X X X Paraguay X X X Haiti X Jamaica No Information Costa Rica No Infomratlon Panama No Information Trinidad-Tobago No Information 107 Table 15. ConC'd
197'.—1975
Country Tanker Recyn,l_l_H r>oi.'!u*r Interceptor FlEhtor-bonher Trainer Helicopter Transm
United States XX X X X X X Dominican Republic X X X X X Peru X X X X X Brazil X X X X X Chile X X X X X X Venezuela X X X X X X Argentina X X X X X X
Ecuador x x x x x x x x X X X X X Canada X X X X X Cuba X X X X X Cojocibia X X X X Bolivia X X X X Mexico X X X X Uruguay X X X X Paraguay X X X Haiti No Informal ion El Salvador NoInformat ion Jamaica No Informat ion Costa Rita No Information Panama NoInformal ion Trinidad-Tobago No InfotmatIon Guatemala No Information Honduras NoInformation Nicaragua No lnfonaat ion 108 TaDle 16. Western European Force Structures
1970-1971
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flghter-bomher Trainer Helicopter Transport
United Kingdom X X XXX X XXXX France X X XX X X X Portugal X X X X XX Netherlands X XXXXX Belgium X X X XX X Switzerland X X XXXX Spain X XX XXX West Germany X X X X X X Italy X XXXXX Yugoslavia X X XXXX Greece X XXX XX Norway X XXXX X Denmark X XXX XX Turkey X XXX XX Finland XXXX Sweden XXXXX Austria X XX X Albania XXX X Ireland XXX Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Air Force Iceland No Air Force 109 Tabic 16. Cont'd
1971-1972 Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flghtcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
United Kingdoa X X X X X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x France X X X X X Portugal X X X X Netherlands X X X Belgium X X a Switzerland X X Spain X X Vest Germany X X Italy X X Greece X X Norway X X Denmark X X Turkey X X Sweden X X Albania X Yugoslavia X Finland X Austria Ireland No Information Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information
alt Is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft In its Inventory.
O Table 16. Cont'd
1972-1973
Country Tanker Reconalasance Bomber Interceptor Fip.htcr-bombcr Helicopter Transport
United Kingdom X X X X France X X X X Portugal X X X X Netherlands X X X Belgium X X X Switzerland X X X Spain X X X West Germany X X X Italy X X X Greece X X X Norway X X X Denmark X X X Turkey X X X Sweden X X X Albania X X Yugoslavia X X Finland X Austria
Ireland xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Luxenbourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information
aIt is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory. Table 16. Cont *d
1973-1974
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fighter-bonbcr Trainer Helicopter Transport
United Kingdom X X X X XX XX France X X XXX XX X Spain X X X X X A Portugal X X X X X X x^ Netherlands XXX XX x' Belgium X X X a XX Switzerland X X X a X X West Germany X X X a X X Italy X X X a XX Greece X X X a X X Norway X XX a X X Denmark X X X a X X Turkey X X X a X X Sweden X XXX XX Albania X X a XX Yugoslavia XX XX X Finland X XX X Austria XX XX Ireland XX X Luxembourg No Air Force Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information
aIt is assumed chat Che nation has cralners because of the sophisticated aircraft in its Inventory.
H* I—1 N5 Table 16. Cont'd
1974-1975
Country Tanker Recona{esance Bomber Interceptor Fight er-bombcr Trainer Helicopter Transport United Kingdom X X X X X X Frarce X X X X X X X Spain X X X X X X Portugal X X X X X X Netherlands X X X X X X Belgium X X X X X X Switzerland X X X X X West Germany X X Italy X X X X X X Greece X X X X X X Norway X X X X X X Denmark X X Turkey X X X X X X Sweden X X X X X Albania' X X X X Yugoslavia X X X X X X Finland X Austria X X Ireland X X X Luxembourg No Air Force X Cyprus No Information Iceland No Information
aIt la assumed that the nation haa trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory. Table 17. Eastern European Force Structures
1970-1971
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor F1ftht er-bombet Trainer Helicopter Transport
Soviet Union X X X X X Bulgaria X X X X X Poland X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X X X X Czechoslovakia X X X X X Rumania X X X X X East Germany X X X X
1971-1972
Soviet Union X X X X X X X
Bulgaria X h X X a X X X x X x X
Poland X X X X a X X Czechoslovakia X X X X a X Rumania X b X a X
East Germany X a X X X X
Hungary X X a X x
alt is assumed the the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its Inventory. blL-28 designated as a reconalssance plane but designed to be a light bomber. Table 17. Cont'd
1972-1973
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flghtcr-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Soviet Union Bulgaria Poland Czechoslovakia Rumania East Germany Hungary
1973-1974
Soviet Union Bulgaria Poland Czechoslovakia Rumania East Germany Hungary
alt is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory.
^TL-28 designated as a reconalssance plane but designed to be a light bomber.
clL-28 shifted from bomber to reconalssance role. Table 17. Cont’d
1974-1975
Country Tanker P.econalSBdnce Bomber Interceptor Fight er-bomber Trai ner Helicopter Transport
Soviet Union X X X X X X X X Bulgaria X b X X a X X Poland X X X X a X X Czechoslovakia X c X X X X X Rumania X b X X a X X base Germany X X a X X Hungary X X a X
aIt is assuraed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in ite inventory.
^IL-28 designated as a reconalssance plane but designed to bo a light bomber.
cIL-28 shifted from bomber to reconalssance role Table I®. Hlddlo East Force Structure
1970-1971
Country Tar.ker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flgbtcr-bomher Trainer Helicopter Transport
Iraq X X X X X X Egypt X X X X X X Israel X X X X X X Saudi Arabia X X X X X X Yemen X X X X X X Iran X X X X X Syria X X X X X Lebanon X X X X X Jordan X X X X X Kuwait X X X X
1971-1972
Israel X Iraq X Egypt X Saudi Arabia X Iran X Syria X Lebanon X Jordan X Yemen No Information Kuwait No Information
aIt is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft In Its inventory. Table IB. Cont’d
1972-1973
Country Tanker Recon.iissance Bomber Interceptor Fifihter-bonber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Israel Iraq Egypt Saudi Arabia Iran Syria Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Yemen No Information
1973-1974
Israel X X X X X X X Iraq X X X 1 X Egypt X X X X X Syria ; X X X a X Iran • X X X X Saudla Arabia X X X X Sudan X X X X Lebanon X X a X Jordan X X a X Kuwait X X X X
Yemen X X X xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx
aIt is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory.
00 Table 18. Cont'd
1974-1975
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flfthter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Israel X X X X X Iran X X X X X Iraq X X X X X Egypt X X X X X Syria X X X X Lebanon X X X X Jordan X X X X * Saudia Arabia X X X X Kuwait X X X X Yemen X X X
aIt Is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in its inventory. Table African Force Structures
1970-1971
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fip.hter-bomher Trainer Helicopter Transport
South Africa X X X X X X Morocco X X X X X Algeria X X X X X Nigeria X X X X Zaire X X X X Ethiopia X X X X X Rliodcsia X X X X X Libya X X X X X Sudan X X X X Somalia X X X X Tunisia X X X X Mali X X X X Guinea X X X Togo X X Uganda X X X X Mauritania X X Ghana X X X Kenya X X Tanzania X X Zambia X X X Senegal X X Ivory Coast X X Cameroon X X Central African Republic X X Chad X X Congo, People's Republic X X Malagasy Republic X X Dahomey X Nigor X Gabon X Upper Volta No Air Force Liberia No Air Force Burundi No Air Force Rwanda No Air Force Sierra Leona No Air Force 120 Table 19. Cont'd
1971-1972
Coantry Tanker Reconaissance Bomber Interceptor Fighter-bomber Trainer He!icopter Transport
South Africa X X X X X X Algeria X X v X X Nigeria X X X X X Ethiopia X X X X X Rhodesia X X X X X Morocco X X X X Libya X X X Sudan X X X X Tunisia X X X Cuinea X X X Zaire X X X X Uganda X X X X Kenya X X X X Somalia X X X Zambina X X X X Ghana X X X Tanzania X X Senegal X X Ivory Coast X X Malagasy Republic X Cameroon No Information Central African Republic No Inforraation Chad No Information Congo, People's Republic No Information Mali No Information Dahomey No Information Mauritania No Information Niger No Information Upper Volta No Air Force Liberia No Information Sierra Leone No Information Burundi No Information Togo No Information Gabon No Information Rwanda No Information Table IS. ContM
1972-1973
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fighter-bomber Trainer Helicopter Transport
South Africa X X X X XX X Algeria X X X XX X Ethiopia X X X X XX Nigeria X X XX X Rhodesia X XX XX X Morocco X X XX X Libya X X X X Sudan X X X XX Tunisia X X X X Zaire X XX X Somalia XX X Mali XX X Guinea X X X Uganda X X X X Kenva X X X Zambia X X X X Ghana X X X Tanzania X X Senegal X X Ivory Coast XX Cameroon X X Chad X X Congo, People's Republic X X Malagasy Republic X X Dahomey X X Rwanda X X Niger X Liberia X(Army) Mauritania No Information Upper Volta No Air Force Sierra Leone No Air Force Togo No Information Gabon No Information Central African Republic No Information Burundi No Air Force Tabic IV. Cont'd
1973-1974
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Flghter-homber Trainer Helicopter Transport
South Africa X X X X X X X Algeria X X X X X X Ethiopia X X X X X X Nigeria X X X X X Somalia X X X X Rhodesia X X X X X X Morocco X X X X X Libya X X X X Tunisia X X X X Miili X X X Guinea X X X Zaire X X X X Uganda X X X X Kenya X X X X Zambia X X X X Ghana X X X Tanzania X X Senegal X X Ivory Coast X X Cameroon' X X Chad X X Congo, People's Republic X X Malagasy Republic X X Dahomey X X Ruanda X X Niger X Liberia X Mauritania No Information Upper Volta No Air Force Sierra Leone No Air Force Togo No Information Cabon No Information Central African Republic No Information Burundi No Air Force 123 Tabic 19. Cont'd
1974-1975
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor FlRhtcr-bombcr Trainer Helicopter Transport South Africa X X Libya X x X X X X Algeria X XXX Ethiopia x X X X X Nigeria x X X X X Somalia x X X X Rhodesia X X X X Morocco x X X X X Tunisia X X X X X Sudan X X X X Mali X X X X X Guinea x XX X X X Zaire Uganda X X X X Kenya X X X X Tanzania X X X X Zambia X X X X Ivory Coast x X X X Sierra Leone X X X Ghana X X Cameroon X X X Senegal X X X Togo X X Rwanda X X Malagasy Republic X X Congo, People1• Republic X X Dahomey X X Mauritania X Niger X Upper Volta X Liberia X Chad X Gabon No Information Central African Repbulic No Information Burundi No Information 124 Table 20. Asian Force Structures
1970-1971
'cuntry Tanker Reconalaaance Bomber Interceptor Flghter-bomber Trainer Helicnpter Transport
epubllc of China X X X X X outh Korea X X X X X apau X X X X X ndia X X X X X X ouch Vietnam X X X X X X ustralla X X X X X X ev Zealand X X X X X fghaniatan X X X X X eople's Republic of China X X X X X ortii Korea X X X X X aklatan X X X X X hailand X X X X X orth Vietnam X X X X X ndoncaia X X X X X hilipplnea X X X X ongolia X X X uma X X X ambcdia X X X aos X X X alayala X X X eylon X X
epal XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
L Table ?0. Cont'd
1971-1972
"ountrv Tanker Reconalaaance Boc.ber Interceptor Fishter-bomber Trainer Helicooter Transp
Republic of China X XXX X X South Korea X X X a XX Japan X XX XXX India XXX X a X X Pakistan X XXXXXX South Vietnam X X XXXX \usiralla X X X X X X X 'lew Zealand XX a XX Afghanistan X X X a XX PcipJe'a Republic of China X XX a X X 'torch Korea X X X X X X sorth Vietnam XXX a XX Indonesia X X X a XX Ihailand X X X X X Philippines X XXX X •lalaysia X X XX Mongolia XXX Jurma X X X 'arabodla X X X Laos X X X Ceylon No Information Sep&l No Information
pIt la assumed that the nation haa trainera because of the sophisticated aircraft in ita inventory.
M N3 Table 20. Cont'd
1972-1973
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor righter-bnmber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Republic of China X X X X X South Korea X X a X X Japan X X X X X India X X X a X X Pakistan X X X X X X Sotsth Vietnam X X X X X Australia X X X X X X New Zealand X a X X Afghanistan X X a X X People's Republic of China X X a x X North Korea X X X X X North Vietnam X X X X X Indonesia X X a X X Thailand X X X X Philippines X X X X Ceylon X X Malaysia X X X Mongolia X X X Burma X X X Cambodia X X X Laos X X X Nepal No Information
• It la assumed that the nation haa trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft In its Inventory.
to Table 20. Cont'd
1973-1974
Country Tanker Reconalssance Bomber Interceptor Fl^hter-bombor Helicopter Transpor Republic of China X X X X South Korea X X X X X Japan X X X X X X India X X X Pakistan X X X X X X X South Vietnam X X X Australia X X X X X X X New Zealand X X X Afghanistan X X X X X People's Republic of China X X X North Korea X X X X X North Vietnam X X X Indonesia X X X X Thailand X X X X Philippines X X X X X Mongolia X X Ceylon X X X Malaysia X X X Burma X X Cambodia X X Laos X X Nepal No Information
aIt la aaaumed that the nation has tralnera became of the aophlatlcated aircraft in ita Inventory. Table 2^. Cont*d
1974-1975
Country Tanker Reconalssance Hmnber Interceptor Flghter-boc.ber Trainer Helicopter Transport
Republic of China X X X X X South Korea X X X X X Japan X X X X X India . X X X X X Pakistan X X X X X South Vietnam X X X X X Australia X X X X X New Zealand X X X X Afghanistan X X X X People's Republic of China X X X X North Korea X X X X North Vietnam X X X X Indonesia X X X X Phi 1ippines X X X Ceylon X X X Thailand X X X Cambodia X X X Malaysia X X X Mongolia X X Burma X X Lacs X X Nepal X X
aIt is assumed that the nation has trainers because of the sophisticated aircraft in Its inventory.
ho VO CHAPTER III: ARMS TRANSFER MODEL
Design Perspective. A model for dealing with arms transfer consid
erations will be designed and operationalized in this chapter..
Having completed this task, the model will then be used to evaluate
the conformity of past combat aircraft military assistance and
foreign military sales with the considerations established by
Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. This endeavor
will yield a systematic set of procedures for deciding whether
arms requests conform to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.
Currently arms requests are handled on a case by case basis with
a variety of criteria applied depending on the nature of the
requestor and the situation.^ Leiss, et al. (1970) have noted
that the policy problems of transferring arms must be viewed as
a "complex calculus of risks, costs, benefits, and gains (p. 338)."
Although arms transfers are complex, the design process enables one to systematically make judgements on when to transfer arms.
A substantial amount of literature has been written on the various aspects of the design p r o c e s s . ^ The purpose here is not to review that literature, but to indicate how the design of an arms transfer model will serve as an "adjunct device" to assist
130 131
in the arms request decision-making process. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1974) has stated that it is difficult to predict the effects of a transfer.^ Kemp (1970) observes that
the problems of arms transfers are "ones of judgement in parti cular and highly differentiated cases (p. 274)." Although it is difficult to accurately predict the eventual effects of a trans fer, it is possible to systematize the evaluation of each request and the assessment of situations that a particular requested trans fer will create if approved. Consequently, even though requests result from highly differentiated cases, a properly designed model will permit each case to be evaluated in accordance with criteria established by the decision-maker.
The design and application of an arms transfer model will conserve the effort needed to reach a recommendation on a specific request. In general, design activities are found where- ever there is a need to make something function in a preferred fashion. In this case, the design is to assist in structuring the decision process dealing with two specific Congressional considerations. The model facilitates the decision process by identifying and structuring the evaluation of key indicators.
Although the model does not take into account all factors related to arms transfer, it does specify the most salient factors to be reviewed when reaching a recommendation. The design process is flexible, and this particular arms transfer model has the 132 flexibility to be altered as decision-maker goals change or as new factors are identified for incorporation into the model.
The application of the design process to arms transfer decisions is new for the areas legislated in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971. The role of the social sciences in this process is in the conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement of the various indicators. Furthermore, certain statistical techniques assist in interpretating the information available for each nation. Proper application of the design perspective can yield recommendations for input into the decision making process. However, the decision-maker must also consider the political consequences, many of which cannot be quantified or accurately predicted, in addition to the recommendation genera ted by the model when reaching a decision. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find decisions that were contrary to the recommendation based on the Congressional considerations. The philosophy here is that the model does not provide a "ready-made decision, but rather it provides information for reaching a decision.
Design applications are more readily found in the development of weapon systems rather than the decision transfer area. In research and development of combat aircraft, the design process is used to develop the capacity of new aircraft to complete specified missions more effectively and reliably than existing 133
air systems. The recent development of the YF-16 aircraft dis
plays positive proof of the utility found in design applications.
This new interceptor aircraft has been designed to fly faster,
have a greater thrust ratio, and have greater manuverability
than current United States aircraft.^ Inquiries have already
been received from foreign countries to purchase this new plane
as they roll off the assembly line. Although design applications
have been more extensively used in the research and development
phase of weapon systems, their usefulness in the transfer phase
needs only to be demonstrated. In the near future, United States
decision-makers will have to decide the extent to which the new
combat aircraft system will be made available to foreign countries.
The decision model presented below can assist in evaluating the
extent to which transfers should take place.
Arms Transfer Model. The model was designed after careful con
sideration of the existing arms literature. Interest in and
analyses of arms transfers are relatively new, as is the
increasing interest in assessing the impact of technological
transfers.^ The model is based upon information related to national defense programs; with all of the information gathered
from public sources. Overall, the model could be expanded and
further refined given the availability of government intelligence information and assessments.6 The potential use of intelligence 134 information, as it related to the various sections of the model, will be discussed in the final chapter. At the present time, the model has been designed in accordance with information that is publicly available. Obviously, there are some problems in the validity and predictive power of the model presented below. How ever, these weaknesses are not critical in this initial design of an arms transfer evaluation process. The contribution here is the establishment of an evaluation process based upon the legislated considerations. Moreover, the model has the flexibility to be refined in accordance with feedback from the decision making community.
This design is based upon several assumptions that should be presented before proceeding to a discussion of the components of the design. The first assumption is that even though it is not feasible to predict the exact response and time of response another nation may make to an arms transfer, it is possible to identify the existing political and military situations between countries within a region and the military situation that will exist if the arms request is approved. This latter capability permits the analyst to conjecture about the likelihood of a response given the creation of a particular situation. Although the assumption seems rather simple and straightforward, it is an important one for this study because it forms the basis for the entire evaluation process. If one does not accept the notion that the political and military situations are knowable, then 135
one cannot proceed to evaluate changes in the situations and
conjecture about potential responses by a nation within the
region.
A second assumption is that the analyst needs only several
key indicators for the evaluation process. It is assumed that
the analyst need not know every detail related to the political
and military situation of various nations within a geographic
region. What is needed, however, are indicators that measure
relevant national trends and capabilities. The development of
such indicators thus form the basis for evaluating an arms trans
fer. Those who would argue for total information before making a recommendation would never reach a decision, because total
information is an ideal rather than a reality. Total information is an ideal because events creating new information never cease occurring. Even during the evaluation process, new events would be occurring that the analyst would want to consider. Hence, the need exists for this assumption and the development of key indicators for the evaluation process.
A final assumption is that the spirit of the legislated con siderations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 intends that arms should not be transferred if they will contribute to an arms race or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict. Thus, a strict interpretation of the considerations will be used in this study as opposed to the loose construction 136
of the legislation. The implication of this perspective is that
a large number of arms transfers would not be permitted to occur
had the Congress used more restrictive language rather than the
phrase "shall take into account." By making this assumption,
situations can be identified where over-riding considerations
(e.g., in an alliance with the requesting nation) influence the
final decision to approve the request rather than reject it.
The intent of the legislation is clear, the questions is how
strongly and how often the considerations are taken into account.
Obviously, a looser construction provides the President with
more flexibility in approving or rejecting arms requests. Like
wise, weapon critics may selectively invoke when the considerations
should strongly be taken into account.? The design perspective
for this study is to develop a model that will produce recommenda
tions based on a strict interpretation of the legislation,
leaving open the option for the decision-maker to reject the
recommendation and approve the request because of over-riding
considerations. This point will be further elaborated upon as
the model is discussed. For the present, it is important to
note that the design is based on this strict interpretation of
the considerations.
The model presented in Figure 6 outlines the process that will be used to systematically evaluate arms requests. This
model is designed to specifically consider air system requests. Military 3 National 4 Attitude 5 Presence 6 Expenditure Interaction Indicators Indicator Indicators Conflict
Analysis of < Contextual Indicators
Air System Indicator L Recommendation 1 Request Review
Yes 1 Analysis of National ? and Regional Force Structures Over-ride 1! Considerations Type of * Force Structure Air Systca 10 Force Structure Capability Acquisition Patterns
Figure 6* Arms Transfer Decision Model 138
As stated earlier, the analysis will be limited to evaluating combat aircraft transfers in order to keep the topic manageable.
However, the basic conceptualization of the model can be applied to other weapon systems. The model is divided into two areas of analysis that yield indicators of the political and military situation within the requesting nation and other nations in the geographic region. These indicators have been developed to assess the likelihood of an arms race or conflict occurring, or the ability for conflict to continue to occur as a result from transferring weapons to one nation in a region.
Descriptively, the decision review process presented in
Figure 6 would occur in the following manner. An air system request is received by the United States from another nation.
Upon receiving the request, a two part analysis process would be undertaken that would evaluate the political-military atmosphere in which the transfer would occur. First, analysis of contextual indicators (box 2) provides information on political trends within the nation and its geographic region. Line ' c' in Figure 6 dis plays that four major indicator categories (boxes 3-6) are reviewed in the analysis of the contextual indicators. Secondly, force structure analysis (box 7) provides information on the military trends within the nation and its geographic region.
Line 'e' displays that three major areas (boxes 8-10) are reviewed in the analysis of national and regional force structures. 139
The results from analyzing these indicators are then reviewed
(box 11) with the intent of answering a series of basic questions.
Arrow 'h* displays that the information from the indicator
review is used in reaching a recommendation (box 12). Five
decision rules are used in reaching a 'yes' or 'no' recommendation
(boxes 13 & 14) on transferring the requested air system. The
two T j1 arrows point to box 15 because there may be certain cases
where the recommendation would be rejected due to any one of
several over-riding considerations. These special intervening
considerations normally have an impact in the case of a negative
recommendation.8 The final decision on whether or not the trans
fer occurs is the result of the decision-maker reviewing the
recommendation and any over-riding considerations. This brief
description should provide an understanding of the designed
decision process. The actual functioning of the model should become more clear as each of the various components are discussed below.
All of the contextual indicators have been designed to measure dimensions of national tension. As noted in Chapter 1, the measurement of tension is important because it has a direct impact on arms transfers. Arms requests, as well as the effects of an arms transfer, are influenced by tensions existing within an area. It was noted that tension indicators were to be develped along three dimensions explicated by Holsti (1963). The military 140
expenditure indicator reflects one of the dimensions of national
capabilities. National air system force structures represent a
second dimension of capabilities. The attitude dimension of
tension is developed in the form of tension scores for each
nation. Lastly, the behavior dimension is developed using events
data and measuring the degree of conflict and cooperation occurring
between two nations. Holsti's three dimensions have provided
the nucleus for the contextual analytic indicators.
Military Expenditure Indicator. The first indicator in the
contextual analysis section relates to national military expendi
tures (Figure 5, box 3). Table 21 presents national military expenditure data, in 1972 United States constant dollars, for the years 1963 to 1973.^ The purpose of this table is to have the ability to observe similar expenditure patterns across time between two nations.10 By presenting military expenditures in constant dollars, it is more feasible to make dyadic comparisons because the effects of inflation are being held constant for all nations. Yet to make such comparisons, one must also assume that the dollar purchasing power is relatively the same for each nation.In making this assumption, the analyst may then roughly compare the existence of competition between nations on the basis of their defense spending patterns. Although this data only permits gross comparisons of arms competition, it does 141 provide information that can be used in conjunction with other indicators to identify patterns of arms competition between various nations.
One statistical technique that may be used to assist in interpretating the patterns of expenditures is correlation a n a l y s i s . 12 This technique measures the degree of association between two sets of numbers. The Personian product-moment correlation is the standard statistic used for interval level data of this t y p e . 13 The use of this statistical technique assumes that there is a linear relationship' between the two sets of data, and that the data are normally distributed. These two assumptions will be applied for the data presented in Table 21, and correlation coefficients will be calculated for each pair of nations within a geographic region. Tables 22 thru 26 present the correlation coefficients for Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The coefficients were calculated for five time periods, with 1963 to 1968 selected as the base time period.^ The correlation coefficient for each successive year was calculated by adding that years military expenditure to the previous group of years. This procedure was necessary in order to establish whether or not a trend military expenditures was continuing to occur in each successive year. Thus the correlation for 1969 is based on military expendi tures from 1963 through 1969 and likewise for the other three 142
time periods. These coefficients enable one to more closely
identify those pairs of nations that have similar military
expenditure patterns. That is, two nations which have relatively
high correlation coefficients (.80 or higher) across time can
be identified as having similar expenditure patterns. Likewise, nations that have low correlation coefficients across the five
time periods have dissimilar military expenditure patterns.
Although this technique is useful, it is not without fault and the analyst must be careful as to the degree of emphasis placed on the correlation coefficient. Some individuals may question the assumption of linearity in military expenditure patterns, contending that arms competition may produce a variety of patterns including curvilinear ones. The problem is that the correlation coefficient only reflects linear unit changes, either up or down, between two variables. Consequently, the existence of a curvilinear relationship in spending patterns would not be identified using a Pearson product-moment correlation.
This study assumes that arms competition is linear by nature, and thus product-moment correlational analysis is an appropriate technique to apply to military expenditure data.-^
More severe criticisms can be levied at this technique than the assumption of linearity. The first criticism is that the coefficient is exceptionally sensitive when there are fewer than
10 data points for comparison. This is a valid criticism and must be kept in mind when evaluating the first four time periods 143 for each dyad. The second criticism is that the correlation coefficient would not accurately reflect a.unilateral arms build-up. That is, the coefficient would be near zero for two nations if nation A had a relatively consistent large military expenditure, and nation B was rapidly increasing its defense outlays to catch up to nation A. Therefore, the correlation coefficient would not reflect the true situation for the two nations. Again 'this is a valid criticism that one needs to be aware of, but it does not completely disqualify the usefulness of the technique.
A third criticism of this technique would be that it does not take into account a nation that responds to its neighbors increases in subsequent years rather than the same year. To account for this phenomena, the correlation coefficient should be computed on military expenditures that are time lagged by one year. The author tested for this phenomena in two regions (Latin
America and Western Europe) and found no coefficient patterns to support this criticism. It is feasible that this lagged arms race situation could occur. However, the more plausible arms race situation is one in which two nations increase their mili tary expenditures for several subsequent years rather than in a delayed fashion. 144
The correlation coefficients also do not take into account the impact that alliance membership has on military expenditures.
Therefore, it would be possible to have nations whose dyadic expenditures did not correlate highly, but who are members of blocs which did have strong military competition. This situation would seem the exception rather than the rule however, since most developing nations are not members of alliance blocs. If anything, the cirticism should be that the present data does not take into account the amount of military aid received by any dyadic pair of nations when computing their correlation coeffic ients. This latter criticism is most sound, yet there is little that can be done to change the situation given the currently available data base.
A final criticism of the indicator would be that it is of little utility because of the quality of the data. Obviously, any indicator is only as good as the reliability of the data it is based upon. In the case of military expenditure data, the quality of the data varies from country to country and region to region. Furthermore, the variance in national accounting practices also has an impact on the quality of the data. But the fact remains that decisions have to be made, and are being made on the basis of the military expenditure data gathered by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Government decision-makers do not have the same latitude that the 145 academician does in waiting to do an analysis until the best possible data becomes available. The military expenditure indi cator in this decision model should be viewed as a necessary, albeit imperfect, indicator for reviewing an arms request.
The correlation coefficients presented in Tables 22 thru
26 should be used as a supplement for interpretating the raw data presented in Table 21. Once can have confidence in the coefficients if they are consistent across the five time periods.
That is, correlation coefficients that are consistently high
(.80+) or consistently low (.30 or less) present the analyst with a relatively accurate assessment of the relationship, or lack of it, between two nation's yearly military expenditures.^
It is more difficult, however, to interpret a series of correla tions that have a large amount of variance (i.e., correlations that fluctuate over the time periods). For these nation dyads, the coefficients reflect mixed changes in spending patterns.17
Substantively, the meaning of such expenditure patterns is less clear because the analyst is oriented to looking for similar patterns that indicate arms competition rather than the lack of it.
Both sets of tables (Table 21 and Tables 22 thru 26) provide information about national military expenditures. The information is important for the assessment of arms competition between two nations or a group of nations. Furthermore, the military 146 expenditure data assists in identifying those nations that are rapidly increasing their defense posture. It is difficult to extrapolate and firmly state that a nation rapidly increasing its military posture will become involved in external conflict.
However, the expenditure data are an important indicator, of national policy priorities, and can be used in conjunction with other indicators to assess the political-military situation within a region. For these reasons, the indicator has been included in the model.
Interpretation of the data presented in Tables 22 thru 26 will be reserved for the analysis to be presented in Chapter 4.
The expenditure data and correlation coefficients take on more meaning as they are applied in assessing an arms request. The purpose throughout this chapter is to identify the components of the design, discuss their operationalization, and present the information to be used in the following chapter. Without excessively deviating from these stated goals, one observation can be made to exemplify the utility of the information found in these tables. The arms competition that has developed between
Egypt and Israel since 1967 can be observed in both Table 21 and
Table 25. In Table 21, corresponding increases in military expinditures can be observed from 1967 to 1972. While Egypt increased its yearly military expenditure from $422 million to
$1,016.86 million dollars, Israel increased its expenditures from 147
$672.12 million to $1,490.95 million dollars. The correlation
coefficients for this particular dyad, in Table 25, also reflect
the relationship as the value of the coefficient for each
consecutive year (.565 to .892) more closely approximates a
perfect relationship (i.e., is approaching 1.00). This informa
tion suggests that since 1967, Egypt and Israel have chosen similar
national policies with respect to their military expenditures.
The observation takes on added meaning as the other indicators
are reviewed in the model.
Attitude Indicator. Tension scores form the basis of the
contextual attitude indicator (Figure 6, Box 5). They are com puted by doing a residual analysis of the regression analysis
of a nation's Gross National Product versus its military expendi
tures. Alan Newcombe's (1969) work in'developing an inter-nation tension-meter provided the initial stimulus for this indicator.
During the past six years, Newcombe has been involved in develop ing a measure of tension that will enable the analyst to predict future involvement in conflict.18 As of this writing, the ten- sionmeter is still being revised as new information becomes available. This design will build on these past efforts, but not use Newcombe's procedure for measuring national tension for reasons to be noted below.
The underlying assumption for this indicator is that national tension may be observed through the analysis of the amount of 148
resources (I.e., dollars) a nation commits to its military
posture rather than some other sector of society. Furthermore,
national tensions may be compared by analyzing the relationship
between a nation's development, measured by its Gross National
Product (GNP), and its military expenditure. It is postulated
that for any given level of development, nations that have high
tension will have larger military expenditures than those nations
which have a low degree of tension. By using regression techniques,
it is possible to analyze national military policy commitments
(expenditures) and the associated levels of t e n s i o n . 19
Regression analysis assists in measuring levels of tension by providing a theoretical military expenditure estimate for
each level of economic development.20 This theoretical estimate
is needed because the analyst has data on each nation's GNP and military expenditure but does not have any information as to what a nation could be expected to spend militarily, given its level of development. By using this technique, the analyst can identify those nations which have lower military expenditures than would be expected, given their level of economic development, and those nations which have higher military expenditures than would be expected. For this study, a nation's level of tension is measured by the difference between its theoretic military expenditure and its actual military expenditure for its level of development.^ The resulting positive or negative regression 149
residual will be the nation's tension score. A large, positive
residual indicates that a nation's military expenditure is
greater than would be expected, and thus the nation has a con
siderable amount of tension. Likewise, a negative residual would
indicate that a nation is under-spending for its level of develop
ment, and thus has no tension. The purpose of this technique
is to identify those nations that have high tension levels, since
they are more likely to become involved in conflict.
This approach to measuring tension is different from that
espoused by Newcombe. The differences are in the methodology
used to obtain the theoretical military expenditure values, and
the computation of the tension indicator. Newcombe (1969, 1974)
uses a rather more simplistic approach for calculating the
theoretical military expenditure values.22 The fact that his
straight line results in some nations being misclassified tends
to make one skeptical of his theoretic military expenditure values. However, the more substantive issue is his measurement
of tension. Newcombe's measurement of tension is a tension
ratio score obtained by dividing a nation's actual military
expenditure value by its theoretic military expenditure value and then multiplying the resulting number by 100. The problem with this procedure is that it results in inflated tension ratio scores for nations that have lower levels of military expenditures because of statistical nature of ratio calculations.23 For 150 this reason, Newcombe's tension ratio score was discarded in favor of the regression residual that accurately reflects the difference between the actual and expected military expenditure values.
The adopted procedure for calculating an indicator of national tension is by no means perfect. In using regression analysis, the results are sensitive to the data included to be analyzed.
That is, it makes a difference which nations are analyzed together since the theoretic expected value is calculated on the basis of the observed values. For this reason, tension scores were calculated for the international system as a whole, and also on a regional basis. Table 27 presents national tension scores calculated at the system level, while Tables 28 thru 32 contain national tension scores computed at the regional level. Tension scores have been computed on a yearly basis for the years 1963 to 1973. Thus, it is possible to observe trends in national tension acorss time both at the system level and the regional level.
There are several reasons for calculating tension scores at both levels of aggregation. First, the system level of aggregation permits the analyst to identify those nations and geographic regions that have experienced and are continuing to experience tension. The scores presented in Table 29 indicate that Western Europe (including Turkey), the Middle East, and parts of Asia have experienced considerable amounts of tension for the 151
time period under consideration. Secondly, the regional analysis
provides the analyst insight into national tensions that may be
obscured by a system level of aggregation. This is especially
true for less developed nations whose primary interest and
policies are based upon events occurring within their r e g i o n . 2 4
For example, the regional analysis of Latin America (Table 28)
points out existing national tensions that were obscured at
the system level. Thus, tension scores computed at both the
system and regional level of aggregation will be reviewed when
evaluating an arms request; but the regional scores will be
weighted more heavily than the system based scores in the
final analysis.
As noted earlier, the computation of the expected national
military expenditure values is influenced by the nations that
are included in the analysis. Consequently, the defined
composition of the regions in the international system will influ
ence the regional national tension scores. This study based its
regional composition on the perspective of Che Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, with the exception of combining East Asia,
South Asia, and Oceania into one large Asian c a t e g o r y . 25 Con
siderable thought was given to the composition of the Middle
East. Peter Mansfield (1973) observes that the region has been
defined in several ways over the years, sometimes including the
North African states along with the nations that have been 152
traditionally defined as the Middle E a s t . 26 This study rejected
the traditional view of the Middle East, and followed the ACDA
perspective that treats the North African nations as part of
Africa rather than the Middle East. Also, Turkey was included
as part of Europe because of its Western European orientation,
and its clashes with Greece over Cyprus. Although these decisions are open to challenge, its seemed most appropriate to adopt the perspective currently held by those concerned with arms transfers.
The reader is encouraged to review the Tables at the end of this chapter and compare tension scores for nations that would be considered as having tension on the basis of personal knowledge of past events. Yet how does one interpret these scores? In this study, any nation that has a tension score of
100 or more will be viewed as having high tension. The only exception to this rule is the African region where a score of 2 or more will be treated as indicative of the presence of high tension. This adjustment is necessary because of the considerably lower levels of military expenditures in the region. These two numbers will be used as the benchmark figures in assessing the presence of a substantial degree of tension for a nation.
National Interaction Indicator. In analyzing the contextual dimension of behavior (Figure 6, box 4) attention will be focused in two specific areas. The first area to be dealt with is the presence of external conflict between the requesting nation 153
and another nation. Involvement in external conflict is defined
as any situation in which military action is taken against
another sovereign nation. This action may be in the form of
small military clashes, such as would occur in a border skirmish,
up through and including a full scale military invasion. The
Congressional legislation is very specific about transferring
arms that will cause an escalation of conflict to occur. For
this reason, it was necessary to include a measure of overt mili
tary conflict. The second area for analysis overlaps somewhat
with the conflict dimension, but is designed to measure the whole
spectrum of national interaction.
Events data will be used to assess the scope of national
interactions. This type of data will provide indicators of
national cooperation and conflict with other regional members.
Edward Azar's (1975) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) will be used as the event data base in this study. This parti
cular events data set has been selected for two reasons. First, it is the most extensive events data set in existence, covering the years 1948 to 1973. This presents an analyst with the opportunity to observe trends in interactions between various nations across time. Secondly, Azar has developed a Dimension of Interaction indicator, ‘for both conflict and cooperation, that measures the quality of interactions between two nations.
Unfortunately, Azar has only released data on 29 of the 60 "core" 154
actors in C O P D A B . 2 7 Consequently, this indicator cannot be applied in evaluating all of the United States combat aircraft transfers. However, it will be applied in a sufficient number of cases to demonstrate the utility of events data in the evaluation process.
This application of events data is unique for the area of arms transfers. In general, events data have mostly been used for the study of foreign policy. A good example of the multiple applications of events data for foreign policy analysis is found in the efforts of the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project.^ Six different theoretical per spectives are being pursued in this project for the years 1959 to 1968.29 in addition to the CREON project, a sizeable number of other events data sets have been created. However, all of these events data sets are diverse in nature as a result of the
on perspective of each principal investigator. u Overall, events data analysis is a relatively new approach to the study of international politics, with the majority of data sets being created in the last six years.Although this approach has not been completely accepted in the academic community, it is used here because the data provide a substantive measure of nation interactions. 155
But what is an event and how do events data relate to
national interactions and arms transfer decisions? Azar (1970)
conceputally defined an event as:
any overt input and/or output of the type "who does or says what to and/or with whom and when" which may have ramifications for the behavior of an international actor or actors (p. 12).
In operational terms, an event is as defined above with the addi
tion that it be recorded in a public source. Thus, an event is a public recorded statement of an interaction in which someone did or said something to and/or with someone else and when.
Normally, one thinks of an event as composed of an actor, a target, an action, and when the action occurred. Events data relate to national interactions and arms transfer decision because once the data has been collected, the analyst can then begin to identify the quality (friendly or hostile) and trend of interactions between various nations. In having knowledge about the quality of national interactions, the analyst can then consider whether or not arms should be transferred to another nation given its recent interactions. Events data provide information that can be considered in conjunction with other indicators when reviewing an arms request.
The use of events data requires some assumptions to be made.
First, it must be assumed that the public record of national actions toward another nation is reflective of the state of relations between the two nations. This is not a difficult 156
assumption for highly conflictive or cooperative events. However,
some may question the interpretation of interactions that fall
in between the two .extremes. Also, some skeptics make note of
the fact that events data do riot measure secret interactions between two nations. If the interactions are secret, however,
then it is impossible to assess the state of relations between
two nations regardless of the approach used for the analysis.32
This study makes the assumption that events data provide an accurate accounting of the state of interactions between two nations.
A second assumption in the use of events data, is that it is possible to scale interactions and group them into categories according to levels of cooperation and conflict. Table 33 presents the Azar-Sloan 15 point scale of national event interactions that is used in this study. This assumption permits the quantification of qualitative interactions. Through the use of scaling techniques, it is possible to create indicators that present summary measures of cooperative or conflictual inter actions for a time p e r i o d . ^3 Given this assumption, the analyst has the ability to identify degrees of cooperation or conflict between two nations.
Finally, a third assumption is that event categories can be meaningfully valued in terms of intensity. As a result of this assumption, the analyst not only has the ability to identify 157
degrees of interaction but also intensity of interaction.
Azar (1975) used a panel of expert judges to assess the intensity
of each of his fifteen categories. On the basis of their
responses, a weighted value was created for each category. These
values and the corresponding event categories are presented in
Table 34. Having made this assumption and obtaining values for
each event category, it then is feasible to create a Dimension
of Interaction indicator for conflict and cooperation. This indicator, developed by Azar and Sloan, will be used to evaluate national interactions.
Dimension of Interaction scores for the Middle East nations, and Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus are presented in Tables 35 and 36.
The scores have been computed in the same manner as the following hypothetical situation. Table 37 contains data for a hypothetical series of interactions from Nation A to Nation B for the year
1972. To compute the Dimension of Interaction -- Conflict score, multiply the frequency of events times the weighted value of the scale point. Having completed this for each conflictual scale- point, sum up the values. The sum total represents the D. I. -
Conflict for Nation A toward Nation B. Likewise, one computes the D. I. - Cooperation in the same manner but using the cooperative scale-points and frequencies. A comparison of the two scores indicates that Nation A was exceptionally hostile toward Nation B during 1972, since the D. I. - Conflict in 650 158
while the D. I. - Cooperation is only 136, This information would
assist the analyst in evaluating an arms request from Nation A.
Through the use of events data, the analyst has information on
the scope of Nation A's interactions with one of its neighbors,
and the fact that some military conflict has occurred at the
initiation of Nation A. The analyst must then review this
information along with the information from the other indicators
already discussed in evaluating whether or not the transfer would
conform to the Congressional legislation.
Table 37. Nation A Actions Toward Nation B.
Scale-Point Weighted (Category) Frequency Value Total
13 3 50 150 12 5 44 220 11 Conflict 2 29 58 10 12 16 192 9 5 6 30
8 Neutral 0 1 0
7 17 6 102 6 Cooperation 2 10 20 5 1 14 14
Dimension of Interaction - Conflict = 650 Dimension of Interaction - Cooperation = 136
Dimension of Interaction scores could be calculated on a monthly basis if the data were available. Unfortunately,
Professor Azar has only made his data available aggregated by years. As a result, it is only possible to identify trends 159 in relations between two nations across several years. The value of the events data on a monthly basis should be obvious. Upon receiving a request, the analyst could review the trend in a nation's relations over the past six months and then conjecture about future interactions if the request was approved. Also, recent interactions could be placed in the perspective of past interactions to assess whether or not they represented normal behavior between the various nations.34 Events data have great potential for being applied in the evaluation process. The analyses presented in Chapter 4 should underscore their usefulness, especially if the data becomes available in its unaggregated format.
The discussion of the four indicators has presented'insight into the application of social science techniques for the design of an arms transfer evaluation process. Up to this point, only contextual indicators have been presented. These indicators have been designed to assist in evaluating the political situation existing within the requesting nation and other members of the region. The other half of the analysis section is designed to assist in evaluating the military capability of the requesting nation and other members of the region. Force structure analysis will yield information to be used in assessing the military impact (both for an arms race and conflict situations) of approving the transfer of a requested air system. The information from these two analytic areas is reviewed by the analyst in terms 160
of specific criteria that determine the eventual recommendation.
This review process will be characterized after presenting the
components of force structure analysis.
Force Structure Analysis. National force structures and regional
force sturcture comparisons were briefly discussed in Chapter 2.
At that time it was noted that the "type" of force structure a
nation possessed had an impact on its capacity to deal with a
variety of different air missions. That is, Type II force
structures had greater mission capacities than Type III force
structures because of the various aircraft associated with a
Type II structure. In this section, force structure capabilities will also be developed. The model will suggest that in reviewing an air system request, the analyst must consider: (1) whether or not the transfer will result in a force structure type change; and (2) the capability impact the transfer will have on the
type of national force structure of the recipient. Information gathered from these two areas will be reviewed along with the contextual indicators to reach a recommendation on the approval or rejection of the air system request.
Several assumptions are necessary for undertaking an analysis of national and regional force structures. First, one must assume that although there is great flexibility in the uses of an aircraft, different types of aircraft perform certain types of missions better than other missions. For example, a 161 reconaissance aircraft is best deployed to accomplish reconaissance missions rather than ground support attack missions. Some argue that it is practically impossible to compare air weapon systems because of their flexibility. This study recognizes that air craft can be used for a variety of different missions, but that comparisons can be made, among categories of aircraft on the basis of their designed m i s s i o n s . ^5
Secondly, it will be assumed that aircraft maintenance is relatively the same for nations within each region. Public sources do not contain information on either operational inventories or national maintenance capabilities. Consequently, air force structures will be compared at full strength rather than opera tional strength. This assumption is not unreasonable since comparisons will be made on total potential strength for every nation. If intelligence information could provide reliable data on maintenance capabilities, this factor could be included in the model. For the present time, the evaluation process will be based on the total aircraft inventories identified from public sources.
Thirdly, the operational air environment will be assumed to consist of the aircraft inventory of each nation within the region. Anti-aircraft capabilities will be discounted as an influential factor in the model. As with maintenance capabilities, reliable information is not available from public sources. It is acknowledged, however, that this factor is strongly considered 162
by requesting nations in selecting electronically sophisticated
aircraft to counter surface-to-air missile anti-aircraft systems.
In this initial effort, the ability to compare air force structures
is developed. As more and better information becomes available,
these other factors can be included in the model.
Finally, it is assumed that "types" of aircraft can be
established on the basis of performance characteristics. This
assumption is most essential for evaluating combat aircraft
transfers. Having the ability to group aircraft into types on
the basis of performance characteristics, permits the evaluation
of force structure capabilities in terms of number of aircraft
and total deliverable ordance loads. It should be realized
that this is a macro-analytic approach for comparing combat air
craft, since it is only comparing aircraft on several selected
characteristics and in a non-mission oriented context. In
contrast a micro-analytic approach would compare combat air craft by taking into account a number of the following factors:
(1) Mission— close air support or interdiction; (2) Target system— what is the target; (3) Air defense system; (4) Operational aircraft; (5) Abort rate of aircraft; (6) Ordance needed;
(7) Target acquisition; (8) Weapon system reliability; (9) Combat radius of aircraft; and (10) Maintenance ability of nation and its supply of spare parts.36 Micro-analyses are important for military planning and execution of specific combat missions. 163
However, they are not readily applicable to the larger question of when to transfer arms. Aircraft "types" have been established for all combat aircraft present in national inventories.
Originally, two types of aircraft were developed on the basis of six performance characteristics. The six characteristics were: maximum take-off weight, maximum speed, combat radius, ordance load, gun armament, and missile armament. Discriminant anal ysis was used to test the classification procedure.37 The results indicated that combat aircraft could be separated into two groups on the basis of their performance characteristics. A subsequent discussion with Air Force experts suggested that the groups were not substantively meaningful because of the large variance in maximum speed of the high capability aircraft, and that Attack aircraft could not be realistically categorized with the high capability fighter-bomber group. A re-thinking of the classifica tion problem has resulted in dividing combat aircraft into three categories, in addition to the Bomber, Attack, and Trainer air craft, as presented in Tables 38 thru 43.
Table 38 and Table 43 contain the performance statistics for
Bomber and Trainer a i r c r a f t . ^8 Although the United States has not transferred any Bomber type aircraft during the period under consideration, they are included because Bombers contribute to the total force structure capability of a nation. Trainer air craft are included in the analysis because for some nations, armed 164
trainers are the only combat aircraft in their inventory.
Furthermore, some trainer aircraft are only modified versions of
Type I and Type II aircraft. Therefore, some nations may have
high capability trainers with large ordance loads while others
may have trainer aircraft whose only armament is two machine-guns.
As a result of the wide variety of trainer aircraft, it was nec
essary to include them in the analysis.
Tables 39 thru 41 contain the performance statistics for
Type I, Type II, and Type III aircraft respectively. Each Type
category contains similar aircraft with some amount of variance present in their performance characteristics. Type I and Type II aircraft were created out of the original fast, high capability aircraft category. The distinguishing characteristics of Type I aircraft are that their maximum speed is over 1000 miles per hour and they all have guided missile capabilities. No distinction is made between interceptors and fighter-bombers because these aircraft are used in mixed capacities, as are Type II and Type
III aircraft. The various aircraft roles are noted in Appendix
A, but all Type I aircraft will be combined, as will Type II and Type III, when evaluating force structure capabilities.
Type II aircraft are slower, high capability planes. The maximum speed for these aircraft normally range between 680 to
850 miles per hour. As with Type I aircraft, these planes also have guided missile capabilities. In comparison, Type III air craft have a maximum speed of less than 680 miles per hours, and 165 normally have a maximum take-off weight of less than 18,000 pounds.
More importantly, these aircraft do not usually have guided missile capabilities.
Attack and Counter-insurgency aircraft are presented in Table
42. These aircraft have all been designed and produced by the
United States aircraft industry. The Vietnam war provided a sub stantial part of the stimulus for producing this type of air weapon system. In general, these aircraft have slower maximum speeds than Type I aircraft, but carry sophisticated armaments and high ordance load capabilities. Three Counter-insurgency aircraft are included at the bottom of the Attack aircraft table for lack of a better category to place them in. The AC-119G and
AC-130E are heavily armed transports designed to be used in close support, high firepower situations. The OV-10A Bronco is a lighter aircraft to be used in similar counter-insurgency situa tions. These aircraft have proved successful in Vietnam, and have also been transferred to nations in Latin America, as well as Asia and the Middie East. The transfer of Attack aircraft will be evaluated in the next chapter.
Some may question the validity and applicability of the
"types" of aircraft categorization scheme. For each type, the most discriminating characteristics are the aircraft's maximum speed and missile armament.^ These two factors are of prime importance in combat situations. A close review of the national 166
inventories presented in Appendix A would tend to support the
validity of these types. In focusing on "types" of aircraft
present within a region, one observes similar trends in the
national inventories. These trends will be presented in detail
in the following chapter. For the present, the reader may judge
the validity of the "types" by reviewing the tables at the end
of the chapter.
The analysis of national and regional force structures will
be based on the above discussion. National force structures will
be compared in terms of the type of force structure present.
Force structures capabilities will be operationalized in terms
of the number of each "type" of aircraft and the total deliverable
ordance load for each category.Table 44 is presented below
to exemplify force structure capbility analysis. In comparing
the force structures, Israel has moved from a Type II structure
to a Type I structure beginning in 1971-1972 while Egypt has
continued to have a Type III structure throughout the time period.
Thus, Israel has greater flexibility in its air inventory in comparison to Egypt.
In comparing the force structure capabilities of Egypt and
Israel for 1970-1971, it is obvious that Egypt has a greater number of combat aircraft than Israel (450 versus 275). Yet even though the Egyptians have a larger number of combat aircraft, the
Israelis hold the edge in total deliverable ordance. This Table 44. Force Structure Capability istics Illustrated for Egypt 6 Israel, 1970-1975
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance
Egypt III III III III III
Bonber 15 20,000 ' 18 20,000 18 20,000 25 20,000 25 20,000 Type I 110 2,000 200 2,000 220 2 ,0 0 0 210 2 ,0 0 0 200 2 ,0 0 0 80 2,000 Type II 105 4,500 110 4,500 120 4,500 80 4,500 100 4,500 Type III 120 1,100 200 1,100 200 1,100 100 1,100 100 1,100
Total Ordance: 450 1,284,500 528 1,455,000 558 1,560,000 415 1,390,000 425 1,460,000 Belabor 15 300.000 18 360,000 18 360,000 25 500,000 25 500,000 Type I 190 380.000 200 400,000 220 440,000 210 420,000 200 400,000 Type II 105 472.000 110 495,000 120 540,000 80 360,000 100 450,000 Type III 120 132.000 200 220,000 200 220,000 100 110,000 100 110,000
Israel II I
Bonber 15 4.000 10 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 Type I 65 2.000 60 2,000 50 2,000 59 2,000 55 2,000 36 13,500 81 13,500 96 13,500 101 13,500 156 13,500 Type II 12 2.200 9 2,200 9 2,200 18 2,200 12 2,200 Type III 35 2.000 27 2,000 27 2,000 23 2,000 23 2,000 45 1.000 30 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 Attack 67 8.200 72 8,200 125 8,200 160 8,200 180 8,200
Tctal Ordance 275 1,366,800 289 1,947,300 347 2,564,800 401 2,938,600 466 3,834,400 Bomber 15 60,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 Type I 101 616.000 141 1,213,500 146 1,396,000 160 1,471,000 211 2,216,000 Type II 12 26,400 9 19,800 9 19,800 18 39,600 12 26,400 Type III 80 115.000 57 84,000 57 84,000 53 76,000 53 76,000 Attack 67 549.000 72 590,000 125 1,025,000 160 1,312,000 180 1,476,000
I-* O' -J 168 advantage is underscored in the Type I aircraft category where
Israel has a definite superiority over Egypt. For Type I air craft, the Mirage III-C and MiG-21 have the same ordance loads, but the United States F-4E gives Israel a considerable advantage over Egyptian aircraft because of its exceptional ordance capa bility. A more important observation is the competition that existed between the two nations through 1973. From 1970 through
1973, the data indicate that both nations increased the size and capability of their respective air forces. Israel continued to increase its air force capability to over 2.6 times that of Egypt.
This behavior could be interpreted in a number of different ways.
However, the final interpretation will be presented in the next chapter when specific Israeli requests are evaluated.
Tables 45 thru 48 present national force structure capabilities for Latin American, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia respectively.
National force structure capabilities were not calculated for
Europe because several European national inventories are reported on the basis of squadrons, with varying number of aircraft in a squadron, making the calculations subject to error. Furthermore, the European transfers are of the type that can be evaluated on the basis of national inventories. Finally, Western Europe pre sents a unique case for United States' transfers because of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance and the location of major combat aircraft producers in the region. For these 169
reasons, Western Europe transfers will be evaluated in a similar
but somewhat different fashion.
The national capabilities in each of the tables were cal
culated in a simple, straight-forward manner. Using the national
air system inventory information in Appendix A, the number of maximum ordance load for each "type" of aircraft was listed by
year. The total capability for each of the six "types" of combat
aircraft was then calculated by multiplying the number of air
craft times their maximum ordance load and summing the values
for each type of aircraft present in the national inventory. The
resulting set of numbers provides a gross measure of national air system capabilities. Table 44 and the above discussion of
Egyptian and Israeli force structures provide an excellent example of ascertaining national capabilities. The comparative superiority of the Israeli air force is underscored by the fact that the total ordance capability of the Egyptian Type I, II, and III aircraft
(some 400 planes) is less than one-half the capability of Israel's
211 Type I aircraft. This analytic process permits the evaluation of national air capabilities and produces several pieces of information to be used in the air system request evaluation process.
First, the analyst has information that segments a nation's air systems into types of combat aircraft and their respective ordance capability. Secondly, the analyst has a summary indicator 170
for each "type" category by knowing the number of combat aircraft within the type and their total capability. Finally, the analyst
has a summary indicator of the nation's combat air system capa
bility in the total number of combat aircraft and their total
ordance capability. These indicators permit the analyst to
identify both quantitative and qualitative changes in a nation's air force structure. Quantitative changes can easily be seen within each of the "type" categories by changes in the number of aircraft. Qualitative changes are observed in two different areas. The first qualitative change can be observed in shifting between types of aircraft. That is, a qualitative change in an air force structure occurs when a higher level type of air system is acquired (e.g., a shift from Type III to Type I air craft). A second qualitative change can be observed in a nation having fewer aircraft within a "type" category, but increasing its ordance capability. In these instances, a qualitative shift has occurred in that the newly acquired air system have higher ordance capabilities. Both types of force structure information are valuable for evaluating an arms request.
In analyzing national and regional force structures, the analyst is looking at two basic phenomena. First, acquisition patterns are closely scrutinized to identify arms competition within a region. Similar trends in acquiring aircraft and increasing overall force structure capabilities will be viewed as indicative of competition between the two nations.^1 Secondly,
the analyst will be reviewing qualitative changes in force struc
tures and their relative capability. ^ The acquisition of F-4's
by Israel is a good example of the qualitative impact of 'a trans
fer. The F-4 is a multi-purpose aircraft that can carry over
six times the ordance load of a Mirage III or a MiG-21. Given
this performance characteristic, qualitative changes must be
closely reviewed when evaluating a request for the F-4 aircraft.
In essence, this analysis section is based on evaluating the balance of air system power existing between nations within a region.
The concept of "balance of power" has traditionally been used in a variety of different ways when discussing influences on national foreign policy.43 This study's approach is more specific and concrete than most usages of the concept in that it is used in analysis of the balance of air system power between two nations, and is operationalized in terms of the number of aircraft in national inventories and the ordance capability of those aircraft. This is a reasonable analytic approach because it is based on recent observed behavior in the international system. The arms acquisition process of some Latin American nations has already been cited as supportive evidence for this approach. Further evidence can be found in the recent attempts by the United States and Soviet Union to reduce their arms race 172 in strategic weapons. The 1972 ABM treaty and the 1972 Interim
Agreement for the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms both represent national concerns over the number of weapon systems and the capability of those weapon systems.^ These two agreements place limitations on the number of ABM sites and their locations, and the number of offensive nuclear Inter-continental Ballistic
Missiles each nation may maintain. The difficulty of applying this approach in the evaluation process is not in identifying levels of power, but in conjecturing the degree of change that will cause an arms race to occur.
Indicator Review. Results from the force structure analysis are reviewed in combination with the contextual indicators. The purpose of an indicator review (Figure 6, box 11) is to pu't each indicator in its proper perspective, and assess the potential for an arms race, conflict, or escalation of conflict to occur. Each area of the model provides information related to the Congressional considerations. In reviewing the indicators, the analyst is seeking answers to the following questions:
(1) Is the requesting nation's military expenditure pattern within a normal range, or is it rapidly increasing?
(2) Does the requesting nation's military expenditure pattern indicate it to be in competition with other nations in the region?
(3) Does the nation's tension scores indicate the presence of an increasing amount of tension? 173
(4) Does the requestor's interaction indicator identify the presence of tension or conflict with another member of the region?
(5) Is the requesting nation currently involved in an external conflict with another nation or group of nations?
(6) If the requesting nation is involved in a conflict, is he dependent on external sources for war materials?
(7) Is the request consistent with the recipient's national force structure and the force structures present within the region?
(8) Does the request increase the force structure capa bility of the requesting nation in comparison to its neighbors?
(9) Does the requesting nation's arms acquisition pat tern indicate it to be in competition with other members of the region? i Positive findings in several of the above identified areas would justify denying the request. This design will initially evaluate arms requests in terms of a worst case perspective. That is, a very stringent interpretation of the indicators will be used when reaching a recommendation.
In answering these questions, the review process involves comparing the requesting nation's scores on each of the indicators with other members of the region. This requires the analyst to search out the information for the requesting nation and its neighbors in Tables 21 thru 32 and Tables 35 to 48 where appropriate. Having obtained the relevant infomration, the analyst then reviews the trends of each indicator. The recommendation process is straightforward if all of the indicators are 174
consistent in the same direction. For example, if the requesting
nation is rapidly increasing its military expenditures, has a
high tension score (a score of 100 or higher for all nations
except those in Africa), a trend toward increasing conflictual
interactions but is not presently involved in a military conflict
at the time of the request, a competitive arms acquisition
pattern with its neighbors, and the transfer would increase
the requesting nation's force structure capability in comparison
to its neighbors, then the recommendation would be to deny the
request. Likewise, consistent trends in the opposite direction would result in a recommendation to approve the request. The
recommendation process is more difficult however, when there are mixed trends in the pattern of the indicators.
Decision rules have been established for reaching a recommenda tion during this review process. Recommendations will be based on the following guidelines:
(1) Transfers will be rejected to nations involved in external conflict.
(2) Transfers will be rejected to requesting nations that have high tension and Dimension of Interaction— Conflict scores.
(3) Transfers will be rejected to nations identified to be in an arms race with a neighboring nation.
(4) Transfers will be rejected if they alter the force structure of the requesting nation in comparison to its neighboring nations. 175
(5) Transfers will be rejected if they increase the force structure capabilities of the requesting nation in compari son to its neighbors.
The above decision rules strictly interpret the legislation.
They provide direction in the review process for evaluating the
information obtained when answering the nine basic questions,
and form the basis for a recommendation on a specific arms
request. Furthermore, the decision rules present the persepective
that arms transfers should not be viewed as a vehicle for mani
pulating foreign policy situations. The rules will be used
for the analysis of combat aircraft transfers from 1969 to 1973.
Each of the above decision rules can be justified in terms
of the legislated considerations. The first rule or guideline
is astraightforward implementation of the Congressional consider
ation dealing with conflict. If arms are not transferred into
a conflictive situation, then it is less likely that an escala
tion of conflict can occur. Bloomfield and Leiss (1967) note
that "all types of weapons can be used in local conflicts, but
the most relevant categories are small arms, crew-served weapons and artillery, armored vehicles and combat aircraft (p. 115)."
Combat aircraft can provide a source of mobile firepower in the smallest conflict. Consequently, aims should not be transferred
to nations engaged in conflict.
A most obvious objection to this guideline is that it ignores those nations whose sovereignty is threatened by an 176
external attack. There should be no disagreement about rejecting
a request from a nation that has initiated conflict with another
nation, but a request from a nation being threatened would seem
to be a different case. Should not arms be transferred to
nations that are threatened by an external attack? The analysis
in Chapter Four will confirm that arms have been transferred
under such conditions. But the problem is that it is difficult
to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons. Weapons
that were transferred for defensive purposes can also be used
for offensive action. This problem of distinction exists regard
less of the situation. Kemp (1970) lists six factors that the analyst needs to know before an evaluation of offensive versus defensive weapons can even be attempted.^5 Leiss, et al. (1970) state that there is "no ready list of weapons, on the basis of military performance, that permit one to separate ’offensive1 from 'defensive'...(p. 351)." The most conservative approach in terms of the spirit of the legislation is to avoid arms transfers to nations involved in conflict.
The second decision guideline is designed to avoid transfers to nations that exhibit a potential for conflict. A thermometer indicator has been developed to measure national tension. The
Dimension of Interaction indicators assist in measuring dyadic tensions within a region. These two indicators assist the analyst in identifying nations whose policy actions suggest the potential 177
for conflict. Arms requests should be denied for those nations
whose policy actions are conflictive rather than cooperative in
nature. This arms transfer policy would assure that all approved
transfers were in compliance with the legislation.
But what about those nations that only have a high tension
score? Arms transfers may be approved to nations that exhibit
tension but are peacefully interacting with neighboring nations
and are not involved in an arms race with them. The tension
indicator only measures the presence of tension and not its
cause. Thus, it is used in conjunction with other indicators
in providing a profile of the requesting nation's political and military situation. For this reason, transfers may be recommended
for approval even though a nation is exhibiting tension.
The third decision rule needs no explanation. Indicators have been developed to identify the existence of an arms race.
As a result, air system requests will be rejected for those nations indentified to be involved in an arms race. However, it is more difficult to identify those transfers that would contribute to the occurrence of an arms race. Decision rules
4 and 5 have been designed to deal with this situation. The model presents the perspective that altering either the Type of force structure or the force structure's capabilities of one of two similar nations will create a situation that could cause the occurrence of an arms race. Gray (1971) lists four basic 178
conditions to identify an arms race:
(1) there must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism;
(2) they must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race partici pants ;
(3) they must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment); and
(4) there must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality (p. 41).
If decision rules 4 and 5 seem too absolute, the contextual indi cators and force structure analysis provide the information necessary to identify the conditions stipulated by Gray. The purpose of the last two guidelines is to avoid transfers that will create situations that could potentially stimulate an arms race to occur. All of the above decision rules form the basis for a recommendation on a specific request. Yet, the recommenda tion and the decision to approve or re.j ect a request may not be congruent in the final analysis.
Over-ride Considerations. The indicator review process with its decision rule guidelines produces a recommendation on a specific request. This recommendation may be altered by certain overriding considerations of the decision-maker. If the recommendation is positive, then in all likelihood the transfer will be approved.
However, since the spirit of the legislation has been identified 179
as potentially being in conflict with the values of United States
decision-makers, there exists a strong possibility that a negative
recommendation would be overridden because of other considerations.
The overriding considerations could include:
(1) the requesting nation is a formal ally of the United States and the transfer is to supplement the alliance member's existing force structure;
(2) the requesting nation is a country aligned with the United States, and dependent upon United States weapons for its security;
(3) the United States has a negative balance-of-payments problem with the requesting nation; and
(4) the value of the air system request is such that it would have a most favorable impact on the United States balance-of- payments.
Whether or not any of the above considerations prove to be
overriding will be evaluated in the following chapter.
Each of the overriding considerations is related to larger
concerns of American foreign and domestic policies. These
identified considerations suggest that United States arms trans
fers cannot be separated from the overall thrust of American
foreign policy. The first consideration denotes that there is a
strong commitment to our formal alliances. Moreover, it would be difficult not to supply weapon systems in order to maintain a strong alliance. A rejection of an arms request from an ally would definitely raise political questions about the strength of the alliance. For this reason, the first overriding consider ation was included in the model. 180
The second overriding consideration has been a basic funda
mental of American foreign policy since the end of World War II.
Assistance to various nations has traditionally been viewed as
in America's best interest. The Nixon Doctrine also provided a
stimulus for including this consideration in the model. This
doctrine indicates that the United States would assist other
nations to maintain their sovereignty by providing military and
economic assistance but the nation directly threatened must provide
the manpower for its defense. ^ Failure to make weapons avail
able, either in sales or aid, could raise questions about the
American commitment to the free world. The importance of this
particular consideration should be identifiable in the analysis
of United States transfers.
Finally, the last two considerations are important for the
time period under consideration. They were included in the
model because the United States has periodically experienced
difficulty with its balance of payments situation. The balance
of payments problem has become more important because of the re
cent events surrounding the price of oil. Industrialized nations have been experiencing negative balance-of-payments situations because of inflation and the increased cost of petroleum. One method of offsetting this situation is to sell large quantities of expensive weapon systems. Although these factors may prove to be of minimum importance for the time period of the current 181
analysis, they may well be factors that take on added importance
in 1975 and subsequent years.
Chapter 4 contains a series of applications of the designed
evaluation process. Past arms transfers will be evaluated as to
their conformity with the spirit of the legislation. It will be possible to identify transfers in which overriding considera
tions influenced the final decision. The extent to which over riding considerations were of prime importance in comparison to the legislation will suggest possible future legislative action.
Regardless of the findings, the following chapter displays the systematic application of a designed evaluation process for air weapon system requests. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
•*-By nature of the requestor, I mean whether it is a developed nation and also whether the nation has political ties with the United States. The situation can be characterized in terms of the nation's political and military dimensions.
2For a review of the design literature see Lawton (1974). Suggested readings on design include Asimov (1962), Christopherson (1963), Dror (1971), Eveleigh (1972), Gregory (1966), Jones (1970), and Papanek (1971).
^In its report to Congress, ACDA (1973) observed that "in many cases— especially those where there is a record of stability, where recipients have security ties to outside powers, where the intensity of the underlying dispute is not so great, and where the arms transferred do not give recipients what is regarded by neighbors as a new or threatening military capability— it is often possible to make reasonably reliable predictions of the effects of the transfers. But there are other recipient areas where these conditions are not present and where there is likely to remain a much larger element of unpredictability and risk (p. 64)."
^This development is the result of design applications in a different field (Engineering) and for different purposes.
^The subject of arms transfers has only been given serious consideration in the academic community since the mid 1960's with Lincoln Bloomfield's study of Regional Arms Control for Developing Areas (1964).
^For example, intelligence information could supply the analyst with more accurate national aircraft inventories. Further more^ better estimates could be obtained of the military and political situation within a country.
^The cases of aid to Vietnam and aid to Israel are prime examples of selective criticism. Although both cases involved large weapons transfers, the former situation drew much more criticism than the latter.
182 183
O It is possible, but highly improbable, that a positive recommendation would result in a negative decision. One of the few times this could conceivably occur would be if the transfer was "politically embarassing" to the United States.
^All tables for this chapter have been placed at the end due to the exceptional length of each table.
10ln collecting this data, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency attempted to apply a standard operationalization for mili tary expenditures. National military expenditures was defined to include "current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces; expenditures of national defense agencies for military programs; expenditures for the military components of such mixed activities as atomic energy, space, and research and development; military assistance to foreign countries; military stockpiling; retirement pensions of career personnel; and expenditures on certain paramilitary forces as defined above. Excluded are expenditures for veterans benefits, civil defense, civilian space, strategic industrial stockpiling, and public debt services (1975, p. 10-11)."
11-For a discussion of this problem see SIPRI (1971) Appendix 1 and the statistical note section of World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973 (ACDA, 1975).
-^See Blalock (1960) and Garson (1971) for a discussion of correlation techniques.
13xhe Pearsonian correlation, r, ranges from a +1 to a -1, with the end points indicating either a perfect positive rela tionship (+1) or a perfect negative relationship (-1) between the two sets of numbers.
14The years 1963 to 1968 were selected as the base time period in order to have a 'benchmark' correlation coefficient to compare with the succeeding coefficients. It would have been better to have had several more years in the base time period, but reliable data were not available.
l^Linearity in arms competition can be observed in the trends of national aircraft inventories presented in Appendix A. Also, it can be observed in arms control proposals. For example, see the discussion of the SALT talks presented in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (ACDA, 1975). 184
wish to thank Dr. Aage Clausen and Dr. Stuart Thorson for their insights into the problems of using correlation analysis with military expenditure data.
l^Argentina and Brazil present a good example of this pattern, where Brazil continues to increase its military expenditures while Argentina reduces its defense outlays after 1970.
l%ewcombe (1974, 1975) has found that nations with high tension ratio scores are more likely to be involved in conflict within the next five years.
19see Blalock (1960), Draper and Smith (1966), Ezekiel and Fox (1967), and Garson (1971), for a discussion of regression Techniques.
^Least-squeares regression is used to calculate the theoretical military expenditure scores. It requires interval level data, and assumptions that the data are normally distributed and linear related. The process is to fit the best line through the actual GNP-military expenditure data. This technique minimizes the differences between the actual military expenditure values and the theoretic military expenditure values represented by the line. In fitting the best line to determine expected expendi tures, it is assumed that Gross National Product is a prime pre dictor of defense expenditures, and that all things being equal, the expected value represents what the nation would normally spend without the influence of other factors.
21The process of analyzing expected versus actual expenditures is known as residual analysis. A residual is the score calculated by substracting the expected value from the actual value.
22Newcombe rank orders nations on both their level of develop ment and military expenditures. He than compares national ranks and identifies over and under spenders in terms of the congruency between a nation's development rank and its military expenditure rank. Over-spenders are those nations whose military expenditure rank is higher than its development rank. Having identified the over and under spenders, he then plots the data and draws a straight line that best separates the over and under spenders with the fewest misclassifications. This procedure is somewhat questionable because of the existence of misclassifications. These misclassifications are nations that are located on the opposite side of the line than where they should be once the line is drawn. Using Newcombe's rank technique, it is possible for a nation to be an over-spender but be located as an under spender because of the positioning of the line. 185
23consider the following hypothetical example. Nation A fs actual military expenditure is $800 million dollars while its theoretical expenditure is calculated to be $700 million dollars. On the basis of these figures, its tension ratio is 114.28. In comparison, Nation B's actual military expenditure is $300 million while its theoretic military expenditure is calculated to be $200 million dollars. On the basis of these figures, Nation B’s tension ratio is 150.00. In comparing Nation A and Nation B, both have the same difference in spending levels but do not have the same tension ratios.
^Regional patterns in arms acquisition have been observed by Leiss, et al. (1970). They concluded: "we find strong clusterings of patterns among the countries in our sample in terms of the region of the world in which they exist (p. 343)."
25in computing the national tension scores for this region, Japan was excluded from the analysis because its military expendi ture pattern greatly distorted the tension scores. It seems justifiable to delete Japan on the basis of its post-war experi ence and constitutional limits for its defense posture.
26peter Mansfield's survey of the Middle East includes the following nations: Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni Republic, the People's Democratic Repbulic of South Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States, Oman, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, the Sudan, Syria, and Turkey.
27pata for the rest of the "core" actors will be released sometime in the future, once it is completely free of errors.
28The principal CREON investigators include: Professors Charles F. and Margaret G. Hermann at Ohio State University; Maurice East at the University of Kentucky; Stephen A. and Barbara G. Salmore of Rutgers and Drew University respectively; and Linda P. Brady at Vanderbilt University.
2^See Hermann, et al. (1973) for an overview of the CREON project and a description of the various theoretical perspectives.
"^For an assessment of events data research see Burgess and Lawton (1972). Also see Vol. 2, no. 1 of International Inter actions (1975) for a current review of the events data approach. 186
31lt should be noted that events data analysis is a very expensive and time consuming project. The cost in both time and money is in the collection and preparation of the data. Hermann, et al. (1973) and Azar (1975) provide insight into the effort involved in events data research.
32()ne real difficulty for events data researchers is the problem of source coverage. The question in this instance is one of interactions occurring but not being reported. Azar has attempted to solve this problem by using multiple public sources. For a discussion of the source coverage problem, see Azar (1972).
33ihese indicators usually take the form of percentagized scores of conflict or cooperation in relation to each other or the total number of events. For an example of this type of indi cator, see Kridler (1973).
3^Azar (1972, 1973) has presented the concept of a nation's normal relations range based on the COPDAB data. The development of dyadic NRR's has great potential for evaluating interactions. Perhaps there will be wider application of the notion of national NRR's once the full data set is released to the academic community.
35The most extreme example in this case is the recent use of a transport aircraft by the United States to launch an inter continental ballistic missile, thus demonstrating the ability to have air mobile ICBM's. Still, transport aircraft are best used for transport missions.
36These factors were identified by Lt. Colonel Max Nunnekamp during a discussion at the Department of State on 16 April, 1975.
o 7 -"For a discussion of discriminant analysis procedures see Anderson (1958) and Hope (1968).
All performance statistics should be considered as approxi mations rather than absolutes. Yearly volumes of Jane's All The Worlds Aircraft, dating back to 1941, provided the performance statistics. This is the best public information available and the most extensive. The notes in the right hand part of the tables contain qualifying information about some of the various statistics.
39xhe reader should notice that electronic equipment has not been included in developing the various types. Aircraft electronics were excluded because of the wide options available for most of the aircraft, and the unavailability of the data. Consequently, it is assumed that the electronic equipment are similar within "types" of aircraft. ^Tahtinen (1973) provided the stimulus for this approach. He used a somewhat similar approach in his studies of the Arab- Israeli military balance and trends in armaments in the Persian Gulf.
4lLeiss, et al. (1970) refer to an arms race as "the acquisition of arms by adversary states that are intended to alter the relative power relationship between or among them. They are characterized by departure from past habits and patterns of acquisition and efforts to shorten the time between a decision to acquire and the actual acquisition. Sharp rises in military expenditurs that cannot be explained in nonequipment terms should alert one to the possible commencement of an arms race (if adversaries react).
^Huntington (1958) has distinguished between two types of arms competition. The first type of competition is a quantitative one in which numbers of weapons are important. The second type is qualitative, which is reflective in the desire for more different weapons.
/ Q For a traditional discussion of this concept, see Morgenthau (1968), Claude (1965), Haas (1953), and Zinnes (1967).
^The text of these two agreements can be found in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1975), Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements.
45The six factors to be taken into account are: "(a) the stated and real attentions of the recipients; (b) a potential adversary’s perception of the intention of the recipient; (c) the geography of the recipient's country; (d) the other weapons in the recipient's armed forces; (e) the technical competence and fighting ability of the recipient; and (f) the technical competence, fighting ability, force levels, geography, and intentions of the of the recipient's adversary (p. 24-25)."
^See Richard Nixon (1973), U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970's. Table 21. National Military Expendlturea, 1963*1973* (millions of dollars)
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Canada 2419.56 2493.53 2211.90 2256.17 2416.64 2295.41 2166.48 2250.72 2255.64 2257.19 2253.59 Cuba 306.00 289.00 272.00 264.00 306.00 361.00 293.00 338.00 328.00 319.00 MD Haiti 9.52 9.87 8.95 8.09 8.04 8.42 7.98 6.38 8.27 5.80 HD Dominican Republic 38.39 39.85 37.36 36.70 34.75 33.07 31.75 31.61 32.54 32.50 25 21 Jamaica 5.42 5.74 6.07 5.67 5.93 6.33 5.30 6.68 7.86 7.43 MD Trinidad and Tobago 2.39 3.52 3.04 2.92 2.97 2.87 3.00 3.93 4.55 5.09 MD Mexico 158.92 171.89 178.49 212.07 206.06 225.59 235.79 242.75 264.11 296.00 301.70 Guatemala 9.93 12.38 15.81 16.41 17.34 17.12 17.42 30.06 20.38 22.50 19.26 Honduras 7.11 6.20 6.81 7.81 8.30 7.18 15.14 7.29 9.82 12.35 11.85 El Salvador 9.95 9.88 10.00 10.24 10.46 12.68 30.71 10.81 12.06 14.44 13.81 Nicaragua 8.78 8.75 9.76 10.24 11.60 11.10 11.73 13.67 13.30 16.57 16.88 Costa Rica MD HD MD MD MDMD MD MDMD MD MD Panama .61 .59 .71 .58 .91 1.01 1.45 1.36 3.06 2.00 1.93 Colombia 81.16 85.52 93.44 96.61 88.75 96.01 88.34 102.94 202.32 109.50 87.95 Venezuela 173.98 183.09 211.68 216.25 244.77 234.79 230.07 238.92 297.77 270.00 269.05 Ecuador 18.84 23.14 25.29 24.78 22.55 23.33 30.75 32.06 33.86 43.08 40.34 Peru 143.54 160.15 166.53 161.99 216.26 245.93 210.10 259.75 275.88 252.27 228.77 brazil 390.80 726.65 664.71 763.55 835.16 820.46 911.26 1121.14 1174.74 1240.97 1187.79 Bolivia 15.02 15.10 17.08 16.42 16.49 15.25 16.41 19.71 20.56 26.23 33.16 Paraguay 7.32 7.00 8.24 9.23 11.96 11.99 12.50 13.10 12.23 11.98 11.16 Chile 127.25 116.88 126.32 146.47 134.72 145.02 142.12 156.72 179.35 138.95 133.16 Argendna 397.47 417.25 401.01 452.64 429.52 435.82 457.80 486.56 431.00 416.90 MD Uruguay 40.04 38.62 43.80 36.67 44.12 34.22 45.05 50.18 64.37 54.42 63.92
United Kingdom 7390.22 7674.51 7647.95 7544.45 7739.39 7639.29 7181.75 7112.94 7487.25 8182.05 8135.35 Ireland 48.93 46.15 54.80 55.08 51.24 52.61 52.36 54.65 61.82 66.00 79.13 Netherlands 1235.50 1320.01 1271.40 1233.42 1359.47 1344.71 1426.73 1459.11 1523.70 1549.53 1629.71 Belgium 750.75 846.67 817.14 828.02 866.56 908.18 908.48 957.81 957.70 1002.68 1041.70 Luxembourg 11.95 14.80 14.87 15.01 12.23 10.67 10.45 10.03 10.50 11.74 12.21 France 6767.14 6915.71 7034.40 7218.42 7593.16 7595.34 7372.80 7315.51 7343.87 7295.65 7176.57 Switzerland 540.10 560.72 568.83 ' 596.73 572.08 532.50 579.92 588.11 581.18 573.34 548.19 Spain 800.92 831.15 808.01 •. 1042.32 1208.41 1384.77 1350.28 1423.89 1484.17 1571.57 1542.40 Portugal 302.48 334.87 333.96 351.71 439.72 484.70 459.62 517.34 584.99 591.14 533.53 Vest Cormany 8974.05 8570.40 8424.11 8275.29 8641.75 7671.78 82 76.06 8035.24 • 8471.68 9007.65 9350.68 East Germany 1578.86 1598.80 1716.11 1750.52 1866.42 2311.87 2422.04 2564.99 2624.68 2753.00 2943.99 Poland 2428.00 2S44.00 2611.00 2655.00 2740.00 2938.00 3081.00 3145.00 3388.00 3632.00 3655.00 Austria 163.05 206.63 170.80 194.42 194.99 196.29 209.74 200.96 200.59 212.21 208.19 Hungary 907.00 907.00 917.00 862.00 836.00 890.00 939.00 1069.00 1092.00 1098.00 1145.00 Czechoslovakia 1966.00 2168.00 '2209.00 2194.00 2304.00 2317.00 2306.00 2217.00 2418.00 2499.00 2560.00 Italy 2622.97 2676.74 2791.72 3026.22 2976.44 3028.49 2925.06 3036.05 3377.06 3703.94 3713.39 Albania 75.00 75.00 76.00 72.00 75.00 80.00 99.00 103.00 120.00 118.00 112.00 Yugoslavia 634.00 644.00 657.00 633.00 620.00 697.00 717.00 700.00 724.00 885.00 834.00 Table 21. Cont*d
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Greece 233.38 239.06 257.23 282.68 361.75 419.10 473.75 511.52 540.48 573.70 559.24 Cyprus 2.45 8.30 10.21 8.63 9.68 8.12 7.48 8.42 9.65 9.66 7.92 Turkey 439.27 463.20 499.11 491.10 533.52 571.44 569.39 598.84 689.27 711.50 775.14 Bulgaria 862.00 913.00 908.00 913.00 918.00 918.00 945.00 1008.00 1075.00 1159.00 1262.00 Rusiania 1537.00 1532.00 1471.00 1432.00 1325.00 1367.00 1509.00 1590.00 1538.00 1726.00 1741.00 Finland 160.70 159.85 153.33 153.03 171.65 191.51 175.41 183.79 197.63 227.85 211.65 Sweden 1233.20 1276.71 1319.93 1405.80 1376.35 1359.00 1366.59 1447.54 1614.27 1502.42 1376.17 Norway 353.89 361.40 414.02 407.38 421.53 448.27 473.17 470.63 479.79 491.65 509.13 Denmark 413.93 421.56 440.11 433.02 444.64 484.81 468.92 455.64 498.53 487.04 434.76 Morocco 99.84 86.52 81.81 87.61 94.65 110.45 113.19 117.78 127.14 139.72 147.61 Algeria 105.60 112.45 127.76 125.16 124.45 123.27 122.34 117.93 112.09 109.97 MD Tunisia 17.05 19.20 16.99 17.96 19.40 21.66 20.49 26.29 26.87 30.42 30.65 Libya 27.68 36.45 39.64 45.71 47.91 57.88 86.36 140.03 89.91 121.92 MD Sudan 32.73 35.89 54.79 53.89 58.11 68.72 74.21 99.86 118.56 107.70 MD Ms 11 6.61 6.31 7.14 7.10 7.24 6.22 5.86 5.99 6.96 8.42 MD Senegal 9.41 17.31 18.15 16.70 18.75 19.00 18.82 18.82 19.37 19.55 MD Dahomey 1.27 4.85 4.67 4.19 4.43 4.39 4.74 5.00 5.20 5.28 MD Mauritania 4.26 2.02 2.11 2.02 2.23 2.39 2.49 2.63 2.67 1.88 MD Niger 3.82 6.16 8.44 3.55 4.29 4.52 4.25 4.59 4.77 5.92 MD Ivory CoasC 1.24 13.56 15.51 15.53 16.63 17.94 17.61 19.75 21.07 21.50 MD Guinea 8.93 7.05 14.47 17.32 18.08 17.94 17.86 21.49 20.86 18.65 MD Upper Volca 3.37 3.31 3.28 4.23 4.06 4.17 4.39 4.76 4.82 4.88 MD Liberia 4.05 2.80 2.80 2.91 3.40 2.92 3.30 3.79 4.31 3.30 MD Sierra Leone 2.42 2.89 2.46 2.55 2.06 2.43 3.04 3.70 4.17 3.31 MD Ghana 32.83 35.98 30.85 37.69 51.68 52.00 41.20 38.67 36.47 34.46 36.23 Togo 1.10 3.25 3.45 2.84 3.10 3.20 3.28 3.55 3.93 4.38 MD Cameroon 19.32 17.74 18.94 20.38 20.91 21.73 21.96 22.40 22.62 23.46 MD Nigeria 69.64 89.94 103.46 81.45 209.76 328.06 694.02 561.38 454.99 565.89 MD Gabon 2.66 2.56 3.96 3.92 3.83 3.46 5.01 5.63 6.52 6.58 MD Central African Republic 1.22 2.67 2.76 2.89 4.12 5.19 6.05 5.82 6.30 5.56 MD Chad 1.28 2.50 3.51 5.67 8.88 9.14 9.22 14.12 15.49 15.64 MD Congo, People's Republic 5.15 6.32 6.20 8.44 7.16 6.85 5.67 7.11 6.82 5.92 MD Zaire 26.71 43.71 61.25 93.32 76.16 63.39 65.86 106.64 102.61 100.20 MD Uganda 1.89 6.43 12.85 20.56 19.81 26.97 28.93 28.57 23.82 78.11 MD Kenya MD 8.08 9.66 13.14 17.19 19.61 17.37 17.42 18.94 25.20 28.25 Tanzania 2.02 3.58 7.26 9.40 10.10 14.21 12.29 19.48 32.87 34.16 38.18 Burundi 1.48 1.76 2.63 2.82 3.01 3.24 3.06 3.49 3.37 3.60 MD Rwanda 4.07 4.50 5.33 6.40 3.72 4.77 4.28 4.83 5.27 5.70 MD Table 21. Conc'd
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Somalia 6.10 6.51 5.51 7.65 8.08 8.92 9.02 11.13 11.15 13.29 MD Ethiopia 25.53 28.10 34.00 39.74 38.99 45.56 4b. 14 42.95 46.91 52.11 4S.06 Zambia MDMD 26.15 23.18 20.26 26.60 16.15 30.47 75.97 92.82 56.64 Rhodesia MDMD MD 22.71 25.24 26.51 25.69 29.20 31.18 33.78 MD Union of Souch Africa 244.36 348.10 321.30 367.54 404.83 413.35 422.37 385.13 445.31 433.76 505.19 Malagasy Republic 11.61 11.99 13.51 13.40 14.21 15.15 15.31 14.18 14.18 14.37 MD Iran 268.82 314.98 429.38 483.38 659.29 791.95 956.30 1051.04 1347.12 1704.69 Iraq 2158.57 217.59 295.71 304.i6 295.21 279.03 382.33 476.97 452.54 489.50 474.31 MD Egypt 483.72 511.77 586.73 457.55 422.00 573.60 655.66 933.14 1016.86 1136.15 MD Syria 101.37 92.43 91.43 88.67 94.74 154.71 158.29 194.79 171.28 249.31 MD Lebanon 43.35 34.01 39.15 42.18 46.27 43.31 49.93 48.53 48.74 51.07 MD Jordan 77.07 78.88 79.29 84.87 99.26 139.47 152.28 117.97 120.25 123.21 MD Israel 285.59 362.12 357.30 429.01 672.12 837.85 1135.94 1484.03 1491.25 1490.95 3255.72 Saudi Arabia 145.87 154.11 139.35 168.42 336.34 205.27 233.69 220.91 259.54 650.97 MD Yemen 14.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 15.00 13.00 11.00 13.00 17.00 18.00 21.00 Kuwait 32.24 42.85 45.34 49.25 80.42 83.57 89.03 89.58 91.57 97.29 MD Afghanistan 7.97 12.16 13.65 14.02 15.02 16.50 17.03 17.34 17.07 17.05 MD People's Republic of China 6800.00 8100.00 8600.00 9600.00 9300.00 9600.00 12000.00 13000.00 14500.00 14500.00 14200.00 Mongolia 20.00 20.00 20.00 19.00 25.00 30.00 38.00 40.00 43.00 48.00 50.00 Republic of China 302.90 351.20 397.79 463.37 481.59 514.62 319.91 519.34 631.04 698.25 MD North Korea 382.00 403.00 461.00 449.00 584.00 729.00 701.00 756.00 775.00 500.00 592.00 South Korea 179.48 165.20 183.00 217.25 233.14 272.65 314.33 331.51 406.00 454.51 443.S6 Japan 1235.24 1366.08 1412.37 1520.76 1618.27 1756.27 1935.52 2157.86 2409.04 2710.21 2910.25 India 1676.84 1700.06 1715.97 1551.41 1523.33 1632.25 1663.49 1748.29 2144.71 2070.39 1890.65 Pakistan 235.12 248.63 513.37 393.62 339.69 385.73 386.39 426.23 521.51 602.21 452.59 Burma 110.10 106.06 118.22 113.51 93.62 92.07 99.06 108.13 117.11 118.02 110.83 Ceylon 8.81 7.42 7.90 8.36 8.43 8.67 9.10 9.71 18.40 16.30 15.48 Nepal 6.59 6.27 5.96 4.22 5.80 5.69 5.80 5.71 6.31 6.22 MD Thailand 96.32 101.03 101.53 105.67 126.58 156.12 185.89 213.77 266.08 272.50 301.17 Cambodia 26.38 25.71 23.61 23.51 25.68 25.79 26.94 61.30 88.04 110.18 MD Laos 12.49 22.17 24.11 21.90 23.15 22.67 22.55 21.33 22.22 26.13 MD North Vietnam 341.00 403.00 422.00 423.00 404.00 388.00 342.00 324.00 310.00 325.00 275.00 Souch Vietnam 288.10 291.26 500.09 381.59 388.93 469.19 431.53 444.65 437.33 512.50 MD Malaysia 58.77 83.46 108.26 136.42 131.85 120.72 119.25 144.14 208.72 240.78 186.98 190 Philippines 100.85 101.42 97.83 93.19 109.22 124.64 135.20 152.61 137.65 146.88 181.05 Indonesia 196.70 211.15 282.68 81.26 178.32 233.34 262.95 286.70 312.49 337.81 335.93 Australia 921.58 1182.06 1339.28 1504.78 1519.41 1462.00 1627.35 1484.59 1451.25 1451.06 1395.51 New Zealand 104.41 129.91 140.20 156.20 147.77 138.11 138.50 152.85 154.12 154.89 MD
The data in this table are arranged by geographic region and were adapted from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). Table 112. I.atln American Defense Spending Correlations
CUBA HAI DOM JAM TRI HEX GUA HON EI.S NIC PAN COL YEN ECU PER BRA BOL PAR CHL ARC [laid 1963-1968 -.104 1969 -.062 1970 -.360 1971 -.359 1972 -.357 Dominican Republic 1963-1968 -.649 .805 1969 - .7*47 .828 1970 -.563 .848 1971 -.597 .816 1972 -.60S .774 Jamaica 1963-1968 .518 -.417 -.717 1969 .465 -.066 -.072 1970 .599 -.533 -.368 1971 .534 -.341 -.456 1972 . .527 -.545 -.524 Trinidad U Tobago 1963-1968 -.253 .186 .261 .287 1969 -.256 .146 .165 .200 1970 .165 -.501 -.275 .611 1971 .299 -.364 -.409 .849 1972 .307 -.649 -.474 .874 Mexico 1963-1968 .401 -.854 -.865 .647 .060 1969 .283 -.874 -.911 .098 .081 1970 .437 -.875 -.933 .409 .423 1971 .494 -.745 -.908 .659 .656 1972 .465 -.849 -.851 .755 .803 Guatemala 1963-1968 .131 -.865 -.775 .750 .231 .873 1969 .096 -.831 -.776 .375 .236 .867 1970 .420 -.936 -.749 .737 .736 .791 1971 .449 -.926 -.759 .562 .624 .750 1972 .464 -.861 -.778 .610 .632 .740 Honduras 1963-1968 .038 -.871 -.619 .025 -.411 .573 .558 1969 -.069 -.577 -.729 .567 -.037 .659 .444 1970 -.119 -.274 -.561 .499 -.123 .497 .082
1971 -.062 -.277 -.583 .107 .066 .511 .118 191 1972 Le 22. Conc'd
CUBA HAI DOM JAM TRI HEXCUA HON ELS NIC PAN COL VEN ECU PER BRA BOL PAR CHL ARG El Salvador 1963-1968 .860 -.428 .838 .746 -.133 .749 .510 .154 1969 .030 -.459 -.716 -.504 .038 .643 .395 .972 1970 -.028 -.201 -.553 -.451 -.071 .485 .064 .972 1971 -.040 -.198 -.508 -.290 -.085 .370 .053 .943 1972 -.030 -.197 -.507 -.216 -.011 .332 .072 .878 Nicaragua 1963-1968 .399 -.904 -.917 .646 -.054 .865 .890 .765 .607 1969 .301 -.919 -.933 .150 -.018 .902 .892 .644 .57 4 1970 .497 -.962 -.920 .572 .529 .904 .923 .343 .303 1971 .545 -.862 -.916 .680 .670 .926 .886 .392 .240 1972 Panama 1963-1968 .787 -.539 -.900 .811 -.087 .668 .643 .382 .819 .821 1969 .345 -.609 -.908 -.153 .001 .773 .605 .874 .898 .806 1970 .492 -.740 -.931 .273 .398 .833 .707 .663 .686 .857 1971 .431 -.345 -.651 .823 .793 .800 . 465 .445 .236 .751 1972 .447 -.469 -.682 .842 .776 .799 .517 .525 .246 .735 Colombia 1963-1968 .020 .708 -.607 .669 .179 .809 .849 .281 522 .596 .367 1969 .030 -.537 -.382 .612 .170 .588 .750 -.062 060 .444 .084 1970 .301 -.786 -.576 .787 .575 .714 .842 -.134 129 .705 .403 1971 .305 -.181 -.405 .898 .806 .661 .337 .168 073 .585 .926 1972 .308 -.167 -.402 .804 .615 .542 .336 .171 069 .437 .885 Venezuela 1963-1968 .317 -.892 -.883 .724 .069 .867 .952 .688 579 .984 .796 .685 1969 .282 -.895 -.329 .402 .082 .843 .954 .415 344 .954 .637 .619 1970 .386 -.810 -.846 .511 .308 .857 .715 .340 276 .870 .689 .664 1971 .442 -.575 -.772 .808 .694 .894 .616 .368 147 .870 .866 .808 1972 .456 -.650 -.791 .837 .726 .881 .655 .471 163 .829 .883 .765 Ecuador 1963-1968 -.347 -.407 -.192 .568 .612 .484 .722 -.008 109 .329 .085 .827 .483 1969 -.265 -.551 -.607 -.211 .399 .694 .668 .794 817 .581 .719 .372 .494 1970 .093 -.764 -.723 .328 .685 .784 .807 .515 536 .772 .809 .638 .576 1971 .223 -.646 -.741 .633 .805 .855 .758 .524 405 .832 .801 .664 .746 1972 .247 -.813 -.677 .734 .902 .911 .696 .639 321 .922 .754 .472 .740 Peru 1963-1968 .768 -.592 -.909 .827 .054 .801 .719 .378 873 .850 .966 .484 .832 .202 1969 .713 -.633 -.849 .481 .067 .791 .744 .351 382 .843 .724 .426 .845 .339 1970 .772 -.784 -.868 .691 .481 .849 .803 .200 228 .899 .810 .650 .842 .593
1971 .765 -.678 -.877 .777 .678 .896 .766 .271 162 .924 .780 .636 .879 .723 192 1972 .762 -.693 -.887 .796 .683 .858 .787 .368 ,176 .832 .803 .618 .892 .688 Table 22, Conc'd
CUBA UAI DOM JAM TRI HEX GUA HCtl ELS NIC PAN COL VEN ECU PER BRA BOL PAR CHL ARC Brazil 1963-1968 .166 -.628 -.577 .683 .595 .812 .866 .330 .468 .742 .550 .684 .807 .695 .705 1969 .109 -.699 -.692 .213 .550 .857 .878 .523 .519 .804 .655 .539 .814 .739 .729 1970 .356 -.843 -.779 .571 .768 .839 .889 .301 .302 .894 .768 .739 .801 .850 .833 1971 .430 -.723 -.789 .727 .840 .924 .832 .354 .221 .920 .772 .657 .860 .898 .884 1972 .435 -.805 -.793 .795 .875 .939 .833 .496 .227 .915 .798 .588 .878 .894 .882 Bolivia 1963-1968 -.556 -.563 -.187 .262 .120 .228 .626 .431 -.252 .416 .050 .525 .514 .669 .008 .339 1969 -.557 -.595 -.291 .067 .130 .317 .653 .323 .204 .468 .227 .476 .546 .569 .073 .402 1970 .119 -.850 -.557 .621 .690 .574 .920 .045 -.010 .786 .557 .748 .554 .776 .546 .723 1971 .262 -.643 -.599 .825 .849 .734 .786 .166 -.0.3 .831 .797 .777 .732 .859 .710 .819 1972 -.383 .252 -.Sll -.540 .799 .911 .837 .647 .449 .039 .690 .454 .707 .938 .625 .808 Paraguay 1963-1968 .587 -.831 -.962 .671 -.114 .871 .811 .697 .741 .975 .897 .533 .938 .199 .926 .696 .217 1969 .461 -.861 -.963 .166 -.069 .907 .828 .633 .590 .982 .842 .388 .915 .518 .906 .769 .303 1970 .570 -.856 -.971 .434 .315 .929 .756 .488 .454 .942 .880 .570 .919 .655 .923 .822 .546 1971 .602 -.832 -.973 .465 .412 .894 .767 .514 .420 .928 .606 .374 .801 .676 .895 .812 .573 1972 .611 -.757 -.973 .501 .439 .813 .779 .545 .425 .780 .629 .375 .806 .597 .898 .791 .480 Chile 1963-1968 .294 -.859 -.789 .339 -.378 .865 .660 .683 .633 .707 .449 .727 .667 .254 .540 .435 .203 .714 1969 .253 -.873 -.776 .074 -.341 .855 .696 .453 .392 .739 .494 .644 .695 .399 .580 .514 .262 .744 1970 .443 -.915 -.838 .465 .279 .892 .797 .273 .228 .846 .657 .786 .727 .636 .734 .710 .635 .809 1971 .475 -.631 -.758 .800 .689 .910 .659 .322 .110 .851 .867 .835 .880 .779 .817 .808 .824 .721 1972 .464 - .447 -.714 .672 .466 .675 .616 .268 .106 .551 .797 .831 .796 .477 .760 .669 .399 .693 Argentina 1963-1968 .076 -.724 -.518 .240 .189 .857 .660 .532 .428 .604 .239 .674 .599 .450 .452 .738 .129 .581 .776 1969 .017 -.777 -.692 -.174 .187 .904 .703 .652 .610 .718 .588 .477 .630 .679 .515 .803 .238 .702 .786 1970 .307 -.891 -.777 .386 .606 .912 .847 .374 .347 .858 .728 .714 .665 .821 .711 .892 .685 .775 .872 1971 .285 -.837 -.723 .175 .367 .725 .821 .353 .349 .728 .259 .081 .413 .641 .569 .714 .463 .730 .536 1972 .249 -.528 -.625 .050 .121 .424 .711 .227 .326 .345 .169 .070 .298 .263 .466 .493 .071 .655 .534 Uruguay 1963-1968 -.442 .039 .231 -.135 .026 -.445 -.021 .179 -.613 .013 -.070 -.350 .042 -.031 -.246 -.166 .581 -.122 -.492 -.540 1969 -.421 -.175 -.166 -.388 .050 -.032 .151 .522 .429 • 26S .394 -.364 .173 .393 -.065 .108 .608 .166 -.244 -.099 1970 .005 -.593 -.440 .255 .526 .319 .649 .294 .229 .620 .604 .238 .352 .656 .362 .504 .807 .428 .269 .412 1971 .221 -.356 -.490 .780 .820 .620 .507 .319 .079 .700 .902 .853 .753 .778 .627 .696 .897 .460 .733 .184 1972 .252 -.486 -.538 .810 .802 .675 .557 .424 .100 .711 .914 .812 .786 .748 .668 .742 .751 .496 .667 .096 193 Table 23. European Defense Spending Correlations
United IRE NTH BEL LUX FRN SUZ SPN POR CXW GME POL AUS HUN CZE ITA ALB TOG GRC CYP TOR Kingdom
Ireland 1963-1968 .051 1969 -.058 1970 -.263 1971 -.180 197Z .418 Netherlands 1963-1968 .815 -.252 1969 -.247 -.103 1970 -.547 .136 1971 -.427 .543 1972 .148 .707 Belgium 1963-1968 .779 .156 .815 1969 -.015 .187 .850 1970 -.401 .349 .906 1971 -.357 .557 .917 1972 .183 .713 .942 Luxembourg 1963-1968 .108 .126 -.436 -.272 1969 .484 .051 -.635 -.461 1970 .631 -.120 -.732 -.610 1971 .600 -.314 -.739 -.661 1972 .351 -.284 -.664 -.600 France 1963-1968 .614 .412 .693 .842 .471 1969 .167 .423 .631 .822 .504 1970 .051 .435 .566 .720 .497 1971 .050 .389 .520 .693 .510 1972 .081 .323 .470 .617 .513 Switzerland 1963-1968 .220 .432 -.288 -.061 756 .040 1969 -.131 .442 .022 .101 450 .104 1970 -.335 .514 .248 .303 189 .140 1971 -.328 .495 .324 .362 106 .165 194 1972 -.176 .401 .309 .342 010 .167 Spain 1963-1968 .409 .309 .629 .817 633 .947 -.159 1969 -.204 .319 .737 .861 729 .909 .021 1970 -.444 .427 .804 .891 790 .850 .196 1971 -.400 .587 .839 .913 813 .315 .268 1972 .078 .689 .873 .929 762 .756 .270 Table 23. Cont'd
United IRE NTH BEL LUX FRN SWZ SPN POR CMW GME POL AUS HUN CZE IXA ALB TOG GRC CYP TUR Kingdom
Portugal 1963-1968 .569 .232 .783 .884 -.637 .952 -.246 .966 1969 -.071 .254 .810 .908 -.719 .929 -.074 .972 1970 -.410 .391 .875 .938 -.790 .827 .157 .974 1971 -.325 .668 .924 .941 -.785 .726 .254 .960 1972 .167 .763 .944 .956 -.720 .660 .254 .967 West Germany 1963-1968 -.354 -.476 -.359 -.794 .236 -.648 .137 -.720 .710 1969 -.086 -.484 -.351 -.753 .273 -.657 .086 -.689 .693 1970 .123 -.534 -.443 -.748 .367 -.659 -.032 -.717 .710 1971 .122 -.282 -.279 -.610 .315 -.636 -.010 -.596 .493 1972 .434 .176 .071 -.175 .229 -.517 .026 -.237 .119 East Germany 1963-1968 .357 .371 .577 .808 -.647 .839 -.370 .918 .927 -.869 1969 -.414 .341 .782 .849 -.762 .743 -.045 .920 .908 -.721 1970 -.642 .463 .863 .905 -.820 .660 .194 .932 .939 -.725 1971 -.557 .643 .896 .927 -.832 .633 .272 . 946 .949 -.574 1972 .013 .740 .921 .944 -.768 .534 .271 .957 .961 -.193 Poland 1963-1968 .560 .436 .650 .910 -.467 .927 -.132 .934 .952 -.875 .959 1969 -.357 .380 .826 .907 -.654 .789 .130 .923 .915 -.709 .979 1970 -.599 .490 .838 .940 -.744 .704 .318 .936 .943 -.719 .936 1971 -.460 .732 .934 .937 -.744 .620 .376 .927 .965 -.482 .975 1972 .219 .850 .951 .951 -.624 .516 .333 .924 .962 -.000 .965 Austria 1963-1968 .650 -.212 .603 .766 .103 .493 .231 .489 .496 -.451 .334 .494 1969 -.061 -.135 .714 .820 -.174 .526 .339 .610 .602 -.459 .540 .648 1970 -.185 -.050 .682 .767 -.251 .535 .388 .626 .606 -.492 .551 .635 1971 -.183 .101 .632 .749 -.292 .546 .411 .631 .578 -.464 .558 .592 1972 .155 .331 .696 .788 -.302 .529 .406 .692 .652 -.184 .635 .663 Hungary 1963-1968 -.354 -.243 -.347 -.386 .183 -.707 -.473 -.616 .526 .062 -.272 -.421 -.428 1969 -.633 -.138 .200 .004 -.172 -.445 -.196 -.157 .135 -.029 .227 .162 -.039 1970 -.796 .245 .621 .541 -.489 -.010 .249 .358 .451 -.269 .619 .580 .173 195 1971 -.596 .619 .781 .671 -.558 .018 .325 .536 .679 -.134 .735 .762 .246 1972 .031 .745 .844 .764 -.518 .050 .312 .644 .763 .164 .802 .835 .393 Czechoslovakia 1963-1968 .858 .402 .740 .931 -.126 .887 .177 .760 .834 -.713 .729 .886 .630 -.497 1969 .178 .411 .736 .931 -.283 .887 .264 .790 .855 -.711 .735 .831 .685 -.186 1970 .120 .394 .594 .753 -.261 .883 .254 .707 .718 -.688 .601 .687 .674 -.064 1971 .097 .626 .730 .814 -.382 .808 .325 .774 .810 -.521 .710 .792 .654 .324 1972 .470 .768 .814 .871 -.361 .698 .306 .824 .862 -.083 .786 .865 .712 .528 Table 23. Cont'd
United IRE NTH BELLUX FRN SVZ SPN POR CMWCUE POL AUS HUN CZE ITA ALB YUG GRC CYP TUR Kingdom
Italy 1963-1968 .419 .673 .336 .710 -.205 .892 .329 .851 .763 -.715 .740 .850 .454 -.706 .797 1969 .105 .678 .349 .689 -.257 .894 .359 .809 .751 -.721 .641 .704 .471 -.481 .793 1970 -.161 .718 • 4S1 .731 -.383 .870 .447 .836 .783 -.748 .696 .745 .507 .117 .747 , 1971 -.115 .870 .716 .787 -.482 .693 .457 .839 .873 -.443 .780 .861 .473 .544 .826 1972 .489 .936 .807 .843 -.382 .506 .353 .833 .876 .121 .814 .918 .573 .702 .878 Albania 1963-1968 .247 -.040 .579 .534 -.684 .398 -.812 .496 .628 -.586 .747 .608 .027 .299 .386 .126 1969 -.755 .092 .788 .596 -.659 .309 .098 .591 .573 -.285 .804 .798 .466 .613 .428 .187 1970 -.854 .304 .875 .765 -.745 .300 .330 .704 .735 -.397 .880 .872 .474 .828 .319 .382 1971 -.578 .692 .923 .801 -.708 .299 .373 .752 .847 -.190 • S82 .925 .443 .909 .585 .717 1972 .047 .791 .946 .858 -.643 .288 .354 .808 .858 .127 .911 .942 .548 .934 .711 .801 Yugoslavia 1963-1968 .116 .201 .277 .526 -.384 .290 -.593 .427 .487 -.822 .738 .618 .102 .435 .370 .240 .853 1969 -.549 .214 .648 .673 -.607 .351 -.165 .616 .622 -.661 .868 .815 .407 .659 .490 .280 .853 1970 -.647 .324 .718 .737 -.682 .367 .015 .689 .700 -.696 .878 .843 .451 .642 .457 .388 .840 1971 -.559 .567 .801 .799 -.719 .382 .123 .758 .789 -.546 .910 .883 .473 .752 .608 .600 .861 1972 .445 .809 .803 .798 -.422 .242 .120 .721 .769 .208 .809 .889 .542 .771 .743 .848 .819 Greece 1963-1963 .468 .314 .697 .829 -.679 .949 -.257 .980 .990 -.723 .950 .953 .450 -.525 .789 .797 .625 .504 1969 -.374 .298 .845 .861 -.781 .817 .036 .957 .947 -.613 .974 .976 .586 .084 .774 .678 .786 .753 1970 -.616 .431 .902 .912 -.834 .719 .253 .959 .964 -.643 .983 .984 .587 .564 .633 .724 .869 .796 1971 -.526 .638 .928 .932 -.840 .677 .323 .964 .970 -.492 .987 .979 .585 .710 .739 .807 .885 .851 1972 .037 .741 .945 .949 -.771 .620 .315 .971 .977 -.125 .990 .969 .657 .784 .809 .834 .914 .789 Cyprus 1963-1968 .847 .452 .469 .665 .396 .548 .528 .312 .410 -.462 .298 .534 .521 -.320 .843 .565 .034 .120 .346 1969 .551 .442 .288 .547 .369 .521 .483 .239 .339 -.448 .174 .330 .428 -.297 .768 .546 -.051 .037 .206 1970 .364 .443 .279 .485 .283 .526 .478 .251 .327 -.452 .190 .317 .435 -.060 .767 .538 .025 .069 .216 1971 .350 .474 .369 .533 .178 .538 .506 .330 .405 -.411 .287 .398 .459 .126 .760 .542 .205 .187 .311 1972 .396 .485 .423 .557 .154 .538 .508 .387 .453 -.236 .352 .440 .498 .221 .734 .516 .288 .282 .373 Turkey 1963-1968 .633 .445 .705 .896 -.469 .940 -.131 .904 .954 -.809 .933 .985 .432 -.427 .914 .819 .627 .574 .950 .588 1969 -.115 .433 .794 .923 -.615 .896 .053 .928 .961 -.758 .936 .961 .572 -.004 .913 .774 .640 .715 .945 .469 1970 -.434 .529 .863 .947 -.713 .804 .251 .943 .973 -.763 .956 .973 .583 .494 .770 .802 .771 .770 .962 .436 196 1971 -.301 .785 .919 .915 -.695 .644 .325 .902 .975 -.448 .933 .980 .523 .739 .839 .907 .896 .825 .944 .473 1972 .267 .869 .944 .940 -.606 .553 .301 .914 .976 -.010 .943 .908 .614 .819 .894 .930 .926 .953 Bulgaria .845 .502 1963-1968 .877 .314 .621 .200 .872 .700 .390 .558 .620 -.649 .507 .717 .781 -.423 .929 .696 .154 .256 .551 .919 .721 1969 -.108 .311 .781 .902 -.190 .671 .431 .687 .711 -.593 .713 .835 .834 .076 .900 .640 .626 .586 .740 .684 .305 1970 -.580 .448 .856 .905 -.486 .471 .561 .732 .798 -.557 .818 .865 .634 .754 .524 .636 .834 .639 .829 .453 .837 1971 -.357 .773 .906 .859 -.533 .392 .504 .753 .874 -.269 .830 .915 .521 .872 .699 .842 .931 . 740 .347 .467 .927 1972 .384 .891 .913 . 882 -.413 .306 .382 .780 .874 .230 .842 .944 .601 .884 .809 .931 .918 .896 .855 .466 .990 Table 23. Cont'd
United IRE NTH BEL LUX FRN SUE SPN POR CKW GMEPOL AUS HUN CZE ITA ALB YUG GRC CYP TUR Kingdom
Rumania 1963-1968 -.575 -.479 -.619 -.727 .443 -.978 -.130 -.887 .886 .517 -.747 -.846 -.369 .778 -.834 -.8S0 -.288 .142 -.893 -.536 -.929 1969 -.559 -.423 -.209 -.458 .202 -.848 -.027 -.587 .626 .447 -.313 -.356 -.169 .780 -.644 -.781 .217 .123 -.403 -.529 -.564 1970 -.705 -.152 .191 .018 -.102 -.649 .179 -.183 .133 .207 .111 .070 -.024 .779 -.531 -.420 .508 .314 .045 -.400 -.096 1971 -.683 .093 .306 .137 -.175 -.586 .225 -.043 .059 .224 .222 .218 .023 .732 -.291 -.093 .518 .392 .173 -.309 .124 1972 .155 .531 .562 .456 -.186 -.379 .210 .282 .382 .485 .474 .563 .275 .814 .223 .472 .685 .740 .448 -.065 .485 Finland 1953-1968 .288 -.059 .717 .710 -.858 .712 -.652 .843 .886 -.619 .888 .791 .325 -.217 .532 .454 .827 .637 .836 .016 .798 1969 -.073 -.027 .686 .732 -.848 .727 -.509 .842 .887 -.627 .813 .734 .408 -.011 .577 .475 .477 .625 .808 -.002 .781 1970 -.326 .125 .752 .785 -.878 .703 -.265 .873 .903 -.666 .844 .788 .453 .375 .531 .556 .607 .690 .841 .035 .825 1971 -.268 .504 .843 .838 -.861 .645 -.083 .894 .937 -.481 .886 .866 .466 .618 .630 .735 .765 .780 .888 .176 . 834 1972 .421 .764 .876 .871 -.631 .474 -.003 .865 .912 .101 .875 .920 .568 .743 .799 .884 .827 .907 .880 .280 .918 Sweden 1963-1968 .484 .704 .248 .629 .063 .794 .578 .687 .606 -.591 .538 .713 .483 -.734 .779 .958 -.105 .052 .620 .693 .726 1969 .076 .705 .337 .649 -.072 .805 .607 .697 .632 -.602 .542 .655 .525 -.452 .792 .957 .202 .206 .598 .657 .698 1970 -.327 .738 .574 .772 -.326 .720 .676 .775 .753 -.637 .702 .772 .543 .344 .659 .937 .527 .391 .738 .584 .795 1971 -.197 .892 .774 .783 -.441 .531 .564 .769 ,850 -.296 .765 .870 .460 .691 .766 .966 .-810 .611 .797 .537 .910 1972 .129 .844 .800 .80S -.441 .518 .550 .802 .866 -.062 .798 .852 .532 .736 .790 .864 .830 . 58S .823 .563 .694 Norway 1963-1968 .531 .704 .477 .762 -.324 .888 .048 .816 .835 -.798 .863 .929 .257 -.420 .868 .877 .487 .520 .859 .634 .932 1969 -.283 .609 .709 .825 -.547 .807 .230 .863 .860 -.700 .920 .956 .476 .093 .850 .772 .709 .737 .918 .450 .956 1970 -.491 .666 .781 .863 -.647 .765 .363 .893 .891 -.728 .930 .958 .512 .451 .763 .806 .773 .786 .929 .437 .962 1971 -.445 .724 .819 .890 -.691 .742 .413 .914 .898 -.610 .943 .939 .531 .593 .813 .815 .787 .830 .940 .491 .909 1972 .031 .767 .854 .908 -.659 .697 .402 .930 .917 -.264 .953 .926 .606 .681 .848 .809 .830 .738 .950 .528 .914 Denmark 1963-1968 .451 .439 .590 .830 -.546 .829 -.319 .864 .904 -.893 .983 .966 .316 -.209 .790 .731 .764 .771 .919 .426 .931 1969 -.125 .439 .684 .865 -.648 .822 -.139 .892 .922 -.857 .943 .921 .458 .095 .818 .719 .599 .794 .899 .355 .963 1970 -.207 .466 .638 .783 -.645 .824 -.061 .856 .847 -.858 .846 .838 .478 .199 .809 .723 .541 .785 .812 .364 .384 1971 -.166 .708 .781 .834 -.677 .723 .088 .877 .907 -.607 .886 .903 .479 .533 .870 .842 .747 .846 .869 .433 .928 1972 .175 .737 .815 .856 -.655 .690 .108 .896 .918 -.290 .902 .888 .556 .622 .880 .805 .790 .717 .888 .475 .917 197 Table 23. Cont'd
BUT, RUM FIN SU’D NOR
Rumania 1963-1968 -.629 1959 -.290 1970 .305 1971 .384 1972 .703 Finland 1963-1958 .281 -.610 1969 .386 -.475 1970 .550 -.134 1971 .736 .046 1972 .886 .540 Sweden 1963-1968 .757 -.807 .206 1969 .725 -.678 .259 1970 .811 -.157 .439 1971 .932 .118 .683 1972 .840 .325 .688 Norway 1963-1968 .682 -.867 .587 .790 1969 .806 -.453 .615 .744 1970 .785 -.090 .691 .806 1971 .775 .033 .759 .779 1972 .782 .317 .774 .811 Denmark 1963-1968 .582 -.740 .828 .556 .909 1969 .682 -.506 .838 .589 .910 1970 .521 -.327 .820 .574 .875 1971 .743 -.086 .885 .769 • 8S7 1972 .742 .210 .830 .800 .905 198 Table 24. African Defense Spending Correlations
Morocco ALG TUN L3Y SUD MLI CEN Algeria 1963-1968 -.217 1969 -.098 1970 -.138 1971 -.311 1972 -.460 Tunisia 1963-1968 .661 .203 1969 .718 .232 1970 .790 .034 1971 .868 -.195 1972 .922 -.385 Libya 1963-1968 .422 .722 .795 1969 .697 .461 .698 1970 .769 .128 .921 1971 .758 .020 .861 1972 .820 -.165 .883 Sudan 1963-1958 .323 .849 .585 .938 1969 .566 .758 .663 .882 1970 .730 .419 .869 .938 1971 .836 .040 .923 .839 1972 .862 -.133 .913 .873 Hall 1963-1968 -.547 .543 -.539 -.033 .188 1969 -.726 .336 -.628 -.570 -.253 1970 -.781 .347 -.659 -.618 .468 1971 -.456 .225 -.334 -.505 -.143 1972 .239 -.147 .338 .073 .247 Senegal 1963-1968 -.138 .813 .567 .783 .743 .139 1969 .049 .812 .603 .595 .733 -.059 1970 .159 .766 .493 .466 .633 -.142 1971 .268 .613 .524 .502 .609 -.072
1972 .347 .467 .533 .538 .633 .127 199 Dahomey 1963-1968 -.357 .721 .429 .607 .542 .114 1969 -.131 .724 .475 .495 .564 -.064 1970 .046 .665 .471 .466 .561 -.170 .960 1971 .205 .499 .530 .507 .584 -.085 1972 .321 .345 .559 .557 .623 .148 Table 24. Cont'd
Morocco ALG TUN LBY SUD ML! SEN DAH MAU NIR IVO GUI UPP LBR SIE GHA TOG CAO NIG GAB CEN Mauritania 1963-1968 .432 -.756 -.342 -.591 .527 -.220 -.923 -.980 1969 .336 -.752 -.318 -.300 .434 -.164 -.895 -.955 1970 .312 -.753 -.117 -.090 .241 -.174 -.860 -.901 1971 .294 -.729 -.044 -.067 .122 -.149 -.814 -.841 1972 .029 -.530 -.233 -.201 .238 -.322 -.825 -.853 Niger 1963-1968 -.576 .282 -.255 -.158 .003 .091 .353 .463 -.375 1969 -.564 .251 -.305 -.244 .114 .192 .287 .397 -.366 1970 -.516 .258 -.238 -.196 .143 .212 .260 .356 -.370 1971 -.439 .256 -.210 -.200 .131 .194 .242 .330 -.372 1972 -.200 .151 -.011 -.068 .019 .287 .280 .368 -.411 Ivory Coast 1963-1568 -.108 .861 .564 .839 .799 .173 .985 .932 -.925 .249 1969 .086 .855 .606 .638 .785 -.048 .986 .935 -.891 .183 1970 .264 .758 .600 .596 .750 -.190 .976 .938 -.811 .138 1971 .415 .535 . 664 .634 .756 -.078 .970 .941 -.726 .114 1972 .513 .342 .689 .684 .786 .203 .957 .944 -.753 .176 Guinea 1963-1968 .247 .838 .376 .830 .922 .463 .581 .374 -.421 -.228 .671 1969 .379 .827 .451 .666 .897 .133 .613 .419 -.402 -.268 .699 1970 .550 .662 .628 .713 .887 -.104 .626 .484 -.318 -.277 .743 1971 .629 .451 .684 .738 .846 -.001 .654 .536 -.269 -.272 .777 1972 .593 .346 .620 .722 .825 .132 .667 .555 -.306 -.224 .780 Upper Volta 1963-1968 .448 .515 .568 .807 .719 .157 .411 .233 -.316 -.650 .530 .831 1969 .616 .502 .646 .785 .799 -.221 .470 .317 -.276 -.648 .578 .840 1970 .742 .342 .776 .821 .868 -.410 .497 .405 -.187 -.575 .645 .881 1971 .811 .110 .833 .824 .883 -.223 .539 .478 -.127 -.521 .703 .894 1972 .838 -.067 .846 .858 .905 .189 .572 .530 -.238 -.370 .741 .872 Liberia 1963-1968 .387 -.643 -.316 -.511 .453 .047 -.817 -.908 .909 -.518 -.822 -.248 .138 1969 .381 -.618 -.241 -.142 .294 -.046 -.753 -.847 .900 -.529 -.749 -.193 .054 1970 .538 -.593 .278 .344 .174 -.231 -.554 -.599 .825 -.509 -.459 .080 .233 1971 .709 -.652 .562 .431 .532 -.017 -.270 -.272 .689 -.423 -.106 .285 .462 1972 .692 -.678 .572 .485 .572 .177 -.193 -.187 .561 -.347 -.015 .316 .511 200 Sierra Leone 1963-1968 -.340 -.350 -.066 -.314 .483 -.557 -.068 .173 -.160 .285 -.083 .656 .435 -.456 1969 .207 -.180 .210 .459 .088 -.746 .118 .280 -.139 .082 .122 -.256 .056 -.254 1970 .552 -.191 .747 .836 .638 -.741 .240 .377 -.034 .025 .351 .266 .500 .237 1971 .737 -.374 .857 .756 .819 -.314 .335 .456 .029 -.046 .490 .435 .654 .577 1972 .697 -.420 .769 .751 .813 -.037 .368 .487 -.039 .002 .523 .456 .670 .600 Table 24, Conc'd
Morocco ALG TUN LBY SUD MLI SEN DAU MAU NIR IVO GUI UPP LBR SIE GHA TOG CAO NIG GAB CEH Ghana 1963-1968 .653 .348 .856 .817 693 -.108 .524 .308 -.258 -.443 .539 .650 .760 -.049 -.537 1969 .503 .351 .807 .445 592 -.112 .518 .310 -.258 -.443 .531 .631 .678 -.042 -.371 -1970 .407 .356 .365 .149 335 -.070 .488 .278 -.261 -.433 .469 .510 .503 -.071 -.279 1971 .227 .335 .177 .097 125 -.108 .429 .217 -.269 -.421 .372 .409 .355 -.156 -.307 1972 .030 .433 -.023 -.027 008 -.241 .354 .143 -.180 -.449 .266 .353 .216 -.204 -.342 Togo 1963-1968 -.322 .766 .427 .632 604 .123 .970 .990 -.954 .531 .939 .415 .212 -.903 .114 .311 1969 -.117 .768 .467 .492 605 -.045 .971 . .990 -.934 .468 .941 .452 .287 -.848 .225 .313 1970 .074 .698 .489 .487 605 -.164 .969 .990 -.872 .418 .946 .523 .396 -.581 .367 .277 1971 .292 .462 .599 .539 676 -.044 .958 .984 -.768 .367 .953 .592 .512 -.168 .520 .186 1972 .499 .196 .711 .645 744 .336 .929 .961 -.788 .417 .948 .595 .610 -.024 .550 .030 Caneroun 1963-1968 .685 .475 .568 .791 806 .110 .296 .034 -.049 -.546 .389 .866 .877 .079 -.683 .802 .072 1969 .780 .466 .648 .786 862 -.261 .376 .149 -.046 -.558 .462 .866 .910 .133 -.092 .709 .171 1970 .837 .354 .713 .757 863 -.412 .425 .256 -.010 -.530 .549 .899 .929 .328 .344 .582 .278 1971 .864 .149 .771 .776 859 -.251 .476 .344 .022 -.495 .619 .912 .942 .500 .525 .448 .409 1972 .892 -.060 .825 .828 883 .221 .516 .420 -.129 -.320 .671 .871 .952 .544 .554 .272 . 546 Nigeria 1963-1968 .737 .390 .886 .853 793 -.302 .549 .319 -.218 -.170-. .551 .614 .591 -.176 -.425 .888 .375 .775 1969 .799 .269 .637 .965 792 -.681 .448 .339 -.096 -.244 .467 .527 .671 .044 .475 .406 .345 .745 1970 .852 .181 .735 .836 825 -.745 .486 .417 -.054 -.256 .554 .643 .762 .261 .642 .316 .433 .806 1971 .819 .071 .718 .848 757 -.627 .51? .461 -.032 -.257 .595 .674 .772 .363 .621 .258 .489 .816 1972 .825 -.078 . 744 .868 794 -.102 .554 .512 -.140 -.154 .644 .682 .806 .419 . 644 .149 .576 .843 Gabon 1963-1968 -.208 .940 -.011 .585 774 .737 .585 .466 -.537 .125 .657 .880 .543 -.380 -.541 .272 .514 .542 .260 1969 .331 .731 .271 .829 854 -.076 .573 .481 -.376 -.055 .634 .805 .689 -.168 .201 .221 .500 .695 .733 1970 .580 .468 .676 .884 922 -.334 .558 .524 -.237 -.101 .676 .851 .808 .200 .629 .114 .554 .777 .804 1971 .744 .095 .812 .817 958 -.072 .564 . 564 -.128 -.102 .713 .834 .851 .532 .805 -.024 .644 .810 .755 1972 .822 -.121 .864 .862 963 .354 .588 .603 -.262 .027 .747 .792 .879 .569 .784 -.139 .732 .857 .792 Central African Republic 1963-1968 .461 .639 .872 .966 888 -.120 .810 .631 -.569 .071 .824 .729 .688 -.473 -.331 .876 .662 .721 .921 .465 1969 .679 .555 .858 .935 926 -.495 .754 .613 -.413 -.180 .775 .728 .780 -.267 .254 .686 .625 .805 .888 .720 1970 .758 .441 .795 .803 889 -.592 .752 .649 -.353 -.201 .806 .789 .831 .003 .505 .572 .667 .849 .913 .783 1971 .812 .212 .835 .813 884 -.397 .760 .683 -.282 -.197 .835 .820 .868 .283 .638 .431 .726 .878 .905 .822 1972 .774 .093 .775 .813 880 -.056 .774 .705 -.337 -.131 .846 .826 .869 .329 .658 .347 .739 .867 .908 .812 201 Chad 1963-1968 .473 .660 .747 .937 892 .129 .688 .472 -.457 -.308 .734 .872 .851 -.255 -.578 .928 .491 .870 .854 .597 .932 1969 .611 .638 .789 .808 910 -.202 .708 .514 -.411 -.356 .753 .881 .884 -.168 -.085 .848 .524 .898 .726 .695 .922 1970 .752 .390 .836 .884 953 -.423 .649 .545 -.256 -.320 .755 .896 .924 .208 .515 .564 .568 .905 .797 .835 .912 1971 .838 .094 .926 .851 962 -.184 .652 .591 -.165 -.284 .784 .891 .936 .496 .710 .358 .656 .914 .780 .395 .924 1972 .871 -.100 .923 .835 969 .249 .668 .628 -.281 -.144 .809 .857 .950 .541 .714 .201 .733 .934 .813 .919 .909 Table 24. Cont'd
Morocco ALG TUN LBYSUD MLI SEN DAH MAU NIR IVOGUI UPP LBR SIE CHA TOG CA0 RIG GAB CEN Congo 1963-1968 -.148 .682 .277 .648 .568 .383 .586 .563 -.694 -.317 .700 .694 .801 -.522 -.090 .396 .504 .473 .187 .656 .489 1969 -.328 .590 .102 -.009 .227 .504 .439 .429 -.645 -.222 .531 .502 .464 -.529 -.300 .353 .384 .192 -.254 .164 .106 1970 -.156 .554 .221 .169 .296 .364 .463 .458 -.619 -.234 .557 .526 .'484 -.369 -.016 .331 .418 .261 -.119 .252 .183 1971 -.081 .493 .216 .182 .262 .370 .466 .459 -.611 -.236 .543 .514 .457 -.243 .041 .314 .412 .266 -.095 .236 .196 1972 -.214 .535 -.005 .039 .120 .050 .383 .363 -.490 -.276 .416 .448 .293 -.287 -.014 .352 .234 .108 -.176 .068 .120 Zaire 1963-1968 -.189 .847 .199 .684 .700 .569 .653 .589 -.704 -.171 .755 .831 .772 -.506 -.297 .405 .565 .542 .241 .850 .533 1969 -.093 .848 .217 .417 .621 .377 .652 .591 -.702 -.184 .748 .814 .708 -.488 -.161 .407 .569 .508 .181 .649 .459 1970 .290 .592 .620 .705 .790 .004 .630 .613 -.509 -.200 .767 .861 .815 -.049 .428 .271 .610 .651 .431 .795 .606 1971 .473 .343 .711 .729 .817 .115 .655 .653 -.422 -.197 .802 .881 .854 .242 .585 .168 .678 .717 .491 .827 .685 1972 .562 .169 .728 .766 .840 .331 .678 .682 -.482 -.107 .824 .874 .872 .306 .611 .075 .724 .756 .555 .842 .710 Uganda 1963-1968 .358 .789 .665 .977 .956 .130 .730 .549 -.568 -.215 .812 .918 .869 -.467 -.391 .759 .573 .840 .767 .710 .899 1969 .564 .729 .724 .870 .968 -.255 .733 .576 -.436 -.2eo .807 .906 .904 -.326 .102 .668 . 5S8 ■ S83 . 749 .798 .921 1970 .654 .620 .695 .738 .889 -.382 .741 .617 -.419 -.292 .834 .920 .907 -.078 .381 .579 .634 .903 .795 .813 .934 1971 .629 .505 .649 .749 .758 -.315 .752 .634 -.397 -.294 .831 .911 .870 .058 .396 .531 .646 .832 .802 .721 .904 1972 .777 -.131 .810 .721 .698 .587 .529 .510 -.439 .065 .645 .554 .729 .248 .365 .024 .680 .774 .662 . 740 .618 Kenya 1963-1968 .866 .391 .707 .946 .853 -.037 .672 -.663 .859 -.647 .926 .810 .829 .637 -.726 .935 -.337 .962 .873 .370 .932 1969 .831 .364 .739 .655 .835 -.235 .709 -.459 -.806 -.675 .928 .825 .841 .681 -.313 .879 -.241 .949 .625 .470 .840 1970 .809 .240 .585 .519 .693 -.316 .731 -.194 .757 -.681 .835 .821 .811 .621 .030 .804 -.031 .931 .655 .510 .838 1971 .813 -.016 .640 .557 .698 -.202 .767 .066 .782 -.666 .819 .843 .832 .633 .261 .655 .233 • 93S .680 .580 .854 1972 .885 -.351 .790 . 6S0 .765 .369 .805 .378 .203 -.390 .874 .737 .851 .670 .322 .324 .592 .941 .718 .715 .797 Tanzania 1963-1968 .430 .768 .699 .932 .978 .075 .720 .520 -.514 -.166 . 7S9 .905 .821 -.434 -.427 .780 .561 .856 .835 .682 .926 1969 .550 .750 .744 .785 .959 .021 .792 .619 -.574 -.114 .852 .914 .848 -.348 -.038 .737 .587 .875 .669 .713 .896 1970 .716 .467 .870 .878 .977 -.419 .671 .573 -.302 -.225 .789 .917 .903 .095 .533 .481 .611 .889 .761 .846 .894 1971 .817 -.037 .903 .706 .971 -.021 .568 .546 -.111 -.161 .718 .785 .849 .555 .805 .137 .646 .810 .636 .907 .824 1972 .887 -.259 .941 .784 .959 .455 .577 .579 -.270 .009 .738 .717 .867 .576 .752 -.036 .742 .856 .693 .931 .785 Burundi 1963-1968 .227 .892 .541 .933 .982 .308 .775 .591 -.603 -.058 .839 .956 .780 -.469 -.502 .700 .633 .795 .719 .833 .868 1969 .364 .878 .596 .714 .943 .021 .792 .619 -.574 -.114 .852 .961 .798 -.401 -.146 .678 .654 .809 .568 .774 .826 1970 .524 .728 .669 .706 .897 -.176 .785 .653 -.432 -.143 .871 .969 .843 -.105 .290 .568 .692 .851 .665 .817 .863 1971 .592 .533 .695 .731 .835 -.079 .799 .685 -.431 -.148 .885 .971 .854 .124 .424 .478 .729 .866 .693 .792 .875 1972 .661 .319 .729 .774 .860 .233 .807 .712 -.494 -.055 .899 .953 .876 .204 .465 .347 .772 .883 .735 .821 .881 202 Ruanda 1963-1968 -.395 .482 -.221 .199 .246 .226 .209 .293 -.434 .089 .330 .293 .262 -.581 .372 -.335 .282 .026 -.260 .475 -.027 1969 -.438 .440 -.282 -.092 .070 .309 .142 .232 -.422 .127 .250 .202 .110 -.590 .127 -.337 .223 -.091 -.303 .162 -.164 1970 -.337 .433 -.112 -.005 .OSO .261 .147 .235 -.418 .127 .250 .198 .115 -.502 .111 -.339 .226 -.057 -.241 .150 -.125 1971 -.132 .317 .056 .056 .210 .302 .194 .283 -.391 .110 .308 .260 .206 -.245 .235 -.362 .290 .045 -.167 .257 -.008 1972 .125 .143 .274 .216 .333 .453 .258 .350 -.455 .177 .389 .302 .325 -.134 .292 -.410 .403 .208 -.014 .390 .084 Table 24. Cont'd
CHACONCOP UGA KEN TAZ BUI RWA SOI ETH ZAM RHO SAT MAG Congo 1963-1958 .606 1959 .343 1970 .381 1971 .351 1972 .185 Zaire 1963-1958 .672 .953 1969 .637 .855 1970 .791 .778 1971 .835 .727 1972 .853 .578 Uganda 1963-1968 .930 .736 .791 1969 .943 .396 .717 1970 .905 .435 .765 1971 .832 .440 .757 1972 .746 -.030 .623 Kenya 1963-1968 .996 .335 .422 .916 1969 .987 .086 .387 .898 1970 .849 .119 .451 .898 1971 .840 .112 .533 .895 1972 .875 -.145 .610 .834 Tanzania 1963-1968 .936 .634 .709 .990 .927 1969 .945 .408 .636 .979 .935 1970 .971 .426 .819 .928 .800 1971 .928 .301 .782 .673 .679 1972 .935 .079 .790 .787 .805 Burundi 1963-1968 .913 .691 .813 .970 .876 .967 1969 .915 .500 .796 .948 .837 .969 1970 .906 .526 .838 .956 .873 .939 1971 .885 .520 .855 .950 .887 .771 1972 .900 .378 .873 .723 .885 .793 203 Ruanda 1963-1968 -.035 .616 .581 .315 -.302 .236 .285 1969 -.129 .639 .545 .147 -.366 .128 .195 1970 -.063 .635 .453 .152 -.354 .124 .194 1971 .079 .634 .494 .188 -.262 .251 .251 1972 .232 .488 .556 .395 .020 .403 .350 Table 24. Cont'd
Morocco ALG TUN L3Y SUD MLI SEN DAH MAU NIK IVO GUI UPP LBR SIE GHA TOG CAO NIG GAB CEN Somalia 1963-1968 .662 .347 .846 .858 .693 -.177 .463 .276 -.280 -.609 .535 .680 .909 -.137 -.353 .923 .256 .847 .806 .281 .831 1 9 6 9 -76s * " 7 .867 .813 .782 -.448 .514 .350 -.244 -.611 -.582 .716 .933 -.051 .116 .813 .324 . 8 8 8 .754 .540 ^875 1970 .843 .172 .928 .901 .899 -.585 .503 .428 -.126 -.489 .632 .789 .948 .299 .624 .513 .429 .890 .811 .760 .872 1971 .891 -.050 .946 .879 .918 -.341 .541 .499 -.067 -.434 .693 .815 .960 .532 .752 .340 .546 .909 .803 .836 !s99 1 9 7 2 -934 -.276 .969 .900 .916 .311 .551 .540 -.243 -.189 .715 .729 .940 .555 .703 .109 .674 .°20 SIC" SS-1 833 Echiopia 1963-1968 .391 .779 .661 .974 .963 .115 .703 .514 -.529 -.217 .787 .921 .863 -.443 -.405 .753 .544 .857 780 707 894 1 9 6 9 -578 .727 .721 .858 .971 -.251 .714 .548 -.459 -.281 .790 .913 .898 -.313 .077 .671 .566 .895 .740 .768 .913 “ 1 9 7 0 -616 -665 .603 .640 .825 -.336 .729 .582 -.424 -.294 .808 .899 .861 -.139 .267 .622 .602 . 8 6 6 755 747 907 1 9 7 1 -689 .437 .678 .674 .818 -.199 .746 .625 -.360 -.286 .836 .913 .883 .145 .453 .501 .664 .905 !?74 ^774 ^921 1 9 7 2 -7 7 7 -164 - 7 7 0 .751 -856 .262 .744 .655 -.448 -.136 .849 .867 .905 .245 .492 .310 .744 .927 .808 832 901 Zambia 1963-1968 .178 .198 .101 .149 .395 -.643 .127 .351 .239 .512 .191 -.489 -.385 -.373 .712 -.332 .545 -.153 .190 -.211 .093 1969 -.432 .585 -.227 -.727 -.464 .368 -.187 -.364 -.466 .469 -.288 -.493 -.5S0 -.844 -.464 -.120 .096 -.516 -.702 -.836 -.547 1970 .081 -.278 .465 .339 .405 -.048 .022 .275 .164 .295 .364 .282 .041 .095 .347 -.216 .447 -.003 -.188 .103 -.078 1 9 7 1 -589 -.835 .692 .284 .805 .217 .422 .693 .554 .028 .746 .529 .488 .768 .758 -.306 .797 .443 1 5 5 7 3 7 4 3 7 1972 - 7 7 2 --908 .841 .518 .808 .662 .562 .799 -.155 .194 .831 .389 .612 .706 .632 -.425 .912 .652 .350 .820 ^436 Rhodesia 1963-1968 .918 -.945 .950 .856 .908 - . 6 6 8 .972 .882 .994 .994 .971 .873 -.518 .205 -.413 .951 .998 .952 .9S6 -.864 . 5 3 9 1969 .853 -.776 .954 .488 .781 -.629 .974 .628 .887 .988 .962 . 8 6 8 -.272 .295 .022 .730 .925 .869 608 005 848 1970 .876 -.915 .967 .847 .923 -.685 .759 .861 .928 .905 .986 .874 .708 .743 .670 .045 .970 .911 6 6 6 017 S06 1971 .923 -.942 .975 .697 .963 -.220 .776 .928 .926 .906 .993 .898 .838 .885 .839 -.296 .981 .920 561 819 823 19 7 2 -957 -.969 .987 .762 .923 .447 .786 .940 .043 .937 .983 .600 .879 .799 .708 -.500 .987 .955 .598 .670 .696 South Africa 1963-1958 .219 .683 .791 .924 .797 .028 .880 .766 -.753 -.123 .906 .708 .744 -.581 -.227 .822 .751 .605 734 507 930 1969 .426 .663 .824 .791 .837 -.260 .876 .772 -.682 -.192 .904 .743 .743 -.464 .135 .759 .754 .692 . 6 6 8 629 916 1910 -430 .636 .559 .507 .659 -.296 .878 .775 -.664 -.203 .889 .712 .725 -.338 .199 .738 .756 .670 .646 561 872 19?1 -573 .381 .669 .559 .733 -.144 .871 .792 -.561 -.199 .903 .756 .784 .039 .444 .581 .798 .733 .678 670 898 1972 .623 .215 .684 .617 .763 .150 .877 .809 -.603 -.117 .913 .762. .808 .115 .479 .464 .816 .762 .715 .708 .904 Malagasy Republic 1963-1968 .398 .799 .662 .954 .992 .132 .748 .534 -.504 -.040 .792 .902 .726 -.411 -.511 .772 .594 .825 .855 .713 .930 1969 .591 .737 .722 .861 .993 -.253 .748 .564 -.432 -.134 .791 .893 .799 -.279 .026 .679 .606 .873 .730 800 941 1970 .570 .708 .509 .543 .763 -.292 .754 .578 -.417 -.146 .786 .843 .729 -.174 .139 .658 .617 .828 .746 6 P8 896 1971 .534 .611 .476 .555 .636 -.245 .758 .587 -.402 -.150 .774 .827 .696 -.051 .192 .621 .614 .798 .743 .598 .853 204 19 7 2 .516 .495 .462 .560 .637 .150 .877 .809 -.603 -.117 .913 .761 .692 -.007 .221 .558 .612 .770 .747 .591 .656 Table 24. Conc'd
CHA CON COP UGA KEN TAZ BUI RHA SOM ETH ZAM RHO SAP Somalia 1963-1968 .894 .594 .532 .833 .904 .822 .710 -.027 1969 .917 .291 .500 .878 .902 .848 .740 -.135 1970 .957 .341 .720 .850 .790 .923 .737 -.062 1971 .969 .326 .783 .806 .809 .884 .802 .068 1972 .958 .087 .785 .848 .886 .929 .810 .275 Ethiopia . 1963-1968 .924 .707 .768 .998 .906 .994 .965 .313 .828 1369 .940 .387 .704 .998 .899 .986 .951 .152 .873 1970 .847 .419 .701 .939 .905 .877 .940 158 .784 1971 .862 .413 .752 .968 .915 .781 .945 .229 .819 1972 .894 .226 .784 .817 .939 .840 .946 .362 .864 Zambia 1963-1968 -.328 -.471 -.605 .059 -.221 .199 -.020 .379 -.225 .134 1969 -.515 .300 -.132 -.477 -.330 -.167 -.221 .482 -.494 -.408 1970 .244 .297 .428 -.050 -.114 .464 .348 .349 .207 -.189 1971 .655 .032 .560 .044 .292 .917 .471 .244 .552 .405 1972 .743 -.280 .608 .738 .660 .944 .668 .394 .769 .684 Rhodesia 1963-1968 .964 -.989 -.994 .691 .997 .838 .970 -.743 .931 .684 .371 1969 .950 -.788 -.979 .657 .951 .848 .958 -.762 .875 .681 -.006 1970 .978 -.448 .236 .716 .654 .943 .985 -.449 .946 .449 .570 1971 .987 -.385 .482 .410 .668 .924 .917 -.154 .957 .635 .790 1972 .964 -.561 .553 .736 .845 .955 .942 .138 .977 .819 .897 Souch Africa 1963-1968 .901 .713 .713 .879 .935 .857 .843 .098 .820 .854 -.327 .987 1969 .921 .445 .678 .902 .923 .880 .858 -.008 .857 .883 -.564 .936 1970 .764 .461 .616 .876 .904 .733 .823 -.001 .697 .851 -.437 .263 1971 .815 .444 .692 .854 .894 .738 .841 .097 .765 .900 .453 .630 1972 .831 .331 .725 .643 .877 .746 .359 .198 .761 .898 .540 .683 Malagasy Republic 1963-1968 .929 .530 .653 .953 .911 .981 .971 .134 .744 .959 .229 .973 .830 1969 .943 .232 .600 .966 • 8S7 .973 .949 -.004 .813 .970 -.400 .912 .865 1970 .783 .255 .559 .935 .884 .802 .904 .003 .670 .963 -.350 .390 .868 1971 .708 .262 .556 .935 .855 .562 .891 .033 .633 .931 -.137 .156 .830 1972 .695 .209 .572 .558 .741 .539 .878 .090 .587 .880 -.053 .098 .829 205 Tabic 25. Middle Ease Defenbe Spending Correlations
Iran IRQ UAR SYR LEB JOR ISR YEM
Iraq 1963-1968 .753 1969 .875 1970 .902 1971 .913 1972 .873 Egypt 1963-1968 .085 .567 1969 .522 • S03 1970 .722 .752 1971 .649 .811 1972 .912 .817 Syria 1963-1968 .676 .698 .479 1969 .825 .841 .718 1970 .889 .857 .368 . 1971 .872 .880' .847 1972 .932 .841 .911 Lebanon 1963-1968 .754 .255 -.148 .621 1969 .828 .563 .274 .745 1970 .828 .627 .421 .732 1971 .790 .668 .496 .760 1972 .796 .714 .597 .769 Jordan 1963-1968 .904 .794 .278 .920 .726 1969 .951 .900 .634 .956 .809 1970 .866 .869 .463 .794 .812 1971 .766 .839 .463 .793 .819 1972 .691 .840 .482 .699 .819 Israel 1963-1968 .973 .735 .061 .753 .737 .947 1969 .979 .904 .565 .871 .804 .972 1970 .970 .888 .331 .939 .761 .787 1971 .971 .916 .881 .937 .77$ .752 1972 .940 .926 .892 .910 .80S .751 Saudi Arabia 1963-1968 .646 .097 -.559 .097 .567 .411 . 664 1969 .612 .243 -.236 .222 .589 .443 .583
1970 .563 .272 .002 .244 .592 .456 .483 206 1971 .604 .375 .214 .334 .630 .485 .553 1972 .798 .474 .644 .737 .582 .377 .601 Table 25. Cont'd
Iran IRQ UAR SYR LEB JOR ISR SAU YEM
Yemen 1963-1968 .040 -.439 -.710 -.564 .267 -.317 -.102 .435 1969 -.544 -.821 -.861 -.786 -.296 -.708 -.668 .063 1970 -.524 -.788 -.534 -.652 -.328 -.717 -.559 .736 1971 .173 -.161 .200 -,lt>3 -.020 -.374 .041 .241 1972 .527 .115 .518 .352 .227 -.153 .307 .654 Kuwait 1963-1968 .968 .669 -.039 .606 .700 .860 .977 .783 .034 1969 .964 .761 .354 .742 .786 .894 .939 .733 -.426 1970 .956 .810 .533 .777 .814 .875 .891 .533 -.446 1971 .915 .840 .619 .811 .832 .868 .898 .765 -.036 1972 .883 .862 .688 .805 .857 .863 .914 .635 .220 207 Table 26. Asian Defense Spending Correlations
Afghan GIN MON CHI KON KOS JAP IND PAX BUR CEY NEP TAI CAM LAO VTN VTS MAL PHI INS istan
People's Republic of China 1963-1968 .952 1969 .890 1970 .875 1971 .834 1972 .829 Mongolia 1963-1968 .643 .491 1969 .707 .822 1970 .757 .897 1971 .770 .930 1972 .764 .948 Republic of China 1963-1968 .935 .959 .681 1969 .527 .181 -.034 1970 .615 .430 .270 1971 .647 .672 .538 1972 .655 .768 .698 North Korea 1963-1968 .806 .691 .963 .841 1969 .852 .780 .894 .400 1970 .877 .842 .920 .542 1971 .885 .863 .932 .660 1972 .795 .650 .665 .406 South Korea 1963-1963 .753 .744 .867 .897 .936 1969 .797 .889 .938 .215 .928 1970 .826 .931 .961 .430 .946 1971 .784 .961 .964 .686 .921 1972 .754 .961 .973 .809 .597 Japan 1963-1968 .931 .892 .829 .969 .937 .934 1969 .914 .946 .913 .297 .937 .967 1970 .884 .971 .949 .509 .937 .974 1971 .883 .983 .960 .723 .922 .986 1972 .783 .973 .969 .834 .580 .991 India 1963-1968 -.450 -.623 -.277 -.678 -.382 -.604
1969 -.396 -.385 -.153 -.607 -.323 -.408 -.404 208 1970 -.100 .105 .223 -.225 .031 .032 1971 .247 .628 .594 .526 .421 .639 1972 .347 .732 .722 .690 .248 .765
I Table 26. Cont'd
Afghan CHN MON CHI KON KOS JAP IND TAK BUR CEY NEP TAI CAM LAO VTN VTS MAL PHI INS istan
Pakistan 1963-1968 .600 .583 .093 .512 .319 .287 .402 -.028 1969 .586 .464 .159 .396 .337 .289 .374 -.027 1970 .623 .507 .286 .460 .414 .380 .442 .113 1971 .668 .666 .494 .635 .548 .592 .626 .510 1972 .678 .762 .661 .768 .337 .743 .763 .672 Burma 1963-1968 -.498 -.384 -.881 .562 -.793 -.727 -.711 .458 .275 1969 -.541 -.424 -.676 .378 -.782 -.658 -.661 .444 .232 1970 -.437 -.221 -.434 .272 -.594 -.441 -.381 .444 .257 1971 -.248 .118 -.090 .082 -.297 -.004 .020 .548 .414 1972 -.121 .283 .141 .292 -.335 .233 .258 .627 .531 Ceylon 1963-1958 -.055 .020 .427 .259 .391 .582 .260 -.430 -.071 -.334 1969 .221 .445 .658 .055 .570 .736 .545 -.357 .013 -,a06 1970 .422 .695 .803 .269 .709 .840 .755 .114 .164 -.214 1971 .385 .743 .686 .679 .565 .796 .767 .905 .537 .369 1972 .457 .814 .784 .787 .370 .864 .645 .934 .688 .492 Nepal 1963-1968 -.512 -.744 .063 .636 -.165 -.412 -.458 .635 -.451 -.119 -.103 1969 -.441 -.443 .054 .579 -.128 -.262 -.308 .635 -.444 -.121 -.073 1970 -.413 -.344 .025 .526 -.123 -.225 -.240 .531 -.435 -.123 -.072 1971 -.292 -.072 .175 .205 .017 .032 .012 .458 -.217 .006 .255 1972 -.223 .038 .252 .036 -.016 .149 .137 .482 -.056 .079 .317 Thailand 1963-1968 .754 .644 .977 .802 .988 .934 .917 -.372 .190 -.841 .407 -.142 1969 .780 .864 .990 .088 .933 .969 .956 -.227 .218 -.694 .646 -.069 1970 .793 .928 .990 .380 .931 .973 .978 .225 .334 -.396 .811 -.067 1971 .747 .958 .974 .669 .900 .986 .9S6 .722 .570 .050 .817 .152 1972 .746 .968 .982 .783 .639 .987 .985 .810 .713 .248 .874 .234 Cambodla 1963-1968 -.333 -.467 .419 .269 .164 .074 -.070 .086 -.802 -.630 .297 .694 .264 1969 -.002 .166 .635 .440 .398 .429 .329 .074 -.608 -.649 .502 .603 .553 1970 .406 .684 .682 .420 .549 .634 .714 .519 .205 .069 .697 .031 .740 1971 .468 .828 .777 .722 .639 .828 .848 .889 .531 .366 .907 .249 .883 1972 .502 .855 .849 .840 .302 .899 .915 .911 .725 .518 .919 .310 .908 Laos 1963-1968 .868 .804 .275 .669 .456 .329 .633 -.203 .651 -.174 -.509 -.413 .379 -.529 1969 .825 .604 .268 .530 .457 .324 .543 -.201 .658 -.202 -.341 -.406 .341 -.372 1970 .754 .448 .209 .472 .392 .261 .393 -.170 .636 -.199 -.252 -.406 .244 -.032 209 1971 .742 .396 .222 .415 .389 .250 .351 .013 .569 -.143 .038 -.364 .233 .060 1972 .761 .522 .403 .556 .278 .441 .515 .246 .679 .036 .262 -.242 .411 .346 Table 26. Cont'd
Afghan- CHN MON CHI KCN KOS JAP IND PAK BUR CEY NEP TAI CAM IAO VTN VTS HAL PHI INS AUL iatan
North Vietnam 1963-1968 .675 .723 -.120 .513 .113 .090 .384 -.236 .685 .191 -.569 -.623 .027 -.800 .900 1969 .194 -.111 -.552 .635 -.242 -.392 -.206 -.189 .466 .296 -.711 .512 -.460 -.860 .630 1970 -.094 -.460 -.717 .190 -.471 -.606 -.525 -.432 .212 .162 -.819 -.401 -.676 -.647 .509 1971 -.244 -.646 -.803 -.230 -.596 -.741 -.690 -.Oal -.125 -.100 -.665 -.472 -.783 -.745 .379 1972 -.312 -.697 -.817 -.333 -.493 -.757 -.716 -.691 -.298 -.216 -.710 -.503 -.802 -.727 .178 South Vietnam 1963-1963 .725 .635 .445 .643 .619 .530 .613 -.034 .927 -.051 .083 -.293 .507 -.533 .648 .520 1969 .723 .548 .414 .470 .623 .504 .571 -.033 .926 -.100 .182 -.282 .468 -.334 .657 .283 1970 .737 .551 .459 .514 .639 .532 .562 .093 .930 -.065 .288 -.260 .488 .202 .640 .087 1921 .743 .523 .470 .495 .640 .497 .526 .193 .873 .012 .223 -.219 .456 .250 .643 -.020 1972 .761 .628 .597 .623 .491 .625 .646 .392 .693 .175 .412 -.106 .587 .477 .709 -.169 Malaysia 1963-1963 .881 .968 .363 .923 .586 .678 .810 -.723 .626 -.287 .072 -.7B4 .516 -.548 .758 .744 .618 1969 .846 .726 .342 .737 .580 .579 .636 -.712 .634 -.317 .154 -.768 .447 -.370 .764 .484 .631 1970 .873 .777 .516 .790 .673 .680 .748 -.322 .665 -.225 .395 -.702 .595 .405 .688 .098 .654 1971 .773 .878 .707 .884 .731 .844 .870 .614 .761 .186 .800 -.225 .817 .788 .510 -.359 .546 1972 -726 .898 .811 .930 .409 .910 .927 .75S .852 .381 .865 -.026 .877 .893 .625 -.482 .660 Philippines 1963-1968 .517 .332 .978 .529 .893 .7t>2 .715 -.119 -.041 -.874 .377 .224 .928 .552 .169 -.250 .332 .179 1969 .655 .725 .933 -.023 .899 .693 .865 -.078 .071 -.744 .624 .165 .969 .705 .216 -.582 .370 245 1970 .706 .859 .982 .324 .903 .927 .932 .333 .239 -.405 .804 .093 .984 .776 .149 -.749 .416 .472 1971 .738 .845 .961 .467 .915 .877 .890 .461 .380 -.191 .507 .183 .899 .691 .171 -.785 .444 .563 1972 .757 .875 .959 .597 .743 .885 .889 .585 .530 .000 .619 .247 .913 .738 .320 -.813 .550 .664 Indonesia 1963-1968 .016 -.270 .263 -.222 .180 -.142 -.073 .725 .242 -.027 -.245 .721 .131 .192 .140 -.120 .405 -.353 .357 1969 .190 .139 .447 -.351 .340 .186 .217 .673 .272 -.116 .019 .677 .371 .349 .181 -.314 .445 -.258 .500 1970 .329 .376 580 -.091 .482 .388 .433 .740 .348 -.050 .291 .604 .534 .448 .166 -.476 .491 -.027 .616 1971 .420 .549 .682 .233 .587 .562 .589 .681 .499 .147 .494 .642 .656 .594 .138 -.601 .508 .330 .677 1972 .482 .654 .761 .450 .434 .679 .698 .760 .630 .294 .621 .649 .741 .697 .346 -.660 .609 .531 .741 Australia 1963-1968 .935 .983 .439 .939 .647 .693 .855 -.666 .618 -.358 .001 -.714 .530 -.495 .825 .760 .643 .989 .266 -.257 1969 .950 .910 .611 .525 .735 .764 .863 -.585 .601 -.423 .263 -.617 .689 -.119 .785 .249 .652 .938 .512 -.030 1970 .928 .784 .580 .543 .713 .710 .743 -.398 .618 -.388 .317 -.611 .611 .173 .772 .091 .666 .910 .478 .051 1971 .910 .663 .538 .482 .683 .587 .622 -.060 .584 -.305 .170 -.553 .500 .184 .774 .016 .671 .667 .482 .095 1972 .899 .619 .498 .437 .653 .514 .534 .006 .526 -.245 .195 -.521 .467 .196 .740 -.018 .642 .551 .475 .129 New Zealand 1963-1968 .827 .925 .151 .802 .389 .463 .668 -.612 .631 -.106 -.191 -.807 .318 -.679 .839 .893 .543 .958 -.024 -.365 .952 1969 .754 .616 .130 .692 .359 .354 .511 -.611 .632 -.117 -.128 -.804 .238 -.547 .837 .681 .542 .952 .025 -.317 .862
1970 .789 .666 .321 .738 .472 .479 .592 -.305 .664 -.062 .148 -.760 .410 .307 .783 .308 .576 .956 .279 -.119 .857 210 1971 .810 .689 .434 .741 .544 .552 .633 .179 .705 .082 .346 -.602 .503 .428 .767 .070 .592 .831 .364 .046 .841 1972 .825 .717 .508 .737 .464 .594 .650 .306 .717 .182 .437 -.507 .562 .493 .789 -.038 .637 .779 .440 .175 .829 Table 27. National Tension at the System Level®
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1966 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Canada -576.68 -555.39 -922.71 -998.24 -839.08 -815.82 -1010.63 -867.15 -1099.25 -1224.74 -1245.86 Cuba 87.46 55.34 17.14 23.75 30.93 69.78 -14.33 14.55 5.92 -16.89 MD Haiti 27.77 7.11 -2.06 -7.07 -28.42 -77.30 -93.14 -116.13 -121.96 -144.09 MD Dominican Republic 25.02 4.63 .57 -8.76 -32.78 -79.87 -100.15 -124.33 -135.69 -159.09 -290.59 Jamaica -.41 -23.43 -33.55 -36.86 -59.30 -106.22 -123.46 -145.36 -153.60 -175.73 MD Trinidad and Tobago 9.06 -11.55 -21.16 -26.28 -48.77 -98.26 -112.18 -133.08 -141.55 -160.63 MD Mexico -838.49 -909.04 -936.91 -946.83 -997.83 -980.75 -1017.10 -1045.60 -1094.72 -1147.74 -1227.86 Guatemala -13.46 -32.80 -38.62 -43.72 -65.07 -113.48 -129.43 -138.67 -159.65 -179.54 -305.69 Honduras 22.84 .50 -9.23 -13.31 -35.44 -85.67 -92.99 -122.35 -127.88 -145.41 -270.72 El Salvador 15.50 -8.15 -17.16 -22.81 -45.56 -90.83 -88.37 -130.15 -137.47 -154.66 -279.16 Nicaragua 20.36 -4.18 -12.82 -16.61 -38.84 -86.39 -101.77 -122.51 -130.36 -147.20 -270.60 Costa Rica MD MDMD MD HD MD MD MD MD MD MD Panama 8.24 -14.06 -23.76 -29.92 -53.18 -101.85 -118.48 -133.34 -149.42 -171.87 -299.19 Colombia -116.41 -136.64 -136.34 -142.71 -173.09 -201.89 -230.38 -239.82 -165.69 -289.81 -428.14 Venezuela -212.71 -231.22 -222.21 -220.35 -217.31 -246.98 -268.23 -292.43 -262.93 -320.91 -439.94 Ecuador 6.06 -13.22 -19.19 -25.04 -50.86 -96.87 -106.05 -127.83 -140.14 -155.40 -284.25 Peru -54.54 -65.45 -70.93 -86.51 -49.48 -43.15 -91.78 -68.55 -78.21 -127.43 -266.10 Brazil -843.82 -497.80 -548.92 -476.49 -433.70 -465.32 -454.05 -315.29 -447.51 -522.55 -700.46 Bolivla 24.38 2.56 -4.24 -10.91 -33.11 -82.79 -96.71 -114.53 -121.61 -136.51 -254.48 Paraguay 23.05 .64 -7.52 -10.63 -30.76 -79.68 -94.67 -115.81 -124.71 -145.04 -270.52 Chile -90.22 -119.60 -120.17 -111.60 -140.46 -158.83 -176.47 -183.28 -193.95 -254.16 -346.72 Argentina -374.46 -415.39 -483.13 -406.68 -437.73 -422.31 -454.53 -441.95 -548.16 -600.89 MD Uruguay -22.92 -43.70 -44.59 -56.79 -62.98 -114.60 -121.45 -138.19 -131.69 -159.95 -269.13
United Kingdom 1754.96 1996.05 2062.98 2015.08 2279.70 2558.12 2162.30 2195.15 2365.65 3039.41 3092.34 Ireland 93.97 -116.61 -144.44 -115.53 -144.00 -186.69 -204.02 -219.34 -227.15 -243.74 -350.74 Netherlands -55.79 -38.29 -112.68 -146.30 -65.73 -56.39 -35.31 -33.11 -62.99 -83.74 -40.15 Belgium -314.80 -256.48 -291.73 -231.86 -264.37 -190.31 -240.81 -223.48 -291.71 -297.18 -335.70 Luxembourg 6.85 -13.42 -21.26 -24.96 -48.50 -97.92 -115.12 -136.51 -143.65 -162.50 -285.40 France 1070.97 1130.46 1208.18 1253.69 1553.39 1912.18 1443.84 1329.64 937.26 676.32 682.25 Swi tzcrland -415.73 -414.55 -417.49 -390.71 -416.18 -428.85 -412.64 -425.10 -493.02 -540.38 -637.46 Spain -402.52 -402.62 -471.49 -302.40 -161.21 47.37 -52.78 -10.52 -45.70 -50.02 -167.66 Portugal 122.19 128.83 111.81 123.61 180.34 185.88 145.74 174.47 219.02 191.97 14.96 Vest Germany 883.61 358.49 88.80 -41.19 646.94 1.22 245.94 -11.20 -20.21 433.60 1038.32 East Germany 144.15 178.70 272.99 301.12 405.31 908.99 1006.66 1154.48 1133.13 1220.42 1364.27 Poland 845.65 950.73 986.84 977.78 1049.96 1277.74 1448.81 1509.52 1616.36 1738.82 1669.23 Austria -408.73 -391.78 -432.70 -424.30 -436.16 -441.17 -456.00 -502.23 -554.53 -589.49 -691.67 Hungary 325.83 295.01 325.32 247.14 190.93 253.66 285.88 396.46 361.97 338.61 284.46 Czechoslovakia 722.08 913.72 944.71 902.72 980.90 1028.75 999.02 874.31 988.03 1041.14 1056.05 Italy -1074.01 -956.36 -833.42 -697.48 -668.85 -656.85 -853.92 -751.28 -541.49 -267.42 -197.17 Albania 75.74 55.80 50.26 38.12 21.41 -23.47 -17.00 -35.04 -28.85 -53.38 MD Yugoslavia 137.44 55.77 69.60 55.49 54.69 124.43 84.42 33.97 -49.15 50.89 -105.86 Table 27. Conc'd
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Greece -17.37 -44.82 -48.80 -38.50 11.58 32.63 54.55 60.81 50.70 34.89 -99.63 Cyprus 23.33 8.98 -1.05 -7.57 -30.65 -81.20 -98.40 -118.81 -127.07 -147.08 -273.34 Turkey 58.68 65.39 90.30 44.23 62. 74 73.43 48.45 54.12 84.84 60.71 18.06 Bulgaria 548.75 564.18 539.09 522.24 492.29 465.89 470.89 501.37 534.05 578.28 565.99 Rumania 749.01 710.37 630.84 526.66 372.82 433.05 540.93 598.65 413.22 524.79 419.20 Finland -188.52 -215.74 -234.80 -236.08 -233.77 -229.33 -284.33 -308.34 -317.30 -316.93 -441.92 Sveden -165.74 -160.29 -122.93 -35.47 -77.36 -38.22 -60.33 5.72 148.15 15.79 -158.22 Noway -72.01 -86.78 -47.36 -63.92 -79.46 -67.37 -65.98 -83.05 -112.16 -128.54 -207.91 Denrr-ark -190.77 -227.34 -221.95 -228.81 -239.57 -194.97 -256.23 -277.74 -276.36 -324.74 -463.70
Morocco -9.47 -34.89 -45.24 -37.14 -57.10 -91.15 -101.48 -119.37 -127.52 -135.90 -241.85 Algeria -24.39 -35.85 -28.34 -20.82 -54.49 -108.41 -136.86 -170.15 -182.68 -229.68 MD Tunisia -1.09 -20.41 -30.57 -34.35 -52.66 -98.51 -116.00 -132.85 -146.27 -170.02 -290.74 Libya 3.47 -18.08 -44.67 -56.50 -82.65 -138.83 -143.95 -116.90 -163.95 -160.51 MD Sudan -10.24 -24.20 -16.21 -17.94 -31.14 -76.29 -75.65 -68.74 -60.45 -91.82 HD Mali 34.42 11.91 3.24 -1.50 -23.64 -74.23 -89.43 -111.19 -117.33 -135.11 MD Senegal 6.84 -7.02 -13.88 -17.59 -37.77 -83.46 -98.69 -118.12 -127.98 -145.74 KD Dahomey 30.58 12.43 3.50 -1.60 -23.80 -73.71 -83.86 -110.40 -117.11 -136.59 MD Mauritania 38.91 13.26 4.00 -.74 -23.02 -72.99 -38.27 -109.83 -116.48 -136.75 MD Ntger 24.77 6.16 -5.31 -13.92 -34.35 -81.62 -95.51 -116.43 -123.57 -140.29 MD Ivory Coast -4.19 -20.32 -23.66 -28.90 -49.89 -100.47 -117.10 -138.74 -147.56 -168.36 MD Gui nea 32.14 7.81 5.70 4.03 -17.32 -66.55 -31.87 -99.50 -107.31 -128.95 MD Upper Volta 28.58 6.66 -2.55 -6.08 -28.59 -77.58 -92.70 -114.16 -121.09 -139.87 MD Liberia 33.45 9.97 1.76 -3.77 -25.81 -76.34 -91.95 -112.88 -119.99 -140.13 MD Sierra Leona 25.71 4.61 -5.07 -9.94 -32.03 -80.24 -96.13 -117.83 -124.33 -144.17 MD Ghana -7.03 -24.45 -36.08 -23.66 -36.06 -78.01 -106.95 -132.93 -145.59 -166.95 -287.24 Togo 32.42 11.54 2.61 -3.64 -26.32 -76.09 -91.94 -112.98 -119.43 -138.55 MD Cftt.ieroun 24.07 -.12 -8.99 -13.71 -34.51 -82.85 -99.00 -121.15 -129.20 -149.42 MD Nigeria -187.04 -183.25 -188.99 -192.74 -33.90 60.83 366.20 163.47 14.55 89.62 MD Gabon 32.31 10.53 2.64 -2.42 -25.22 -76.63 -91.17 -112.36 -119.63 -140.36 MD Central African Republic 32.26 11.55 2.61 -1.74 -22.93 -72.14 -86.99 -103.76 -115.02 -124.91 MD Chad 28.75 8.22 .63 -1.40 -20.18 -69.92 -85.70 -102.49 -107.74 -126.65 MD Congo, People's Republic 32.53 11.72 2.90 .63 -22.85 -72.87 -89.44 -109.58 -117.02 -137.52 MD Zaire -4.76 -7.23 4.01 25.81 -12.57 -70.77 -87.09 -71.11 -87.40 -109.46 MD Uganda -10.52 -29.36 -30.50 -23.52 -52.47 -90.95 -107 79 -123.32 -141.62 -109.61 MD Kenya MD -25.59 -31.75 -38.42 -55.81 -102.44 -122.18 -145.11 -155.80 -170.99 -29G.93 Tanzania -1.89 -22.72 -27.54 -33.61 -56.27 -100.24 -117.49 -132.54 -128.06 -147.69 -266.81 Burundi 32.55 10.42 2.49 -1.68 -24.16 -73.42 -68.73 -110.42 -117.30 -136.41 MD Rvanda 34.80 14.24 6.05 2.05 -23.24 -72.26 -88.23 -109.37 -115.85 -134.73 MD 212 Table 27. Cont’d
COUNTRY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Sor.alit 37.18 16.14 7.02 4.16 -17.91 -66.95 -81.92 -101.43 -108.30 -125 90 MD Ethiopia 1.86 -18.18 -22.95 -28.12 -46.73 -85.48 -100.59 -124.40 -130.66 -146.26 -272.54 Zant j.a KD MD -22.17 -25.34 -52.11 -93.34 -118.26 -123.14 -85.05 -91.17 -250.05 Rhodesia MD >3 MD -27.56 -48.46 -93.90 -114.50 -132.62 -143.25 -162.70 MD Union of South Africa -279.05 -204.16 -253.18 -224.04 -226.78 -222.49 -250.48 -308.97 -295.04 -333:37 -351.20 Malagasy Republic 13.70 -8.05 -13.25 -17.59 -39.70 -87.81 -103.21 -125.52 -133.57 -151.49 MD Iran 4.60 17.39 101.65 127.35 256.32 345.13 475.34 527.88 759.03 1050.43 Iraq 1346.25 156.83 206.99 197.54 181.58 151.55 203.15 301.51 237.80 255.69 223.23 MD Egypt 259.05 262.09 321.45 194.60 150.66 276.88 336.85 592.40 657.66 751.21 KD Syria 85.93 52.70 43.63 39.26 22.40 35.52 17.73 34.47 -4.16 50.79 KD Lebanon 1.61 -14.26 -20.49 -20.38 -32.59 -80.82 -93.02 -115.38 -128.51 -148.73 MD Jordan 92.59 69.03 58.73 59.51 50.61 44.61 40.47 -11.35 -16.55 -32.15 MD Israel 164.35 216.01 194.58 265.21 483.98 600.70 863.98 1191.27 1169.96 1134.56 2786.81 Saudi Arabia 93.45 73.97 42.80 60.70 199.02 23.87 32.57 -4.93 12.67 374.37 MD Yemen 22.26 -4.90 -17.99 -20.41 -38.87 -79.74 -96.10 -109.65 -112.21 -129.99 Kuvflit MD -23.19 -38.67 -45.26 -54.50 -47.97 -87.98 -102.46 -127.28 -142.01 -159.07 MD Afghanistan 8.81 -8.08 -14.98 -18.45 -39.19 -85.28 -100.30 -120.89 -129.12 -148.74 MD People's Republic of China 2467.94 3522.74 3681.33 4540.66 4534.91 5349.82 7464.82 8111.36 9112.57 9137.22 8917.84 Mongolia 24.03 3.92 -5.74 -9.89 -26.20 -67.10 -74.57 -92.51 -96.56 -110.38 MD Republic of China 202.85 219.89 246.83 304.64 285.49 273.07 54.30 221.86 300.93 328.97 MD North Korea 275.57 268.27 377.72 298.93 417.53 510.73 453.68 490.10 492.80 195.42 KD South Korea 17.63 -25.08 -20.05 -9.11 -23.84 -35.03 -35.27 -46.34 -9.12 5.65 -150.39 Japan -4519.02 -4882.40 -4BS0.34 -5193.78 -5729.70 •5745.83 -6185.33 -6385.99 -6850.69 -7096.44 -7059.32 India -392.94 -430.12 -263.73 -381.51 -505.93 -284.65 -335.61 -233.35 97.63 70.25 -149.60 Pakistan -71.54 -92.53 156.62 29.84 -42.53 -33.80 -51.60 -47.85 45.53 244.14 -23.22 Burma 69.80 51.78 50.72 47.34 11.70 -40.15 -48.70 -60.87 -63.01 -81.90 -209.16 Ceylon 4.05 -20.04 -28.47 -32.63 -55.72 -103.39 -119.39 -140.44 -138.88 -160.42 -284.26 Nepal 6.89 -16.58 -25.67 -30.51 -49.82 -93.37 -114.52 -133.64 -140.19 -160.15 KD I ha Hand -54.45 -74.13 -89.66 -107.22 -116.82 -129.78 -123.70 -120.57 -93.65 -109.48 . -202.44 Cambodia 31.66 11.13 -.13 -5.37 -25.73 -73.85 -87.50 -70.65 -48.86 -44.35 MD Laos 45.41 33.03 26.08 19.05 -2.51 -53.16 -68.66 -91.51 -97.52 -113.11 KD North Vietnam 290.97 335.18 340.13 347.63 317.30 261.85 202.38 165.46 140.58 150.37 KD South Vietnam 226.99 203.30 393.40 278.22 265.32 310.78 257.16 247.45 228.59 287.60 MD Malaysia -34.73 -30.91 -19.04 .61 -28.43 -79.23 -100.99 -97.18 -51.82 -43.61 -220.43 Philippines -176.00 -189.24 -204.93 -219.05 -230.39 -245.27 -257.00 -262.14 -310.08 -326.91 -413.11 Indonesia -62.90 -65.50 5.73 -199.02 -117.08 -107.06 -101.79 -105.22 -110.09 -114.89 -244.14 Australia -301.90 -79.17 30.09 219.98 167.07 171.02 275.29 105.99 -23.30 -48.67 -142.58 New Zealand -135.58 -133.34 -137.87 -128.27 -146.78 -179.97 -197.74 -202.13 -223.41 -246.94 KD
The ordering of the nations in this table is based on geographic regions of the international system. Table 28. Latin American Tension Scores
Country 1963 1954 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973* Cuba 208.26 175.58 156.36 147.72 176.98 236.80 169.91 203.63 197.47 202.48 Haiti -18.41 -6.14 -11.27 -9.07 -12.33 -18.23 -12.93 -13.22 -17.00 -9.26 Dominican Republic 1.14 10.14 7.05 6.19 0.19 -6.50 -4.41 -7.08 -13.58 -5.30 Jamaica -29.61 -21.41 -25.34 -23.54 -27.58 -33.05 -29.31 -29.78 -34.54 -25.77 Trinidad & Tobago -28.95 -17.69 -22.34 -20.42 -24.40 -31.09 -24.88 -23.95 -29.43 -18.60 Mexico -168.45 -298.96 -273.89 -308.76 345.72 -333.04 -355.82 -442.77 -435.28 -424.86 Guatemala -30.28 -21.53 -21.40 -20.56 -23.99 -30.83 -26.15 -15.94 -32.21 -21.00 Honduras -21.56 -11.05 -15.38 -11.98 -15.43 -22.85 -9.24 -16.38 -19.55 -7.00 El Salvador -21.72 -12.57 -16.54 -14.80 -18.86 -22.41 0.90 -19.32 -23.80 -11.09 Nicaragua -21.12 -11.55 -14.98 -12.07 -15.18 -21.13 -15.32 -13.73 -19.34 -6.06 Costa Rica KD MD KD MD MD MD ID KD MD MD Panama -30.45 -20.44 -24.77 -23.34 -27.53 -33.77 -23.78 -25.20 -34.42 -26.14 Colombia -10.40 -23.05 -12.39 -19.27 -34.25 -31.37 -40.39 -42.47 46.58 -41.82 Venezuela 26.66 -6.54 25.98 13.50 30.63 20.13 12.35 -14.21 36.30 14.36 Ecuador -18.24 -7.05 -8.03 -7.65 -14.69 -19.69 -7.84 -8.89 -15.43 1.52 Peru 51.83 50.13 57.70 42.07 91.48 122.74 89.71 122.60 127.78 111.85 Brazil -6.51 195.25 173.88 206.99 253.81 224.11 263.94 351.03 330.81 345.68 Bolivia -15.38 -5.04 -7.17 -6.10 -9.91 -17.25 -10.44 -6.59 -11.26 4.16 Paraguay -21.35 -10.53 -13.84 -10.00 -11.31 -17.48 -11.42 -10.15 -16.72 -6.96 Chile 29.82 2.27 13.95 22.34 5.64 14.82 13.45 12.89 20.71 -8.78 Argentina 136.57 51.14 39.12 63.74 30.96 42.49 34.93 6.57 -60.07 -71.60 Uruguay -11.83 -10.96 -6.70 -14.97 -8.45 -22.38 •8.26 -7.04 2.98 4.19
“Tenaion scores could not be computed because of missing d 214 Tabic 29. Western European Tenaion Scoroa
Country 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 United Kingdom 1004.04 1311.96 1437.18 1416.04 1372.83 1669.60 1440.54 1563.01 1761.55 2238.96 2131.97 Ireland -62.57 -105.53 -112.65 -115.77 -103.76 -216.13 -238.77 -278.47 -282.97 -279.18 -266.47 Netherlands -187.96 -177.88 -251.67 -281.65 -246.76 -291.96 -243.96 -242.56 -266.05 -328.68 -236.69 Belgium -414.81 -363.91 -398.82 -387.05 -392.46 -372.19 -4C4.35 -394.56 -456.50 -489.35 -466.00 Luxembourg 57.89 14.63 -4.04 -10.60 15.94 -104.17 -131.00 -179.92 -184.18 -176.49 -171.19 France 311.37 432.91 554.44 605.99 542.16 916.85 590.91 565.71 187.38 '-357.89 -606.76 Switzerland -500.12 -505.86 -510.39 -482.23 -518.60 -536.40 -553.58 -575.44 -637.94 -703.08 -724.35 Spain -522.17 -526.51 -598.36 -433.34 -332.24 -176.89 -252.93 -212.84 -242.30 -293.12 -373.29 Portugal 148.27 134.46 107.47 116.95 209.04 145.89 102.70 106.84 154.46 142.38 79.13 West Germany -217.03 -644.91 -855.71 -951.69 -716.02 -1346.72 -910.06 -1035.55 -1006.69 -910.02 -662.39 East Germany -8.45 31.33 127.16 157.98 217.81 673.11 804.74 955.11 940.86 991.42 1188.16 Poland 672.02 781.53 820.03 609.19 821.29 996.19 1215.62 1282.40 1392.32 1452.73 1401.16 Austria -438.41 -435.60 -481.24 -474.61 -474 . 34 -541.25 -549.79 -614.32 -663.24 -702.80 -713.84 Hungary 294.81 249.49 278.16 197.27 150.24 153.78 193.91 288.15 256.11 232.00 271.20 Czechoslovakia 596.65 787.24 819.60 777.25 818.23 813.24 812.74 683.31 802.76 823.96 897.09 Italy -1551.13 -1332 66 -1232.10 -1094.76 -1465.28 -1297.70 -1396.75 -1243.92 -1009.10 -882.46 -901.10 Albania 127.60 89.98 68.67 53.17 87.14 -28.81 -31.50 -77.40 -68.77 -66.91 HD Yugoslavla 118.47 16.62 22.94 9.79 28.36 35.87 -4.59 -73.54 -159.91 -67.55 -137.08 Greece -1.33 -48.99 -62.86 -55.60 23.95 -22.91 -3.68 -20.12 -27.91 -36.80 -67 22 Cyprus 78.07 40.67 19.05 9.45 37.46 -84.03 -111.44 -159.84 -165.62 -158.30 -155.43 Bulgaria 555.89 551.82 517.75 497.40 491.07 398.70 404.60 413.54 449.64 499.96 589.99 Rumania 688.53 638.43 554.88 444.32 276.89 280.36 403.53 451.00 262.57 348.23 301.49 Finland -186.50 -231.47 -258.38 -260.74 -231.33 -290.93 -348.42 -394.39 -398.77 -389.57 -408.31 Sweden -313.25 -309.80 -268.73 -177.70 -263.53 -273.10 -263.91 -197.51 -41.22 -205.93 -324.08 Norway -80.92 -111.66 -79.43 -97.75 -94.22 -145.84 -141.51 -176.69 -202.36 -213.12 -168.69 Denmark -225.15 -277.51 -277.27 -283.94 -287.29 -302.56 -358.59 -393.56 -387.32 -439.65 -485.55 Turkey 56.22 46.23 64.33 13.13 53.42 -1.90 -24.45 -38.41 -6.77 -28.71 28.24 215 Table 30* African Tension Scores
Country 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973*
Morocco 39.44 13.74 12.15 15.43 5.84 6.31 -8.81 2.99 9.84 14.45 Algeria 36.51 24.41 42.72 40.61 16.68 -5.28 -43.00 -41.81 -38.77 -71.00 Tunisia -5.09 -7.16 -10.55 -12.00 -13.82 -16.38 -25.41 -19.64 -22.20 -29.45 Libya 3.00 1.62 -7.37 -13.33 -26.11 -42.29 -50.86 7.78 -26.74 -9.27 Sudan 0.17 -2.09 14.83 12.55 12.90 10.52 12.29 45.57 64.58 48.63 Hall 3.76 5.61 2.73 2.61 2.74 0.42 0.05 -2.90 -1.22 -1.94 Senegal -6.19 -0.37 -1.16 -2.75 -3.63 -4.65 -8.61 -7.51 -8.11 -9.74 Dahomey -0.95 5.23 1.71 1.34 1.78 0.50 0.58 -2.32 -3.33 -3.64 Mauritania 4.28 4.52 0.77 0.94 1.86 0.71 1.09 -2.10 -1.21 -4.22 Niger -1.91 2.29 -1.19 -6.10 -5.62 -5.90 -5.91 -7.70 -6.80 -6.78 Ivory Coast -15.56 -9.55 -7.58 -9.83 -12.73 -18.67 -26.56 -25.60 -24.22 -29.17 Culnea 4.15 3.61 7.48 10.10 10.43 8.86 7.73 9.23 9.43 4.74 Upper Volta -0.57 1.34 -2.15 -1.25 -1.68 -2.68 -3.17 -5.67 -4.72 -6.55 Liberia 1.86 2.99 -0.09 -0.46 -0.06 -1.91 -2.46 -4.66 -3.88 -6.91 Sierra Leone -2.33 -0.00 -3.87 -4.20 -4.72 -5.16 -6.54 -9.04 -7.53 -10.50 Ghana 1.57 -2.19 -6.95 -0.45 7.53 5.98 -16.05 -13.26 -20.06 -26.25 Togo -0.27 4.03 0.66 -0.41 -0.38 -1.65 -2.46 -4.77 -3.47 -5.46 Cameroon 6.79 3.72 1.80 1.04 -0.71 -3.65 -8.83 -9.78 -8.60 -12.44 Nigeria -52.62 -71.82 -53.82 -77.81 56.86 170.65 461.90 304.71 182.21 266.03 Gabon 0.58 3.21 0.92 0.75 0.61 -2.05 -1.67 -3.98 -3.22 -6.75 Central African Republic -0.27 3.83 0.34 0.72 2.29 1.93 2.43 -0.78 0.60 -2.14 Chad -1.7.1 1.87 -0.36 2.08 5.65 4.47 3.77 5.73 8.19 6.36 Congo, People's Republic 2.12 5.51 2.11 4.41 3.26 1.65 0.03 -1.35 -0.98 -4.37 Zaire -1.02 10.92 28.58 54.51 31.32 14.00 3.93 44.28 39.42 32.31 Uganda -17.84 -17.76 -12.45 -7.51 -13.57 -9.24 -17.20 -15.37 -18.80 29.30 Kenya MD -14.91 -14.62 -16.38 -16.47 -19.95 -31.52 -31.51 -31.47 -39.97 Tanzania -14.14 -15.22 -13.52 -15.14 -19.15 -19.18 -27.09 -20.17 -5.98 -9.53 Burundi -0.00 2.80 0.22 0.72 1.09 0.52 0.66 -2.52 -1.79 -3.70 Rwanda 2.44 6.15 3.37 4.39 1.95 1.75 1.17 -1.43 -0.26 -1.97 Somalia 4.63 8.10 3.97 6.14 6.99 6.84 7.45 6.31 7.01 6.70 Ethiopia 1.07 -2.01 1.49 0.72 -3.76 -1.30 -9.73 -10.23 -5.86 -5.95 Zambia MD MD -1.79 -4.57 -13.17 -11.25 -27.73 -10.82 37.04 47.26 Rhodesia MD MDMD -6.06 -9.13 -11.72 -23.32 -19.10 -18.96 -22.64 Union or South Africa 10.14 30.78 14.60 23.32 -18.64 -43.26 -145.55 -132.96 -78.46 -119.07 Malagasy Republic -2.04 -3.26 -3.01 -4.13 -6.35 -8.91 -13.11 -14.60 -13.64 -15.42
^Tension scores could not he computed because of aliasing date. Table 31, Middle East Tension Scores
Country 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973* Iran -132.67 -148.12 -132.73 -81.34 -74.42 -125.07 -179.93 -317.69 -281.71 -264.39 Iraq 76.27 130.31 120.05 106.23 50.70 96.27 159.79 69.64 74.45 8.42 Egypt 132.79 116.96 131.38 37.11 -70.24 10.48 -26.74 147.50 172.21 174.85 Syria 18.00 -3.13 7.87 -0.76 -32.44 10.15 -25.24 -14.16 -43.82 -14.42 Lebanon -73.64 -73.73 -64.67 -67.65 -92.88 -119.70 -140.31 -171.92 -172.53 -217.48 Jordan 33.30 25.89 42.31 32.72 15.55 52.29 49.21 8.06 37.54 20.98 Israel 72.04 114.93 77.28 162.26 341.68 415.17 598.62 851.76 776.49 636.49 Saudi Arabia 15.21 0.95 -27.55 -11.40 89.96 -85.95 -119.35 -197 48 -200.23 95.06 Yemen -39.06 -51.47 -42.55 -52.74 -78.30 -69.20 -78.90 -75.58 -39.69 -56.65 Kuwait -102.26 -112.58 -111.40 -124.43 -149.60 -184.44 -237.14 -300.13 -322.71 -382.86
°Ten*lon scores could not be computed becsuee of missing decs.
ho Table 32. Aden Tension Scores
Country 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 19731
Afghanistan 76.37 100.66 68.14 116.72 111.80 120.32 214.37 215.02 230.88 216.25 People's Republic of China 782.56 938.87 739.69 818.03 1008.28 1154.58 1471.37 1392.64 1353.71 1332.98 Mongolia 90.88 115.11 79.16 128.02 127.13 143.46 246.89 251.88 273.71 266.24 Republic of China 227.64 263.00 254.37 339.08 325.10 330.39 157.26 321.38 376.05 374.07 North Korea 297.78 309.36 346.12 343.85 480.88 592.75 594.89 636.42 642.11 342.24 South Korea 17.45 -16.82 -44.81 -22.74 -31.16 -47.86 -52.24 -66.33 -65.71 -74.33 India -1164.13 -1568.09 -1387.46 -1704.80 -1896.80 -2004.63 -2665.03 -2610.17 -2486.89 -2448.20 Faklstan -130.24 -193.50 36.78 -93.08 -147.b2 -165.30 -194.79 -210.69 -105.32 306.88 Buruia 118.74 140.40 109.80 156.66 141.06 133.15 222.52 229.33 244.43 229.43 Ceylon 67.35 84.42 49.85 96.00 87.49 91.29 179.35 177.76 203.93 187.38 Nepal 72.23 90.60 55.59 102.93 100.06 104.81 195.89 200.61 219.33 203.90 Thailand -50.15 -56.94 -107.09 -110.51 -113.53 -119.50 -83.54 -75.91 -64.42 -84.34 Cambodia 99.02 123.21 86.02 132.56 127.46 134.00 231.30 274.59 325.53 338.33 Laos 123.93 160.13 128.13 176.96 170.75 179.95 283.30 282.11 303.44 293.60 North Vietnam 335.98 415.80 390.33 449.88 442.92 441.58 485.23 471.20 464.61 501.46 South Vietnam 267.53 272.02 436.33 358.99 362.08 456.30 490.40 495.80 491.70 559.66 Malaysia -7.29 22.21 3.05 56.47 39.75 22.22 66.75 85.63 131.03 134.94 Philippines -222.65 -240.30 -291.36 -298.58 -303.09 -324.13 -334.81 -336.89 -417.18 -446.03 Indonesia -102.58 -108.26 -64.74 -254.01 -154.40 -154.60 -140.39 -146.07 -178.22 -200.91 Australia -731.09 -703.70 -678.88 -605.92 -695.35 -884.94 -1173.07 -1400.11 -1720.98 -1780.53 New Zealand -167.33 -168.19 -209.03 -186.50 -183.43 -203.85 -195.64 -188.11 -221.76 -252.99
aTenaion scores could noc be cocputad because of olssiog data. 218 219
Table 33. Azar Sloan 15-Point Scale For Inter-Nation Events
Scale-Point Description
15 Nation A initiates or engages in very hostile war actions against Nation B and occupies territory of the latter, causes many deaths and dislocations, captures enemy soldiers.
14 Nation A engages in limited hostile acts against Nation B; bombards military units or hits territory of B; minor costs to Nation B.
13 Nation A engages in subversion against Nation B; they engage in small clashes (air or border) and police acts, skirmishes or blockades.
12 Nation A breaks up diplomatic relations with Nation B; A incites riots or rebellion in B (either through aid to rebels or radio war); terrorists or demonstrators in Nation A bomb Nation B's property; Nation A nationalizes B 1s companies.
11 Nation A increases its military capabilities and political-economic resources to counter Nation B's actions or the latter's contemplated actions; Nation A places sanctions on B or hinders B's movement in waterways or on land and attempts to cause economic problems for B. ‘
10 Nation A engages in verbal threats, warnings, demands, and accusations against Nation B; verbal hostile behavior (to imply major dis satisfaction with B).
9 Nation A expresses mild disaffection toward Nation B's policies, objectives, goals, be havior without A's government objection to these protestations; A's communique or note dissatisfied with B's policy in third party.
8 Nations A and B demonstrate indifference to each other's policies, moves, actions, or makes no comment-type statement toward on another (an act among sub-groups not aimed at government); non-governmental visitors. Table 33. Cont'd
Description
Nations A and B communicate, meet or propose talks regarding problems of mutual interest; A's officials visit B; there are public supports in A towards B (with officials of Nation A favoring such support); issue joint communiques; appoint ambassador (routine).
Nation A supports Nation B's policies, recog nizes B's regime, etc., or solicits support of B against a third party.
Nation A establishes friendship, cultural, or similar limited agreements with B; start of diplomatic relations; head of state of Nation A visits or meets B; Nation A thanks B for aid.
Nation A extends economic aid to B; draws up economic pacts; gives assistance and famine relief; industrial and economic assistance to B.
Nation A extend military aid to B; military technical assistance to strengthen B; gives B facilities and special privileges.
Nations A and B establish international or dyadic alliance; economic market; joint military command and maneuvers.
Nations A and B unite voluntarily into one nation-state. 221
Table 34. Weighted Values of Scale-Points
Scale-Point Weighted Value
15 102
14 65 13 50 12 44 Conflict End 11 29 10 16 9 6
8 1 Neutral Point
7 6 6 10 5 14 Cooperative End 4 27 3 31 2 47
1 92 Table 35. Dimension of Interactions In the Middle East
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 173
20 6 6 127 6 14 64 76 14 10 6 12 26 54 6 0 0 0 114;l 200b 0 0 98a 50 61 !31S*
16 0 0 0 53 10 6 0 0 0 10 14 6 60 0 0 16 16 137c 22 6 0 0 0 0 0
27 10 0 0 6 14 0 27 0 0 0 0 6 44 0000 44 60000 0 0
0 0 0 0 6 0 20 0 14 00 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 0 16 44 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 6 10 0 39 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 10 0 0 00000006000 0 16
0 47 14 6 6 54 37 34 61 0 0 6 12 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 20 24 6 27 41 0 0 27 22 ooooooaoooo 6 0
30 6 10 101 6 14 80 157 12 12 6 18 56 6 66 a 60 48 0 0 142'1 0 16 106 131 192 Table 35. Cant'd
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Egypt Cooperation 20 120 18 517 700 219 367 517 34 12 77 20 53 105 Conflict 138 32 0 205 12 29 28 0 58 0 61 12 0 93
Syria Cooperation 6 47 199 459 112 55 205 410 91 102 34 70 78 196 Conflict 16 16 29 57 2.2 16 77 38 0 0 0 0 51 119
Lebanon Cooperation 6 39 0 12 22 27 39 147 12 0 37 14 32 107 Conflict 0 0 103 74 0 0 0 29 0 90 0 0 0 58
Jordan Cooperation 40 55 0 39 39 134 62 226 102 71 83 70 66 12 Conflict 0 16 58 22 0 0 16 16 0 0 181* 35 12 16
Israel Cooperation 0000000000 12 606 Conflict 61 45 32 119 45 29 96 815° 134 462b 125 118 48 732=
Saudi Arabia Cooperation 0 57 10 6 34 43 24 55 76 0 16 6 0 18 Conflict 000000 38 6000006
Kuwait Cooperation 18 45 6 131 290 118 79 112 80 0 16 27 16 87 Conflict 0 439 150 67 0 0 6 94b 16 0 . 0 0 0 261c
Egypt--
Iran Cooperation 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 10 0 14 26 0 12 Conflict 66 00600 38 80 0 0 0 6 0 0
Iraq Cooperation 6 44 6 301 509 124 212 259 16 12 77 0 0 18 Conflict 38 54 6 . 88 6 6 0 0 0 6 70 0 16 0 223 Table 35. Cont'd
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Syria Cooperation 36 69 6 189 57 20 160 178 39 65 75 240 111 169 Conflict 0 419* 48 92 22 22 0 12 0 0 0 0 6 12
Lebanon Cooperation 6 32 115 0 106 0 12 27 6 18 61 6 47 18 Conflict 660000000 12 000 0
Jordan Cooperation 6 20 0 0 215 24 24 136 66 64 118 36 0 133 Conflict 223 60 45 16 0 0 70 48 0 0 79 66 199 12
Israel Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 84 36 18 72 72 30 152 Conlllct 433b 368b 188a 336b 143a 83 147 3634‘‘ 1762b 4733c 1186b 1186b 817a 4635e
Saudi Arabia Cooperation 18 34 6 36 96 92 81 146 39 39 20 20 47 60 Conflict 0 61 444b 7701-' 115b 32 328>> 344>> 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kuwait Cooperation 10 121 14 54 155 52 44 47 6 6 20 14 26 44 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syria—
Iran Cooperation 00000 20 0000000 33 Conflict 6 0 0 0 0 6 16 000000 0
Iraq Cooperation 0 60 90 874 265 88 149 340 54 137 28 87 87 63 Conflict 22 0 0 101 48 16 186 6 0 16 150a 0 60 0
Egypt Cooperation 0 6 51 433 169 74 253 200 51 69 150 438 172 150 Conflict 0 671 296n 504a 48 64 29 16 0 0 16 0 16 12
Lebanon
Cooperation 6 39 50 84 52 54 98 90 55 27 53 16 100 51 224 Conflict 0 16 45 174a 0 16 106 16 77 77 16 0 50a 105 Table 35. Cont'd
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Jordan Cooperation 27 43 39 74 177 269 147 167 85 47 36 87 162 135 Conflict 173 16 0 72a 0 6 475b 246 45 0 510c 331a 0 6
Israel Cooperation 0 0 6 6 0 0 18 58 0 12 0 0 6 42 Conflict 330a 253b 413b 377b 512-* 377b 153Bb 3926c 290b 577b 1167b 278b 1816b 44S6C
Saudi Arabia Cooperation 27 74 6 54 64 26 96 27 54 27 16 33 33 61 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 16 112 54 16 0 29 6 0 0
Kuvait Cooperation 0 0 0 55 137 24 33 6 0 33 22 10 20 32 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lebanon-•
Iran Cooperation 0 0 31 0 6 0 14 0 14 10 0 14 0 6 Conflict 0 0 6 0 0 0 44 0 0 16 0 0 0 0
Iraq Cooperation 12 34 0 36 47 10 37 112 0 33 6 6 16 57 Conflict 0 12 29 12 0 6 0 0 0 61 29 16 6 16 Egypt Cooperation 12 6S 87 0 98 43 26 26 0 12 28 10 0 28 Conflict 56a 54 16 6 29 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0
Syria Cooperation 6 20 32 78 55 24 26 77 63 18 S3 16 46 36 Conflict 0 106a 66-' 220b 72a 0 U0« 61 77 64 0 0 16 32
Jordan Cooperation 12 14 16 33 37 101 32 95 6 6 23 6 0 16 Conflict 0 45 45 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 16 74 0
Israel Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 24 0 6 10 0 6 10 225 Conflict 114 41 154a 80 22 191° 93a 438a 215 483b 380c 146b 1090b 384b Table 35. Cont'd
i.ff—— 3 ^ 1 _19h2 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Saudi Arabia Cooperation 0 27 6 33 47 24 26 133 0 20 6 28 80 28 Conflict 0 0 16 16 16 0 16 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kuwait Cooperation 6 41 20 24 6 6 93 28 27 0 20 10 60 6 Conflict 0600006000000 0 Jordan--
Iran Cooperation 0 0 6 45 6 10 0 26 14 14 0 0 6 18 Conflict" ' - 0 -16 -0000600000 - - - - q 0 Iraq Cooperation 97 34 0 96 130 96 60 107 24 55 60 33 60 6 Conflict 0 0 44 12 0 0 22 56* 0 0 141b 44 6 0 Egypt Cooperation 0 33 27 0 198 61 37 276 102 76 78 14 39 114 Conflict 314 54 156 38 0 0 74 156 0 6 12^> 32 38 28 Syria Cooperation 33^ 94 30 76 127 101 39 198 27 20 44 20 37 223 Conflict 104“* 0 0 50 0 0 394* 207s 0 6 955= 319c 0 Lebanon Cooperation 26 27 20 33 33 96 16 72 55 6 32 14 0 6 Conflict 22 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Israel Cooperation 0 0 27 6 27 0L 61 216 26 6 60 44 153 24 Conflict 113° 254° 292n 158h I25b 514h 1089*' 3454c 4393° 2585c 852'- 395c 210b 986c Saudi Arabia Cooperation 33 102 175 120 39 104 190 87 127 59 20 40 33 24 Conflict 0000600000000 0 Kuwait Cooperation 0 6 38 0 145 64 12 53 20 0 63 0 27
12 6 2 2 Conflict 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tabic 35. Cont'd
1960 1961 1962 1963 1966 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Israel-- lean Cooperation 0 0 10 Conflict 16 12 0
Iraq Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 Conflict 65 b 16 526'c 134 c 500 c 22 16 16 617=
Egypt Cooperation 6 0 0 6 0 0 6 144 90 12 72 110 36 316 Conflict 623b 728b 433 b 370b 72" 106 134c 8224{* 2531c 7149= 9980c 1358° 625c 7428=
Syria Cooperation 12 0 0 6 0 0 18 54 0 20 0 0 6 46 Conflict 674= 249 b 556c 490b 556b 287b 1507 = 3798 = 248c 1042c 1581c 64 2775c 5110°
Lebanon Cooperation 0 0 0 0 47 0 14 0 0 34 18 Conflict 29 44 135b 71° 370= 276 = 690c 1869° 130b 2429c 665c
Jordan Cooperat ion 0 47 0 16 143 26 0 94 91 10 24b Conflict 97“ 97“ 295'v 180" 178b 518b 920= 3673= 4311= 4521= 1485 = 87b 277 = 147
Saudi Arabia Cooperation 0 0 0 0 C Conflict 16 16 16 16 22
Kuwai t Cooperation Conflict
Saudl Arabla--
Iran Cooperation 10 47 6 54 55 14 38 39 18 Conflict 16 0 l b 0 0 0 0 0 0 227 Table 35. Cont'd
1960 1941 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 973
10 77 6 43 34 27 12 12 0 12 10 33 6 18 0 22 0 0 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 0 0 45
0 39 12 80 172 82 60 225 37 0 6 30 119 149 6 66 34 51’ 467L’ 22 16 82 3 6 lc 0 0 0 0 16 0
27 74 16 37 107 47 40 16 31 0 10 0 43 154 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 22 0 0 71b 0 0
0 26 14 27 74 33 26 66 24 39 0 45 54 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 6 0 0 0 0
6 47 96 125 56 157 204 255 142 80 10 6 26 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 43 6 16 0 0 0 35 296c 0 16 0 0 32 372b
10 136 0 51 60 115 26 90 14 6 16 0 39 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 20 24 34 6 30 0 0 27 14 12 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 16 0
20 20 6 148 284 63 32 90 82 0 16 27 10 69 0 498a 16 50a 16 0 12 160'1 0 16 44 0 16 806c
0 ' 37 33 81 278 138 225 253 58 0 18 10 43 82 0 0 0 0 16 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tabic 35* Cont'd
1960 1961 1962 1963 1966 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Syria Cooperation 0 0 0 61 110 40 53 95 0 33 22 37 31 111 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Lebanon Cooperation 0 108 14 14 60 27 136 103 27 0 18 10 113 6 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 50 0 0 0 0 0 6
Jordan Cooperation 27 0 • 33 12 154 10 109 115 118 0 88 27 16 39 Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 50 0 88
Israel Cooperation 00000000000000 Conflict 0 0 0 0 44 16 29 470r 50 0 22 16 29 267c
Saudi Arabia Cooperation 10 39 18 10 38 90 80 46 67 0 22 0 53 55 Conflict 00000000000000
'Victor engages in subversion against the target; they engage in small clashes (Air or Border) and police acts, skirmishes or blockades. I'Actor engages in limited hostile acts against the target; bombards military units or hits territory of the target; minor costs to the target. cActor initiates or engages in very hostile war actions against the target, and occupies territory of the target; causes many deaths and dislocations, and captures enemy soldiers. 229 Table 36. Dimension of Interactions for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Greece--
Turkey Cooperation 0 0 16 30 99 6 53 60 42 34 6 0 6 0 Conflict 0 0 16 45 1045b 109 98 66.< 16 0 29 0 16 0
Cyprus Cooperation 0 0 0 12 66 10 68 66 12 0 26 6 64 40 Conflict 65b 0 0 1151' 247b 22 0 72a 16 0 12 0 336 56
Turkey--
Creece Cooperation 0 0 0 53 78. 18 46 ® 0 0 0 Conflict 0 0 16 66 628n 100 32 467° 22 16 0 0 0 0
Cyprus Ccrneration 27 0 0 18 52 10 27 96 12 0 0 0 30 0 Conflict 50° 0 0 390b 961c 152a 88a 250a 0 0 0 6 32 16
Cyprus*-
Greece Cooperation 14 0 41 14 46 20 38 32 20 6 28 14 12 6 Conflict 0006 66 6 0 0 6 0 6 0 82 0
Turkey Cooperation 14 0 14 6 24 6 0 0 20 6 0 6 18 6 Conflict 0 0 0 22 196 73 16 18 16 0 0 32 0 0
aActor engages in subversion against the target; they engage in small clashes (Air or Border) and police acts, skirmishes or blockades. bActor engages in limited hostile acts against the target; bombards military units or hits territory of the target; minor costs to the target. cActor initiates or engages in very hostile var actions against the target, and occupies territory of the target; causes many deaths and dislocations, and captures enemy soldiers. 230 Table 38 Bomber Performance Statistics
Maximus) Maximum Combat Ordance Cun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radlua Load Armament Armament Notes
BAC Canberra Mk.1/2/62 46000 lb 570 mph 2656 8000 lb 4-20mm Not Specified Max. speed is at 30,000 feet. The combat radius specified is for still air conditions.
BAG Canberra Mk.6 46000 lb 570 mph 3500 8000 lb 4-20nro Not Specified This plane Is similar to the Mk.2, but with additional fuel for a range of approximately 3500 miles.
DAC Canberra Mk.12 53000 lb 580 mph 4340 3000 lb 4-20mm Net Specified Max speed 16 at 40,000 feet. The combat radius specified is for still air conditions.
BAC Canberra Mk.20 53000 lb 580 mph 4340 8000 lb 4-20mm Not Specified This aircraft is Australian built and similar to the Mk.12.
B-25, B-25J, B-26C No Information Available These are World War II vintage aircraft
B-26 & B-26K Invader 43370 lb 397 mph 575 11000 lb 8-.50 in. Rockets Aircraft has eight .50 inch machine guns. It is u6ed mainly for counter-insurgency operations.
Hawker Siddelcy bucaneer 62000 lb 645 mph 2300 16000 lb Bullpup AAM Model Mk.50; this is a light strike bomber. Rockets
FB-111A 100000 lb 1905 mph 3800 37500 lb AAM,ASM Aircraft has both air-to-air and alr-to-surface missile capability.
Mirage IV-A 69665 lb 1676 mph 2000 8000 lb AAM Aircraft designed to deliver nuclear bombs.
Hawker Siddcley Vulcan Not Specified 692 mph 1725 21000 lb ASM Model Mk.i&2. Combat radius increases to 2300 miles in a high flight plan.
Sud Vatour II-B 44000 lb 680 mph N.A. 4000 lb Rockets Aircraft carries two 1000 lb bombs and up to ASM 240 SNEB rockets or ten bombs or one ASM.
Ilushin 11-28 44000 lb 580 mph 1550 4400 lb 4-23mo Aircraft ha6 two 23mm guns in a tall turret.
Tupolev Tu-4 No Information Available Is an old Soviet bomber designed similar to the B-29. Tuploev Tu-16 150000 lb 587 raph 3000 20000 lb 7-23ma The aircraft's range increase to 3975 miles with a 6600 lb load. Tuploev Tu-2 28224 lb 345 mph 1550 5000 lb 2-20mm Specified combat radius is with a 3000 lb ordsnce 231 load. The combat radius with a 5000 lb load is 880 miles. Tabic 39. Type I Aircraft Performance Statistics
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Gun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load_ Armament Armament Notes
F-4D/E/M 54600 lb 1524+mph 2300 13500 lb l-20mm AAM, ASM, Rocket The maximum armament load Is 16,000 lb.
F-5A 20677 lb 1066 mph 558 6200 lb 2-2Gmm AAM, ASM, Rocket Combat radius specified is with maximum fuel. Combat radius with maximum payload is 195 miles.
F-5B 20500 lb 1029 mph 570 6200 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius specified is with maximum fuel. Combat radius with maximum payload is 201 miles.
F-5E/M 24080 lb 1219 mph 875 7000 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius specified is with maximum fuel. Combat radius with maximum payload is 190 miles.
F-101A/C Voodoo 49000 lb 1371 mph 2800 N.A. 4-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 40,000 feet. (CF-101) Combat radius specified is with auxiliary tanks.
F-1013 49000 lb 1371 mph 2800 N.A. AAM, ASM, Rocket Maximum speed is at 40,000 feet. Combat radius specified is with auxiliary tanks. Aircraft used in bomber role.
F-104A thru G/J 28779 lb 1450 mph 745 4000 lb l-20ran AAM,ASM,Rocket (CF-104)
F-106A 35000 lb 1400+mph 1500 N.A. AAM Sophisticated Interceptor armed with nuclear AAM.
F-111A/C/D 91500 lb 1905 mph 3800 15000 lb l-20roa AAM,ASM,Rocket The 20mm gun is a multi-barrel cannon. Maximum armament load is 25,000 lb.
MIG-19 19840 lb 1066 mph 600 N.A. 3-23mm AAM,Rocket Ordance consists mainly of missiles and rockets probably totaling less than 1,000 lb.
MiG-21 20725 lb 1385 mph 1150 2000 lb l-23cm AAM,Rocket Gun armament is a 23mm twin barrel cannon.
MIG-23 28000 lb 1752 mph 1800 N.A. N.A. AAM Little is known about this aircraft in terms of its ordance capability.
Mirage IXI-B/D/E/O 29760 lb 1460 mph 745 2000 lb 2-30mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Performance characteristics are for the Mirage III-E. The Mirage III-B is a slightly lighter aircraft. The other two planes are versions of the Mirage III-E. 232 Mirage III-C/RZ 26015 lb 1430 mph 745 2000 lb 2-30mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet. Table 39. Cont’d
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Cun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
Mirage III-S 21165 lb 1430 mph 745 2000 lb 2-30cm AAM, ASM, Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet.
Mirage IV/IV-A 69665 lb 1676 mph 2000 8000 lb AAM Aircraft designed to deliver nuclear bombs.
Mirage V 29760 lb 1460 mph 805 8820 lb 2-30nxn AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius 16 based on a 2,000 lb ordance load in a hl-lo-hl flight. Combat radius is 400 miles for a lo-lo-lo flight.
Saab J-35 Draken 19800 lb 1371 mph N.A. 5000 lb 2-30mm AAM,ASM,Rocket
Saab J-37 Vlggen 35275 lb 1524 mph 620 7000 lb 1-30ma AAM, ASM, Rocket Ordance load i6 approximate. Combat radius is for a hl-lo-hi flight. Combat radius Is 310 miles for a lo-lo-lo flight.
Su-ll Flagon 35275 lb 1752 mph 450 N.A. N.A. AAM Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet.
Tu-28P 100000 lb N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. AAM Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet
Jaguar A/B/E/S 34000 lb 990 mph 818 10000 lb 2-30nia AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet. Combat radius is with external fuel in a hl-lo-hi flight. Combat radius is 507 miles on Internal fuel for same flight pattern.
BAC Lightning N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 2-30tnm AAM This aircraft is a high performance, all-veatner Interceptor. Unfortunately, performance statistici are not available at the present time.
F-9 (Shenyang) 22050 lb 1524 mph 500 1000 lb 3-30ma AAM,Rocket Maximum speed and combat radius are approximations true performance characteristics. 233 Table 40. Type II Aircraft Performance Statistics
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Cun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
F-100D 29500 lb 822 mph 575 7000 lb 4-20mm AAM,Rocket
F-100F 28000 lb 822 mph 575 6000 lb 2-39mm AAM, Rocket
F-102A 27000 lb 952 mph N.A. N.A. AAM Primary mission Is for interception.
Harrier GR Mk.l 25000+lb 737 mph N.A. 8000 lb 2-30mm AAM, Rocket Normal bomb load is 3,000 lb.
Hawker Hunter Hk.6/56 24000 lb 715 mph 575 4000 lb 4-30mm AAM Rocket Maximum speed Is at 36,000 feet.
Hawker Hunter Kk.9 24000 lb 715 mph 575 3000 lb 4-30mm AAM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet. Models Mk.51/52/53/58 are very similar to the Mk.9.
U.S. Bucaneer Mk.1/2/50 62000 lb 645 mph 2300 9000 lb N.A. AAM,ASM,Rocket
Saab J-32 Lansen 28660 lb 700 mph N.A. 1320 lb 4-20mm AAM.ASM,Rocket
Super Mystere B-2 22046 lb 745 mph 300 2200 lb 2-30mm AAM,Rocket Ordance load is total bomb weight in fighter' bomber role. Combat radius Is approximate; flying time is I hour.
Su-7 "Fitter A" 29750 lb 788 mph 900 4500 lb 2-30M Rocket Maximum speed at 36,000 feet without externa! stores Is 1,055 mph. In recent years, this aircraft has been produced as a varlable- geometery fighter making it a Type 1 aircraf
Vatour II-H 44000 lb 680 mph N.A. N.A. 4-30mm AAM,Rocket Designed for Interceptor role.
Yak-28P 35000 lb 838 mph 575 4400 lb N.A. AAM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 35,000 feet. 234 Table 41. Type III Alrcrafc Performance Statistics
Maxlr.um Maximum Combat Ordance Cun Missile Aircraft Take-Off-Weight Jjf2Lei- Radius Load Armament Armament Notes CA-27 17300 lb 672 mph 1150 2000 lb -30nm AAM,Rocket
CL-13B No Information
Dassault Ouragon MD 450 11660 lb 532 mph N.A. 1000 lb 4-20nsn Rocket Maximum speed is at 29,520 feet. Ordance load is estimated.
D.H. Vampire Mk.l 12170 lb 531 mph 600 2000 lb 4-20mm None Combat radius is estimated; aircraft is capable of 2 to 2.35 hours of flying time.
D,ll. Vampire FB.5/6/9 12360 lb 531 mph 344 2000 lb 4*20mn Rocket Combat radius i6 approximate.
D.H. Vampire FB.50 15800 lb 568 mph 705 N.A. 4-20rarn N.A. Combat radiu6 is with external tanks. Ordance load and missile armament are not given; only specification is that ordance i6 carried under the wing6.
D.H. Venom FB.4/50 12402 lb 531 toph 590 2000 lb 4-20nsn Rocket Combat radius is at sea level; 1145 miles at 30,000 feet. F-4U Corsair 12845 lb 450 mph N.A. 2000 lb 4-20mm Rocket
F-47D No Information (World War II aircraft)
F-51D 14000 lb 541 mph 155 4000 lb 6-12.7mm Rocket The 12.7mm gun armament is a machine gun.
F-80C 15336 lb 543 mph 900 2000 lb 6-.50 in. Rocket Combat radius is estimated; 3.2 hours flying time is specified. The gun armament 16 a .50 inch machine gun.
F-84F 25000 lb 650+mph 1000+ 4000 lb 6-.50 in. Rocket The gun armament is a .5- inch machine gun.
F-86D 16360 lb 670 mph 1250 N.A. 6-12.7nm Rocket The 12.7mm gun armament is a machine gun.
F-86E & CF-86E 16500 lb 670 mph 1250 2000 lb 6-12.7ma Rocket The 12.7mm gun armament is a machine gun.
F-86F/L 16860 lb 670 mph 1250 2000 lb 6-12.7cm Rocket The 12.7mm gun armament is a machine gun. This aircraft has new "data link" equipment which assists pilot in interception missions. 235
F-86K 16860 lb 6 7 0 m ph 1250 N.A. 4-20ma None Gun armament has a radar fire control system. Tabic 41. Cont'd
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Gun Missile Aircraft Take-Off-Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
FR-9 15770 lb 575 mph 520 2000 lb 4-20mm Rocket Maximum speed is at 20,000 feet.
Flat C91 R/N 11350 lb 650 mph 800 1500 lb 4-12.7mm AAM. Rocl The 12,7mm gun armament is a machine gun; two 30mm cannons may be mounted in place of the four machine guns.
Galeb G2-A 9210 lb 505 mph 770 650 lb 2-.501n. Rocket Combat radius is with tip tanks. The gun armament is .50 inch machine gun6.
Gloater Meteor Mk.4&9 15675 lb 575 mph 520 2000 lb 4-20mm Rocket Maximum 6peed Is at 20,000 feet.
Gnat Mk.l 8885 lb 714 mph 500 1000 lb 2-30mm Rocket
I1F-24 Marut 24048 lb 691 mph N.A. 4000 lb 4-30mm Rocket
J-29F 13360 lb 658 mph 1677 N.A. 4-20mm Rocket
Jantreb 10287 lb 510 mph 945 1100 lb 3-.501n. Rocket Maximum speed is at 19,680 feet. Combat radius is with tanks. The gun armament is .50 inch machine guns.
Kraguj (piston) 3580 lb 183 mph 500 500 lb 2-7.7mm Rocket Combat radius is with maximum fuel.
MB-326K 12000 lb 533 mph 167 2300 lb 2-30mm Rocket Combat radius is with a full ordance load.
MiG-15 14240 lb 670 mph 650 2000 lb 2-23mm Rocket Combat radius is approximate; two hours flying l-37mm time specified.
MIG-17 15500 lb 702 mph 510 1100 lb 2-23mm Rocket l-37mm
Mystere XV-A 16535 lb 615 mph 300. 2000 lb 2-30ima Rocket Combat radius is approximate; 70 minutes flying time Is specified.
Saab 17-A 8356 lb 270 mph N.A. N.A. None Rocket
Saab 105A 9920 lb 478 mph 870 1320 lb 2-30ms Rocket Maximum speed is at 20,000 feet. 236
Yak-25 25000 lb 724 mph N.A. N.A. 2-37mm Rocket Table 42. Attack/Counter-InBurgency Aircraft Performance Statistics
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Gun Missile Aircraft Take-Off-Veifiht Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
A-1D/E/H/J 21000 lb 365 mph 1500 6000 lb 2-20nra Rocket Maximum speed is at 15,000 feet.
A-4B 22500 lb 680 mph 2055 5000 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius is with tanks.
A-4E 24500 lb 674 mph 2055 8200 lb 2-20na» AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius is with tanks.
A-4F/K 27420 lb 593 mph 2055 10000 lb 2-20rra AAM, ASM,Rocket Combat radius is with tanks. Maximum 6peed is with a 4,000 lb load.
A-6A 60626 lb 686 mph 3225 18000 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Only combat radius specified is its ferry range.
A-6D 25000 lb 365 mph 1500 10500 lb 2-20mm Rocket Maximum speed is at 15,000 feet.
A-7D Corsair 11 42000 lb 698 mph 2871 15000 lb l-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket
A-37B 14000 lb 507 mph 460 4200 lb 1-7.62mm Rocket Maximum speed is at 16,000 feet.
AC-119G 80400 lb 250 mph 1980 N.A. 4-7.62mm COIN Gunship. Combat radius is with maximum 2-2Cmm payload. Aircrafts main armament is a variety of gun pods for close support missions.
AC-130E 175000 lb 384 mph 2420 N.A. 4-20mm COIN Gunship. Aircraft’s main armament is four 4-7.62csa 20 mm Vulcan cannons and four 7.62mm minlguns.
OV-lOA Bronco 14466 lb 281 mph 228 3600 lb 4-7.62mm Rocket Combat radius is for a maximum ordance with no loiter oyer the target. 237 Table A3. Trainer Statistics
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Gun Mi6Eile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
AL-60F5 4500 lb- 156 mph 645 None None None Combat radius Is with maximum fuel.
AM-3C 3750 lb 173 mph 615 750 lb 2-7.62csn ASM,Rocket Combat radius is at 5,000 feet with a 30 minute reserve. The gun armament is externally mounted. Maximum speed is at 8,000 feet.
AT-25 Xavante 11500 lb 483 mph 403 4000 lb 7.62mm ASM,Rocket Combat radius is approximate. The gun armament is an external 7.62mm or 12.7ncn gun pod.
AU-23A Pacemaker 6100 lb 174 mph 634 2000 lb 2-MYU470 Rocket The gun armament consists of two MYU-470 mini- guna.
BAC 145 TMk.5 9200 lb 440 mph 900 1000 lb 4-7.62mra ASM,Rocket Combat radius is with tip tanks at 184 mph.
BAG 167 10500 lb 645 mph 115 3000 lb 4-7.62ca Rocket Combat radius la with a 2740 lb ordance load.
BAC Jet Provoat Mk.52/53 7400 lb 410 mph 700 360 lb 2-.303in. Rocket Maximum speed 16 at 20,000 feet. Combat radius is with maximum fuel at 30,000 feet.
BAC T.55 Lightning N.A. N.A. N.A. 6000 lb 2-30ram AAM,ASM,Rocket
CA-25 Kinjeel 4265 lb 186 mph 3^hr. None None None Combat radius is 3^ hours at 158mph, or approximately 553 miles.
CL-41G 11288 lb 480 mph 920 4000 lb pods AAM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 28,500 feet without external stores. Combat radius is 1,210 miles with external tanks.
Canberra T-4 46000 lb 570 mph 2656 6000 lb optional None Gun armament may Include 4-20mm cannons in rear section of weapons bay. Aircraft is normally used in bomber mission role.
D.H. Chipmunk 2014 lb 138 mph 280 None None None
DHC-2 Beaver 5100 lb 140 mph 778 None None None
D.ll. Vampire T-55 12390 lb 549 mph 623 2000 lb A-20nm Rocket Combat radius specified is for still air conditions. 238 Do-27 3460 lb 155 mph 540 None Ncne None Table 43. Cont*d
Maximum Maximum Ccxnbat Ordance Gun Mi68lle Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radiu6 Load Armament Armament Note6
F-100F 28000 lb 822 mph 575 6000 lb 2-M39 AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 35,000 feet.
Fokker S-14 12230 lb 536 mph 565 200 lb 2-20na Rocket Maximum speed is at 9,820 feet.
HA-200D Saeta 7385 lb 404 mph 930 2000 lb 2-7aa Rocket Combat radius is with maximum fuel at 29,500 feet.
I1-28U 44000 lb 580 mph 1490 4400 lb 2-23mm Ordance load is for regular version; trainer model considered to be less but not specified.
Jaguar E 34000 lb 990 mph 818 10000 lb 2-30mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet. Combat radius is with external fuel and a hi-lo-hi flight pattern. Combat radius is 507 miles with intern fuel and the same pattern.
L-29 Delfin 7804 lb 407 mph 397 220 lb 2-7.62mm Rocket Maximum speed is at 16,400 feet.
M3-326 12000 lb 533 mph 167 4000 lb 2-30mm ASM,Rocket Combat radius is with 2,320 lb ordance load in a low flight pattern for the duration of the mission.
MiG-15UTI 14240 lb 670 mph 650 2000 lb Rocket
MIG-17UTI 15500 lb 702 mph 510 1100 lb Rocket
M1G-19UTI 19840 lb 1066 mph 850 N.A. AAM,ASM,Rocket Ordance consists mainly of missiles and rockets probably totaling less than 1,000 lb.
MiG-21UTI 20725 lb 1385 mph 1150 2000 lb AAM, ASM, Rocket
Mirage III-B 22050 lb 1752 mph 365 2000 lb 2-30mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Combat radius is at 59,000 feet flying at 1371 mph.
MS-733 3900 lb 162 mph 4 hra. 220 lb 2-7.5mn Rocket Combat radius is 4 hours cruising at 143 mph, or approximately 572 miles.
MS-760 8820 lb 416 mph 1240 None None None Maximum speed is at 29,500 feet. Combat radius is with maximum fuel. 239 NF-5B 20500 lb 1021 mph 570 6200 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 36,000 feet. Combat radius is with a 1060 lb ordance load. Table 43. Cont'd
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Gun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
P-148 2645 lb 138 mph 573 None None None
P-149D 3704 lb 177 mph 680 None None None Combat radius includes \ hour reserve.
PL-1 1326 lb 205 mph 600 None None None Combat radius is with maximum fuel.
SF-260W 2998 lb 271 mph 895 660 lb 2-7.62mm Rocket Combat radius is with maximum fuel. SF-260MZ performance statistics are similar except that the aircraft has no provisions for armaments.
Sk-6 Bulldog (Series 120) 2350 lb 241 mph 621 640 lb optional Rocket Gun armament is external machine-gun pods if desired.
Su-7B Moujik 29750 lb 788 mph 300 2750 lb 2-30mm Rocket
Saab 91D Safir 2660 lb 165 mph 660 None None None
Saab 105 8820 lb 490 mph 1300 1500 lb 2-20mm AAM,ASM,Rocket Maximum speed 16 at 26,000 feet. Combat radius is at 385 mph.
Sud Maglster CM.170 7187 lb 451 mph 490 220 lb 2-7.62cra AAM, ASM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 30,000 feet. Combat radius Is at 30,000 feet.
T-2 13179 lb 522 mph 1047 640 lb Rocket Maximum speed is at 25,000 feet.
T-6 Harvard 5248 lb 205 mph 750 300 lb 2-.30cal. Ordance load 16 estimated. Gun armament is .30 caliber machine-guns.
T-6G Texan No Information
T-ll Kansan No Information (World War II aircraft)
T-28 6759 lb 285 mph 1008 Minimum .50inch Rocket Ordance load is not specified, but minimal at best.
T-28P 8486 lb 346 mph 1060 1000 lb .50inch Rocket Combat radius is at 10,000 feet. Gun armament is .50 inch machine-gun.
T-33/33A 11965 lb 600 mph 3.12hrs. 2-.50inch Combat radius only specified as 3.12 hours. 240 Aircraft's only ordance is two .50 inch machine- guns. Table A3. Cont'd
Maximum Maximum Combat Ordance Cun Missile Aircraft Take-Off Weight Speed Radius Load Armament Armament Notes
T-34A/B Mentor 2950 lb 189 mph 728 650 lb 2-.50inch Rocket Gun armament Is a .50 inch machine-gun.
T-37B/C 8007 lb 425 mph 831 500 lb pods AAM,Rocket Maximum speed is at 20,000 feet. Gun armamei is carried underving in the fora of .50 inch machine-gun pods.
T-41A 2300 lb 174 mph 695 None None None
T-42A 5100 lb 236 mph 1085 None None None Four/six seat cabin monoplane
T-43A 34790 lb 1524 mph 2995 None None None Navigation trainer
TF-86F 16500 lb 670 mph 535 2000 lb 2-.501nch Rocket Ordance load of 2000 lb is only possible by eliminating external tank6.
TF-104 28779 lb 1450 mph 593 3000 lb l-20mm AAM, ASM, Rocket Gun armament is a 20mm Vulcan cannon.
Yak-11 5512 lb 286 mph 795 N.A. 1 Gun armament is one machine-gun.
Yak-18 2910 lb 136 mph 435 None None None 241 Table 45. National Force Structure Capability - Latin America
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974- 1975 Number Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number_____ Ordance dumber Ordance Number Ordance
Cuba IV IV IV IV
Bomber Type I 50 2,000 N.I. N.I. 50 2,000 80 2,000 80 2,000 40 2,000 40 2,000 40 2,000 40 2,000 Type II Type III 75 1,100 75 1,100 75 1,100 70 1,100 20 2 ,0 0 0 20 2,000 20 2,000 15 2, COO
Tctal Ordance: 185 302,500 185 302,500 215 362,500 205 347,000 Type I 90 180,000 90 180,000 120 240,000 120 240,000 Tvpe II Type III 95 122,500 95 122,500 95 122,500 85 107,000
Haiti V V VII V
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 6 4,000 N.I. N.I. 6 4,000 6 4,000
Total Ordance: 6 24,000 6 24,000 6 24,000 Type III 6 24,000 6 24,000 6 24,000
Dominican Republic II II II II
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 20' 4,000 N.I. N.I. 20 4,000 20 4,000 20 4,000 20 2 ,0 0 0 20 2,000 10 2,000 10 2,000
Total Ordance: 40 120,000 40 120,000 30 100,000 30 100,000 Type III 40 120,000 40 120,000 30 100,000 30 100,000
boJN N3 Table 45. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number_____ Ordance Number Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance
Brazil cont'd
Total Ordance: 59 325.000 90 270.000 71 217,000 53 176.500 Bomber 18 198.000 15 165.000 15 165,000 12 132,000 Type I 16 32,000 16 32,000 Type III 26 52.000 Attack 15 75.000 15 75.000 Trainer 60 30.000 40 20,000 25 12,500
Bolivia IV IV IV IV
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 12 4,000 N.I. N.I. 12 4,000 10 4,000 10 4.000 3 2.000 Trainer 3 300 13 300 13 300 12 300 10 minimal 8 minimal 10 minimal 6 minimal
Total Ordance: 15 48,900 25 51,900 23 43,900 25 49,600 Type III 12 48,000 12 48,000 10 40,000 13 46,000 Trainer 3 900 13 3,900 13 3,900 12 3,600
Paraguay VI VI VI VI
Bomber Type I Type II Type III Trainer N.A. N.I. N.I. N.A. 6 N.A. 10 N.A.
Chile II III Ill II
Bomber 15 11,000 N.I. N.I. 12 11,000 12 11,000 10 11,000 Type I Type II 18 3.000 18 3.000 18 3,000 32 3,000 ^ Type III 20 2.000 11 2.000 11 2,000 ■C- LO Table 45. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance
Chile cont'd
Total Ordance: 53 259,000 41 208,000 41 208,000 42 217,000 Bomber 15 165,000 12 132,000 12 132,000 10 121,000 Type II 18 54,000 18 54,000 18 54,000 32 96,000 Typo III 20 40,000 11 22,000 11 22,000
Argentina III III III II
Bomber 12 8,000 N.I. N.I. 12 8,000 2 8,000 2 8,000 10 8,000 9 8,000 Type I 12 2,000 12 2,000 Type II Type III 45 2,000 20 2,000 20 2,000 20 2,000 Attack 25 5,000 47 5,000 47 5,000 47 5,000
Total Ordance: 82 311,000 79 371,000 91 395,000 90 337,000 3cmbcr 12 96,000 12 96,000 12 96,000 11 88,000 Type I 12 24,000 12 24,000 Type III 45 90,000 20 40,000 20 40,000 20 40,000 Attack 25 125,000 47 235,000 47 235,000 47 235,000
Uruguay V VI VI V
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 14 2,000 N.I. N.I. 6 2,000 Trainer 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal
Total Ordance: 14 28,000 6 12,000 Type lit 14 28,000 6 12,000 244
I, Table 45, Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number Ordance Kutnber Ordance Mexico V V Bomber Type I Type II Type III 1 3 2,000 N.I. N.I. 12 2,000 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 Trainer 45 300 4 5 3 0 0 45 300 45 300 30 1,000 32 1,000 32 1 , 0 0 0 32 1 , 0 0 0 15 N.A. 13 N-A- 13 N.A. 13 N.A. Tctal Ordance: 90 73,500 89 69,500 89 69,500 89 Type III 69,500 15 30,000 1 2 24,000 1 2 24,000 Trainer 12 24,000 4 5 13,500 4 5 13,500 45 13,500 45 13,500 30 30,000 3 2 32,000 32 32,000 32 32,000
Guatemala III v III III Bomber 5 11,000 N.I. N.I. 4 1 1 , 0 0 0 4 Type I 1 1 , 0 0 0 Type II Type III U 4,000 8 4,000 6 4,000 Attack 6 4,000 8 4,200 8 4,200 8 4,200 Total Ordance: 1 6 99,000 16 65,600 18 101,600 18 101,600 Bomber 5 55,000 4 44,000 4 44,000 Type III 11 44,000 8 32,000 6 24,000 6 24,000 8 33,600 8 33,600 8 33,600
Honduras III v V V Bomber Type I Type II
Type III 6 12 2,000 N.I. N.I. 2,000 6 2 , 0 0 0 1 1 2 , 0 0 0 6 4,000 5 4,000
Total Ordance: 18 48,000 11 32,000 6 1 2 , 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 Type III 18 48,000 1 1 32,000 6 1 2 , 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 Table 45. Conc'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance
111 Salvador V V V III
Bomber Type I Typo II Type III 6 4,000 N.I. N.I. 10 4,000 6 4,000 6 4,000 6 2,000 4 2,000 4 2,000 4 2,000
Total Ordance: 12 36,000 14 48,000 10 32,000 10 32,000 Type III 12 36,000 14 48,000 10 32,000 10 32,000
Nicaragua III III III III
Bomber 6 11,000 N.I. N.I. 4 11,000 4 11,000 5 11,000 Type I Type 11 Type III 15 4,000 8 N.A. Trainer 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal 6 minimal
Total Ordance: 21 126,000 4 44,000 4 44,000 5 55,000 Bomber 6 66,000 4 44,000 4 44,000 5 55,000 Type III 15 60,000
Colombia XI II IV IV
Bomber 8 11,000 N.I. N.I. 8 11,000 Type I 4 2,000 4 2,000 4 2,000 14 8,820 14 8,820 14 8,820 Type II Type III 2 2,000 6 2,000 6 N.A.
Total Ordance: 10 92,000 32 231,480 18 131,480 18 131,480 Bomber 8 88,000 8 88,000 Type I 18 131,480 18 131,480 18 131,480 246 Type III 2 4,000 o 12,000 Table 45. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance N amber______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance
Ecuador II II II Bomber 6 8,000 N.I. N.I. 5 8,000 5 8,000 5 8,000 Type I Type II Type III 10 2,000 8 2 ,0 0 0 8 2 ,0 0 0 8 2,000 12 2,000 10 2 ,0 0 0 8 3,000
Total Ordance: 28 92,000 23 76,000 13 56,000 21 80,000 Bomber 6 48,000 5 40,000 5 40,000 5 40.000 Type III 22 44,000 18 36,000 8 16,000 16 40.000
Peril II II II Bomber 22 8,000 N.I. N.I. 20 8,000 15 8,000 15 8,000 8 11,000 5 11,000 Type I 14 8,820 14 8,820 14 8,820 14 8,820 Type II 16 3,000 6 3,000 6 3,000 6 3.000 Type III 20 2,000 10 2,000 10 2,000 10 2.000 10 2,000 10 N.A.
Total Ordance: 90 495,480 50 321,480 45 281,480 50 336,480 Bomber 30 264,000 20 160,000 15 120,000 20 175,000 Type I 14 123,480 14 123,480 14 123,480 14 123,460 Type II 16 43,000 6 18,000 6 18,000 6 18,000 Type III 30 60,000 10 20,000 10 20,000 10 20,000
Brazil II II II
Bomber 18 11,000 N.I. N.I. 15 11,000 15 11,000 12 11,000 Type I 16 2,000 16 2,000 Type II Type III 26 2,000 Attack 15 5,000 15 5,000 Trainer 54 minimal 15 minimal 20 minimal 60 500 40 500 25 500 to ■P' Table 45. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance
Venezuela III H I III III
Bomber 14 8,000 N.I. N.I. 15 8,000 30 8,000 26 8,000 6 5,000 15 5,000 15 5,000 15 5,000
Type I 16 6,200 18 6,200 20 6,200 Type II Type III 74 2.000 50 2,000 50 2,000 24 2,000 15 2,000 20 2 ,0 0 0 Attack 16 3,600 16 3,600
Total Ordance: 138 378,000 61 324,200 129 584,200 127 564,600 Bomber 20 142,000 30 195,000 45 315,000 41 283,000 Type I 16 99,200 18 111,600 20 124,000 Type III 118 236,000 15 30,000 50 100,000 50 100,000 Attack 16 57,600 16 57,600
to ■tt- OO Table 46. Nacionol Force Structure Capability - Africa
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 K.u7lbeS______Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Morocco IV IV IV IV IV
Bomber Type I 10 6,200 14 6.200 24 6,200 24 6,200 24 6,200 Type II Type III Trainer 30 220 24 220 24 220 24 220 24 220
Total Ordance: 40 68,600 38 92,080 48 154,080 48 154,080 48 154,060 Type I 10 62,000 14 86,800 24 148,800 24 148,800 24 148,800 Trainer 30 6,600 24 5,280 24 5,280 24 5,280 24 5,280
Algeria III III III III m
3 ember 30 4,400 24 4,400 30 4,400 30 4,400 30 4,400 Type I 60 2,000 30 2,000 30 2,000 35 2,000 35 2,000 Type II 20 4,500 20 4,500 Type III 30 2,000 20 2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 30 1,100 40 1,100 70 1,100 70 1,100 70 1,100 Trainer 28 220 26 220 26 220 26 220
Total Ordance: 150 345,000 142 255,760 183 324,720 206 424,720 206 424,720 Boeder 30 132,000 24 105,600 30 132,000 30 132,000 30 132,000 Type I 60 120,000 30 60,000 30 60,000 35 70,000 35 70,000 Type II 2 0 90,000 20 90,000 Type III 60 93,000 60 84,000 95 127,000 95 127,000 95 127,000 Trainer 28 6,160 26 5,720 26 5,720 26 5,720
Tunisia IV IV IV IV IV
Bomber ’ Type I Type II Type III 12 2,000 12 2,000 12 2,000 12 2,000 12 2,000 Trainer 14 2,300 8 2,300 8 2,300 8 2,300 8 2,300
Total Ordance: 26 56,200 20 42,400 20 42,400 20 42,400 20 42,400 249 Type III 12 24,000 12 24,000 12 24,000 12 24,000 12 24,000 Trainer 14 32,200 8 18,400 8 18,400 8 18,400 8 18,400 Table ^6, Cont'd
1S70-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Libya XV IV IV IV II Bomber Type I 7 6,200 7 6,200 10 6,200 9 6,200 12 2 ,0 0 0 35 2,000 42 2.000 Type II 20 8,820 Type III
Total Ordance: 7 43 ,400 7 43,400 22 84,000 44 125,800 62 260,400 Type I 7 43,400 7 43,400 22 84,000 44 125,800 62 260,400
Sudan IV IV IV IV IV Bomber Type I 16 2,000 16 2,000 16 2,000 20 2 ,0 0 0 Type II 20 2,000 Type III 8 1,100 17 1,100 Trainer 17 1,100 10 1,000 S 1,000 5 1,000 5 1,000 5 1,000
Total Ordance: 26 42,000 21 37,000 29 45,800 42 63,700 Type I 42 63,700 16 32,000 16 32,000 16 32,000 20 40,000 Type III 20 40,000 8 8,800 17 18,700 17 18,700 Trainer 10 10,000 5 5,000 5 5,000 5 5,000 5 5,000
Hall V V V V Bomber N.I. N.I. Type I Type II Type III 4 2,000 6 1,100 6 1,100 1 2 ,0 0 0 3 1,100 6 1,100
Total Ordance: 7 11,300 6 6,600 6 6,600 7 8,600 Type III 7 11,300 6 6,600 6 6,600 7 8,600
hO Senegal VII N.I. N.I. VII VII VII Ul o Table 46. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance
Dahomey VIII N.I. N.I. VII VII VIII
Mauritania VI N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. VIII
Niger VIII N.I. N.I. VIII VIII VIII
Ivorv Coast VII VII VII VII VII
Guinea V V V V V
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 8 1,100 S 1,100 10 1,100 8 1,100 8 1,100
Total Ordance: 8 8,800 5 5,500 10 11,000 8 8,800 8 8,800 Type III 8 8,800 5 5,500 10 11,000 8 8,800 8 8,800
Ghana VI VI VI VI VI
Bomber Type I Type II Type III Trainer 6 4,000 6 4,000
Total Ordance: 6 24,000 6 24,000 Trainer 6 24,000 6 24,000
Togo VIII N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. VII
Cameroun VII N.I. N.I. VII VII VI Table 46. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number_____ Ordance
Nigeria III III III III III
Bomber 3 4,400 6 4,400 6 4,400 6 4,400 6 4,400 Type I Type II Type III 10 1,100 8 1,100 12 1,100 12 1,100 21 1,100 5 2,000 Trainer 10 220 8 220 10 220 10 220 15 220
Total Ordance: 23 26,400 22 36,960 28 41,800 28 41,800 42 52,800 Bomber 3 13,200 6 26,400 6 26,400 6 26,400 6 26,400 Type III 10 11,000 8 8,800 12 13,200 12 13,200 21 23,100 Trainer 10 2,200 8 1,760 10 2,200 10 2,200 15 3,300
Chad VII N.I. N.I. VII VII VIII
Congo. People's Republic VII N.I. N.I. VII VII VII
Zaire III V V V V Bcmber 9 11,000 Type I Type II Type III 15 4,000 17 4,000 15 4,000 15 4,000 17 4,000 Trainer 16 minimal 5 minimal 5 minimal 5 minimal 5 minimal 32 N.A. 8 N.A. 21 N.A. 8 N.A. 6 N.A.
Total Ordance: 24 159,000 17 68,000 15 60,000 15 60,000 17 68,000 Bomber 9 99,000 Type III 15 60,000 17 68,000 15 60,000 15 60,000 17 68,000 252 Table 46. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance
Uganda
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 18 1,100 7 1,100 7 1,100 7 1,100 29 1,100 Trainer 12 220 12 220 14 220 14 220 10 220
Total Ordance: 30 22,440 19 10,340 21 10,780 21 10,780 39 34,100 Type III 18 19,800 7 7,700 7 7,700 7 7,700 29 31,900 Trainer 12 2,640 12 2,640 14 3,080 14 3,080 10 2,200
Kenya VI V V V V
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 6 3,000 6 3,000 6 3,000 6 3,000 Trainer 5 640 5 640
Total Ordance: 6 18,000 6 18,000 11 21,200 11 21,200 Type III 6 18,000 6 18,000 6 18,000 6 18,000 Trainer 5 3,200 5 3,200
Tanzania VI VI VI VI IV
lornber Type I 12 1,000 (est.) Type II ?ype III 12 1,100
,'otal Ordance: 24 25,200 (est.) .'ype X 12 12,000 (est.) ’ype III 12 13,200 253 Table 46. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance
Somalia v V V I U h i
Btxnber some 4,400 4 4,400 TyPe 1 6 1 , 0 0 0 (esc.) Type II Type ITT 18 1,100 20 1,100 2 2,000 2 2,000 2 2,000 19 1 , 1 0 0 19 1 , 1 0 0 19 1,100
Total Ordance: 18 19,800 20 22,000 21 24,900 21 24,900 31 48 500 Bomber 4 17>600 TyPe 1 6 6,000 (esc.) Type H I 18 19,800 20 22,000 21 24,900 21 24,900 21 24,900
Ethiopia III H I h i m u
Bomber 6 8,000 4 8,000 4 3,000 4 8,000 4 8,000 Type I 12 6,200 10 6,200 15 6,200 15 6,200 8 6,200 Type II Type III 12 2,000 11 2,000 12 2,000 12 2,000 12 2,000 9 N.A. 8 N.A. 9 N.A. 8 N.A.
Total Ordance: 30 146,400 24 116,000 31 149,000 31 149,000 24 105,600 Bomber 4 48,000 4 32,000 4 32,000 4 32,000 4 32,000 Type X 12 74,400 10 62,000 15 93,000 15 93,000 8 49,600 Type III 12 24,000 11 22,000 12 24,000 12 24,000 12 24,000
Znmb la VI V V V V
Bomber Type I Type IX Type III 4 1,100 4 1,100 4 1,100 4 1,100 Trainer 6 4,000 6 4,000 6 4,000
Total Ordance: 4 4,400 10 28,400 10 28,400 10 28,400 Type III 4 4,400 4 4,400 4 4,400 4 4,400
Trainer 6 24,000 6 24,000 6 24,000 254 Table 46. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 A974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Rhodesia III III III III III Bomber 11 8,000 11 8,000 10 8,000 10 8,000 9 8,000 Type I Type II 12 3,000 12 3,000 12 3,000 12 3,000 12 3,000 Type III 12 2,000 12 2,000 11 2,000 11 2,000 11 2,000 Total Ordance: 35 148,000 35 148,000 33 138,000 33 138,000 32 130,000 Bomber 11 88,000 11 88,000 10 80,000 10 80,000 9 72,000 Tvpe II 12 36,000 12 36,000 12 36,000 12 36,000 12 36,000 Type III 12 24,000 12 24,000 11 22,000 11 22,000 11 22,000
Union of South Africa II II II II II Bcxnber 10 8,000 16 8,000 9 8,000 6 8,000 6 8,000 15 16,000 15 :6,000 14 16,000 13 16,000 10 16,000 3 6,000 3 6,000 Type I 36 2,000 40 2,000 40 2,000 36 2,000 64 2,000 Type II Type III 30 2,000 35 2,000 21 2,000 18 N.A. 40 2,000 5 2,000 Trainer 85 4,000 50 4,000 75 4,000 some 4,000 some 4,000 20 2,000 150 300 200 300 Total Ordance: 386 957,000 161 728,000 359 778,000 58 346,000 83 354,000 Bomber 25 320,000 31 368,000 23 296,000 22 274,000 19 226,000 Type I 36 72,000 40 80,000 40 80,000 36 72,000 64 128,000 Type III 70 140,000 40 80,000 21 42,000 Trainer 255 425,000 50 200,000 275 360,000
Malagasy Republic VII VIII VII VII
Rwanda VIII N.I. N.I. VII VII VII Lnto Upper Volta VIII N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. VIII Oi Tabic 47. National Force Structure Capability - The Middle East
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance
Iran II II II II II Bomber Type I 115 6,200 100 6,200 120 6,200 80 6,200 116 6,200 32 13,500 40 13,500 40 13,500 64 13,500 100 13,500 Type II Type III 20 2,000 20 2,000
Total Ordance: 167 1,185,000 160 1,200,000 160 1,284,000 144 1,360,000 216 2,069,200 Type I 160 1,145,000 140 1,160,000 160 1,284,000 144 1,360,000 216 2,069,200 Type III 20 40,000 20 40,000
Iraq III III III III III
Bomber 8 20,000 9 20,000 9 20,000 8 20,000 8 2 0,0 00 10 4,400 12 4,400 Type I 60 2,000 85 2,000 80 2,000 90 2,000 100 2,000 Type II 30 4,500 48 4,500 48 4,500 60 4,500 60 4,500 36 3,000 35 3,000 32 3,000 36 3,000 20 3,000 Type III 45 1,100 15 1,100 20 1,100 30 1,100 30 1,100
Total Ordance: 189 616,500 204 740,300 189 674,000 224 751,000 218 723,000 Bomber 18 204,000 21 232,800 9 180,000 8 160,000 8 160,000 Type I 60 120,000 85 170,000 80 160,000 90 180,000 100 200,000 Type II 66 243,000 83 321,000 80 312,000 96 378,000 80 330,000 Type III 45 49,500 15 16,500 20 22,000 30 33,000 30 33,000
Egypt III III III III III
Bomber 15 20,000 18 20,000 18 20,000 25 20,000 25 20,000 Type I 110 2,000 200 2,000 220 2,000 210 2,000 200 2,000 80 2,000 Type II 105 4,500 110 4,500 120 4,500 80 4,500 100 4,500 Type III 120 1,100 200 1,100 200 1,100 100 1,100 100 1,100
Total Ordance 450 1,284,500 528 1,455,000 558 1,560,000 415 1,390,000 425 1,460,000 Bomber 15 300,000 18 360,000 18 360,000 25 500,000 25 500,000 256 Type I 190 330,000 200 600.000 220 440,000 210 420,000 200 400,000 Type II 105 472,000 110 495,000 120 540.000 80 360,000 100 450,000 Type III 120 132,000 200 220,000 200 220,000 100 110,000 100 110,000 Table 47• Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Syria IV IV IV III III
Bomber some 4,400 some 4,400 Type I 90 2,000 100 2,000 100 2,000 200 2,000 200 2,000 Type II 40 4,500 30 4,500 30 4,500 30 4,500 30 4,500 Type III 70 1,100 80 1,100 80 1,100 80 1,100 60 1,100
Total Ordance: 200 437.000 210 423.000 210 423.000 310 623.000 290 601,000 Bomber N.A. N.A. Type I 90 180.000 100 200.000 100 200.000 200 400.000 200 400.000 Type II 40 180,000 30 135,000 30 135,000 30 135.000 30 135.000 Type III 70 77,000 80 88,000 80 88,000 80 88,000 60 66,000
Lebanon IV IV IV IV IV E ember Type I 12 2,000 9 2,000 10 2,000 10 2 ,0 0 0 10 2,000 Type II 11 4.000 12 4,000 8 4,000 8 4,000 3 4,000 5 3.000 Type III 10 2.000
Total Ordance: 33 103,000 21 66,000 18 52.000 18 52.000 18 52.000 Type I 12 24.000 9 18,000 10 20.000 10 20.000 10 20.000 Type II 16 59.000 14 48,000 8 32,000 8 32,000 8 32,000 Type III 10 20.000
Jordan IV IV IV IV IV Bomber Type I 18 4.000 15 4.000 15 4.000 20 4.000 18 4.000 Type II 22 3.000 18 3.000 35 3.000 32 3.000 32 3.000 Type III 4 2 .0 0 0
Total Ordance: 44 146,000 33 114,000 50 165.000 52 176,000 50 168,000 Tyre I 18 72.000 15 60,000 15 60,000 20 80,000 18 72.000 Type II 22 66.000 18 54,000 35 105.000 32 96,000 32 96.000 Typo III 4 8,000 257 Table 47. Corn*d
1970- 1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance
Israel II I I I I
Bomber 15 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 Type I 65 2,000 60 2,000 50 2,000 59 2,000 55 2,000 36 13,500 81 13,500 96 13,500 101 13,500 156 13,500 Type II 12 2,200 9 2,200 9 2,200 18 2,200 12 2,200 Type III 35 2,000 27 2,000 27 2,000 23 2,000 23 2,000 45 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 At. Cack 67 8,200 72 8,200 125 8,200 160 8,200 180 8,200
Total Ordance: 275 1,366,800 289 1,947,300 347 2,564,800 401 2,938,600 466 3,834,400 Bomber 15 60,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 10 40,000 Type I 101 616,000 141 1.213,500 146 1,396,000 160 1,471,000 211 2,216,000 Type II 12 26,400 9 19,800 9 19,800 18 39,600 12 26,400 Type III 80 115,000 57 84,000 57 84,000 53 76,000 53 76,000 Attack 67 549,000 72 590,000 125 1,025,000 160 1,312,000 180 1,476,000
Saudi Arabia III IV IV IV IV
Bomber 3 5,000 Type I 35 7,000 20 7,000 35 7,000 35 7,000 35 7,000 14 7,000 20 6,200 Type II Type III 16 2,000 15 2,000 15 2,000 15 2,000 24 3,000 27 3,000 21 3,000 20 3,000 21 3,000
Total Ordance: 78 349,000 62 251,000 71 33S.000 70 335,000 90 530,000 Bomber 3 15,000 Type I 35 245,000 20 140,000 35 245,000 35 245,000 69 467,000 Type III 40 104,000 42 111,000 36 93,000 35 90,000 21 63,000
Yemen III V IV
Bomber 12 4,400 N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. Type I 25 2,000 12 2,000
Type II 258 Type III 12 1,100 15 1,100 15 1,100 4 3,000 4 3,000 Tabic 47. Cont'd
1970-•1971 1971-1972 1972- 1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Numbcr Ordance Number______Ordance Number Ordance Yemen cont'd
Total Ordance: 49 126,000 N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. 19 28,500 31 52,500 Bomber 12 52,800 Type I 25 50,000 12 24,000 Type III 12 13,200 19 28,500 19 28,500
Kuwait IV IV IV IV Eoraber Type I 12 7,000 N.I. N.I. 14 7,000 12 7,000 12 7,000 Type II 4 3,000 6 3,000 8 3,000 4 3,000 Type III 6 3,000 6 3,000 10 3,000 12 3,000
Total Ordance: 22 114,000 26 134,000 30 138,000 28 132,000 Type I 12 84,000 14 98,000 12 84,000 12 84,000 Type II 4 12,000 6 18,000 8 24,000 4 12,000 Type III 6 18,000 6 18,000 10 30,000 12 36,000 259 Table £8. National Force Structure Capability - Asia
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Afghanistan III III III III III
Bomber 10 4,400 10 4,400 10 4,400 10 4,400 30 4,400 Type I 30 2,000 30 2,000 30 2,000 30 2,000 30 2,000 20 1,000 (eat.) 12 1,000 | Type II 24 4,500 24 4,500 20 4,500 Type III 70 1,100 48 1,100 48 1,100 48 1,100 55 1,100 25 1,100
Total Ordance: 130 201,000 100 168,000 112 264,000 112 264,000 160 370,000 Bomber 10 44,000 10 44,000 10 44,000 10 44,000 30 132,000 Type I 50 80,000 42 72,000 30 60,000 30 60,000 30 60,000 Type II 24 108,000 24 108,000 20 90,000 Type III 70 77,000 48 52,800 48 52,800 48 52,800 80 88,000
People'a Republic of China III III III III III
Bomber 150 4,400 150 4,400 200 4,400 200 4,400 200 4,400 12 N.A. few N.A. feu N.A. few N.A. few N.A. 12 20,000 30 20,000 100 20,000 100 20,000 50 20,000 100 100 Type I 50 2,000 50 2,000 75 2,000 75 2,000 50 2,000 500 1,000 (eat.) 800 1,000 1000 1,000 1000 1,000 1300 1,000 Type II 200 300 400 Type III 1200 1,100 1700 1,100 1700 1,100 1700 1,100 1700 1,100
Total Ordance: 1912 2,820,000 2730 4,030,000 3275 6,100,000 3375 6,200.000 3700 5,550,000 Bomber 162 900,000 180 1,260,000 300 2,880,000 300 2.880,000 250 1,890,000 Type I 550 600,000 850 900,000 1075 1,150,000 1075 1,150,000 1350 1,400,000 Type II 200 200,000 300 300,000 400 400,000 Type III 1200 1,320,000 1700 1,870,000 1700 1,870,000 1700 1,870,000 1700 1,870,000
Mongolia V VI VI V VI 260 Bomber Type I Type II Type III 10 2,000 10 2,000
Total Ordance: 10 20,000 10 20,000 Type III 10 20,000 10 20,000 Table 48. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Japan II II II II II Bomber Type X 195 4,000 175 4,000 160 4,000 150 4,000 130 4,000 20 13,500 55 13,500 Type II Type III 315 2,000 200 2,000 246 2,000 216 2,000 200 2,000
Total Ordance: 510 1,410,000 375 1,100,000 306 1,132,000 386 1,302,000 385 1,662,500 Type I 195 780,000 175 700,000 160 640,000 170 870,000 185 1,262,500 Type III 315 630,000 200 400,000 246 492,000 216 432,000 200 400,000
India II II II II II
Bomber 50 8,000 54 8,000 72 8,000 80 8,000 60 8,000 Type I 100 2,000 126 2,000 144 2,000 220 2,000 220 2,000 Type II 100 4,500 90 4,500 96 4,500 96 4,500 77 4,500 150 4,000 150 4,000 150 4,000 150 4,000 130 4,000 Type III 200 1,000 200 1,000 200 1,000 200 1,000 180 1,000 90 4,000 50 4,000 50 4,000 50 4,000 50 4,000 80 2,000 36 2,000 36 2,000 30 2,000 50 2,000
Total Ordance: 820 2,470,000 706 2,161,000 748 2,368,000 826 2,572,000 617 2,166,500 Bomber 50 400,000 54 432,000 72 576,000 80 640,000 60 480,000 Type X 100 200,000 126 252,000 144 288,000 220 440,000 220 440,000 Type II 250 1,050,000 240 1,005,000 246 1,032,000 246 1,032,000 207 866,500 Type III 420 820,000 286 472,000 286 472,000 280 460,000 130 380,000
Pakistan II II II II II
Bomber 20 8.000 20 8,000 20 8,000 10 8,000 10 8,000 12 4,400 12 4,400 Type I 10 4,000 6 4,000 10 4,000 10 4,000 12 2,000 24 2,000 24 2,000 20 2,000 3 2,000 90 1,000 (eat.) 64 1,000 64 1,000 112 1,000 140 1,000 28 8,820 Type II ' 261 Type III 84 2,000 96 2,000 96 2,000 90 2,000 75 2,000 Table 48. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973- 1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance
Republic of China II II II II II Bomber Type I 25 2,800 4 2,800 4 2,800 4 2,800 78 4,000 53 4,000 63 4,000 71 4,000 71 4,000 70 6,200 70 6,200 70 6,200 30 6,200 35 6,200 Type II 90 7,000 80 7,000 80 7,000 90 7,000 90 7,000 Type III 150 2,000 150 2,000 20 2,000 local Ordance: 413 1,746,000 357 1,517,200 237 1,297,200 195 1,111,200 196 1,131,000 Type I 173 816,000 127 657,200 137 697,200 105 481,200 106 501,000 Type II 90 630,000 80 560,000 80 560,000 90 630,000 90 630,000 Type III 150 300,000 150 300,000 20 40,000
North Korea III III III III III
Bomber 70 4,400 70 4,400 70 4,400 70 4,400 70 4,400 Type I 90 2,000 100 2,000 100 2,000 130 2,000 130 2,000 20 1,000 (eat.) 5 1,000 some 1,000 50 1,000 70 1,000 Type II 28 4,500 28 4,500 28 4,500 Type III 340 1,100 380 1,100 380 1,100 300 1,100 300 1,100 60 2,000 ‘
Total Ordance: 818 1,002,000 555 931,000 578 1,074,000 578 1,074,000 598 1,094,000 Bomber 70 308,000 70 308,000 70 308,000 70 308,000 70 308,000 Type I 110 200,000 105 205,000 100 200,000 180 310,000 200 330,000 Type II 28 126,000 28 126,000 28 126,000 Type III 400 494,000 380 418,000 380 418,000 300 330,000 300 330,000
South Korea II II II II II
Bomber Type I 55 6,200 17 6,200 77 6,200 37 6,200 70 6,200 18 13,500 ia 13,500 18 13,500 18 13,500 30 13,500 Type II Type III 130 2,000 120 2,000 120 2,000 120 2,000 110 2,000 262 Total Ordance: 203 844,000 155 588,400 215 960,000 175 712,400 220 1,059,000 Type I 73 584,000 35 348,000 95 720,400 55 472,000 110 839,000 Type III 130 260,000 120 240,000 120 240,000 120 240,000 110 220,000 Table 48. Cont'd
1970-1971- 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance Number Ordance
Thailand II II II II II Bomber Type I 17 6,200 11 6,200 11 6,200 11 6,200 11 6,200 Type II Type III 14 2,000 20 2,000 20 2,000 20 2,000 Attack/COIN 16 3,200 16 3,200 32 3,200 16 3.200 16 4.200 Trainer 45 1,000 55 1,000 55 1,000 55 1,000 30 1,000 20 N.A. 40 N.A. 40 N.A. 40 N.A. 19 N.A. 11 2,000
Total Ordance: 73 178.400 102 214,400 102 214,400 118 265,600 84 238,600 Type I 17 105.400 11 68,200 11 68,200 11 68,200 11 68,200 Type III 14 28,000 20 40.000 20 40.000 20 40.000 Attack/COIN 16 51,200 16 51,200 32 102,400 32 118,400 Trainer 45 45,000 55 55.000 55 55.000 55 55.000 41 52,000
Cambodia VI VI VI VI Bomber Type I Type II Type III 24 1,100 Attack/COIN 20 6,000 Trainer 20 1,000 1,000 15 1,000 40 1,000 45 1,000
Total Ordance: 64 166,400 7.000 15 15.000 40 40.000 45 45.000 Type III 24 26,400 Attack/COIN 20 120,000 Trainer 20 20,000 7.000 15 15.000 40 40.000 45 45.000
Laos VI VI VI VI VI
Bomber Type I
Type II 263 Type II Trainer 60 1,000 75 1,000 65 1,000 63 1,000 71 1,000 5 300
Total Ordance: 65 61,500 75 75,000 65 65,000 63 63,000 71 71,000 Trainer 65 61,500 75 75,000 65 65,000 63 63,000 71 71,000 Table 48. Conc'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number_____ Ordance Number______Ordance rakl6Can cont'd
Total Ordance: 228 534.800 222 540.800 214 504.000 242 452.000 256 622.960 Bomber 32 212.800 32 212.800 20 160.000 10 80,000 10 80,000 Type I 112 154.000 94 136.000 98 152.000 142 192.000 171 392.960 Type III 84 168.000 96 192.000 96 192.000 90 180.000 75 150,000
Burma VI VI VI VI
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 12 2,000 Trainer 10 minimal 12 minimal 18 minimal 18 minimal 10 minimal 6 2,000 6 2,000 3 2,000 1 2,000 1 2,000
Total Ordance: 18 36.000 12,000 6,000 2,000 2,000 Type III 12 24.000 Trainer o 12.000 12,000 6,000 2,000 2,000
Ceylon VI N.I. N.I.
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 5 1,100 5 1,100 5 1,100 Trainer 12 360 6 360 6 360 6 360 1 2,000 1 2,000 1 2,000
Total Ordance: 12 4.320 12 9,660 12 9,660 12 9,660 Type III 5 5,500 5 5,500 5 5,500 Trainer 12 4.320 7 4,160 7 4,160 7 4,160
Nepal VIII N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. VII 264 Table 48. Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance North Vietnam III III III III III Bomber 10 4,400 10 4,400 8 4,400 8 4,400 8 4,400 Type I 30 2,000 40 2,000 60 2,000 40 2 ,0 0 0 60 2,000 25 1.000 (esc.) 30 1,000 30 1,000 30 1,000 (esc.) Type II Type III 60 1,100 70 1,100 130 1,100 100 1,100 105 1,100 40 2,000 10 2.000
Total Ordance: 140 252.000 155 246.000 228 328,200 178 255,200 203 300,700 Bomber 10 44.000 10 44.000 8 35,200 8 35,200 8 35,200 Type X 30 60.000 65 105.000 90 150.000 70 110,000 90 150,000 Type III 100 148.000 80 97.000 130 143.000 100 110,000 105 115,500
South Vietnam II II II II II bomber Type I 20 6,200 20 6,200 20 6,200 115 6,200 115 6,200 Type II Type III Attack/COD) 60 6,000 60 6,000 60 6,000 60 6,000 60 6,000 60 4,200 60 4,200 50 4,200 228 4,200 228 4,200
Tocal Ordance: 140 736,000 140 736,000 130 694,000 403 2,030,600 403 2,030,600 Type 1 20 124,000 20 124,000 20 124,000 115 713,000 115 713,000 Attack/COIN 120 612,000 120 612,000 110 570,000 288 1,317,600 288 1,317,600
Malaysia
Bomber Type I Type II Type III 10 2,000 10 2,000 16 2,000 18 2,000 16 2,000 Trainer 20 4,000 20 4,000 20 4,000 20 4,000 20 4,000
Total Ordance: 30 100,000 30 100,000 36 112,000 38 116,000 36 112,000 Type III 10 20,000 10 20,000 16 32.000 18 36.000 16 32.000 265 Trainer 20 80,000 20 80,000 20 50.000 20 80.000 20 80.000 Table 48. Cont'd
1970- 1971 1971-1972 1972- 1973 1973-1974 1974- 1975 Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance Number Ordance
Philippines IV IV IV IV IV Bomber Type’ I 22 6,200 20 6,200 20 6,200 16 6,200 16 6,200 Type II Type III 25 2,000 26 2,000 40 2,000 24 2,000 20 2,000
Total Ordance 47 186,400 46 176,000 60 204,000 40 147,200 36 139,200 Type I 22 136,400 20 124,000 20 124,000 16 99,200 16 99,200 Type III 25 50,000 26 52,000 40 80,000 24 48,000 20 40,000
Indonesia III lit III III III
Boaoer 30 4,400 10 4,400 10 4,400 10 4,400 10 o o 15 5 ,0 0 0 5 5,000 5 5,000 5 5,000 10 11,000 4 11,000 4 11,000 2 11,000 25 20,000 22 20,000 22 20,000 22 20,000 22 20,000 Type I 15 2,000 15 2,000 15 2,000 15 2,000 15 2,000 35 2,000 (est.• ) Type II Type III 40 1,100 .40 1,100 8 1,100 8 1,100 8 1,100 20 2,000 20 2,000 4 2,000 4 2,000 4 2,000 15 4,000 10 4,000 13 4,000 5 4,000 11 4,000 16 2,000 17 2,000 Total Ordance: 170 416,000 100 223,000 55 167,800 63 167,800 65 Bomber 163,800 45 207,000 15 69,000 15 69,000 15 69,000 10 44,000 Type I 50 65,000 15 30,000 15 30,000 15 30,000 15 30,000 Type III 75 144,000 70 124,000 25 68,800 33 68,800 40 94,800
Australia II II II II II
Bomber 8 8,000 3 8,000 8 8,000 8 8,000 8 8,000 Type I 36 2 ,0 0 0 48 2,000 48 2,000 48 2,000 48 2,000 24 13,500 24 13,500 6 15,000 24 15,000 Type II
Type III 266
Total Ordance: 44 136,000 80 484,000 80 484,000 62 250,000 80 520,000 Bomber 8 64,000 8 64,000 8 64,000 8 64,000 8 64,000 Type I 36 72,000 72 420,000 72 420.000 54 186,000 72 456,000 Table 68, Cont'd
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number______Ordance Number Ordance Number______Ordance
New Zealand II II II II II
Bomber 11 8,000 Type I Type II Type III 12 2,000 8 2,000 10 3,000 10 3,000 10 3,000 Attack/COIN 10 10,000 16 10,000 14 10,000 14 10,000 14 10,000
Total Ordance: 33 212,000 22 156,000 24 170,000 24 170,000 24 170,000 Bomber 11 8c,000 Type III 12 26,000 8 16,000 10 30,000 10 30,000 10 30,000 At tack/COIN 10 100,000 14 160,000 14 140,000 14 140,000 14 140,000 267 CHAPTER IV: ARMS TRANSFER EVALUATIONS
Two forms of United States arms transfers will be analyzed.
This analysis will focus on combat aircraft transferred under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) and through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) process administered by the Department of Defense.
These two areas constitute over 65 percent of United States transfers. The remaining transfers occur through either direct commercial sales, under licenses administered by the Office of
Munitions Control in the Department of State, or the Excess Defense
Articles program.^ With the exception of South Vietnam and the
Middle East nations, the transfer data has been supplied by the
United States Defense Security Assistance Agency. ^ Unfortunately, all recent United States transfers to the Middle East and South
Vietnam are classified. Consequently, non-government sourcesJ will be used to identify agreements to transfer air weapon systems for these nations. The data will be treated as close approximations of the final approved transfers. In comparison, the DSAA data contains the actual number of aircraft formally approved for transfer.
However, no information is available on the expected delivery of approved weapon system requests. Past United States transfers will 269
be analyzed by requesting nation for each year that they occurred.
Normally, requests would be reviewed as they occurred. But be
cause this study is analyzing several years of transfers, there
is more utility in looking at all requests from a particular nation
for the time period rather than individual request in the chron
ological sequence as they occurred.
As noted above, only two forms of arms transfers will be
analyzed. These two forms were selected because they represent
a large portion of United States transfers, and the data were
readily available. The differences between each of the four types
N. deal with who the requesting nation interacts with and the cost
of the weapon system. Still, all sales must be reviewed and
approved by the Department of State. In a direct commercial sale,
the requesting nation purchases arms directly from the arms
producer (e.g., Northrop, Boeing, etc.) who obtains a license
from the State Department to sell the weapon system to the parti
cular foreign requestor. Direct commercial sales can include
anything from a rifle to a supersonic combat aircraft or advanced missile system, depending on the nature of the request and the
items which the Department of State are willing to approve for
sale.
In each of the other three types of transfers, the requesting nation interacts with representatives of the United States Govern ment. The Excess Defense Articles program is a program where \
270
excess Department of Defense weapon systems are sold at reduced
costs. Foreign Military Sales are almost the same as commercial
sales except that the seller is the United States Government and
the requesting nation pays an extra fee for Government services.
Foreign nations prefer buying from the Department of Defense,
even though there is an additional fee, because they are assured
of getting functional equipment and there are fewer problems in
replacing defective weapon systems. Finally, the Military Assis
tance Program is a program for direct military assistance by the
United States Government. Such assistance normally occurs without any charges to the recipient. Although this study is reviewing two different forms of arms transfers, the criteria and evaluation process are applicable because each form involves the transferring of weapon systems by the United States Government. Before pro ceeding to the evaluation of approved United States transfers, observations will be made on indicator trends within each of the geographic regions.
Regional Review. A considerable amount of data has been presented in the tables located at the end of Chapter 3. The reader is encouraged to closely review the trends present within each region as found in the tables. General observations will be made here about trends occurring within each region. These observations will assist in placing individual evaluations within the proper perspective. For this reason, it is appropriate to review regional trends before proceeding to more detailed evaluations. 271
Observable trends in Latin America indicate that the region
is relatively free of tension and conflict. Trends in military expenditures, as indicated in Table 21, reveal very little competi
tion or rapidly increasing military expenditure patterns. Brazil is the only Latin American nation that has considerably increased its military expenditures over the time period. Part of these increases can be attributed to modernization of the Brazilian armed forces. Brazil's military expenditures peaked in 1972 as it acquired Mirage III aircraft. Columbia exhibited a similar rise in expenditures for 1971 when it acquired four Mirage III and fourteen Mirage V aircraft. Other dominant spenders in the region include Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and Argentina.
However, each of these nation's military expenditures are only one-fourth to one-third as much as the military expenditures of
Brazil. In general, the data indicate a lack of reactive spending patterns.^
Latin America is also relatively free of tensions as indicated in Table 27 when viewed at the system level. All of the Latin
American nations have sizeable negative tension scores indicative of a lack* of tension. This trend is further observed when re viewing the regional tension scores presented in Table 28. Cuba,
Peru, and Brazil are the only three Latin American nations having high regional tension scores. All of the other nations have negative or inconsequential positive tension scores that indicate 272 a lack of tension. Arms requests from Cuba, Peru, or Brazil will have to be evaluated more closely because of their regional tension scores. The conclusion to be drawn is that these three nations do exhibit a considerable level of tension when viewed in their regional setting rather than the international system as a whole.
Although COPDAD event interaction data is not available for
Latin America, observations can be made about national acquisition interactions. Throught this study Latin America has been characterized as reactive in terms of arms acquisitions. Appendix
A supports this observation for Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. All of these nations have similar force structures and, with the exception of Peru, acquired Type I interceptors at approximately the same time. Peru had Type I air systems in its inventory as early as 1970-1971. The other nations almost simultan eously acquired these aircraft from 1972 to 1973. Furthermore,
Argentina also acquired a number of maritime reconaissance aircraft in 1974 to bring its force structure up to a comparable level with its neighboring nations. The information presented in
Appendix A suggests that the introduction of a new air weapon system into the region could result in similar requests from other members in the region.
Latin America is a region relatively free of tension, conflict, and arms races. The nations have similar force structures and somewhat constant air system inventories across time.^ Reactive acquisition interactions have been identified for several members in the region. The potential exists for competition among other regional members if qualitative force structure changes occur.
Although the contextual indicators present a favorable political- military environment, requests must be carefully reviewed in terms of their force structure impact. If the nations have the resources available to commit to increased military expenditures, changes in national force structures could result in an arms race. On the basis of past trends, this problem is mostly rele vant for the nations identified in the southern part of the region.
The European region contains a number of intervening factors and cannot be treated in the same manner as transfers to other regions in the international system. The NATO alliance and the existing political situation between the various nations makes this region unique. Furthermore, the developed nations of the region produce combat aircraft for sale to other nations in the international system.6 Great Britain, France, and Sweden are self-sufficient not only in the production of combat air systems, but also in ordance production for their weapon systems. Although the same legislated considerations apply for transfers to European nations as other nations, United States' national security consider ations for Europe strongly influence the scope and content of transfers to this region. 274
The various indicators provide different insights into the
political-military situation. Trends in military expenditures
for the European region are mixed. Table 21 displays that all
of the nations' have increased their expenditures during the time
period, but there is a large amount of variance in the amount of
increases between the various nations and the consistency of the
increments. One plausible explanation for the variance is that
it is caused by the level of support the United States and Soviet
Union give to their respective allies in Europe. This is most
noticeable in the large increments in military expenditures for
major NATO nations in 1972, because the United States gave notice
in 1971 that the European nations would have to bear a larger
amount of the burden for their defense in the future. In com
parison, the tension indicator and force structure evaluation
provide more consistent findings across time.
Tables 27 and 29 contain European tension scores computed
at the system level and regional level respectively. Both sets
of tension scores identify the same nations as having considerable
tension for the time period. Those nations experiencing high levels of tension include: Great Britain, France, Portugal,
West Germany, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. With the exception of Portugal, the rest of the high tension nations were expected because of their involve ment in the Cold War. It is suggested that Portugal's high tension scores are resultant from the problems it has experienced with 275
its overseas colonies during the 1960's. Whereas the tension
scores identify major nations associated with East-West competi
tion, the national force'structures clearly underscore the involve
ment of the United States and Soviet Union in the region.
The European region contains the highest concentration of
Type I aircraft of any region in the international system. This
should not be surprising because the developed nations have the
capability to maintain such sophisticated aircraft. The United
States produced F-104, F-4 and F-5 constitute the main combat air weapon systems for the NATO nations while the Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 are the main air systems for the Communist countries.
All of these aircraft are sophisticated air systems havings both air-to-air and air-to-surface guided missile capabilities. Although both groups of nations have sophisticated aircraft, they do not have similar force structures. The NATO national air force structures are either Type I or Type II, while the Communist nations have a mixture of Type II, III or IV force structures. Poland,
Bulgaria, and Rumania are the only Communist nations having a
Type II force structure. As a result, the NATO forces have greater mission flexibilities in comparison to the majority of their
Communist counterparts. In general, a conventional confrontation between these two groups of nations would result in a highly
"industrialized" war with the potential for extensive damage to be inflicted on both sides. So far attention has been focused on two major groups of
nations in the European region. A more limited focus will be
necessary in evaluating United States transfers because of the
extensive transfers that have occurred to Greece and Turkey.
These transfers are special because they have gone to two alliance
members that have militarily clashed several times in the past,
and most recently over Cyprus. The transfers present a unique
opportunity to apply the candidate design process for evaluating
arms transfers. Fortunately, event interaction data are available
for these two nations and will be used in the evaluation process.
These transfers as well as other one-time only transfers will be evaluated after reviewing the trends in other regions of the international system.
The United States has exercised restraint in supplying com bat air systems to Africa. Arms requests to only two nations
(Morocco and Ethiopia) have been approved during the time period under consideration. As with other arms transfers, these transfers will be evaluated within their regional context. In reviewing the African indicators, it is important to keep in mind that this is a developing region in the international system. Consequently, military expenditures will usually be on a lower scale as will substantive changes in the various indicators.
Finally, it is feasible to divide the region into two areas, northern Africa and sub-Sahara Africa, for evaluative purposes. 277
Several African nations that are substantially increasing their military expenditures can be identified. In northern
Africa, Morocco, Libya, and the Sudan have increased their defense spending. Likewise, in sub-Sahara Africa those nations sub stantially increasing military expenditures include: Nigeria,
Zaire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zambia and Union of South Africa. Table
24 contains dyadic correlations for African defense spending and can be used to identify similar patterns in spending. A good example of similar defense allocations by members in this region is also similar to Latin America when reviewing national tension scores for regional members.
African nations exhibit no tension when viewed at the system level in Table 27. The only exception is Nigeria in the latter 1960's which had a rather costly civil war within its borders. Prior to the civil war, Nigeria also had high, nega tive tension scores indicating a lack of tension. A regional analysis of African nations reveals that there are several nations experiencing high tension as presented in Table 30.
Morocco and the Sudan have high tension scores in northern
Africa. Similarly, Guinea, Nigeria, Chad, Zambia, Zaire, and
Somalia exhibit tensions in sub-Sahara Africa. The African findings underscore the need to analyze nations within a regional perspective. Although African nations have negative tension scores when comparing them to other nations in the 278
international system, positive tension scores surface in a
regional analysis.
Africa is a sensitive region for combat air weapon systems.
Only sixteen of the thirty-five nations in the region have Type VI
force structures or better. In northern Africa, Algeria has the
largest and most capable force structure, while Libya is rapidly expanding its force structure capability. Sub-Sahara Africa has nine nations with a Type V force structure or better. The Republic of South Africa is the only southern nation with a Type II level force structure. Also, four of these nine nations (Ethiopia,
Somalia, Rhodesia, and South Africa) have either Type I or Type
II aircraft in their force structures. However, the most domineering force structure in the area is that of South Africa whose total ordance capability at one time was six times that of its closest competitor (a total of 957,000 lb.). Since 1970,
South Africa, has made qualitative changes in its force structure by phasing out the majority of its armed trainers and replacing them with sophisticated Mirage III air systems. Overall, six of the sixteen nations are expanding their force structures, both quantitively and qualitatively, while the other nations maintain their present level.7 Appendix A and Table 46 provide the reader with the necessary information to further reveiw these trends.
The Middle East is an exceptionally sensitive region for arms transfers. This region has periodically experienced severe 279 conflict since World War II and presents one of the most challeng ing situations for the United States arms request evaluation pro cess. Military expenditures have sharply increased in Iran and
Israel, and to a considerable extent in Egypt and Saudi Arabia during the last three years. The defense correlations presented in Table 25 display the fact that although there are relative differences in levels of expenditures five Middle East nations
(Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Israel) have had very similar military expenditure patterns in recent years. A considerable amount of arms competition has occurred within the region. This arms competition has been able to occur partially because of a willingness by the United States and Soviet Union to make combat air weapon systems available to regional members. The extent of this competition is visible in Appendix A, and also Table 47 which contains the national force structure capability statistics for the Middle East.
The competition and conflict present within the region is also identified in the national tension scores and the event interaction indicators. National tension scores (computed at the system level) presented in Table 27 indicate that Iran, Iraq,
Egypt, and Israel have substantial levels of tension since 1965.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has varying degrees of tension during the time period but a high tension score for 1972. These system level trends vary somewhat when tension scores are cal culated at the regional level. The tension scores in Table 31 280
indicate that even though Iraq, Egypt, and Israel continue to
have high levels of tension throughout most of the time period,
Iran has negative tension scores (indicating a lack of tension)
and Saudi Arabia's level of tension fluctuates over time. Iran's
tension posture will be evaluated in terms of its regional scores,
rather than its system scores. However, it will be noted that
for its level of development, Iran's military expenditures are
higher than what would be expected in comparison to similar developed
nations in the international system.
Table 35 contains the Dimension of Interaction indicators
for cooperation and conflict, among Middle East dyads, developed by Edward Azar and Thomas Sloan. The data suggested that a number of different pairs of nations have been engaged in con
flict at some time between 1969 and 1973. Relations between
Iran and Iraq have been more conflictual than cooperative during this time period. As would be expected, the Dimension of Inter action— Conflict for Israel and its Arab neighbors reflects the many conflicts that have occurred in recent years. Jordan's
D.I.-Conflict also identifies tensions and conflicts it has periodically experienced with Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. Finally,
Kuwait's conflictual interactions with Iraq can also be noted across time. The event interaction data provides insight into trends of interaction between various members of the region. These indicators will provide valuable information to be inputed into the evaluation process. 281
Extensive arms acquisitions have occurred in the Middle East.
Of the ten regional members that are being analyzed, six have
increased their force structure capabilities, two have remained
the same, one has declined in capability, and one is difficult
to assess because of incomplete information. Appendix A and
Table 47 contain the relevant information needed to assess Middle
East national force structures and their respective capabilities.
Israel and Iran have substantially increased their force structure
capabilities. From 1970 to 1975, Iran added 72 Type I combat air
systems while Israel made both quantitative and qualitative changes
in its force sturcture resulting in an increase of 2.47 million pounds of ordance delivery capability. Saudi Arabia also made qualitative changes in its force structure by adding 34 Type I combat air weapon systems, and increasing its ordance delivery capability by 225,000 pounds. During this time period, both
Egypt and Syria also increased their force structure capability through the acquisition of Soviet built Type I combat air systems. Although Iraq's ordance capability has remained rela tively constant, it has made qualitative changes in its force structure composition by replacing older Type III air systems with modern Type I systems. Only Jordan and Kuwait have main tained their force structure at a relatively constant level.
The overall impact of these changes‘is that most Middle East nations not only have more sophisticated combat air weapon 282
systems in their inventories than in the past, but also greater
ordance capabilities that result in increased destructive capa
cities of the various force structures. These trends will have
to be carefully considered when evaluating a Middle East nation's
arms request because they are directly related to the legislated
considerations.
Lastly, the Asian region presents the analyst with a mixture
of problems that are somewhat similar to those encountered in
the European region. In this region, many different situations
Q exist both in the northern and southern areas. These situations
are further complicated by the varying degrees of involvement of
the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China. The
assistance that these three powerful nations provide to various members of the region has an impact on their policy actions.
Table 21 presents little indication of arms competition in the
form of military expenditures. South Korea, Thailand, South
Vietnam (since 1971) and Cambodia are the only four nations with more rapidly increasing military expenditures than other regional members. The defense correlations presented in Table 26 identify similar expenditure patterns for North and South Korea, Japan, and the People's Republic of China, but do not strongly suggest
the existence of an arms race. Although these two indicators do not suggest any serious problems in the region, there is a
considerable amount of tension and conflict present. 283
A striking contrast is found in the tension scores computed
at the system and regional levels. The system level perspective
identifies the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China
(Taiwan), North Korea, Pakistan, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam
as experiencing tension. In contrast, the regional analysis
identifies these same nations and also Afghanistan, Mongolia,
Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia as having a
considerable level of tension. The differences occur because
the tensions present in the Middle East and Europe obscure the
tensions of smaller nations when comparing all nations at the
system level. Consequently, the regional analyses present a more
accurate picture of existing tensions among nations in a geographic
area. These identified tensions are further validated when re viewing the conflict present within the region.
Several areas of tension and/or conflict exist within Asia.
The situation between North and South Korea remains tense even
though the two nations signed a joint statement, in July of 1972,
setting a goal of peaceful reunification. Likewise, a similar
situation exists between Taiwan and Communist China, with the
United States continuing to supply military assistance to Taiwan.
The conflicts in Southeast Asia underscore the tension indicated
for the two Vietnams, Cambodia, and Laos, Both Cambodia and
Laos have had to deal with insurgent rebels in their nations during the time period under consideration. The situation in 284
South Vietnam is much more complicated because of the United
States involvement and the enormous amount of assistance provided
to the South Vietnamese to deal with their p r o b l e m . ^ At this
time it is only appropriate to note that a substantial amount of
conflict has occurred in Vietnam through May of 1975. Finally,
Pakistan had a high positive tension score for 1972 because of
its political problems with East Pakistan and subsequent military
clashes with India. The identified tensions and conflicts must
be considered when evaluating arms requests from nations in
this region.
Trends in combat air weapon system acquistion vary within
the region. In general, however, one does not find the type of
expansion-reactive situation previously noted in the Middle East.
During this time period, Afghanistan and Communist China have
increased their force sturcture capabilities as indicated in
Table 48. In comparison, Taiwan has been experiencing a downward
trend in its force sturcture capability as its older Type III air
systems are withdrawn from service. Japan has made qualitative
changes in its force structure by acquiring additional Type I air systems, while Pakistan has also increased its inventory of
Type I aircraft. Lastly, South Vietnam substantially increased its force structure capability as a result from massive United
States' transfers in 1973. For this region, force structure analysis will center mainly on capabilities since similar force 285 structure types are found among contiguous members of the region.
Regional trends have been presented to sensitize the reader to the similarities and differences that exist between the five geographic regions. The evaluative process has been accordingly designed to take into account the unique qualities present within each region. It would be virtually meaningless to attempt to evaluate arms transfer requests at the system level. The direct impact of any arms transfer is at the regional level.
With these trends in mind, the designed evaluation process will now be applied to past United States’ transfers to thirty-nine different nations.
Arms Transfer Evaluations. Table 49 presents a complete listing of United States Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance
Program transfers that were approved from 1969 through the first quarter of 1975, with the exceptions previously noted for South
Vietnam and the Middle East. During this time period, the
United States transferred combat aircraft to 39 nations.^
Although some transfers are of a minor nature, consisting of a small number of trainers, all transfers will be evaluated in accordance with the designed model described in the preceeding chapter. This perspective is adopted because for some small nations the transfer of sophisticated armed trainers is important to their combat aircraft inventory. 1 1 As a result, no transfer Table 49. United States Combat Aircraft Transfers
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Dominican Republic 4 T-41 (MAP) 4 T-41 (MAP)
Guatemala 8 A-37 (FMS) 5 A-37 (FMS) 4 T-41 (FMS)
Honduras 6 A-37 (FMS) 3 T-41 (FMS)
F.l Salvador 4T-41 (FMS)
Venezuela 2 Antlsub 4 Antlsub 1 Antlsub S-2 (FMS) S-2 (FMS) S-2 (FMS) 16 OV-IO (FMS) 12 T-2 (FMS)
Ecuador 2 A-37 (FMS)
Peru 24 A-37 (FMS) 12 Antlsub S-2 (FMS)
Brazil 25 T-37 (FMS) 8Antlsub S-2 (FMS)
Paraguay 5 T-41 (MAP)
Uruguay 5 T-41 (MAP) 2 T-41 (MAP) 8 A-37 (FMS) 4 T-33A (MAP)
Chile 16 A-37 (FMS) 18 F-5E (FMS) .8 A-37 (FMS) 8 T-37 (FMS) 8 T-37 (FMS) 9 T-41 (FMS)
Argentina 20 A-4 (FMS) 4 A-4 (VMS) >5 A-4 (FMS)
France 10 T-33 (HIS)
Spain 36 RF-4C (FMS)
Portugal 10 T-33A (MAP) 286
West Germany 88 RF-4E (FMS) 175 F-4F (FMS) 18 OV-IO (FMS) Table 49. Cont'd
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Italy 4 T-33 (FMS)
Greece 4 F-104 (MAP) 2 F-5A (MAP) 20 T-33A (MAP) 36 F-4E (FMS) 2 F-4E (FMS) 2 TF-102A (MAP) 1 TF-102A (MAP) 1 TF-102A (MAP) 60 A-7 (FMS) 20 F-102A (MAP) 5 T-37 (MAP) 40 T-2 (FMS) 1 T-41 (MAP)
Turkey 2 TF-102A (MAP) 1 TF-102A (MAP) 4 TF-102A (MAP) 75 F-100 (MAP) 44 F-100 (MAP) 12 F-100 (MAP) 20 F-102A (MAP) 40 F-100 (MAP) 3 F-5A (MAP) 3 T-33A (MAP) 40 F-4E (FMS) 1 F-5B (MAP) 2 F-5B (MAP) 8 Antl6ub 24 A-37 (FMS) 25 T-41 (MAP) 30 T-41 (MAP) S-2 (MAP) 5 T-42A (MAP) 4 Antlsub S-2 (MAP)
Korvay 12 F-5A (FMS)
Derma rk 14 F-100 (FMS)
Morocco 1 F-5B (FMS) 2 RF-5A (FMS)
Ethiopia 4 T-41 (MAP) 1 F-5A (MAP) 2 F-5A (MAP) 2 T-33A (MAP) 1 T-28 (MAP) 2 T-33A (MAP)
Iran8 32 F-4 (SIP) 138 F-4 (CDI)b 141 F-5E (CDI)c 80 F-14 (ISS)
Jordan3 18 F-104 (SIP) 24 F-5B/E (ISS)
Israel 3 50 F-4 (SIP) 18 A-4 (ISS) 42 F-4 (ISS) 48 F-4 (ISS) 36 A-4 (ISS)d
Saudi Arabia3 50 F-5A/B (ISS) 20 F-5B (CDI) 70 F-5E (ISS)
Republic of China 2 T-33A (MAP) 38 F-100 (MAP) 2 F-100 (MAP) 2 F-100 (MAP) 2 F-104 (MAP) 6 F-104 (FMS) 22 F-104 (MAP) 1 F-104 (MAP) 12 F-5B (FMS) 25 T-33 (FMS)
2 F-5A (MAP) 10 T-33A (MAP) 12 Antl6ub 287 2 T-33A (MAP) S-2 (FMS) Table 49. Conc’d
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
South Korea 13 T-33A (MAP) 3 F-5A (MAP) 10 F-5A (MAP) 5 F-5B (MVP) 21 F-5E (MVP) 3 F-5B (MAP) 8 RF-5A (MAP) 18 T-41 (MAP) 9 T-41 (MVP) 24 F-5E (MAP) 4 F-5B (MVP) 14 T-37 (MAP) 13 F-5B (FMS) 11 T-37 (MAP) 8 Antlsub S-2 (MAP)
Pakistan 5 T-37 (FMS) 4 T-33 (FMS) 7 T-37 (FMS)
Thailand 16OV-IO (MAP) 16 OV-IO (FMS) 6 F-5A (MVP)
Cambodia 20 T-28 (MVP) 22 T-28 (MAP) 16 T-28 (MAP) 23 T-28 (MAP) 12 T-41 (MVP) 7 T-41 (MAP) 4 T-41 (MAP) 1 T-41 (MAP)
South Vietnam® 7 RF-5A (ISS) 30 EC-47 (ISS) 90 F-5A (ISS) 10 RC-119 (ISS) 168 A-37B 10 AC-119G (ISS) 14 AC-119G (ISS)
Malaysia 2 F-5B (FMS) 14 F-5E (FMS)
Philippines 2 T-33A (MAP)
Indonesia 9 T-41 (MAP) 6 T-41 (MAP) 2 TF-51 (MAP) 1 TF-51 (MAP) 16 0V-10 (FMS) 5 F-51 (MVP) 16 T-33A (MVP)
Australia 10 A-4 (FMS) 1 F-4E (FMS)
New Zealand 14 A-4 (FMS)
Kuwait® 36 A-4 (CDI)
aData for these nations was gathered frcxn public sources. The sources Include: (1) SIP - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The A m s Trade With the Third World: (2) CDI - Center for . . fense Information. The Defense Monitor; and (3) ISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1973 and 1974-1975. ^These aircraft were ordered in 1971, 1972, and 1974. No available Information ho Identifies the number of aircraft ordered in any particular year. 5® Table ^9, Cont'd
cin contrast, ISS Indicates that an agreement for 30 F-5E planes was made in 1972. ^Thc ISS Military Ralancc 1974-1975 indicates that a considerable larger number of aircraft (59 to be exact) were transferred. eThe transfers for South Vietnam represent changes in their aircraft Inventory as published in The Military Balance 1973-1974 and 1974-1975. 289 290
should be labeled as "minor" until it is reviewed in its overall
context. When deemed appropriate, abbreviated evaluations will
be presented due to the limited nature of the particular transfer
under consideration. A summary will be presented at the end of
this series of evaluations assessing the overall conformity of
past United States transfers to the legislated considerations.
1. Dominican Republic. In 1970, the United States trans
ferred four T-41 trainer aircraft under its Military Assistance
Program. This aircraft has no combat capability and its designed mission is for training purposes. Table 21 indicates that the
Dominican Republic's military expenditures are normal, and have
decreased slightly each year from 1967 to 1970. The Dominican
Republic is also free of tension as displayed in Tables 27 and
28, with the nation having a -124.33 tension score computed at the system level and a -7.08 tension score computed at" the regional level of analysis. Furthermore, Tables 22 and 45 display that the nation is not involved in an arms race with any members of its region. This particular transfer will have no effect on the
Dominican Republic's overall force structure capability. On the basis of reviewing all of the various indicator's, the model's recommendation would be to approve the transfer.
The United States transferred an additional four T-41 trainers to the Dominican Republic in 1974. Becuase the Dominican Republic's military expenditures, arms acquisition pattern, tension indicator, 291
and force structure continued to be normal, as indicated by the
various tables, the recommendation would be to approve the trans
fer. Both United States transfers conformed to the Congressional
considerations as stipulated in the Foreign Assistance Act of
1971.
2. Guatemala. A Foreign Military Sales request for eight
A-37 attack aircraft was received in 1971. An analysis of the
contextual indicators reveals that Guatemala's military expendi
tures are not excessively increasing (Table 21) and that the country is not involved in arms competition (Tables 22 and 45) or conflict with neighboring nations. Table 28 also indicates that the nation is free of tension. This is an initial arms acquisition designed to somewhat modernize the nation's existing force structure. If approved, the transfer will not result in a force structure change or significantly increase Guatemala's force structure capability (Table 45) in comparison to existing cap abilities, provided that some of the older aircraft are retired from service. In reviewing all of the indicators, the model's recommendation would be to approve the request.
A similar FMS request for five A-37 attack aircraft and four
T-41 trainers was received in 1973. The contextual analysis revealed that the situation had not changed since 1971, However, the force structure analysis indicated that all aircraft remained in service and if approved, the transfer of five additional A-37 292
attack aircraft would further alter Guatemala's force structure
capability in comparison to its neighbors. On the basis of deci
sion rule 5 presented in Chapter Three, the model would recommend
that the request for additional A-37's be denied. It would be
further recommended that the sale of T-41's be approved because
the T-41 aircraft would not have any significant impact on Guate
mala's force structure.
In reviewing these two requests, the second recommendation
is in conflict with the final decision to approve the sale. For
this request, it was determined that the sale would create a force
structure situation conducive for an arms race. Interestingly
enough, the United States received a request form neighboring
Honduras for six A-37 attack aircraft in 1973. The imbalance
created by the first transfer would seem to have prompted
Honduras' request.
3. Honduras. As noted above a FMS request for six A-37 attack aircraft was received in 1973. An analysis of the con textual indicators reveals that Honduras' military expenditures
(Table 21) are normal and that the country does not have any tension (tables 27 and 28) nor has it been involved in arms competition (Tables 22 and 45) or conflict with neighboring nations. In analyzing the nation's force structure (Table 4 5 ) it is obvious that the requested aircraft are to replace five
F-51D similar level (37,200 pounds) when the Mustangs were still 293
in service. The model's recommendation from the review of the various indicators would be to approve the request because it
conforms to the legislated considerations.
The following year (1974) Honduras requested to purchase
three T-41 trainers. Since the T-41's have little impact on the nation's force structure, and a review of the various indicators reveals similar trends, the model's recommendation would be that the request be approved.
4. El Salvador. In 1974, a FMS request was received from
El Salvador to purchase four T-41 trainers. As with other T-41 requests, the model would recommend that the request be approved.
Several times it has been noted that Latin American nations having similar acquisition patterns as a result of one nation acquiring a new weapon system. The requests from El Salvador and Honduras for T-41 trainers supports the observation of re active acquisitions since their requests followed the initial acquisition of the T-41 trainer by neighboring Guatemala.
5. Venezuela. In 1972, a FMS request for several different types of aircraft was received from Venezuela. The request was for two Antisub S-2 reconaissance aircraft, sixteen OV-IO attack aircraft, and twelve T-2 trainer aircraft. Contextual analysis reveals that Venezuela's military expenditures (Table 21) have been relatively consistent across time and that it does not seem to be involved in competition with its neighbors. Venezuela does 294 have a positive tension score (36.30 in 1971) but it does not
indicate a high level of tension (over 100.0). Furthermore, Vene
zuela has not been involved in any major conflictual situation.
Force structure analysis indicates that the attack aircraft would
replace Type III air systems being phased out of service, and would result in only a relative increase in force structure capa bility. The acquisition of maritime reconaissance, however, would cause a force structure type change. However, the impact of this change would be to bring Venezuela up to a comparable force structure level (Type II) with its neighbors. A review of the indicators yields no major negative observation and the model would recommend that all three requested air systems be approved.
Venezuela requested additional maritime reconaissance air systems in 1973 and 1974. These requests were consistent with its force structure, and because Venezuela's contextual indicators remained at similar levels, the model would recommend that the requests be approved.
6 . Peru. In 1973, the United States received a FMS request for twenty-four A-37 attack aircraft from Peru. A review of
Peru's contextual indicators reveals that they are all within acceptable level, except for its tension score. Peru's military expenditures (Table 21) have varied from 1963 to 1973, but have not abnormally increased during that time period. The defense 295
spending correlations in Table 22 indicate that little competition
exists with neighboring nations. Peru's arms acquisition pattern
as displayed in Appendix A, reinforces this conclusion. In fact,
Table 45 indicates Peru's force sturcture capability has been
declining since 1970 from a high of 495,800 pounds to 281,480 pounds.
However, Peru has had the third highest tension score (111.85 or
higher) in the region for the past three years as displayed in
Table 28. This high tension indicator must be given careful
consideration when reaching a recommendation.
Force structure analysis indicates that Peru has a Type II
structure that is similar in comparison to its neighbors, but
is also one of the most capable in the areas. Approval of this
transfer would increase Peru's ordance capability by 100,800 pounds, or double the amount of ordance capability of the aircraft that were retired from service. At a time when neighbor ing capabilities are declining, approval of this request would create a force structure situation conducive for a qualitative arms race. A more acceptable request would be for twelve air craft rather than twenty-four. This would maintain Peru's force structure capability at approximately the previous year's level, and not be viewed as expansionistic. In its present form, the model would recommend to reject the request because the trans fer would result in a large increase in Peru's ordance capability in comparison to its neighbors and create the potential for an arms race to occur. The following year a FMS request was received for twelve
Antisub S-2 aircraft. All of the contextual indicators continued
in their respective patterns. Force structure analysis indicated
that Peru already had twenty reconaissance aircraft, having added
ten C-60 aircraft from 1972 to 1973. The request would seem to be stimulated by the recent Venezuelean acquisition of six S-2 aircraft. Peru still has a high tension score and rather than encourage reactive acquisitions, the model would recommend that the request be denied. This request and the former request for
A-37 attack aircraft were approved by United States decision makers. It would seem that the overriding consideration for both requests was the desire to maintain good relations with Latin
America. Southern Latin American nations had recently acquired
Type I aircraft from European competitors. As a result, it is suggested that the legislated considersations were discounted in favor of restoring United States preeminence in combat air weapon system sales to Latin America.
7. Brazil. Two Brazilian arms request will be evaluated.
The first FMS request was in 1969 for twenty-five T-37 trainer aircraft. Analysis of Brazil's military expenditures as displayed in Table 21, reveals that the nation's military expenditures are increasing above the rate of both regional members. More impor tantly even though Brazil has not been involved in external con flict within the region, Table 28 indicates that Brazil has had 297
a high tension score of above 2 0 0 during the past four years.
Force structure analysis indicates that the transfer of these 25 aircraft would not change Brazil's force structure or substantially increase its ordance capability in relation to neighboring nations.
The model would recommend that the request be approved. Although
Brazil has had a high tension score and increasing military expendi tures, its other contextual indicators and force structure analysis indicate no characteristic in conflict with the established deci sion rules. Consequently, the decsision was to recommend approval of the request.
Brazil's second FMS request was for 8 Anti-sub S-2 reconnaissance planes in 1974. At this point in time, Brazil had previously decreated its military expenditures in 1973 by approximately 53 million dollars over its 1972 budget. However, it still had a trend of high tension scores. Furthermore, competitive arms acquisition was observed between Argentina, Columbia and Brazil in their almost simultaneous acquisition of Mirage III aircraft the previous year. Force structure analysis revealed that
Brazil already maintained over 50 maritime reconaissance air craft. It would seem that this request is another example of competitive status acquisition. Because Brazil does not have high tension scores and, more importantly, has been involved in arms competition, the model would recommend that the request be rejected due to the existing political-military situation.
In this instance, the approved request is contrary to the recommendation of the model. It would seem that the over-riding 298
considerations were two-fold. First, approving the request
maintains good relations with a major Latin American nation.
Secondly, the Brazilians had recently acquired Type I aircraft,
for the first time, from a European producer and United States
decision-makers wanted to reverse a potential tendency for
European aircraft acquisitions. For these reasons, it is suggested
that the request was approved.
8. Paraguay. The only request to transfer arms to Paraguay
was a MAP request for five T-41 trainers in 1973. All of Paraguay's
contextual indicators are favorable. Furthermore, Paraguay has
a Type VI force structure and the request is for a non-combat
trainer. If approved, the request would only marginally add to
Paraguay's air system force structure. Consequently, the model
would recommend that the request be approved.
9. Uruguay. In 1969, a MAP request for five T-41 and four
T-33A trainers was received. Uruguay's contextual indicators
are all within an acceptable range. Its military expenditures,
as displayed in Table 21, have slowly been increasing during the
previous five years, and the country has negative tension scores
(Tables 27 and 28) at both the system and regional levels of
analysis. Uruguay has also not been involved in conflict with
its neighbors. Force structure analysis reveals that Uruguay has a minimum Type V force structure and is not in any position
to compete with, or be a threat to, neighboring Brazil and 299
Argentina. The T-41 is a non-combat trainer and the T-33A has
a minimal armament consisting of two machine guns. On the basis
of the indicators and the nature of the request, the model's
recommendation would be to approve the transfer.
The following year two additional T-41 trainers were requested
under the MAP program. Again, the model would recommend to approve
the transfer because it did not alter Uruguay's force structure
or capability.
10. Chile. A FMS request for sixteen A-37 attack aircraft
and eight T-37 trainer aircraft was received from Chile in 1973.
Tables 21 and 28 indicate that Chile's past military expenditures were within a normal range, and that the nation had slightly posi
tive tension scores suggesting the presence of a minimum amount
of tension. Furthermore, Chile's defense spending correaltions and arms acquisition patterns indicated a lack of competition with neighboring nations. At this time, Chile had a Type III force structure whose ordance capability was considerably less than either the capability of Argentina or Peru. The addition of new
A-37 attack aircraft would replace the nation's aging Type III fighter-bombers which were being retired from service. Overall, the transfer of both the attack aircraft and the T-37 trainers would not significantly increase Chile's force structure capability in relation to its neighbors. For this case, the model's rec ommendation from the review of the various indiccators would be to approve the request. In 1974, another FMS request for eighteen F-5E and eight
T-37 trainers and nine T-41 trainers was submitted for considera
tion. A review of the contextual indicators revealed little
change from the previous year. However, force structure analysis
indicated that the transfer would result in a qualitative force
structure change. Chile was apparently reacting to Argentina's
Type I acquisition of twelve Mirage III-B/E aircraft. It had
already acquired an additional sixteen Hunter F-71 aircraft, but
did not have any Type I combat air systems in its inventory. If
approved, the transfer would result in a Chilean force structure of greater capability than either of its neighbors, and create a situation that would increase the likelihood of an arms race to occur. Because of the considerable qualitive change in Chile's force structure and the potential arms race situation that would be created, the model would recommend that the F-5E transfer be rejected and the transfer of the T-37 and T-41 trainers be approved. The trainer transfers could be approved because their impact is minimal at best and is congruent with the existing force structure.
The United States approved the transfer as requested. It is suggested that the transfer was approved to reestablish Chilean interest in United States air systems. Chile had just acquired sixteen additional British aircraft and would have probably pur chased additional aircraft from Great Britain had the United States 301
rejected the request. The Chilean transfer represents a case in which overriding considerations influenced the final decision.
11. Argentina. In 1970, a FMS request for twenty A-4 attack
aircraft was received from Argentina. These aircraft were to
supplement the twenty-five A-4's already in Argentina's inventory.
A review of the available contextual indicators reveal that Argen
tina has a normal trend in military expenditures and does not
seem to be in competition with its neighbors. Even though
Argentina had internal political problems and a past boundary dispute with neighboring Chile, it had not recently experienced any external conflict. Force structure analysis indicates that
.the nation's Type III force structure has a superior capability in relation to any of the contiguous force structures. Even though the additional attack aircraft were being acquired to replace air systems being retired from service, the transfer would result in a qualitative force structure change that would considerably increase the nation's force structure capability.
Thus, the acquisition would create a potential arms race situation.
The model's recommendation after reviewing the total situation would be to reject the air system request.
The United States approved the sale of additional A-4 air craft to Argentina. This transfer would have been in violation of the spirit of the legislated considerations passed the follow ing year in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. In announcing 302
the sale, the Department of State noted that it was attempting
to counteract the increasing Latin American dependence on European military s u p p l i e r s . in this case, as in others that have been
reviewed above, the political and economic advantages gained from a particular transfer were valued more highly than the potential military consequences.
A subsequent request for four additional A-4 aircraft was received and approved in 1971. The trends identified in the previous contextual analysis continued for the following year.
If the 1970 transfer had not occurred, the force structure analysis would have found the transfer to have been within acceptable limits. Yet because of the previous transfer, the model's recom mendation would be to rej ect the request since it further widened the existing gap in force structure capabilities and increased the likelihood for an arms race to occur.
12. Latin American 1975 Requests. During the first quarter of 1975, the United States has received four different Foreign
Military Sales requests from Latin Americna nations. Ecuador has requested twelve A-37 aircraft, while Uruguay has requested eight A-37 attack aircraft. In addition, Chile has requested eighteen A-37 attack aircraft. Similarly, Argentina filed a request for twenty-five A-4 attack air systems. Unfortunately, data are not available to completely evaluate these requests in terms of the designed process. Still some comments can be made 303 as to the force structure impact of each transfer, First, the approval of Ecuador's request would result in a qualitative force structure change and a two-thirds increase in its overall force structure capability. It is suggested that Ecuador is competively reacting to air systems that have been acquired by its neighbors.
Likewise, Uruguay's request is competitive status oriented in nature. The force structure impact of approving this request is to quadruple Uruguay's ordance capability. This transfer would not be threatening to either Brazil or Argentina, but does re present a sizeable qualitative force structure change. Even if both nation's contextual indicators continued their past trends, the model would recommend that the requests be rejected because of the force structure changes and the creation of a potential arms race situation between the smaller nations in the region.
The requests from Chile and Argentina present a serious situation. These requests would seem to represent a qualitative arms race. Argentina's request for additional A-4 air systems would have restored the original force structure capability balance prior to the approval of the F-5E transfer to Chile. On the other hand, Chile is attempting to keep pace with neighboring Argentina by acquiring additional A-37 aircraft. The approval of these two requests would be in direct confrontation with the legislated considerations. Therfore, the model would recommend that the requests be rejected. This analysis suggests that the overriding 304
consideration continues to be the importance placed on keeping
foreing competition out of Latin America. Whether or not such a
policy continues to remain in force is at the disgression of
Congress and its legislative priorities.
13. France. In 1969 a FMS request was received for ten
T-33 trainers. Since the request is from a major allied European
power who is also a major weapons producer, there is little reason
to proceed with a complete evaluation. The model would recommend
that the transfer be approved because the trainer aircraft have
no meaningful impact on the nation's combat force structure.
14. Spain. A FMS request for thirty-six RF-4C aircraft was
received from Spain in 1971. The data in Table 21 indicate that
Spain has a normal increasing military expenditure pattern.
Although the data in Table 23 display that Spain has a similar military expenditure pattern in comparison to France and Portugal, a sizeable difference in level of expenditures exists between.
Also, there is little indication of the arms competition, and
Spain has negative tension scores as displayed in Table 29. Analy sis of national and regional force structures confirms that the transfer would be comparable to air systems already possessed both nationally and within the region. Furthermore, the acquisition is designed to replace older Type I systems that are being retired from service. After a review of all indicators, the model would recommend that the request be approved. 305
15. Portugal. A MAP request for ten T-33A trainers to
Portugal was considered In 1969. Because Portugal is a member of
the NATO alliance and the transfers of trainer aircraft would have
negligible impact on its Type II force structure, the model would
recommend that the transfer be approved.
16. West Germany. Transfers to this NATO country represent
a unique case. The United States maintains armed forces in West
Germany, in addition to it being a member of NATO. West German
sovereignty is regarded as vital to United States national
security. Consequently, arms transfers to West Germany cannot
be considered as similar to transfers to other nations in the
international system, and thus will not be evaluated in this
study.
17. Italy. In 1970, a FMS request for four T-33 trainer
aircraft was received from Italy. Because Italy is a member of
the NATO alliance and the impact of this transfer on its Type II
force structure would be negligible, the model would recommend
that the transfer be approved.
18/19. Greece and Turkey. These two NATO allies present
the United States with a sensitive arms transfer situation. The
United States desires to maintain a strong southern flank in
NATO, but must also consider the existing political situations within both nations and the potential for conflict between the
two nations over Cyprus. As with the case of West Germany, 306
the legislated considerations are not applicable for these nations. Up until 1972, the majority of arms transfers to both nations were carried out through the Military Assistance Program.
For each of these transfers, the United States discussed with the recipient nation its needs and then made the equipment avail able. Some interesting observations can be drawn from Appendix
A.
The first observation is that the United States maintained a relative balance between.the two nations when introducing new combat air weapon systems under the MAP program. An exception to this rule is the transfer of forty F-100 aircraft to Turkey in 1970. Secondly, in reviewing both nation's force structures and relative capabilities it is obvious that Turkey has a con siderable advantage over Greece. At least two reasons could account for this preference. First, Turkey is the foremost nation in the southern flank of NATO and correspondingly needs to have a greater capability. Secondly, and seemingly equally important,
Greece has experienced more internal political turmoil than
Turkey. This observation is reinforced by the fact that no combat air systems were approved for transfer during 1973 when
Greece experienced a year of internal government instability.
Finally, a comparison of transfers from 1972 onwards reveals that a relative balance in ordance capability was maintained with
Turkey having a slight advantage. The combined ordance capability of thirty-eight F-4E's and sixty A-7's is approximately 1.413
million pounds whereas the combined ordance capability of one
hundred thirty-one F-100*s and forty F-4E*s is 1.457 million
pounds.Thus, the United States has pursued a prudent arms
transfer policy with respect to these two allies.
A review of the contextual indicators for these two nations
provides some insight into their relationship. First, Greece's
military expenditures have increased more rapidly than Turkey's
but have also closely paralleled Turkish expenditures. Secondly,
Turkish positive tension scores exhibited the presence of some
tension during the majority of time between 1963 and 1973. More
importantly, the Dimension of Interaction indicators in Table 36
identify those years in which cooperation was at a minimum
between the two nations and conflict occurred. In addition,
the interaction indicators identify the dyadic conflictual actions
that occurred between the two nations and Cyprus. Still, it is
difficult to extrapolate from the scores that intense conflict would occur between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 1974. At
best, the indication of increasing tension is identified by the
lack of cooperation between the two allied nations from 1971
onwards. Unfortunately, the contextual indicators do not
provide a clear, concise picture of the trends between these
two nations. 308
Overall, the situation between Turkey and Greece presents
the United States with difficult choices. One cannot supply
arms to two allies if they are going to deploy them against each
other, yet arms must be supplied if the nations are going to be
credible members of the alliance. This issue is different from
the legislated considerations, but the considerations are inter
twined with the issue. Needless to say, the policy decisions and
implications are difficult with the designed evaluation process
only tangentially applicable to the problem.
20. Norway. In 1969, a FMS request for twelve F-5A aircraft was received from Norway. Norway is a member of the NATO alliance and the request is to supplement existing F-5A aircraft in its
inventory. The model would recommend that the request be approved.
21. Denmark. A FMS request for fourteen F-100 aircraft was received from Denmark in 1974. Denmark is a member of the
NATO alliance and the transfer is to supplement existing F-100 aircraft in its force structure. The model would recommend that the transfer be approved. With the exception of Greece and
Turkey, all air system requests that supplement the existing force structure of an alliance member should be approved without extensive review. This overriding consideration has been invoked for several transfers to NATO alliance members. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 3, United States rejection 309 of an arms request from a NATO member would raise political questions about the strength of the alliance. Consequently, such requests are approved without a substantial review.
22. Morocco. In 1969, a FMS request for one F-5B and two
RF-5A was received from Morocco. Contextual analysis indicated that there were no abnormalities in Morocco's political-military situation. Morocco's military expenditures were normal and not sharply increasing over time. Also, its defense spending corre lations (Table 24) indicate a lack of competition with neighboring nations. The tension scores presented in Table 30 reveal a minimum amount of tension for Morocco, and the nation was not involved in any external conflict at the time of the request.
Force structure analysis identifies Morocco as having a Type IV structure with considerably less capability than neighboring
Algeria. The request for three Type I weapon systems was consistent with the nation's existing inventory. As a result of reviewing the various indicators and present force structure, the model would recommend to approve the request.
23. Ethiopia. During the time period under consideration, a series of MAP requests have been received for a variety of different aircraft. In 1970, a request for four T-41 trainers was received. Because the T-41 is a non-combat trainer and would have negligible impact on Ethiopia's Type III force structure, the model would recommend that the transfer be approved. 310
Contextual analysis of Ethiopia’s political-military situation reveals acceptable findings for all of the indicators. Ethiopia’s military expenditures have increased at an acceptable rate, and its tension scores in Table 30 are negative indicating a lack of tension. The defense spending correlations in Table 24 present similar expenditure patterns for Ethiopia and its contiguous neighbors but a substantial difference exists between their respective levels of expenditure. Finally, Ethiopia's arms acquisition process has been minimal during the time period and is reflective of an non-competitive situation.
Analysis of national and regional force structures confirms the lack of competition between Ethiopia and its neighbors.
Ethiopia has maintained one of the most capable Type III force structures in the region, but has not continually increased its force structure capability across time. The MAP requests for one F-5A in 1971 and two F-5A in 1972 are consistent with
Ethiopia's Type I inventory, and not expansionistic in terms of its force structure capability. Therefore, the model would recommend that both requests be approved. Furthermore, the model would yield a recommendation to approve the subsequent trainer requests in 1972, 1973, and 1974. These trainers would have minimum impact on the Ethiopian force structure and its overall capability. 311
24. Iran. This Middle East nation has made several requests
to pruchase sophisticated Type I aircraft from the United States.
The first request occurred in 1969 for thirty-two F-4 air systems.
Analysis of the Iranian contextual indicators identifies several
sensitive areas for consideration. First, Iran's military expendi
tures have risen substantially from 1963 through 1969 as indicated in Table 21. Secondly, Iran's Dimension of Interaction indicators display that it has not had exceptionally good relations with neighboring Iraq, and was involved in military skirmishes in 1969.
In contrast, however, Iran's regional tension scores, indicate a lack of tension through the time of this request. In retrospect, force structure analysis suggests that the transfer substantially increases Iran's ordance capability in comparison to Iraq. The transfer also involves qualitatively increasing Iran's force structure with a high ordance combat air weapon system. Iraq's closest air weapon system in ordance capability is a Type II
Soviet Su-7 aircraft whose delivery capability is 1/3 that of the F-4. After a review of the indicators, the model's recommenda tion would be to reject the request for the F-4 air systems.
The transfer was being made in a tense political situation and created a force structure divergency that was conducive to an arms race.
United States policy, however, has been to assist Iran in becoming a pro-American stabilizing force in the region. This 312
policy has caused United States decision-makers to overlook the
legislated considerations when approving further arms requests
from Iran. Looking back at this initial decision, one result
was that the following year Iraq obtained additional Type I air
systems from the Soviet Union in an attempt to keep pace with
the Iranian acquisition. Public sources indicate that two
further agreements were made with the United States in 1971 and
1972, for an additional 138 F-4 aircraft and 141 F-5E respectively,
The trends identified for the various contextual indicators have
continued through 1972. Also, a reactive arms race has occurred
in light of the Iraqi Type I acquisitions. Furthermore, 1972
was a very conflictual time period for Iran-Iraq relations as
indicated in Table 35. The D.I.-Conflict indicator displays
very hostile war relations occurring between the two nations.
The eventual acquisition of such a large number of Type I air
craft would tremendously alter the force structure configurations
present within the region. For both requests, the model's rec
ommendation would be to reject the transfers because all of the
basic decision rules are contradicted during the review process.
A final request and agreement with the United States was made in 1974. The request was for 80 new Grumman F-14 aircraft
as they rolled off the assembly line. This aircraft is the very
latest multi-purpose combat air weapon system being acquired by
the United States. Its armament consists mainly of guided 313
air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. A review of the contextual
indicators displays continuing large increases in Iranian military
expenditures and the existence of continued expansion of Iraqi
Type I air systems in response to Iranian acquisitions. The
D.I.-Conflict indicator identifies that 1973 was less conflictual
between Iran and Iraq, but that limited conflictual interactions
did occur. Lastly, force structure analysis reveals that Iran
has a commanding ordance delivery capability in comparison to
neighboring nations, and has 116 more Type I aircraft than Iraq.
On the basis of these indicators, the model's recommendation would
be to rej ect the request.
Over-ride considerations have influence the final decisions
to transfer Type I aircraft. Iran is a pro-Western nation and
friendly with the United States in a very strategic region.
United States decision-makers view Iran as a stabilizing force
in the Middle East among the oil producing nations. Furthermore,
the modernization of Iran's armed forces "permits it to play a
significant and active role in insuring the security of the vital oil routes from the Persian Gulf (Atherton, 1974, p. 3)." The
fact that the United States also imports petroleum from Iran would seem to be an influential factor in favorably reviewing arms requests. Finally, the sale of these sophisticated air
craft has a positive effect on the United States' balance-of- payments situation. It is suggested that a combination of these 31'4 over-ride considerations have influenced the final decisions to approve Iranian arms requests.
25. Jordan. A request for eighteen F-104 aircraft was received from Jordan in 1970 and subsequently approved for transfer.
Contextual analysis of Jordan's political-military situation revealed a number of contrasting considerations. Jordan's level of military expenditures was within a normal rate of increase, but its defense spending correlations (Table 25) indicated that it had similar expenditure patterns in comparison to neighboring
Syria and Iraq. Its tension scores, as displayed in Table 31, were positive up through the time of the request denoting varying degrees of tension. More importantly, Jordan's Dimension of
Interaction indicators revealed a series of conflicts with its neighbors. In 1970, Jordan conflictually interacted with Iraq,
Egypt, Syria, and Israel as displayed in Table 35.
Force structure analysis indicates that the transfer would result in a qualitive increase in Jordan's force structure capa bility. Although an increase would occur, it would be well within acceptable limits in comparison to the superior capabilities of
Jordan's neighbors. After a review of all the indicators, the model would recommend to reject the request because of Jordan's involvement in external conflict with four of its neighbors and the negative aspects of its contextual indicators. The approval of this transfer demonstrated the United States continuing support 315
for King Hussein and Jordan’s security since the mid-1950's. In
this case, the over-riding consideration was continued support
to a pro-American nation that exists within a complex Middle
East situation.
A second request for twenty-four F-5B/E combat aircraft was
received in 1972. Contextual analysis findings displayed several
changes in Jordan's situation. Although military expenditures
continued at an acceptable level, there was a lessening of
similar expenditure patterns with neighboring nations. Also,
Jordan continued to experience an average level of tension as
indicated by its positive tension scores in Table 31. Jordan's
interaction indicators improved since 1970 with a relative balance
appearing between cooperation and conflict with its neighbors.
The Palestinian guerillas were still causing conflictual inter
actions with Israel, but there was also a marked increase in
cooperation with Israel for 1972. Force structure analysis
indicated that the qualitative impact of the transfer would be only
to enhance Jordan's ability to defend its border. The force structure capabilities of Jordan's neighbors are such that it would take an additional transfer of almost an equal number of aircraft for Jordan to reach a comparable level of force structure capability with Syria. On the basis of the overall indicator trends, the model would recommend that the request be approved. 316
26. Israel. Combat air weapon system transfers to Israel represent a special case. Israel has received varying numbers of sophisticated combat air systems from the United States. The best available, non-classified information on United States trans fers to Israel is presented in Table 49. Public sources do not account for the total reported increases in Israel’s combat air system inventory. More importantly, however, is the United States commitment to assisting Israel in maintaining its sovereignty through arms transfers. The basic question for this case is whether or not the legislated considerations should be applied to Israeli arms transfers.
A review of the contextual indicators and force structure analysis findings would indicate that the spirit of the legis lated considerations is completely ignored in the case of Israel.
Military expenditures have rapidly and substnatially increased during the time period under consideration, with a quantum increase of 1.865 billion dollars from 1972 and 1973. This is understand able given the number of wars and continuing skirmishes that
Israel has been involved in from 1967 to the present. Israel's enormous tension scores displayed in Table 31 reflect the con flictual situation within the Middle East. The extent of conflict in the Middle East is further reflected in Israel's Dimension of
Interaction indicators presented'in Table 35. On the basis of the designed evaluation process, it would hardly be expected that 317 transfer would be approved given the value of Israel's contextual indicators.
Force structure analysis reveals that qualitative changes in
Israel's force structure capability have resulted in a superiority over the combined air systems of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.
Although the Arabs have a numerical advantage in number of aircraft
(733 versus 466), Israel has obtained an ordance delivery capa bility of 1.72 million pounds more than the Arab capability.
The transfer of Type I F-4 Aircraft and A-4 attack aircraft by the the United States has permitted Israel to obtain a dominant air superiority over its neighbors. In the process of obtaining such air superiority, the Israelis were involved in a competitive arms race with the neighboring Arab states. The data presented in
Table 47 and Appendix A display the reactive acquisition process that occurred from 1970 through the beginning of 1975. As in the case of the contextual indicators, a number of air system transfers did not conform to the decision rules outlined in the model.
Combat air system transfers to Israel provide the strongest direct confrontation with the legislated considerations. This analysis is not at all questioning Israel's right to sovereignty and freedom from conflict. However, the utility and applicability of the legislated considerations is severely questioned in light of the Israeli transfers. The designed evaluation process yields recommendations that would reject Israeli requests on the basis of negative findings in both sections of the analysis. Still,
the over-riding consideration of United States support to demo
cratic nations that are dependent upon American weapons for their
security, reverses the recommendations and results in affirmative
decisions to transfer. One expressed purpose of this study was
the creation of a set of systematic procedures to evaluate arms
transfer requests. Yet one can hardly fail to observe the use
lessness of a set of procedures.that yield recommendations which would be ignored. The Middle East presents such a situation.
This problem will be discussed further in the final chapter.
27. Saudi Arabia. The United States has received three requests for combat air systems from Saudi Arabia. In 1971, a request for fifty F-5A/B was received. Analysis of Saudi Arabia's contextual indicators shows that the nation has had a normal rate of increase in military expenditures (with the exception of 1967), and has not been involved in competition with contiguous nations.
Also, Saudi Arabia's tension scores are negative denoting the lack of national tension. Dimension of Interaction indicators presented in Table 35, identify that Saudi Arabia had a minimum conflictual encounter with Syria in 1971. The nation has dis played a cooperative trend in its interactions from 1968 through
1971. Force structure analysis reveals that the requested air systems would supplement the nation's Type I inventory and increase its force structure capability to a more comaprable level with Iraq. After a review of the various indicators 319 identified above, the model recommendation is to approve the request.
Two further requests were received in 1973 and'1974. They were for twenty F-5B and seventy F-5E combat aircraft respectively.
Since the approval of the first request, Saudi Arabia's contextual indicators displayed a change in the nation's political-military situation. Military expenditures jumped sharply in 1973, and
Saudi Arabia engaged in limited hostile acts against Israel as indicated in its dyadic interaction indicators. Approval of either transfer would also result in a qualitative force structure change that would create a potential arms race situation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. As a result of the change in the contextual indicators and the impact of the qualitative force structure change, the model would recommend that both requests be rejected.
United States decision-makers approved both requests even though the political and force structure evaluation would suggest otherwise. It would seem that a number of over-riding considera tions influenced these decisions. First, the United States wanted to continue to maintain favorable relations with Saudi Arabia because of its petroleum production. Secondly, the transfers would have a positive affect on United States' balance-of-payments with Saudi Arabia. Finally, United States decision-makers viewed
Saudi Arabia as sharing responsibility with Iran for stability 320
in the Persian Gulf.-*-4 Thus, it is important to assist Saudi
Arabia in the modernization of its defense f o r c e s . 15 Consequently,
arms transfers were approved that conflicted with the spirit of
the legislation in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.
28. Kuwait. The United States received a request for thirty-
six A-4 attack aircraft from Kuwait in 1974. Analysis of Kuwait's
contextual indicators results in a mixture of trends. First,
the country's military expenditures have expanded at an accept
able rate after a considerable increase between 1966 and 1967.
The defense spending correaltions in Table 25 reveal that Kuwait
has exhibited a similar pattern of military expenditures in rela
tion to its neighbors. However, Table 21 displays that Kuwait
has not committed the same amount of resources to military
expenditures as either neighboring Saudi Arabia or Iraq. Therefore,
Kuwait does not have the same level of tension as either of the
two contiguous nations. The data presented in Table 31 supports
this conclusion. Throughout the time period, Kuwait has had
increasing negative tension scores that denote a lack of tension.
Although Kuwait has had a lack of tension, it has not been able to completely avoid conflict with its neighbors. Kuwait and Iraq have had a long standing border dispute, and in 1973 Kuwait mili
tarily clashed with Iraq after Iraqi troops infringed upon
Kuwait's national boundary. Also, Kuwait has supported the
Arab cause against Israel and participated in the oil boycott. 321
This mixture of contextual trends must be reviewed in conjunction with the force structure analysis before reaching a recommendation.
Kuwait has a Type IV force structure with some Type I systems used for intercept missions. The request for A-4 attack air craft is congruent with Kuwait's force structure. Approval of this transfer would have a qualitative impact on Kuwait's force structure capability. Yet, the impact would not create a situation conducive for an arms race to occur. It is suggested that the stimulus for this request was Kuwait's recent experience with
Iraq and its ability to defend its borders. If approved, the transfer would increase Kuwait's ability to bring force to bear in defense of its borders. In reviewing the total situation, the model would recommend to approve the request.
29. Republic of China. Combat air system transfers to the
Republic of China represent another example of United States assistance to maintain the independence of a nations.
Taiwan's national air force structure is completely composed of
United States weapon systems. As displayed in Appendix A, all air systems in Taiwan's inventory are of American origin.
This complete dependence on United States weapon systems adds another dimension to Taiwanese arms transfers and creates a special consideration for the evaluation process. During periods of exceptional stress, it would be difficult to reject arms requests from the Republic of China becasue of the long standing 322
commitment that has developed to the recipient nation. A failure
to transfer arms would result in other nations questioning American
fortitude to stand by its commitments.
In 1969, a MAP request for two T-33A trainer aircraft was
received. The T-33A trainer has a minimum combat capability with
only two small caliber machine guns. The model would recommend
that the request be approved because the trainer will have no
impact on Taiwan's force structure.
A large number of air weapon systems were transferred in'
1970 under the Military Assistance Program. The transfers included: (a) thirty-eight F-100; (b) twenty-two F-104; (c) two
F-5A; and (d) two T-33A trainers. Analysis of Taiwan's contextual indicators reveals only one potential problem area. Taiwan's military expenditures, as displayed in Table 21, have a normal rate of increase, and its defense spending correlations in
Table 26 reflect a lack of competition with other regional members.
The problem area is Taiwan's high positive tension scores as dis played in Table 32. Taiwan has experienced a high level of ten sion throughout the time period under consideration. Although
Taiwan's tension socres are high, indicating the presence of tension but not the cause of it, this indicator alone is not sufficient to warrant a rejection of the request.
Force structure analysis indicates that the transfers are compatible with Taiwan's current force structure. The transfer 323 will result in an increase of approximately 350,000 pounds of ordance capability, but Taiwan's force structure capability will still be substantially less (1.1 million pounds) than the People's
Republic of China. After a reveiw of all the indicators, the model would recommend to approve the request.
The subsequent requests in 1971, 1972, and 1973 for a limited number of aircraft can be reviewed together. Contextual analysis reveals similar trends in the various indicators.
However, military expenditures increased rather sharply for 1971 and 1972. This behavior can be accounted for in that the nation accepted a greater share of the burden for its defense. Taiwan's tension indicator remained above 300 for the time period, but the nation was not involved in any extended conflictual situation.'
Force structure analysis displays that the transfers are used to replace older air systems in inventory. Even with the trans fer of the seventeen aircraft during this time period, the
People's Republic of China's force structure capability is five and one-half times as great as Taiwan's force structure capa bility. After a review of all the indicators, the model's recommendation would be to approve the three requests.
30. South Korea. The United States relationship with South
Korea is similar to its Taiwanese relationship, but represents an even stronger commitment. United States armed forces are based in South Korea to assist in guaranteeing that nation's ^24
independence. Thus, the American commitment to this Asian nation
is an intervening factor in the evaluation process. Throughout
the time period under consideration, almost all of the combat
air system transfers have been through, the United States Military
Assistance Program.
A review of South Korea's contextual indicators shows that
everything is in accordance with the prescribed decision rules.
South Korea's military expenditures have increased at an accept
able rate. Its defense spending correlations indicate a similarity
in expenditure pattern with North Korea, but the levels of expendi
tures are considerably different. As in the case of Taiwan,
South Korea has increased its military expenditures to bear a larger burden of its own defense. Secondly, South Korea has had negative tension scores, above a -50.0, which would denote a lack of tension. However, these scores could be potentially influenced by the United States presence in South Korea and the military aid that the nation receives from the United States.
Finally, South Korea has not been recently involved in any external conflicts.
Force structure analysis reveals that South Korea has a
Type II force structure of comparable capability to North Korea.
There are also no bomber systems present even though the nation has a Type II force structure. This would indicate a more defensive oreintation in the force structure composition. The 325
transfer of trainer aircraft to this type of structure has negli
gible impact and are recommended by the model for approval.
Without going into detail, all of the transfers proposed in 1971
were consistent with the existing air systems and did not
represent an extensive qualitative increase in force structure
capability. As a result, the model would recommend to approve
the transfers. Likewise the twenty-one F-5E aircraft requested
in 1973 are consistent with existing systems and would be
recommended for approval.
Of all the transfers, the only questionable one is the large requested transfer of Type I air systems in 1974. The approval of these three requests would result in a considerable qualitative change in South Korea's force structure capability. By 1974,
South Korea had reached a relative equality in capability with
North Korea. The introduction of additional Type I air systems would create a sitaution conducive for a reactive arms race to occur. As a result, the model's recommendation would be to rej ect the request. The requests were approved due to the over-riding consideration of maintaining South Korea's sovereignty.
But in this instance the transfers were in violation of the legislated considerations, because of the divergent situation they would create. It remains to be seen whether or not the
North Koreans will respond to the incongruency in force structure capabilities created by this transfer. 326
31. Pakistan. In 1969 and 1970, two FMS requests for a minimum number of trainers were received from Pakistan. Due to
Pakistan's Type II force structure, the model's recommendation would be to approve the requests because of the minimal impact
of the training aircraft oh Pakistan's overall force structure,
32. Thailand. Three requests for combat air systems were received from Thailand. Contextual analysis indicates a very favorable political-military situation. Thailand's military expenditures were increasing at a slightly higher rate than normal, but its defense spending correlations (Table 26) indi cated lack of competition. Table 32 contains Asian tension scores, and a review of Thailand scores showed it to be lacking in tension. Finally, Thailand is not involved in any competive arms acquisition process. Instead, its air system inventory has remained relatively stable across time.
Thailand has a Type II force structure of modest capability.
Force structure analysis yields a positive recommendation for the acquisition of OV-10 counter-insurgency air systems. Because the 0V-10 would not result in a significant qualitative force structure change and the contextual indicators are all favorable, the model would recommend to approve the OV-10 acquisition in
1970 and 1972. Likewise, the acuqisition of six F-5A aircraft would supplement the existing inventory and not result in a sub stantial change in force structure capability because a number 327 of older air systems are being phased out of service. Consequent
ly, the model would recommend to approve this request in 1973.
33. Cambodia. A series of MAP requests for Cambodia were
received from 1971 to 1974. The Cambodian government was exper
iencing an increasing problem of Communist guerilla activity with
in its borders. Analysis of Cambodia's contextual indicators displayed a sharply rising military expenditure pattern, and increasing positive tension scores. Yet, the nation was not involved in arms competition with any of its neighbors. The contextual indicators were reflecting the effects of the current internal political problem. Force structure analysis revealed that the majority of Cambodia's combat aircraft were armed trainers.
Therefore, the requests for additional armed trainers to assist in combating the guerrilla problem was most appropriate. The model's recommendation would be to approve each of the requests for trainer aircraft.
34. South Vietnam. The United States transferred a large number of combat aircraft to South Vietnam as it withdrew its forces in 1973. Public sources provide estimates of the number of aircraft transferred, but the actual number transferred is still classified information. Although this particular transfer was not authorized under either the Foreign Military Sales
Program or the Military Assistance Program, it will still be evaluated because of its relationship to the legislated considera tions. Even though military assistance to South Vietnam was 328
carried out under a special program, the assistance was still
subject to the regulations of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.
This particular transfer was the largest transfer of combat air
craft, at one time, ever carried out by the United States during
the time period of this evaluative study. Because this transfer
was u n i q u e and subject to the regulations of the Foreign Assistance
Act, it is included for evaluation.
A number of divergent findings surface when analyzing the
contextual indicators for South Vietnam. First, South Vietnam's
military expenditures display a normal rate of increase in
Table 21 through the time of the transfer, even though the nation
was experiencing a war within its borders. Secondly, the defense
spending correlations in Table 26 reveal a lack of competition
between South Vietnam and its contiguous neighbors. This
observation is further supported when reviewing the nation's
pattern of arms acquisition. Thirdly, the tension scores
presented in Table 32 indicate the presence of a considerable
amount of tension. This is not surprising given the long term
conflict that existed between North and South Vietnam, and
the guerrilla war activities of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
The variance in the indicators is accounted for by the impact of United States assistance to South Vietnam. Both material assistance and the presence of United States armed forces from
1966 through the beginning of 1973, influenced the trends in the 329
contextual indicators. Without United States assistance,
South Vietnam could not have decreased its military expenditures
in 1969 and 1971.
South Vietnam has a Type II force structure. Analysis of
its force structure revealed that the majority of South Vietnam's
combat air systems were attack and counter-insurgency aircraft.
However, included in the nation's inventory were twenty Type I
(F-5A) air systems. From 1970 to the time of the transfer, South
Vietnam's force structure capability was three times that of rival
North Vietnam. The impact of the transfer in 1973, was to almost
triple South Vietnam's ordance capability from the following
year, and raise its potential force structure capability to
almost eight times the capability of North Vietnam. On the basis of the force structure impact alone, the model would rec ommend to rej ect such a massive transfer.
Two related over-riding considerations influenced the deci
sion to transfer such a large number of combat air weapon systems.
First, the United States was disengaging its armed forces from
the region and the transfer displayed the continuance of support for the Republic of South Vietnam. Secondly, Article 7 of Chapter
II of the Agreement on Eliding the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam stipulated that periodic replacements of armaments could only take place "on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties...." of the worn out weapon system 330
(Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1973, p. 34).^
This section of the agreement created a situation in which it
was deemed necessary, by United States decision-makers, to build
up South Vietnam's air force structure in order to set the
initial level for future resupply efforts. Furthermore, it was
questionable as to the lead time necessary to eventually get
replacements approved. Thus, a large number of aircraft were
transferred, many of which went into storage for future use.
It is evident that little attention was given to the legis
lated considerations during the process of authorizing such a
large transfer. Over-riding considerations for continued support
to South Vietnam were most influential in 1973. The evaluation process used in this study would have recommended a level of
transfer that would have been more in tune with the stipulations in the Foreign Assistance Act. Regardless of the number of air craft transferred, it would have been almost impossible to con jecture that in a little over two years the aircraft would eventually be confiscated by the North Vietnamese. The only difference in the eventual outcome would have been the presence of a few number of aircraft available to North Vietnam.
35. Malaysia. In 1972, a FMS request for two F-5B and fourteen F-5E aircraft was received from Malaysia. Contextual analysis revealed that Malaysia's military expenditures varied from 1963 to 1970, but then considerably increased (by 64 331
million dollars) over the 1970 level. A review of its defense
spending correlations in Table 26 displays a lack of competition
between Malaysia and other Southeast Asian nations. It must be
noted, however, that Malaysia had increasing positive tension
scores since 1969. Still, Malaysia had not recently been in
volved in external conflict. The nation's increasing military
expenditures and tension scores must carefully be considered when
reaching a final recommendation.
Malaysia has a Type V force structure. National force
structure analysis indicates that requested air systems would
result in both a qualitative force structure change and a change
to a Type IV force structure. If approved, the additional
aircraft would double Malaysia's ordance delivery capability, making it comparable to Thailand's capability but still inferior
to Indonesia's large force structure capability. On the basis of the decision rules in Chapter Three, the model would recommend to reject the request. The political-military situation is not conducive for such a large transfer of sophisticated combat air weapon systems.
36. Philippines. A MAP request for two T-33A trainers was received in 1969 for consideration. Since the Philippines had a
Type IV force structure, the model would recommend that the re quest be approved. 332
37. Indonesia. A series of MAP requests have been received
from 1969 to 1972 for training aircraft and five F-51 combat
aircraft. Contextual analysis revealed that all of the indicators
are normal and that Indonesia has not experienced any tension
during the time period. More importantly, Indonesia has a Type III
force sturcture with an exceptional level of ordance capability.
As a result, the model would recommend to approve each request
because of their negligible impact on the total force structure.
38. Australia. Two FMS requests have been received from
Australia. The first request was in 1970 for ten A-4 attack aircraft, and the second, in 1972, for one F-4E. Contextual analysis reveals that Australia has a very complacent political- military situation. The nation's military expenditures have varied across time and its large negative tension scores denote a lack of tension. Australia has not been involved in any external conflict and its defense spending correlations and arms acquisitions reflect a lack of competition with neighboring nations.
Australia's Type II force structure is composed of high perform ance aircraft. The requested transfers would only supplement the already existing weapon systems. As a result, the model's recommednation would be to approve each request.
39. New Zealand. In 1969, a FMS request was received for fourteen A-4 attack aircraft from New Zealand. An analysis of
New Zealand's contextual indicators displays acceptable behavior 333 in all areas. The nation slowly increased its military expendi tures and had negative tension scores indicating a lack of tension. Furthermore, New Zealand has not been involved in arms competition or conflict with neighboring Australia. Force structure analysis reveals that the transfer would modernize
New Zealand's Type II force structure and increase its ordance capability. However, the transfer would not pose a threat to
Australia. Having reviewed the various indicators, the model would recommend to approve the request.
Summary. The above evaluations demonstrate the ability of the designed evaluation process to be systematically applied to combat air system requests from thirty-nine different nations in five geographic regions. Several observations need to be made after having applied this model. First, United States decision makers have preferences as to which types of aircraft will be introduced into a region. With the exception of a 1975 transfer to Chile, the United States has only transferred attack and trainer aircraft to Latin America. Within the attack aircraft category, the trend has been to transfer the lesser capable A-37 rather than the A-4 or A-7 air systems. Argentina has been the only Latin American nation to receive the more sophisticated
A-4. In comparison, nations in the other geographic regions have received Type I air systems. This is especially true for the Middle East nations, where the F-4 and F-5 air systems have 334
been the standard systems to be transferred. Thus, it would
seem that the United States is less willing to introduce air
systems having greater destructive capability closer to home.
Secondly, the applied evaluation process most often recommend
ed a request be denied because the transfer would create a force
structure imbalance that could contribute to the occurrence of
an arms race. This was the case both in Latin America and the
Middle East. Three Middle East requests were also rejected
becasue of recent invovlement in external conflict and the potential
for re-involvement in the future. The only transfers that should
have been rejected because they increased the possibility of
escalation of conflict., were transfers to Israel and South Viet
nam. However, in both these situations the over-riding consider
ation was American commitment to assisting in the defense of a nation's sovereignty. The United States has generally avoided
transferring combat air systems to nations involved in conflict.
Exceptions to the rule have been nations whose independence was being threatened. Thus, past transfer situations suggest that denying a request on the basis of escalating the level of an on going conflict is not a very viable consideration. This observation will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
A third observation is that different over-ride considerations exist for each region. In the case of Latin America, the most salient consideration was having Latin Americans purchase air 335
systems from the United States rather than Western European
producers. This creates a philosophy that arms should be trans
ferred regardless of the situation, because it is better to
have the nation or nations purchasing them from the United States
rather than someone else. The broader implications of this
perspective will be pursued in the conclusion. Rejected trans
fers to the Middle East were over-ridden in an attempt to obtain and/or maintain influence in the area. This consideration is
especially true for transfers to Iran and, to a lesser extent,
Saudi Arabia. A second consideration more difficult to document is approving weapon system transfers to maintain a "favorable balance-of-payments situation. Yet the recent conclusion of agreements to sell eighty F-14's to Iran and seventy F-4's to
Saudi Arabia tends to support this observation. Finally, national security reasons and assisting in the defense of non-communist nations can be cited as the over-riding considerations in Asian transfers. In each of the areas of questionable transfers, arms transfers were used to extend or maintain United States policy or influence in the region. The justification and implications of this perspective will be fully discussed in the conclusion.
Finally, a surprising number of transfers did conform to the legislated considerations. These transfers included all types of combat air systems, and occurred in each of the five geographic regions. Furthermore, past trasnfers indicate a conscious policy on the part of United States decision-makers rather than transferring weapon systems to any requestor without consideration of the nature of the request. This policy could be reviewed more fully if information was available on discussions between the United States and recipient nations prior to reaching an agreement as to which air systems would be transferred. In general, critics tend to overlook the majority of transfers that conform to established legislation and focus solely on question able transfers. Of the evaluated combat aircraft transfers that have occurred between 1969 and 1975, the applied evaluation process identified only fourteen nations received transfers which did not conform to the legislated considerations. The designed evaluation process creates a framework in which to systematically review and compare transfers to different nations in different situations. Debate on questionable transfers revolves around
United States' goals rather than the actual transfer. Once transfer parameters have been agreed upon, then it is possible to evaluate transfers and their conformity to the established restrictions. The evaluations presented above, demonstrate the applicability of the designed evaluation process to this problem. NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
^Transfers occurring in these areas were not included because of the availability of data.
2The author is most grateful to Mr. Stanley Stack and Ms. Betsy White of the DSAA's Comptroller's Office for their assistance in making this data available.
3These public sources include: (1) International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1973 and 1974-1975; (2) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Trade the Third World; and (3) Center for Defense Information (1975), The Defense Monitor.
^The defense spending correlations in Table 22 support this observation. Peru and Venezuela are the only two major contiguous nations that exhibit similar expenditure patterns.
^In their study of arms transfers, Leiss, et. al. (1970) noted that the most frequent pattern of aircraft acquisition in Latin American since 1955 was replacement of old aircraft. The national inventories for 1970 to 1975 tend to support this observation.
6The recent competition between the United States and France to sell newly designed sophisticated combat aircraft ex emplifies the uniqueness of the region.
?In contrast, Leiss, et al. (1970) reported that African acquisitions had been one of replacement rather than expansion. This pattern appears to have changed since the material for their book was gathered.
®For example, there is the problem of a divided Korea with United States armed forces assisting in the maintenance of South Korean sovereignty. Japan and the constitutional limitations on the size of its armed forces is a second problem to be considered. Thirdly, there is the two China problems, with the United States
337 338 providing military assistance to the Republic of China. Fourthly, the situation in South East Asia and the various super power involvement in this area has had an impact on the total situation. Finally, there is the recurring hostilities between India and Pakistan in South Asia.
^This study will not attempt to spell out the political dimensions of the Vietnam conflict because the United States commitment clearly generated overriding factors that minimized the role of the decision rules developed in the present model. Instead, the evaluation process will only be applied to the transfers that took place when the United States withdrew from South Vietnam after signing the Vietnam agreement in January of 1973.
^Unfortunately, data are not available on requests that were not fulfilled or were negotiated before their final approval.
11-Trainer transfers can vary in quality from unarmed trainers to very sophisticated, two-seat F-4 and F-5 trainers. It is the latter type of trainer transfer that must be closely reviewed.
l%ew York Times (1970), "U.S. To Sell Jets to Latins."
13A review of the performance characteristics and missile armament reinforces the relative comparability of the transfers.
l^See, Alfred Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, statement before the House Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs reprinted in Current Foreign Policy, Department of State Publication 8777, Near East and South Asian Series 83 (September 1974).
l^In a joint statement on cooperation issued June 8, 1974, the United States and Saudi Arabia established a "Joint Commission to review programs already underway for modernizing Saudi Arabia's armed forces...." (Bureau of Public Affairs, 1974, p. 24).
l^For a complete text of the Vietnam agreement see, Depart ment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Documentation on Viet- Nam Agreement, 1973. CHAPTER V: ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS
Arms transfer decisions are complex and contain numerous
dimensions to be considered during the evaluation process. The
preceeding discussion has demonstrated how social science techni
ques may be applied in a design situation to contruct an evaluation process for reviewing combat air system requests. Although the
Suggested decsision model only focuses on two central issues in evaluating a particular type of arms request, it provides a frame work for future efforts in developing systematic procedures to assist in deciding when to transfer weapon systems.^ The decision model has the potential to be expanded to include more issues, and also refined in terms of the level of information process. Either the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or the United States
Congress could use the proposed candidate model to evaluate arms requests. Given both organizations access to additional classified information, the designed evaluation process could be modified according to the organization’s goals and the available information.
This study has focused on two considerations legislated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. An evaluation process was designed to assess whether a particular arms transfer would
339 contribute to an arms race, or increase the outbreak or escalation
of conflict. The designed decision model proposed to evaluate
each request in terms of the current political-military situation
of the recipient, and the impact that the approved request would
have on the recipient's national force structure in relation to
the force structures of contiguous nations. An underlying
assumption of the model was that transfers should not be approved
if they created an imbalance of air force structure capabilities
between the recipient and neighboring nations.2 The logic was
that the creation of such situations were counter-productive to
the legislated considerations. In the final analysis, transfers
to fourteen nations were identified to be in violation of the
spirit of the legislated considerations.
Table 50 presents a summary of all United States combat air
system transfers and the model's corresponding recommendation
for each transfer. A total of 152 different transfers to
thirty-nine nations occurred between 1969 and the first quarter
of 1975. Thirty-four transfers, of this total, were to seven
NATO members and conseuqently not reviewed because of the nature of alliance transfers. Of the remaining 118 transfers, thirty- four (29%) were found to be in violation of the spirit of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. These questionable transfers to fourteen nations contained a variety of Type I and Attack combat air systems. The rationale for a negative recommendation in these cases clustered around three reasons. Table 50. Susmary o f Recommendations on United States Transfers
Ration Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Recoranendat: Exner.ditures Interaction Coraetition Structure Cepability
Dominican Republic 1970 1* T-Ul (MAP) Approve 197U U T-Ul (PAP) Approve
Guatemala 19?l 8 A-37 (FMS) Approve
19/3 5 A-37 (FMS) X Reject U T - M (FMS) Approve
Honduras 1973 6 A-37 (FMS) Approve 197U 3 T-Ul (FK3) Approve ml Salvador 197U U T-Ul (FMS) Approve
Venezuela i?ra 2 Antisub S-2 (FMS) X Approve 16 07-10 (FMS) Approve 12 T-2 (FMS) Approve
1973 U Antisub S-2 (FMS) Approve
197U 1 Antisub S-2 (FMS) Approve
Ecuador 1975 12 A-37 (FMS) X* X Reject
Peru 1973 2U A-37 (FMS) X X Reject
197U 12 Antisub S-2 (FMS) X xa Reject
Brazil 1969 25 T-37 (FIB) X X Approve
19','U 8 Antisub S-2 (FK3) X X Reject
Paraguay 1973 5 T-Ul (MAP) Approve 341
I Table 50. Cont'd
Nation Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Reccsnendet: Expenditures Interaction Cometition Structure Capability
Uruguay 1969 5 T-Ul (NAP) Approve 1* T-33A (HAP) Approve
1970 2 T-Ul (KAP) Approve
197 5 8 a -37 (FMS) xb X Reject
Chile 1973 16 A-37 (FFE) X Approve 8 T-37 (FFE) X Approve
1974 18 F-5E (FMS) X Reject 8 T-37 (FI-IS ) Approve 9 T-Ul (FI-E) Approve
1975 18 A-37 (FMS) X X Reject
Argentina 1970 20 A-U (FMS) Reject 1971 U A-U (FFE) Reject
1975 25 A-U (FFE) X XXX Reject
France 1969 10 T-33 (FFE) Approve
Spain 1971 36 RF-UC (FFE) Approve
Portugal 1969 10 T-33A (MAP) Approve
Weet Germany 1969 88 RF-UE (FFE) NAT0C 18 ov-io (ffe) NATO
1972 175 F-UF (FMS) NATO
Italy 1970 U T-33 (FFE) Approve
Greece 1969 U F-10U (MAP) KAT0C • 2 TF-1Q2A (MAP) NAT0C ' 20 F-102A (MAP) NATOc 342 Table 50- Cont'd
Nation Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Reconmendation Expenditures Interaction Competition Structure Capability
Greece (cont’d) 1970 2 F-5A (MAP) NATO. 1 TF-102A (MAP) NATO0 5 T-37 (MAP) NATO0 1 T-Ul (MAP) NATO0
1971 20 T-33A (MAP) NATO0 1 TF-102A (MAP) NATO0
1972 36 F-UE (FMS) KAT0C
197U 2 F-UE (Fffi) NATO0c 60 A-7 (f ;e ) NATO UO T-2 (rMs) NATO0
Turkey 1969 2 TF-102A (MAP) NATO0 20 F-102A (MAP) NATO0
1970 1 TF-102A (MAP) NATO0 UO F-1CC (MAP) NATO0 1 F-5B (MAP) NATO0 25 T-Ul (MAP) NATO” 5 T-U2A (MAP) NATO0
1971 U TF-102A (MAP) NAT0° 3 f-:a (map) NATO0 2 F-53 (MAP) NATO0 30 T-Ul (MAP) NATO0 U Antisub S-2 (MAP) NATOc
1972 75 F-100 (MAP) NATO0 3 T-33A (MAP) NATO0 8 Antisub S-2 (MAP) NATO0
1973 UU F-100 (MAP) NATO0 uo f-Ue (f:-e) NATO0 2U A-37 (FMS) NATO0
1S7U 12 F-100 (MAP) NATO0 to •b- W Tatle 50. Cont ■d
Nation Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Pecommendat Expenditures Interaction Competition Structure Capability
Nor/ay 12 F-5A (F1C) 1969 KAT0e Denmark 197U 1U F-100 (FMS) NATO0 Morocco 196 9 1 F-5B (FMS) X Approve 2 RF-5A (FMS) X Approve Ethiopia 1970 U T-Ul (MAP) Approve
1971 1 F-5A (MAP) Approve
1972 2 F-5A (MAP) Approve 2 T-33A (MAP) Approve
1973 2 T-33A (MAP) Approve
1971* 1 T-28 (MAP) Approve
Iran 1969 32 F-U (SIP) X X X Reject
1971 138 F-U (CDI) X X XX Reject
1972 1U1 F-5E (CDI) X X XX Reject
1971* 80 F-lU (ISS) X X X Reject
Jordan 1970 18 F-10U (SIP) X XX Reject
1972 2U F-5B/E (ISS) X Approve
Israel 1969 50 F-U (SIP) X XX XX Reject
1970 18 A-U (ISS) XX X XXX Reject
1972 U2 F-U (ISS) X X XXX X Reject
1973 U8 f-U (iss) XXXXX X Reject 36 A-U (ISS) 344 Table 50. Cont'd
Katlon Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Recommendation Expenditures Interaction Competition Structure Capability Saudi Arabia 1971 50 F-5A/B (ISS) X* Approve 1973 20 F-5B (CDI) X X X Reject 197U 70 F-5E (ISS) X X X Reject Kuwait 197U 36 A-U (CDI) xd Approve Republic of China 1969 2 T-33A (MAP) Approve
1970 38 F-1 0 0 (MAP) X Approve 22 F-10U (MAP) X Approve 2 F-5A (MAT) X Approve 2 T-33A (MAP) X Approve
1971 2 F-100 (MAP) X Approve
1972 2 F-100 (MAP) X Approve 1 F-10U (MAP) X Approve 10 T-33A (MAP) X Approve
1973 2 F-lOU (MAP) X Approve 12 F-53 (FIS) X Approve
1975 6 F-lOU (FIS) Hot evaluated6 25 T-33 (FIS) Not evaluated® 12 Antlsub S-2 (F16) Not evaluated6
South Korea 1969 13 T-33A (MAP) Approve
1970 3 F-5A (MAP) Approve
1971 10 F-5A (MAP) Approve 8 RF-5A (MAP) Approve U F-53 (MAP) Approve 11 T-37 (MAP) Approve 8 Ar.tisub S-2 (MAP) Approve
1972 5 F-5B (MAP) Approve w 18 T-Ul (MAP) Approve U i Table 50. Cont'd
Nation Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Recommendation Expenditures Interaction Comuetition Structure Capability
South Korea (cont'd) 1973 21 F-5E (tlAP) Approve 9 T-Ul (MAP) Approve 1U T-37 (NAP) Approve
197U 3 F-5B (NAP) X Reject 2U F-5E (MAP) X Reject 13 F-5B (F!'E) X Reject
Pakistan 1969 5 T-37 (F>S) Approve 1970 U T-33 (F!S) Approve 1975 7 T -3 7 (f:c) Approve
Thailand 1970 16 0V-10 (NAP) X Approve 1972 16 0V-10 (F1*S) X Approve 1973 6 F-5A (MAP) X Approve
Cambodia 1971 20 T-23 (NAP) X X Approve 12 T-Ul (MAP) XX Approve
1972 22 X-28 (NAP) XX Approve 7 T-Ul (NAP) XX Approve
1973 16 T-23 (NAP) X X Approve U T-Ul (MAP) XX Approve
197V 23 T-23 (KAF) XX Approve 1 T-Ul (MAP) XX Approve
South Vietnam 1973 7 PF-5A (ISS) X X Reject 90 F-5A (ISS) X X Reject 168 A-37B (ISS) XX Reject lU AC-1190 (ISS) X X Reject
197U 30 EC-U7 (ISS) X X Reject 10 RC-119 (ISS) X X Reject 10 AC-II9C (ISS) XX Reject
LO S > Table 50. Cont'd
Nation Year Transfer Military Tension Dimension of Conflict Arms Force Pecommendec Expenditures Interaction Competition Structure Capability
Malaysia 1972 2 F-5B (FMS) X X X Reject 11* F-5E (FMS) XX X Reject
Philippines 1969 2 T-33A (MAP) Approve
Indonesia 1969 9 T-l*l (MAP) Approve
1970 6 T-Ul (MAP) Approve
1971 2 TF-51 (MAP) Approve
1972 1 TF-51 (MAP) Approve 5 F-51 (MAP) Approve 16 T-33A (MAP) Approve
Australia 1970 10 A-1* (FMS) Approve
1972 1 F-ltE (FI-E) Approve
New Zealand 1969 lU A-U (Fi-E) Approve
^Peru's request is a reactive acquisition arcs competition. ^The transfer vculd create a potential arcs race situation. ®NAT0 transfers represent a special case that is not evaluated. “This conflict vas a border incursion by Iraqi troops, Kuwait's involvement vas defensive in maintaining its national boundaries. eThese transi'ers were not evaluated because of insufficient data. fThis vas a mininal ccnflictual encounter and not viewed serious enough to reject the transfer. 347 348
The first reason for a negative recommendation on two nations
was the existence of arms competition underscored by positive
tension scores for the requesting nations. In the case of
these two Latin American nations, the requests were competitive
with their neighbors. By approving the requests, the situation
for further competition was created. The requests could have
been rejected. However, it is very likely that the nations would
then have turned to European combat air system producers to obtain
similar aircraft. As a result, arms were transferred to offset
the trend of purchasing from European producers. The policy
implication of this type of decision is clear. Arms will be
transferred regardless of the legislation if it is deemed by
decision-makers to be in the best interest of the United States.
For the above transfers, it was in the United States interests
to supply the desired systems rather than having the nations
purchase them elsewhere. Whether or not this is a viable orientation remain to be seen.
Force structure changes creating potential arms race situa
tions was the second major reason for a negative recommendation.
Transfers to five Latin American and three Asian nations were
recommended for rejection because of this resulting situation.
The decision rules are very clear for this situation as they were
in the first two cases. In these eight cases, the overriding
considerations are varied. With respect to the Latin American
transfers, the consideration is again that of supplying arms to offset purchases from European producers. Assisting in the main tenance of national sovereignty was a second overriding consider ation for transfers to South Korea and South Vietnam. Finally, it is more difficult to assess the overriding consideration in case of the Malaysian transfer. The most reasonable considera tion is that of assisting in building a sound defense force structure for a nation that supplies a number of essential raw materials to the United States. Given the political and military situation in Southeast Asia at the time of the request, it is not surprising that the United States would transfer sophisticated air weapon systems to assist in guaranteeing continued access to Malaysian raw material esports.
The third cluster of transfers involves the existence of conflict in combination with force structure changes as the reasons for a negative recommendation. These transfers were all to
Middle East nations. There would seem to be several overriding considerations for these cases. The most obvious one is that of assisting Israel in maintaining its national sovereignty.
This consideration has been discussed in the previous chapter and will not be reiterated again, A second overriding consider ation is the economic benefits accrued from selling large quantities of sophisticated air systems. The United States balance of payments situation has benefited from the large sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia. A final overriding consideration 350
is the maintaining of favorable relations with influential nations
in the Middle East. A certain amount of mutual respect and in
fluence is gained by becoming a principal supplier of weapons
to a particular nation. Thus arms transfers can be used in pur
suing national foreign policy objectives. The policy implications
of this last overriding consideration will be reviewed later in
this chapter. Although the overriding considerations have been
varied and open to interpretation in each of these transfers,
the fact remains that questionable transfers have occurred in
the past and are likely to continue to occur in the future. The
nature of the legislation seems to have an impact on the continued
occurrence of such transfers.
United States decision-makers have great latitude in approv
ing an arms request because the language of the 1971 Foreign
Assistance Act only indicates that decision-makers shall "take into account" the arms race/conflict effects of a transfer. For this reason, the designed evaluation process should be viewed as an aid in the decision-making process. Evaluation of an arms request on the basis of the legislation produces a recommendation.
The decision-maker may either accept the recommendation or reject it because of certain over-riding considerations. Poli tical considerations are most often involved in rejecting a nega tive recommendation. United States commitment to assisting nation's in the maintenance of their independence is a key factor 3bl
in approving many controversial arms requests. Such a consider
ation is open to debate, as to how much support is realistically
needed. This consideration is one of many issues that will be
reviewed.
Overall, the designed evaluation process proved to be
applicable to past air weapon system transfers. Indicators
measuring national tension, arms competition, national inter
action, and military expenditures were developed and operational
ized to provide insight into the political-military situation of
the requesting nation and other nations in the region. Further
more, the conceptualization of national air force structures and
force structure capability was developed and presented for the
first time. These two components of the model present the
analyst with information to reach a recommendation on a specific
request. Having applied the designed evaluation process to past
arms transfer decision, a number of model refinements and arms
transfer issues need to be reviewed for future work in this area.
Model Refinements. The availability of intelligence information would provide the ability to make several refinements in the decision model. Information on national tension, military expenditures, recent air system acquisitions, and current combat air system inventories could come from a variety of sources including the regional bureaus and country desks within the 352
Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. It would seem that the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency is in an excellent position to obtain
information from the country experts housed in the adjoining
areas of the Department of State. The country desks receiving
daily reports from their respective nations are in the position
to provide the latest information available on any particular
nation in the international system. It is possible that dramatic
changes could have occurred within a nation that would not be
reflected in the indicators given the time period they are based
upon. In order to make sound recommendations, it is necessary
to keep the information in the model as current as possible.
Intelligence sources could provide the necessary information.
They could also provide more qualitative information than would
be needed by the model. But the main point is that the information
be gathered in accordance with the designed contextual indicators.
Too much information could cause an information overload and blur
the decision-maker's perspective of the requesting nation's
political-military situation.
Having the latest information available on nations within
a region is exceptionally important for arms transfer decisions.
The academic analyst is at a disadvantage in analyzing arms
transfer decisions because he usually does not have recent and
complete information. Still, the academic has the luxury of 353 analyzing past decisions rather than having to be confronted with current requests that need relatively quick responses. In com parison, the government decision-maker is faced with the task of making decisions on the best information available at the time of the request. The designed evaluation process structures the information needed to reach a decision and assists in efficiently processing that information. Combining intelligence information with previously available information should provide the decision maker with enough information to make an appraisal of the situation.
But what types of intelligence information would be of assistance in evaluating an arms request. First, more accurate and up-to-date information on national tensions and potential conflicts with neighboring nations would be available through intelligence sources. Having access to this type information is necessary for evaluating the potential application of trans ferred weapon systems. Events data provides an adequate amount of information on national interactions. Still, intelligence information is often more rich in detail about future contempleted national actions. As a result, intelligence information could increase the quality of data available on national interactions.^
Secondly, intelligence information could provide current estimates of military expenditures and recent acquisitions. One of the difficulties with relying on public sources is the lag time between when the information is released to someone and when 354
it appears in print. This problem is significantly reduced within
the government. However, information channels would need to be
established in order that new information could immediately
become available to the appropriate individuals. In a large
bureaucracy such as the United States government, it is likely
that information could be of use to a number of different groups
if they knew it were available. Thus the need exists for estab
lishing communication links with the various intelligence collecting
groups to provide the information identified in the model.
Thirdly, more accurate national air inventories would be
available for assessing national force structures and force
structure capability. Public sources provide the academician with the "available" knowledge about national air inventories.
Still, intelligence reports should provide more accurate accounts not only of the number of aircraft, but also the various models within a particular type of aircraft whether it is produced by the United States or some other foreign producer. Knowing the particular model is important because ordance capabilities vary among different models of aircraft. Also, intelligence information should be available on the missile armaments for each aircraft. This information increases the analyst's ability to identify qualitative force structure changes.
Intelligence information could provide estimates on two force structure variables presently assumed to be constant for 355
all nations. The first variable is the number and types of
operational air weapon systems in a particular nation. This data
is different from the national air inventory information in that
it reflects the actual number of aircraft that could be deployed
in a combat situation. An example of the impact of such information
can be seen in Latin America. In this region, a number of old
bomber air systems are listed as part of each members inventory.
If the majority of these aircraft are not operational, the force
structure capability of each nation would be reduced by one-
third to one-half its original size because bomber air systems
are a central component of most Latin American force structures.
This factor could be quite influential when reviewing new re
quests from members in the region. Similarly, if intelligence
sources indicated that fifteen per cent of Israel's Type I air
systems were always non-operational, an analyst could calculate
that this meant an eight per cent ordance reduction (310,000 pounds for 1974) in Israel's total force structure capability.
Correspondingly, requests for additional Type I air systems would be further evaluated by comparing Israel's operational capabilities with that of the neighboring Arab nations. Including this factor in the evaluation process could alter the final recommendation, especially if the Arab's operational rate was considerably less than that of Israel.^ Attrition rate of combat air systems is the second variable
that could be added into the evaluation process. This factor is
defined as the percentage of combat air systems that become
totally non-operational and must be replaced with new aircraft.
The attrition rate for various types of aircraft would vary from
country to country.^ Both Hoagland (1970) and Leiss (1970-72) sug
gest a rate of approximately ten per cent for developing nations
on the basis of their data from 1945 to 1968. This rate may
have changed considerably given the increased sophistication of
recent combat air systems, but suggested figures are not avail
able. National attrition rates are important in assessing the
impact of a requested transfer on the nation's total air force
structure. Knowing a nation's attrition rate would enable the
analyst to assess whether a particular request was to maintain
the nation's current force structure level or increase it in
comparison to changes occurring in neighboring inventories.^
Having this information for each member in a region increases
the accuracy and quality of force structure analyses.
Overall, intelligence information greatly adds to the evaluation process. Intelligence units can provide additional information as well as more current information for the designed model. Because arms requests are received sporadically, it is necessary to keep all indicators as current as possible. The analyses of past arms transfer decisions in Chatper IV were 357
treated on a yearly basis. In reality, the requests and corre
sponding decisions occurred throughout the year. Consequently,
the need for current indicators is self-evident. If the designed
evaluation process, or some form of it, is to be used by Govern
ment decision-makers, some organization will have to be charged
with the responsibility of coordinating all the information from
the various sources. In the end, arms transfer evaluations and
the resulting recommendation are only as good as the available
information they are based upon.
Quality versus Quantity. United States decision-makers must
address themselves to the problem of quality versus quantity in
the transfer of combat air weapon systems. This specific
problem was not presented earlier because it seemed more appropriate
to consider it after having evaluated past transfers. The issue
is whether it is better to transfer a larger number of air systems with low ordance capability or a few air systems with higher
ordance delivery capabilities to a particular nation. It is
clear that no consistent policy exists for the time period under
consideration. The United States has pursued a mixed policy with different nations throughout the various regions of the inter national system.
A number of different considerations exist in this situation.
If the choice is quality over quantity, then fewer aircraft need
to be transferred in order to qualitatively raise a nation’s 358
force structure capability. Without undertaking a number of micro analyses, several general implications for this selection
can also be identified. These include:
(1) The need for Air-to-Air missiles and Air-to-Surface missiles in addition to normal rocket and bomb ordance;
(2) The reduced ability to fly numerous simultaneous missions, but greater attack capability for those missions selected;
(3) The need for faster maintenance turn-around time in order to keep the force structure at near full capability;
(4) A higher level of pilot and maintenance capability, because these aircraft are usually more sophisticated; and
(5) The need to be concerned about maintaining a low air craft attrition rate since the loss of several aircraft has a noticeable impact on total force structure capability.
In comparison, the opposite implications would generally be true if the option selected was for a larger number of lower ordance capability aircraft. The exception would be in the guided missile category. In this case, both types of aircraft need 'to have guided air-to-air missiles if they are expected to perform satis factorily in combat interception missions against similar air system with Air-to-Air missiles.
The most visible application of this perspective has been noted in the transfer to Greece and Turkey. For these two nations a relative ordance balance was maintained by transferring higher ordance capability A-7 attack aircraft to Greece in order to offset the larger number of less capable F-100fs transferred to Turkey. In other cases, complete qualitative transfers have 359
prevailed without much consideration seemingly given to the impact
on total force sturcture capability. Iran and Israel are two
cases where only high capability, Type I air systems were trans
ferred to establish each nation in a superior position in compari
son to other regional members. Finally, the transfer of F-5E
aircraft to Chile represents a qualitative decision to sell Chile
similar Type I air systems in relation to the Mirage aircraft
purchased by other Latin American nations in the previous year.
A review of past United States transfers indicates that there is
an awareness of the issue, but no consistent application of which
type of transfer is most appropriate in a given situation.
The issue of quality versus quantity is not easily resolved.
Generally, it would seem reasonable to transfer the same "type"
aircraft found in the inventories of contiguous nations. The
case of Greece and Turkey matches a slightly slower, higher
ordance, attack aircraft with AAM capability against a somewhat
faster, lesser ordance, Type II aircraft also having air-to-air
guided missile capabilities. This situation represents a con
scious decision to match force structure capabilities. Likewise,
the Type I transfer to Chile represents a transfer consistent with existing Type I air systems in the region. The problem
has been identified because it is one that must be dealt with
in making arms transfer decisions. How it is resolved, remains at the
disgression of the decision-maker. 360
Issues. Analysis of past United States arms transfers has
identified several decisions related issues that should be reviewed.
These issues are open for debate, and are not resolvable because
there exists no right or wrong opinion on any of them. The first
issue involves the fact that the United States has either directly
or indirectly determined the composition of various national force
structures. Latin America represents a prime example of United
States influence, as does Greece, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and South Vietnam (until the spring of 1975). United States influence has been exercised through the Military Assistance
Program, selected Foreign Military Sales, and training programs for foreign military p e r s o n n e l . ^ The questions is how desirable is it for the United States to have such an impact and have foreign nations dependent upon U.S. weapon systems?
In terms of the designed evaluation process, United States influence invariably becomes an over-riding consideration in approving arms requests that should have been rejected. That is, arms transfers are approved because they will assist the
United States in having an impact on national actions or inter actions within a region. This situation was observed in the approval of requests from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.
Having influence can prove to be a double-edged sword. On the one side, the United States has the ability to influence national interactions because of their dependence of U.S. weapon 361
systems. Yet on the other side, the United States may have to
approve transfers that might noramlly be rejected in order to
maintain its credibility. The overall benefits are not all they
might seem to be for every case.®
A second issue is the legislated consideration that decision
makers shall take into account the potential effects of a trans
fer on increasing the possibility of outbreak or escalation of
conflict. In Chapter IV, it was noted that this is not a viable consideration in terms of escalating an ongoing conflict. United
States commitment to assisting nations in maintaining their independence is an overriding consideration in all ongoing con flicts. As a result in both Vietnam and the Middle East the level of conflict was sustained because of United States transfers.
The difficulty with this issue is that the United States only becomes involved in certain types of conflicts. Yet the spirit of the legislation suggests that transfers to nations involved in ongoing conflicts should not take place because of the potential for escalation. The basic American foreign policy position, supported by the Congress, of assisting threatened non-communist nations is incongruous with the intention of the legislated considerations. Arms will be transferred to nations fighting to maintain their independence regardless of the consequences.
The impact of all this is that either the legislation or the basic foreign policy position needs to be changed. In 1973, 362
Israel was able to participate and escalate the level of conflict
in the Middle East becuase of United States arms transfers.
Interesting enough, little criticism has been voiced in the United
States over periodic Israeli incursions into Syria and Lebanon
to attack suspected Arab guerrilla staging areas. Still, these
attacks are a violation of Syrian and Lebanese soverighty and
carried out with United States combat air weapon systems. This
analyst is not at all questioning Israel's right of survival as
a nation in the Middle East. What is questioned, however, is
the appropriateness of the legislated consideration in light
of United States foreign policy. Perhaps South Vietnam and
Israel are the only exceptions to a rule that must otherwise be
enforced. The issue is not easily resolved, and needs to be
given attention.
A third issue is the general use of United States arms
transfers to maintain and/or extend U.S. foreign policy.
Although this is a much broader issue than the first two issues discussed, it is a central issue to the evaluation process.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has used both economic and military assistance to further its foreign policy interests. A basic question resulting from the evaluation is whether arms transfers should continue to be used in support of foreign policy objectives? The answer is a debatable one, and will continue to be debated in the future. 363
The impact of this issue in terms of the legislated consider ations and the designed evaluation process occurs in those instances where foreign policy objectives become overriding considerations for negative recommendations. Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine is a good example where the potential exists for the legislation to be set aside in order to accomplish national objectives in a particular region. Extensive arms transfers to certain nations in the Persian Gulf is another area of conflict with the legislation. In the geographic area, the United States
Government has developed special relationships with Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The objective of maintaining regional stability through the extensive modernization of Iranian and Saudi Arabian armed forces seriously questions the considerations in the Foreign
Assistance Act. In this instance, the creation of regional sta bility via a militarily strong Iran is a prime objective of United
States foreign policy. Consequently, extensive combat air weapon system transfers have been approved to accomplish this objective even though a potentially dangerous situation for an arms race or conflict to occur is developing.
A final issue is the overall utility of the evaluation process in light of the problems already identified above. The designed evaluation process is useful regardless of the problems associated with the legislated considerations. It has identified a format for structuring information to assess a nation's poli tical-military situation. Furthermore, a process for comparing 364
national air force structures at a macro level has been developed.
If nothing else, this candidate decision model should stimulate
further attempts to develop political and military indicators
that can be applied to policy problems. The process of refining
the model is continuous as new information becomes available and
new indicators are conceptualized and operationalized.
These issues display the existence of value tradeoffs that
occur when making arms transfer decisions. If the decision maker strictly adheres to the legislation, he looses a consider able amount of flexibility in implementing United States foreign policy. The Congress in passing the legislation has been willing to give up this flexibility in order to gain a somewhat tighter control over United States arms transfers. However, Congress has also been willing to loosely interpret the legislation in certain cases. Arms transfers to Israel exemplify tradeoffs made in order to assist a nation in maintaining its sovereignty. Value choices need to be made when setting limitations on when to transfer arms. The designed model nor any other model can make these choices. But once the value decisions are made, the model can assist in providing recommendations based on the established values. In the end, the final decision is the responsibility of the decision-maker.
The evaluations presented in Chapter IV identify several trends in United States combat air system transfers. First, 365
United States decision-makers have preferences as to which types
of aircraft will be introduced into a region. Secondly, there
is a goal of regaining American dominance of Latin American
sales. This is evident in the combat air system transfers approved
in 1974 and the first quarter of 1 9 7 5 . Thirdly, United States
foreign policy objectives have influenced the transfer of sophis
ticated Type I combat air systems to certain Middle East nations.
Finally, a large number of transfers did not conform to the
legislated considerations, and included all types of combat air
systems. The utility of the designed evaluation process has been
demonstrated, but its overall impact on the decision-making process will be realized in future applications of the model.
Conclusion. The policy implications for this study would seem to be two-fold in nature. First, one must seriously question the
usefulness of the legislated considerations in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971. An evaluation process has been designed and applied to past combat air system transfer decisions. Although
the model identifies that a sizeable number of transfers did conform to the legislation, there also exists thirty-four situations in which the legislation was complteley ignored because of over riding foreign policy objectives. In their present form, the legislated considerations are merely an expression of preference and carry little influence, if any, in the final decision process.
It would seem that either the legislation needs to be rewritten 366
to be more responsive to the current political situation or else
it be completely dropped from arms transfer decisions. To
selectively invoke the considerations is not a viable approach in
the evaluation process.
Secondly, an evaluation process does exist to deal with the
considerations if they are going to be seriously applied to arms
transfer decisions. A number of refinements have been suggested
for the decision model that can only be instituted within the
United States governmental organization. What is needed, however,
is a group of individuals to be responsible for continually up
dating the various indicators, and to be extensively familiar
with weapon systems and past United States transfers. If Congress
is going to continue to involve itself in this area, as is sug
gested by the new requirements established in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, ^ then the most likely place for this group would be
in the newly created Congressional Budget Office. This groups
designated mission would be to provide Congress with appropriate
technical and political information for evaluating the conformity of arms transfers to its legislation.-*-2 However, if Congress is
going to continue to be reactive to Defense policy and arms
transfer decisions, then the designed evaluation process could be used within the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Social science techniques have assisted in the creation of an evaluation process for arms transfer requests. The question now is whether 367 or not there is a serious interest in applying the process for future combat air system decisions.
Although one cannot accurately predict the total impact of any particular arms transfer, the candidate decision model assists in identifying the current political-military situation within the requesting nation and its region. Furthermore, the newly designed force structure analysis permits "the evaluation of the force structure situation that will be created if the transfer is approved. On the basis of this information, conjectures can be made about the potential impact of a transfer. Arms transfer decisions have to be continually made in situations of imperfect information. The designed evaluation process presented in this study, assists in providing the decision-maker with better information on which to make a decision.
I NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
■^•Raser (1965) notes that "any scheme which spurs us to look at weapons systems in terms of how well they meet a broad range of criteria is worthwhile. It is not so important that the scheme be foolproof. What is important is that it provoke ana lysis which might reveal unseen fallacies and pitfalls (p. 462)."
^This assumption is consistent with current policy in the Department of State. The arms perspective in State is that "an arms balance in areas of tension has, in most cases, inhibited the occurrence of conflict. Also, a good case and should be made that the risk of war is increased in situations where a power imbalance exists, where the stronger power is tempted to take advantage of the weaker, or where one or the other power attempts to markedly alter the power relationship (Department of State, Current Policy: U.S. Foreign Military Sales, July 1975, p. 4).
^The commitment to using events data along with other intelli gence information would require the creation of a group to collect, code, and process daily events. Such an operation could also include the coding of daily diplomatic dispatches from United States embassies in addition to those interactions recorded in public sources. This would have 'to be a government operation because of the need for up-to-date information. Data collection and processing is too slow within the academic community because of the lack of resources and other demands placed on the academician's time.
^A similar non-operational Type I rate would have less of an impact on Egypt's force structure capability (4.1% decreased), and a slightly higher impact on Syria (10% decrease in total ordance capability).
^Leiss (1970-72) notes that the rate "would reflect the intensity of use of the system, the ability of the country's technicians to maintain it, the availability of outside technical help, the availability of spare parts, the efficiency of the logis tics of spares and replacements, and a host of other considerations. The fate would also vary with climate, time of year, and other factors that affect the durability of goods (p. 124)."
368 369
^In making policy recommendations on the basis of their study, Leiss, et al. (1970-71) noted that it is important in evaluating arms transfers, "to distinguish between one that is designed to keep an inventory at a steady level by replacing systems that have worn and aged beyond their useful lives, and a transfer designed to increase the size of usable inventories. To character ize all transfers under the same rubric— for example, as arms races— is to obscure the real issues (p. 341-342)."
?Jacob Refson (1970-74) and Geoffrey Kemp (1970-75) have demonstrated in separate studies that United States military training programs have an impact on future acquisition patterns. It seems logical that if a nation's military personnel has been trained with U.S. weapon systems, they should then have a pre ference to purchase such weapon systems.
^The recent difficulties with Turkey over Cyprus and the suspension of arms shipments to Turkey is an interesting example. On July 27, the Turkish government began taking control of United States bases in Turkey because of the continued refusal by the Congress to approve arms transfers to Turkey. In this situation up to the present time, U.S. influence has not been very effective in improving relations between Greece and Turkey.
9ln Hay of 1975, seventy-five senators sent President Ford a letter during continued economic and military support to Israel.
•^See Table 49 in Chapter IV for the exact details of Latin American transfers.
llln the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Congress asserted its right to review and cancel any arms transfer in excess of $25 million dollars unless the President "certifies that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security interests of the United States (U.S. Statutes at Large, 1974, p. 21)."
•^Currently, Congress received publications such as Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, and The Journal published by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Appendix A. lonal Air System Inventories
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Cuba
Tanker No Information
P.econai86ance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 50 NIC-21 50 MiG-21 80 MiG-21 80 MiG-21 90 MiG-19 40 MiG-19 40 MiG-19 40 MiG-19 Type' II Type III 75 MiG-17 75 MiG-17 75 MiG-17 70 MiG-17 Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 20 MiG-15 20 MiG-15 20 MiG-15 15 MiG-15
Trainer 30 MiG-15 UTI 30 MiG-15 UTI & 30 MiG-15 UTI & 25 MiG-15 UTI 50 Zlin 226 Zlin 326 Zlin 326 60 Zlin 226/326
Helicopter 30 Ml-1 30 Mi-1 30 Mi-1 30 Mi-1 25 Mi-4 25 Mi-4 24 Mi-4 24 Mi-4 1 Hiller 4 Bell 47G 7 Bell 47J 2 Whirlwinds
Transport 12 11-14 50: mostly 11-14, An-2, 70: mostly 11-14, An-2, 70: mostly 11-14, An-2, 20 An-2 and An-24 end An-24 and An-24 370 Appendix A
1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 6 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang
Trainer 15: T-6 Texan, T-19 Cornell, and 2 T-28A Trojan
Helicopter Six on order Six on order
Transport 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 2 C-45 2 C-45 2 C-45 2 C-45 1 Cessna 310 71 3 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Dominican Republic
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance 2 PBY-5A Catalina '2 PBY-5A Catalina .2 PBY-5A Catalina 2 PBY-5A Catalina
Bomber 7 B-26 Invader 3 B-26 Invader 3 B-26 Invader 3 B-26 Invader
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 20 D. H. Vampire Mk.l
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 20 F-51D Mustang 20 F-51D Mustang 20 F-51D Mustang 20 F-51D Mustang 20 D. H . Vampire Mk.l 10 D. H. Vampire Mk.l 10 D. H. Vampire Mk.l
Trainer 30: T-6 Texan, 30: T-6 Texan, 30: T-6 Texan, 30: T-6 Texan, T-ll Kansan, T-ll Kansan, T-ll Kansan, T-ll Kansan, BT-13 Valiant, BT-13 Valiant, BT-13 Valiant, BT-13 Valiant, PT-17 Kaydet PT-17 Kaydet PT-17 Kaydet PT-17 Kaydet
Helicopter 2 Bell 47G 2 Sikorsky H-19 2 Sikorsky H-19 2 Sikorsky H-19 2 Sikorsky H-19 3 Alouette 1 1 / 1 1 1 3 Alouette II/III 3 Alouette II/III 2 Bell 011-13 2 hell 011-13 2 Bell 011-13 2 Hiller UU-12 2 Hiller Ull-12 2 Hiller UH-12
Transport 6 C-45 5 C-45 6 C-46 5 C-46 6 C-46 6 C-46 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 Cessna 170 3 Cessna 170 3 Cessna 170 6 C-47 6 C-47 372 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Mexico
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type 1 Type II Type III
Pighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 15 D. H. Vampire 12 D. H. Vampire 12 D. H. Vampire 12 D. H. Vampire
Trainer 15 T-33A (armed) 15 T-33A (armed) 15 T-33A (armed) 15 T-33A (armed) 45 T-6 Texan® 45 T-6 Texan® 45 T-6 Texan® 45 T-6 Texan® 30 T-28 Trojan® 32 T-28 Trojan® 32 T-28 Trojan® 32 T-28 Trojan® 15 T-ll Kansan® 13 T-ll Kansan® 13 T-ll Kansan® 13 T-ll Kansan® 10 T-34 Mentor 10 T-34 Mentor 10 T-34 Mentor 10 T-34 Mentor (some armed) 18 LASA-60 18 LASA-60
Helicopter 8 Alouette II 8 Alouette II 6 Alouette II 8 Alouette II 18 Bell 47 18 Bell 47 14 Bell 47 14 Bell 47 1 Hiller UH-12E 1 Hiller UH-12E 1 Hiller UH-12E 1 Hiller UH-12E 1 Bell 212 1 Bell 212 3 Puma 3 Puma 5 Jet Ranger 5 Jet Ranger
Transport 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 5 C-54 5 C-54 5 C-54 5 C-54 2 C-118 2 C-118 2 C-118 2 C-118 2 DC-6 3 Islander 3 Islander 3 Islander 1 Jctstar 1 Jctstar 1 Jetstar 20 C-45 20 C-45 W 3 Arva ambulance w I MU-25 *Can be used for ground support. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Guatemala
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber S B-26 Invader 4 B-26 Invader 4 B-26 Invader
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 11 F-51D Mustang 8 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang Attack 8 A-37B COIN 8 A-37B COIN 8 A-37B COIN
Trainer 10: T-6 Texan & T-33 4 RT-33A ,4 RT-33A
Helicopter 6 UH-12B 6 UH-12B 10 10
Transport 6 C-47 11 11: 4 C-47 11: 4 C-47 1 C-54 1 Aero Commander
—jCo •o Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Honduras
Tanker Mo Information
Reconalssance
Bomber 6 B-26C
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 6 F-51D Mustang 5 F-51D Mustang 12 F-4U Corsair 6 F-4U Corsair 6 F-4U Corsair 11 F-4U Corsair
Trainer 3 RT-33 (armed) 3 RT-33A 3 RT-33A 3 RT-33A
Helicopter 3 H-19 3 H-19 3 H-19 3 H-19
Transport 3 C-47 7 4 C-47 6 C-47 1 C-54 1 C-54 2 Cessna 180
w "J U l Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
El Salvador
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber 3 B-26
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 6 F-51D Mustang 10 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang 6 F-51D Mustang 6 F-4U Corsair 4 F-4U Corsair 4 F-4U Corsair 4 F-4U Corsair
Trainer 30: 10 T-6 Texan, 3 T-34 T-ll Kansan
Helicopter 10 1 FH-1100
Transport 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 1 C-54 1 DC-4 376 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Nicaragua
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber 6 B-26 4 B-26 4 B-26 5 B-26
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 15 F-51D Mustang 8 F-47D
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-26A (armed) 6 T-28A (armed) 20 Other-- T-6 Texan, 15 Others 15 Others BT-13A Valiant, and AT-11 Kansan
Helicopter 2 0H-6A 2 0H-6A 5 6 2 Hughes 300
Transport 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 4 C-45 1 Arava 10 Cessna 180
U> Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 ,
Jamaica Air systems are minimal and part of the army.
Trinidad and Tobago No regular Air Force
Cosca Rica No regular Air Force
Panama No regular Air Force 378 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Colombia
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance 8 PBY-5A Catalina 8 PBY-5A Catalina
Bomber 8 B-26 8 B-26
Interceptor
Type I 4 Mirage III R/D 4 Mirage III R/D 4 Mirage III R/D 14 Mirage V 14 Mirage V 14 Mirage V Type II Type III 2 F-86F 6 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 6 CL-13B Sabrejet
Trainer 3 RT-33 Some T-33 Some T-33 10 T-33 30 T-41D 30 T-41D 30 T-41D 30 T-41D 10 T-37 10 T-37 10 T-37 10 T-37 50 others: Inc. T-6 & T-34A Some T-34 Some T-34 30 T-34
Helicopter 12 0H-6A 12 0H-6A 12 0H-6A 12 0H-6A 6 TH-55 6 TH-55 6 TH-55 20 Bell 47 16 Bell 47 16 Bell 47 16 Bell 47 6 Kaman HH-43B 6 Kaman lluskle 6 Kaman Huskie 6 Kaman Huskie 6 UH-1B 1 UH-1B 6 UK-1B 4 Hiller H-23 4 Hiller H-23
Transport 2 C-130 2 C-130E 2 C-130E 2 C-130E 13 DHC-2 50 others: Inc. C-47, 50 others: inc. 10 DHC-2 4 DHC-3 C-54, DHC-3, DHC-2, 1 Fokker F-28, 4 DHC-3 6 C-47 6 Aero Comander 4 HS-748, and 6 C-47 1 C-54 Aero Commander 10 C-54 1 F-28 4 HS-748 Aero Commander Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Venezuela
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance 2 Canberra 4 HU-16
Bomber 14 B-2 Canberra 15 B-2 Canberra 30 B-2 Canberra 26 B-2 Canberra 6 B-25J (piston) 15 B-25 Mitchell 15 B-25 15 B-25
Interceptor
Type I 16 CF-SA 18 CF-5A 20 CF-5A Type II Type III 74 F-86F/K 50 F-86F/K 50 F-86F/K
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 24 D.H. Vampire Fb.5 15: Vampire Fb 5 20 D.H. Venom Fb.4 Venom Fb.4 Attack 16 OV-10A 16 OV-lOA
Trainer 90: T-6 Texan 2 Mirage III-D 2 Mirage III-D 2 Mirage III-D T-52 Jet Provost 90: T-6 38: T-34 Mentor 20 T-34 Mentor T-55 Vampire T-24 T-52 12 T-52 T-24 Mentor T-52 HS-748 T-ll Vampire
Helicopter 20 Alouette II/III 20 Alouette II/III 24: Alouette III 20 Alouette III 6 Bell 47 6 Bell 47 UH-1D 16 UH-1B/D/M 4 Sikorsky UH-19 4 Sikorsky UH-19 4 UH-19
Transport 12 C-47 45: Inc. C-47 12 C-47 12 C-47 18 C-123 18 C-123B 18 C-123B 13 C-123B 3 C-54 4 C-130 4 C-130H 4 C-130H 6 Beech Queen Air 1 HS-748 1 Mitsubishi Mu-2 U> 00 o Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Ecuador
Tanker No Information*
Reconalssance 2 PBY-5 Catalina 2 PBY-5 Catalina 2 PBY-5 Catalina
Bomber 6 B-6 Canberra 5 B-6 Canberra 5 B-6 Canberra 5 B-6 Canberra-
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 10 FR-9 Gloster Meteor 8 FR-9 Gloster Meteor 8 FR-9 Gloster Meteor 8 FR-9 Gloster Meteor
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 F-80C 10 F-80C 8 BAC-167
Trainer 25: T-6 6 T-33 25: T-6 & T-33 25: T-28 6 T-33 25: T-28 & T-33 12 T-41 12 T-41 12 T-41
Helicopter 3 Bell 47 3 Bell 47 3 Bell 47G 3 Bell 47G 1 FH-1100 1 FH-1100 6 Alouette III
Transport 12: C-45 & C-47 6 C-45 6 C-45 6 C-45 2 DC-6 8 C-47 8 C-47 8 C-47 2 C-118 3 HS-748 3 HS-748 4 DC-6B 4 DC-6B 1 Skyvan 3M 1 Skyvan 3M
OJ 00 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Peru
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance 6 PV-2 Harpoon 6 PV-2 Harpoon 6 PV-2 Harpoon 6 PV-2 Harpoon 5 HU-16A Albatross 5 HU-16A Albatross 4 HU-16A AlbatroGS 4 KU-16A Albatross 10 C-60 10 C-60 10 C-60
Bomber 22 BAC Canberra 20 BAC Canberra 15 BAC Canberra 15 BAC Canberra 8 B-26C 5 B-26
Interceptor
Type I 14 Mirage V 14 Mirage V 14 Mirage V 14 Mirage V Type II 16 Hunter F-52 6 Hunter F-52 6 Hunter F-52 6 Hunter F-52 Type III 20 F-86F 10 F-86F 10 F-86F 10 F-86F 10 F-80C
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 10 F-47D Thunderbolt
Trainer 8 T-33 (armed) 20 T-33 (armed) 28 T-33 (armed) 28 T-33A (armed) 26 T-37B 26 T-37B 26 T-37B 26 T-37B 25 T-41A 25 T-41A 19 T-41A 20 T-41A 2 T-62 Hunter 2 T-62 Hunter 2 T-62 Hunter 2 T-62 Hunter 15 T-6 Texan 15 T-6 Texan 2 Mirage III-B 2 Mirage III-B 6 T-34 Mentor 6 T-34 Mentor
Helicopter 11 Bell 47G 4 Bell 47C 4 Bell 47G 4 Bell 47G 9 UH-1D Iroquois 9 U11-1D Iroquois 9 UH-1D Iroquois 9 UH-1D Iroquois 10 Alouettes 6 Alouette II & III 10 Alouette III 10 Alouette III 2 Cell 212 5 Bell 212 13 U11-1H 13 UH-1H 2 Hiller UH-12B 2 Hiller UH-12B 4 Mi-8 8 Ki-6
Transport 19 C-47 19 C-47 19 C-47 19 C-47 382 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter 12 DHC-6 Twin Otter 12 DHC-6 Twin Otter 16 DHC-5. Buffalo 16 DHC-5 Buffalo 16 DHC-5 Buffalo 16 DHC-5 Buffalo Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Peru cont'd
Transport 18 Beech Queen Air 18 Beech Queen Air 21 Beech Queen Air 21 Beech 5 C-54 4 C-54 4 C-54 9 DHC-2 Beaver 9 DHC-2 Beaver 9 C-130 9 C-130 9 C-130 383 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Brazil
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance 13 Tracker 13 Tracker 13 Tracker 13 Tracker 14 P-2 Neptune 14 P-2 Neptune 14 P-2 Neptune 14 P-2 Neptune 12 HU-16 Albatross 12 HU-16 Albatross 13 HU-16 Albatross 15 HU-16 Albatross 9 PBY-5 Catalina 8 PBY-5 Catalina 8 PBY-5 Catalina 9 RC-130E Hercules MR 9 RC-130E Hercules MR
Bomber 18 B-26K 15 B-26K 15 B-26K 12 B-26K
Interceptor
Type 1 16 Mirage III 12 Mirage III-EBR 4 Mirage III-DBR Type IX Type III 26 F-80C
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type XI Type III Attack 15 A-4 Skyhawk 15 A-4 Skyhavik
Trainer 54 T-33 (armed) 15 T-33 (armed) 20 T-33A (armed) COIN 40 T-37C 60 T-37C (armed) 40 T-37C (armed) COIN 25 T-37C (armed) COIN 70 Urtapuru T-23 70 Uriapuru T-23 90 Uriapuru T-23 7 Fouga Mnglster 7 Fouga Mnglster 7 Fouga Mnglster 7 Fouga Mnglster 18 T-28 18 T-28 (armed) 160: Fokker Sll/12, T-6G 60 T-6G Texan (armed) 90 T-6G Texan (armed) COIN Texan, Super 11-18 70 Fokker Sll/12 6 T-ll 70 Fokker Sll/12 & T-ll 50 Fokker Sll/12 112 MB-326GB (armed) 63 Cessna T-37C 63 Cessna T-37C 150 T-25 Universal 50 T-25 Universal 100 AT-26 Xavante (armed)
Helicopter 11 Bell 47G Include 011-6A, Alouette 60 Bell 47 11 Hughes 500
II, and FH-1100 16 UH-1D 42 UH-1D 384 8 Westlands 43 H-13J 11 Bell 206A 5 Alouette II 6 0H-4A/5A Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Brazil cont'd
Transport 7 C-130E 17 C-130E 10 C-130E 10 C-130E 25 C-47 180: C-45, C-47, DC-6B, 56 C-47 55 C-47 6 HS-125 C-115, HS-125, 5 HS-125 11 HS-125 24 DHC-5 Buffalo C-119F, HS-748, 24 DHC-5 Buffalo 24 DHC-5 Buffalo 2 BAC-111 BAC-111, Viscount 2 BAC-111 2 BAC-111 5 DC-6B 4 C-118 4 C-118 50 Beech C-45 12 C-119F 12 C-119F 7 D-13S 6 HS-748 12 HS-748 1 Viscount 5 Pilatus Porcer 5 Pilatus Porcer Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Bolivia
Tanker No Information'
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 12 F-51D Mustang 12 F-51D Mustang 10 F-51D Mustang 10 F-51D Mustang 3 F-86
Fighter-bomber
Type I type I I Type III
Trainer 3 T-6D (armed) 13 T-6D (armed) 13 AT-6D (armed) COIN 12 AT-6D (armed) COIN 10 AT-28 (armed) 8 Fokker T-21 6 T-28A (armed) COIN 6 T-28A (armed) COIN 8 Fokker T-21 8 Fokker T-21 13 T-33A 13 T-33A 12 T-33 (armed) FGA 18 AT-26 Xavante (armed) COIt 20 T-6 4 T-28
Helicopter 12 Hiller OH-23C/D 15:: Inc. OH-23C/D 6. 12:: OH-23C/D 6. 3 Hiller OH-23C/D 12 Hughes 500M Hughes 500M Hughes 500M 12 Hughes 500M
Transport 18 C-47 16 C-47 13 C-47 18 C-47 1 C-54 1 C-54 1 C-54 1 C-54 6 Cessna 172 6 Cessna 172 3 Cessna 172 7 PT-19 7 PT-19 6 PT-19 1 Beech C-45 6 CV-440 5 CV-440
U> O'00 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Paraguay
Tanker Ho Information
Reconaisaance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghter-boraber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 6 T-6 Texan (armed) 20: Inc. T-6 Texan 6 T-6 Texan (armed) 10 T-6 Texan (armed) 14: PT-17 Kaydet & which are armed 14: PT-17 Kaydet & 10: PT-17 Kaydet & MS-760 MS-760 MS-760
Helicopter 4 Bell 47C 4 Bell 47C 4 Bell 47C 6 Bell 47C 3 Hiller UH-12E 3 Hiller UH-12E 3 Hiller UH-12E 3 Hiller UK-12E 12 Bell UH-13 12 Bell UH-13 4 L-4
Transport 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 1 C-45 3 C-45 3 Hiller EC-2 3 Hiller EC-2 2 C-54 1 C-54 2 C-54 1 DIiC-6 Twin Otter 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter 3 Convalr 240 1 DH Dove Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Chile
Tanker No Information
Reconaissance 14 HU-16B Albatross 5 HU-16C 3 PBY-5A Catalina
Bomber 15 B-26 Invader 12 B-26 Invader 12 B-26 Invader 10 B-26 Invader
Interceptor
Type I Type II 18 Hunter F-71 18 Hunter F-71 18 Hunter F-71 32 Hunter F-71 Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 20 F-80C 11 F-80C 11 F-80C
Trainer 45 T-34 45 T-34 45 T-34 45 T-34 10 T-37B 10 T-37B 10 T-37B 10 T-37B 8 T-33A 8 T-33A 8 T-33A 8 T-33A 5 D.H. Vampire 5 D.H. Vampire 5 D.H. Vampire 11 D.H. Vampire T-22/55 3 H.S. Hunter 20 T-6 5 T-6 10 F-8.0C
Helicopter 11 Bell 47 7 Bell 47 7 Bell 0H-13H 7 Bell 0H-13H 9 Sikorsky UH-19 5 Sikorsky UH-19 2 Sikorsky UH-19 6 Sikorsky UH-19 10 Hiller UU-12E 16 Hiller U11-12E 16 Hiller 0H-23G 16 Hiller OH-23G 2 Bell Ull-ID 2 Bell UH-1D 2 Bell UH-1D 6 Bell UH-1D/H
Transport 20 C-45 20 C-45 20 C-45 10 C-45 25 C-47 25 C-47 25 C-47 10 C-47 20 DilC-2 Beaver 20 DHC-2 Beaver 9 Beechcraft 99A 9 Beechcraft 99A 12 DHC-3 Otter 12 DHC-3 Otter 4 C-118 4 C-118 8 DHC-6 Twin Otter 8 DHC-6 Twin Otter 8 DHC-6 Twin Otcer 8 DHC-6 Twin Otter 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 2 C-130E 2 C-130E 388 5 Twin Bonanza Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Argentina
Tanker No Information
Reconaissance 12 IA-35IV Huanquero
Bomber 12 Canberra 12 Canberra 2 Canberra T.Mk.64 2 Canberra T.Mk.64 10 B-62 9 B-62
Interceptor
Type I 12 Mirage III-B/E 12 Mirage III-B/E Type II Type III 25 F-86F 20 F-86F 20 F-86F 20 F-86F 20 Gloster Meteor Mk.4
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III Attack 25 A-4B Skyhawk 47 A-4B Skyhawk 47 A-4B Skyhawk 47 A-4B Skyhawk
Trainer 32 MS-760 40 MS-760 40 MS-760 30 MS-760A Paris I. (armed) 80 T-34 60 T-34 60 T-34 60 T-34 30 T-28A
Helicopter 4 Bell 47G 4 Bell 47G 4 Bell 47G 8 Hughes 0H-6A 12 Hughes 0H-6A 14 Hughes 500M 14 Hughes 50CM 4 UH-111 Iroquois 8 UU-111 Iroquois 6 UH-1H Iroquois 6 UH-1H Iroquois 6 Sikorsky S-55 6 Sikorsky S-55 6 UH-19 6 UH-19 14 Hughes 269HM 3 Bell UH-1D 4 Bell UH-1D 4 Bell UH-1D
Transport 3 C-130E 3 C-130E 5 C-130E 5 C-130E 30 C-47 20 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 6 C-45 6 C-45 6 C-45 6 C-45 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6
20 D.H. Dove 20 D.H. Dove 20 D.H. Dove 389 15 Dlnfla Guarani II 16 Dlnfla Guarani II 24 Dlnfia Guarani II 35 Dlnfla Huanquero 14 Aero Commander,Beaver 14 Aero Commander, Beaver Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Uruguay
Tanker No Information
Reconaissance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type X Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 14 F-80C 6 F-80C
Trainer 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 6 T-33A (armed) 28 T-6 20 T-6 (Borne armed) 20 T-6 (some armed) 20 T-6 (some armed)
Helicopter 2 Hiller UH-12 2 Hiller UH-12 2 Hiller UH-12 2 Hiller UH-12 1 Bell UH-1H 2 Bell UH-1H
Transport 14 C-47 14 C-47 14 C-47 13 C-47 1 DKC-2 Beaver 1 DlIC-2 Beaver 1 DHC-2 Beaver 5 C-46 2 Fokker F-27 2 Fokker F-27 4 Fokker F-27 2 F-227 2 F-227 5 C-45 2 Seech Queen Air 2 Beech Queen Air 8 U-17
U> VO O Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
United Kingdom*
Tanker 20 Victor 1 3 sqd. Victor 3 sqd. Victor K1/K-1A 56 Victor K1/K-1A 24 Victor K-1A
Reconaissance 12 Victor SR2 1 sqd. Victor SR2 1 sqd. Victor SR2 15 Victor SR2 15 Victor SR2 30 Canberra PR-7 4 sqd. Canberra 4 sqd. Canberra 4 sqd. Canberra 2 sqd. Canberra PR- 6 Nimrod 2 sqd. Nimrod 2 sqd. Nimrod 6 sqd. Nimrod 6 sqd. Nimrod 45 Shacklcton 6 sqd. Shackleton 1 sqd. Shackleton 1 sqd. Shackleton 1 sqd. Shackleton 1 sqd. Vulcan SR-2
Bomber 75 Vulcan B-2 8 sqd. Vulcan B-2 8 sqd. Vulcan B-2 6 sqd. Vulcan B-2 50 Vulcan B-2
Interceptor
Type I 130 BAC Lightning 9 sqd. Lightning 8 sqd. Lightning 8 sqd. Lightning 8 sqd. Lightning 160 F-4 1 sqd. F-4K 1 sqd. F-4K 1 sqd. F-4K 1 sqd. F-4K Type II 27 Harrier 4 sqd. Harrier 4 sqd. Harrier 4 sqd. Harrier 48 Harrier 2 sqd. Jaguar Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 6 sqd. F-4M 7 sqd. F-4M 7 sqd. F-4M 6 sqd. F-4M Type II 60 Hunter 1 sqd. Hunter 1 sqd. Hunter 2 sqd. Hunter 35 KS Bucaneer 3 6qd. Bucaneer 3 sqd. Bucaneer 3 sqd. Bucaneer 4 sqd. Bucane* Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 12 Whirlwind 7 sqd. Whirlwind & 60 Whirlwind & Wessex 75 Whirlwind 30 Whirlwind 70 Wessex Wessex 60 Wessex 60 Wessex 40 SA-330 Puna 30 SA-330 Puma 40 SA-330 Puma 26 SA-330 Puma
Transport 10 Belfast 4 sqd. Belfast, 5 sqd. Belfast, 10 Belfast 10 Belfast 22 Brlttania Brlttania Brlttania 15 Brlttania 15 Brlttania 14 VC-10 VC-10 VC-10 14 VC-10 14 VC-10 5 Comet 8 Comet C-4 50 C-130E 8 sqd. Hercules & 7 sqd. C-130 Hercules 7 sqd. C-130 Hercules 6 sqd. C-130 He: 15 Argosy Argosy 30 Andover 1 sqd. Andover 391
•Squadrons have 6 to 12 aircraft. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Ireland
Tanker No Information
Reconaissance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 6 Vampire T-55 2 Vampire T-55 3 Vampire T-55 3 Vampire T-55 10 Chipmunk 6 Chipmunk 8 Chipmunk 8 Chipmunk 7 BAC Provost 6 BAC Provost 4 BAC Provost 4 BAC Provost 8 Cessna FR-172 8 Cessna FR-172 8 Cessna FR-172
Helicopter 3 Alouette III 3 Alouette III 6 Alouette III 8 Alouette III
Transport 4 HS-104 Dove 3 Dove 2 Dove 2 Dove 392 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Netherlands
Tanker
Reconaissance 20 RF-104G 18 RF-104G 18 RF-104C 18 RF-104G 18 RF-104G
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 36 F-104G Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 36 F-104G 36 F-104C 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 30 NF-5A 36 NF-5A 54 NF-5A 54 NF-5A 72 NF-5A Type II Type III 43 F-84F
Trainer 30 NF-5B 30 KF-5B 20 NF-5B
Helicopter Alouette III Alouette III Alouette III 70 Alouette III 54 Alouette III
Transport 17 F-27 18 F-27 12 F-27 12 F-27 12 F-27 9 DHC-2 Beaver 393 /
Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Belgium*
Tanker
Reconaissance 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. Mirage V-BR 1 sqd. Mirage V-BR 1 sqd. Mirage V-BR
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 2 sqd. F-104C 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104C 2 sqd. F-104G Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 3 sqd. Mirage V-BA 3 sqd. Mirage V-BA 3 sqd. Mirage V-BA 3 sqd. Mirage V-BA Type II Type III 2 sqd. F-84F 2 sqd. F-84F
Trainer
Helicopter 4 sqd. ulth light 11 HSS-1 11 HSS-1 5 HSS-1 5 HSS-1 aircraft 6 S-58 6 S-58
Transport 33 C-119 33 C-119 24 C-119 12 C-130 12 C-130 23 C-47 18: C-47, DC-6, 6 5 C-47 4 DC-3 2 DC-3 Pembroke Pembroke 12 Pembroke 12 Pembroke 12 Pembroke DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6 4 DC-6A/C C-54 2 Falcon 20
^Squadrons have between 18 to 25 aircraft.
l o '-> ■ D Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
France
Tanker 12 KC-135 9 KC-135F 12 KC-135F 12 KC-135F 11 KC-135F
Reconaissance 3 sqd. Mirage III-R/RD 3 sqd. Mirage III-R/RD 3 sqd. Mirage III-R/RD 3 sqd. Mirage III-R/RD 45 Mirage III-R/RD
Bomber 2 sqd. Vatour II 2 6qd. Vatour II 2 sqd. Vatour II 30 Vatour II (being phased 3 sqd. Mirage IV-A 36 Mirage IV-A 36 Mirage IV-A 36 Mirage IV-A 36 Mirage IV-A 22 Mirage IV-A (reserve) 22 Mirage IV-A (reserve) 18 Mirage IV-A (reserve)
Interceptor
Type I 3 sqd. Mirage III-C 3 sqd. Mirage III-C 3 sqd. Mirage III-C 3 sqd Mirage III-C 45 Mirage III-C Type II 2 sqd. Vatour II-N 2 sqd. Vatour II-N 30 Vatour II-N 30 Vatour II-N 30 Mirage F.l (Type I) 3 sqd. Super Mystere B-2 3 sqd. Super Mystere B-■2 3 sqd. Super Mystere B-2 3 sqd. Super Mystere 45 Super Mystere B-2 Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 9 sqd. Mirage III-E 8 sqd. Mirage III-E 8 sqd. Mirage III-E 8 sqd. Mirage III-E 120 Mirage III-E 1 sqd. Mirage III-B 1 sqd. Mirage III-B 1 sqd. Mirage III-B 1 sqd. Mirage III-B 2 sqd. Mirage V 30 Mirage V Type II 3 sqd. F-100D 2 sqd. F-100D 2 sqd. F-100D 4 sqd. F-100D 56 F-100D Type III 2 sqd. Mystere IV-A 2 sqd. Mystere IV-A 2 sqd. My6tcre IV-A 2 sqd. Mystere IV-A 4 30 Jaguar Jaguar
Trainer
Helicopter 4 sqd. ,H-34 4 Alouette 4 sqd. H-34 & Alouette 4 sqd. H-34 4 4 sqd. H-34 4 93 H-34 4 Alouette II Alouette II Alouette II/III
Transport 3 sqd. C-160 3 sqd. C-160 3 sqd. C-160 40 C-160F 50 C-160F 4 sqd. Noratlas 4 sqd. Noratlas 173 Noratlas 173 Noratlas 120 Noratlas 2501 1 sqd. DC-6 6 BR-765 1 sqd. DC-6 4 BR-765 4 DC-6 5 DC-6 5 DC-6 4 BR-765 2 BR-763 2 BR-763 3 DC-8 3 DC-8 4 DC-6B 4 DC-6B
to y l.n Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Switzerland
Tanker
Reconaissance 15 Mirage III-R 15 Mirage III-R 15 Mirage III-R 15 Mirage III-R 30 Mirage III-R
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 30 Mirage III-S 30 Mirage III-S 30 Mirage III-S 30 Mirage III-S 30 Mirage III-S type II 75 Hunter F-58 75 Hunter F-58 75 Hunter F-58 75 Hunter F-58 80 Hunter F-58 Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 195 Venom FB.50 185 Venom FB.50 185 Venom FB.50 165 Venom FB.50 150 Venom FB.50
Trainer
Helicopter 60 Alouette II/III 80: Inc. 60 Alouette 80: Inc. 60 Alouette 100 Alouette II/III 30 Alouette II II/III II/III 50 Alouette III
Transport 6 Do-27 6 Do-27 6 Do-27 28 20 Do-27 3 Ju-52/53 3 Ju-52/53 3 Ju-52/53 3 Ju-52/53 some Pilatus Porter 396 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Spain
Tanker KC-137 12 KC-97L
Reconaissance 11 HU-16B Albatross 11 HU-16B Albatross 11 HU-16B Albatross 11 HU-16A 11 HU-16A 11 SA-16 11 SA-16 Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 21 F-104G 21 F-104G Type II Type III 65 F-86F 48 F-86F 13 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I 10 Mirage III-E 12 Mirage III-E 30 Mirage III-E 24 Mirage III-E 24 Mirage III-E 20 F-5 50 F-5 70 F-5 36 F-5A 36 F-5A 36 F-4E 36 F-4C 36 F-4C 36 SF-5B Type II Type III 50 HA-200 Saeta 55 HA-200 Saeta 55 HA-200 Saeta 44 HA-200 Saeta 44 HA-200 Saeta 25 HA-220 Saeta
Trainer 25 T-6 (armed) 12 T-6 (armed) 6 Mirage III-BE 6 Mirage III-BE 6 F-5B 6 SF-5B
Helicopter Specified but not AB 205 A3 205 Bell 47 listed AB 47 AB 47 AB 206
Tansport 175: Inc. C-47, 150: Inc. C-47, 150: Inc. C-47, C-47 C-47 C-54, C-54, C-54, DC-4 DC-4 12 Caribou, 12 Caribou, 12 Caribou, Caribou Caribou Azors 20 Azors 21 Azors Azors Azors CASA 207 CASA 207
CO CD'O Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Portugal*
Tanker
Reconaissance 1 sqd. P-2 Neptune 1 sqd. P-2V 1 sqd. P-2V 12 P-2V 6 P-2V
Bomber 2 sqd. B-26 Invader & 2 sqd. B-26 Invader & 2 sqd. B-26 Invader & 6 B-26 Invader 6 B-26 Invader PV-2 Harpoon PV-2 Harpoon PV-2 Harpoon 10 PV-2 Harpoon 10 PV-2 Harpoon
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 1 sqd. F-86F 1 sqd. F-86F 1 sqd. F-86F 40 F-86F 25 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 1 sqd. F-84G 1 sqd. F-84G 1 sqd. F-84G 20 F-84G 1 sqd. Flat C-91 2 sqd. Fiat G-91 2 sqd. Flat G-91 40 Fiat G-91 30 Fiat G-91
Trainer 50 T-6 6 sqd. T-6 (armed) COIN 6 sqd. T-6 (armed) COIN 24 T-6K (armed) COIN 50 T-6K (armed) COIN 25 Do-27 11 Do-27 11 Do-27 11 Do-27 15 T-33 13 T-33 13 T-33 13 T-33 13 T-33 30 T-37 12 T-37 25 T-37 25 T-37 25 T-37
Helicopter 20 Alouette II 85: Alouette II/III, 85: Alouette II/III, 100 Alouette II/III 2 Alouette II 30 Alouette III SA-330 Puma SA-330 Puma 12 SA-330 Puma 80 Alouette III 11 SA-330 Puma
Transport 40 C-47 16 C-47 16 C-47 20 C-47 20 C-47 12 Noratlas 22 Noratlas 22 Noratlas 24 Noratlas 20 Noratlas some DC-6 11 DC-6 11 DC-6 10 DC-6 10 DC-6 15 C-45 15 C-45 15 C-45 15 C-45 15 C-45 5 C-54
^Squadrons have betveen 10 to 25 aircraft. 398 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
West Germany*
Tanker
Reconaissance 4 sqd. RF-104G 4 sqd. RF-104G 60 RF-4E 60 RF-4E 60 RF-4E 4 sqd. G-91 4 sqd. G-91
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 4 sqd. F-104G 4 sqd. F-104G 7 sqd. F-104C(105 planes) 4 sqd. F-104G 60 F-4F Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 10 sqd. F-104C 10 sqd. F-104G 7 sqd. F-104G 10 sqd. F-104G 180 F-104G Type II Type III 8 sqd. Flat G-91 4 sqd. Flat G-91 168 Flat G-91 168 Fiat G-91 168 Fiat G-91
Trainer
Helicopter 4 sqd. UH-1D 4 sqd. UH-1D 134 UH-1D 80 UH-1D 80 UH-1D 55 Bell 47 4 50 Bell 47 Alouette II 54 Alouette II
Transport 6 sqd. C-160 Transall & 6 sqd. C-160 Transall 4 sqd. C-160 Transall 4 sqd. C-160 Transall 56 C-160 Transall Noratlas
sgquadrons have between 15 to 21 aircraft, with transport squadrons having up to 18 aircraft. 399 i
Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 East Germany
Tanker
Reconaissance
Interceptor
Type I 176 MiG-21 256 MiG-21 272 MiG-21 288 MiG-21 294 MiG-21 Type II Type III 112 MiG-17 & 32 MiG-17 32 M1C-17 32 MiG-17 MiG-19 (Type I)
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 40 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 30 Mi-1/4 20 Ml-1/4/8 30 Mi-1/4/8 40 Mi-1/4/8 85 Mi-1/2/4/8/24
Transport 20: inc. An-2 30: An-2 30: An-2 30: An-2 34: 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-18 Li-2 Ll-2 11-18 Tu-124 Tu-134 400 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Poland8
Tanker
Reconaissance 3 sqd. MiG-15/17 6 sqd. MiG-15/17 & 6 sqd. MiG-21 & 72 MIG-15/21 & 48 MiG-21 11-28 11-28 11-28 24 11-28
Bcmber 4 sqd. 11-28 4 sqd. 11-28 4 sqd. 11-28 4 sqd. 11-28 30 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 45 sqd. MiG-17/19/21 36 sqd. MiG-17/19/21 36 sqd. MiG-17/19/21 432: MIG-19/21 & 36 MiG-19 (MiG-17 is type III) MiG-15/17 156 MiG-21 Type II Type III MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-15/17 240 MiG-17
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 12 sqd. Su-7 6 12 sqd. Su-7 6 12 sqd. Su-7 & 12 6qd. Su-7 & 200: Su-7 6 Type III MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 40: Mi-1/4 40: Mi-1/4 40: Mi-1/4/8 40: Ml-1/4/8 140: Mi-1/2/4/8
Transport 40: An-2, An-12, 45: An-2, An-12, 45: An-2, An-12, 45: An-2, An-12, 35: An-2, An-12, 11-12/14/18, 11-12/14/18, 11-12/14/18, 11-12/14/18, 11-12/14/18, Li-2 Ll-2 Li-2 Li-2 Ll-2, An-24
8Squadrons have between 8 to 12 aircraft. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Austria
Tanker
Reconaissance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 3 Saab 105 17 Saab 105 36 Saab 105 38 Saab 105 38 Saab 105 10 Saab J-29F Tunnan 6 Saab J-29F Tunnan
Trainer 11 Maglstcr 35: Maglster 11 Maglster 1 sqd. Saab 105E 5 Vampire Vampire 5 Vampire 1 sqd. Saab Saflr 24 Cessna L-19 Saflr 19 Cessna L-19 19 Cessna L-19 17 Cessna L-19 19 Cessna L-19 26 Saflr 2 Cessna 185
Helicopter 24 AB-204 22 AB-204 24 AB-204 23 AB-204B 23 AB-204B 23 Alouette II/III 23 Alouette II/III 15 Alouette II 22 Alouette II/III 25 Alouette II/III 16 Alouette III 12 AB-206 12 AB-206 12 AB-206 18 AB-206A & H-13 13 AB-206A 2 S-65 2 S-650E 2 S-650E 4 OH-13 5 0K-13H 10 AB-47C
Transport 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 DHC-2 Beaver 3 Beaver L-20A 3 Beaver L-20A 2 Skyvan 2 Skyvan 2 Skyvan 2 Short Skyvan Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Hungary
Tanker
Reconalasance
Bomber 12 11-28
Interceptor
Type 1 120 MiG-19/21 120 MIG-19/21 108 MiG-19/21 108 MiG-19/21 36 MiG-19 36 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 12 Su-7 Type III 12 MiG-17 24 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 10 Mi-1/4 6 Ml-1/4 15 Mi-1/4/8 15 Ml-1/4/8 25 Mi-1/4/8
Traneport 20: An-2 25: An-2 25: An-2 5 An-2 5 An-2 11-14 11-14 11-14 10 11-14 10 11-14 Ll-2 Ll-2 Ll-2 10 Li-2 10 Li-2 403 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Czechoslovakia
Tanker
Reconaissance 84: MIG-15 & L-29 84: MiG-21, 11-28, & 84: MiG-21, 11-28, & 80: MiG-21 & 11-28 L-29 L-29
Bomber 60 11-28 60 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 100 H1G-19 252: MiG-19 252: MiG-19 252: MiG-19 84 MiG-19 150 MiG-21 MIG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 168 MiG-21 Type XI Type III 40 MIG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 150 Su-7 168: Su-7 168: Su-7 56 Su-7 Type III 40 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 112 MiG-17 80 MiG-15 MiG-15 MiG-15 MiG-15
Trainer 150 L-29 plus others some L-39 Albatross
Helicopter 100 Mi-1/4/6/8 90 Mi-1/4/8 90 Ml-1/4/8 90 Mi-1/4/8 180 Mi-1/4/8
Transport 65: Ll-2 50: Li-2 50: Ll-2 50: Ll-2 40: 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-18 11-18 11-18 11-18 11-18 An-24 An-24 404 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-197S
Italy8
Tanker
Reconaissance 2 sqd. RF-84F 3 sqd. RF-84F & 27 RF-84F 3 sqd. RF-104G 38 RF-104G RF-104G 20 RF-104G 14 Breguet 1150
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 3 sqd. F-104G 4 sqd. F-104G 1 sqd. F-104C 1 sqd. F-104S 2 sqd. F-104S 4 sqd. F-104S 5 sqd. F-104S 6 sqd. (90) F-104S Type II Type III 2 sqd. F-86K 1 sqd. F-86K 1 sqd. F-86K 1 sqd. (15) F-86K
Fighter-bomber
Type I 2 sqd. F-104G 3 sqd. F-104G 3 sqd. F-104C 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. (36) F-104G 1 sqd. F-104S 2 sqd. F-104S 2 sqd. (30) F-104S Type II Type III 2 sqd. F-84F 1 sqd. F-84F 1 sqd. F-84F 4 sqd. G-91R 4 sqd. C-91R 4 sqd. G-91R 3 sqd. G-91R 2 sqd. (35) G-91R 1 sqd. G-91Y 1 sqd. C-91Y 1 sqd. C-91Y 2 sqd. G-91Y 2 sqd. (36) G-91Y
Trainer
Helicopter SO approx. Attached to SO approx. SO approx. 12 HU-16 12 HU-16 the Navy; Includes AB-47 15 AB-204 15 AB-204 AB-204, SH-3D, SH-34 60 AB-204B 60 AB-204B 90 AB-205 90 AB-205 2 AB-206A 2 AB-206A sorr.e AB-47G/J some AB-47G/J
Transport 48 C-119 48 C-119 48 C-119 25 C-119 32 C-119 1 sqd. of C-47, 16; C-47, DC-6, 14 C-130E Hercules 14 C-130E Hercules DC-6, & Convalr 440 Convalr 440 2 sqd. of DC-6 & 2 sqd. of DC-6 6 Convalr 440 Convair 440 2 DC-9 1 PD-808 Vespa Jet 405
^Squadrons have between 12 to 25 aircraft. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Albania*
Tanker
Reconaissance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 12 MiG-19 24 MIG-19/21 36 MiG-19 36 MiG-19 12 MiG-21 12 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 6 sqd. MtG-19 Type II Type III MiG-17 36 MiG-17 24 MiG-17 24 MiG-17 MIG-15 24 MiG-15 24 MiG-15 24 M1G-15/F2 24 MiG-15/F2 Trainer
Helicopter 8 Hi-1/4 8 Mi-1/4 12 Mi-1/4 20 Ml-1/4 20 Mil/4
Transport 1 sqd. 11-14 & 12 11-14 & An-2 12 11-14 6 An-2 3 11-14 3 11-14 An-2 3 An-2 3 An-2
*Squadrons have between 10 to 12 aircraft. 406 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Yugoslavia
Tanker
Reconaissance 30 RT-33A & RF-86F 30 RT-33 30 RT-33 30 RT-33 15 RT-33A 25 Caleb/Jastreb Bomber
Interceptor
Type X 60 MiG-21 Fishbed C/D 60 MIG-21 82 MiG-21 82 MiG-21 110 MiG-21 Type XI Type III 100 F-86E & CF-86D/E 90 F-86D/E 50 F-86D/E 50 F-86D/E
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 90 F-84 150: F-84 180: F-84 180: F-84 10 F-84 30 KraguJ KraguJ KraguJ KraguJ 20 KraguJ 30 Jastreb Jastreb Jastreb Jastreb 95 Galeb/Jastreb
Trainer 60 Caleb 60 Caleb 60 Galeb 60 Caleb 30 T-33 some MiG-21UTI
Helicopter 40: 16 Mi-4 50: Ml-4, 50: Mi-4, 18 Mi-4 & Mi-8 35 Mi-4 20 Whirlwind Whirlwind, Whirlwind, 15 Whirlwind 15 Whirlwind Alouette III Alouette III 5 Alouette III 5 Alouette III 25 Mi-8
Transport 25: inc. C-47, 11-14 25: C-47, 11-14, 25: C-47, Li-2, & 25: C-47, Ll-2, & 55: C-47, U-14, 11-18, Ll-2, & Beaver Beaver Beaver & An-12 13 11-14 13 11-14 407 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Greece*
Tanker
Reconaissance 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. RF-84F 1 sqd. (18) RF-84F 1 sqd. RF-5 1 sqd. RF-5 1 sqd. RF-5 1 sqd. (14) RF-5 some HU-16B 1 sqd. HU-16 1 sqd. (12) HU-16
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 4 sqd. F-5A 4 sqd. F-5A 2 sqd. F-5A 3 sqd. F-5A 3 sqd. (40) F-5A Type II 1 sqd. F-102A 1 sqd. F-102A 1 sqd. F-102A 1 sqd. (16) F-102A Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104C 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. (40) F-104C 1 sqd. F-5A 1 sqd. (18) F-4E Type II lype III 4 sqd. F-84F 3 sqd. F-84F 3 sqd. F-84F 5 sqd. F-84F 4 sqd. (62) F-84F
Trainer 100 70 T-33 22 T-41 20 T-6 18 T-37 10 F-5B
Helicopter 12 H-19 12 H-19 12 H-19 14 H-19 4 H-19B 6 AB-205 6 AB-205 6 AB-205 6 AB-205 14 UH-1H 10 Bell 47G 10 Bell 47G 10 Bell 47C 10 Bell 47G 4 Bell 47G
Transport 20 C-47 20 C-47 15 C-47 27 C-47 35 C-47 10 C-119C 10 C-11SG 25 Noratlas 45 Noratlas 30 Noratlas 44 Noratlas
•A squadron has up to 18 aircraft. 408 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Turkey*
Tanker
Reconaissance 3 sqd. RF-84F & 2 sqd. RF-84F 3 sqd. RF-84F 6. 3 sqd. RF-84F & 3 sqd. RF-84F & F-84Q RF-5A RF-5A RF-5A
Interceptor
Type I 3 sqd. F-5A 4 sqd. F-5A 2 sqd. F-5A 1 sqd. (28) F-5A Type II 2 sqd. F-102A 2 sqd. F-102A 2 sqd. F-102A 2 sqd. F-102A 2 sqd. (30) F-102A Type III 5 sqd, F-86D/E/K 2 sqd. F-86 (storage) 2 Bqd. F-86 (storage)
Fighter-bomber
Type I 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. F-104G 2 sqd. (33) F-104G 3 sqd. F-5A 4 sqd. F-5A 1 sqd. F-5A 2 sqd. F-5A 2 sqd. F-5A 1 sqd. F-4 Type II 1 sqd. F-100 4 sqd. F-100 6 sqd. F-100D 5 sqd. F-100D 5 sqd. F-100D Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 3 AB-204B ASH some AB-204B some AB-204B 10 U11-1D 10 UH-1D 10 UH-19D Sikorsky 10 UH-19D Sikorsky
Transport 10 C-47 50 C-47 30 C-47 14 C-47 14 C-47 3 C-54 3 C-54 16 Transall 20 Transall 20 Transall 10 C-130E 5 C-130 8 C-130 10 C-130 10 C-130 6 C-45
•Squadrons have between 14 to 20 aircraft 409 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Bulgaria
Tanker
Reconalsaance 36 M1G-17C 26 M1G-17C 24 MiG-17/21 24 MiG-15/17/21 35 MiG-15/17/21 12 11-28 12 11-28 12 11-28 12 11-28 12 11-28
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 24 MiG-21 48 MiG-21 36 MiG-21 36 MiG-21 48 MiG-21 72 MiG-19 36 MiG-19 36 MiG-19 36 MiG-19 40 MiG-19 Type XI Type III 60 MiG-17 60 MiG-17 72 MiG-17 72 MiG-17 60 MiG-17
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 72 MIG-17 72 MiG-17 72 MiG-17 72 MiG-17 72 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 30 Mi-4 40 Ml-4 40 Ml-4 40 Ml-4 36 Mi-4
Transport 20 11-14 10 11-14 10 11-14 10 11-14 10 11-14 4 Li-2 4 Ll-2 4 Li-2 4 Ll-2 4 Li-2 6 11-12 6 An-2 6 An-2 6 An-2 6 An-2 4 11-18 410 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Rumania
Tanker
Reconaissance 2 sqd. 11-28 12 11-28 12 11-28 12 11-28 10 11-28
Bomber
Intcrcepcor
Type I 18 sqd. MiG-19 214: MiG-19 240: MiG-19 240: MiG-19 200: MiG-19 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 H1G-21 Type II Type III MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17 MiG-17
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II 80: Su-7 Type III 100 MiG-17 MiG-17 20 MiG-15
Trainer
Helicopter 10 Ml-4 10 Mi-4 10 Mi-4 10 Mi-4 10 Mi-4
Transport 2 sqd. 11-14, 12 11-14 4 Li-2 12 11-14 4 Ll-2 12 11-14 4 Li-2 30 11-14 Li-2 11-1 2, Li-2 411 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Finland
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 20 MiG-21 20 M1G-21F 20 MiG-2IF 20 M1G-21F 35 M1G-21F 12 Saab J-35BS Draken 12 Saab J-35BS Draken Type II Type III 9 HS Gnat Mk.l 9 HS Gnat Mk.l
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 16 Magister (armed) 12 Magister (armed) 55 Magister 70 Magister 60 Magister 60 Magister 60 Magister 30 Saflr 91D 30 Saflr 91D 30 Saflr 91D 30 Saflr 91D 30 Saflr 91D few M1G-15/21UTI few H1G-15/21UTI few M1G-15/21UTI 4 M1G-15/21UTI 3 MiG-15DTI 2 M1G-21UTI
Helicopter Mi-4 Hound Ml-4 Hound MI-4 Hound 3 Ml-4 Hound 3 Ml-4 Hound Alouette II Alouette II Alouette II 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II AB-204B 4 AB-204B 4 AB-204B 1 AB-204B 1 AB-206A
Transport 10 C-47 & Beaver 10 C-47 h Beaver 2 BAC Pembroke Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Sweden0
Tanker
Reconalssance 2 sqd. S-32C Lansen 2 sqd. S-32C Lansen 2 sqd. S-32C Lansen 2 sqd. S-32C Lansen 2 sqd. S-32C Lan6en 3 sqd. S-35E Draken 3 sqd. S-35E Draken 3 sqd. S-35E Draken 3 sqd. S-35E Draken 3 sqd. S-35E Draken
Bomber
Interceptor '
Type I 21 sqd. J-35 Draken 8 sqd. J-35 Draken A/D 8 6qd. J-35 Draken A/D 6 sqd. J-35 Draken A/D 6 sqd. J-35 Draken 13 sqd. J-35 Draken F 13 sqd. J-35 Draken F 13 sqd. J-35 Draken F 13 sqd. J-35 Draken F Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 3 sqd. AJ-37 Viggen 3 sqd. AJ-37 Viggen Type II 10 sqd. A-32A Lansen 10 sqd. A-32A Lansen 10 sqd. A-32A Lansen 6 sqd. A-32A Lansen 6 sqd. A-32A Lansen Type III 1 sqd, Saab SK-60B 1 sqd. Saab SK-60B
Trainer 130 Saab 105 110 Saab 105 110 Saab 105 5 Bulldog 78 SK-6 Bulldog 54 SK-6 Bulldog
Helicopter 1 sqd. Vertol 107 10 Vertol 107 10 Vertol 107 4 Vertol 107 10 Vertol 107 6 Alouette II/III 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II 16 AB-204/206 6 AB-204B 6 AB-204B
Transport 2 C-130 2 C-130 5 sqd.: 2 C-130E 2 sqd.: 2 C-130E 2 sqd.: 2 C-130E 7 C-47 7 C-47 7 C-47 7 C-47 5 C-47 Norsemen Norsemen Norsemen BAC Pembroke BAC Pembroke BAC Pembroke Beech Expediter DHC-2 Caribou HS-104 Dove
®A squadron has up to 18 aircraft. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Norway
Tanker
Reconalssance 16 RF-5A 16 RF-5A 16 RF-5A 16 RF-5A 16 RF-5A 6 P-3B Orion 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-33 Orion 5 P-3B Orion 8 HU-16 Albatross some HU-16 Albatross
Interceptor
Type I 20 F-104G 20 F-104G 16 F-104C 16 F-104G 16 F-104G 13 CF-104G Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 64 F-5A 80 F-5A 90 F-5A 80 F-5A 48 F-5A 22 CF-104G Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 32 UH-1B Iroquois 32 UH-1B Iroquois 32 UH-1B Iroquois 32 UH-1B Iroquois 32 UH-1B Iroquois 2 Bell 47C 10 Sea King
Transport 10 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 6 C-130 6 C-130 6 C-130 6 C-130 6 C-130H 4 DH Twin Otter 414 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Persia rk
Tanker
Reconalssance 16 RF-84F 16 RF-84F 16 RF-35XD Draken 16 RF-35XD Draken 23 RF-35XD Draken
Bomber
Interceptor
Type X 32 F-104G 32 F-104G 32 F-104C 32 F-104G 25 F-104G Type TI 16 HS Hunter Mk.51 16 HS Hunter 16 HS Hunter 16 HS Hunter 15 CF-104G Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 16 F-35XD Draken 16 F-35XD Draken 16 F-35XD Draken 20 F-35XD Draken Type XI 32 F-100D/F 32 F-100D/F 32 F-100D/F 32 F-100D/F 40 F-100D/F Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 8 S-61A 8 S-61A 12 S-61 8 S-61 8 S-61
Transport 1 sqd. C-47 6 C-54 16 C-47 6 C-54 6 C-47 8 C-47 8 C-47 8 C-54 5 C-54 2 C-54 415 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Luxembourg No Air Force No Air Force No Air Force No Air Force No Air Force
Cyprus No Information No Information No Information No Information No Information
Iceland No Information No Information No Information No Information No Information Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Morocco
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 10 F-5A 10 F-5A 20 F-5A 20 F-5A 20 F-5A 4 F-5B 4 F-5B 4 F-5B 4 F-5B Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 MIG-17 (storage) 12 MIG-17 (storage) 12 MIG-17 (storage) 12 MIG-17 (storage) 12 MIG-17 (storage)
Trainer 30 Sud Magister (armed) 24 Sud Magister (armed) 24 Sud Magister (armed) 24 Sud Magister (armed) 24 Sud Magister (armed) 45 T-6 Texan 45 T-6 Texan 35 T-6 Texan 35 T-6 Texan 35 T-6 Texan 25 T-28 Trojan 25 T-28 Trojan 25 T-28 Trojan 25 T-28 Trojan 25 T-28 Trojan 4 T-6 Texan (armed)
Helicopter 24 Bell 204 24 Bell 204 1 011-13 2 H-34 12 AB-205 12 AB-205 12 AB-205 12 AB-205 4 HH-43 6 HH-43 6 HH-43 4 HH-43B 4 HH-43B 4 Alouette II 4 Alouette II
Transport 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 11 C-119 11 C-119 11 C-119 11 C-119 11 C-119 1 D.H. Heron Appendix A
1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Algeria
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 30 11-28 24 11-28 30 11-28 30 11-28 30 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 60 MiG-21 30 MiG-21 30 HiC-21 35 M1C-21 35 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 20 Su-7 20 Su-7 Type III 30 NlG-15 20 MiG-15 25 MiG-15 25 MiG-15 25 MiC-15 30 MIG-17 40 MIG-17 70 MiG-17 70 MIG-17 70 MtG-17
Trainer 12 Yak-11 28 Magister (armed) 26 Magister (anned) 26 Magister (armed) 26 Magister (armed) COE) 12 Gomhurlah Mk.2
Helicopter 50 Mi-4 40 Ml-4 42 Ml-4 42 Ml-4 42 Ml-4 4 SA-330 2 SA-330 2 SA-330 5 SA-330 5 SA-330 3 Mi-1 4 Ml-1 4 Ml-1 4 Mi-1 4 Mi-1 7 Hughes 269A 6 Hughes 269A 6 Hughes 269A 6 Hughes 269A 6 Hughes 269A
Transport 8 An-12 8 An-12 8 An-12 8 An-12 8 An-12 4 11-18 3 11-18 12 11-18 5 11-18 418 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Tunisia
Tanker
Reconalssance % Bcxnber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 12 F-86 12 F-86 12 F-86 12 F-86 12 F-86 Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 14 MB-326 8 MB-326 8 MB-326 8 MB-326 8 MB-326 14 Saab 91-D 14 Saab 91-D 12 Saab 91-D 12 Saab 91-D 12 Saab 91-D 12 T-6 Texan 12 T-6 Texan 12 T-6 Texan 12 T-6 Texan 12 T-6 Texan
Helicopter 8 Alouette II 8 Alouette II 8 Alouette II 6 Alouette II 2 Alouette II 8 Alouette III 6 Alouette III
Transport 3 Flamant 3 Flamant 3 Flamant 3 Flamant 3 Flamant Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 l.lbva
Tanker
Reconalseance 10 Mirage III-ER
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 7 F-5A 7 F-5A 10 F-5A 9 F-5A 12 Mirage III-B/E 35 Mirage III-B/E 32 Mirage III-B/E Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 20 Mirage V (33 In Egypt) Type II Type III
Trainer 3 T-33 3 T-33 3 T-33 3 T-33 3 T-33 10 Mirage III-B
Helicopter 3 Alouette II 4 Alouette III 10 Alouette III 10 Alouette III 10 Alouette III 4 Bell 47 2 AB-206 2 AB-206 2 AB-206 5 AB-206 3 011-13 3 OH-13 3 OH-13 7 011-13 6 Super Frelon 6 Super Frelon 9 Super Frelon 9 Super Frelon
Transport 9 C-47 9 C-47 9 C-47 9 C-47 9 C-47 8 C-130E 8 C-130E 8 C-130E 8 C-130E 420 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Sudan
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 16 MiG-21 16 MiG-21 16 MiG-21 20 MiG-21 24 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 8 MiG-17 17 MiG-17 17 MiG-17
Trainer 10 BAC-145 T.Mk.5 (armed) 5 BAC-145 T.Mk.5 (armed) 5 BAC-145 T.Mk.5 (armed) 5 BAC-145 T.Mk.5 (armed) 5 BAC-145 T.Mk.5 (armed) 8 Jet Provost Mk.52 8 Jet Provo6t Mk.52 8 Jet Provost Mk.52 8 Jet ProvoBt Mk.52 8 Jet Provost Mk.52 3 Piston Provost Mk.51 3 Piston Provost Mk.Sl 3 Piston Provost Mk.51
Helicopter 10 Mi-8 10 Ml-8 10 Mi-8 10 Mi-8 4 Mi-4
Transport 3 BAC Pembroke 3 BAC Pembroke 3 BAC Pembroke 3 BAC Pembroke 3 BAC Pembroke 3 F-27 3 F-27 3 F-27 4 F-27 5 An-24 5 An-24 5 An-24 5 An-24 5 An-24 2 C-47 6 An-12 421 Appendix A
X970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1373 1973-1974 1974-1975
Hall
Tanker. No Information1
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 4 MIG-15 6 MIG-15/17 6 MIG-17 1 MiG-15 3 MIG-17 6 MIG-17
Trainer 1 M1G-15UTI
Helicopter 2 Ml-4 2 Ml-4 2 Ml-4
Transport 2 C-47 2 C-47 2 C-47 2 C-47 3 An-2 2 11-14 2 MH-1527M Broussard 2 Brousard 422 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Senegal
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 2 Bell 47G 2 Bell 47G 2 Bell 47C 2 Bell 47G 1 Alouette II 2 Alouette II
Transport 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 MH-1521 Broussard 4 MH-1521 Broussard 4 MH-1521 Broussard 4 MH-1521 Broussard 4 MH-1521 Broussard 423 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Dahomey
Tanker No Information^
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type XI Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 1 Alouette III 1 Alouette III
Transport 2 C-47 2 C-47 1 C-47 3 tpt. 1 Aero Commander 3 light tpt. 3 light tpt. 2 Broussard
-P-to Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Mauritania
Tanker No Information^ No Information! No Information!
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 6 MS-881
Helicopter
Transport 3 C-47 2 C-47 6 MH Broussard 1 11-18 4 light tpt.
■C- ro l_n Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Niger
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter
Transport 1 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 1 C-47 3 Noratlas 4 Noratlas 4 Noratlas 4 Noratlas 3 Broussard 4 light tpt. 4 light tpt. 4 light tpt. 426 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Ivory Coast
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 5 not Identified
Helicopter 4 Alouette 5 Alouette 5 Alouette 4 Alouette II/III 5 Alouette II/III 1 Puma
Transport 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 2 C-47 1 C-47 5 KH-1521 Broussard 5 MH-1521 Broussard 9 light tpt. 9 light tpt. 1 Mystore 20 1 Mystere 20 1 Coanander 500
-P- to Appendix .A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Guinea
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 8 MiG-17 5 MIG-17 10 MiG-17 8 MiG-17 8 MiG-17
Trainer 7 Yak-18, L-29, & Yak-18 & MIG-15 7 Yak-18, L-29, & 7 Yak-18, L-29, & 7 Yak-18, L-29. & MiG-15 MiG-15 MiG-15 MiG-15
Helicopter
Transport 2 11-18 2 11-18 2 11-18 2 11-18 4 11-14 4 11-14 4 11-14 4 11-14 4 An-14 4 An-14 4 An-14 428 o Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Ghana
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 5 MB-326F 6 MB-326 6 MB-326 6 MB-326 (armed) 6 MB-326 (armed) 10 Dtl Chipmunk 9 DH Chipmunk 9 DH Chipmunk 9 DH Chipmunk 6 SA Bulldog 2 DHC Beaver 11 DHC Beaver 11 DHC Beaver 11 DHC Beaver 1 IIS-125 4 HT-2
Helicopter 6 Whirlwind 3 Whirlwind 3 Whirlwind 5 Whirlwind 2 Bell 212 3 Wessex 11C-53 2 Wessex 2 Wessex 2 Wessex 3 Alouette III-B 4 Hughes 269 3 Hughes 269 3 Hughes 269 3 Hughes 269A 1 Mi-4 3 Sikorsky H-19
Transport 11 DHC Otter 7 DHC Otter 7 DHC Otter 7 DHC Otter 8 BN Islander 8 DHC-4 Caribou 8 DHC-4 Caribou 8 DHC-4 Caribou 8 DHC-4 Caribou 3 Skyvan 3M 3 HS Heron 3 HS Heron 3 HS Heron 3 HS Heron 1 HS-125 429 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Tor o
Tanker No Information No Information No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type 1 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 1
Transport 2 C-47 2 medium 2 Broussards 4 light aircraft 430 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Car.eroun
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 6 Magister
Helicopter 2 Alouette III 2 Alouette III 2 Alouette III 2 Alouette III 1 Puna
Transport 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 4 light tpt. 4 light tpt. 4 light tpt. 4 light tpt.
•P- W Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Nigeria
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 3 11-28 6 11-28 6 11-28 6 11-28 6 11-28
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 10 MiG-1? 8 MiG-17 12 MiG-17 12 MiG-17 21 MiG-15/17 5 MiG-15
Trainer 10 L-29 Delfin (armed) 8 L-29 Delfln (armed) 10 L-29 Delfln (armed) 10 L-29 Delfin (armed) 15 L-29 Delfln (armed) COIN 14 P-149D (armed) 10 P-149D (armed) 10 P-149D (armed) 10 P-149D (armed) 5 P-149D 1 BAC Provost 2 M1G-15UTI 2 M1G-15UTI 20 SA Bulldog
Helicopter 3 Whirlwind 8 Whirlwind & 8 Whirlwind & 8 Whirlwind & 3 Whirlwind 7 Alouette II Alouette II Alouette II Alouette II 4 Bo-105
Transport 3 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 Fokker F-27 6 Fokker F-27 6 Fokker F-27 432 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Chad
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II
Transport 1 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 15 tpt. 6 light aircraft 3 Broussard 3 light tpt. 3 light tpt.
4 S 00 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Congo. People's Republic
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 2 2 2 4 Alouette II/III
Transport 1 C-47 1 C-47 2 C-47 2 C-47 1 An-24 1 An-24 2 An-24 4 An-24 3 light tpt. 3 light tpt. 3 light tpt. 2 Broussard
-P' -P-to Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Zaire
Tanker
Reconalsaance
Bomber 9 B-26K (piston)
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Plghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 15 MB-326GB 17 MB-326GB 15 MB-326GB 15 MB-326GB 17 MB-326GB
Tra lner 32 T-6G (armed) 8 T-oG (armed) 21 T-6G (armed) 8 T-6G (armed) 6 T-6G (armed) 16 T-28 (armed) 5 T-28 (armed) 5 T-28 (armed) 5 T-28 (armed) 10 T-28 (armed) 12 SF-260M 8 SF-260M 12 SF-260M 12 SF-260M 12 SF-260M 12 Piaggio P-148 8 T-6 8 T-6 8 T-6
Helicopter 6 Alouette 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II 7 Bell 47G 4 Alouette III 14 Alouette III 8 Alouette III 20 Alouette II/III 7 SA-330 Puma 7 SA-330 Puma 7 SA-330 Puma 7 SA-330 Puma
Transport 12 C-47 10 C-47 9 C-47 9 C-47 9 C-47 3 C-54 4 C-54 4 C-54 4 C-54 4 C-54 6 C-46 3 C-130 3 C-130 3 C-130 3 C-130 2 DH Caribou 2 DC-6 Some Caribou 2 HS Heron 6 HS Dove 3 Beech 18 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Uganda
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 18 MIG-15/17 7 MlC-15/17 7 MiG-15/17 7 MiG-15/17 29 MiG-15/17
Trainer 12 Maglster (armed) 12 Maglster (armed) 14 Maglater (armed) 14 Maglster (armed) 10 Magister (armed) 5 L-29 Delfin 12 L-29 Delfin 12 L-29 Del fin 12 L-29 Del fin 12 L-29 Delfin 4 Plaggio P-149 4 Plaggio P-149 4 Plaggio P-149 4 Plaggio P-149
Helicopter 2 OH-13 2 Scout 2 Scout 2 Scout 5 AB-205 2 AB-206 2 AB-206 2 AB-206 2 AB-206 2 AB-206
Transport 6 C-47 6 C-47 3 DC-3 1 DH Caribou 1 DH Caribou 1 DH Caribou 1 DH Caribou 436 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Kenya
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 6 BAC-167 6 BAC-167 6 BAC-167 6 BAC-167
Trainer 5 Chipmunk 5 Bulldog (armed) 5 SA Bulldog (armed)
Helicopter 3 Alouotte II 2 Bell 47G 2 Bell 47G 2 H-269 2 H-269
Transport 4 DHC-4 Caribou 4 DHC-4 Caribou 6 DHC-4 Caribou 6 DHC-4 Caribou 7 DHC-2 Beaver 7 DHC-2 Beaver 8 DHC-2 Beaver 10 DHC-2 Beaver 10 DHC-2 Beaver Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Tanzania
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 12 MiG-19 Type II Type III 12 MiG-17
Fighter-bcimber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 7 P-149D 7 P-149D 7 P-149D 7 P-149D 7 P-149D
Helicopter 2 AB-206A 2 Bell 47G
Transport 1 An-2 1 An-2 1 An-2 1 An-2 1 An-2 4 DHC-4 Caribou 4 DHC-4 Caribou 12 DHC-4 Caribou 12 DHC-4 Caribou 10 DHC-4 Caribou 5 DHC-3 Otter 5 DHC-3 Otter 5 DHC-3 Otter 6 DHC-2 Beaver
-O- CO oo Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Somalia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber Some 11-28 4 11-28
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 6 MiG-19 Type II Type III 18 MiG-15/17 20 MiG-15/17 2 MiG-15 2 MiG-15 2 MiG-15 19 MlC-17 19 MiG-17 19 MiG-17
Trainer 6 M1G-15/17UTI 2 M1C-15/17UTI 2 M1G-15/17UTI 2 M1G-15/17UTI 8 Plaggio P-148 3 Plaggio P-148 10 Plaggio P-148 & 8 Plaggio P-148 20 Yak-11 Yak
Helicopter Mi-4 6. Mi-8
Transport 2 C-45 1 C-45 1 C-45 1 C-45 2 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 4 C-47 2 An-2 3 An-2 3 An-2 3 An-2 3 An-2 1 An-24 1 An-24 1 An-24 1 An-24 An-26 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Ethiopia
Tanker
Reconalssance 8 RT-33
Bomber 6 Canberra B-2 4 Canberra B-2 4 Canberra B-2 4 Canberra B-2 4 Canberra B-2
Interceptor
Type I 12 F-5A 10 F-5A 15 F-5A 15 F-5A 8 F-5A Type II Type III 12 F-86F 11 F-86F 12 F-86F 12 F-86F 12 F-S6F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 9 Saab 17A/B 8 Saab 17A/B 9 Saab 17A/B 8 Saab 17A/B
Trainer 8 T-28A (armed) 13 T-28A (armed) 6 T-28A (armed) 6 T-28A (armed) 15 T-28A 15 T-28A 15 T-28A 15 T-28A 15 Saab 91 Saflrs 20 Saab 91 Saflrs 20 Saab 91 Saflrs 20 Saab 91 Safirs 20 Saab 91 Saflrs 3 T-33A (armed) 11 T-33 11 T-33 11 T-33A 11 T-33A
Helicopter 7 Alouette II/III 4 Alouette II 5 Alouette II 5 Alouette II 5 Alouette II 2 Ml-8 2 Ml-8 2 Ml-8 2 Mi-6 2 Mi-6 6 AB-204B 5 AB-204B 5 AB-204B
Transport 6 C-47 4 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 2 C-54 2 C-54 2 C-54 2 C-54 2 C-54 3 D1I Dove 3 DH Dove 3 DH Dove 3 DH Dove 3 DH Dove 1 11-14 1 11-14 4 C-119G 4 C-119G 5 C-119G 5 C-119G Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Zambia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 4 Jastrcb 4 Ja6treb 4 Jastreb 4 Soko J-l Jastreb
Trainer 6 Chipmunk 8 SF-260MZ (armed! 8 SF-260MZ (armed) 8 SF-260MZ (armed) 8 SF-260MZ (armed) 6 MB-326GB (armed) 6 MB-326GB (armed) 6 MB-326GB (armed) 6 Chipmunk 8 Bulldog 2 Caleb 2 Galeb
Helicopter 5 AB-205 4 AB-205 4 AB-205 3 AB-205 3 AB-205 2 AB-47 2 AB-47 2 AB-47 1 AB-212 1 AB-212
Transport 2 C-47 2 C-47 3 medium tpt. 3 medium tpt. 6 DHC-2 Beaver 6 DHC-2 Beaver 5 DHC-2 Beaver 4 DHC-4 Caribou 4 DHC-4 Caribou 5 DHC-4 Caribou 2 Pembroke
■P- Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Rhodesia
Tanker
Reconaiasance
Bomber 11 Canberra B-2 11 Canberra B-2 10 Canberra B-2 10 Canberra B-2 9 Canberra B-2
Interceptor
Type I Type II 12 Hunter Mk.9 12 Hunter Mk.9 12 Hunter Mk.9 12 Hunter Mk.9 12 Hunter Mk.9 Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 Vampire FB.9 12 Vampire FB.9 11 Vampire FB. 9 11 Vampire FB.9 11 Vampire FB.9
Trainer 13 T-52 Provost 13 T-52 Provost (recon) 12 T-52 Provost (recon) 12 T-52 Provost (recon) 12 T-52 Provost (recon) 7 AL-60F5 9 AL-60F5 7 AB-60F5 7 AL-60F5 (COIN) 7 AL-60F5 3 Canberra T-4 3 Canberra T-4 7 AM-3C (COIN)
Helicopter 8 Alouette III 8 Alouette III 12 Alouette III 8 Alouette III 8 Alouette III
Transpore C-47'a C-47'a 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 1 Beech 55 Baron 1 Beech 55 Baron 1 Beech 55 Baron Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Republic of South Africa
Reconalssance 7 Shackleton 7 Shackleton 7 Shackleton MR-3 7 Shackleton MR-3 7 Shackleton MR-3 4 Mirage III-RZ 4 Mirage III-RZ 4 Mirage III-R2 4 Mirage III-RZ 9 Piaggio P-166S 9 Piaggio P-166S
Bomber 10 BAC Canberra B-12 16 BAC Canberra B-12 9 BAC Canberra B-12 6 BAC Canberra B-12 6 Canberra B-12 3 BAC Canberra T Kk.4 3 BAC Canberra T Mk.4 15 H.S. Bucancer Mk.50 15 H.S. Bucaneer Mk.50 14 H.S. Bucaneer Mk.50 13 H.S. Bucaneer Mk.50 10 H.S. Bucaneer Mk.50
Interceptor
Type I 16 Mirage III-CZ 16 Mirage III-CZ 16 Mirage III-CZ 16 Mirage III-CZ 16 Mirage III-CZ 4 Mirage III-BZ Type II Type III 30 F-86 35 F-86 21 F-86 18 CL-13B Sabre
Fighter-bomber
Type I 20 Mirage III-EZ 20 Mirage III-EZ 20 Mirage III-EZ 16 Mirage III-EZ 32 Mirage III-EZ 8 Mirage III-DZ Type II Type H I 60 Vampire FB. 5 5 Vampire FB. 5
Trainer S5 MB-326 (armed) 50 MB-326 (armed) 75 MB-326 (armed) MB-326 (some armed) 160 MB-326M (some armed) 20 Vampire T-55 (armed) Varapiee FB. 6/9/55 Vampire FB. 6/9/55 150 AT-6 Harvard (armed) 200 AT-6 Harvard (armed) Armed Harvard IT-86
Helicopter 6 Alouette II 106 Alouette II/III 60 Alouette II/III 20 Alouetee III 20 Alouette III 8 Wasp 8 Wasp 8 Wasp 5 Wasp 7 Wasp 16 Super Frelon 16 Super Frelon 16 Super Frelon 15 SA-321L Super Frelon 15 SA-321L Super Frelon 50 Alouette III 16 SA-330 Puma 20 SA-330 Puma 20 SA-330 Puna
Transport 9 Transall C-160 9 Transall C-160 9 Transall C-160 9 Transall C-160 9 Transall C-160Z 40 C-47 30 C-47 20 C-47 23 C-47 23 C-47 4 C-54 Skymaster 4 C-54 Skymaster C-54 Skymaeter 5 C-54 Skymaster 5 C-54 Skymaster 7 C-130B/E 7 C-130 7 C-130B/E 7 C-130B/E 7 C-130B/E 443 I Vl6count 1 Viscount 1 Viscount 1 Vi6count 781 1 Viscount 781 9 Piagglo 166 9 Plaggio 166 9 Piagglo 166 4 HS-125 Mercurlus 4 HS-125 Mercurius Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Malagasy Republic
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Flghcer-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 3 Alouette 1 Alouette III 1 Alouette III 1 Alouette III
Transport 3 C-47 5 C-47 1 C-47 3 C-47 3 C-47 3 Flamant 2 MD-315 Flamant 2 MD-315 Flamant 9 light tpt. 8 light tpt. 7 Brousard 3 MH-1521 Brouaard 4 DC-3 444 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Central African Republic 1 C-47 No Information No Information No Information No Information 3 light liaison
Gabon 1 C-47 No Information No Information No Information No Information 3 liaison
Liberia No Air Force No Information No Information No Information 2 C-47 3 light tpt.
Rwanda 2 C-47 No Information 2 light aircraft 2 C-47 1 Do-27 liaison 3 Do-27 liaison 1 Alouette II 1 Alouette II 2 Alouette II 1 Courrier light aircraft
Sierra Leone No Air Force No Information No Information No Information 2 Saab MFI-15 trainers 2 Hughes 300 helicopters
Upper Volta 1 C-47 No Information No Information No Information 2 medium transports 1 Aero Commander 3 light aircraft 2 Broussard
Burundi No Air Force No Information No Information No Information No Information
-P- •P* Un Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Iran
Tanker
Reconalssance 16 RT-33 9 RT-33 9 RT-33 15 RT-33 16 RF-5A 4 RF-4E
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 115 F-5 100 F-5 120 F-5 80 F-5A 100 F-5A Type II Type III 20 F-86F 20 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I 32 F-4D 40 F-4D 40 F-4D 64 F-4D/E 32 F-4D 64 F-4E Type II Type III
Trainer 20 T-6 30;; T-6, T-33 30 T-41
Helicopter 40 Bell 205 45 Bell 205 Huskies 10 Huskie 4 Huskie 12 Huskie 12 Huskie 2 Whirlwind 16 Super Frelon 16 Super Frelon 10 AB-206A 5 AB-206A 5 AB-206A 2 CH-47C Chinook 4 CH-47C Chinook 4 CH-47C Chinook 5 AB-212 5 AB-212
Transport 10 C-47 10 C-47 5 C-47 5 C-47 16 C-130E 26 C-130E 26 C-130E 35 C-130E 60 C-130E/H 5 DHC-2 Beaver 6 DHC-2 Beaver 6 DHC-2 Beaver 6 DHC-2 Beaver 5 DHC-2 Beaver 8 C-45 12 F-27 12 F-27 6 C-54 446 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Iraq
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 8 Tu-16 9 Tu-16 9 Tu-16 8 Tu-16 8 Tu-16 10 11-28 12 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 60 MiG-21 85 M1C-21 80 MiG-21 90 MiG-21 100 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Flghter-bomber
Type I Type II 30 Su-7 48 Su-7 48 Su-7 60 Su-7 60 Su-7 36 Hawker Hunter Mk.9 35 Hawker Hunter Kk.9 32 Hawker Hunter i-.9 36 Hawker Hunter Mk.9 20 Hawker Hunter Mk.9 Type III 45 MiG-17 6 15 M1C-17 20 MiG-17 30 MiG-17 30 MiG-17 MIG-19 (Type I)
Trainer 20 T-52 Jet Provost 16 T-52 Jet Provost 30 MiG-15, M1G-21UTI, Hunter T66/69, Yak, L-29
Helicopter 20 Mi-4 35 Mi-4 30 Mi-4 35 Mi-4 35 Mi-4 4 Ml-1 4 Mi-1 5 Alouette III 20 Alouette III 11 Uessex 9 Uessex 12 Mi-8 12 Ml-8 29 Ml-8 30 Mi-8
Transport 12 An-2 2 An-2 4 An-2 27: An-2, An-12, An-24, 12 An-2 6 An-12 8 An-12 7 An-12 11-14, Tu-124, and 6 An-12 10 An-24 10 An-24 10 An-24 Heron 10 An-24 4 Tu-124 13 11-14 8 11-14 2 Heron 2 Heron 3 Bristol 2 Tu-124 2 Tu-124 447 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
EsZEl Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 28 11-28 25 bight bombers 10 11-28 5 11-28 5 11-28 15 Tu-16 18 Tu-16 18 Tu-16 25 Tu-16 25 Tu-16
Interceptor
Type I 110 MIG-21 200 MiG-21 220 MIG-21 210 MIG-21 200 MiG-21 80 MIG-19 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 105 Su-7 110 Su-7 120 Su-7 80 Su-7 100 Su-7 Type III 120 MIG-15 & MIG-17 200 MIG-17 200 MiC-17 100 MiG-17 100 MiG-17
Trainer 150 MiG, Yak, & Delfin 150 MIG, Yak, & L-29 200 MiG, Yak, & L-29 200 MiG, Yak, & L-29 200 MiG-15/21, Su-7, Yak-18, L-29, and Gomhourla
Helicopter 70: Ml-1,4,6,8 140: Ml-1,4,6,8 180: Ml-1,4,6,8 190: Ml-1,4,6,8 200 Mi-1,4,6,8 30 Sea King
Transport 40 11-14 40 11-14 40 11-14 50 11-14 50 11-14 20 An-12 20 An-12 20 An-12 20 An-12 20 An-12 3 An-24 »VV Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Syria
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber Some 11-28 Some 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 90 MiG-21 100 MiG-21 100 MiG-21 200 MiG-21 200 MiG-21 (some in storage) (some in 6torage) Some MiG-23 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 40 Su-7 30 Su-7 30 Su-7 30 Su-7 30 Su-7 (some in storage) (some In storage) Type III 70 MiG-15 & MiG-17 80 MiG-15 & MiG-17 80 MiG-17 80 MIG-17 60 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 4 Ml-1 4 Ml-1 4 Ml-1 4 Mi-1 4 Ml-2 8 Ml-4 8 Mi-4 10 Ml-4 8 Ml-4 8 Mi-4 3 Mi-8 Some Mi-8 Some Ml-8 22 Ml-8 39 Mi-8 10 Ka-25
Transport 8 11-14 8 11-14 8 11-14 8 11-14 6 11-14 6 C-47 6 C-47 6 C-47 3 C-47 3 An-12 4 DC-18 3 Li-2 677 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Lebanon
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 12 Mirage III-C 9 Mirage III-C 10 Mirage III-C 10 Mirage III-D 10 Mirage III-EL Type II (4 In storage, plus Type III 1 III-BL)
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 11 H.S. Hunter Mk.6 12 H.S. Hunter 8 H.S. Hunter 8 H.S. Hunter 8 H.S. Hunter 5 H.S. Hunter Mk.9 Type III 10 Vampire Mk.52
Trainer
Helicopter 3 Alouette II 4 Alouette II 3 Alouette II 4 Alouette II 4 Alouette II 6 Alouette III 6 Alouette III 5 Alouette III 10 Alouette III 6 Alouette III
Transport 1 H.S. Dove 5 5 4 SM-79 450 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Jordan
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 18 F-104A 15 F-104A 15 F-104A 20 F-104A 18 F-104A Type II Type III 4 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 22 H.S. Hunter Mk.6/9 18 H.S. Hunter 35 H.S. Hunter 32 H.S. Hunter 32 H.S. Hunter Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 7 Alouecte III 7 Alouette III 7 Alouette III 6 Alouecte III 6 Alouette III 4 Whirlwind 3 Whirlwind 3 Whirlwind
Transport 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 C-47 2 H.S. Dove 2 H.S. Dove 2 H.S. Dove 2 H.S. Dove 2 H.S. Dove 2 H.S. Heron 2 Packet 2 Packet 1 Falcon 1 Falcon
■C- U i Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Israel
Tanker 2 Stratocrulaer 2 Stratocrulser 2 Stratocrulser 2 Stratocrulser
Reconalssance 6 RF-4E 6 RF-4E 6 RF-4E 6 RF-4E
Bomber 15 Vatour 10 Vatour 10 Vatour 10 Vatour 10 Vatour
Interceptor
Type I 65 Mirage III-C 60 Mirage III-C 50 Mirage III-C 35 Mirage III-B/C 25 Mirage III-B/C Type II 12 Super Mystere B-2 9 Super Mystere B-2 9 Super Mystere B-2 18 Super Mystere B-2 12 Super Mystere B-2 Type III 35 Mystere IV-A 27 Mystere IV-A 27 Mystere IV-A* 23 Mystere IV-A* 23 Mystere IV-A* 24 Barak 30 Barak Fighter-bomber
Type I 36 F-4E 75 F-4E 90 F-4E 95 F-4E 150 F-4E Type II Type III 45 Dassault Ouragon 30 Dassault Ouragon 30 Dassault Ouragon^ 30 Dassault Ouragon^ 30 Dassault Ouragon^ Attack 67 A-4E Skyhawk 72 A-4E/H Skyhawk 125 A-4E/H Skyhawk 160 A-4E/H Skyhawk 180 A-4E/H Skyhawk
Trainer 85 Maglster (armed) 85 Mngister (armed) 85 Maglster (armed) 85 Maglster (armed) 85 Maglster (armed)
Helicopter 12 Super Frelon 12 Super Frelon 12 Super Frelon 12 Super Frelon 9 Super Frelon 8 CH-53 8 CH-53 10 CH-53C 12 CH-53 18 CH-53 25 AB-205 25 AB-205 30 AB-205 20 AB-205 20 A3-205A 20 Alouette 20 Alouette 20 Alouette 5 Alouette 5 Alouette II 25 S-58 25 UH-1D Iroquois 25 UH-1D Iroquois
Transport 30 Noratlas 15 Noratlas 20 Noratlas 20 Noratlas 20 Noratlas 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 10 C-47 6 Boeing Stratocrulaer 8 Boeing Stratocrulser 8 Boeing Stratocrusier 6 Boeing Stratocrulser 8 C-97 Stratocrusier 4 C-46 2 C-130E 2 C-130E 14 C-130E
*In reserve bUsed main;y for training 452 Appendix A
1970*1971 1971*1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Saudi Arabia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 3 B-25
Interceptor
Type T 35 Lightning F-52/53 20 Lightning F-52/53 3 Lightning F-52 35 Lightning F-52/53 35 Lightning F-52/53 32 Lightning F-53 14 F-5E 20 F-5B lype II Type III 16 F-86 15 F-86 15 F-86 15 F-86
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 24 BAC-167 27 BAC-167 21 BAC-167 20 BAC-167 21 BAC-167
Trainer 30: Hunter, Lightning, 35: Hunter, Lightning, 13 T-33 1 T-33 1 T-33 T-41A T-33A 1 Cessna 310 1 Cessna 310K 1 Cessna 310K 3 Lightning T-55
Helicopter 2 Alouette III 4 Alouette III 1 Alouette III 1 Alouette III 6 Alouette III 2 AB-204 1 AB-204 1 AB-204 1 AB-204 1 AB-204 24 AB-205 3 AB-205 8 AB-205 8 AB-205 10 AB-205 10 AB-206 14 AB-206 20 AB-206 20 AB-206 20 AB-206
Transport 9 C-130E 10 C-130E 10 C-130E 10 C-130E 9 C-130E 6 C-123 2 C-140B 2 C-140B 2 C-140B 2 C-118 8 C-47 453 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Yemen
Tanker No Information No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber 12 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 25 MiG-21 12 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 MiG-17 15 MiG-17 15 MiG-17 4 BAC-167 4 BAC-167
Trainer 30 Yak-11 (armed) 8 Jet Frovost 8 Jet Provost
Helicopter 3 Ml-4 6 Bell 47G 8 Ml-8
Transport 4 C-47 4 C-47 4 An-24 2 11-14 4 DHC Beaver 454 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Kuwait
Tanker No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 12 BAC Lightning 14 BAC Lightning 12 BAC Lightning 12 BAC Lightning F-53 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 4 H.S. Hunter 6 H.S. Hunter 8 H.S. Hunter 4 H.S. Hunter Type III 6 BAC-167 6 BAC-167 10 BAC-167 12 BAC-167
Trainer 6 Jet Provost 4 Jet Provost 4 Jet Provost 6 Jet Provost T-51 2 BAC Lightning T-55 2 BAC Lightning T-55 7 H.S. Hunter 2 H.S. Hunter T-67
Helicopter 6 Bell 204 4 AB-205 5 AB-205 6 AB-204B
Transport 2 DU Caribou 6 light 3 light 2 DH Caribou 2 H.S. Dove 2 medium 1 Argosy 1 Devon 2 Lockheed L-100-20 455 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Afghanistan
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 10 11-28 3 sqd. 11-28 3 sqd. 11-28 10 11-28 30 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 30 MIG-21 30 MIG-21 30 MiG-21 30 MiG-21 30 MiG-21 20 MiG-19 12 MiG-19 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 2 sqd. Su-7 24 Su-7 20 Su-7 Type III 70 MIG-17 4 sqd. MiG-15/17 -4 sqd. MiG-15/17 48 MiG-15/17 55 MiG-15/17 25 MiG-17
Trainer Yak-11, Yak-18, MiG-15 UTI
Helicopter 8 Mi-4 Mi-1 & Ml-4 1 aqd. Ml-1 U 4 1 sqd. Mi-1 & 4 1 sqd. Mi-1 & 4
Transport 30: 2 Li-2 1 11-18 2 sqd. Yak-12, An-2, 2 sqd. Yak-12, An-2 2 sqd. Yak-12, An-2 3 11-14 25 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 An-2 10 An-2 11-12 2 Twin Otter An-24 5 Anson
Ui Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
People's Republic of China*
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 150 11-28 150 11-28 200 11-28 200 11-28 200 11-28 12 Tu-4 few Tu-4 few Tu-4 few Tu-4 few Tu-4 12 Tu-16 30 Tu-16 100 Tu-16 100 Tu-16 50 Tu-16 100 Tu-2 100 Tu-2 100 Tu-2
Interceptor
Type I 50 MtG-21 some MiG-21 75 MiG-21 75 MIG-21 50 MiG-21 Type II 200 F-9 300 F-9 400 F-9 Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 500 MiG-19 800 MiG-19 1000 MtC-19 1000 MiG-19 1300 MiC-19 Type II Type III 1200 MiG-15/17 1700 MIG-15/17 1700 MIG-15/17 1700 MiG-15/17 some MiG-15 1700 MiG-17
Trainer
Helicopter 200 Mi-1 & Ml-4 Ml-4 300 Ml-4 & others 300 Ml-4 & others 300 Mi-4 & others 15 Alouette III 10 SA-321JA Super Frelon
Transport 300 11-12 6 11-14 An-2, 11-14, 6 400 An-2, 11-14, 6 400 An-2, 11-14, & 200 An-2, 11-14, 11-18 50 Li-2, Tu-70 11-18 11-18 11-18 200 others
*A11 statistics are approximations of the actual number 457 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Mongolia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 10 MiG-15 10 MiG-15
Trainer Yak-11/18 & UT-2 Yak-11/18 Yak-11/18 Yak-11/18 Yak-11/18 M1G-15UTI
Helicopter 3 10 Mi-1 t. Ml-4 10 Ml-1 £> Ml-4 10 Mi-1 & Mi-4 10 Mi-1 & Mi-4
Transport 30: An-2 30: An-2 30: An-2 30: An-2 30: An-2 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 An-24 An-24 An-24 An-24 An-24 11-12
1-P~ Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Republic of China
Tanker
Reconalssance 25 RF-101 4 RF-101 4 RF-101 4 RF-101 10 S-2A 15 RF-104G 8 RF-104G 8 RF-104G 8 RF-104G 8 RF-104G 9 S-2A Bomber
Interceptor
Type I IB F-104A 45 F-104G 45 F-104G 55 F-104C 63 F-104A/G 63 F-104A/G 70 F-5A 70 F-5A 70 F-5A 30 F-5A 35 F-5A/B Type II Type III 150 F-86F 150 F-86F 20 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 90 F-100A 80 F-100A/D 80 F-100A/D 90 F-100A/D 90 F-100A/D Type III
Trainer 35: 100 : 100: 125: T-28, T-33, F-5B, F-100, F-104B, PL-I
Helicopter 7 UH-19 10 UH-19 10 UH-19 7 UH-19 10 UH-1H (SAR) 17 Bell 47G 10 Bell 47G 6 Kaman HH-43B 6 1IU-16B 10 HU-16A (SAR) 6 Hughes 500
Transport 30 C-46 95: C-46 95: C-46 40 C-46 40 C-46 50 C-47 C-47 C-47 30 C-47 30 C-47 40 C-119 C-119 C-119 50 C-119 35 C-119 10 C-123 10 C-123 10 C-123 459 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
North Korea
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 70 11-28 70 11-28 70 11-28 70 11-28 70 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 20 MiG-19 5 MiG-19 some MiG-19 50 MIG-19 70 MiG-19 90 MiG-21 100 MIG-21 100 MiG-21 130 MiG-21 130 MiG-21 Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 28 Su-7 28 Su-7 28 Su-7 Type III 60 MiG-15 380 MIG-15/17 380 MIG-15/17 300 MiG-15/17 300 MiG-15/17 340 MIG-17
Trainer 70: Yak-9/11/18, 70: Yak-11/18, MiG-15, 70: Yak-11/18, MiG-15, 70: Yak-11/18, MIG-15 70: Yak-18, MiG-15 MiG-15, & 11-28 6 11-28 & 11-28 & 11-28
Helicopter 20 Mi-4 20 Mi-4 20 Ml-4 20 Mi-4 30 Mi-4
Transport 30: An-2 40: An-2 40: An-2 60 An-2 120 An-2 Li-2 Ll-2 Li-2 15 Li-2, 11-12 11-12 11-12 11-12 4 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14 460
j
M Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
South Korea
Tanker
Reconalssance 10 RF-86F 10 RF-86F 10 RF-86P 10 RF-86F 10 RF-5A
Bomber
Interceptor
Type 1 55 F-5A/C 17 F-5 77 F-5A 37 F-5A 70 F-5A Type II Type III 25 F-86D 20 F-86D 20 F-86D 20 F-86D
Fighter-bomber
Type I 18 F-4D 18 F-4D 18 F-4D 18 F-4D 30 F-4D Type II Type III 120 F-36F 110 F-86F 110 F-86F 110 F-86F 100 F-86F
Trainer
Helicopter 6 H-19 Chickasaw 6 H-19 Chickasaw 6 H-19 Chickasaw 6 11-19 Chickasaw 6 UH-19 10 UH-1D 5 UH-1D 7 UH-1D/N 2 Bell 212 2 Kli-14
Transport 20 C-46 35 C-46, C-47, C-54 35 C-46, C-47, C-54 35 C-46, C-47, C-54 40 C-46, C-54, C-123, UH-llJ 6 C-54 2 Aero Conmander 461 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 Japan
Tanker
Reconalseance 20 RF-86F 25 RF-86F 16 RF-86F 16 RF-86F 15 RF-4E Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 195 F-104J Eiko 175 F-104J 160 F-104J 150 F-104J 130 F-104J 20 F-4EJ 40 F-4E Type II Type III 80 F-86F 80 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 295 F-86F 175 F-86F 230 F-86F 120 F-86F 120 F-86F
Trainer 350 inc. T-l, T-33A, 360 inc. T-l, T-33, 55 T-l 55 T-l 350 T-l, T-33A, T-34A & T-34, & F-104DJ T-34, & F-104DJ 170 T-33 170 T-33 F-104DJ 105 T-34 105 T-34 12 F-104DJ 12 F-104DJ
Helicopter 35 H-19, S-62, 6 V-107 20 S-62 & V-107 26 S-62 6 V-107 16 V-107 7 S-62
Transport 62 C-46 30 C-46 30 C-46 20 C-46 20 C-46 10 YS-11 10 YS-11 13 YS-11 10 YS-11 10 YS-11 12 MU-2
CT\ hi Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
India*
Tanker
Reconalssance 8 Canberra PR-57 8 Canberra PR-57 8 Canberra PR-57 8 Canberra PR-57 8 Canberra PR-57 9 L-1049 Constellation 9 L-1049 Constellation 8 L-1049 Constellation 8 L-1049 Constellation 8 L-1049 Constellation Mystere & Dakota
Bomber 50 Canberra B-l 3 sqd. Canberra B-l 4 sqd. Canberra B-l 80 Canberra B-l 60 Canberra B-l
Interceptor
Type I 100 MiG-21 7 sqd. MiG-21 8 sqd. MiG-21 220 MiG-21 220 MiG-21FL/M Type II Type III 200 Gnat Mk.l 8 sqd. Gnat Mk.l 8 sqd. Gnat Mk.l 200 Gnat Mk.l 180 Gnat Mk.l
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II 100 Su-7 5 sqd. Su-7 6 sqd. Su-7 96 Su-7 77 SU-7BKL 150 Hunter F-56 6 sqd. Hunter F-56 7 sqd. Hunter F-56 150 Hunter F-56 130 Hunter F-56 Type III 90 HF-24 Marut 2 sqd. HF-24 Marut 2 sqd. HF-24 Marut 50 HF-24 Marut 50 HF-24 Marut 80 Mystere IV-A 2 sqd. Mystere IV-A 2 Sqd. Mystere IV-A 30 Mystere IV-A 50 DH Vampire
Trainer 7 sqd. Harvard & 22 HJT-16 Kirin Vampire
Helicopter 90 Mi-4 80 Ml-4 12 sqd. Mi-4, Ml-8, 12 sqd. Mi-4 80 Ml-4 70 Alouette III 150 Alouette III Alouette III Alouette III 80 Alouette III feu Mi-8 Mi-8 30 Mi-8 & Sioux 12 Bell 47G 10 Bell 47 Bell 47 2 S-62B S-62, 6 SA-315 Cheetah
Transport 60 C-47 55 C-47 13 Bqd. C-47 55 C-47 50 C-47 60 C-119G 60 C-119 C-119 60 C-119 52 C-119G 24 11-14 20 11-14 11-14 20 11-14 18 11-14 30 An-12 30 An-12 An-12 34 An-12 34 An-12 30 DH Otter 25 DH Otter DH Otter 30 DH Otter 30 DH Otter 25 HS-74S 12 HS-748 HS-748 27 HS-748 45 HS-748 463 18 Caribou 15 Caribou Caribou 20 Caribou 16 Caribou
*8 to 25 aircraft in a sqd.; average is 18. Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Pakistan®
Tanker
Reconalssance 5 RT-33A 4 RT-33A 4 RT-33A 4 RT-33A 4 RT-33A 2 RB-57 2 RB-57 2 RB-57 2 RB-57 4 F-104B 4 F-104B 3 Mirage III-RP
Bomber 20 Canberra B-57B 2 sqd. B-57B 2 sqd. B-57B 10 Canberra B-57B 10 Canberra B-57B 12 11-28 1 sqd. 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 10 F-104A 6 F-104A 6 F-104A 6 F-104A 21 Mirage III-EP Type II Type III 7 sqd. F-86 8 sqd. F-86 6 sqd. F-86 90 F-86 75 F-86
Fighter-bomber
Type I 1 sqd. Mirage III-E 2 sqd. Mirage III-E 2 sqd. Mirage III-E 20 Mirage III-E 28 Mirage V 5 sqd. MIG-19 4 sqd. MIG-19 4 Bqd. MiG-19 112 M1G-19/F-6 140 M1C-19/F-6 Type II Type III
Trainer 80: T-6, T-33, T-37B, Mirage III-D
Helicopter 25 Bell 47 40: Sioux, Huskle, 35: Sioux, Huskle, 10: Huskle, Alouette III 6 HH-43B 4 Kaman HH-43B Alouetce III, Ml-8 Alouette III, Mi-8 UH-19 2 Alouette III 3 Alouette III 2 UH-19
Transport 8 C-130 8 C-130B 8 C-130B 4 C-130B 6 C-130B 1 F-27 1 F-27 1 F-27 1 F-27 1 F-27 8 C-47 1 C-46 1 Falcon 20 1 Aero Commander 2 Beech Twin Bonanza
®Combat squadrons have between 12 to 16 aircrafc. 464 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Burma
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 F-86F
Trainer 10 T-33 (armed) 12 T-33 (armed) 18 T-33 (armed) 18 T-33 (armed) 10 T-33 (armed) COIN 6 Vampire (armed) 6 Vampire (armed) 3 Vampire (armed) 1 Vampire (armed) 1 Vampire (armed) COIN
Helicopter 6 Sioux 6 Sioux 5 Sioux 5 Sioux 5 Sioux 10 Kaman HH-43B 10 Huskle 9 lluskie 9 Huskle 7 Huskle 8 Alouette III 8 Alouetce III 6 Alouette III 6 Alouette III 12 Alouette III 3 Mi-4 10 Shawnee 10 Shawnee 10 Shawnee 9 Boeing Vertol 44A 3 KV 107-11
Transport 6 C-47 12 CtA7 18 C-47 18 C-47 16 C-47 6 DllC-3 Otter 8 D1IC-3 Otter 8 DllC-3 Otter 8 DHC-3 Otter 8 DHC-3 Otter 2 Bristol 170 2 Bristol 170 6 Beech 18 6 Beech 18 1 Beech 18 4 C-45 4 C-45 5 Cessna 5 Cessna 5 C-45 syv Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Cevlon
Tanker No Information^
ReconalEsance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II i Type III t
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 5 MIG-17 5 MIG-17 5 MiG-17
Trainer 12 Jet Provost (armed) 6 Jet Provost (armed) 6 Jet Provost (arced) 6 Jet Provost Hk.51 (armed) 1 M1G-15UTI (armed) 1 M1G-1SL’TI (armed) 1 M1G-15UTI (armed) 9 DH Chipmunk 9 Chipmunk 9 Chipmunk S HS Dove 1 HS Dove 1 HS Dove 5 Cessna 150 5 Cessna 150 2 Jet Provost 2 Jet Provost
Helicopter 2 Westland 2 KA-26 2 KA-26 2 KA-26 1 Hiller 7 Jet Ranger (AB-206) 7 Jet Ranger (AB-206) 7 Jet Ranger (AB-206) 6 Bell 47-C2 gunshlp 6 Bell 47-G2 gunshlp 6 Bell 47-G2 gunshlp
Transport 3 Twin Pioneer 2 Riley 2 Riley 2 Heron 2 Heron 1 Dove 1 Dove 1 CV-440 1 CV-440 466 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Nepal
Tanker No Information No Information No Information
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer
Helicopter 1 Alouette III
Transport 3 Twin Pioneer 2 Skyvan 3M 1 DC-3
o\■P- Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Thailand
Tanker
Reconalssance 5 RT-33A 2 RT-33A 2 RT-33A 2 RT-33A 2 RT-33A
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III 14 F-86F 20 F-86F 20 F-86F 20 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I 17 T-5A/B 11 F-5A/B 11 F-5A/B 11 F-5A/B 11 F-5A/B Type II Type III Attack 16 A-37 c om 16 OV-10 16 OV-10 32 OV-10 16 OV-10
Trainer 45 T-28D (armed) 55 T-28D (armed) 55 T-28D (armed) 55 T-28D (armed) 30 T-28D (armed) 20 T-6 (armed) 40 T-6 (armed) 40 T-6 (armed) 40 T-6 (armed) 19 T-6 (armed) 11 AU-23A Pacemaker (armed)
Helicopter 40 CH-34 35 01-34 35 CH-34 35 CH-34 30 CH-34 20 H-19 23 UH-1H 23 UH-1H 23 UH-1H 22 UH-1H 17 S-51/52
Transport 20 C-47 25 C-47 25 C-47 25 C-47 25 C-47 6 C-123B 13 C-123B 13 C-123B 13 C-123B 21 C-123B 5 C-45 2 C-54
O'.■P- 30 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Cambodia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Tntercepcor
Type I Type II Type III
F igh ter -bomber
Type I Type II Type III 24 MiG-15/17 Attack 20 A-1D Skyraider COIN 13 AU-24 Stallion 6 AC-47 Gunshlp
Trainer 20 T-28 Trojan (armed) 7 T-28 (armed) 15 T-28 (armed) 40 T-28 (armed) 45 T-28 (armed) 20 Horizon 11 Horizon 10 GY-80 Horizon 13 T-41 4 Magis ter 4 Yak-18 4 Yak-18 45 0-1 light aircraft 6 T-6 3 M1G-15UTI 3 M1G-15UTI 6 T-37
Helicopter 10 Alouette II 4 Alouette II 5 Alouette II 2 Alouette II 6 Alouette II/III 3 H-34 2 H-34 2 11-34 1 Mi-4 1 Ml-4 1 Ml-4 5 UH-l 30 UH-l 30 UH-1H 10 UH-1H (Gunship)
Transport 25: 12 C-47 5 C-47 19 C-47 20 C-47 20 C-47 11-14 1 11-14 1 11-14 7 C-123K An-2 5 An-2 2 An-2 8 U-1A Otter Beaver 1 C-54 1 C-54 1 C-54 MD-315 VO Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Laos
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III COIN 10 AC' Cunshlp 10 AC-47 Cunship 10 AC-47 Cunship 10 AC-47 Gunshlp
Trainer 60 T-28 (armed) 75 T-l (armed) 65 T-28A/D (armed) 63 T-28A/D (armed) 71 T-28A/D (armed) 5 T-6 (armed) 5 T-41D
HelicoDter 15: Alouette II/III, 8 11: Alouette II/III, 6 Alouette II/III UH-19, UH-34 UH-34 18 UH-34D 23 UH-34D
Transport 20: 10 C-47 10 C-47 20 C-47 20 C-47 24 C-47 3 DH Beaver 1 Aero Cocmander 1 Aero Commander 5 Cessna 185
O Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
North Vietnam
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bociber 10 11-28 10 11-28 8 11-28 8 11-28 8 11-28
Interceptor
Type I 30 MIG-21 40 MiG-21 60 MIG-21 40 MIG-21 60 MiG-21 25 MIG-19 30 MIG-19 30 MiG-19 30 MiG-19 Type II Type III 60 MIG-17 70 MIG-17 130 MiG-15/17 100 MIG-15/17 105 MiG-15/17 40 MIG-15 10 HlG-15
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 20 50 50 50
Helicopter 30 Ml-1 & 4 20 Ml-4 12 Ml-4 12 Ml-4 12 Ml-4 12 Mi-6 2 Mi-6 5 Mi-6 5 Mi-6 5 Mi-6
Transport 8 An-2 8 An-2 20 An-2 20 An-2 20 An-2 3 An-24 3 An-24 4 An-24 4 An-24 4 An-24 40 11-14 10 11-12 12 11-14 12 11-14 12 11-14 3 Ll-2 20 Ll-2 20 Ll-2 20 Li-2 20 Ll-2 6 11-12
4>- H*
I Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
South Vietnam*
Tanker
Reconalssance some RC-47 some RC-47 some RC-47 10 RC-47 10 RC-47 7 RF-5A 7 RF-5A 30 EC-47 10 RC-119
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 20 F-5A 20 F-5A 20 F-5A 18 F-5A 72 F-5A 90 F-5A In storage 36 F-5A In storage Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III Attack 60 A-1E Skyralder 60 A-l Skyralder 60 A-l Skyralder 60 A-1H/J 60 A-1H/J 60 A-37B 6 sqd. A-37 5 sqd. A-37 168 A-37B (60 more In 220 A-37B (8 more in s storage) COINb 10 C-119 Gunshlp 16 AC-119G Gunshlp 30 AC-119G Gunshlp 40 AC-119C/K Gunship 25 AC-47 Cunship 16 AC-47 Gunshlp 16 AC-47 Gunshlp 16 AC-47 Gunshlp
Trainer 80 0-1A armed liaison 80 O-IA armed liaison 80 0-1A armed liaison 248 O-l 220 O-l 6 0-2A 250 misc. training 250 misc. 24 T-37 24 T-41
Helicopter 20 CH-34 35 CH-34 200 Bell Iroquois 230 UH-l Iroquois 465 UII-1 Iroquois 625 UH-l Iroquois 625 UH-l Iroquois 5 Alouette 10 CH-47 15 CH-47 60 CH-47 60 CH-47
Transport 45 C-47 25 C-47 20 C-47 40 C-47 10 C-47 55 C-119, Caribou, & 25 C-119 16 C-119 43 C-119 Skyvagon 465 C-123 56 C-123 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
South Vietnam
Transport 32 C-130 E 32 C-130E 53 C-7 53 C-7 10 U-6A 10 U-6A 80 U-17A/B 80 U-17A/B
®There are 15 to 20 aircraft in a squadron (sqd.)* bThe gunshlps noted in the fighter-bomber section are special counter-insurgency aircraft and not regular fighter-bomber type aircraft.
-C' Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Malaysia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 10 CA-27 Sabre 10 CA-27 Sabre 16 CA-27 Sabre 18 CA-27 16 CA-27
Trainer 20 CL-41C (armed) 20 CL-41G (armed) 20 CL-41G (armed) 20 CL-41G (armed) 20 CL-41G (armed) COIN 16 SA Bulldog 14 SA Bulldog
Helicopter 20 Alouette III 24 Alouette III 23 Alouette III 25 Alouette III 25 Alouette III 10 S-61A 10 S-61A 14 S-61A 16 S-61A 15 S-61A
Transport 10 HP Herald 8 Herald 8 Herald 10 Herald 401 8 Herald 401 12 DH Caribou 12 DH Caribou 12 DH Caribou 12 DHC-4A Caribou 16 DHC-4A Caribou 5 HS Dove 5 HS Dove 5 HS Dove 5 HS Dove 5 HS Dove 2 HS Heron 2 HS Heron 2 HS Heron 2 HS Heron 2 HS Heron 2 HS-125 2 HS-125 2 HS-125 474 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Philippines
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber
Interceptor
Type I 22 F-5A/B 20 F-3 20 F-5 16 F-5A/B 16 F-5A/B Type II Type III 25 F-86F 26 F-86F 40 F-86 24 F-86F 20 F-86F
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III
Trainer 100 3 T-33 (armed) 10 T-33 (armed) 10 T-33 (armed) 10 T-33 (armed)
Helicopter 20: 11-36 16: H-34 IS: H-34 2 H-34 2 H-34 UH-21H U1I-11I UH-1H 12 U11-1D 25 UH-1D 2 MS-62A 2 MS-62A
Transport 30 C-47 20 C-47 28 ft* OC-47 27 C-47 24 C-47 1 F-27 1 F-27 1 F-27 8 F-27 8 F-27 4 Y S - U 4 C-130 15 C-123K 475 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Indonesia
Tanker
Reconalssance
Bomber 30 11-28 10 11-28 10 11-28 10 11-28 10 11-28 15 B-25 5 B-25 5 B-25 5 B-25 Mitchell 10 B-26 4 B-26 4 B-26 Invader 2 B-26 Invader 25 Tu-16 22 Tu-16 22 Tu-16 22 Tu-16 22 Tu-16
Interceptor
Type I 15 MiC-21 15 MIG-21 15 MiG-21 15 MiG-21 15 MiG-21 35 MiG-19 Type II Type III 40 MIG-17 40 MIG-17 8 M1C-17 8 MiG-17 8 MiG-17 20 MiG-15 20 MIG-15 4 MIG-15 4 MIG-15 4 MiG-15
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 15 F-51D Mustang 10 F-51D 13 F-51D 5 F-51D 11 F-51D 16 CA-27 17 CA-27 17 T-33
Trainer L-29, T-34, T-41
Helicopter 30: Ml-4, Mi-6, 60: Ml-4 30: Ml-4 16 Mi-4 12 UH-34D Bell 47, & Ml-6 Ml-6 6 Mi-6 Alouette II Bell 204 Bell 204/H-13 2 AB-204B 5 Bell 204B Alouette II 10 Alouette II/III 7 others 4 Bell 47G
Transport 60: 11-14 60: 11-14 50: 11-14 60: 10 11-14 70: 4 11-14 C-130B C-130B C-130B 8 C-130B 8 C-130B C-47 C-47 C-47 C-47 37 C-47 DliC-2 Otter Skyvan Skyvan Skyvan Skyvan
An-12 476 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
Aus tralla
Tanker
Reconalssance 12 P-2H Neptune 12 P-2H Neptune 12 P-2H Neptune 12 F-2H Neptune 10 P-2H Neptune 10 P-3B Orion 10 P-3B Orion 10 P-3B Orion 10 P-3B Orion 9 P-3B Orion
Bomber 1 sqd. Canberra B-20 1 sqd. Canberra B-20 1 sqd. Canberra B-20 1 sqd. Canberra B-20 8 Canberra B-20
Interceptor
Type I 3 sqd. Mirage III-O 4 sqd. Mirage III-O 4 sqd Mirage III-O 4 sqd. Mirage III-O 48 Mirage III-O (52 In storage) Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I 2 sqd. F-4E 2 sqd. F-4E 6 F-111C 18 F-111C (6 in storage) Type II Type III
Trainer 75 MB-326 (armed) 64 MB-326 75 MB-326 80 MB-326 80 MB-326 41 CA-25 Kinjeel 41 CA-25 (some in storage)
Helicopter 46 UH-1H Iroquois 2 sqd. Iroquois 2 sqd. Iroquois 2 sqd. Iroquois 2 sqd. Iroquois
Transport 24 C-130 24 C-130 24 C-130 24 C-130 24 C-130 22 CV-2B Caribou 24 Caribou 24 Caribou 24 Caribou 24 Caribou 10 HS-748 10 HS-748 10 HS-748 10 HS-748 22 C-47 2 BAC-III 2 BAC-III 2 BAC-III 3 Mystere 20 3 Mystere 20 23 Dakota
-P- ~-J ^ .1 Appendix A
1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975
New Zealand
Tanker
Reconalssance 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-3B Orion 5 P-33 Orion
Bomber 11 Canberra B-12
Interceptor
Type I Type II Type III
Fighter-bomber
Type I Type II Type III 12 D1I Vampire 8 DH Vampire FB.5 10 BAC-167 10 BAC-167 10 BAC-167 Attack 10 A-4K 10 A-4K 10 A-4K 10 A-4K 10 A-4K 4 TA-4K 4 TA-4K 4 TA-4K 4 TA-4K
Trainer 52: 19 Harvard 14 Devon 4 Alrtourer 4 Sioux
Helicopter 14 U11-1D Iroquois 14 UH-1D Iroquois 13 UH-1D Iroquois 13 UH-1D/H Iroquois 13 UH-1D/H Iroquois 13 Sioux 13 Sioux 11 Sioux 11 OH-13H Sioux 12 0H-13H Sioux
Transport 5 C-130H 5 C-130 5 C-130 5 C-130H 5 C-130H 9 Bristol Mark 31 9 Bristol Mark 31 9 Bristol Freighter, 9 Bristol Mark 31 9 Bristol Mark 31 Devon, A Dakota 6 Dakota & Devon 6 Dakota 2 Devon
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