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Download The THE UNEQUAL DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OF CLASS by Alexander Vincent Hemingway B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2008 MSc, London School of Economics, 2009 MSc, London School of Economics, 2010 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) December 2020 © Alexander Vincent Hemingway, 2020 The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled: The unequal descriptive and substantive representation of class submitted by Alexander Vincent Hemingway in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Examining Committee: Alan Jacobs, Political Science, UBC Supervisor Richard Johnston, Political Science, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Cesi Cruz, Political Science and Vancouver School of Economics, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Fred Cutler, Political Science, UBC University Examiner Sylvia Fuller, Sociology, UBC University Examiner ii Abstract This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of unequal class representation among legislators in advanced democracies. In particular, the consequences of unequal class representation are examined quantitatively at the levels of both individual legislators and policy outcomes. This builds on a small number of recent studies showing that class representation does indeed matter, contrary to an earlier wave of literature and assumptions on this question. In addition, the possible causes of and potential solutions to the underrepresentation of working- class people are also explored. Paper 1 studies the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and self-reported behaviour, drawing on existing survey data from 15 countries including 73 national and subnational parliaments in Europe and Israel. The results show that legislators from business backgrounds are more likely to support income inequality and small government, as well as less likely to consult with labour groups, than those from working-class and other backgrounds. An exploratory analysis also suggests that these class-based differences between legislators may vary across different institutional contexts. Paper 2 examines the relationship between the share of working-class representatives on Finnish municipal councils and the levels of social spending in those municipalities. Using an instrumental variables approach to exploit as-if-random variation in close elections, the analysis shows that a higher share of workers on these municipal councils is associated with higher levels of social spending. This represents one of the only studies showing that the effect of class carries through to policy outcomes. iii Paper 3 looks further back in the causal chain to explore the possible barriers to working-class people taking office, reviewing and analyzing the sparse literature on the topic and employing an exploratory analysis of the data sets used in the first paper to probe for further evidence. The paper also examines possible solutions and interventions that could help increase working-class representation. While recent research has examined these questions in some depth in the US case, this paper considers how we would expect barriers and solutions to vary across social and institutional contexts. iv Lay Summary This dissertation is composed of three papers that seek to contribute to our understanding of both the consequences and causes of unequal class representation among legislators in advanced democracies. Paper 1 studies the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and behaviour, drawing on existing survey data from 15 mainly European countries. The results show that legislators from business backgrounds are more likely to support income inequality and small government, as well as less likely to consult with labour groups, than those from working-class and other backgrounds. Paper 2 uses more advanced quantitative methods to show that higher shares of working-class representatives on Finnish municipal councils are linked to higher levels of social spending. Paper 3 explores the barriers to working-class people taking office in the first place, as well as solutions and interventions that could help increase their representation, including how these barriers and solutions may vary across countries. v Preface This dissertation is my own original, independent work. The quantitative analyses make use of a range of existing and newly compiled data sets, as cited and indicated in each paper. A version of paper 1 has been accepted for publication in the peer-reviewed academic journal, Government and Opposition. The initial online citation is: Hemingway, A. (2020). Does Class Shape Legislators’ Approach to Inequality and Economic Policy? A Comparative View. Government and Opposition, 1-24. vi Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary .................................................................................................................................v Preface ........................................................................................................................................... vi Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ vii List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................x List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. xiv Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................xv Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xvi Introduction ....................................................................................................................................1 Paper 1 – Does class shape legislators’ approach to inequality and economic policy? A comparative view ...........................................................................................................................5 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................5 2 Descriptive and substantive representation of class ...........................................................8 3 Research design ....................................................................................................................12 3.1 Dependent variables ...................................................................................................... 13 3.2 Explanatory variables.................................................................................................... 15 3.3 Model specification ....................................................................................................... 17 4 Empirical analysis ................................................................................................................18 4.1 Legislators’ attitudes ..................................................................................................... 19 4.2 Legislators’ behaviour .................................................................................................. 24 5 Electoral institutions as moderators of the influence of legislators’ class ......................27 6 Alternative explanations and additional analysis .............................................................33 vii 6.1 Political culture of a country or region ......................................................................... 34 6.2 Constituents’ preferences at the district level ............................................................... 35 6.3 Alternative outcome variables ...................................................................................... 37 6.4 Subsample of experienced and influential MPs ............................................................ 38 6.5 Testing using a second data set: Comparative Candidate Survey................................. 39 6.6 Additional robustness checks ........................................................................................ 44 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................46 Paper 2 – The effect of class representation on social spending in Finnish municipalities ...50 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................50 2 Linking the descriptive representation of class to substantive policy outcomes ............53 3 Empirical strategy ................................................................................................................56 3.1 Data and variables ......................................................................................................... 56 3.2 Identification strategy and model.................................................................................. 58 4 Validity
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