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Lbjgoing to Asian Summit Parley Weather mnii t ri'% >" V"J*» mnoamnm. Urn Wrigkt to" Red Bank Area f flM fh. Cori tMMmnr. fcfch h Copyright-The Red Bank Register, Inc. 1961. lb» Ms. JDmnday'i ootlook, fair DIAL 741-0010 MONMOUTH COUNTY'S HOME NEWSPAPER FOR 88 YEARS IUU4 duly, XanMr am|Urou«k& rrMgrITMw. IKOD•• I Ckn Putin PAGE ONE VOL. 89,(NO. 65 Pud tt tod Buk «nd «t AdBuoim TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27,1966 7c PER COPY War Conference Slated in Manila LBJGoing to Asian Summit Parley WASHINGTON <AP) - President Johnson plans to attend Only yesterday, the White House said in response to queries Humphrey, when he toured Asia last February, to try to con- a summit conference in Manila next month with leaders of the that Johnson's schedule was clear of any political events. vince Johnson he should make such a trip. six Allan nations fighting Communist forces in Viet Nam. White House Press Secretary Bill D. Mqyers said Johnson had In his Honolulu address last night, Marcos said the em- In addition to the meeting in the capital of the Philippines, hundreds of invitations for appearances and speeches but none phasis of the proposed Manila summit meeting would be on the Johnson was reported planning a major tour of Asia with visits had been accepted. nonviolent and nonmllltary aspects of the Viet Nam situation. to Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. When Moyers was asked last night about the proposed American military efforts are necessary to stop the spread '. The White House was expected to announce details of the Manila meeting, he said "I know the President will be interest- of Communism, Marcos said, but, he added: "We like to look trip today. ed in this." He said he would be meeting with Johnson early beyond to the questions of security and economic issues and Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos proposed the today and would relay any information he obtained. the dignity of man." conference last night. He invited the Allied leaders to meet in The President's official party for the Asian trip already The conference invitation is "a quiet role for the Philip- Manila Oct. IB to "review the prospects for a peaceful settle- was taking shape. His older daughter, Lynda Bird, said last pines to take," Marcos said. "The Philippines Is willing to ment of the conflict" in Viet Nam.. night she may accompany her father. She talked with reporters step back and let other nations lead, but the Philippines is The governments of South Viet Nam, South Korea and after a White House dinner honoring West German Chancellor willing to provide the initiative to bring about a dialogue." Thailand had agreed to plans for the conference, Marcos said tudwig Erhard. Speaking at the United Nations last Wednesday, Marcos In a speech at the University of Hawaii's East-West center. GIVEN INVITATION called on the Soviet Union to join in an Asian conference seek- Later, Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia agreed. New At the dinner, Johnson Indicated he also has European ing an end of the war. Zealand also was invited. travel plans in mind. He said in a champagne toast to his He also proposed formation of a permanent political forum Marcos Is in Honolulu on the last stop of a state visit: to guest of honor that he will try his best to accept Erhard's in- to which Asian issues such as the Viet Nam war could be the United States. vitation to visit West Germany next spring. referred. EYE DRAMATIC MOVE Earlier this month during his Washington visit, Marcos The Manilla meeting would come exactly three weeks prior had urged Johnson to visit the Philippines. Leaders of other Announcement of the planned Manila conference was the to the congressional elections in the United States. There has Asian nations supporting the U. S. commitment in Viet Nam second major diplomatic development within a week on the been speculation in Washington political circles that the also have strongly recommended that Johnson make a trip to Viet Nam situation. In an address to the U. N. General Assem- President might make some dramatic move regarding the Asia. bly last Thursday, U. S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg pro- posed a de-escalation of the war. • Ferdinand Marco* Viet Nam situation just before the elections. Several Asian leaders urged Vice President Hubert H. President Lyndon B. Johnson Red Chinese: S. Koreans Press Would Settle Viet Nam Battle SAIGON (AP) — Infantrymen In Saigon, South Viet Nam's weapon to win over commu- of, the South Korean Tiger Di- new constituent assembly .con- nism." • . Differences vision reported killing 92 more vened today to write a new con- The 117-member assembly, TOKYO (AP) — Comniunlst|buffed Peking's proposals, which Viet Cong today to run the total stitution and restore civilian rule which was elected Sept, 11, is China's premier and foreign Included Communist occupation enemy dead to 300 in five-days to the war-torn nation, supposed to draft a new con- |of Formosa. He indicated, how- of mountain fighting near South minister were quoted today as Premier Nguyen Cao Ky told stitution in the' next six months, ever, that the Warsaw, channel Viet Nam's central coast. Insisting their country has the opening session that South paving the way for elections was still open. While the Tiger Division drove wanted to settle differences with Viet Nam Is entering "an era some time next year. Chen Yi said China did not] against the Communists in tile the .United States but that Wash- Of democracy, peace and pros- ington has not met Peking's pro- intend opening a new channel Phii Cat mountains, 4,000 more Plaster D-Zone perity" but that the nation still posals. for talks with the United States troops of the 9th Korean Elsewhere in South Viet Nam, faces "many trials and difficul- Premier Chou En-Lai and For- besides Warsaw. He said he was (White Horse) Division landed in only scattered, small ground ac- ties. eign Minister Chen Yi had sep- "not too pessimistic" about the Viet Nam. tion was reported. But the arate long talks with a group future of U.S.-Chinese relations The new arrivals, making tip The chief of .state. Gen. U.S. a(r offensive over Nor)h of Liberal Democratic members but that any improvement would the division's 29th regiment, Nugyen Van Thieu, urged the Viet; Nam continued and giait of Japan's Parliament earlier have to start wifn U.S. withdraw- raised to 36,500 the Korean assembly to "respond to the con- B52 bombers again plastered this month. Japanese newspapers al from Viet Nam. forces . opposing the Com- fidence of the people who be- Communist infiltration routes in printed what they said were vir- Chou noted that the Warsaw muniats there. lieve democracy is 'the best the demilitarized zone. tual transcripts of the statements talks "lasted 11 years and one by thB*two Chinese leaders. They month and are still continuing. gave this account: "These talks are pproceeding g onj j tald Peking entered the two problems of principles," he use the Mid.' Chinese /people waited to be- was peace- SARASOTA,Fla,— _ action in both come^frlfiTOrwfifttiiJ© AxuftflGti fa! """"•' [CoppoIiniS, the accused Coppollno married people by solving all pending | basic items'on China, A*lsn and g pp y g murderer, is upset about the pub- Coppollno another woman fallowing his first problembl s bbetwee n tthh e ttw o gov Africa~ n countries' . ! "The United States has been lliclty tie is<tgettlng. [for strangling his former neigh- wife* deatin • . ' V «nvnents Including Formosa. One of his attorneys filed The now-retired anesthetist-hyp- Chou said Washington had re- (See CHINA, Page 2) bor, rttlred Army Col. William E. motion in Circuit Court here yes- Farber, at Middletown, N.J., in notist, who- claims to have a terday asking that Florida offi- 1963, and for fatally drugging his chronic heart disease, is being cials be barred from discussing first wife, Carmela, in Sarasota held In lieu of $15,000 bail await- the case with newsmen. in 1965. ing action on a New Jersey ex- Chrysler Joins The petition by James Russ Col. Farber's widow, Marjorie, tradition plea. of Orlando would not apply to 53, who has admitted an Inti- Florida officials have agreed to SENIOR CITIZENS PROJECT — Keansburg officials yesterday signed contract for out-of-state news media except mate relationship with Coppollno, hold, off their prosecution until in their interviews with Florida triggered the probes which led (See COPPOLINp, Page 2) $>rice Rollback construction by King Construction Co., Middletown, of senior citizens apartment PETRO1T (AP) — Chrysler and Ford had been caught off home at Main and Church Sti. Seated at right is company president James R. Corp.* today followed Ford's lead balance when, after they had an- Same Offense, Same Cop — Fine: $335 and called off a btg chunk of a. nounced price increases for their Snyder, Atlantic Highlands. Baside him is Housing Authority vice chairman John J. proposed Increase in 1987 auto forthcoming new models, Gener- Ryan. Looking on, from loft,* are Councilman Harry Qraham, Mayor Leonard S. 9 prices. The twin move was al Motors — giant of the Industry aimed, at keeping them more IT- came up with smaller av Bellezza and Freeholder Eugene J. Bedell. Groundbreaking is jet for either Oct. 6 or. 'Quail Catching Succeeds competitive with. General Motors creases. .Oct. 7.. • -' •.'•••• ••;•,-.:' • ••• • '• pfyes, That put the pressure on Chry- SHREWSBURY - Late sum- by mailing In a $15 fine last Carroll F. Clark of Honolulu, 1 mer seems to be "quail catching" year, imposed fines totaling (335 stationed at Fort Monmouth and • ford, first of the auto makers sler and Ford and the price' re- time in the state police radar last night.
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