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THE CHANCBI.LOR8VILLB Camraicn CAVALRY OPIRATIONS AND '111111 SmCTS 01 THE CHANCBI.LOR8VILLB CAMrAICN A Che.i. pl'e••ced CO CIa. rAQ1I1ey of ella U... Am'! co-.d _ G.aral Staff Col1e.e ill ,.~ti.l fulfil1_t of tlae "equir_ca of tbe cle.r.e MAIDa or HlLITAIt aT AID SCIDCI by CHAlLIS I.. SMITH, JI... NAJOI., U. 8. MAlIKB CORPS B.8., Kortb Carolina State Oniv.rlity, 1961 Port L••veaworth, lAD'.' 1976 Document Title: Cavahy Operations and their Effects on the Chancellorsville Campaign, AD Number: ADA029993 Subject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS Title: Cavalry Operations and their Effects on the Chancellorsville Campaign, Descriptive Note: Final rept., Personal Authors: Smith,Charles ; Report Date: 11 JUN 1976 Pages: 139 PAGES Supplementary Note: Master's thesis. Descriptors: *VIRGINIA, *ARMY OPERATIONS, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, DEPLOYMENT, DECISION MAKING, LEADERSHIP, INFANTRY, THESES, HISTORY, MANEUVERS, MILITARY TACTICS, RECONNAISSANCE, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. Identifiers: Cavalry, Civil war(United States), Lessons learned, Chancellorsville campaign Abstract: The purpose of the study is to establish the effects of cavalry operations, both Federal and Confederate, on the Chancellorsville Campaign of the American Civil War. The primary source used for the study was the 'War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Confederate and Union Armies.' In analyzing the campaign, several factors emerge which help to explain Lee's victory and Hooker's defeat. One ofthese factors is the manner in which each commander employed his cavalry assets. Among the major conclusions of the study are as follows: -- (1) federal cavahy operations produced no beneficial effects for the Almy ofthe Potomac; (2) the failure of Federal cavalry to produce significant results at Chancellorsville was due to the methods General Hooker used to employ his cavalry assets; (3) the Federal defeat at Chancellorsville was due, in part, to lack of cavalry support on the main battlefield; (4) confederate cavalry was properly employed at Chancellorsville, and (5) the effectiveness of Confederate cavahy contributed significantly to Lee's victory. Limitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Source Code: 037260 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Narne 0 f candidat e:-_-=C.:.:h.::a~r=l.=.e.:;.s....:.;:R:..._S;:;.;m::;i=.t=.;h:.:.L.'....;J;.;r::;.;.=-.&...:Ma;.;;:;.,j...,;o;.;:r::..l,r.....::U:;..:.:.:S;.:.~Ma.;;;;.:r:.:i:=:n:.:e;......;:C;.;:o;.=r.Ap-=s __ Title of thesis__---.;.~~;;;..I/-___'Il...-..-;..;...;..-.;,._;..;.;..;_--..;~__...;.-...;;.,,;;__...;;.;.; _ Chancellorsville Campaign Research Advisor Member, Graduate Research Faculty Member, Consulting Faculty : i ~, l ~ \'\ ();&A-A 1 J-. ~ Accepted this /.). day of 1976 b~'-v~ Director, Master of Military rt and Science. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to establish the effects of cavalry operations, both Federal and Confederate, on the battles which occurred during the Chancellorsville Campaign. The primary source used for the study was the War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Confederate and Union Armies. The Chancellorsville Campaign, fought by the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, during the spring of 1863, was a major Federal offensive. Its purpose was to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia and to force it to retreat from Fredericksburg, Virginia. The campaign involved nearly 200,000 soldiers of both sides and produced over 30,000 casualties. Ultimately, the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker was defeated by General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and as a result abandoned its offensive and retreated to its previous positions north of the Rappahannock River. The Federal Army possessed a large numerical advantage and though initially on the offensive it was forced to retreat by a smaller army. In analyzing the campaign, several factors emerge which help to explain Lee's victory and Hooker's defeat. One of these factors is the way in which each commander utilized his cavalry assets. The hypothesis to be tested in the study is that Lee's emploYment of cavalry forces contributed to his victory, while Hooker's use of cavalry was a signifi­ cant factor in producing his defeat. iii iv Among the major conclusions of the study are: 1. Federal cavalry operations produced no beneficial effects for the Army of the Potomac. 2. The failure of Federal cavalry to produce significant results at Chancellorsville was due to the methods used by General Hooker to employ his cavalry resources. 3. The Federal defeat at Chancellorsville was due, in part, to the lack of adequate cavalry support on the main battlefield. 4. Confederate cavalry was properly employed at Chancellorsville. 5. The effectiveness of Confederate cavalry operations con­ tributed significantly to Lee's victory. The study is concluded with a review of the l.s.ona regarding cavalry eaployment provided by the Chancellor.ville C..paign and with soaa general thoughts OD the use of cavalry forc•• on the modern battle­ field. TABLE OF CONTENTS Pase ABSTRACT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iii LIST or MAPS AND AClCNOWLEDGEMENTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • vi INTBODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • vii Chapter I. THE PRELUDE TO BATTLE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 II. mE BATTLE, AN OVERVIEW • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • 20 III. CAVALRY OPERATIONS DURING THE alANCELLORSVILLE CA!'IPAIGN ••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 47 IV. ANALYSIS OF THB METHODS USED TO EMPLOY CAVALRY fORCES DURING THE CllANCBLLOlSVILLE CAMPAIGN • • • • • • 100 V. CONCLUSIONS • . • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • 114 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 123 v LIST or MAPS AND ACKNOWLEDGBMENTS Map Pase 1. Theater of Operations • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • 17 2. Movements on 29 April 1863 • • ·• · 24 3. MOvements on 30 April 1863 · • • · • •• • • • • · 26 4. Federal Advance to Contact, 1 May 1863 · · · · • · · • 30 S. Midnight Positions, 1 May 1863 • · · · • • • · · • 33 6. Stonewall Jackson's March, 2 May 1863 • • • · 3S 7. Confederate Attack Positions. 2 May 1863 • · • • · • · 38 8. Stonewall Jacuon'. Attack, 2 May 1863 • • • · • · • • 39 9. Action at Fredericksburl, 3 May 1863 · • • • · · 42 10. Situation at Chancellor.ville, 3 May 1863 • • • · • • • 43 11. Battle at Sal.. Church, 3 May 1863 •• • · • • • • · • 44 12. Federal Cavalry Pickets, Pebruary 1863 • • · • • · · • 62 13. Enlapent at Hartwood Church · • · · · · · · · 66 14. Engagement at Kelly'. Pord · • • · • · • • · · 73 15. Stoneman's Raid. • • • • . · • • • • · · • • • · · 96 ACKNOWLBDGEMENTS: All maps contained in this study are reproduct1ona of .aps appearinl in Edward J. Stackpole's Chancellorsville. Lee's Gr••teat Battle• Map 12 haa been annotated with infonaation froa John Bi.elow, Jr.. The Cap.iF of Ch&llcellor8vill.. Map 2. vi INTRODUCTION The genesis of this study is rooted in a long and persisteDt fascination with the American Civil War. This fascination is reinforced by a North Carolina birthplace and a strong sense of heritage and pride in the achievements of ancestors in Gray. Though interest is rooted in the past. the true origins of this study flow from three more recent sources. It is useful here to set forth each of these sources with the view toward aSliating the reader in understanding why the study was undertaken. The first stimulus lies in the future. If America is again involved in armed conflict. two factors are stressed by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College concerning the probable nature of that conflict: Americans are no longer likely to enjoy numerical nor tech­ nological superiority; nonetheless. it will be imperative to win the first battle. This stark reality is discomforting. for Americans have seldom fought under these parameters. The serious student of military arts is then drawn to the past for gUidance and assistance. History is replete with many examples of inferior forces engaging a superior enemy and winning. Napoleon and Frederick the Great provide examples of the art. Closer to home the battles of R. E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia provide classic references which are easily researchable and provide voluminous records and documents for study. vii viii With the theme of fighting and winning against a numerically and technologically superior foe in mind, the writer was drawn to the Civil War battle of Chancellorsville. A rather loose analogy is quickly seen between the situation facing General Lee in the spring of 1863 and that which may face an American commander on the contemporary battlefield. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the battle of Chancellorsville was commenced to determine first, how did Lee win; and conversely, how did Hooker lose. This review led to the aecond of the three sources. Chancellora­ ville was primarily an infantry battle of major proportions. Yet, it is a rare ca.e in which infantry fights alone. So what of cavalry, engineera, artillery, and logistics forces? Was the secret of Lee'. succe•• in his eaployment of the total force? In studying these ..pecta of the battle, the writer
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