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The London School of Economics and Political Science The London School of Economics and Political Science Acts of Contention: Local Practices and Dynamics of Negotiated Statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-2010. Outi Keränen A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 75, 499 words. 2 Abstract The thesis is concerned with local practices that seek to contest international statebuilding measures. This line of inquiry stems from the need to generate knowledge on the ways in which international statebuilding is mediated and re-negotiated in local spaces. Rather than focusing on the much-analyzed hidden/everyday forms of resistance, the objective of the analysis is to understand the parallel, disruptive practices that directly challenge the international statebuilding project. These particular forms of contention are important as they explicitly engage with the coercive power of international statebuilding. Through the case study of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the thesis aims to generate an account of local contention and dynamics between domestic and international actors that is attentive to both material and non-material domains and practices. In doing so, the analysis identifies a range of contentious acts in the institutional, discursive and symbolic domains. While administrative practices slow down and block decision-making at the institutions of governance, local actors frequently deploy discursive strategies to destabilize and de-legitimize, or in some cases to co-opt, international statebuilding. They employ symbols and symbolic practices to contest the internationally-led cultural reconstruction efforts. It is argued that these disruptive techniques and the ensuing interactions translate into conflictual and symbiotic dynamic between internal and external actors. Although the interactions between internal and external actors frequently result in conflict, a closer look at the dynamic reveals a mutual dependency whereby the contentious activities of local actors and coercive statebuilding measures of the international officials maintain one another. The thesis makes a conceptual and empirical contribution to the analysis and understanding of the hybrid nature of post-conflict statebuilding. It begins developing the notion of contention and a set of mechanisms derived from contentious politics scholarship as a way to capture and trace local practices challenging internationally-led statebuilding measures. Empirically the study adds to our knowledge of local agency in societies emerging from conflicts. 3 For Dad 4 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Mark Hoffman, George Lawson, John Gledhill and Chris Alden for feedback and advice; Marta Iñiguez de Heredia and Zeynep Kaya for exchange of ideas, support and friendship; the fellow PhDs in ‘the Q’ for the support network without which the journey would have been unmanageable; Martina Langer for outstanding administrative assistance; LSE International Relations Department and University of London Central Research Fund for fieldwork and conference funding; my family for unwavering encouragement along the way. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Evagelos Pafilis for his tireless support and advice. 5 Acronyms DPA Dayton Peace Agreement EU European Union EUFOR European Union Force EUSR European Union Special Representative HDZ BiH Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Croatian Democratic Union BiH) HDZ 1990 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union 1990) HR High Representative HVIDRA Association of Croatian Military Invalids of the Homeland War IMF International Monetary Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development OHR Office of the High Representative OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe PDP Partija Demokratskog Progresa (Party of Dem Progress) PIC Peace Implementation Council PLIP Property Implementation Plan RS Republika Srpska SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement SBiH Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action) SDP Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine (Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina) SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party) SFOR Stabilization Force SNSD Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats) SRS Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party) UN United Nations US United States 6 Table of Contents Acknowledgements List of Acronyms 1 Introduction 10 Building Peace, Nations or States? 12 From Peacebuilding to Stabilization 15 Problem-Solvers and Critics 18 Key Ideas and Concepts of the Thesis 22 Findings of the Research 32 The Bosnian case and a Note on Research Methods 36 The Structure of the Thesis 41 2 Local Agency and Statebuilding Dynamics: Analytical and Conceptual Foundations 44 Local Agency in Post-Conflict Spaces: Partners and Spoilers 45 Local-International Interactions 52 Existing Studies on Hybridity and Interactions between International and Local Agencies 55 Concepts and mechanisms of Contention 62 Coercion, Capital and Decertification: International Responses to Local Contention 70 Conclusion 72 3 Thinking the International in Post-Conflict Bosnia: External Statebuilding Methods, Agendas and Ideas 74 International Community? 75 From the Push of Dayton to the Pull of Brussels 76 7 Key International Statebuilding Actors 80 Fault Lines within the International Statebuilding Mission: the Role of International Actors 84 Fault Lines within the International Statebuilding Mission: Understanding the Conflict and Its Aftermath 92 Conclusion 98 4 The Institutional Domain 100 Local Statebuilding Agendas 101 Contention in the State Level Institutions 107 Contention in Lower Level Institutions 118 Contention through Parallel Structures 125 Conclusion 130 5 The Discursive Domain 132 Frame Contests 135 De-Legitimizing International Statebuilding 137 Discursive Appeals to International Statebuilders 148 Countering Discursive Contention: International Strategy 155 of Decertification Conclusion 158 6 The Symbolic Domain 160 The Ontology of Symbols 161 Symbols and Symbolic Practices 164 From Yugoslavism to Internationally-Driven Identity-Building 166 Depoliticizing Identities: International Statebuilding through Identity-building 169 Mobilization and Framing of Contention in the Symbolic Domain 174 8 State Symbols 176 Naming and Landscape 178 Language and National Holidays 183 Conclusion 185 7 Conclusion 187 Key Findings of the Study 188 The Dynamics of Statebuilding in Post-War Bosnia 195 Final Remarks 203 Avenues for Further Research 207 Sources 210 Appendix I 234 9 Chapter 1 Introduction ______________________________________________________________________ ‘We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not…we cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure’. ‘….we may be tempted to think back to the clarity and simplicity of the Cold War. But now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. Tony Blair 1 Blair’s famous Chicago speech articulating a doctrine of liberal interventionism may not have been based on novel ideas, but it nonetheless signaled a renewed vigor in the attempts to formulate an international society based on liberal values. At the same time, the ideas expressed in the speech provide a good reflection of the post-Cold War zeitgeist; Western liberal norms and values did not only overcome the authoritarian alternatives but also hold the promise of peace and prosperity for others willing to adopt them. Yet, in many ways the most striking aspect of the above excerpts is the intimate connection Blair constructs between the propagation of such values and international security. Such logic essentially securitizes conflict, disorder and underdevelopment. 1 Tony Blair, speech Chicago 22 April 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan- june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html (accessed 13 June 2011) 10 Following the ostensibly pacifist potential of democracy and open economy, it is then in the Western interest to democratize and free-marketize troubled parts of the globe. A considerable stumbling block in such processes has, however, been state failure and weakness as well as ‘bad governance’; weak states are seen as
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