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t . p 1 o a s o r f - r e 3 g - Middle Eastern Outlook - 2- United States. 2 The Cypriot government believes it alone attainable. 9 The United States has already become has 1,770 bcm of natural gas within its territorial waters. 3 self-sufficient in gasoline and natural gas; it may well While Saudi Arabia and Alaska are richer in gas become self-sufficient in oil by 2030 and an exporter of and oil, the Levantine gas fields’ proximity to shore oil a decade later. 10 However, much of the industrialized and to the European markets make it attractive to world remains dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Even if many investors. 4 A number of American and European the United States does not import oil or gas directly companies work in the region. Houston-based Noble from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Qatar, the fungibility Energy Inc., for example, has started production in of prices means that Persian Gulf disruptions adversely Israel’s offshore Leviathan field, and may soon exploit impact the US economy. Should Israel and Cyprus smaller fields nearby. 5 develop the oil and gas resources in the Eastern Mediter - ranean, Europe could potentially reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas. In 2010, the US Geological Survey estimated that the Eastern Mediterranean’s Levant Basin Turkish Turmoil may hold up to 3,450 billion cubic meters (bcm) Much as Iran and Saudi Arabia dominate the Persian of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil, putting Gulf, simple geography makes Turkey a paramount it on par—at least when it comes to natural gas player in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the Persian Gulf littoral states, with few exceptions, profit from gas resources—with onshore lands and state waters or oil, Turkey lacks indigenous energy resources. It has off the Gulf Coast of the United States. instead sought to cash in on its geographical position, which links the energy-rich Caspian Sea region to the energy-hungry West. 11 The gas fields have already begun to reorient strategic As new gas fields are identified in the Eastern Med- alliances. For instance, the prospect of economic cooper - iterranean, Turkey is not only loath to lose its position as ation between Israel and Cyprus has led to their diplo - an energy hub but it also seeks its own cut of the action. matic reconciliation. 6 In February 2012, Benjamin Ankara has used the Turkish Republic of Northern Netanyahu became the first Israeli prime minister to Cyprus—a proxy state formed after Turkey’s 1974 make an official visit to the island nation, just 175 miles invasion of Cyprus and recognized only by Ankara— off Israel’s shore. The two governments are now consid - to dispute sovereignty over Cypriot gas and oil fields. ering laying a Cypriot-Israeli pipeline through the Greek Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız said in March 2013 island of Crete to the European markets or building a that the Turkish government would suspend businesses shared liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Vassiliko that are involved in Cyprus—such as the Italian oil and on Cyprus’s southern shore. 7 Netanyahu and Cypriot gas company Eni—from working on projects in Turkey. 12 President Dimitris Christofias signed agreements to After Noble Energy Inc. began drilling for oil and enable Israel to use Cypriot airfields and to protect gas in the Eastern Mediterranean in September 2011, Cypriot gas fields. Turkey’s European Union Affairs Minister Egemen But security concerns loom over development plans, threatened to use military force against Cyprus. Bağış as certain exclusive economic zones (EEZs) are disputed. “This is what we have the navy for,” he declared, adding, Ankara’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of North - “We have trained our marines for this; we have equipped ern Cyprus in the northern third of the island muddies the navy for this. All options are on the table; anything Cyprus’s EEZ. Israel and Lebanon likewise dispute their can be done.” 13 The same month, the state-owned maritime boundary, and Palestinians claim a gas field Turkish Petroleum Company conducted an explora- off the Gaza Strip. Unrest in Egypt and Syria and the tion drill under Turkish armed escort close to Greek activities of Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups only Cypriot waters. 14 further threaten security. and Yıldız may not be among Turkey’s most Bağış Every US president since Richard Nixon has declared diplomatically refined officials, but it would be negligent “energy independence” a US goal. 8 For the first time in to ignore their threats. Given its embrace of Hamas generations, extraction technologies make this goal and agitation against Israel, the United States can no - 3- longer assume Turkey will help encourage stability in This is also why Russia’s state-owned energy giant the region. In March 2012, the Turkish government Gazprom has bid for Cypriot and Israeli share contracts introduced a five-year strategic plan to make the coun - in LNG marketing to ensure Moscow’s control over the try’s defense industry one of the world’s 10 largest by flow from a future Mediterranean energy production 2016, which reflects the ruling Justice and Development center. Hence, Moscow seeks to use its leverage over Party’s ambition to wean Turkey out of the US and Cyprus to increase Russian influence. 26 European orbits. 15 The Turkish administration views not only Israel and Cyprus as threats, but also Russia. 16 And Turkey is well Turkey retains the strongest navy in the region, positioned to defend itself: it retains the strongest navy with a 200-ship mix of frigates, corvettes, tactical in the region, with a 200-ship mix of frigates, corvettes, submarines, fast-attack craft, amphibious vessels, tactical submarines, fast-attack craft, amphibious vessels, and logistics ships, and has a fleet command at Gölcük and logistics ships, and has a fleet command at on the Sea of Marmara. 17 Gölcük on the Sea of Marmara. Russia’s Quest for Power Projection The Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Turkey is not the only country looking anew at an East - ern Mediterranean presence. In 1967, Moscow formed Lebanon’s desperate need for cash—the country is the 5th Operational Squadron in the Mediterranean to $55 billion in the red, equivalent to 175 percent of its counterbalance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization gross domestic product—means that Lebanese explo - (NATO) and the US Sixth Fleet. The 5th Operational ration of offshore waters is inevitable. Already, Lebanese Squadron remained in the region until 1992, when it Admiral Nazih Baroudi has laid out a10-year strategy withdrew after the Soviet Union’s fall. 18 that includes defense of offshore platforms. 27 While Kofi In May 2013, against the backdrop of the Syrian civil Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations, war, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a new certified Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the Russian taskforce comprised of 16 warships and support countries’ maritime boundary and 330 square miles of vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean. 19 Russian officials territorial waters remain in dispute. 28 announced plans to make this task force a permanent While oil or gas fields have yet to be unearthed in presence in the region and to set up headquarters, this area, seismic studies allude to the possibility of perhaps in the Syrian port of Tartous, which may have discovery. Politics, however, preclude settlement of the become a hub for Russian supply of heavy weaponry dispute between Lebanon and Israel. 29 Nabih Berri, to the Syrian government during Syria’s civil war. 20 speaker of the Lebanese parliament and a close ally to Certainly Putin seeks to return Russia to superpower Hezbollah, said in September 2012 that “we will not status and believes Russia should have the same ability compromise on any amount of water from our maritime to project power that the Soviet Union did. 21 borders and oil, not even a single cup.” 30 Moreover, a What the Kremlin does not do directly, it seeks to do December 2012 US State Department initiative to through client states. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria enjoys settle the maritime border between Lebanon and Israel Russian protection and weaponry. In May 2013, Russia failed. Hezbollah may use the disputed waters to justify reportedly equipped Assad with Yakhont shore-to-ship continued terrorism against Israel and, in turn, to “sea-skimming” cruise missiles (P-800 Oniks). 22 Russia’s provide an opportunity for Iran to further involve itself supplying of weaponry to the Eastern Mediterranean in the region. remains a destabilizing factor, especially since terrorists might seize Syrian arsenals should Assad fall. Enter Iran Energy resources provide both the bulk of Moscow’s revenues and Putin’s chief geopolitical leverage. 23 In The Iranian government increasingly seeks to expand 2012, hydrocarbon exports accounted for at least half of its naval reach. Hossein Salami, deputy commander Russia’s budget. 24 Accordingly, Russia is loath to encour - of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), age the development of a network beyond its control. 25 has declared that Iran intends to extend “our security - 4- borders to the East Mediterranean” and bragged that Iran to use its naval base at Port Sudan. 41 A Sudanese “deceptive ploys [by Israel and the United States] failed base would allow Iran to extend its reach if not into the to stop our movement.” 31 In February 2011, Iranian war - Mediterranean itself, then into the northern Red Sea. ships entered the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal Should Iranian shipping become more frequent in the for the first time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 32 Red Sea, the risk of IRGC Navy operations, mining, and Iranian activity in the Eastern Mediterranean poses commando operations will increase and also become security challenges to the United States and its allies and possible in the Eastern Mediterranean. 42 to offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Iran has made repeated attempts to smuggle weaponry into the Gaza The Rise and Fall of the Strip. On January 3, 2002, the Israeli navy captured the Muslim Brotherhood Karine-A , a ship loaded with 50 tons of Iranian weaponry bound for the Palestinian National Authority, the Hamas- The 1978 Camp David Accords ended the state of war led administration in the Gaza Strip. 33 This was the third between America’s two chief allies in the Eastern attempted Iranian weapons shipment in less than a year. 34 Mediterranean and brought a modicum of security to the region. Israel achieved border security and Egypt gained control of the Suez Canal. While diplomatic Should Iranian shipping become more relations between Cairo and Jerusalem remained cool, frequent in the Red Sea, the risk of IRGC the two countries cooperated economically. In 2005, Navy operations, mining, and commando Israel and Egypt built, under a 20-year contract, a operations will increase and also become 60-mile subsea pipeline from gas fields in the northern Sinai Peninsula to Ashkelon, Israel. 43 possible in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the February 2011 ouster of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, however, a security vacuum In recent years, Tehran has renewed its attempts to in the Sinai resulted in 15 pipeline attacks. Islamist groups smuggle weaponry through the Mediterranean. On mobilized against Israel and pressured the Egyptian Nat - November 3, 2009, Israeli naval forces seized the MV ural Gas Holding Company to cancel the 20-year con - Francop , a cargo ship reportedly carrying 320 tons of tract, even as Egyptian hard currency reserves dwindled. 44 weapons from Iran bound for the Lebanon’s Hezbollah Terrorism in the Sinai continues to challenge Israeli- branch. 35 Furthermore, in March 2011, Israel inter - Egyptian military cooperation. On August 18, 2011, 12 cepted a ship carrying weaponry that was intended to be terrorists dressed as Egyptian soldiers attacked a civilian delivered to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 36 And in August bus near Eilat close to the Sinai border, killing 8 Israelis 2012, an Iranian frigate and cruiser transited the canal and wounding 30. Israel’s retaliation killed five Egyptian and docked in the Syrian port of Latakia. 37 policemen and soldiers. 45 On September 9, protestors Iranian-supplied weaponry poses a threat to interna - attacked the Israeli embassy in Cairo and demanded that tional shipping, including commercial and military Egypt scrap the Camp David Accords. freights. During its 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah President Mohammed Morsi’s July 3, 2013, ouster crippled the Israeli warship INS Hanit , which was cruis - may exacerbate instability. In the wake of the Egyptian ing eight to nine miles offshore, with an Iranian version coup, Morsi supporters clashed with troops in both Suez of the Chinese C-802 missile. 38 Israeli army intelligence and Ismailia alongside the Suez Canal, through which suspects Hezbollah has acquired M-600s, Syrian-guided 8 percent of seaborne trade passes. 46 Not only the missiles modeled after Iran’s Fateh A-110 that have a Muslim Brotherhood but also other radical groups have range of 160 miles. 39 Hezbollah may also maintain an begun to resist the Egyptian military. Further instability amphibious sabotage and coastal infiltration unit. could threaten Suez Canal shipping more than any Recruits may receive training in an IRGC underwater event since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. combat school in Bandar Abbas and in a camp near the Assi River in the northern Bekaa Valley. 40 Defense in the Eastern Mediterranean Both the Iranian Navy and the IRGC Navy have extended their operations to the Sea of Oman, Gulf of In January 2011, Prime Minister Netanyahu described Aden, and Red Sea, and Sudan appears ready to allow the offshore gas fields in the Levant Basin as a “strategic - 5- objective that Israel’s enemies will try to undermine” and regional headquarters in Bahrain; an army base in vowed that “Israel will defend its resources.” 47 Israel’s Kuwait; and a combined air operations center and a Mary-B and Noa fields are in range of Gaza-based US Air Force Central Command forward-deployed Hamas missiles, and the Leviathan and Tamar fields are headquarters in Qatar. 54 within Hezbollah’s range. For this reason, in April 2013, Israel’s navy requested a one-time budget increase of In April 2013, Israel’s navy requested a $760 million to assemble new forces to protect the gas fields. 48 one-time budget increase of $760 million to Still, the Israeli Navy has to overcome significant assemble new forces to protect the gas fields. challenges to adequately secure its new interests. At present, the Israeli Navy can patrol and conduct basic coastal defense, but with just 3 corvettes, 10 missile boats, So should the United States replicate in the Eastern 3 operational submarines, and 42 patrol boats, the naval Mediterranean a presence similar to that which it main - fleet remains too small for wider sustained missions. 49 The tains in the Persian Gulf? Former secretary of defense navy will need to conduct round-the-clock surveillance Donald Rumsfeld was right when he argued, “We should to protect against gunboats and suicide maritime attacks take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow us to targeting infrastructure far off Israel’s shore. This will also do more with less. The old reliance on presence and require more than just new ships. In recent months, Israel mass reflects the last century’s industrial-age thinking.” 55 has also installed a Barak-8 antiair and antimissile naval The US Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, defense system to protect production rigs. 50 commands frigates, destroyers, and aircraft carriers Israel maintains air superiority to deter conventional transiting from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. 56 naval attacks. However, because Turkey has promised American forces in Europe have a threefold base struc - to use its membership in international organizations to ture, with main operating bases, forward-operating sites, hinder broader cooperation with Israel, NATO may not and cooperative security sites. The main operating base be the platform upon which to base Eastern Mediter - for naval forces is in Rota, Spain, a small port on the ranean defense. 51 Because NATO operates by consensus, Atlantic Coast just outside the Strait of Gibraltar. In Turkey has an effective veto over any NATO coopera - 2011, Souda Bay, Crete, became a forward-operating tion with Israel. There is no indication that Turkey plans site for the US Navy to support US and NATO contin - to end its attempts to isolate Israel any time soon. gency operations. 57 An effective US Eastern Mediter - Turkish behavior may mandate that the United ranean defense posture needs new cooperative security States act independently from NATO. The United sites that have favorable geographic locations and States has acted similarly in the past: in 2012, the US on-call operating facilities and that are based on pre- Navy supported joint Greek-Israeli naval exercises to agreements with the host nations that permit the US signal its disfavor with Turkey’s isolation of Israel. 52 military to utilize the sites. 58 Israel might host US forces in Haifa, the most The Case for a New US Force Posture frequent port of call for US Sixth Fleet service mem- bers. The US Department of State and Pentagon If protecting freedom of navigation in the Persian might also negotiate a naval security site in Limassol, Gulf and safeguarding American allies among the Cyprus. The British maintain a Permanent Joint Head - gulf’s littoral states is a US interest, then certainly quarter in 98-square-mile Sovereign Base Areas in security within the Eastern Mediterranean will become Akrotiri—close to Limassol—and in Dhekelia, which increasingly important over the next decade. US they use for electronic intelligence gathering and force posture in the Persian Gulf reflects the type of communications. 59 investment that may become necessary in the Eastern Greece and Britain could join a US-led “Eastern Mediterranean. The US Navy has for more than two Mediterranean Defense Partnership” designed to ensure decades kept at least one carrier strike group in the Israel’s and Cyprus’ exploration rights and seaborne Persian Gulf at all times, with another nearby in the defense against threats from nearby littoral states and Arabian or Red Seas. 53 In addition, the US military terrorism from the Middle East. It is essential that the maintains a number of other facilities: a naval base and US government convince Greece and Cyprus that the - 6-
United States, United Kingdom, and Israel can guaran - www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/turkey-to-deploy-war - tee their diplomatic and economic interests more than ships-over-gas-dispute-with-cyprus-1.386659. Russia and the Arab Middle East. 15. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter The Eastern Mediterranean in 2023 will look far dif - Four: Europe, ” The Military Balance 113, no. 1 (2013): 104. ferent than the Eastern Mediterranean in 2013. The 16. Mahir Zeynalov, “Turkey, US Seek Countering Russian United States must be ready for this outcome. Naval Dominance in Eastern Mediterranean,” Today’s Zaman, July 22, 2012, www.todayszaman.com/news-287264-turkey- us-seek-countering-russian-naval-dominance-in-east- Notes med.html. 17. Yuri M. Zhukov, “Trouble in the Eastern Mediterranean 1. Jon B. Alterman and Haim Melka, “Shifting Eastern Sea,” Foreign Affairs , March 20, 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com Mediterranean Geometry,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2012): /articles/139069/yuri-m-zhukov/trouble-in-the-eastern- 111–25. mediterranean-sea; and “Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri—Turkish 2. US Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Naval Forces,” GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean (March /military/world/europe/tu-navy.htm. 2010), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf. 18. Ibid. 3. Jen Alic, “Cypriot Bailout Linked to Gas Potential,” Oil - 19. Vladimir Isachenov, “Russian Navy to Deploy Mediter - Price.com, March 21, 2013, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural- ranean Fleet in Bid to Protect National Security,” Christian Sci - Gas/Cypriot-Bailout-Linked-to-Gas-Potential.html. ence Monitor , www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires 4. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” /2013/0606/Russian-Navy-to-deploy-Mediterranean-fleet-in- 2011–12, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. bid-to-protect-national-security. 5. Noble Energy, “Eastern Mediterranean,” www.nobleenergyinc 20. “Russia’s Mediterranean Task Force to Include Nuclear .com/operations/international/eastern-mediterranean-128.html. Subs—Navy Chief,” Ria Novosti , May 12, 2013, http://en.rian 6. Poly Pantelides, “Closer Ties with Israel High on State’s .ru/military_news/20130512/181098977.html; and Ronen Agenda,” In Cyprus , May 3, 2013, www.incyprus.eu/cyprus- Solomon, “The Weapon Route from Russia to Syria: How it news/closer-ties-with-israel-high-on-states-agenda/. Works,” Israel Defense , June 6, 2013, www.israeldefense.com 7. “Cyprus Signs LNG Deal with US-Israeli Partnership,” /?CategoryID=484&ArticleID=2177. The Daily Star, June 26, 2013, www.dailystar.com.lb/Business 21. Leon Aron, “Structure and Context in US-Russian /Middle-East/2013/Jun-26/221655-cyprus-signs-lng-deal-with- Relations at the Outset of Barack Obama’s Second Term,” AEI us-israeli-partnership.ashx#axzz2YZk5urQX. Russian Outlook (Winter 2013), www.aei.org/issue/foreign-and- 8. Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking defense-policy/regional/europe/the-putin-doctrine-facts/. of the Modern World (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 267. 22. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Sends 9. Daniel Yergin, “The Real Stimulus: Low-Cost Natural More Advanced Missiles to Aid Assad in Syria,” New York Times , Gas,” Wall Street Journal , October 23, 2012. May 16, 2013. 10. US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy 23. Yergin, The Quest , 40–42. Outlook 2013—with Projections to 2040 (April 2013), www.eia 24. Leon Aron, “The Political Economy of Russian Oil and .gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf. Gas,” AEI Russian Outlook (Spring 2013), www.aei.org/outlook 11. Karen Ayat, “Will Turkey Benefit from its Centrality?,” /foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/the-political Natural Gas Europe , March 14, 2013, www.naturalgaseurope.com -economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/. /will-turkey-benefit-from-its-centrality. 25. Peter C. Glover and Michael J. Economides, “Russia’s 12. Emre Peker and Liam Moloney, “Eni Faces Clash with New Middle East Energy Game,” The Commentator , March 26, Turkey Over Energy Work Off Cyprus,” Wall Street Journal , 2013, www.thecommentator.com/article/3048/russia_s_new March 27, 2013. _middle_east_energy_game. 13. Adam Taylor, “Turkey Threatens Naval Action Against 26. Nathan Morley, “Russia Eyeing Cyprus Bases,” Cyprus Cyprus If They Look For Oil,” Business Insider , September 6, Mail , June 30, 2013, http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/06/30 2011, www.businessinsider.com/turkey-cyprus-oil-2011-9# /russia-eyeing-cyprus-bases/. ixzz2WxndAapa. 27. “The Commanders Respond: Lebanese Navy,” Proceedings 14. Anshel Pfeffer, “Turkey to Deploy Warships over Magazine 138 (March 2012): 309, www.usni.org/magazines Gas Dispute with Cyprus,” Haaretz, September 25, 2011, /proceedings/2012-03/commanders-respond-lebanese-navy. - 7-
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