Explosive ordnance disposal technician, 11th Civil Engineer Squadron, prepares to dispose of IED as part of Operation Llama Fury, August 25, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Brittain Crolley)
The Enduring IED Problem Why We Need Doctrine
By Marc Tranchemontagne
I sometimes hear people express the hope that the IED threat will diminish as Western forces pull out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth—the IED has now entered the standard repertoire of irregular forces in urban areas across the planet, and there are no signs this threat is shrinking; on the contrary, it seems to be growing.
—David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains
Commander Marc Tranchemontagne, USN s the Services and joint force and Asia, now is a good time to con- (Ret.), is an Associate with R3 Strategic Support update their doctrine after nearly sider what we have learned about oper- Group. He served more than 21 years as a a decade and a half of counter– ating in IED-rich environments. At the Special Operations Officer and Master Explosive A Ordnance Disposal Technician. improvised explosive device (IED) start of Operation Enduring Freedom operations in the Middle East, Africa, in 2001, we lacked counter-IED doc-
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 153 trine—as well as counterinsurgency and battlefields. Even in a conventional lethality or its explosive, incendiary, or counterterrorism doctrine—and had war, our adversaries are likely to turn to psychological effect. Explosively formed to figure things out on the fly. It was unconventional warfare tactics, using a penetrators and shaped charges incorpo- a steep learning curve with a high cost mix of special forces, paramilitary units, rate special liners that focus the explo- in lives lost and equipment destroyed, militias, and surrogates to counter our sive’s energy, allowing it to penetrate and the United States spent billions to military superiority. IEDs will figure in armor. Many IEDs incorporate military counter a weapon that costs only a few their order of battle. munitions or commercial components. dollars to make. Although IEDs are more closely as- The IED is frequently referred to as In addition to counter-IED doctrine sociated with irregular warfare, they have the weapon of choice of threat networks and assorted handbooks, manuals, and been used in every modern conflict, often globally. However, this expression does lexicons, we created rapid acquisition on a large scale as a matter of policy and not bear scrutiny. The weapon of choice authorities, notably the Joint IED Defeat doctrine. Explosive booby traps were construction has two implications: first, Organization, now a combat support used extensively in World War I by both that the user has a choice of weapons agency; new countermeasures such as sides, but that story is eclipsed by the and that among those choices the IED counter-radio-controlled IED elec- overwhelming carnage caused by artil- is preferred, and second, that the user tronic warfare (CREW) systems; a new lery, machine guns, and gas in that war. can choose to use or not use IEDs, as in intelligence process (weapons technical British, Australian, and New Zealand “Afghanistan is a war of necessity but Iraq intelligence [WTI]); counter-IED task troops, for example, covered their with- is a war of choice.” The first implication forces and other ad hoc units such as drawal from Gallipoli by booby-trapping is simply untrue, and the second does the Joint CREW Composite Squadron, their trenches and abandoned stores little to further our understanding of the Task Force ODIN, weapons intelligence to obstruct pursuit by Turkish forces.2 IED problem. Like weapon of influence, teams, and deployable counter-IED labo- During the Korean War, North Korean weapon of concern, weapon of interest, war ratories; law enforcement, interagency, troops, following Chinese and Soviet of necessity, and dozens of other inelegant and international partnerships; universal doctrine of the era, saturated areas that constructions using of, weapon of choice counter-IED training and specialized they abandoned with mines and booby is an uninspired kluge whose meaning courses in homemade explosives (HME), traps.3 IEDs, mines, and booby traps is too ambiguous to help us understand post-blast investigation, and IED elec- were such problems in World War II, the IED problem. The term ought to be tronics; counter-IED working groups and Korea, and Vietnam that the Services retired, especially in policy, doctrine, and other new staff elements; new families issued numerous field manuals and hand- other thoughtful writing. Not only is the of armored vehicles; and many innova- books to prepare deploying forces to deal syntax poor and the meaning imprecise, tive tools to meet the IED threat.1 Some with them. One of the earliest counter- but it also has become a cliché and a poor initiatives have been incorporated into IED pamphlets, German Ruses, was substitute for critical thinking. The words doctrine or have become programs of re- published in 1917. Its warnings remain we use matter because they frame how cord, some have been shelved, and others valid today.4 we think about and solve operational remain ad hoc. As a joint force, it is im- problems. portant to institutionalize what we have What Are IEDs? When terrorists have a choice of learned from hard experience in IED-rich The term improvised explosive device—a weapons, the IED is not always preferred. environments. weapon that is fabricated or emplaced Conversely, when terrorists have limited IEDs affect how we fight, that is, how in an unconventional manner incor- alternatives, the IED is often merely the we plan for and execute joint operations. porating destructive, lethal, noxious, best choice available. Threat networks Operating in an IED-rich environment pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals might choose other weapons for a variety creates additional challenges for U.S. designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, of practical, social, or cultural reasons: al forces, just as operating in a chemical harass, deny mobility, or distract— Qaeda used airplanes in the September warfare environment would. Operation covers a wide range of explosive 11 attacks, al Shabaab gunmen used small Iraqi Freedom may represent the worst hazards, including roadside bombs and arms to attack the Westgate shopping case for an IED-rich environment, with explosive booby traps.5 At a minimum, mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September numerous experienced, technology-savvy, an IED is made up of an explosive 2013, and Hutu militants used mostly externally supported violent extremist charge and a means of setting it off. machetes to kill nearly 1 million Tutsis organizations (VEO) with overlapping Typically, however, IEDs have five com- during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. and competing sectarian, nationalist, ponents: a container, a main charge, an In the United States, it is much easier and international agendas in a developed initiator, a switch, and a power source. to buy guns than it is to purchase explo- theater. Future operating environments, Some include enhancements such as sives or many of the precursor chemicals however, may match its complexity and additional fragmentation or pyrophoric, needed for making them. Many groups lethality. Today’s bomb makers will take chemical, biological, and radiological would certainly choose other weapons— their experience and expertise to other materials, which increase the bomb’s for example, man-portable anti-aircraft
154 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 missiles and anti-armor rockets, chemical allows nonstate actors to operate in terms of casualties suffered, resources and biological weapons, mortars and without state sponsorship depleted, and time expended, and foster other indirect-fire weapons, or computer •• lethality, which compensates for a the sense that the conflict cannot be viruses—if they were available. Suicide lack of more powerful conventional won. IEDs can be used to harm a na- IEDs were pioneered by the secular weapons tion’s economy by restricting the flow of Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, •• variability in design, which makes goods and services over internal lines of and today are used by many radical developing countermeasures and communication and creating a climate of Islamic groups. In spite of their effective- countervailing tactics difficult insecurity that discourages foreign invest- ness, however, their appeal is far from •• adaptability to the operating envi- ment, trade, and tourism. IED attacks on universal.6 There are many reasons for ronment, which makes IEDs more Iraqi oil pipelines, for example, denied threat networks to rely on IEDs, includ- versatile and difficult to detect the government much-needed revenue ing avoiding the potential constraints •• scalability, which allows terrorists to for reconstruction during Iraqi Freedom. imposed by a state sponsor, achieving modulate their level of violence IEDs are often regarded as an asym- rough parity with better-equipped •• deniability, which appeals to actors metric means to counter U.S. military government forces, inspiring fear, and who wish to avoid attribution strength, but military power is only one attracting media attention. These factors, •• low risk to the bomber relative factor. U.S. strength in the other ele- however, do not make IEDs necessarily to other means of attack, such as ments of national power—diplomatic, the weapon of choice. In contemplating ambushes and raids informational, and economic—serves to future contingencies, we ought to con- •• operational effects on movement and isolate adversary groups from the state sider the circumstances in which using maneuver and force protection sponsorship that could provide them with IEDs would be an attractive option for •• strategic and psychological effects the sophisticated conventional weapons our adversaries. generated by the high publicity that they would need to match U.S. and host- The phrase weapon of strategic influ- IED attacks garner. nation forces. U.S. hard power and soft ence also should be scrapped. A weapon power deter other nations from sponsor- At the strategic level of war, IED at- is a weapon, and it is how a weapon is ing terrorists or limit such support to tacks support our adversary’s propaganda, used that gives it its strategic influence. methods that are deniable, such as the portraying the host nation as impotent Other weapons have just as much strate- explosively formed penetrators that Iran and undermining U.S. national will. At gic utility. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles provided to Shiite groups in Iraq.7 IEDs the operational level, our adversaries use helped hasten the Soviet withdrawal from provide terrorists a means to attack U.S. IEDs to shape how we fight—tempting Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan forces while avoiding the constraints that us to hunker down in heavily defended War from 1979–1989, and an assassin a sponsor might impose on them. outposts and venture out only in armored wielding a pistol murdered Archduke Operational. Our enemies use IEDs convoys, thereby distancing us from the Franz Ferdinand of Austria in June 1914, to shape the operating environment to people we need to engage. At the tactical triggering World War I. It is not the IED their advantage by impeding friendly level, our adversaries use IEDs to con- itself that is strategic but the terrorist act force movement and maneuver, defeat- strain our freedom of action, counter our for which it is used. Terrorism is always ing force protection measures, and superiority of arms, and attrit our forces. a political act—usually aimed at coerc- complicating logistics. IEDs constrain Strategic. Insurgent groups in Iraq ing governments or populations—and our mobility and hinder our freedom of and Afghanistan proved proficient at syn- therefore of a strategic nature. It is terror action, which isolates our troops from the chronizing IED attacks with information that is strategic; IEDs are merely another population they need to influence and operations to weaken public confidence means of terrorizing. protect. Suicide bombers give the enemy in the government, demonstrate their a means, in terms of space and time, to effectiveness, and undermine coalition re- Why IEDs? attack in our operational depth, including solve. Spectacular IED attacks gain media Like any other weapon, IEDs can be in our rear areas, such as an insider attack coverage and demonstrate a group’s used for various strategic, operational, on a command center. effectiveness, which furthers its recruit- and tactical purposes. IEDs are different Operating in an IED-rich environ- ing and attracts funding, especially when from conventional weapons, however, in ment forces commanders to allocate competing for resources against other important ways that make them appeal- limited resources to force protection VEOs. The presence of multiple VEOs in ing to a range of adversaries. These dif- and sustainment and slows the tempo of an operating environment, as witnessed ferences include the following: operations. To avoid IEDs, we rely on in Iraq and now Syria, is often accom- helicopters and cargo planes for inter- ease and low cost of fabrication using panied by higher levels of violence and •• theater lift, which increases cost and slows commercially available materials, makes the IED problem more complex. sustainment. During Operation Iraqi which makes them cost effective and IEDs help the insurgent raise the cost Freedom, multinational forces devoted of the conflict to an unacceptable level considerable resources to keeping main
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 155 supply routes open. Lesser roads were During the “seize the initiative” and doctrine, while the intelligence value of often impassible, which further con- “dominate” phases, in which the focus of IEDs is emphasized in EOD and WTI strained our mobility. The IED provides a operations is on capturing and occupying publications. Joint doctrine should give means for qualitatively and quantitatively the enemy’s territory, IEDs are primarily commanders an understanding of how inferior groups to operate over a larger an impediment to movement and ma- to reconcile the competing requirements area and strike at a time and place of their neuver that will be breached or bypassed of mobility, force protection, and IED choosing. This, in turn, reduces their like other explosive obstacles. Timing and exploitation. vulnerability as they attrit U.S. forces. tempo typically are more highly valued in It is also important in phases two IEDs serve as force multipliers that allow phase two and phase three operations in and three to preempt the IED problem insurgents to create larger effects on the order to bring about the enemy’s collapse by disposing of unexploded ordnance battlefield without massing forces. or culmination. (UXO) and captured munitions—some- Tactical. IEDs give our enemies tacti- In the “stability” and “transfer to civil thing we failed to do in Iraq. Unsecured cal advantages in ways that other weapons authority” phases, the IED becomes a Iraqi munition stockpiles were quickly do not. IEDs compensate for a lack of means for former regime elements and looted and became a major source of conventional weapons by providing other antagonists to continue the fight. enemy supply early in the insurgency. greater lethality, standoff, and surviv- In these phases of operation, the exploi- Similarly, in Vietnam, Viet Cong guer- ability than small arms. They also provide tation of IEDs provides U.S. forces a rillas used unexploded U.S. ordnance a countermobility capability against means to gain insight into the networks in booby traps and locally manufac- mounted and dismounted units, and a hostile to the occupying force, as it does tured munitions.11 Separatists from means to attack hardened targets such in counterinsurgency and counterterror- the National Organization of Cypriot as armored vehicles and fortifications. ism operations. Exploitation allows us to Fighters in Cyprus in the 1950s went as Like landmines, IEDs alter the terrain attribute IEDs to specific individuals who far as salvaging munitions from sunken to channelize movement into prepared can then be targeted. warships, which they then steamed out in ambushes. In addition, IEDs provide The competing demands of mo- order to obtain material for explosives.12 standoff that reduces the bomber’s vul- bility and intelligence are important Captured munitions and ammunition nerability by keeping him out of the range considerations when operating in an supply points must be guarded or de- of our weapons and sensors. The IED’s IED-rich environment. This language stroyed. UXO should be cleared from the indiscriminate nature and anonymity from the Marine Corps’s MAGTF C-IED battlefield as units move forward. These make it even more fearsome and effective Operations captures the distinction nicely: tasks must be planned for and have forces as a psychological weapon, heightening allocated to them. Phase zero shaping the combat stress of friendly forces. To effectively manage threats in an IED- activities should also include clearing In conventional warfare, when the rich environment, commanders must explosive remnants of war to prevent enemy is forced to withdraw, he typically provide guidance on appropriate actions munitions from past conflicts from be- mines and booby-traps any facilities or when an IED is encountered. Essentially, coming IEDs in future conflicts. stores he leaves behind. The presence the on-scene commander facing an IED of booby traps prevents soldiers from has to decide whether to mark and bypass Counterinsurgency taking shelter in captured buildings and or isolate the area for follow-on EOD [ex- Counterinsurgency provides the context bunkers, leaving them exposed to the ele- plosive ordnance disposal] neutralization for our recent experience in IED-rich ments and vulnerable to attack by aircraft and exploitation. Tactical considerations environments. The IED fight is in part and artillery.8 During the Korean War, and leadership guidelines will dictate a contest for control over the environ- the North Koreans even booby-trapped which action is taken. Finally, law of war ment and the population. We interdict timber, knowing that United Nations considerations must factor into the on-scene the bomber’s access to explosives by forces would be scavenging for firewood commander’s decision whether to destroy an clearing unexploded ordnance, destroy- to stay warm.9 IED. The principles of necessity, distinction, ing enemy ammunition supply points proportionality, and unnecessary suffering and arms caches, and regulating HME Countering IEDs Across must be weighed in making this decision.10 precursors, such as ammonium nitrate the Phases of Operation fertilizers. We restrict the bomber’s IEDs have different implications for Guidance would likely change across access to the electromagnetic spectrum each phase of operation. During the the phases of an operation, with assured with electronic warfare systems such as “shaping” and “deter” phases, they mobility taking priority in the “seize the CREW and Wolfhound, and we likewise are largely a force protection problem. initiative” and “dominate” phases and the restrict his access to resources through Routine peacetime presence and mul- intelligence value of IEDs taking priority counter-threat finance and supply chain tilateral exercises place U.S. forces in the “shape,” “deter,” “stabilize,” and interdiction. We restrict the bomber’s within reach of adversaries who might “enable civil authority” phases. Assured access to terrain with barriers, entry employ IEDs. mobility is emphasized in engineering controls, route clearance, and surveil-
156 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Explosive ordnance disposal technician, 3rd EOD, 9th Engineer Support Battalion, performs sweep with metal detector during post-blast analysis training scenario at Emerson Lake training area, September 19, 2015, Twentynine Palms, California (U.S. Marine Corps/Levi Schultz) lance, and to the population through Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in Vietnam War, Viet Cong guerrillas de- counterinsurgency activities like census December 1988 was an IED concealed veloped many ingenious anti-helicopter taking and biometric enrollment, which in a suitcase, while the time bomb that devices that were designed to be triggered enable network targeting. Many coun- sank SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay in the by the aircraft’s rotor wash.16 The grow- terinsurgency best practices are essential Philippines in February 2004 was con- ing commercial unmaned aerial vehical to countering IEDs, and many counter- cealed in a television set. market may provide new opportunities IED practices are good counterinsur- The nature of the target or the envi- for adversaries to use IEDs in the air. gency. A handwritten sign posted at a ronment, however, may significantly affect The maritime environment has seen Marine combat outpost aptly illustrated design and tactical employment. In World some high-profile IED attacks, most this relationship, stating that the “best War I, for example, French forces at notably the October 2000 suicide boat counter to IEDs = #1 the Afghan Salonika brought down a German aircraft bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, people, #2 ANSF partners and then by loading the basket of an observation Yemen, and the similar October 2002 at- metal detectors, dogs, GBOSS [ground- balloon with several hundred pounds tack on the French tanker MV Limburg. based operational surveillance system], of explosives and command-detonating Overall, however, IED attacks in the airplanes, etc. 80% of our IED finds it via a telegraph cable as the pilot tried maritime domain have been much less have been the direct result of tips from to strafe the balloon. The aircraft was common than on land. Operating at local nationals because of the respect destroyed and the pilot, who had previ- sea requires skills in navigation, coastal that you show to the people—and ously shot down several other observation piloting, ship handling, and combat because they’ve watched you ruthlessly balloons, was killed.14 During the Second swimming that are not easily acquired. It close with and destroy the enemy.”13 World War, the British Special Operations is also harder to blend into the popula- Executive developed an altimeter switch tion at sea, and weapons testing and The Environment for destroying an aircraft in flight.15 The rehearsals are more difficult. Media IEDs have been encountered in every aircraft at greatest risk, however, are he- coverage of an attack—vital to modern domain, but have seen use primarily licopters, especially medevac helicopters terrorists—is less reliable and less spec- in land-based attacks. Most IEDs used called upon to extract personnel wounded tacular far from shore.17 However, a few at sea or in the air have been little dif- in an IED ambush. Special care must groups, notably the Tamil Tigers, have ferent from those used on land. The be taken to ensure their landing zones been very effective in the maritime do- time bomb that brought down Pan Am are clear of secondary IEDs. During the main. Viet Cong sappers also conducted
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 157 Mine clearing line explosive charge launches from Company A, 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division vehicle on Route Dodge, Paktika Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Zachary Burke) some limpet mine and IED attacks changes to force protection measures.”19 capabilities. WTI finds its greatest utility against U.S. ships during the Vietnam The technical exploitation of IEDs— in irregular warfare in which a typically War, including the sinking of the USNS WTI—eventually became its own subset lightly armed, irregularly equipped enemy Card, a utility aircraft carrier.18 Sea ports of technical intelligence (TECHINT) improvises his own weapons and explo- are important logistics hubs for the and comprises a category of intelligence sives. These improvised weapons bear the movement of personnel, equipment, and processes derived from the technical unique signatures—technical, forensic, and supplies into theater and thus make and forensic collection and exploitation behavioral—of their builders, which desirable targets. The geography of rivers, of improvised explosive devices, associ- makes exploiting them useful for attribut- deltas, canals, inland waterways, archipe- ated components, improvised weapons, ing attacks to specific individuals, groups, lagic waters, and narrow and inland seas and other weapons systems.20 Tradi- and networks. make them suitable for interdiction with tional TECHINT and WTI differ in Attribution is an import distinction IEDs, including improvised sea mines, several important ways related to their between TECHINT and WTI. While to give irregular adversaries a limited sea- purpose, execution, and outcomes. TECHINT may be used to target a denial capability. While TECHINT applies to the full nation’s capacity to produce particular range of foreign war materiel, including weapons and systems, WTI is used to Weapons Technical Intelligence aircraft, armor, sensors, communications, target individual bomb makers and the One of the most important innova- and munitions, WTI applies only to terror network to which they belong. tions for countering IEDs has been improvised weapons, particularly IEDs, IED design is exceptionally variable the development of weapons technical and their components. For this reason, and minor differences in construction intelligence. In August 2003, coalition TECHINT has broader application, can tell investigators much about the forces in Iraq identified an operational especially in conventional warfare where bomber, his training, and his sources of need for an IED exploitation capability technical analysis can yield the scientific supply. Biometrics are rarely relevant to “to provide immediate in-theater analy- and technical intelligence needed to TECHINT but are essential to WTI, sis, technical intelligence and advice to ensure the survivability of U.S. systems which fuses technical and forensic infor- EOD personnel and provide advice on and to design countermeasures to enemy mation to produce biometrically enabled
158 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 intelligence. While both TECHINT and it was constructed) but tactically (how IED expertise has several implications for WTI support countermeasure develop- it was employed and for what purpose). friendly forces. ment and force protection, WTI’s five Much of the most useful WTI analysis oc- Operational experience in IED-rich outcomes—force protection, component curs in theater at expeditionary labs. environments such as Northern Ireland, material sourcing, targeting, support to Like TECHINT, WTI benefits from Iraq, and Afghanistan has shown that prosecution, and signature characteriza- an interagency effort and its reports there are often hierarchies of bomb mak- tion—are more relevant to defeating are used across government. In 2013, ers, including experienced “master bomb adversary networks and supporting host- for example, the Federal Bureau of makers” who pass on their techniques to nation rule of law.21 Investigation (FBI) arrested two Iraqi others in the organization. For example, A single conventional munition may refugees in a sting operation in Kentucky Yehya Ayash, nicknamed “the Engineer,” yield ample technical intelligence about after their fingerprints were found to served as the chief bomb maker for the munition in question. Representative match latent prints collected from an Hamas and is credited with greatly im- samples are sufficient because mass- unexploded IED in Iraq.23 Federal law proving the technical sophistication of its produced munitions are identical and enforcement personnel provided key IEDs in the early 1990s.24 Master bomb attribution is not a factor. With IEDs, forensic capabilities and added rigor to makers may have learned their skills in however, every device must be exploited the evidence management processes terrorist training camps or through le- for the unique signatures of individual of the counter-IED task forces in Iraq gitimate occupations such as quarrying, bomb makers that can be correlated and Afghanistan. The FBI’s Terrorist chemistry, or electronics and then honed through pattern analysis and mapped Explosive Device Analytical Center con- them over the course of many years. A geospatially. Two people given identical tinues to fully analyze and exploit IEDs bomb maker’s special skills are not easily components and instructions will pro- recovered overseas. replaced, so removing the bomb maker duce IEDs that are surprisingly different from the environment usually has a direct in appearance, with unique biometric The Enduring Threat measurable effect on the rate of IED markers such as latent fingerprints and As a result of the proliferation of IED incidents. Experienced bomb makers are DNA and different behavioral markers knowledge available on the Internet, in a critical adversary capability that can be such as the placement of components or extremist publications, and at terrorist targeted, and the relationship between skill in soldering. As an example, consider training camps as well as the exploita- master and apprentice is a node that can how easy it is to pick out your child’s tion of readily available off-the-shelf be exploited. artwork from all the other nearly identi- technologies, VEOs are able to develop Successful countermeasures and cal masterpieces displayed in his or her and employ IEDs with a relatively countervailing tactics force the bomb classroom at back-to-school night. The small investment. The example of makers to alter their designs and tech- implication is that the volume of collected tactical—and perhaps operational and niques, thereby increasing the chance for material that must be processed for WTI strategic—success associated with IED error. Fielding unproven and perhaps less is unlimited (theoretically 100 percent), attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan may reliable IED designs carries increased risk which makes WTI much more labor in- inspire other violent actors to employ of failure and may require new tactics for tensive, at least for field collection, triage, IEDs to counter U.S. military strength employment. Effective IED countermea- and chain of custody management. and achieve their objectives. Various sures often have the desirable secondary TECHINT is conducted in both VEOs, including al Qaeda, have stated effect of stressing the bomb-making peacetime and wartime and is generally their intent to obtain and use chemical, network and forcing lethal errors on the a more deliberate, methodical discipline. biological, radiological, and nuclear bomb maker. It strives for a complete understand- weapons. New threat actors operating IEDs have been the signature weapon ing of a weapons system that can serve in different environments will use IEDs in the wars of attrition our enemies have as the foundation of development and in novel and unpredictable ways. Not waged against us in Iraq, Afghanistan, acquisition programs for new weapons, everything that is possible is probable, and other regions, and have featured countermeasures, and equipment. IED but the limitless variability of the IED in every major conflict in the modern use, by contrast, is almost always an act of will continue to be confounding for era. They have resulted in a high cost in violence related to criminality, terrorism, planners and strategists. casualties and materiel, and have impaired or war, which drives a heightened sense Knowledge of IED construction is our ability to achieve our objectives. of urgency to exploit devices quickly more readily available than ever, yet the Recognizing that the IED has been and and derive actionable information from requisite skills remain difficult to acquire. will continue to be a threat to U.S. forces them. WTI is often more urgent because Working with sensitive homemade explo- and mission accomplishment—through- obtaining combat information is a higher sives and complex electronics is risky, and out the range of military operations priority than waiting for fully developed even experienced bomb makers are killed and across all the phases of operation, intelligence.22 Not only does WTI seek by their own devices through error or in both traditional and irregular con- to characterize the IED technically (how miscalculation. The limited availability of flict—the joint force needs to capture
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tranchemontagne 159 authoritatively and comprehensively the fundamental principles and best practices of operating in IED-rich environments Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision before they are forgotten. (to be signed within 6 months) As our force levels in Afghanistan fall JP 1-04, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation and our operational tempo decreases, JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations now is a good time to consider what we have learned about IEDs and invest the JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence intellectual energy into ensuring our doc- JP 3-13.3, Operations Security trine is relevant to future conflicts. While JP 3-14, Space Operations the IED is not the only threat we face, its effectiveness suggests it is not going away JP 3-34, Engineer Operations any time soon. JFQ JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations Notes JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 1 JCCS-1 (Joint CREW Composite Squadron-1) was a Navy-run electronic warfare JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water unit in Iraq that managed CREW systems and developed CREW-related tactics, techniques, and procedures. Task Force ODIN (observe, JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) detect, identify, and neutralize) was an Army JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support aviation battalion in Iraq that flew the MQ-1B Warrior-Alpha unmanned aerial vehicle to JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) against insurgents using JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The range JP 3-61, Public Affairs of materiel solutions that the Joint Impro- vised Explosive Device Defeat Organization JP 6-0, Joint Communications System (JIEDDO) fielded is extraordinary—aerostats, explosives detectors, electronic countermea- sures, patrol dogs, ground-penetrating radar, robots, personnel protective equipment, optics, Air-Ground Task Force] Counter-Improvised 20 JP 1-02, s.v. “weapons technical intel- mine rollers—and reflects the variability and Explosive Device Operations (Washington, DC: ligence.” unpredictability of the IED threat. Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. 21 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 2 Ian Jones, Malice Aforethought: A History Marine Corps, November 14, 2012), 4–5. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat of Booby Traps from World War One to Vietnam 11 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publica- Organization (JIEDDO), Weapons Technical (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), 33. tion (FMFRP) 12-43, Professional Knowledge Intelligence Handbook, Version 2.0 (Washing- 3 Ibid., 226. Gained from Operational Experience in Viet- ton, DC: DIA and JIEDDO, March 2014), 4. 4 General Staff (Intelligence) General nam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Boobytraps, 22 Combat information is “unevaluated data, Headquarters (GHQ), German Ruses (1st Print- (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine gathered by or provided directly to the tactical ing Co., R.E., GHQ, April 8, 1917), available Corps, July 20, 1989), 3. commander which, due to its highly perishable at
160 Joint Doctrine / The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016