UNMAS IED Lexicon

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

UNMAS IED Lexicon This lexicon is intended to provide the United Nations system with a coherent conceptual framework and operational vocabulary to address the IED threat worldwide. It encompasses the broad spectrum of IED employment scenarios, the variety of IED devices, and their critical components. ii Adoption of this lexicon will improve the collection, reporting, and exploitation of IED information at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The lexicon will assist in: - Standardizing terminology across IED reports and improving database content management; - IED related education and training; and - Development and understanding in support of IED policy and doctrine. In order to maintain the ability to effectively communicate and understand the IED using the construct and definitions posed in this lexicon, modification of definitions and diagrams is not recommended. CONTENTS iii GENERAL TERMS . 1 POWER SOURCE . 40 TACTICAL CHARACTERIZATION . 5 CONTAINER . 43 TACTICAL DESIGN . 7 ENHANCEMENTS. 45 PURPOSE OF DEVICE . 13 GLOSSARY . 49 TECHNICAL CATEGORIZATION . 17 SWITCH . 18 INITIATOR . 27 MAIN CHARGE . 31 IED Lexicon: CONSTRUCT Tactical Design IED Related Incidents Tactical Characterization iv Purpose of Device IED Leads Explosion to Find / Cache Trend and Pattern Analysis Motivation of Actor Hoax Event signature development / Device profiling Political False Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) development Criminal Turn-In Ideological Leads Drives to Components Common Intent of Actor Technical Categorization to Most Modern IEDs Maim Switch Kill Destroy Initiator Revenge Main Charge Harass Extort Power Source Distrupt Container This Lexicon -addresses the Enhancements methodology of exploiting (Components potentially IEDs, which leads to a associated with an IED) better understanding of the networks of IED builders, facilitators, and emplacers. GENERAL TERMS 1 Associated Components Explosive Train Improvised Explosive Device Components that are: 1) part of an A succession of initiating and igniting (IED) IED or improvised weapon system; elements arranged to cause a charge to A device placed or fabricated in an 2) the tools required to produce the function. improvised manner incorporating components; or 3) precursors to the destructive, lethal, noxious, manufacture of IED components to False pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals include explosives. An IED related incident that is and designed to destroy, incapacitate, incorrectly identified though reported harass or distract. It may incorporate Event Signature Development / in good faith as an IED, which is military stores, but is normally devised Device Profiling subsequently categorized as a false from non-military components. Refers The process of analyzing the tactical and alarm after positive Explosive Ordnance to a type of IED incident that involves technical identifiers of an IED incident Disposal (EOD) action. a complete functioning device. to support force protection, targeting, Find / Cache prosecution, and sourcing. Weapons Technical Intelligence An IED related incident that involves (WTI) Explosion the discovery and/or recovery of an Intelligence derived from the A nuclear, chemical or physical process IED not yet emplaced or employed, IED processes and capabilities that collect, leading to the sudden release of energy. components, and/or IED paraphernalia. exploit and analyze asymmetric threat weapons systems to enable material sourcing, support to prosecution, force protection and targeting of threat networks. GENERAL TERMS (continued) 2 Force Protection Improvised Weapons Tactics, Techniques and Preventive measures taken to mitigate Weapons constructed in an improvised Procedures Development hostile actions against United Nations manner designed to destroy, Using the lessons learned from an IED staff, Troop Contributing Countries/ incapacitate, harass or distract. attack to refine and improve the tools Police (TCC/PCC), resources, facilities, and methods used during all missions Sourcing and critical information. in which an IED may be encountered The process of determining the (e.g. convoys, tactical suppression Hoax origination point (such as a production efforts, Intelligence Surveillance and An IED related incident that involves a facility or person, a geographic location, Reconnaissance (ISR), Counter-IED device fabricated to look like an IED and or a specific country of origin) for IED (C-IED) missions, etc.). that is intended to simulate one in order components. to elicit a response. Targeting Support to Prosecution The process of selecting and prioritizing IED Related Incidents The process of associating related targets and matching the appropriate An event that involves one or more people, places, devices, or equipment to response to them, considering of the following IED-related actions / an individual for evidentiary purposes in operational requirements and activities: IED, Explosion, Find / Cache, a recognized court of law. capabilities. Turn-In, Hoax, or False. Tactical Characterization The manner in which an IED incident is planned and conducted (tactical design) and the intent (purpose of device). 3 Technical Categorization A description of an IED using a hierarchical construct to identify its key components. The components identified in this categorization are the elements from which technical and forensic information is recovered and exploited. Trend and Pattern Analysis Using prior actions and activities to identify trends in activities or behaviors. Once identified these patterns can be used to predict future attacks or incidents, and plan intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) activities and training. Turn-In An IED related incident where an IED or component is turned over to the proper authority. The ve components common to most modern IEDs. 4 Container Power Source Initiator Main Charge Switch Multiple switches are sometimes A booster is sometimes present present and connected together in the IED explosive train Heat Switches Mechanical Energy Main Initiator Booster Chemical Energy Charge Arming Firing Electrical Energy TWO aspects for understanding an IED incident: 5 1. TACTICAL CHARACTERIZATION 2. TECHNICAL CATEGORIZATION 6 TACTICAL CHARACTERIZATION he manner in which Tactical Design an IED incident Tactical Characterization is planned and T Purpose of Device conducted (tactical design) and the intent (purpose of device). TACTICAL DESIGN 7 he specific design of an Method of Identification IED attack – including but Method of Employment Tnot limited to: position of Method of Emplacement the IED, the type of IED, type of Method of Attachment road segment used, concealment technique, use of secondary Sensor Defeat devices, the time of day, etc. Role of IED Tactical design addresses the Attack Geography questions: Incident Environmental • Why here? Conditions • Why now? Incident Atmospherics • Why in this way? Terms used to describe a specific type of device or component of a device (e.g., VBIED) are often used to describe all or part of the tactical design. Optics Visual Observation Human Eye EXAMPLES (Not All Inclusive) T Dog Working Animal A Marine Mammal 8 Method of Identication C Search and Hand-Held Detectors Aerial Sensors T Detect Sensors Vehicle Mounted Maritime Sensors Local National I Human Tip C NGO Personnel A Animal Borne Vehicle Borne Method of Water Borne Air Borne L Employment Suicide Proxy Person Borne Projected D Method of Surface Subsurface E Emplacement Elevated S Method of Magnet Mechanical I Attachment Tied Adhesive Surgically Implanted Anti-X-Ray Masking Agents G Sensor Defeat N Low Metallic Content Non Metallic Content Primary Device Role of IED Secondary Device Distance to Target Crater Diameter EXAMPLES Blast Dimensions Crater Depth (Not All Inclusive) T Estimated Net Explosive Weight Debris Field Radius Soil A Blast Crater Material Sand 9 Line of Sight Concrete C Device Placement Placement Relative to Target Mid-Road T Characteristics Contact Point Oset I Firing Point O Route C Concealment Distracting Agents A Attack Geography Aiming Marker Camouage L Antenna Orientation Underbelly Subsurface Angle of Attack Top Attack Elevated D Site-Specic Side Attack Surface E Characteristics Obstacles Canal Fence S Routes Ingress Egress I Visibility Incidental Environmental Time of Day G Conditions N Weather Civilian Presence / Absence Incident Atmospherics Interaction with Civilians 10 TACTICAL DESIGN Air Borne IED (ABIED) Emplacement Incident Atmospherics An IED delivered by or concealed in an A description of where a device was A description of the demeanor of the air-based vehicle. placed to attack the intended target. civilian population at an IED event to include mood, absence or presence, Animal Borne IED Estimated Net Explosive Weight changes in previously experienced An IED delivered to a target by means of A reference to the estimated weight of interactions, etc. an animal. the main charge derived from obser- vations of the blast effects and crater Incident Environmental Attack Geography characteristics. Conditions A description of the road segment, A description of the ambient buildings, foliage, etc. Understanding Human Tip surrounding conditions to include the geography can indicate the use Information provided in an advance weather conditions such as of the landscape to channel tactical and/or confidential manner regarding temperature, precipitation, fog, dust, response, slow friendly movement, an IED, IED related materials, or associ- etc. or prevent pursuit of threat
Recommended publications
  • \\Fscl03\Authoring\Msdgen Docs\Atn\Sdsca\Eu Eng\916058 Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution
    SAFETY DATA SHEET 1. Identification Product identifier Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution Other means of identification SDS number KAS_UAN_CA_EN Synonyms UAN 28% Nitrogen, UAN 30% Nitrogen, UAN 32% Nitrogen, UN-28, UN-30, UN-32, URAN, TRI-N-28, TRI-N-30, TRI-N-32, STCC 2871315. Recommended use Fertiliser. Recommended restrictions None known. Manufacturer/Importer/Supplier/Distributor information Manufacturer/Supplier Koch Agronomic Services, LLC 4111 E 37th St N Wichita, KS 67220 US [email protected] 1.866.863.5550 Emergency For Chemical Emergency Call CHEMTREC day or night USA/Canada - 1.800.424.9300 Mexico - 1.800.681.9531 Outside USA/Canada - 1.703.527.3887 (collect calls accepted) 2. Hazard(s) identification Physical hazards Not classified. Health hazards Not classified. Environmental hazards Not classified. Label elements Hazard symbol None. Signal word None. Hazard statement The mixture does not meet the criteria for classification. Precautionary statements Prevention Observe good industrial hygiene practices. Response Wash hands after handling. Storage Store away from incompatible materials. Disposal Dispose of waste and residues in accordance with local authority requirements. Other hazards None known. Supplemental information None. 3. Composition/information on ingredients Mixtures Chemical name CAS number % Ammonium nitrate 6484-52-2 35 - 55 Urea 57-13-6 25 - 40 Water 7732-18-5 15 - 32 Free Ammonia 7664-41-7 0.02 - 0.15 Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution SDS Canada 916058 Version #: 01 Revision date: - Issue date: 31-January-2017 1 / 7 Composition comments All concentrations are in percent by weight unless ingredient is a gas. Gas concentrations are in percent by volume.
    [Show full text]
  • Transport of Dangerous Goods
    ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.16 (Vol.I) Recommendations on the TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS Model Regulations Volume I Sixteenth revised edition UNITED NATIONS New York and Geneva, 2009 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.16 (Vol.I) Copyright © United Nations, 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may, for sales purposes, be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the United Nations. UNITED NATIONS Sales No. E.09.VIII.2 ISBN 978-92-1-139136-7 (complete set of two volumes) ISSN 1014-5753 Volumes I and II not to be sold separately FOREWORD The Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods are addressed to governments and to the international organizations concerned with safety in the transport of dangerous goods. The first version, prepared by the United Nations Economic and Social Council's Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, was published in 1956 (ST/ECA/43-E/CN.2/170). In response to developments in technology and the changing needs of users, they have been regularly amended and updated at succeeding sessions of the Committee of Experts pursuant to Resolution 645 G (XXIII) of 26 April 1957 of the Economic and Social Council and subsequent resolutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Bombing! Incidents by Target 1978-1987 10-YEAR TARGET % YEARLY GRAND TOTALIRANI{ 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 I 1986 1987 TOTAL TOTAL Residential
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. ..• I .....-. • - ... --. 8 i i II' .- , ,. ... • .,1 ,. '. ~ I .,...-.., .. ·.i~1~~ D ... IIJ • I • -e '"• "';:.~ 111 .. -- - ;.,;; '(', ' .. ~. '1'. .. ~ ;~'E·~"~';""">·'\.':;··"'~:""',*"f~·'1~.";' ~'I:{~~~ 121008 U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from ·the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official pOl'ition or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this c~g~qmaterial has been granted by ". Public Domain/Bur. of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms/US Dept. of llh~ffam,};1fc¥iminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Further rep=~utslde of the NCJRS system requires permis- sion of the . wner. Cover: On January 12, 1987, an explosive device detonated between the front and rear seats of a Beechcraft aircraft while it was parked at the Osceola Municipal Allport, Osceola,'Arkansas. A TF assistance was requested by the Osceola Police Department. ATF responded to the scene and conducted a crime scene search. A joint investigation by ATF, the Arkansas State Police, and the Osceola Police Department ensued. A preliminary investigation revealed that a destructive device consisting of suspected dynamite had been placed inside the aircraft. The explosion caused damages estimated at $10,000 but no injuries. On February 12, 1987, a second explosive device.detonated inside the passenger compartment of another private aircraft at the Osceola airport. There were no deaths or ~uries, but damages were estimated at $15,000.
    [Show full text]
  • Winter Antiques & Fine Art Auction
    Winter Antiques Winter & Art Auction Fine Wednesday 27, Thursday 28 & Friday 29 November 2019 Thursday 28 & Friday 29 November 27, Wednesday Winter Antiques & Fine Art Auction Wednesday 27, Thursday 28 & Friday 29 November 2019 Chris Ewbank, FRICS, ASFAV Andrew Ewbank, BA, ASFAV John Snape, BA, ASFAV Alastair McCrea, MA Senior partner Partner Partner Partner [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Andrew Delve, MA, ASFAV Tim Duggan, ASFAV Andrea Machen, Cert GA Emily Angus, BA, FGA Partner Partner Jewellery Specialist Gemmologist [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Front cover: Lot 1137 Inside front cover: Lots 1, 2099 & 2036 Back cover: Lot 385 WINTER ANTIQUES & FINE ART AUCTION Surrey & Hampshire’s Premier Auctioneers & Valuers Winter Antiques & Fine Art Auction Jewellery & Costume Jewellery, Watches, Coins, Silver Plate, Silver, Fine Art, Ceramics & Glass, Collectables & Militaria, Books & Maps, Works of Art & Tea Caddies, Clocks, Antique Furniture and Persian Rugs SALE: Wednesday 27, Thursday 28 & Friday 29 November 2019 from 9.30am VIEWING: Saturday 23 November 10am - 2pm Monday 25 November 9am - 5pm Tuesday 26 November 9am - 7pm Days of Sale For the fully illustrated catalogue, to leave commission bids, and to register for Ewbank’s Live Internet Bidding please visit our website: www.ewbankauctions.co.uk The Burnt Common Auction Rooms London Road, Send, Surrey GU23 7LN Tel +44 (0)1483 223101 E-mail: [email protected] Buyer’s Premium at 28.8% inclusive of VAT, is payable on every lot in this sale.
    [Show full text]
  • Guide for the Selection of Commercial Explosives Detection Systems for Law Enforcement Applications
    U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice National Institute of Justice ABOUT THELaw LAW Enforcement ENFORCEMENT and Corrections AND CORRECTIONS Standards and Testing Program Guide for the Selection of Commercial Explosives Detection Systems for Law Enforcement Applications NIJ Guide 100-99 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Janet Reno Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher Associate Attorney General Laurie Robinson Assistant Attorney General Noël Brennan Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jeremy Travis Director, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij ABOUT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AND TESTING PROGRAM The Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program is sponsored by the Office of Science and Technology of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), U.S. Department of Justice. The program responds to the mandate of the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, which created NIJ and directed it to encourage research and development to improve the criminal justice system and to disseminate the results to Federal, State, and local agencies. The Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing Program is an applied research effort that determines the technological needs of justice system agencies, sets minimum performance standards for specific devices, tests commercially available equipment against those standards, and disseminates the standards and the test results to criminal justice agencies nationally and internationally. The program operates through: The Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Advisory Council (LECTAC) consisting of nationally recognized criminal justice practitioners from Federal, State, and local agencies, which assesses technological needs and sets priorities for research programs and items to be evaluated and tested.
    [Show full text]
  • Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Homeland Security Program View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Stealing theSword Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons James Bonomo Giacomo Bergamo David R.
    [Show full text]
  • Explosive Device Response Operations
    EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS Capability Definition Explosive Device Response Operations is the capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and RESPOND MISSION: EXPLOSIVE DE analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate Render Safe Procedures (RSP). Conduct searches for additional devices and coordinate overall efforts to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threat to the incident site. Outcome Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards. Measures are implemented in the following priority order: ensure public safety; safeguard the officers on the scene (including the bomb technician); collect and preserve evidence; protect and preserve public and private property; and restore public services. Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs): Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response ESF #13: Public Safety and Security VICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Critical Tasks Res.B2c 1.1 Develop, distribute, and maintain National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians Develop effective procedures
    [Show full text]
  • Improvised Firearms in the Collection of the Forensic Laboratory
    FORENSIC PRACTICE Sławomir Kudełka Forensic Laboratory, Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków [email protected] Tomasz Konopka Department of Forensic Medicine, Collegium Medicum, Jagiellonian University [email protected] Improvised firearms in the collection of the Forensic Laboratory, Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków and the Department of Forensic Medicine, Collegium Medicum, Jagiellonian University — towards a systematics Summary Despite a very large variety of improvised firearms, repeatability of certain actions of the manufacturers can be observed, reflecting the purpose to which such weapons are produced (e.g. poaching), and the availability of appropriate technologies. The aim of this article is to make an attempt to systematize improvised firearms on the basis of the expert opinions elaborated at the Weapon Research and Ballistics Department of the Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków (LK KWP) as well as studies carried out on weapons belonging to the collection of the Department of Forensic Medicine (ZMS) in Kraków. Research material included both primitive devices made by using simple methods and without concern for accuracy or aesthetics, as well as fine-tuned pieces with individual design solutions or copies of factory-made weapons. Improvised firearms can generally be divided into conversions and own designs. The conversion most frequently applies to alarm, gas or pneumatic weapons. It consists in removing factory safety mechanisms or, in the case of pneumatic weapons, in introducing technical modifications, which enable to blast off the cartridge and discharge the projectile by means of gas pressure arising during combustion of the propellant. Own designs may contain certain factory elements, most frequently the barrel, however, in most cases, they are manufactured from scratch.
    [Show full text]
  • Explosive Weapon Effectsweapon Overview Effects
    CHARACTERISATION OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS EXPLOSIVEEXPLOSIVE WEAPON EFFECTSWEAPON OVERVIEW EFFECTS FINAL REPORT ABOUT THE GICHD AND THE PROJECT The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with states, the UN and other human security actors. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 55 staff from over 15 countries with unique expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 20 governments and organisations. Motivated by its strategic goal to improve human security and equipped with subject expertise in explosive hazards, the GICHD launched a research project to characterise explosive weapons. The GICHD perceives the debate on explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) as an important humanitarian issue. The aim of this research into explosive weapons characteristics and their immediate, destructive effects on humans and structures, is to help inform the ongoing discussions on EWIPA, intended to reduce harm to civilians. The intention of the research is not to discuss the moral, political or legal implications of using explosive weapon systems in populated areas, but to examine their characteristics, effects and use from a technical perspective. The research project started in January 2015 and was guided and advised by a group of 18 international experts dealing with weapons-related research and practitioners who address the implications of explosive weapons in the humanitarian, policy, advocacy and legal fields. This report and its annexes integrate the research efforts of the characterisation of explosive weapons (CEW) project in 2015-2016 and make reference to key information sources in this domain.
    [Show full text]
  • JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 04 October 2013
    Joint Publication 3-11 OF NT TH E E W M I S E' L L H D T E F T E N A R D R A M P Y E D • • U A N C I I T R E E D M S A T F AT E S O Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments 29 October 2018 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
    [Show full text]
  • Bombs and Terrorism for Patrol Course Outline
    Bombs and Terrorism for Patrol San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Expanded Course Outline I. Orientation and Overview A. Paperwork 1. Distribute POST roster 2. Distribute networking or regional attendance roster B. Housekeeping 1. Facility review and identify restrooms and emergency exits 2. Review breaks including breakroom and/or vending machines C. Introductions 1. Instructor and staff introductions 2. Student introductions D. Overview 1. Overview of the key learning outcomes of the class 2. Review of student and instructor expectations of the course E. Learning Activity and Student Assessment #1 - Student Experience 1. Students will individually complete an assessment questionnaire to determine their professional level experience with bombs and terrorism. 2. Upon completion of the questionnaire, students will review questions and answers using the questionnaire as a process of self-assessment for their prior knowledge related to bombs and terrorism. 3. Students will individually introduce themselves and indicate their level of experience in law enforcement and any related experience in dealing with bombs, explosives and terrorism related topics. 4. Students will also describe their level of responsibility as well as any previous training in bombs and terrorism courses they have completed. F. Key Takeaways 1. Officer safety Bombs and Terrorism for Patrol San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Expanded Course Outline 2. Better situational awareness 3. Current threats in the world II. Bombing Basics A. History 1. Brief history of criminal bombings 2. Recent criminal bombing incidents B. An overview of improvised explosive devices (IED) used by terrorists 1. Definitions 2. Essential components of an explosive device 1. Initiator 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Identification, Chemistry, and Behavior of Seal Bombs Used to Control
    f MARCH 1990 h IDENTIFICATION, CHEMISTRY, AND BEHAVIOR OF SEAL BOMBS USED TO CONTROL DOLPHINS IN THE YELLOWFIN TUNA PURSE-SEINE FISHERY IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC: POTENTIAL HAZARDS By Albert C. Myrick Jr. Martin Fink Cheryl B. Glick ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT LJ-90-08 f This administrative Report is issued as an informal document to ensure prompt dissemination of preliminary results, interim reports and special studies. We recommend that it not be abstracted or cited. 5H // Sic 2 ft,o. 90-0? C. ^ IDENTIFICATION, CHEMISTRY, AND BEHAVIOR OF SEAL BOMBS USED TO CONTROL DOLPHINS IN THE YELLOWFIN TUNA PURSE-SEINE FISHERY IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC: POTENTIAL HAZARDS By 12 1 Albert C. Myrick Jr., Martin Fink, and Cheryl B. Glick 1. Southwest Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, P.O. Box 271, La Jolla, CA 92038 2. San Diego County Sheriff's Dept., Crime Laboratory, 3520 Kurtz Street, San Diego, CA 92110 LIBRARY March 1990 FEB 28 2008 National oceanic & Atmospheric Administration U.S. Dept, of Commerce ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT LJ-90-08 CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT...................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................. 1 METHODS AND MATERIALS........................................ 3 RESULTS Description.............................................. 4 Chemical Analysis and Apparent TNT Equivalents........ 5 Charge-Weights and Relative Strengths.................. 7 Behavior of Units Detonated............................. 7 Relative Strengths Based on Combined Characteristics..
    [Show full text]