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Improvised Explosive Devices: Assessing the Global Risk for Use in Terrorism

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Improvised Explosive Devices: Assessing the Global Risk for Use in Terrorism Improvised Explosive Devices: Assessing the Global Risk For Use In Terrorism by Michael A. Santaspirt A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Global Affairs Written under the direction of Dr. Leslie W. Kennedy and approved by ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ Newark, New Jersey May 2020 © 2020 MICHAEL A. SANTASPIRT ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT Improvised Explosive Devices: Assessing the Global Risk For Use in Terrorism By MICHAEL A. SANTASPIRT Dissertation Director: Leslie W. Kennedy Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the risk of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) employment at the national level, the subnational level, and the street level, and to investigate innovative applications of Risk Terrain Modeling for IED risk analyses across these different levels of study. Methods: This study utilizes three separate applications of the Risk Terrain Modeling technique to determine the risk of IED emplacement at three separate analysis extents. Each level of analysis utilizes Geographic Information Systems to build composite risk maps from different types of risk factors that are associated with IED emplacement. Multivariate regression analysis is used to determine the association and significance of the risk factors as they relate to the outcome events. Results: Composited global level risk factors associated with permissive environments are positively associated with increased IED emplacements. Countries at highest risk of IED emplacements, as determined by the global level model, can be composited with areas of operation for terrorist groups and densely populated areas to identify microplaces for further study. Those microplaces can be assessed for risk using RTMDx. Conclusions: The present study established a link between country level risk factors related to permissive environments enabled by state fragility and IED emplacements at the street level. As such, there are policy implications for strategic action to reduce state fragility and the establishment of permissive environments to curtail explosive violence. Furthermore, the identification of risky areas for IED emplacement can drive risk reduction techniques at all three levels of analysis. Keywords: Improvised Explosive Devices, Crime, Terrorism, Risk, Risk Terrain Modeling ii ACKNOWLDEGMENTS I am grateful to all that assisted in the creation of this work for the support that they provided along the way. I am especially thankful for my committee for the genuine interest that they showed in this work and for the many, many insightful suggestions that they made. In particular, I am thankful for the advice and guidance of Les Kennedy, my advisor, for his patience, understanding, and critical eye. I am thankful for the assistance of Joel Caplan, Norm Samuels, and Grant Drawve, my committee members, who were always available and willing to read another draft, or to look at another map, or to provide another article that I may not have seen yet. The work that they have done in support of the techniques used in this study is exciting and novel, and I’m very much looking forward to its continued evolution and adoption. I would also like to thank Alex Giménez-Santana, who provided excellent support with RTMDx and its many features. I am further thankful for the guidance of Tim Carey, my mentor, for insisting that I take on this challenge, and for the support of my friends and colleagues at the US Army who provided emotional and material backing. I am finally thankful for my family. For my parents who conditioned me to continue to work through adversity, for my brothers who always challenged me to be better, and especially for my wife, Christina, and for my children, Alyssa and Chase, for enduring this with me and never wavering in their support – thank you all. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii ACKNOWLDEGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iv LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. v LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 8 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 60 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS .................................................................................................. 85 CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... 127 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 140 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for IED Events in 2015 .................................................... 87 Table 2: Correlation of Risk Factors to Outcome Events ............................................... 104 Table 3: Ordinary Least Square Regression for Risk Score and IED Events, 2015 ....... 105 Table 4: F-Test Two Sample for Variances for Risk Score and IED Events, 2015 ....... 105 Table 5: t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances for Risk Score and IED Events, 2015 .................................................................................................................... 106 Table 6: JMP Prediction Profiler for Risk Score, 2015 .................................................. 107 Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Regression for 2015 Risk Score and 2016 IED Events to Determine Predictive Validity ........................................................................................ 107 Table 8: RTMDx Output for Relative Risk Factor Value in Kabul, 2015 ...................... 119 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: IEDs made from military grade munitions (source: Wikipedia) ....................... 15 Figure 2: IEDs utilizing homemade explosives in plastic containers (source: SPC Ian Schell, US Army) .............................................................................................................. 17 Figure 3: Bomb Threat Stand-off Card (source: National Counterterrorism Center) ....... 77 Figure 4: PAI Formula ...................................................................................................... 81 Figure 5: IED Events, 2015 .............................................................................................. 86 Figure 6: Global Base Map ............................................................................................... 88 Figure 7: Global Base Map without Internal Boundaries ................................................. 90 Figure 8: Kabul Base Map ................................................................................................ 91 Figure 9: Casablanca Base Map ........................................................................................ 92 Figure 10: Countries with Terrorist Organizations Operating Within Their Borders, 2015 ........................................................................................................................................... 94 Figure 11: Countries with Interstate Violence, 2015 ........................................................ 96 Figure 12: Countries with Non-State Violence, 2015 ....................................................... 97 Figure 13: Countries with One-Sided Violence, 2015 ...................................................... 98 Figure 14: Countries Scoring More Than 90 Points in the Fragile States Index, 2015 .. 100 Figure 15: The Global Risk of IEDs, 2015 ..................................................................... 101 Figure 16: Highest Risk Countries, 2015 ........................................................................ 102 Figure 17: Highest Risk Countries (Detail), 2015 .......................................................... 103 Figure 18: Population Density, 2015 .............................................................................. 109 Figure 19: Example of Terrorist Operational Area Map for Al-Qa’ida (source: National Counterterrorism Center) ................................................................................................ 110 Figure 20: Example of Terrorist Operational Area Map for Lord’s Resistance Army (source: National Counterterrorism Center) ................................................................... 111 Figure 21: Terrorist Group Operational Areas, 2015...................................................... 112 Figure 22: Terrorist Group Operational Areas (Detail), 2015 ........................................ 113 Figure 23: Composite Risk Map of Terrorist Operational Areas and Densely Populated Areas in Highest Risk Countries, 2015 ........................................................................... 114 Figure 24: Composite Risk Map of Terrorist Operational Areas and Densely Populated Areas in Highest Risk Countries (Detail), 2015 ............................................................
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